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DANTE LIBAN, ET AL. V. RICHARD GORDON,G.R. NO. 175352, JANUARY 18, 2011

FACTS: Quezon City Red Cross Board of Directors Liban petitioned the Supreme Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Gordon was elected as Red Cross national chairman during his incumbency as senator.

Petitioners cited Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution which holds that no senator may accept office in any government owned or controlled corporation without forfeiting his seat.

The Court has formerly ruled in July 15, 2009 that the Red Cross is not government controlled nor owned and thus Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator. The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Gov

ernment or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securitie

s and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

Gordon and the Red Cross on its own questioned the second part of the decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

ISSUES: Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the natureof the PNRC?

HELD: NO. It was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional

issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by theparties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. This Court should not have declaredvoid certain sections of the Red Cross charter. Furthermore, the Red Cross, which was not even originally a party to this case, was being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than 60 years of existence in this country.

The passage of several laws relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstan

ding the affectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it (sui generis.) It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment inMarch 22, 1947 to the present. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this casebefore the Court now.

By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs speci

al status under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Cre



scent Movement, can neither be classified as an instrumentality of the State, soas not to lose its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

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SANTIAGO V GUINGONAG.R. NO. 134577. NOVEMBER 18, 1998.

FACTS: On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. as minorityleader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.

The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, andSen. Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted fo

r him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. JuanM. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.

The following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had bee

n usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUE: From the parties' pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution: 1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution? 3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader? 4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader? HELD: Petition is dismissed. Based on the Constitutional concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the provinceof courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a realand effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene. Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the Courts jurisdictionThe Court rules that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Elec

toral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but wassubject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not o



nly was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

In view of constitutional violation

There was no constitutional violation as the Constitution does not prescribe the that loosing candidate in the race for senate president shall become the minority.

Definition of minority and majoritySave for the Senate President and the House Speaker, the Constitution does not prescribe rules to govern the selection or election of other offices. The Rules of the Senate is also silent as how the majority and minority floor leaders are to be selected. The manner by which these offices are filled are is based on tradition.

In view of usurpation

The petitioners did not present sufficient proof for their case that Tatad is the rightful minority leader, In view of Fernans recognition of GuingonaThere was no grave abuse of discretion when Fernan recognized Guingona as the minority leader given the fact that such recognition came after standard process of the Senate: Guingona was unanimously declared by his party to be the minorityleader and he was recognized as such after two sessions.

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DATU KIDA V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES.,

GR 196271

FACTS: A case on Constitutionality of RA 10153 The Constitution mandates for the formation of ARMM, in which RA 6734 was passed in compliance thereof. However, it failed to stipulate the exact date for theARMM Elections. Laws were then enacted to provide for the exact dates of the elections: RA 9054- Second Monday of September 2001, RA 9140November 26, 2001, RA 93332nd Monday of August 2005. And on the same date every three years thereafter.

Pursuant to RA 9333, COMELEC made preparations for August 8, 2001 Election but sometime in June, Congress enacted RA 10153- An act providing for the synchronization of the elections in ARMM with the national and local elections.

ISSUE/S:1. W/N ARMM is distinct from an ordinary local government unit and therefore should not be required to hold its election during the local elections mandated in the constitution.

2. W/N RA. 10153 is constitutional on the basis that it granted the president the power to appoint OIC for several elective positions until such positionsbe filled during the May 2013 elections.

HELD: 1. No. ARMM is not a distinct government unit therefore not exempt from the synchronization of election. SC does not make a distinction between local gover

nment and regional government. Autonomous regions are therefore under the heading local government and is regarded as a local form of government. Autonomous regionstherefore, while enjoying more powers and attributes than other government units



, is still classified as local governments and it therefore follows that elections on autonomous regions are considered as local elections.

SC held that the inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading Local Government indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

2. Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of RA 10153 stating that there is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see toit that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the President

s alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the Presidents appointment power includ

es the power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not of the people.

Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners supposition. Theprovision states:Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.

The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMELEC,SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASANG.R. NO. 148334. JANUARY 21, 2004

FACTS: Regular and Special election were held simultaneously in 2001. 13 senators were proclaimed winners, where the 13th placer was to serve the remaining term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona, who vacated his seat for vice-presidency. Petitioner assailed the manner by which the elections were held, contending that one election must be distinguished from the other in the documentation as well as in thecanvassing of results. Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13th elected senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.

1. Whether or not the petition was moot.2. Whether or not petitioners had locus standi.3. Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat



was Validly Held on 14 May 2001

RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.

On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.

On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standingand exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely toarise again

On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.

The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special El

ection as required under RA 6645, as amended, did not negate the calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidateit. Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special ElectionMisled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held thatunless there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.

FARIÑAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARYG.R. 147387 December 10 2003

FACTS: SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any officeother than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VIof the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with thelifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.

HELD: No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 ar



e comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a completeindex of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code andthe Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, s

o long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, andmay be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not appr

ised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.