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Agenda

1.  Background

2.  UN Intervention - MINUSTAH

3.  MINUSTAH - achievements

4.  2010 – the earthquake and beyond

5.  Conclusion

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UN involvement in Haiti started in early 1990s, but since 2004 UN holds a peacekeeping mission in the country, the MINUSTAH

Background

•  UN involvement in Haiti started in 1990, to observe the preparation and holding of elections in that country (ONUVEH – UN

Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti)

•  After a coup which overthrew the legitimate President, a joint UN – OAS mission was deployed in February 1993

•  In September 1993, the Security Council set up the first UN peacekeeping operation in the country – UNMIH (UN Mission in Haiti)

•  However, due to non-cooperation from Haitian military authorities, UNMIH could not be deployed at that time

•  After July 2004, following a Security Council authorization, successive UN Missions, including UNMIH (which assumed its

functions in full in March 1995), followed, until 2000

•  After some positive and negative achievements, however, the lack of stability in the country led to an armed conflict in February,

2004, which led the Security Council to authorize the MIF (Multinational Interim Force) to establish a stabilization force to support

continuation of a peaceful and constitutional political process and the maintenance of a secure and stable environment

•  And, on April, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1542, establishing the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH), which took over from the MIF on 1 June 2004

Source: UN.

1. Background

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MINUSTAH main objectives were to ensure a secure and stable environment, assist the development and maintenance of public institutions

Main Objectives

MINUSTAH main objectives were to:

•  Support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment

•  Assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police

•  Help with comprehensive and sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes

•  Assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order

•  Protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians

•  Support the constitutional and political processes

•  Assist in organizing, monitoring and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections

•  Support the Transitional Government and the Haitian Human Rights Institutions in their efforts to promote and protect

human rights

•  Monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country

The Mission included 6,700 military personnel, 1,622 police, 550 int’l civilians, 150 UN volunteers and about 1,000 local civilians

Source: UN.

1. Background

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In our evaluation of the Peacekeeping / Peacebuilding Mission in Haiti, we have opted for the ICAF (Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework)

Source: http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/MINUSTAH-White-Paper1.pdf

1.  Context: •  Contextual issues of conflict

2.  Core Grievances and Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience: •  Core Grievance – Perception that needs for physical security, livelihood, interest of values are threatened by one or more

other groups and/or social institutions

•  Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience – View that social institutions are in place and able to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through nonviolent means

3.  Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors: •  Drivers of Conflict – based on grievances, key actors escalate and move conflict

•  Mitigating Factors – dynamic situation resulting from key actors’ mobilization of social groups around Sources of Social/Institutional resilience

4.  Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity:

•  Windows of Vulnerability – events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change balance of political or economic power

•  Windows of Opportunity – moments when overarching identities become more important than sub-group indentities

ICAF Framework

2. UN Intervention – ICAF Framework

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•  Permission for MINUSTAH presence was granted by an unconstitutional, unelected government, after the democratically-elected President, for the period 2001-2004, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was ousted from power in an internationally-backed coup

•  The Bush Administration orchestrated the coup d’état against Jean-Bertrand Aristide – a long-held aim;

•  MINUSTAH was created at the behest of the US, and is a highly partisan political force in a sovereign country, and actively meddles in Haiti’s domestic affairs

•  Haiti has not experienced any armed conflict, which was the justification for the arrival of MINUSTAH in Haiti

Perception that needs for physical security, livelihood, interest of values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions

Source: http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/MINUSTAH-White-Paper1.pdf

•  Their mission is to protect the Haitian people from the predatory elements of gang warfare and political insecurity in Haitian society

•  Edmond Mulet, former head of MINUSTAH – “just fall apart” if MINUSTAH were to leave, and identifying Haiti as “a society, community, a nation that has committed collective suicide”

•  Armed gangs that supported former President Aristide were systematically destabilizing interim government and preventing international community from helping Haitian people

Comments Core Grievances

2. UN Intervention – Core Grievances

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View that social institutions are in place and able to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through nonviolent means

Sources of Social / Institutional Resilience

•  Haiti did see a peaceful transition in 2006, so there are institutions set up that prevent it from being a completely failed state

•  Protests around that time were nonviolent as well

•  Other countries, such as the US Virgin Islands, and even Brazil, present a much higher rate of murders per 100,000 than Haiti

Country Population (2010) Murders (2010) Rate per 100,000

US Virgin Islands

Jamaica

Trinidad & Tobago

Brazil

Haiti

110,000

2,600,000

1,300,000

189,953,000

9,600,000

66

1,428

472

50,113 (2008)

795

60.0

54.9

36.3

26.4

8.2

2. UN Intervention – Sources of Social / Institutional Resilience

Source: MINUSTAH: Keeping the peace,or conspiring against it? HealthRoots Student Organization, Harvard School of Public Health, October 2011

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2. UN Intervention – Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors

The main drivers of conflict and mitigating forces within the Haitian UN Mission were the lack of communication and local knowledge

•  Inability to communicate prevents ability to execute mission

•  MINUSTAH peacekeepers and soldiers do not speak creole (native language) and are not typically accompanied by translators – lacks accessibility and prevents organization from getting local knowledge

•  Can hurt the image of MINUSTAH: Haitians view them antagonistically, and objet to having MINUSTAH presence there

•  Dynamic situation resulting from key actors’ mobilization of social groups around sources of social / institutional resilience

Drivers of Conflict Mitigating Factors

Source: http://www.thenation.com/article/163632/10-reasons-why-un-occupation-haiti-must-end

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Events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change balance of political or economic power

Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity

•  Widespread and rampant crime: a study by The Lancet, a medical journal, found that there were 8,000 deaths in the greater Port-au-Prince area, with many of the perpetrators being criminals – some were Haitian National Police and others were UN soldiers

•  On July 6, 2005, MINUSTAH troops fired 22,000 rounds of ammunition into the Port-au-Prince slum of Cité Soleil in just seven hours, leading a Doctors Without Borders medic to report that “we treated twenty-seven people for gunshot wounds”. Of them, around twenty were women under the age of 18

•  MINUSTAH mandate allows for judicial immunity from Haitian law for its soldiers. Since its inception, hundreds of soldiers implicated in crimes have escaped prosecution because of this clause

•  MINUSTAH acts against Haitian interests in order to meet the geopolitical or economic needs of foreign nations or those seeking to ingratiate themselves to those nations

Source: http://www.thenation.com/article/163632/10-reasons-why-un-occupation-haiti-must-end and http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2806%2969211-8/abstract

2. UN Intervention – Windows of Vulnerability / Opportunity

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The slight results the MINUSTAH Mission were presenting by 2010 do not compensate for the problems it’s generating concomitantly

Main Failures of the MINUSTAH Mission in Haiti

•  By 2010, the country appeared to be on track to advance toward a more promising future – violence had largely been removed from politics and public security has mostly been restored; the media was operating freely and the economy was growing

•  However, less than a year after the first soldiers landed, independent humanitarian organizations documented cases of robbery, murder, assault, rape, and sexual exploitation of minors

•  Since then, myriad violations of the Human Rights of Haitians have been continuously documented

•  Evidence grew that MINUSTAH ignored extrajudicial, paramilitary killings of civilian groups mobilizing to protect their communities; worse, it sometimes acted as the guerillas’ personal security force

•  In 2007, over 100 Sri Lankan troops were repatriated due to allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse, involving underage girls – the UN investigative arm found that “in exchange for sex, the children received small amounts of money, food, and sometimes mobile phones.” There is no evidence Sri Lankan troops were ever prosecuted

3. MINUSTAH - Achievements

Source: MINUSTAH: Keeping the peace,or conspiring against it? HealthRoots Student Organization, Harvard School of Public Health, October 2011

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4. 2010 – Earthquake and Beyond

While MINUSTAH was still leading the peace mission in Haiti, a terrible downturn occurred, which changed considerably (or not) the outcomes

•  UN endorsed Secretary-General’s recommendation to increase the overall force level of MINUSTAH

•  In 2010, contrary to its mandate to assist in free and fair elections, MINUSTAH played a role in an illegitimate presidential election, with the exclusion of numerous political parties - including one of Haiti’s largest - and a large part of the population

•  In September 2011, a video was released alleging sexual assault of an 18-year old Haitian man by Uruguayan troops in Port-Salut; also in 2011, there were allegations that Uruguayan soldiers impregnated local women in Port-Salut, including a 17-year old girl

•  Troops from Nepal were responsible for introducing cholera into Haiti in late 2010, by contaminating rivers with improperly treated human waste, killing more that 6,200 and infecting more that 440,000 Haitians in just ten months; after protests following UN’s denials, several protesters were shot dead by UN troops

Beyond the Earthquake Haiti Earthquake – January 12, 2010

A Magnitude 7.0 Mw earthquake hit Haiti early in 2010, 16` miles away from Port-au-Prince:

•  Approx. 220k people had died, another 300k had been injured and 1.5MM people were made homeless, including 102 UN personnel

Source: xxx

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5. Conclusion

MINUSTAH Mission in Haiti has presented some positive outcomes, but the mission was not yet completed when a terrible earthquake hit the country

Conclusion

•  Slight results were presented by MINUSTAH since the beginning of its operation, back in 2004;

•  However, Human Rights violations and transgressions have been continuously reported, positioning MINUSTAH as a threat to Haitian stability and security instead of a safeguard:

•  MINUSTAH prioritizes security and military issues, contributing little to social and economic development. Since the earthquake, these problems have worsened

•  MINUSTAH fails to effectively monitor internally displaced people (IDP) camps, often only patrolling outside them; the forces do not speak the language

•  MINUSTAH fails to engage with community leaders dedicated to IDPs, gender-based violence, or protection against forced eviction

•  Hundreds of cases of sexual assault, rape, and gender-based violence were reported before and after the earthquake

•  MINUSTAH has been destabilizing Haiti; its failure has presented adverse effects, and has brought Haitians together in nonviolent yet persistent solidarity against it

Source: xxx

Uruguayan Peacekeepers receive medals (August 2011)

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•  After years of failures, inaction, repression, and human rights violations, it is time that MINUSTAH respect the Haitian people’s wishes, and withdraw from Haiti; arguments of greater instability cannot justify the current abuse and violence against Haitians

•  If the UN and its members want to support Haiti, it’s USD 1 billion/year budget should be put toward sanitation, shelter, health, infrastructure, and education

•  “It is essential for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response required.” Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, OECD, 2007

5. Conclusion

MINUSTAH should leave Haiti, and direct its budget towards what Haitians really need – which, certainly, is not troops, who actually make things worst!

Conclusion