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Central Banking andthe Governance of Credit Creation
Professor Richard A. Werner
Director, Centre for Banking, Finance and
Sustainable Development
School of Management
University of Southampton
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Copenhagen
17 March 2009
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Is it the fault of the new, complex financial products?
The achievements of free financial markets, until AD 2007:
- sub-prime mortgages, predatory lending
- securitisation und asset-backed securities (ABS; MBS, ABCP, etc.)
- credit-derivatives: credit default swaps (CDS), collateralised debt
obligations (CDOs), etc.
- structured investment vehicles (SIVs), special purpose companies (SPCs)
- financial products with high credit rating that combine the above
- hedge funds investing in the above with significant leverage (e.g. Bear
Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund)
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The transformation from toxic waste to top-investment:
financial engineering or Alchemy?
Bank Diversified intlInvestors
Toxic Waste Top Asset
Profits
Is it the fault of the new, complex financial products?
credit e
xtension for
speculative
investments
financial
engineeringTriple-A rating
Risk transfer away from
banks balance sheet
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For almost 20 years, Alan Greenspan, Fed Chairman (Aug 1987 Jan 2006), was the oracleon banking, monetary, fiscal and economic policy.
A pillar of the Washington Consensus, he recommended deregulation, liberalisation andprivatisation, because markets, left to their own devices, would produce the best possibleresult (e.g. his advice to Asia 10 years ago).
In October 2008, all this changed. The Maestro testified to Congress that his fundamentalgrasp of the operation of banking systems and markets was partially wrong.
He had uncovered a flawin how the free market system works.
He charged that the modern risk-management paradigm the whole intellectualedifice has collapsed due to the banking crisis.
His belief in the self-regulatory forces of the markets had been shaken.
The problem is more fundamental
Its official: There is a flaw in mainstream thinking
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A significant break-down in the inter-bank market is rare in
industrialised countries the last time was in the 1930s.
The nominal extent of the problem is larger than ever before. But there have been many, recurring banking crises.
The number and magnitude of financial/banking crises has not decreased
but increased in the last 30 years
During the 1980s and 1990s, systemic financial crises occurred in atleast 93 countries (Caprio & Klingebiel, 1999), 88 were in developing
countries.
But this is not the first banking crisis
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Why do we observe recurring banking crises?
Mostly the IMF, World Bank and regional development banks
stepped in and demanded structural reform to free the markets
from regulation and controls.
This has now been recognised as being part of the problem, not the
solutation.
So why do we observe recurring banking and economic crises?
What are the true lessons that need to get learned?
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It is always the same old but little known - cause
The underlying cause of the crisis is not new.
To the contrary: the problem can be traced to a fundamental problem, which is
as old as banking and the use of credit money (5000 years).
Should we have been warned? --- You have been warned.
(Werner, 2001, 2003, 2005, etc.)
Time to ask some basic questions.
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What is money?
Textbooks say they do not know. They talk about deposit aggregates M1, M2, M3 or M4, but admit
that these are not very useful measures of the money supply.
The M measures are not in a stable and reliable relationship to economic activity (velocity decline,
breakdown of money demand)
This is a world-wide puzzling anomaly (Belongia Chalfant, 1990). The quantity relationship came
apart at the seams during the course of the 1980s (Goodhart, 1989). Once viewed as a pillar of
macroeconomic models, it is now one of the weakest stones in the foundation (Boughton, 1991).
Even the Federal Reserve does not tell us just what money is:
there is still no definitive answer in terms of all its final uses to the question: What is money?
8
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Who creates money? How is it allocated?
Are they taking us for a ride? Or should we press on finding an
answer to the question what is money?
The answer can be found when considering where the money
supply comes from.
Only about 2% or so of the money supply comes from the
central bank.Who creates the remaining 98% or so of our money supply
and how is this money allocated?
9
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Do we Understand Banks Properly?
What makes banks special?
- Fama (1985) shows that banks must have some special power
a monopoly power compared to other financial institutions.
- Mainstream theories offer no clear answer what this is.
- Leading textbooks represent banks as mere financial intermediaries:
Saving
(Lenders,Depositors)
$100
Banks
(FinancialIntermediaries)
=indirect finance
Investment(Borrowers)
$99
Puzzles
direct finance
10
RR = 1%
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What Makes Banks Special?
History of Banking: Banking has been at the core of the economy, businesscycles, wars, many major political developments
Schumpeter (1912): Banks are special.
They are the central settlement system of the economy. They operate a
huge system of credits and debits, of claims and debts, by which capitalistsociety carries on its daily business of production and consumption.
Thus it is more useful to start from the credit transactions and look uponcapitalist finance as a clearing system that cancels claims and debts andcarries forward the differences so that money payments come in only as aspecial case without any fundamental importance.
In other words, credit is the key.
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Some crucial facts that you are not supposed to know
There is no such thing as a bank loan.
A loan is when the use of something is handed over to
someone else. If I lend you my car, I cant also use it myself.
When banks lend money, they are not extending loans.
What they do is much more important the single most
important fact about how economies actually work.
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$ 100
Liabilitie
s
Assets
Step 2 Bank A uses the $100 as reserve with the central bank
Banks create money out of nothing
Balance Sheet of Bank AStep 1 New deposit of $100 with Bank A
$ 100$ 100
Liabilitie
s
Assets
Schritt 3 With a reserve requirement of 1%, Bank A can now extend $ 9,900 in
credits. Where do the $ 9,900 come from? From nowhere.
$ 100
+
$ 9,900
$ 100
+
$ 9,900
LiabilitiesAssets
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What makes banks special? They create 98% of our money- Their role as the economys accountants AND their ability to
individually create credit makes banks special (MacLeod 1855; Schumpeter1912)
- The textbook representation is incorrect: banks are not merely
financial intermediaries. They are special, because they createnew money out of nothing = credit creation
- This is how 95-98% of our money is created by commercial
enterprises.
- In other words: the creation of the money supply has been inprivate, commercial hands for a long time.
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The fundamental cause of banking crises:
The privatised creation and allocation of money
Banks are profit-seeking institutions.
They do not consider the macroeconomic or social welfare implications oftheir creation and allocation of money.
They do not even consider how their actions might affect themselves in the
long-run
Banking has been an industry oblivious to sustainability considerations forcenturies.
This system has been put in place by interested parties without any public
debate about it.
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Some features of the credit market
- Banks ration credit to maximise profits (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981)
(as loan demand > supply, equilibrium rates would be too high)
- The credit market is rationed and supply-determined
- There is no indication that their selection of projects/firms to give
newly
created money to is the best possible for the economy as a whole.
- Given the reality ofcredit creation, the quantity of credit is the key
budget constraint on activity and thus determines growth, asset prices
and should be used for policy
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Case 1. Newly created purchasing power is used for transactions that are not partof GDP (financial and real estate transactions). In this case, GDP is not directly
affected, but asset prices must rise (asset inflation).
Credit creation for financial transactions CF Asset Markets
Asset Inflation:
Credit is used for financial and real
estate speculation:
More money circulates in the financial
markets
= speculative credit creation
The effect of credit creation depends on the use of money
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A significant rise in speculative credit creation CF/C must lead to:
- increased financialisation and lack of support for productive industries
- asset bubbles and busts
- banking and economic crises
Case Study Japan in the 1980s:
Credit flows explain the boom/bust cycles
Loans to the real estate industry,
construction companies and non-
bank financial institutions
3 0 %
CF/C
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Types of Speculative Credit Creation (CF)
Margin loans (credit for financial speculation)
Loans to non-bank financial institutions
Credit for real estate speculation:
to construction companies
Mortgages, buy-to-let mortgages
real estate investment funds, other financial investors
Loans to structured investment vehicles
Loans to Hedge Fonds
Loans for M&A
Loans to Private Equity Funds
Direct financial investments by banks
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asset prices risecorporate balance
sheets improve
generally
positive/euphoric outlook
banks increase
loan/valuation
ratios, more
willing to lend
Financial credit creation rises
This is how the Bubble Economy works:
The proportion of financial credit creation rises (CF /C ).
This creates capital gains from speculation and bolsters balance
sheets.
The myth of the continually rising asset price comes about
collateral values
rise
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credit creation falls
credit crunch,
bankruptcies
unemployment
rises
demand, growth
fall; deflation
bad debts
increase
banks get more risk averse,
shrink risk-assets
This is how the banking crisis and debt deflation works
The creation of speculative credit suddenly drops (CF).
Usually triggered by central banks
IMF 28 July 2008: The vicious cycle has started...
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USA 1920er Jahre (Margin Loans):
Scandinavia in the 1980s:
Japan in the 1980s:
Asian Crisis, 1990s:
UK property bubble until 2007:
US property bubble until 2006:
Irish property bubble until 2007:
Spanish property bubble until 2007:
The Cause of Past Banking Crises
speculative credit creation
speculative credit creation
speculative credit creation
speculative credit creation
speculative credit creation
speculative credit creation
speculative credit creation
speculative credit creation
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Case 2. The newly created purchasing power is used for transactions that arepart of GDP. In this case, nominal GDP will expand:
credit creation for real economy transactions CR nominal growth
The effect of the credit creation depends on the use of money
(b) Growth without inflation:
Credit creation is used for
productive credit creation:
More money, but also more goods
and services
= productive credit creation
(a) Inflation without growth:
Credit creation is used for
consumption:
More money, but same amount of
goods and services
= consumptive credit creation
two possibilities
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1. Avoid unproductive credit creation (speculative and consumptive credit creation).
If this form of credit creation rises in the banking system, it cannot be repaid without major problems. Crises follow.
2. Focus on productive credit creation.
Then banks have the highest chance of avoiding non-performing loans, asset bubbles, crises and bank failure. There will also be stable,
non-inflationary growth without recessions.
The definition of productive should include sustainability.
How to avoid banking and economic crises:
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What is required: transparent regulation of the qualitative
allocation of credit creation
In the past this was rejected as inefficient interference in theefficient functioning of free markets
Ironically, today, the UK, French, German and US governments aretrying to re-assert influence on bank credit (to small firms, formortgages). The French PM two days ago threatened to nationalise
banks if they did not increase lending.
Had proper regulation of the qualitative allocation of credit takenplace earlier, the bubble could have been avoided.
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Investors, bank employees and mortgage borrowers merely responded to the incentive structure
presented to them.
The creation of bubbles and hence the crisis could have been prevented by monitoring and directly
targeting speculative credit creation.
Central banks have the means and know-how to do this; they did so world-wide until the early
1970s.
In the 1980s they said that such credit guidance had to stop as free markets would deliver better
results, and, besides, that they should be granted total independence from the government.
Their role and independence needs to be reviewed.
Who carries greatest responsibility for the crisis?
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Either return the power to create the money supply to the public
or institute rigorous controls and transparency over the money creation and allocation
decisions of banks.
Either abolish central banks and render them departments of the govt (finance
ministry)
Or make them legally dependent on democratically elected institutions, accountable andtransparent concerning their credit creation policies.
Then monitor and restrict the allocation of credit to productive uses (defined as being
sustainable and welfare enhancing).
How can we end the cycle of recurring banking crises?
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The activities of central banks need to be scrutinised
1. Central banks aim at price, economic and
currency stability.
2. To do this, they use interest rates as the
main monetary policy tool.
3. Interest rates are the key variable
driving prices, exchange rates, growth,
stock markets and bond markets.
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Interest rates dont lead economic growth they follow it
Rates are not negatively correlated to growth but positively
True for long, short, nominal and real rates - and in almost all countries
Japan
US
Nominal GDP and Call rate
0
12
3
4
56
7
8
9
-4 1 6 11
Nominal GDP YoY%
Call rate
Nominal GDP and Call Rate
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03
YoY%
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Nominal GDP (L)
Call rate (R)
U S N o m i n a l G D P a n d L o n g - T e rm
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
0 5 1 0 1 5
U S N o m i n a l G D P Y
R a t e %
US Nom inal GDP and L ong-Term In tere
0
5
1 0
1 5
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
0
2
4
6
8
1012
14US Interest Rates (R)
US Nom inal GDP (L
Y oY % Rate %
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Cognitive dissonance: Traditional story vs. fact
Traditional story:
Fact: High growth leads to high rates;
Low growth leads to low rates.
Interest rates are the result and hence cannot be the cause ofgrowth.
Thus why would central banks use interest rates as policy tool?That is an impossibility.
Low rates lead to high growth;
high rates lead to low growth.
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What will happen next?
This depends on the policy response.
Often economists are in danger of staying far too optimistic in this type of
banking crisis.
The reason is that it is not difficult to end it quickly, at zero costs.
But: this requires an understanding of the correct policy response and its
implementation
Unfortunately there are more examples of misguided (if well-intentioned) policy
responses
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Banking Crisis
Correct Response Wrong Response I Wrong Response II
USA 1907
UK 1914
Germany 1933
Japan 1945Malaysia 1998
Japan since 1990
Thailand 1997
Indonesia 1997
Korea 1997Scandinavia 1990
USA 1929-1935
Germany 1929-1933
Germany 1880s
USA 2000
UK 1991
Wrong policy responses are more frequent
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Problems with the current bail-out programmes:
Banks will remain risk-averse and could even become more vicious in foreclosing to reduce their assets
(the most aggressive mortgage forecloser currently is Northern Rock).
Credit creation in the economy is likely to fall; this means declining nominal GDP and moving towards
debt deflation and depression
Meanwhile, the total amount of debt which caused the crisis in the first place is increased: national debt
will rise by tens if not hundreds of billions of pounds in the UK
This debt will have to be serviced at compounding interest, and repaid. The total burden on the economy
will thus be even larger.
Moral hazard: Tax payers should not be burdened with the costs.
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The biggest problem with the govt spending programme:
Nominal GDP cant grow without more credit used for GDP transactions
Fiscal expenditure does not increase credit creation.
The money for the government expenditure (bailout plus increased Keynesian spending programmes)
is being raised through bond issuance, i.e. borrowing from the economy!
This constitutes merely a re-allocation of existing money.
The national income pie stays the same size; the govt share of the pie merely rises.
What the government injects with the right hand, it takes out with the left at best a zero sum game.
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- Estimation Results of Private Demand Modelsample 1990 (1) to 2000 (4)
Coeff. Std. err t-value t-prob. Part.R2
Const 430.797 323.8 1 .33 0.191 0 .043
GDP1 0.369 0.128 2.90 0.006 0.177
GDP3 0.203 0.111 1.83 0.075 0.079
CR
0.015 0.004 3.45 0.001 0.233
G -0.957 0.206 -4.65 0.000 0.357
Evidence from Japan in the 1990s: Complete crowding outEvidence from Japan in the 1990s: Complete crowding out
Result: G = 1
Private and Government Deman
-4000
-2000
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
90 92 94 96 98 00
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
Latest: Q4 2000
Bn yen
C+I+NX (L)
G (R)
Bn yen
Without a rise in credit used for GDP transactions, nominal GDP cant grow.
Without credit creation, fiscal policy will crowd out private demand completely.
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Why fiscal spending programmes will not work
Ministry of Finance
(no credit creation)
Funding
via
bond
issuance
Fiscal
stimulus
Net Effect = Zero
Non-bank private sector
(no credit creation
Fiscal stimulation funded by bond issuance(e.g. : 20trn government spending package)
-20trn +20trn
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The Solution: How to recapitalise banks, increase
credit creation and boost demand - at zero cost!
All the government needs to do is change the way the bailout is funded: it should
not be the government who pays for this, but the central bank.
If the central bank pays, and keeps the assets, there will be no liability for the
government, no increased debt, no increased interest burden, and no crowdingout of private demand. Most of all, there will be zero costs for anyone.
Even the Bank of England is sure to make a profit (as it acquires assets of a value
higher than zero; but its funding costs are zero).
A radical idea, never implemented? Think again.
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The Solution (II): How to make govt spending effective
Non-bank private
sector
(no credit creation)
+ 20 trn
Bank sector
(credit creation power)
Assets Liabilities20 trn 20 trn
MoF
(No credit
creation)
Funding
via bank
Loans
Fiscal
stimulus
deposit
Net Effect = 20 trn
Fiscal stimulation funded by bank
borrowing(e.g. : 20trn government spending package)
- Government debt: Public debt can be reduced significantly, fiscal policyrendered effective
- Euro: Governments can stimulate growth, even without ECB
cooperation or new fiscal spending
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Time to re-think our financial architecture. There are better, moresustainable systems.
Milton Friedman (1982): abolish the central bank and make it a (small)department within the Treasury.
Do we need central banks? The government could just issue its own
money. This way, it would not have to pay interest on its borrowing, as itwould not borrow money.
The Solution (III): How to make govt spending effective
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The standardFederal Reserve
Note
JFKs 1963 United
States Note:No Fed seal
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Palgrave
Macmillan,
2005
Further Reading:
Vahlen,
2007
A di Wh t i h d h t it h t
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Perception:Mainstream neoclassical economics has proven that- only free markets and free trade can lead to economic success- government intervention of any kind is inefficient and must fail- deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation increase efficiency.
Reality:Mainstream neoclassical economics has proven that
- free markets and free trade would only then optimise welfare
- government intervention would only then be inefficient
- privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation would only then
increase efficiency
if and only ifwe lived in a world of perfect information.
Appendix: What economics has proven, and what it hasnt
A di Wh t i h d h t it h t
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The most familiar diagram in economics: a downward-sloping
demand and upward-sloping supply curve.
Perception:
Mainstream economics has shown that
- prices move to equalise demand and supply = equilibrium.
Reality:
Mainstream economics has shown that
- equilibrium exists if and only ifwe lived in a world of perfect
information (etc.).
Appendix: What economics has proven, and what it hasnt
Appendix: What economics has proven and what it hasnt
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Market clearing requires perfect information (etc.).
In our world, information, time and money are rationed.
Economics must recognise pervasive disequilibrium.
Yet almost all economics is based on equilibrium.
What happens when markets do not clear (i.e. always)?
Demand does not equal supply. Markets are rationed.
Rationed markets are determined by quantities, not prices.
The outcome is determined by the short-side principle.
Appendix: What economics has proven, and what it hasnt