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Averting the Tragedy of the

CommonsUsing Social Psychological Science to Protect theEnvironmentMark Van Vugt

University of Kent

ABSTRACT Many local and global environmental chal-

lenges are tragedies-of-the-commons dilemmas in which private and collective interests are frequently at odds.Recent developments in social psychological theory and research suggest that in such commons dilemmas peopleare not just motivated by narrow (economic) self-interestbutthat they also consider thebroader implicationsof theirdecisions for others and for the natural environment.Based on a core-motives analysis, I identify four necessarycomponents for designing interventions to protect the en-vironment: (a) information, (b) identity, (c) institutions,and (d) incentives, and discuss their utility and the feasi-bility of incorporating them.

KEYWORDS commons dilemma; cooperation; core mo-tives; environmental conservation; human evolution; so-cial dilemma; social psychology; tragedy of the commons

Dont it always seem to goThat you dont know what youve got till its goneThey paved paradiseAnd put up a parking lotFrom the Joni Mitchell song Big Yellow Taxi (1970)

Within a short (evolutionary) time frame, Homo sapiens hasbecome a global force dominating the natural world. Currentlythe human population worldwide amounts to 6.6 billion, and it isexpected to rise to almost 9 billion by 2050. It is doubtfulwhether the Earths ecosystems can sustain such large numbers,particularly at the current standard of living. Human activitiesare responsible for depleting natural resources, polluting the

environment, and reducing biodiversity. Human-made envi-

ronmental problems create economic and social conicts withpotentially devastating consequences for the health and well-being of ourselves and future generations. This is nothing new.Our species has had a long history of causing ecological de-struction; yetdue to a rise in population andtechnological know-how, these effects are now felt globally.

It is widely accepted that we need to move toward greater environmental sustainability. Yet making the necessary changeshas proved very difcult, in part because there are conictinginterests between relevant parties (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern,2003). As the World Commission on Environment and Devel-opment (1987) recognized a while ago: The Earth is one, but the

world is not (p. 27).

THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS

The social dynamics underlyingmanyenvironmental challengesare famously captured by Garrett Hardin (1968) in an article inScience titled The Tragedy of the Commons, one of the mostfrequently cited works in the social sciences. The essay tells thestory of how the management of a communal pasturage by agroup of herdsmen turns into ecological disaster when each in-dividual, upon realizing that adding extra cattle benets him

personally, increases his herd, thereby unintentionally causingthe destruction of the commons.The tragedy of the commons has become central to our un-

derstanding of many local andglobalecological problems. As anevolutionary biologist, Hardin argued that nature favors indi-viduals whoexploit commonresources at theexpense of themorerestrained users. He also argued that voluntary contributions tocreate institutions for managing the commons often fall shortbecause of (the fear of) free-riders.To save thecommons, Hardintherefore recommended mutual coercion, mutually agreed

Address correspondence to Mark Van Vugt, Department of Psychol-ogy, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK; e-mail: [email protected].

CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

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upon by the majority of the people affected (Hardin, 1968, p.1247).

The tragedy of the commons has generated much researchactivity in the behavioral sciences, from psychology to politicalscience and from economics to biology. But despite its com-pelling logic, it has been criticized for two main reasons. First,scientists studying real-world environmental problems havefound many instances of successful community-resource-man-agement projects around the world, such as the maintenance of common agricultural land, irrigation systems, and lake andshore sheries (Ostrom, 1990). Rather than a free forall, thesecommons arestrictlyregulated in terms of accessandintensityof use. A second more fundamental criticism concerns the validityof the assumption that commons users are driven exclusively bynarrow (economic) self-interest. Although this is clearly an im-portant motive, recent theoretical and empirical developmentsin social psychology, evolutionary biology, anthropology, andexperimental economics suggest that individuals are not in-different to the welfare of others, their group, or the natural

environment. Using experimental game paradigms, such as theprisoners dilemma, the public goods dilemma, or the commonsdilemma (the latter is also known as the resource dilemma or common pool resource game), researchers have discoveredmyriad motives beyond self-interest that inuence decisionmaking in commons dilemmas (Weber, Kopelman, & Messick,2004).

KEY STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THEENVIRONMENT

In combination with eld data, the experimental games litera-ture suggests four key components of strategies for successfulresource management: information, identity, institutions, andincentives. These four Is correspond, by and large, to four coremotives for decision making in social dilemmas: understanding,belonging, trusting, and self-enhancing (for an overview, seeTable 1). These motives are fundamental psychological pro-

cesseslikely shaped by evolutionary selection pressuresthat inuence our thinking, feeling, and behaving in social in-teractions (cf. Fiske, 2004).

InformationPeople have a fundamental need to understand their environ-

ment to predict what will happen in case of uncertainties. En-vironmental uncertainty tends to promote overuse because mostusers are optimistic about the future and underestimate thedamage they are doing to the environment (Opotow & Weiss,2000). Managing environmental resources therefore dependsrst and foremost on reliable information about the use andavailability of resources like, for instance, drinking water, fossilfuels, and sh stocks. Science plays a vital role in reducingenvironmental uncertainty. Gathering reliable information ismuch easier when resources have clearly dened boundaries(e.g., land is easier to control than water or air).

Global environmental trends are highly complex and uncer-tain,whichundermineseffective behavioralchange. In contrast,information about local environmental destruction is generallymore persuasive, in part because the contingencies betweenactions and outcomes are easier to understand. A perceptiblelocal resource threatsuch as an acute food or water shortage is anexample. My colleagues and I conducted a survey among 120households during the 1997 water shortage in the UnitedKingdom and found that the perceived severity of the shortagewas positively associated with households efforts to conservewater (Van Vugt& Samuelson, 1999). Peoples attributions of thecauses underlying the water shortage made a difference. Whenpeople believed the shortage was caused by other households,they consumed more (and conserved less) water than when theybelieved it was caused by the weather. In addition, peoplemade more efforts to conserve when they believed their owncontribution made a difference in alleviating the crisis (cf. self-efcacy).

It appears that, when crafting messages to raise publicawareness about environmental matters, simple information is

TABLE 1Four Is: Core Motives and Foci of Interventions for Successful Commons Resource Management and Potential Constraints

Focus of

intervention Core motive Description Aim of intervention Potential constraintInformation Understanding The need to understand the

physical and socialenvironment

Reducing environmental and socialuncertainty

Global environmental problems areinherently uncertain.

Identity Belonging The need for positive socialidentity

Improving and broadening ones senseof community

Resource competition betweencommunities increases overuse.

Institutions Trusting The need to build trustingrelationships

Increasing acceptance of commonsrules and institutions

Authorities are not always seen aslegitimate and fair.

Incentives Self-Enhancing

Theneedto improve oneselfandincrease ones resources

Punishing overuse and rewardingresponsible use

Economic incentives undermineintrinsic motivation to conserve.

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often most effectiveparticularly when decision makers arealready contemplating changing their behavior. For instance,labels with comparative information about energy use andemissions of household appliances work best when consumersare already thinking green but lack specic technicalknowledge. Environmental and social scientists must work moreclosely together to enhance peoples understanding of environ-mental problems and to design public campaigns providingaccurate information (Dietz et al., 2003).

IdentityAs a group-living species, humans have a deep sense of be-longing to social groups. Research suggests that people easilyidentify with and form attachments with other individuals insometimes very large groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Thestrength of their social identity affects how much people arewilling to help their group or community, for instance in pro-tecting the environment (Van Vugt, 2001). High-identifying

group members sometimes even compensate for the resourceoveruse of fellow group members (Brewer & Kramer, 1986).

There are several ways in which peoples identity and be-longingness needs could be mobilized to foster proenviron-mental action. First, people identify strongest with primarygroups such as friends and family, and therefore an appeal to theinterests of those groups will generally be more persuasive (e.g.,think of your childrens future). In addition, when peopleidentify with a group, they are more likely to share costly envi-ronmental information (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999). For in-stance, in comparing lobster-shing communities in Maine itwas found that shermen in communities with dense social

networks exchanged catch information more frequently than didthose in more loosely connected communities, resulting in moresustainable shing (Penn, 2003).

Third, when people identify with a social group they are moreconcerned about their in-group reputation, and this can promoteproenvironmental action (Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Milinski,Semmann, Krambeck, & Marotzke, 2006). Asking households tomake a public commitment, for instance, reduces energy use by20% (Penn, 2003). Providing households with normative socialfeedbacksticking a smiley or frowney face on their homeenergy bill when their energy use is less or more than theneighbourhood averageleads to similar reductions (Schultz,

Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007). Finally, en-vironmental pressure groups routinely, and with some success,apply reputation tactics in so-called naming and shamingcampaigns to force pollutingcompanies to change their policies.

Human belongingness needs are embedded within a markedin-group/out-group psychology. Many studies show that our so-cial identities are boosted through inducing competition, either real or symbolic,betweengroups (DeCremer& Van Vugt, 1999).Yet creating intergroup competition in environmental dilemmascan be a double-edged sword. Resources that are shared be-

tween several communities, such as river irrigation systems or sea sheries, are generally at greater risk of depletion (Ostrom,1990). In such cases, it would be helpful to promote a superor-dinate social identityfor instance by promoting trade betweenthe communities or by emphasizing a common threat such as thecollapse of the local economy.

InstitutionsA third condition for successful resource management is thepresence of legitimate commons institutions. Authorities play akey role in governing local and global environmental resources,but who is prepared to trust and empower them? Institutions areessentially public goods that are in danger of being underminedby free-riders, individuals who prot from their existence butdont contribute to their upkeep. One way out of this dilemma isto appoint a leader or authority to regulate resource access (theHardin solution). Yet this creates a second-order free-rider problem also known as the who guards the guards paradox:

How can authorities be trusted to look after the common good(OGorman, Henrich, & Van Vugt, 2008)?Trust is a core motive in social relationships (Fiske, 2004).

Having condence in the benevolence of other individuals andinstitutions lies at the heart of any collective effort to protect theenvironment. Commons users generally trust others to exercisevoluntary restraint, but if institutional changes are necessary(e.g., during a resource crisis) they want leaders and authoritiesthat can be trusted to look after the common good.

To get trust, authorities must employ fair decision-makingrules and procedures. Regardless of whether people receive bador good outcomes, they want to be treated fairly and respectfully.A study on the 1991 California water shortage (Tyler & Degoey,1995) showed that Californians only cooperated with local water authorities in implementing drastic water-saving measures if they believed the authorities made efforts to listen to their concerns and provide accurate, unbiased information about theshortage. Moreover, procedural concerns were particularly im-portant forresidents with a strongsense of communityidentity. Asurvey on the 1994 British railway privatization found that trainusers whodid nottrustprivate companies to look after this publicgood were more likelyto take a carinstead (Van Vugt, Van Lange,Meertens, & Joireman, 1996). Thus, trust in institutions plays acrucial role in managing urgent and complex environmentalchallenges.

IncentivesThere is no denying that many proenvironmental actions aredriven by self-enhancing motives, notably the desire to seekrewards and avoid punishments. Monetary incentive schemes intheform of subsidiesappeareffective in fostering theadoption of home saving devices such as solar panels, water meters, androof insulation. Financial incentives also promote sustainablepractice within industry. In the United States, market-based

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systems of tradable environmental allowances have becomequite popular in recentyears. This scheme permits companies tobuy and sell pollution credits, and this system is believed tohave contributed to a decline in acid rain (Dietz et al., 2003).Furthermore, in applying penalties for environmental damage, itseems better to start with a modest punishment and then grad-ually increase it after repeated violation, such as with catchquotas in sheries (Ostrom, 1990).

The core-motives approach provides various novel insightsinto why particular incentive schemes might work better thanothers and why some might not work at all. First, not everyone isequally motivated by economic self-interest (Van Lange, DeBruin, Otten, & Joireman, 1997). In a water-conservation study,I asked households to complete a short community-identityscale(Van Vugt, 2001), with statements such as I feel strongly at-tached to this community and There are many people in mycommunity whom I think of as good friends (1 5 strongly dis-agree, 5 5 strongly agree). Water records (corrected for variousdemographic variables and previous use) showed that house-

holds that identied strongly with their community did not needa nancial incentive (through a metered tariff) to consume lesswater but those that weakly identied with their community did(see Fig. 1). This implies that economic incentives work better when other core needs are unfullled.

Second, interventions that fulll various core motives simul-taneously are likely to be most successful. The Van Vugt andSamuelson (1999) study showed that, during a shortage, con-

servation efforts were highest among households with a water meter, because having a meter both gave them a nancial in-centive to conserve (thus furthering their self-enhancement) andenhanced their knowledge about appropriate water-savingmeasures (thus furthering their understanding). Thus, meteredhouseholds were better able to adjust their behavior during theshortage.

Third, incentive schemes might be counterproductive if theyundermineother core needs.Handing outsmallnes forlitteringmight signal that theproblem is more widespread than it actuallyis (undermining the need for trust) or transform it from an ethi-cal-environmental issue into an economic issue (altering theunderstanding of the problem; cf. Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).Particular incentive schemes might also create mistrust in au-thorities. When the Dutch government built a special lane for carpoolers in 1993 along one of the busiest highways in theNetherlands, it cut travel times substantially for car sharers. Yetsingle drivers reacted strongly against the lane, and after widespread protest anda legal challenge thelane closedwithina

year. Survey data suggested that many drivers did not trust theintentions of the authorities, and whereas some single driversshowed open resistance against the lane (by going to court to getaccess to it), others showed more subtleattitudinal shifts in favor of driving their car alone (cf. cognitive dissonance reduction;Van Vugt, Van Lange, Meertens, & Joireman, 1996).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

More research is needed to establish theinterplay between thesecore motives in shaping environmental decisions. For instance,do peoplewith strongcommunity ties also have betterknowledge

of local environmental problems? Do sanctioning schemes en-hance or undermine peoples trust in commons institutions andin other users? Individual differences in core motives may alsomatter. We already know that environmental appeals are morepersuasive among car drivers with cooperative dispositions (VanVugt et al., 1996). Similarly, I suspect that people with highbelongingness needs will be inuenced more by community-based incentive schemes, whereas individuals with low be-longingness needs might respond better to individual nancialincentives. Also, we know very little about how these core mo-tives change across the lifespan: Do peoples belongingnessneeds become weaker or stronger as they grow older, and how do

their social networks change? Finally, are there other centralmotives shaping peoples decision making in commons dilem-mas, such as autonomy or caring needs? We know that humansevolved on the savannah in Africa, and living in this environ-ment may have endowed us with biophilia (Wilson, 2006), aninnate tendency to enjoy and care for the natural world. Acrosscultures, people are attracted to the same savannah-type land-scapes, and in both Europe and the United States, zoos attractmore visitors annually than all professional sports events com-bined. Exposing children to enjoyable social outdoor experi-

02468

101214161820

M o n

t h l y W a t e r

U s e

( 1 0 0 0

L i t e r s

)

Unmetered MeteredTariff

Low Community IdentityHigh Community Identity

Fig. 1. Average monthly water use among a sample of 593 households inthe United Kingdom in 1997 (data are corrected for income, householdsize, and pre-meter use). Water use varied between households as afunction of tariff (meteredvs. unmetered) and level of community identity(high vs. low). Adapted from Community Identication Moderating theImpact of Financial Incentives in a Natural Social Dilemma: A WaterShortage, by M. Van Vugt, 2001, Personality and Social PsychologyBulletin , 27, pp. 14401449. Copyright 2001, Society for Personality andSocial Psychology. Adapted with permission.

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ences such as camping, trekking, or scouting may promote their lifelong environmental commitment. To develop these and other interventions to protect our environment and avert a commonstragedy requires a good understanding of human nature, whichsocial psychology can provide.

Recommended ReadingBiel, A., Eek, D., Garling, T., & Gustafson, T. (2008). New issues and

paradigms in research on social dilemmas . Berlin: Springer. Astate-of-the-art review of contemporary research on social dilem-mas.

Buunk, B.P., & Van Vugt, M. (2008). Applying social psychology: From problems to solutions. London: Sage. A manual for developing so-cial interventions informed by social psychological theory andresearch.

Gardner, G.T., & Stern, P.C. (1996). Environmentalproblems and humanbehavior. Boston: Allyn & Bacon. A complete, highly accessibletext about the human impact on the environment.

Ostrom, E. (1990). (See References). A classic book with case studies of commons resource management problems from around the world.

Van Vugt, M. (2001). (See References). A representative empiricalstudy of a real-world commons dilemma, a water shortage.

Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank Vladas Gris-kevicius, Hans-Joachim Mosler, Jessica Nolan, Wesley Schultz,Robbie Sutton, and Paul Van Lange for their comments on pre-vious versions.

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Van Vugt, M., & Samuelson, C.D. (1999). The impact of metering in anatural resourcecrisis:A social dilemmaanalysis. PersonalityandSocial Psychology Bulletin , 25, 731745.

Van Vugt, M., Van Lange, P.A.M., Meertens, R.M., & Joireman, J.A.(1996). How a structural solution to a real-world social dilemmafailed: A eld experiment on the rst carpool lane in Europe.Social Psychology Quarterly , 59, 364374.

Weber, M., Kopelman, S.,& Messick,D.M. (2004).A conceptual reviewof social dilemmas: Applying a logic of appropriateness. Person-ality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 281307.

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