UN Recon Mission to Rwanda

8/6/2019 UN Recon Mission to Rwanda

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Report ofthe UN Q OReconnaissance ~ssonRwan(ta

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Part ne: oliticalspectsIntroduction L0022629A. Terms f eferencef he ission L0022629B. Mandatef he ission L0022629C. Activitiesnd fficialontacts L0022630D, Generalummaryf iews ollected L0022631E. Generalbservations L0022638F. Meetingith he residentf he L0022640Unitedepublicf anzaniaMeetingwithhe ecreta~eneral. L0022641...........................fthe-OrganizationofAf~-ean-.Unity.....................................................AnnexesAnnex of Part ne: Programmef missingactivitiesf he issionpL0022630)Part wo: eacekeepingspectsIntroductionLikely andateFactorsffectinghe lanTopographyGovemmentorcesGovemmentolice orcesRPF orcesForeignroopsn Rwanda

UNOMUR StatusIntemalecurityituationSecufityf igaliNeutral-militarybserverroup,MOG OAU)The urrent MZHumanitarianituationRoad nd ridgeepairMines nd ooby rapsTrainingf he ew wandeseDefenceorces nd endarmerieand ntegratedrainingentersClarficationf he rotocolgreementAssumptionsConceptf perationsOutlinelanDeploymentequencend ime stimateOrganizationStructuref he fficeRSGCommandnd ontrolf he ilitaryivisionCommandnd ontrolf he oliceivision

L0022650L0022650L0022650L0022654L0022656L0022657L0022660L0022661L0022662L0022663L0022668L0022669L0022669L0022673L0022675L0022676L0022677

L0022677L0022678L0022679L0022680L0022685L0022692L0022693L0022693L0022694


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MilitarybservertructureConceptnd mploymentf formedontingentsSecurityf igaliDemarcationf he ssemblyones,ssemblyointsndcantonmentointsnd ntegratedrainingentersMine learanceConclusionRecommendationsAnnexesAnnex Compositionf he eam......... .Ann_ex_2ermsf eferenceAnnex List f fficiaisontacted

L0022695L0022697L0022699L0022701L0022705L0022707L0022710L0022712 ...............................................................m_t_S_Sl_~g............................L0022713L0022714missingL0022715L0022716L0022720L0022721L0022724L0022725L0022727L0022728L0022733L0022747L0022748L0022749L0022750

Annex List f lacesisitedAnnex Map of RwandaAnnex 0rganizationf GovemmentorcesAnnex 0rganizationf PoliceorcesAnnex a ocationf GendarmerieAnnex b ogisticsituationAnnex RPF orcesAnnex 0rganizationf the MOGAnnex a MNOG mandateAnnex b MNOG equipmentAnnex 0 larificationf he rotocolf greementAnnex 1 Organizationf he RSGAnnex 2 rganizationf he ilitaryivisionAnnex 2(a) rganizationf he orceAnnex 2(b) rganizationf he ilitarybserverroupAnnex 2(c) rganizationf he ilitarybserverroup L0022751Annex 2(d) rganizationf he ilitarybserverector L0022752Annex 2(e) rganizationf ption - Phase L0022753Annex 2(f) ilitarytaff ummaryption - Phase L0022754Annex 2(g) rganizationf ption -Phases and L0022755Annex 2(h) ilitarytaff ummaryption - Phases and L0022756Annex 2(i) rganizationf ption - Phase L0022757Annex 2(j) ilitarytaff ummaryption - Phase L0022758Annex 2(k) rganizationf ption - Phase L0022759Annex 2(1) ilitarytaff ummaryption - Phase L0022760Annex 2(m) rganizationf ption - Phase and L0022761Annex 2(n) ilitarytff ummaryption - Phase and L0022762Annex 2(o) rganizationf ption - Phase L0022763Annex 2(p) ilitarytaff ummaryption - Phase L0022764Annex 3 rganizationf he oliceivision L0022765Annex 4 Known ine reas L0022765AAnnex 5 Assemblynd antonmentoints Centresf L0022765BInstructionuggestedy econnaissanceissionAnnex 5 (a) PF uggestedssemblynd antonmentoints L0022765C


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Annex 5 (b) Proposed ssembly nd Cantonmentor RPF L0022765DAnnex 5 (c) RGF suggested ssembly nd Cantonmentoints L0022765EAnnex 5 (d) entresf InstructionAnnex 6 Kigaliecurityonly itle age.t)Annex 7 Arusha eace greementAnnex 8 Organizationf AdministrativeivisionAnnex 8(a) taffingableAnnex 8(b) inance ectionAnnex 8(c) ersonnelection

L0022765FL0022766L0022767L0022767AL0022767BL0022767CL0022767D

Annex 8(d) rocurementection L0022767E...........................nnex8()_ommunicationection.............................................................9022767F_[.............................Annex 8(f) eneral ervice ection L0022767GAnnex 8(g) uilding anagementection L0022767HAmaex 8(h) ransportection L0022767I

Annex 8(i) DP Section missingPart hree: ogisticspectsContents-ogisticsoncept f Operations L0022767JL0022767K

: .... i nart Four t=ommumcat AspectsTelecommunicationsackgroundUtilitiesProposed ommunicationsetwork or RwandaSimplex requenciesMHz)Duplex requenciesMHz)Local echnicalupportStaffingAnnexesAnnex Rwanda elecommunicationsetworkAnnex Map Electricaletwork

L0022769L0022771L0022772L0022774L0022774L0022776L0022776missingmissing

Part ive: umanitarianspectsI. IntroductionII. isplacedersonsIII. eace greementIV. ajor ssuesV. Conclusionsnd recommendationsAnnexesAnnex 1 List f fficialsnd epresentativeset yDHA mission memberAnnex Humanitarianssues f concem o UNHCRwithin he rameworkf the econnaissanceMission o Rwanda

L0022779L0022779L0022781L0022782L0022786L0022788L0022789


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PART 1POLITICAL ASPECTS


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REPORT ON THE RECONNAISS E SIONPOLITICAL ASPECTSINTRODUCTION

A. Ter ms of r eference of the mlssiol. It will be recalled that the Security Council, in paragraphIl of resolution 846 (1993), requested the Secretary Generalreport on the. contribution which the United Natons could makein order to assist the OAU in the implementation of the PeaceAgreement, s igned by the Government of Rwanda and the RwandesePatriotic Front (RPF) in Arusha on 4 August 1993, and to beginent--ingency-(,poEann-i-ng,..........hould:......-~....oun-I........-~~:.~-h.la:.......u~h.............2. On 15 August 1993, the Secretary-General decided to send areconnaissance mission to Rwanda in order to assess the situationon the ground and gather the relevant information so as to enablethe Council to reach a decision. The reconnaissance mission,which included officials from the departments of politicalaffairs, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance,administration, as well as from the field office division and theUNHCR, waS led by Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire (Canada).B. Mandate of the misslo~

} 3~ The mission arrived in Kigali on 19 August 1993 and stayedin Rwanda until 31 August 1993. During that period, the missiondiscussed with the parties the tasks envisaged for the NeutralInternational Force (NIF) by the Arusha Peace Agreement inattempt to determine thosewhlch could be realistically In particular, it carried out an assessment of therequirements which the NIF woUld need to~execute its~monitoring. functions, n Rwanda,. earinqin indthat t mightinclude cease-flre c ~ mpl~ance xn th~j c , . e demilltarized zones, antonment and assembl are __ . .secu . Y a for weapons andperson, i~l, demlnlnr~ty of humanltarian a~d efforts, return of the refugeesofdisarmingthe and demobilization of armed personnel and restructuring~..... Rwandese Defence Forces and gendarmerie.4. The mission tri?d to develop a reasonably detaled inventoryofrequlrements to include a prOposed force structure, commandand control" assets, vhicles,

protection,o " -g~st~cs and medical and overall infrastructure needs. In thisreport, it proposes deployment opti .... tables, ons wlth correspondlng rime-5, From the humanitarian aid point ofVlew, the missiondentfled the arrangements for which couldenhance the various aspects of the on-going humanitariana " ctvlties. Lastly, the mission dlscusSed withthe Governmentthequestion of the settlement sites of the refugeeswho will bereturning to Rwanda and all other matters concerning therepatriation of the refugees, the return of the dlsplaced pers0nsto their homes and the rehabilitatlon of their demobilizedpersonnel.


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- 2 -C. ACc.ivitiesnd ...... official on,t,,a,ctS6. The programme Of activities of the mission is attachedin Annex I.7. The reconnaissance mission held consultationswith: ~_~

a) Seni0r officials of the Government ~\~Upon its arrival, it was rethe Minister of )..........................................

On 23 August, the mission was received bythe MiD~~ster of ~Intri__r, Mr. Faustin Munyazesa,and the Minister of. Plan.ning, Mr. AugustinNgirabatware.On 27 August, General Dallaire was received bythe Prime Minister designa~ed, Mr. FaustinTwagiramungu.On 30 August, General Dallaire was received bytheMrs. AgatheFinally, on 31 August, . General Dallaire wasgranted an audience with President. Habyarimana.

b) Representatives of the FPRon 21 August, the mission was escorted by the NMOG to Mulindi where it in aworking session with the Chariman of the FPR,the Vice Chairman ofthe FPR and the head of theePR del gation in , Mr. PasteurBizimun~.

ohe missl n organized, on~ 22 and 27 August, joint- s " ...... e worKlng ses 1.ons InK1nihlra, wlth repr sentativesof both armes in order to clarfy the PeaceAgreement article after article. On thoseoccasions, the mission had an opportunity to havefurther discussions with the representatives ofthe FPR.Lastly, the mission held the final meeting withrepresentatives of the FPR, in Mulindi, on3 0 August.


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- 3 -c) Representatives of the diplomatic corps

- On 22 August, General Dallaire had apreliminary meeting with the Ambassad.or ofFance, Mr. Jean-Michel Marlaud who wasaccompanied by Colonel of gendarmerie Damy

- On 26 AuguSt, General Dallaire met with theMissJoyce Leader, and fCanada, Mr. Denis Provost.

Tanzania, Mrs. Justine Dora Mbez- On 28 August, General Dallaire met with the

_~_~_L ,, ,, ,,,, U Ambassador of Bur~~;Ln~, Mr. Marc Nteturuye, andwith the Chef. du bureau of Be!gium,Mr. Philippe Colyn., On 29 August, General Dallaire met with theAmbass~dor of China, Shejiao and had alast meeting with the

,On 30 August, . General Dallaire met with theCharq d affaires of Russia~ Mr. VlamdirPriakhine.

d) In addition, the mission held several workingsessions with General Opareye, the Commandant of theNMOG, and with the re .ve of the OAU,Mr. Joe Felli. General Dallaire also chaired,respectively on 20 and 28sessions with the agencies of the UN system (WorldBa~, UNICEF, WHO, FAO and PAM) and with non- Seovernmental organlzat&one) On his way to Dallaire had anopportunity to visit the displaced persons camp of Nyacyonga.f) In addition, General Dallaire had the opportunity, nto meet the Press (Radio and Televisio )several occasions.

D. General S.mmarw of views collected" ta) VleWS of .the Governmen .....

~ ~ 8, The expressed..... Internatlon 1"norce (NIF) deployed i Rwanda before 10 September 1993, the date~ nset by the Arusha Peace Agreement for the beginnl g of thetransitional period. While it size and


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- 4 -multidisciplinary character of the reconnaissance mission, theGovernment underlined the urgent need to respect that deadlinein order to implement the Peace Accord. For the Minister, theUnited Nations, which had been asked by the Arusha Peace Accordto, ~nter alia, guarantee the security throughout the country,constituted the "ignition key" of the Accord.9. General Dallaire stressed that the Security Council had notyet taken the decision to deploy an international neutral forcein Rwanda. He underlined that the mandate of his missionessentially derived from paragraph ii of Council resolution 846e(1993). On several occaslons, he clarified the decision-makr s-s.-of......~Y-:i%~--d~to:

ofconsultations and deliberations before a final decision could bemade.I0. The Government understood the time and financial constraintsunder which the United Nations tbait was almost impossible for the NIF to be deployed before i0September9193.romthatointn, theiscussions enterednthe UN might adopt in order to avoid givingthe population the impression, on 10 September, that theinternational communitywas abandoning Rwanda toits fate.il. For the.} importance of a national reconc who stressed theand called for adequateresources to ensure the success of thedemobilizatlon " of thearmed forces, arrangements could be made directly between theGovernment and the FPR so that theGovernment oftransition beenabled to start its work on i0 Septmber. He evoked theb ...... as ossl lllty of deploying in Kigall, an Interim measure pendingeh arrval of the NIF, a security force composed of 200 soldiersfrom the FPR and 200 soldiers from the Government. The PrimeMinister designate insisted that the NMOG should be enlarged.He was aware that Tanzania bas offered to put at the NMOGsdisposal 500. men but wondered how it would finance thatcontribution.12. to whomGeneral paid a courtesy v expressedher gratitude for the work done by~ the mission and for the

e,,I o . opr llmlnary reports which had New YorkThis would certainly accelerate the decision-making process aters. While the Government was fully aware of theof 10 September was not very realistic, it hoped thatby that time the Rwandese could be info~ed that at least thee o 0 curity Councl had received the Secretary-Generals report andwas about to adopt a resolution. Meanwhile, the Government was Caintaining ts 1ose contacts with the RPF in order to show that 0 ~ was not trylng In any way to delay the peace process.~~ Finally, the Prime Minister noted, that an enlarged NMOG couldhave been deployed pending the decision of the Security Council,e Vbut unfortunately only 55 officers had art1 ed. She expressedthe strong hope that General Dalla-lre woud clarlfy that issuein Addis Ababa. Likewise, she hoped that the Generals visit t0


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- 5 -Dar-es-Salaam would be fruitful. She agreed that the role of theFacilitator was not finished. In conclusion the Prime Ministersaid that she felt that Rwanda was on~ the right path and sheexpressed her optimism.13. In the course of his audience with President Habyarimanahe stated his pleasure with the conclusion and recommendationthat the mission was going to propose to the Secretary-General.The President reiterated the will of hisnationfor a lastingpeace and tranquillity. He also stated that the 1990 was an"accident de parcours" and that chapter is now closed and theaccord not perfect but_ it is a t0 rebUiid~ .........o r- tryT-......ut-~tu-- .... ~ms itessential to have the UN presence for mediation and as anintermediary. The NIF is control, in his words, to theestablishment of the BBTG. He considers it hazardous anddangerous to think of putting the BBTG in before theeffective deployment of the NIF. The NMOG II cannot fill the gapso he is meeting with the facilitator and the chairman of the RPFin order to informally hasten the process of transition. Heinsists on. the urgency of the He raised hisconcerns with the demobilization process and wishes the NIF andof ensuring the soldiers. Lately, he

. stated that the UNOMUR mission must be the global~andan mission but remain an oper in its currenttasks.

b) views of the FPR14. The Chairman Of the FPR also stressed the importance of thei0 September deadline. For him it was avoid theI!"grangr~nisation of the Arusha Accord and to prevent Rwanda fromreversing the road to peace. The Chairm.an was especia!ly worriedthat the vacuum be filled by ltary groups, which wereJ*~~-. still armed, if the Government of installedin Kigali on~ !0 september. The representatives of the FPR, rimean again, insisted that they would not return to Kigali if theFrench troops were still in the capital.15. or he PR t was imperatlve...o see Its security guaranteed

~usha Accord andwere walting for the flrst pretext to boycottit. No doubt that if, on i0 September, the NIF I not deployedand the transitional government was not led in Kigali,those elements wouldnot hesitate to conclude that the Accord wasonlya piece of paper. ConSequently, the rlsksof d~rapage and} of social troubles were real and should be convened to the" Secretary-General.16. General Dallaire also explained toits FPR interlocutors the derocedure followed by the Securlty Council and un rlined that


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- 6 -f~ the deployment of the NIF on i0 September was quite unrealistic,even if the Security Council gave its green liseemedto ght. The Chairmanunderstand the limits and constraints under which theUnited Nations operated and asked whether the UN, in the intervaland as an interim measure, could give to the OAU the necessary

means to ensure that the I0 September deadline be met. In thatregard, he mentioned Egypts offer to put one battalion et thedisposal of the OAU. In his view, such battalion could bedeployed in Kigali to enable the departure of the French troops.Thus, the OAU could constitute a first element facilitating thedeployment of the NIF.~-;:-: , .......................................

conveyed his preoccupatlons regarding the displaced personsYarengWeand

peace had been signed, to dissuade the displaced persons from........ returning~_ to their homes~2derlXnedhe rgent eed ndfor ieldS.theeploymentThehairmanofhe IFtherefreandacalled that the partles in Arusha had entrusted the UnitedNations with a task of guaranteeing Rwanda. Inhis view the responsibility of theat stake. n conclusion , the Chairman his gratitudefreto the General for the excellent work his eam had accomplishedand he assured him of the FPR continued support to the effortsof the United Nations.

c) Views of the countries concerned18. In the view of theif nothing happens on I0 installationeSreofthatthetransitional goernment is delayed, the population of Rwandawhch snot familar with the procedures of the United Nations~

eet along theSecurity Council, fw111 bedeeply dlsappolnted , He~~~~ underlined that the simple act that the arrival of thereconnaissance mission was delayed raised all kinds ofations. For many Rwandese, the reconnaissance missionmeant the arrival of the NIF. ~ilethe Ambassadordid not think that .neither the Government nor the FPR reallyintended to take the arms if nothing happened on i0 September,he was worried that the vacuum thus created might be verytempting for the extremists andW " ere iaitlng for the first opportunity to conclude that it was"dead". The rlsks were therefore real and France was not readyto bet on them. 19. When the possibility of deploying in Kigali the battalion

offered to the NMOG, as an interimmeasure was mentioned, the unequivocally expressedhsdoubts that such battalion would be enough to counterbalancethe battalion which the FPR intended to bring along whenreturning to the capital,troops hadalready left. Even if the French troops in Kigali


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- 7 -. ntil the arrival of the NIF, the Ambassador thought that thisoption would be extremely dangerous.

20. The Ambassador stated that it was imperative that some meansbe found to reassure the Rwandese people on I0 September. Evena simple gesture, such as the assurance by the Secretary-General,upon the return of General Dallaire to New York, that he wouldsoon submit his report to the Security Council might allay thefearsof thepopulation and discourage the extremists from takingaction. The Ambassador added that, as France was concerned, itwould respect the Arusha Accord and leave Kigali whatever thesize of the 0 or i0,000en~ .........H~~._ howe~erthatthe...............shouldait ........................................

Pendinghe arrival of the NIF, the Ambassadorexpressed the hope thatthe Council would agree to the deployment of an element of avant-garde to avoid the psychological of thesimultaneous departure of the F: the RPF~~~ battalion. Finally, the Ambas ,ted that France,together with other members of the intendedo undertake a dmarche with the, nviting himto. preparewithout anyfurtherdelay a serious economic programmewhich could encourage the EEC and the World Bank to provideRwanda with financial support. In hisvlew, it was necessary~o. . ot~~o~Wtt~~:o:~ W~ ansti0nal government toC ..... : escribed as catastrophic.21. noted that theArusha Accord contained a long of resp ities for theNIF. She wondered whether the United Nations would be able tomeet a11 these expectations. As far as the US Government wasconcerned, t had hot yet made p his mind nd was waltlng forthe report of the mission. While Rwanda was not on the frontburner of the US policy in Africa, the US was interested in

that there might hOt be a "crash" if the 10 September deadlinewas not met, but theUNshould not take too long. She expressedthe hope that the population should be reassured, on 10by the tabling of the resolution in the Securityor, even better, the committment of Member States toprovide contingents for the NIF.

22. With ssions centeredon the offer, by a, provide a battalion forthe NIF and on her efforts in the past to asslst in the peaceprocess. Her successor has not been nominated but Tanzaniastill has an important role du play during this tical period.23, particularly happy that thePeace ~ was si in Arusha at the same time whene lect~ons were country. Hecloseinterrelationshlpbetween Burundi and Rwanda,


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- 8 -~ which he described Now that the Accordhad been signed in zations wouldfinally be able to work. Nevertheless, Rwanda would have to makea big effort - as Burundi had done ~ during the five years

preceding the elections - to teach its population tolerance andreconciliation. He deplored, in particular, that within the MRDstill talking about the emancipation of theh . etus instead of promoting the national reconciliation. TheAmbassador expressed the hope that the democraticsuccess ofBurundi might serve as a lesson and stimulate Rwanda. Until now,Rwandese refugees in Burundi and i s in Rwanda hadbeen used as instr there would ....

J~~... insignificantnd electlve. Burundl,hlchad lttlepace nd ~~~nt, would probably accept to keep in Burundi onlywho had invested - or were able to invest - and forwhom there, was a real need. According to the ~bassador, thest "l uatlon in Rwanda had improved considerably sInce 4 August.The military pressure of the RPF was no longer there and one hadW the impression that the R andese were avoidlng to glve the RPF

~ a pretext to launch a punitive expedition. The CDR had beenmargnalized and most militia had d According to him,there would not be many problems ifwas not set up On I0 September. On the contrary, a slight delayiight be beneficial to the Rwandese who had th s bad habit ofdepending ....ntirely on the international community.- they mightbe forced to think together and resolve their problems bythemselves. Anyway, there were already some encOuraging signs:joint teams including RPF youths were engaged in matches; ayouth seminar wold soon take , with theof RPF youths ; and, even more sur , a member, included in a lling toe .~~~ r ceved hls order of misslon slgned by President

not be integrated into the NIF since its necessity had Inthe ~bassador stated that. even though the delayed

the peace process and reassure the on. Indeed, onebe to enlarge the NMOG. . , except forthe 1 of a few additional offlcers, this had not been done.He regretted it because he thought the enlarged NMOG shouldalready been deployed in Rwanda.situation ina) itional

(Would he MDR and ............ he FPR rally the government?)the two armies and c) the economic development


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~ of.. the country[ .(WOuld ouvernment, t-r~efonstructlonthe..it.uatlon, nd could it m lest make a serioinstal . "J For Mr eet .... us a .confide --Colyn _ the cha nalysls, nce to , the de llen . POpulat the o __ PlOyme

ge of t. lon. I P lltl~ nt of he, . t w i . thIn Ould al Partle e NIFthe su - : so al ~ s, to _ wouldbeen . ~b reglon. A .low the creat ~ the FPR anachleved _ SUccess i ton of t , d tounexpectedlv ~_ n Rwanda was =~ he stabilitv, ~,l ~urundi. The ~~ nanoE, as i", ~anzania and

thought that the risks owhat was important wasa uralism} ci , the state of law, humof a serious economic an ralso Priority for Belgium Which ready tofor al assistance from Rwanda. ly theion Wasve a request25.whab

level. It wasI co~%~u~~~--" "~~Y contnuend" reconcillation, toto keep toFrom theo keep the OAU , ~nvolved. 126.

that part es,beenat thethat theon the roadMr. Colynof v ionlew, it vas

lltt blt of of the inIs essentlal. _~ small who wereof the Peac ~,~__2 e Amb. assador national~~~~ement In Welcomedhlc ih the return of the , wascts in the ne the

of

ofthird


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- lO -world country, should not be underestimated.27. indicated that the PrimeMinister had express hop that his country would doeverything it could to ensure that the Security Councii wouldadopt a resolution as soon as possible asking the Secretary-General to send a peacekeeping force to Rwanda. His answer hadbeen that Russia was in favor in helping Rwanda achieve peace,but at the same time it was aware of the financial crisis whichwas currently affecting the United Nations and it could notignore its own difficulties. In his view, the Rwandese, who hadrealizedhat , ..............ere .............

~Itionparties, was convinced that national in Rwanda,was simply a matter of time. The Charg was alsc convinced thatthe Rwandese needed the support of the international community:even the UN flag would reassure them that they were not alone intheir peace and reconciliation process. As far as the Frenchtresence was concerned, the Charg hat it guaranteedthe security not only of y, but also ofthe ~F, no matter what they were saying under the influence ofTanzania. The tension continued ot instill fears among theand the recent political murder of a formertre of the MDRN was ignlficant in that regard In his e V an interm solution pending the decision of the SecurityCouncil might be for the United Nations to send a smalldetachment in order to dissuade the extremists from trying totake advantage of the vacuum and try to desta lize the country.As far as the arrival in Kigali of the battalion wasconcerned, the Charg@ thought that it Was uncalled for. He evenS tld that such arrival raised a lot of concerns in the capitaland concluded that the Frenchtroops should stay n Kigali untilthe arrival of the NIF even if the GOMN was enlarged by thearrival of an Egyptian battalion.E. Genezal ~Mserva~ions~~~~~~ 28. The overall situation is ~ e 4 August

"t993. A majorl y of displaced persons d not wait theestablisb~entofBroad-Based TransitionalGover~ent to leave theand have already returned to ther villages in thezone. They are tendingtheir abandonedfields andin the rec0nstruction of that area. It is estlmated, outOf the original 900,000, 350,000 displacedhave not yetIn Kigali, the curfew has been lifted and the ss ......-. ~i is progre ~vely resuming a normal llfe. Little by~little, the tourists are coming back. Young hutus andtutsis areld In joint sport events and the mission bas heard thata member of theRPF,

~ traveiling to the US, had received his order ofthe President. A youth seminarwas anned for theand it was expected that tutsis wouldparticipate in it. That type of ~ pes gand it is hoped that they will be mu Last but notleast, the mission learnt during its stay in Rwanda that the


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- 11-Uganda Foreign Minister was meeting with his counterpart inKigali to work out the opening of cross border trade between thetwo countries. Furthermore, during the week-end of 29-30 August,President Habyarimana travelled to Uganda and Tanzania.29 On the other side of the coin, the Government and thepopulation are anxious to see all. the displaced persons back intheir own fields as soon as possible and all the children backto school so that another harvest and another school year shouldnot be lost Since most of the food comes from the north thereare fears ~rf famine, among the Government, if, by the end ofepte ber early OCtober, the sowing is no encedo_

0,-.MeanwhLle,---tq~e-o - n t ~ ........tha--t--~ ...........Government should not wait for the 10th of September to make aserious analysis of the economic situation, which they describeas catastrophic, and present a plan which could encourage theWorld Bank and the European Community to pursue their financialassistance. The Mission learnt that France and Belgium fortheir part,Governmentregard

I population. Fortheparare anxious to fill thelr posts, the idea oft ~he establisl-~ent of the Broad-Based Transtherefore dIfficult to accept.

31. In Kigali, the political situation is still confused andthe partiesto the transitional government are raising concern. For

,the int, entions of the MDR(Mouvement pour la Dfense dewnich has recently split into three factions, areThe fact that the PrimeU " Mrs. Agathe wlllngiymana, was questioned by theof her own party, namely the MDR, is not veryencouragin . The stru .....g . . ~ggle for mlnlsterlal portfolos fs in ful, .... . 1, .[ and tenslon fs nlgh amon ~ the 15 o" ~ ~~~.. . . g p lltlcal partles wh~~,,: al slgned the ethical code devised in Arus a. mb= ~/.1 asslnatlon o a polltl?al fi~re of the MDRN bears~7"~a .I of that tension. The mission heard that yet ber/i J ~, i zo.J ~ threasonsstponement ofGovernment is

3 2. While. the leadership of both the Government and the RPF nowfully realize that the NIF cannot10 September have to belrworked out, no assurance can be given as to the kind of reactionsa epopulatlon which is not famiiiariof theUnited Nations. Thethe absence of the NIF, on 1 as ! concludethat it has been short-slgned the Pace Accord.

might raiselenghtyv esign andpoliticians who33. On the other hand, there is stillthe ~usha Accord .nd extremlsts from both sdes sesz tance tovery well


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..... c640

i :S o " Il klt.=,,,d~.,. _ ...~,, : ,retext , , ppenlng..... September to,,,.e~o . ~ ~ ~ o,o.........e... the Accord was nothing ibut a pi ce ofel ment gh ve we~ 1 that op tyi ~ portunl todestablize country, ing arg qu ys~ antt of arms hiddenthroughoutthe country. -.

... According to some o bservers,~ the r~sks o.... .... ...... " ...... -- -- comexu~^? Sept ~er, are therefore real and should~not be underestimated byrit -tonaiiill O i" : : --M~~ti~q, th the .... ......resldent the Un,!ted Re ....ub~ ~~-~ ... "- .... ....... ,.,,-,-~.~.:.~ ,:~~.~Dg!b!!cf .Tanzania~ ...... ...... l l l" positive on I0 Septe~er s therefOre called for in

order to resassure the Rwandese the peace process is stillon. seems ...... .... internationalwhich has never gven up ire support to Rwanda even int inow~distance ~itself from country s about toa delicate and crucial

~ The: meeting wth President AI Hassan Mwiny .took place~ediately i after the consultatons~ with the Actlng Foreigni M ..... .....nister. In my >nt.roducto~ remarks relterated Secreta~-appreclatlon for succe,sful efforts inconductng the ~Talks and hlm that it washave a Unitei N.atlonS Neutral International Force by

I0 Septe~er as the two parties had wished" i

Followlng a brlefing General Dallalre on the activities ofMission in Rwanda on~e arrangements that

be worked out for the ideplo~ent of a United Nations peace-force, President Mwinyimade statement on theneed for speedy actlon in order ,to start the implementation of the. sha .Peace A~eement. ~ile ~atifylng to~ note that thei cease-fre was holding, only the"effective Impl~entation of the


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Documents

UN Recon Mission to Rwanda