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    Division 44

    Environment and Infrastructure

    Sector project "Transport Policy Advice"

    Bus Rapid Transit

    Planning Guide

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    i

    Author:Lloyd Wright

    Editor:Deutsche Gesellschaft frTechnische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbHP. O. Box 5180D - 65726 Eschborn, Germanyhttp://www.gtz.de

    Division 44,Environment and InfrastructureSector Project "Transport Policy Advice"

    Commissioned byBundesministerium fr wirtschaftlicheZusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ)Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 40D - 53113 Bonn, Germanyhttp://www.bmz.de

    Manager:Manfred Breithaupt

    Comments or feedback?We would welcome any of your comments orsuggestions, on any aspect of the Planning Guide,by e-mail to [email protected], or by surface mail to:Manfred BreithauptGTZ, Division 44

    P. O. Box 5180D - 65726 EschbornGermany

    Cover Photo:Manfred BreithauptTransMileno bus stop, Bogot (Colombia)February 2002GTZ Transport Photo CD Rom: Urban Transport,Second Edition, September 2004

    Photos:Lloyd Wright and GTZ Transport Photo CD Rom:Urban Transport, Second Edition, September 2004

    Layout:Klaus Neumann, SDS, G.C.

    Eschborn, October 2004

    Findings, interpretations and conclusionsexpressed in this document are based oninformation gathered by GTZ and itsconsultants, partners, and contributors fromreliable sources. GTZ does not, however,guarantee the accuracy and completeness of

    information in this document, and cannot beheld responsible for any errors, omissions orlosses which emerge from its use.

    About the author

    Lloyd WrightUniversity College London

    Mr. Wright is currently conducting transportplanning research at University CollegeLondon. Mr. Wright formerly directed theLatin American activities of the Institute forTransportation & Development Policy (ITDP).He also directed the organisations InternationalBus Rapid Transit Programme. Additionally,Mr. Wright has worked with the InternationalInstitute for Energy Conservation, the US

    Environmental Protection Agency, the USAgency for International Development, theUnited Nations, and GTZ on transport andenvironmental issues. He was also previouslya fellow with the US-Asia EnvironmentalPartnership in Bangkok, ailand. Mr.

    Wright is currently working towards a PhDin Urban Transport Planning at UniversityCollege London. He also possesses an MScin Environmental Assessment from theLondon School of Economics, an MBA

    from Georgetown University, and a BSc inEngineering from the University of Washington.

    Planning Guide:

    Bus Rapid Transit

    http://www.gtz.de/http://www.bmz.de/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.bmz.de/http://www.gtz.de/
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    iii

    e development of this Bus Rapid TransitPlanning Guide has benefited from the experi-ences of high-quality public transit projects

    from around the world. e BRT PlanningGuide has benefited greatly from lessons gainedto date from the TransMilenio system in Bogot(Colombia). TransMilenio represents perhapsthe most complete and inventive BRT systemin the world today. e assistance of AnglicaCastro and Carlos Beltrn of TransMilenio SAhas been instrumental in developing this guide-book. Further, the former Mayor of Bogot,Enrique Pealosa, has become an internationalchampion of promoting the BRT concept.

    Additionally, insights from municipal officialsand consultants involved with the BRT systemsin Quito (Ecuador) and Curitiba (Brazil) haveadded greatly to the quality and relevance of theBRT Planning Guide. In many respects, BRTowes its existence to the creativity and deter-mination of Jaime Lerner, the former mayor ofCuritiba and the former governor of the stateof Paran. Csar Arias, who previously directedthe BRT effort in Quito and is now a consultanton the Guayaquil (Ecuador) BRT project, has

    also lent considerable information for the BRTPlanning Guide. Likewise, Hidalgo Nuez andCecilia Rodriguez of Quitos Department ofTransport have provided much assistance. In

    Asia, Kangming Xu and the Energy Foundationare contributing greatly to the development ofBRT in China, as is Dr. Jason Chang who haspreviously led BRT efforts in Taipei. In India,Dr. Dinesh Mohan and Dr. Geetam Tiwari ofthe Indian Institute of Technology in Delhi areat the forefront of efforts there.

    A number of consultancies have worked toimprove the quality of BRT initiatives. Specialthanks go to Luis (Pilo) Willumsen, EnriqueLillo, and German Lleras of Steer Davies Gleavewho are involved in BRT projects worldwide.Also, Jarko Vlasak of StratCo, and formerly ofMcKinsey & Company, has helped to developthe BRT business model used in Bogot. DarioHidalgo, Ignacio de Guzman, and Juan CarlosDaz at Akiris have played a central role in thedevelopment of TransMilenio, and they are nowleading BRT efforts in several cities. Addition-

    ally, several consultancies in Brazil helped to

    create many of the original BRT concepts; thesefirms and individuals include Paulo Custodio,the consulting team at Logit, Pedro Szasz, and

    the consultancy of Logitrans.e BRT Planning Guide has benefited not onlyfrom leading developing-nation experiences butalso from the growing level of interest in BRTin Australia, Western Europe, Japan, and North

    America. A similar compendium of experiencesdeveloped under the United States TransitCooperative Research Program (TCRP) hasbeen a rich source of world-wide experiences inBRT. Sam Zimmerman and the consultancy ofDMJM & Harris have been leading these efforts.

    e concept of BRT owes much to the persistentsupport of key organisations that have worked toraise overall awareness as well as provide directassistance to interested developing-nation cities.e Institute for Transportation & DevelopmentPolicy (ITDP) under the leadership of its Direc-tor, Dr. Walter Hook, has consistently been atthe forefront of providing direct assistance todeveloping cities pursuing sustainable transportoptions. Likewise, Gerhard Menckhoff, a con-sultant with the World Bank, has played a key

    role in catalysing BRT projects in Latin Americaand elsewhere. Also, Peter Midgley, a former

    World Bank transport specialist, has been apioneer with developing-nation BRT efforts.

    Finally, the BRT Planning Guide and the entireSustainable Transport Sourcebook would not bepossible without the strong support and effortfrom the team at GTZ, the German OverseasTechnical Assistance Agency. Karl Fjellstromwas particularly instrumental in developingideas for the Mass Transit BRT Planning Guide

    as well as writing sections comparing differentmass transit options. Klaus Neumann alsoplayed a key role in providing the layout andformatting for the final document. A great dealof thanks goes to Manfred Breithaupt, Directorof GTZs sustainable urban transport pro-gramme, who created the idea of the Sustain-able Transport Sourcebook and who patientlyoversaw the development of each module.

    Lloyd WrightUniversity College London

    Acknowledgements

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    iv

    Contents

    About the author i

    Imprint i

    Acknowledgements iii

    Acronyms vi

    1. Introduction 1

    1.1 Defining Bus Rapid Transit 1

    1.2 History of BRT 2

    1.2.1 The predecessors to BRT 2

    1.2.2 Modern BRT systems 2

    1.2.3 Conventional bus systems 5

    1.3 Public transport in developing

    cities 8

    1.4 Barriers to BRT 9

    1.5 Benefits of BRT 11

    2. Choosing a Mass TransitSystem 13

    2.1 Introduction to mass transit

    options 13

    2.2 Criteria in technology selection 14

    2.2.1 Costs 15

    2.2.2 Design and developmentfactors 19

    2.2.3 Performance 28

    2.2.4 Impacts 33

    2.3 The myths of BRT 38

    3. Planning for BRT 39

    3.1 Planning Stage I:

    Project Preparation 41

    3.1.1 Project creation andcommitment 41

    3.1.2 Legal basis 42

    3.1.3 Development team 43

    3.1.4 Project scope and timing 44

    3.1.5 Planning budget andfinancing 48

    3.2 Planning Stage II: Analysis 51

    3.2.1 Background and situationaldescription 51

    3.2.2 Stakeholder analysis 51

    3.2.3 Transportation data collection 52

    3.2.4 Transportation demandmodelling 58

    3.3 Planning Stage III:

    Communications 63

    3.3.1 Public participation processes 63

    3.3.2 Communications withexisting transport operators 63

    3.3.3 Marketing plan 64

    3.3.4 Public education plan 66

    3.4 Planning Stage IV:

    Operations 693.4.1 Corridor identification 69

    3.4.2 Feeder services 70

    3.4.3 Service options 72

    3.4.4 Passenger capacity 75

    3.4.5 System management andcontrol 79

    3.4.6 Customer service plan 81

    3.5 Planning Stage V: Business

    and regulatory structure 93

    3.5.1 Business structure 93

    3.5.2 Institutional and regulatorystructure 101

    3.5.3 Incentives for competition 104

    3.5.4 Operational cost analysis 113

    3.5.5 Tariff options 115

    3.5.6 Collection and distributionof revenues 119

    3.6 Planning Stage VI:

    Infrastructure 125

    3.6.1 Conceptual study versusdetailed engineering study 125

    3.6.2 Busways 1263.6.3 Stations 135

    3.6.4 Intermediate transfer stations 141

    3.6.5 Terminals 142

    3.6.6 Depots 143

    3.6.7 Control centre 144

    3.6.8 Feeder infrastructure 147

    3.6.9 Integration infrastructure 148

    3.6.10 Commercial space 149

    3.6.11 Traffic signal control 150

    3.6.12 Public utilities 150

    3.6.13 Landscape 1513.6.14 Infrastructure cost analysis 151

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    3.7 Planning Stage VII:

    Technology 155

    3.7.1 Vehicle technology 155

    3.7.2 Fare collection and fareverification systems 169

    3.7.3 Intelligent transportationsystems (ITS) 175

    3.7.4 Equipment procurementprocess 176

    3.8 Planning Stage VIII:

    Modal Integration 177

    3.8.1 Pedestrians 177

    3.8.2 Bicycles 182

    3.8.3 Other public transportsystems 185

    3.8.4 Taxis 186

    3.8.5 Park-and-ride 1863.8.6 Auto restriction measures 187

    3.8.7 Integration with land useplanning 191

    3.9 Planning Stage IX: Impacts 193

    3.9.1 Traffic impacts 193

    3.9.2 Economic impacts 193

    3.9.3 Environmental impacts 195

    3.9.4 Social impacts 203

    3.9.5 Urban impacts 203

    3.10 Planning Stage X:Implementation Plan 205

    3.10.1 Timeline and workplan 205

    3.10.2 Financing plan 205

    3.10.3 Staffing and managementplans 213

    3.10.4 Contracting plan 215

    3.10.5 Construction plan 216

    3.10.6 Maintenance plan 216

    3.10.7 Monitoring and evaluationplan 217

    4. BRT Resources 221

    4.1 BRT support organisations 221

    4.2 Technical resources 223

    4.3 Links to BRT cities 224

    References 225

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    vi Acronyms

    Acronyms

    AGV Automatic Guided Vehicle

    AVL Automatic Vehicle Location

    BRT Bus Rapid Transit

    CIDA Canadian International Development

    Agency

    CNG Compressed Natural Gas

    DFID UK Department for International

    Development

    GEF Global Environmental Facility

    GTZ GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fr

    Technische Zusammenarbeit

    (German Overseas Technical

    Assistance Agency)

    IFC International Finance Corporation

    IPCC Inter-governmental Panel on

    Climate Change

    ITDP Institute for Transportation &

    Development Policy

    ITS Intelligent Transportation Systems

    JICA Japanese International Cooperation

    Agency

    LPG Liquid Petroleum Gas

    LRT Light Rail Transit

    MRT Mass Rapid Transit

    O-D Origin-Destination

    PRT Personal Rapid Transit

    QIC Quality incentive contract

    Sida Swedish International Development

    Agency

    TDM Transportation Demand

    Management

    TOD Transit-Oriented Development

    TRB Transportation Research Board

    UNDP United Nations Development

    Programme

    UNEP United Nations Environment

    Programme

    USAID United States Agency for

    International Development

    USFTA United States Federal Transit

    Administration

    USTCRP United States Transit Cooperative

    Research Program

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    1

    Bus Rapid Transit Planning Guide

    1. Introduction

    1. Introduction

    Effective public transit is central to develop-ment. For the vast majority of developing city

    residents, public transit is the only practicalmeans to access employment, education, andpublic services, especially when such services arebeyond the viable distance of walking or cy-cling. Unfortunately, the current state of publictransit services in developing cities often doeslittle to serve the actual mobility needs of thepopulation. Bus services are too often unreliable,inconvenient and dangerous.

    In response, transport planners and publicofficials have sometimes turned to extremely

    costly mass transit alternatives such as rail-basedmetros. Due to the high costs of rail infrastruc-ture, cities can only construct such systems overa few kilometres in a few limited corridors. eresult is a system that does not meet the broadertransport needs of the population. Nevertheless,the municipality ends up with a long-term debtthat can affect investment in more pressing areassuch as health, education, water, and sanitation.

    However, there is an alternative between poorpublic transit service and high municipal debt.

    Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) can provide high-quality, metro-like transit service at a fraction ofthe cost of other options (Figure 1). is mod-ule provides municipal officials, non-govern-mental organizations, consultants, and others

    1.1 Defining Bus Rapid Transit

    1.2 History of BRT

    1.3 Public transport in developing cities

    1.4 Barriers to BRT

    1.5 Benefits of BRT

    1.1 Defining Bus Rapid TransitBus Rapid Transit (BRT) is a bus-based masstransit system that delivers fast, comfortable,and cost-effective urban mobility. rough theprovision of exclusive right-of-way lanes andexcellence in customer service, BRT essentiallyemulates the performance and amenity charac-teristics of a modern rail-based transit systembut at a fraction of the cost.

    e term BRT has emerged from its applica-tion in North America and Europe. However,

    the same concept is also conveyed around theworld through different names. ese termsinclude:

    High-Capacity Bus Systems,

    High-Quality Bus Systems,

    with an introduction to the concept of BRT aswell as a step-by-step process for successfullyplanning a BRT system.

    is introductory section to BRT includes the

    following topics:

    Fig. 1

    Bus Rapid Transitprovides a sophisticatedmetro-quality transitservice at a cost thatmost cities, evendeveloping cities, canafford.Photo courtesy of Advanced Public

    Transport Sys tems

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    Metro-Bus,

    Surface Subway,

    Express Bus Systems, and

    Busway Systems.

    While the terms may vary from country tocountry, the same basic premise is followed: Ahigh quality, car-competitive transit serviceat an affordable cost. For simplicity, the term

    BRT will be utilised in this module to generi-cally describe these types of systems. However,it is recognised that the concept and the term

    will undoubtedly continue to evolve.

    Perhaps the most telling difference betweenBRT and other transit services is BRTs cen-tral focus on the customer. BRT systems aredesigned around the customer-based needs ofspeed, comfort, convenience, cost, and safetyrather than around a specific technology. In fact,BRT is really just a collection of best practicetraits from a range of mass transit options. Forthis reason, this module will include examplesfrom various mass transit applications in orderto present a package of system characteristicsthat best satisfy customer aspirations.

    While BRT utilises rubber-tyred vehicles, it haslittle else in common with conventional urbanbus systems. e following is a list of featuresfound on some of the most successful BRTsystems implemented to date:

    Exclusive right-of-way lanes;

    Rapid boarding and alighting;

    Free transfers between lines;

    Pre-board fare collection and fare verification;

    Enclosed stations that are safe and comfortable;

    Clear route maps, signage, and real-time in-formation displays;

    Automatic vehicle location technology tomanage vehicle movements;

    Modal integration at stations and terminals;

    Clean vehicle technologies;

    Excellence in marketing and customer service.

    Local circumstances will dictate the extent towhich the above characteristics are actually uti-lised within a system. Small- and medium-sizedcities may find that not all of these featuresare feasible to achieve within cost and capacity

    constraints. Nevertheless, serving customerneeds first is a premise that all cities, regardless

    of local circumstances, should follow in devel-oping a successful transit service.

    Today, the BRT concept is becoming increas-ingly utilised by cities looking for cost-effec-

    tive transit solutions. As new experiments inBRT emerge, the state of the art in BRT willundoubtedly continue to evolve. Nevertheless,BRTs customer focus will likely remain itsdefining characteristic. e developers of high-quality BRT systems in cities such as Bogot,Curitiba, and Ottawa astutely observed that theultimate objective was to swiftly, efficiently, andcost-effectively movepeople, rather than cars.

    1.2 History of BRT

    1.2.1 The predecessors to BRT

    BRTs history resides in a variety of previousefforts to improve the transit experience for thecustomer. e first wide-scale development ofthe BRT concept using bus technology occurredin Curitiba (Brazil) in 1974.

    However, there were several smaller-scale effortsprior to Curitiba that helped to establish theidea. High-occupancy lanes and exclusive buslanes appeared in the United States in the 1960s.

    For example, in 1963, express buses using con-tra-flow bus lanes were developed in the NewYork City area. e origins of the BRT conceptcan be traced back to 1937 when the city ofChicago outlined plans for three inner city raillines to be converted to express bus corridors.Likewise, BRT plans were developed for severalother cities in the United States, including:

    Washington, DC (1955-1959), St. Louis (1959),and Milwaukee (1970) (Levinson et al., 2003).

    Actual construction of a dedicated busway

    first occurred in 1972 with a 7.5 kilometre lineknown as Via Expresa in Lima (Peru). Oneyear later in 1973, busways were constructed inRuncorn (United Kingdom) and Los Angeles(USA). e 22-kilometre Runcorn buswayplayed a central role in the urban form anddevelopment of the citys New Town area. eEl Monte Busway in Los Angeles covered adistance of 11 kilometres.

    1.2.2 Modern BRT systems

    BRTs full promise was not realised, though,until the arrival of the surface subway system

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    Bus Rapid Transit Planning Guide

    1. Introduction

    developed in Curitiba (Brazil) in 1974 (Figure2). Ironically, the city initially aspired to con-structing a rail-based metro system. However, alack of sufficient funding necessitated a more

    creative approach. us, under the leadershipof Mayor Jaime Lerner, the city began a processof developing busway corridors emanating fromthe city centre. Like many Latin American citiesat the time, Curitiba was experiencing rapidpopulation growth. Beginning at a level of some600,000 residents in the early 1970s, the citynow has over 2.2 million inhabitants.

    In much of Latin America, private sector opera-tors have dominated the transit market. How-ever, left uncontrolled and unregulated such

    operators have not met the needs of commutersin terms of comfort, convenience, or safety.Lacking the resources to develop either a rail-based transit system or a car-based urban form,Mayor Lerners team created a low-cost yethigh-quality a lternative utilising bus technology.Today, Curitibas modernistic tubed stationsand 270-passenger bi-articulated buses representa world example. e BRT system now has fiveradial corridors emanating from the city core.e system features 57 kilometres of exclusivebusways and 340 kilometres of feeder services.e system annually attracts hundreds of cityofficials from other municipalities, all seekingto study the organisational and design featuresthat have shaped Curitibas success. e successof Curitibas BRT system has propelled thecareer of Jaime Lerner, the political backer ofthe original concept, as he has been re-electedmayor several times as well as governor of thestate of Paran (Brazil).

    e mid-1970s also saw a limited number of

    BRT applications being developed in othercities of North and South America (Meirelles,2000). While not as sophisticated as the Cu-ritiba system, variations on the concept weredeveloped in Sao Paulo, Brazil (1975); Arling-ton, USA (1975); Goiania, Brazil (1976); Porto

    Alegre, Brazil (1977); and Pittsburgh, UnitedStates (1977). e Sao Paulo BRT system iscurrently the largest in the world with 250kilometres of exclusive busways serving 3.2million passenger trips each day.

    Despite Curitibas success and relative famewithin the transport planning profession, the

    overall replication of the BRT concept wasactually somewhat slow to gain momentumelsewhere. It was only in the late 1990s thatBRTs profile became more widely known. Vis-its by technical and political teams from Bogot(Colombia) and Los Angeles (United States) toCuritiba served to launch BRT efforts in thosecities. In 1996, Quito (Ecuador) opened a BRTsystem using electric trolley-bus technology,

    and the city has since expanded the system withclean diesel technology.

    However, it was the effort in Bogot with itsTransMilenio system that has particularly trans-formed BRTs perception around the world.

    As a large-sized city (7.0 million inhabitants)and a relatively dense city (240 inhabitants perhectare), Bogot provided proof that BRT wascapable of delivering high-capacity perform-ance for the worlds megacities. Today, withboth Bogot and Curitiba acting as catalytic

    examples, the number of cities with built BRTsystems or with systems under development isquite significant.

    In 1998, the administrator of the United StatesFederal Transit Agency (USFTA), GordonLinton, visited the Curitiba BRT system. equalities of the system enabled a conclusionthat such a system could be applicable in theUnited States, where high automobile usagemakes it difficult to justify costly rail-basedoptions. Since Lintons visit, the United States

    has embarked on a national BRT programmethat includes 17 cities. Already, higher-quality

    Fig. 2

    Under the leadershipof former-Mayor JaimeLerner, the BRT system

    in Curitiba (Brazil)became a world leader

    in effective transit.Photo by Lloyd Wright

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    bus systems are in place in Chicago, Honolulu,Los Angeles, Miami, Orlando, Philadelphia,Pittsburgh, and Seattle. Likewise, other OECDnations such as Australia, Canada, France,

    Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom haveseen the potential for BRT as a high-quality

    Table 1: High-quality bus systems around the world (as of February 2004)

    RegionCities with a high-quality bus system in operation(some form of exclusive busway)

    Africa Abidjan, Cot dIvoire; Saint-Denis, Reunion (France)

    Asia Ankara, Turkey; Istanbul, Turkey; Jakarta, Indonesia; Kunming, China; Nagoya, Japan;Taipei, Taiwan

    Europe Bescanon, France; Bradford, UK; Claremont Ferrand, France; Dijon, France;Eindhoven, The Netherlands; Essen, Germany; Grenoble, France; Ipswich, UK; Leeds,UK; Limoges, France; Lyon, France; Montpellier, France; Nancy, France; Rennes,France; Rouen, France; Runcorn, UK; Strasbourg, France; West Sussex, UK

    Latin America Belo Horizonte, Brazil; Bogot, Colombia; Campinas, Brazil; Curitiba, Brazil; Goiania,Brazil; Len, Mxico; Porto Alegre, Brazil; Port of Spain, Trinidad; Quito, Ecuador;Recife, Brazil; Sao Paulo, Brazil

    North America Alameda and Contra Country, USA; Boston, USA; Chicago, USA; Honolulu, USA;Las Vegas, USA; Los Angeles, USA; Miami, USA; Ottawa, Canada; Orlando, USA;Philadelphia, USA; Pittsburgh, USA; Seattle, USA; Vancouver, Canada

    Oceania Adelaide, Australia; Brisbane, Australia; Sydney, Australia

    Region Cities with a high-quality bus system in the design or construction phase

    Africa Accra, Ghana; Cape Town, South Africa; Dakar, Senegal; Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

    Asia Bangalore, India; Beijing, China; Chengdu, China; Dhaka, Bangladesh; Delhi, India;Hangzhou, China; Shejiazhuang, China

    Europe Annecy, France; Brest, France; Caen, France; Cambridge, UK; Coventry, UK; Luton,UK; Maubeuge, France; Nice, France; La Rochelle, France; Toulon, France

    Latin America Barranquilla, Colombia; Bucaramanga, Colombia; Cali, Colombia; Cartagena,Colombia; Cuenca, Ecuador; Guatemala City, Guatemala; Guayaquil, Ecuador; Lima,Peru; Medelln, Colombia; Mexico City, Mxico; Panama City, Panama; Pereira,Colombia; Puebla, Mexico; San Juan, Puerto Rico; San Jose, Costa Rica; SanSalvador, El Salvador

    North America Albany, USA; Charlotte, USA; Cleveland, USA; Eugene, USA; Hartford, USA;Louisville, USA; Montgomery County, USA; Reno, USA; Salt Lake City, USA; SanFrancisco, USA; Toronto, Canada

    Oceania Auckland, New Zealand; Perth, Australia

    but low-cost mass transit option (Figures 3 and4). e transfer of BRT technology from Latin

    America to OECD nations has made BRT oneof the most notable examples of technology

    transfer from the developing south to the devel-oped north.

    Fig. 3 and 4

    Developed-nationcities such as Brisbane,Australia (left photo)and Ottawa, Canada(right photo) have also

    benefited from BRT.Brisbane photo courtesy of

    Queensland Transport

    Ottawa photo by Lloyd Wright

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    ere is no precise definition of what constitutesa BRT system and what represents simply animproved transit system. Table 1 lists the cities

    with bus transit systems that possess some of

    the qualities of BRT, as of July 2004. Most ofthe cities listed have some form of exclusivebusways. e table distinguishes between cit-ies with systems in operation and those in theplanning or construction phase.

    Despite this long list of cities with improvedtransit services, the number of cities with fullBRT systems is actually more limited (Table 2).In this case, a full BRT system is defined assystems with the following characteristics:

    Exclusive busways utilised on trunk-line cor-

    ridors;Pre-board fare collection and fare verification;

    Entry to system restricted to prescribed op-erators under a reformed business and admin-istrative structure (closed system);

    Clean vehicle technology;

    Fare free integration between feeder servicesand trunk-line services.

    Table 2: Full BRT systems(as of February 2004)

    City Total kilometres ofexclusive busways

    Bogot (Colombia) 58

    Curitiba (Brazil) 57

    Goiania (Brazil) 13

    Quito (Ecuador) 26

    e Latin American cities of Bogot, Curitiba,Goiania, and Quito probably possess the mostcomplete systems, in terms of all aspects of BRT.e systems in Brisbane (Australia), Ottawa

    (Canada), and Rouen (France) probably providethe best examples of BRT in the developed-na-tion context. e experiences in Africa and Asiaare more limited in number and scope. eTaipei (Taiwan) and Nagoya (Japan) systemsperhaps stand out as the more complete systemsin the Asian region, although not quite reachingthe level of full BRT systems.

    1.2.3 Conventional bus systems

    Conventional transit systems can vary signifi-cantly in size and quality, even within the samecity. Transit ranges can range from relatively

    modest van services to bus systems approachingthe performance of a BRT system. e qualityof public transit can be seen as a spectrum ofpossibilities ranging from customer unfriendlyinformal operations to full-feature mass transitsystems that achieve mass transit speeds andcapacities (Figures 5 and 6). It is worth notingthat this spectrum can encompass both road andrail transit options. In general, most developingcities should be attempting to move towards

    higher-quality services. BRT has provided ameans to enter the higher-quality, higher-capac-ity end of the spectrum but at a substantiallyreduced cost in comparison to other options.

    Mini-buses and vans, both formal and informal,are quite evident in cities of Africa and Latin

    America. While these services are sometimes ofrelatively low quality, they often provide transitoptions for communities with few other choices.Standard bus services encompass the conven-tional 70 passenger buses (12 metres) plying the

    streets in most parts of the developing world.ese conventional services are typically saferthan informal mini-buses, but nevertheless stillare not an attractive, comfortable, or convenientoption. e next stage in transit evolution istowards more organised and higher-quality busservices. Such services may feature newer andcleaner vehicles, more sophisticated fare collec-tion systems, bus lanes, and improved stations.

    Higher-quality conventional bus services, whilenot BRT, can be a significant improvement for

    residents of most cities. e conventional bussystems in cities such as Hong Kong, London,

    Fig. 5

    Mass transit speeds andcapacities

    Non-regulated operators

    Taxi-like services

    Poor quality customer service

    Relatively unsafe and insecure

    Very old, smaller vehicles

    Pre-board fare payment

    On-board fare verification

    Higher quality shelters

    Euro II - Euro III type vehicles

    Marketing identity

    Publicly-owned service

    Often subsidised

    On-board fare collection

    Stops with basic shelters

    Relatively infrequent service

    Older vehicles

    Metro-quality service

    Closed stations

    Pre-board fare collectionand fare verification

    Modern, clean vehicles

    Integrated transfer stations

    Informal transitservice

    Standardtransit service

    Higher-qualitytransit service

    Mass rapidtransit

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    1. Introduction

    and Singapore have achieved considerablesuccess without the full application of BRTattributes. Londons bus network serves 5.4million passenger trips each day, far exceedingthe citys underground metro system. Londonis one of the few cities in the world in whichbus ridership has consistently risen over the pastten years. Londons success has been predicatedupon four broad goals of service quality:1. Frequency (turn up and go service withwaits of 12 minutes or less); 2. Reliability (en-

    forced bus lanes); 3. Comprehensiveness; and 4.Simplicity. To accomplish these goals, Londonhas implemented many BRT-type features

    within a conventional bus service:

    Accessible low-floor vehicles for fast boardingand alighting;

    Pre-board fare collection in central areas;

    Real-time information displays at stations;

    Quality incentive contracts with conces-sioned operators;

    Enhanced driver training;Priority lane measures.

    ig. 6

    Developing cities canvolve from relativelynformal transit serviceso formally organised

    mass transit systems;RT is a cost effective

    way of making thisransformation.hotos by Lloyd Wright and Carlos

    ardo

    While London has not strictly implementedbusways, the frequent use of well-demarcatedbus lanes has helped to increase average speedsand overall reliability. Painted bus lanes withcameras to control private vehicle infringementshave helped to avoid many of the problems as-sociated with standard bus lanes (Figure 7). Box1 compares bus lanes to busways.

    Hong Kong has achieved many of the samesuccesses as London with priority bus lanes, in-tegrated fare structures with other mass transit

    options, incentive-based contracts with conces-sioned operators, and higher-quality vehicles.Whether a system is termed BRT or not is lessrelevant than the quality of the service providedand the degree to which continual improvementis achieved. Most conventional bus services canbe upgraded substantially by considering someof the low-cost customer service enhancementsthat are evident in BRT systems.

    However, experiences with bus lanes have oftenfailed to deliver desired results in developing

    cities. In many developing cities the bus lanesare regularly invaded by mixed traffic, even

    Informal services Standard services

    Bus Rapid Transit Higher-quality services

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    Box 1: Bus lanes or buswaysBus lanes and busways are quite differentin design and effectiveness. While somewell-demarcated and well-enforced bus lane

    systems in developed nations have succeed-ed (e.g., London), in general, bus lanes dolittle to enhance the effectiveness of publictransport.

    Bus lanes are street surfaces reservedprimarily for public transport vehicles ona permanent basis or on specific hourlyschedule. Bus lanes are not physically segre-gated from other lanes. While the lanes maybe painted, demarcated, and sign-posted,changing lanes is still feasible. In some cases,bus lanes may be shared with high-occu-pancy vehicles, taxis, and/or non-motorised

    vehicles. Bus lanes may also be open to pri-vate vehicle usage near turning points.

    Busways are physically segregated lanesthat are exclusively for the use of publictransport vehicles. Entrance to a buswaycan only undertaken at specific points. Thebusway is segregated from other traffic bymeans of a wall, curbing, cones, or otherwell-defined structural feature. Non-transitvehicles are generally not permitted accessto a busway although emergency vehiclesoften also may utilise the lane. Busways maybe at surface level, elevated, or underground.

    BRT systems typically consist of buswayinfrastructure.

    Fig. 7

    While not as effective asdedicated busways, thebus lanes in Londonare protected fromencroaching traffic by

    enforcement cameras.Photo by Lloyd Wright

    Fig. 8 and 9

    e photo above is takenfrom a bus in a bus only

    lane in Mexico City(Mexico).

    Photo courtesy of Lee Schipper

    e photo on the leftshows a bus only street

    in San Jose (CostaRica) being invaded by

    private vehicles.Photo by Lloyd Wright.

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    when the buses are travelling in a counter-flowdirection (Figures 8 and 9). Without the strongenforcement environment and resources of acity such as London, bus lanes tend to lose their

    effectiveness. In fact, buses operating alonghighly-invaded bus lanes will in some instancesleave the bus lane to travel more rapidly in amixed traffic lane. Bus lanes also force unavoid-able conflicts with turning vehicles. With buslanes on the sides of the roadways, vehicles mustcross the bus lane or even utilise the bus lane toenter or exit side streets.

    1.3 Public transport in developingcities

    For much of the worlds population, publictransit is a necessary evil that must be enduredrather than appreciated. For many families, theultimate goal is to one day afford individualmotorised transport, either in the form of amotorcycle or automobile. e state of publictransit implies discomfort, long waits, risk topersonal safety, and restrictions on movement.Customer satisfaction with the myriad of infor-mal and formal vans, mini-buses, and full-sizedbuses that ply developing city streets is typically

    extremely low.Under such conditions, it is not surprising thatsuch services are losing passengers at alarmingrates. e private vehicle continues to makegains in virtually every city. If present trendscontinue, public transport may have a ratherdoubtful future. As incomes rise in developingnations, private vehicles are gaining usage whilepublic transports ridership is almost universally

    declining. A selection of developing citiesindicates that public transit systems are typi-cally losing in the area of between 0.3 and 1.2percentage points of ridership each year (Table

    3) (WBSCD, 2001).e reasons for public transports demise are notdifficult to discern (Figures 10 and 11). Poortransit services in both the developed and devel-oping world push consumers to private vehicleoptions. e attraction of the private car andmotorcycle is both in terms of performance andimage. Public transport customers typically givethe following reasons for switching to privatevehicles:

    1. Inconvenience in terms of location of stations

    and frequency of service;2. Failure to service key origins and

    destinations;

    3. Fear of crime at stations and within buses;

    4. Lack of safety in terms of driver ability andthe road-worthiness of buses;

    5. Service is much slower than private vehicles,especially when buses make frequent stops;

    6. Overloading of vehicles makes ride uncom-fortable;

    7. Public transport can be relatively expensivefor some developing-nation households;

    8. Poor-quality or non-existent infrastructure(e.g., lack of shelters, unclean vehicles, etc.)

    9. Lack of an organised system structure and ac-companying maps and information make thesystems difficult to use; and

    10. Low status of public transit services.

    Table 3: Changes over time in daily average public transport trips, selected cities

    (includes bus, rail, and paratransit)Earlier Year Later Year

    City YearPopulation

    (million)

    Public

    Transport

    Trips/day

    Percent of

    All TripsYear

    Polulation

    (million)

    Public

    Transport

    Trips/day

    Percent of

    All Trips

    Mexico 1984 17.0 0.9 80 1994 22.0 1.2 72

    Moscow 1990 8.6 2.8 87 1997 8.6 2.8 83

    Santiago 1977 4.1 1.0 70 1991 5.5 0.9 56

    Sao Paolo 1977 10.3 1.0 46 1997 16.8 0.6 33

    Seoul 1970 5.5 67 1992 11.0 1.5 61

    Shanghai 1986 13.0 0.4 24 1995 15.6 0.3 15

    Warsaw 1987 1.6 1.3 80 1998 1.6 1.2 53

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    Fig. 10 and 11e poor-quality urbantransit in Tanzania(left photo) andMozambique (rightphoto) exemplifiesthe challenges facingdeveloping cities.Photos by Lloyd Wright

    However, the demise in public transport is notpre-ordained. BRT is public transports responseto this decline, with an attempt to provide a

    car-competitive service. With the introductionof the TransMilenio BRT system in Bogot,Colombia, public transit ridership has actuallyincreased in that city. Although the systemhad only opened two of its 22 planned lines inDecember 2000, the system achieved an imme-diate 6 per cent of transport mode share. Privatevehicle usage declined from 18 per cent of dailytrips in 1999 to 14 per cent in 2001 (ComoVamos Bogot, 2001). A more detailed studyalong the TransMilenio corridor indicates that

    the system captured nearly 10 per cent of tripsthat would have been otherwise undertaken byprivate vehicle. (Steer Davies Gleave, 2003). Cu-ritibas BRT system witnessed a similar increase

    when initially opened, and was able to increaseridership by over 2 per cent a year for over twodecades, enough to maintain the public transitmode share when every other Brazilian city was

    witnessing significant declines.

    BRT attempts to address each of the identifieddeficiencies in current services by providing

    a rapid, high quality, safe and secure transit

    option. Figures 12 and 13 present images ofBogot, Colombia before and after the develop-ment of its TransMilenio system.

    1.4 Barriers to BRT

    When measured in terms of economic, environ-mental and social benefits, BRTs track recordprovides a compelling case for more cities toconsider it as a transit priority. However, as anew concept, there remain several barriers thathave prevented wider dissemination of BRT.

    Specifically, these barriers include:

    Political will;

    Existing operators;Institutional biases;Lack of information;Institutional capacity;Technical capacity;Financing;Geographical / physical limitations.

    Political will is by far the most importantingredient in making BRT work. Overcomingresistance from special interest groups andthe general inertia against change is often an

    insurmountable obstacle for mayors and other

    Fig. 12 and 13

    Bogot transformeditself from road chaos toformal mass transit injust three years.

    Photo on left by Lloyd Wright

    Photo on right courtesy of

    TransMileni o SA

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    officials. Lobby groups from rail and automo-bile interests can make for a powerful politicalargument against BRT implementation. How-ever, for those public officials that have made

    the commitment to BRT, the political rewardscan be great. e political leaders behind theBRT systems in cities like Curitiba and Bogothave left a lasting legacy to their cities, and inthe process, these officials have been rewarded

    with enormous popularity and success.

    While automobiles may represent less than 15per cent of a developing citys transport modeshare, the owners of such vehicles represent themost influential socio-political grouping. eidea of prioritising road space to public trans-

    port may appear to be counter to the interestof private vehicle owners. However, in reality,separating public transit vehicles from othertraffic may often improve conditions for privatevehicles. Since public transit vehicles stop morefrequently, the separation of these vehicles frommixed traffic can actually improve flows for all.

    Existing transit operators may also proveto be a substantial political barrier to BRTimplementation. Such operators may be quitesceptical of any change, especially when the

    change may have ramifications on their ownprofitability and even viability. In cities suchas Quito (Ecuador), the existing operators tookto violent street demonstrations to counter thedevelopment of the BRT system. Likewise, inother cities the private transit operators havepressured political officials through recall effortsand intense lobbying. However, it should be

    noted that the threat to existing operators maybe more perceived than real. In most cases, aneffective outreach effort with the operators canhelp dispel unfounded fears. In reality, exist-

    ing operators can gain substantially from BRTthrough improved profitability and better workconditions. e existing operators can effec-tively compete to win operational concessions

    within the proposed BRT system.

    e professional staff within municipal agenciesmay also represent a barrier to BRT implemen-tation. Such staff often do not utilise publictransit as the primary means to travel. Instead,municipal officials are part of a middle classelite who have the purchasing power to acquire

    a private vehicle. us, the professionals whoare responsible for planning and designing pub-lic transit systems frequently do not use publictransit. is lack of familiarity with transit userneeds and realities can result in less than opti-mum public transit design. Such staff may alsounwittingly give funding and design preferenceto individual motorised travel since this mode isthe one with which they are most familiar.

    Despite the rise of global information networks,a lack of knowledge of options like BRT

    remains a very real barrier. e long period oftime between the development of the systemin Curitiba and the realisation of BRT by othercities is evidence of this information shortfall.rough the assistance of international agenciesand non-governmental organisations, awarenessof BRT has risen sharply in recent years. Visitsto Bogot by city officials from Africa and

    Fig. 14

    Transit officials fromthe world over arevisiting Bogot to

    learn more about BRTimplementation.

    Photo courtesy of Human City

    Foundation.

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    Asia have helped to catalyse new BRT projects(Figure 14). Nevertheless, many developingcities still do not have basic information onunderstanding the potential of BRT.

    e lack of information on BRT at the municipallevel often occurs in direct correlation with thelack of human resource capacity. e transportdepartments of many major developing citiesmust cope with a wide array of issues with onlya handful of staff. e lack of institutional andtechnical capacity at the local level inhibits theability of agencies to consider BRT even whengeneral awareness of the opportunity is present.

    Financing is typically a lesser problem withBRT than other mass transit options. First,

    BRT is a relatively low-cost option that iswithin the funding capacity of most developingcities. Second, the operational cost effective-ness of BRT means that many regional andmulti-lateral organisations are quite willing tofinance such projects. Unlike other options, thelack of on-going operational subsidies with BRTimplies that the sustainability of the project canoften be assured at the local level.

    Various local conditions, such as urban, geo-graphical and topographical factors, can alsopresent barriers to BRT implementation. Forinstance, extremely narrow roadways and steephills can pose design challenges. However, ingeneral, there are technical solutions to each

    one of these issues. Local conditions requirelocal solutions, which ultimately makes eachBRT project unique in its own way.

    1.5 Benefits of BRTAn effective public transit system can underpina citys progress towards social equality, eco-nomic prosperity, and environmental sustain-ability. By leap-frogging past a car-dependentdevelopment path, cities can avoid the manynegative costs associated with uncontrolledgrowth that ultimately disrupts urban coher-ence and a sense of community.

    Table 4 outlines some of the direct benefits thatBRT has provided to developing cities. Beyond

    these benefits, though, there exist multiplierimpacts that can further increase the value ofBRT to a municipality. For example, BRT canlead to reduced public costs associated withvehicle emissions and accidents. Such impactsinclude costs borne by the health care system,the police force, and the judicial system. In turn,by reducing these costs, municipal resources canbe directed towards other areas such as pre-ventative health care, education, and nutrition.

    Methodologies for estimating the economic,

    environmental and social impacts of BRT areincluded in later sections of this guidebook.

    Table 4: The benefits of BRT

    Category Description

    Economic Reduced travel times More reliable product deliveries Increased economic productivity Increased employment Improved work conditions

    Social More equitable access throughout the city Reduced accidents and illness Increased civic pride and sense of community

    Environmental Reduced emissions of pollutants related to human health(CO, SOx, NOx, particulates, CO2)

    Reduced noise levels

    Urban form More sustainable urban form, including densification of major corridors Reduced cost of delivering services such as electricity, sanitation, and water

    Political Delivery of mass transit system within one political term Delivery of high-quality resource that will produce positive results for virtually all

    voting groups

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    2. Choosing a Mass TransitSystem

    Choosing the type of mass transit system for a

    city can be a difficult process. Given the variousinterest groups involved and the substantialprivate sector contracts at stake, the processcan become highly politicised. However, it isquite possible to make such a decision withina rational framework. is section attemptsto provide such a framework, as well as offer adiscussion on each decision variable.

    e choice of mass transit technology will affecttravel times, personal transport expenditures,and commuter comfort and safety. e choice

    will also dramatically affect municipal financesand a citys economic efficiency. Ultimately, theselection will shape a citys urban form and thevery lifestyle of its inhabitants. us, an objec-tive and effective evaluation process is clearly a

    worthwhile goal.

    e topics discussed in this section, include:

    2.1 Introduction to mass transit options

    2.2 Criteria in technology section

    2.2.1 Cost

    2.2.2 Design and implementation

    2.2.3 Performance

    2.2.4 Impacts

    2.3 BRT myths

    2.1 Introduction to mass transit options

    Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) is collective urban

    passenger service that operates at high levels of cus-tomer performance, especially with regard to traveltimes and passenger carrying capacity. Mass rapidtransit can achieve reduced travel times throughthe provision of widely accessible networks,higher speed vehicles, exclusive right-of-wayinfrastructure, efficient fare collection systems,and/or faster boarding and alighting techniques.Higher carrying capacities may be achievedthrough larger vehicles, multiple sets of vehicles(i.e., a train), and/or more frequent service.

    Box 2 defines the major categories of mass tran-sit typologies. Of course, there is a wide range

    of permutations possible with each technology.Some LRT systems may blur the boundaries

    with the definition of a metro when LRT isutilised on grade-separated infrastructure.

    Likewise, some BRT systems have segments thatgo underground. Nevertheless, Box 2 providesa general typology for mass transit systems. econtinued innovation from mass transit devel-opers is likely to mean that these definitions willalso continue to evolve.

    Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is just one of severaltypes of mass rapid transit. Additionally, thereare a range of rail-based transit systems that arepossible, including Light Rail Transit (LRT),trams, underground metro systems, elevated

    Box 2:Types of Mass Rapid TransitBus Rapid Transit (BRT) Bus-basedtechnology typically operating on exclu-sive right-of-way lanes at the surface level;in some cases underpasses or tunnels areutilised to provide grade separation at inter-sections or in dense city centres.

    Light Rail Transit (LRT) Electric rail-basedtechnology operating either as a single rail caror as a short train of cars, typically on exclu-

    sive right-of-way lanes at the surface level withoverhead electrical connectors; a tram systemcan also be considered a type of LRT, buttypically has smaller-sized vehicles and mayshare road space with other forms of traffic.

    Underground Metro A heavy rail transitsystem operating on grade separated tracksthat are located principally underground.

    Elevated rail transit A rail transit systemoperating on grade separated tracks thatare located principally on an aerial structure;elevated systems can also be considered aform of metro.

    Suburban rail A heavy rail transit systemoperating on exclusive right-of-way tracksthat are located principally at the surfacelevel but generally grade separated; typicallycarries passengers between suburban andurban locations; differs from other urban railsystems by the fact that cars are heavier andthe distances travelled are usually longer.

    Personal Rapid Transit (PRT) A rail- orwheel-based system carrying passengers insmall Automatic Guided Vehicles (AGV); PRTtypically operates on exclusive right-of-way

    lanes that may also be grade separated.

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    rail systems, and Personal Rapid Transit (PRT)systems. No one of these options is inherentlycorrect or incorrect. Local conditions and localpreferences play a significant role in determin-

    ing the preferred system type.Additional types of mass transit systems are alsopossible. While monorail and maglev train tech-nologies could be considered a form of elevatedrail transit, these technologies are also distinc-tive enough to be considered as separate transitcategories. However, over the past forty yearsof the technologys existence, monorail systemshave not been developed to any great degree.Other than in Japan, most existing currentmonorail applications are quite specialised such

    as in theme parks. However, Las Vegas (USA)is completing a monorail line in 2004, andSeattle (USA) is currently developing its secondmonorail project. Maglev technology is quitenew and holds the potential to increase vehiclespeeds considerably. e only current passengerapplication of maglev is found in Shanghai(China), where speeds of over 400 km per hourare reached on a 30 kilometre line between thecity and its new international airport. However,at a cost of over US$ 300 million per kilometre,the technology is unlikely to be replicatedelsewhere for the foreseeable future. Further, formany transport professionals, maglev technol-ogy is seen more as a competitor of air travel forinter-city travel rather than a practical solution

    within the urban transit sector.

    Personal Rapid Transit (PRT) is another rela-tively new phenomenon that is being developedas an option in lower-density developed cities.PRT utilises Automatic Guided Vehicles (AGV)that avoid the need for a driver, and thus helpdeveloped cities to reduce their relatively highlabour costs. ese vehicles may be eitherrubber tyre- or rail-based, and are somewhatsmall in size with each vehicle carrying in therange of two to six passengers. To date, only afew experimental systems have been developed.For these reasons, PRT is not presented in anyfurther detail in this document.

    2.2 Criteria in technology selection

    e decision to select Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)

    as opposed to other options depends upon manyfactors. Costs, performance characteristics, and

    personal preferences will all likely play a role.is section will outline some of the factors thatshould be considered in selecting the type ofmass transit system for a city. While this docu-

    ment focuses upon BRT, many of its attributesand design lessons are transferable to other masstransit types as well. Additional informationon different mass transit types can be found inModule 3a of the GTZ Sustainable TransportSourcebook (Wright and Fjellstrom, 2003).

    In recent years, significant debates amongsttransport professionals have occurred on

    whether BRT or rail-based solutions are themost appropriate. Such competition betweensystems can actually be healthy as it implies an

    environment in which all technologies muststrive to improve. A rigorous evaluation processwill also help ensure that a city makes the mostappropriate choice.

    In truth, it may in fact be better to define basictransit characteristics prior to selecting a par-ticular technology. By understanding customerneeds with respect to fare levels, routing andlocation, travel time, frequency of service, qualityof infrastructure, and issues of safety and security,system developers can characterise the most ideal

    type of service without prejudicing the result toany particular technology. Such a customer-ori-entated approach will likely have the best chanceof producing a transit service that can effectivelycompete with the private automobile. In practice,though, a political official or technical official

    will often state a preference for a particulartechnology at the outset. In this case, the serviceis effectively being designed around a technologyrather than the customer. Mass transit technol-ogy decisions can thus become a sort of self-ful-filling prophecy based upon political or personalpreferences rather than customer needs.

    e choice of transit technology should bechosen on a range of considerations withperformance and cost being amongst the mostimportant. As suggested, these requirementsare ideally derived from an objective analysisof the existing and projected situation. Table 5outlines categories of the characteristics that canhelp shape a citys decision towards the mostappropriate type of mass transit system.

    is section attempts to provide an objectivereview of each of these characteristics. Again,

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    no one mass transit solution is the right solutionfor all cities. e local circumstances and publicpolicy objectives play a significant role in select-ing the optimum transit solution for any city.

    2.2.1 Costs2.2.1.1 Capital costs (infrastructure costs)

    For most developing cities, the infrastructurecosts will be a pre-eminent decision-makingfactor. Developing cities often face a borrowingcap which acts as a ceiling to the total amountof borrowing that can be undertaken, basedupon lending regulations set by institutionssuch as the International Monetary Fund andthe World Bank. e lending capacity is oftena function of the amount of loans currently

    outstanding as well as the relative level of debtto gross domestic product (GDP). Addition-ally, lending in the transport sector will have adirect impact on a citys ability to borrow for allcritical functions, including such areas as water,sanitation, education, and health care. us,the decision on a citys transit system will havebroad ramifications affecting many facets ofoverall development.

    e exact capital cost of a system will dependupon many local factors, including:

    Local labour costs;

    Table 5: Factors in choosing a type ofmass transit system

    Category Factor

    Cost Capital costs (infrastructure

    costs)Operating costs

    Design andoperation

    Planning and implementationtimeSystem capacityScalabilityFlexibilityDiversity versus homogeneityManagement and administration

    Performance Travel time / speedService frequencyReliabilityComfort

    SafetyCustomer serviceImage and perception

    Impacts Economic impactsSocial impactsEnvironmental impactsUrban impacts

    Competitiveness of construction industry;

    Quality of management and organisationalcapabilities;

    Local physical conditions (topology, soil con-

    ditions, water tables, etc.);Design and safety requirements;

    Financing costs;

    Local content versus imported content oftechnology;

    Requirements to retire existing vehicle fleets;

    Levels of import duties;

    Property prices and level of expropriation re-quired for system development;

    Level of competitiveness and openness in the

    bidding process.us, while it is possible to compare capitalcosts with other cities, the actual investmentlevel will depend upon the nature of local con-ditions. Table 6 provides a sampling of capitalcosts from several different cities and severaldifferent mass transit technologies. In makingsuch comparisons, one must take extra precau-tion that one is comparing the same set ofcost factors. For instance, one technology bidmay consider rolling stock (vehicles) to be part

    of capital costs while another bid may placethe item in operating costs. Further, in somecases, rail systems may capitalise spare partsand regular maintenance activities while othertransit systems will likely expense such itemsunder operating costs. For the purposes ofdeveloping a decision-making matrix betweensystem types, one must be strict in categorisingeach cost type consistently.

    Table 6 indicates that BRT systems are typicallyin the range of US$ 500,000 per kilometre to

    US$ 15 million per kilometre. By comparison,at-grade light rail transit (LRT) appears to be inthe range of US$ 13 million to US$ 40 millionper kilometre. Elevated systems can range fromUS$ 30 million per kilometre to US$ 100 mil-lion per kilometre. Finally, underground metrosystems seem to range from US$ 45 million perkilometre to as high as US$ 320 million perkilometre. e significant size of the variousranges again indicates the local nature of costing.

    Additionally, the range depends upon the indi-vidual features sought within each system (e.g.,quality of stations, separation from traffic, etc.).

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    Figure 15 presents a graphical way of looking atthe same comparison based upon the amountof city area that can be covered by rail and BRTat equal investment levels. e relative coveragethat each system can provide is not a trivial mat-ter as it will greatly determine usability. A lim-ited system of only a few kilometres will meanthat most of a persons essential destinations arenot reachable by the system. When systems are

    quite extensive across the expanse of a city, thenthe ability to function without purchasing aprivate vehicle is considerably higher.

    e relative robustness of capital cost projec-tions is also an important consideration. Higher-cost options, such as rail technologies, also tendto demonstrate greater disparity between pro-jected and actual costs. is disparity translatesinto greater financial risk for those undertakingthe project. Table 7 illustrates the tendency forcertain rail projects to under-estimate expected

    costs and to over-estimate the number of ex-pected passengers.

    Table 6: Capital costs for different mass transit systems

    City Type of systemKilometres of

    segregated lines (km)Cost per kilometre(US$ million / km)

    Taipei Bus rapid transit 57 0.5

    Porto Alegre Bus rapid transit 27 1.0

    Quito (Eco-Via Line) Bus rapid transit 10 1.2

    Las Vegas (Max) Bus rapid transit 11.2 1.7

    Curitiba Bus rapid transit 57 2.5

    Sao Paulo Bus rapid transit 114 3.0

    Bogot (Phase I) Bus rapid transit 40 5.3

    Tunis Light rail transit 30 13.3

    San Diego Light rail transit 75 17.2

    Lyon Light rail transit 18 18.9

    Bordeaux Light rail transit 23 20.5

    Portland Light rail transit 28 35.2

    Los Angeles (Gold Line) Light rail transit 23 37.8

    Kuala Lumpur (PUTRA) Elevated rail 29 50.0

    Bangkok (BTS) Elevated rail 23 73.9

    Las Vegas Monorail 6.4 101.6

    Mexico (Line B) Metro rail 24 40.9

    Madrid (1999 extension) Metro rail 38 42.8

    Caracas (Line 4) Metro rail 12 90.3

    Hong Kong Metro rail 82 220.0

    London (Jubilee Line ext.) Metro rail 16 350.0

    ig. 15

    e higher cost of rail-ased infrastructure

    means a BRT network

    an cover an entire cityt the same cost as a fewilometres of rail

    wo system options at the same cost

    Rail-based system

    BRT system

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    ere may a variety of reasons for the under-estimation of public transit projects, includingeconomic self-interest, technological complexity,and psychological factors. Project developersmay under-estimate costs in order to win initialcommitment to the project; the underestima-tion may particularly occur when there is nopenalty or risk for doing so (Flyvbjerg et al.,2003). Projects that require tunnelling, elevatedstructures, and advanced technology probablyalso incur greater cost variance due to therelative project complexity that is related tothe occurrence of unforeseen events and costs.

    Allport (2000, p. S-23) notes that metros area different order of challenge, cost and risk.

    Allport also draws similar cautions with LRT:

    LRT is often considered a more affordablealternative to a metro, while having the up-mar-ket and green image which busways have so farusually not had[but LRT systems] comes at avery high cost, both capital and operating, andthey can be risky: much needs to go right for aproject to be successful, and a bad mistake canspell disaster. (Allport, 2000, p. S-6)

    Additionally, overly-optimistic projections mayalso be due to psychological preferences formore grandiose and image-driven options.

    In some instances, capital costs can be reducedthrough concessionary financing or grants fromdeveloped-nation governments and privatefirms. e concessionary funds are provided as ameans to promote the exportation of developed-nation products such as vehicles, informationtechnology, and consultants. Concessionaryterms can also be an effective technique to locka city into a particular technology. e financialconcessions may even be recouped later as theparticular city extends the system. e Mexico

    City metro system, the Medelln (Colombia)urban rail system, and the Delhi metro systemhave also benefited from finance provided by,respectively, France, Germany, and Japan atconcessionary interest rates. Unfortunately, inthe cases of Mexico City and Medelln the costof extending the current rail system is prohibi-tively expensive since the concessionary termsare no longer available.

    2.2.1.2 Operating costs

    e long-term financial sustainability of atransit project is highly dependent upon the

    on-going operating costs of the system. esecosts can include vehicle amortisation, labour,fuel, maintenance and spare parts. If a systemrequires on-going subsidies, the financial strain

    can end up affecting the effectiveness of boththe municipal government and the transitservice to the customer. e level of operatingcosts will also be related to the expected farelevels of the service, and thus will ultimatelyaffect affordability and issues of social equity.

    Labour costs represent perhaps the greatestdifference between systems in developed nationsand systems in developing nations. Whereaslabour can represent between 35% and 75% ofoperating costs in Europe and North America,

    the labour component of developing-nationsystems are often well less than 20%.

    is difference has greatly shaped the directionof public transport in each context. Systemssuch as light rail transit (LRT) have provenquite popular in developed nations, in part dueto the reduced need for operating staff. Withmultiple rail vehicles being operated by onedriver, the labour cost per customer is greatlyreduced. In contrast, the relatively low labourcosts in developing city applications means

    that there is little penalty for modes requiringmore operating staff. Further, for social reasons,maintaining or even increasing employment isoften a fundamental objective of public transitprojects in the developing-city context.

    e difference in labour costs, in conjunctionwith the higher capital costs for rail-basedsolutions, largely explains the relative lackof LRT and metro systems in the developing

    world. Outside of major corridors in a fewdeveloping megacities, rail transit has not been

    implemented significantly in developing na-tions. Rail options are likely to never fully serve

    Table 7: Cost overruns and passenger projections of rail projects

    ProjectCost Overrun

    (%)Actual traffic as a percentage of

    projected traffic, opening year

    Washington metro 85 NA

    Mexico City metro 60 50

    Tyne and Wear metro 55 50

    Kolkata metro NA 5

    Miami metro NA 50Source: Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., and Rothengatter, W. (2003)

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    ig. 16 and 17

    e urban rail andRT systems inorto Alegre (Brazil)rovide a comparativenvironment for the

    different mass transitptions. e railystem requires a 69%perating subsidy whilehe BRT system requires

    o operating subsidies.hotos by Lloyd Wright

    a citys full transit needs. Only corridors withthe highest passenger throughputs can producea competitive operating cost structure for rail.By comparison, bus-based systems can cost-ef-

    fectively serve a wide spectrum of passengernumbers from lower-density residential areas tothe high-density corridors of a megacity such asBogot.

    In developing cities, the lower impact of wageson total costs means that these costs are largelyoverwhelmed by the other components. Porto

    Alegre, Brazil offers a unique opportunity todirectly compare urban rail and BRT operatingcosts. e city has both types of systems operat-ing in similar circumstances. e TrensUrb rail

    system requires a 69% operating subsidy foreach passenger trip. By contrast, the citys BRTsystem has a comparable fare structure, butoperates with no subsidies and in fact returns aprofit to the private sector firms operating thebuses (Figures 16 and 17).

    In the developed cities of North America andWestern Europe, rail solutions, particularly LRT,are now being implemented with increasedfrequency. e divergent technology pathsbetween developing and developed cities do not

    suggest one solution is better or more appropri-ate than another. Instead, it merely reflectshighly different local circumstances and coststructures.

    Beyond labour costs, other operating com-ponents tend to favour BRT over rail-basedoptions in developing cities. With rail carstypically in excess of US$ 2 million and Latin

    American articulated buses in the area of US$200,000, the vehicle amortisation costs are stillin the area of three times more costly for railthan for bus, even accounting for the longer lifeof rail vehicles and the greater passenger car-rying capacity. e more specialised nature ofrail maintenance and spare parts also tends to

    increase these costs. Comparisons of fuel costsobviously depend upon the technology utilisedfor the BRT vehicles, which can be diesel, natu-ral gas, hydrogen, or electricity.

    Operating costs are also affected by the econo-mies of scale of the given operation. In devel-oped nations the lower demand for pubic transitservices has largely translated into inadequaterevenues to cover costs, especially with regardto rail-based services. In turn, this differentialimplies often heavy subsidisation of the system.

    Likewise, rail-based services in developing citiesalso frequently require subsidisation. With theexception of the metros in Hong Kong, Manila,Santiago, and Sao Paulo, there are relativelyfew examples of systems with fare box recoveryratios greater than 1.0 (i.e., revenues greaterthan costs). Further, crossing into the frontierof subsidies also brings with it additional costs.Managing the subsidy process, controllingmisappropriation, and ensuring the right incen-tives for customer service all require personneland resources.

    Implementing a system that will require sub-sidies without end raises issues of inter-genera-tional equity. A commitment to subsidies intothe indefinite future places a potentially heavyburden on future generations. In the short term,such subsidies will reduce annual spendingavailable for other development objectives suchas health care and education. Gregory Ingramof the World Bank supports this possibility with(Ingram, 1998, p. 7):

    e construction costs of Metros in developingcountries are so high that they crowd out many

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    Fig. 18 and 19

    An initial BRT corridorcan take 12 to 24months to construct ascompared to the threeto five years requiredfor underground orelevated rail systems.Photo above by Lloyd Wright

    Photo on left by Karl Fjellstrom

    other investmentsMost systems have operat-ing deficits that severely constrain local budgets,as in Pusan and Mexico City.

    In this sense, future generations may be penal-

    ised twice by having a lower development baseto build upon and by being forced to continuesubsidies for a transit decision placed uponthem by previous administrations.

    Developing-city BRT systems typically oper-ate without subsidies. Revenues cover allBRT operating costs in cities such as Bogot,Curitiba, Quito, and Porto Alegre. Further, thefare levels are often quite affordable with BRT;the customer fare is approximately US$ 0.40 perpassenger in Bogot and is US$ 0.25 in Quito.

    e lack of subsidies also allows these cities toeasily accommodate and manage private sectorconcessions on the corridors. us, not only areall operating costs recovered within the afford-able fares, but a healthy profit is realised by theprivate operating companies.

    2.2.2 Design and development factors

    2.2.2.1 Planning and implementation time

    e window of opportunity for transit projectsis sometimes quite limited. e terms in office

    of key political champions may only be threeto five years. If implementation is not initiatedduring that period, the following administrationmay well decide not to continue the project. Insome instances the project may be cancelled justbecause the new administration does not wantto implement someone elses idea, regardless ofthe merits of the particular project. A longerdevelopment period also means that a host ofother special interest groups will have moreopportunity to delay or obstruct the process.

    Ideally, a transit project can be planned andimplemented within a single political term. isshort time span would provide an additionalincentive, as the projects initiator would wantto finish the project in time to reap the politicalrewards.

    Rail-based options and BRT have significantlydifferent planning and implementation timehorizons. Examples of planning and construc-tion times vary greatly by local circumstances,but the duration from start to completion is

    significantly shorter for BRT. BRT planningtypically can be completed in a 12 month to 24

    month time horizon. e construction of initialcorridors can likewise be completed in a 12month to 24 month period (Figure 18). PhaseI (40 kilometres) of Bogots TransMileniosystem was planned and constructed within thethree-year term of Mayor Enrique Pealosa. Bycontrast, planning a more complex rail project

    will typically consume three to five years oftime (Figure 19). Examples such as the BangkokSkyTrain and the Delhi Metro also show that

    construction can also require another three tofive year time horizon.

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    Bogot (Colombia) makes for an interestingcase study as the city has pursued both rail-based options (metros and LRTs) and BRT.Bogot spent over four decades developingmetro and LRT plans (Figure 20). Not a single

    project advanced beyond the planning stage.

    Subway Line

    Electric Train System

    1981

    Phase I

    Metro Lines

    Phase II

    Phase I

    Metro Lines

    Phase II

    1947 1954

    1967

    Fig. 20

    For six decades,various politicaladministrations

    ttempted to implementrail-based transit

    in Bogot withoutsuccess. e Pealosa

    dministration plannedand implemented theTransMilenio BRTsystem in just three

    years.Illustrations courtesy

    of TransMilenio SA

    While the years of rail planning provided regu-lar incomes to consulting firms, it did little toaddress the citys growing transport crisis. BRTbrought the first sense of implementation realityto the citys public transit objectives. As noted,

    Mayor Pealosa did in a single three-year term

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    what could not be accomplished by forty yearsof metro dreams.

    A longer time horizon can also mean greatercity disruption during the construction phase.

    As portions of the city are under construction,road traffic and businesses will sometimes needto make inconvenient changes to their normalbehaviour. e ensuing congestion and loss ofsales caused by such disruption can do muchto harm the goodwill that a transit project canotherwise deliver.

    Obtaining the project financing can be anothersignificant time delay. Because rail-based op-tions typically have higher capital requirements,arranging the financing can be more compli-

    cated and more time consuming. Further, sincerail-based options typically involve some formof public sector subsidy, the involvement ofthe private sector becomes a more complicatedstructural issue to design and negotiate.

    2.2.2.2 Passenger capacity

    e ability to move large numbers of passengersis a basic requirement for mass rapid transitsystems. is characteristic is particularly im-portant in developing cities where mode shares

    for public transit can exceed 80 per cent of alltrips. Passenger capacity is affected by severalfactors that can differ between types of transitsystems:

    Size of vehicle (passengers per vehicle);

    Number of vehicles that can be groupedtogether;

    Headway between vehicles (amount of timethat elapses between vehicles in safe operation);

    Boarding and alighting techniques.

    In many developed cities, passenger capacity isa less vital issue as the lower density of the citiesalong with lower market shares for public transitcreates less peak demand. By contrast, develop-ing cities often have both high population densi-ties and high market share for public transit.

    Concerns are sometimes raised whetherbus-based options such as BRT can handlethe passenger flows that are often requiredin denser, developing-nation cities. Both theBogot (Colombia) and So Paulo (Brazil) BRT

    systems handle over 30,000 passengers per hourper direction (pphpd) using additional passing

    lanes. Bogots Caracas Avenue corridor actuallyserves an estimated 36,500 pphpd. Such figuresare achieved due to the following characteristics:

    1. Use of articulated vehicles with a passenger

    capacity of 160;2. Stations with multiple stopping bays that canhandle up to five vehicles per direction simul-taneously;

    3. Multiple permutations of routing options thatinclude local, limited stop, and express services;

    4. Average vehicle headways per route of threeminutes, and as low as 60 seconds duringpeak periods; and,

    5. Station dwell times of approximately 20 sec-onds (achieved by use of at-level boarding

    and alighting, pre-board fare collection andfare verification, and three sets of large dou-ble doors on each vehicle).

    Systems such as Quito (Ecuador) and Curitiba(Brazil) that utilise just one lane in each direc-tion reach capacities of approximately 10,000pphpd. However, Porto Alegre (Brazil) alsohas only one lane available in each directionbut reaches capacities of over 20,000 pphpdthrough the clever use of multiple stopping baysand the platooning of vehicle movements. In

    general, these results indicate that BRT canachieve slightly higher passenger capacities thanlight rail systems but somewhat less than el-evated rail and metro systems. Table 8 providesa comparative capacity analysis between differ-ent mass transit options.

    Table 8: Actual peak capacity, selected mass transit systems

    Line TypeRidership (passengers /

    hour / direction)

    Sao Paulo Line 1 Metro 60,000

    Mexico City Line B Metro 39,300

    Santiago La Moneda Metro 36,000

    London Victoria Line Metro 25,000

    Buenos Aires Line D Metro 20,000

    Bogot TransMilenio BRT 36,500

    Sao Paulo 9 de julho BRT 34,911

    Porto Alegre Assis Brasil BRT 25,000

    Belo Horizonte BRT 21,100

    Curitiba Eixo Sul BRT 15,100

    Bangkok SkyTrain Elevated rail 22,000

    Tunis LRT 13,400

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    As surface systems with no mobility beyond therail corridor, LRT systems face some practicallimitations in terms of passenger capacities. isconclusion is supported by the findings fromthe research of Allport (2000, p. 38):

    Typical at-grade LRT throughputs were

    about 4,000-6,000 passengers per hour

    compared to busway average of 15,000

    at about the same commercial speed.There were no known LRTs operating

    at-grade which approach the passenger

    carrying capacity of the existing Curitiba,

    Quito or Bogot busways.

    Allport then goes on to explain the reasons forLRTs capacity limitations:

    LRT achieves high speed by using a

    signalling system to avoid bunching, and

    by obtaining priority at traffic signals

    over other traffic; and it achieves high

    capacity by having large vehicles which

    take advantage of the signal cycles. Inpractice the distance between signals

    defines the maximum vehicle size, and

    the need to provide for crossing traffic

    limits the number of vehicles per hour.

    However, LRT systems are operationally

    vulnerable to the everyday events that

    happen in the centre of developing cities.

    Whether this is junctions being partly

    blocked, or road maintenance work, or

    a breakdown, or an accident, while bus

    systems are often able to get round the

    problem (they can overtake, leave thebusways etc), LRT is not.

    We conclude that an LRT capacity of

    10-12,000 pphpd at an operating speed

    of 20kph is likely to be the limit to what is

    achievable.

    LRT systems generally are not able to introducethe same measures that allow BRT systemsto reach higher capacities. e application ofpassing lanes at stations and express services for

    LRT requires a degree of switching technologythat is quite complicated in urban settings,particularly in developing cities. However, if anLRT system was grade separated from mixedtraffic (i.e., become a metro-like service), thenhigher capacities would be possible. In general,though, capacity is not a major constraint sincethe principal application of LRT is in developednations of Europe and North America. Cities inthese nations rarely have public transit demandin excess of 10,000 pphpd.

    For passenger capacities in excess of 40,000pphpd, grade separated rail is currently theonly option available. Passenger volumes of thismagnitude have been recorded in only a hand-ful of cities such as Hong Kong, New York, SaoPaulo, and Tokyo.

    Interestingly, in cities that have both a metrosystem and a bus network, the metro generallyonly carries a small portion of the cities publictransport ridership. Table 9 compares mode

    shares for several cities with both a metro and abus network. is result is surprising since it is

    Table 9: Mode share comparison

    City Bus Metro Train CarMotor-cycle

    Taxi Walk Bicycle Other

    Bangkok1, 2003 31 3 0 30 32 4 - - -

    Beijing2, 2000 15 2 0 16 2 6 33 26 -

    Buenos Aires3, 1999 33 6 7 37 0 9 7 0 -

    Caracas3, 1991 34 16 0 34 0 0 16 0 -

    Mexico City4, 2003 63 14 1 16 - 5 - - -

    Rio de Janeiro5, 1996 61 2.3 3.1 11.5 0.2 - 19.7 1.3 0.9

    Santiago6, 2001 28.4 4.5 - 23.5 - 1.3 36.5 1.9 4.0

    Sao Paulo3, 1997 26 5 2 31 1 0 35 0 -

    Shanghai2, 2001 18 2 0 4 2 2 44 28 -

    Sources: 1. OTP (2003)

    2. Xu, K. (2004)

    3. Vasconcellos, E. (2001)

    4. SETRAVI (2003)

    5. IplanRio (1996)

    6. Ciudad Viva (2003)

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    generally assumed that metros possess a greatercarrying capacity. While it is true that the peakcapacity of metros and elevated rail systemssurpass other modes, their ability to serve large

    overall numbers of passengers is limited dueto cost reasons. Bus transit, as both a standardservice and an enhanced BRT service, continuesto serve as the principal transit backbone of mostcities. Even cities with metros and elevated railsystems, such as Mexico City and Bangkok, thenumbers served by the rail systems are typicallyless than 15 per cent of the daily trips (Table 9).Such systems typically can only be cost justifiedin a few corridors, and thus actually serve feweroverall numbers of passengers. us, whilemetro systems often receive the largest share ofpublic transport investment as well as politicalattention, the reality is that underfunded bussystems still carry the vast share of customers.

    Figure 21 compares the range of passengercapacity for each technology measured againstthe range of capital costs. e ranges presentedin Figure 21 are based on actual not theoreticaldata. From this data, BRT is positioned as thelowest-cost option that provides a relatively

    wide range of capacity options. BRT can eco-nomically function in cities with low passengerdemand to higher capacities of 40,000 pphpd.

    e area of the rectangles in Figure 21 are alsorevealing with regard to the relative risk and un-certainty involved in a transit technology choice.e range of the cost variable for LRT, elevatedrail, and metros indicates that local conditionscan spiral costs several multiples from originalestimations.

    In reality, the debate over capacity is a bitmisleading. e capacity required on a particu-

    lar corridor is principally determined by thepopulation density along the corridor, the totalcatchment area for passengers, and the originand destination profile of the residents. Whena system consists of a network that covers themajority of central districts and main corridors,this catchment area typically extends to an areaof one kilometre around stations as well as thepassenger traffic collected by feeder services.us, while the central areas of London andNew York host dense populations, the extensive

    coverage of the system network distributes de-mand across many parallel and connecting lines.

    In London, the demand handled by the mass

    transit system does not exceed 30,000 pphpd.

    is lower capacity occurs not because there is

    little demand, but rather because the relatively

    large demand has been well-distributed around

    an overall network.

    However, in cities such as Hong Kong and SoPaulo, where a limited network is provided,

    capacities can reach 60,000 pphpd and higher.

    In this sense, costly metros can become a

    self-fulfilling prophecy with respect to capacity.

    Since developing cities can only afford a few

    metro lines, the passenger demand is drawn

    from a much wider area and thus creates a

    capacity requirement that only metros can fulfil.

    Hong Kong draws large numbers of passengers

    from Kowloon and the New Territories into a

    single metro line on Nathan Road. ere aredisadvantages to this approach. By requiring

    passengers to travel farther to enter the system,

    the system developers are making conditions

    less convenient to the customer, which will

    ultimately result in captive users seeking al-

    ternatives such as private vehicles. Also, when

    operating at a capacity of over 60,000 pphpd,

    the system is far less robust with respect to

    delays and technical problems. A two-minute

    outage in such a system can create extremelydifficult conditions and backlogs.

    Figure 21: Passenger capacity and capitalcost for