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SOC training How to teach the blind to drive Kirill “isox” Ermakov SOC in Russia IV, 201

SOC training

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Page 1: SOC training

SOC trainingHow to teach the blind to drive

Kirill “isox” Ermakov,SOC in Russia IV, 2016

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#:whoami

- QIWI Group CTO/CISO- vulners.com founder- Web penetration tester- Member of “hall-of-fames” (Yandex, Mail.ru, Apple and

so on)- JBFC community participant- Well known integrator hater

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One more time about the essentials

- Stop calling it a “SOC”. It’s security monitoring

- Some kind of collectors and correlation rules

- Pretty little monkeys tired of a false positives (“SOC team”)

- Some kind of a software for operations management

- Technical solution does not matter

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The problem

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Common mistakes

- Templates usage

- Events overflow (system outage)

- Ignorance of it’s own architecture

- Lack of competence in hacking

- Faith in marketing bullshit

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Perfect correlation rules out of the box

- ICMP timeouts- Multiple login failures to the same destination (usually

domain controller)- IRC chat protocol- ”Connect to the known botnet C’n’C” (usually CDN)- Excessive firewall accepts across multiple hosts- Outbound connection to a foreign country/region- Systems using many different protocols

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Anomaly detection is useless unless you got:

- Asset management

- Stable product lifecycle

- Change management

- Documentation

- Network scheme with information flows

- Policies that are not just a paper sheet

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What da hell are you looking for?

- Collecting every logged event is not only stupid but also is very expensive

- Malicious activity as told by Certified Ethical Hackers

- Erotic fantasies of SIEM developers

- Infrastructure that actually didn’t match the reality

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Monitoring kiwi reservation

- Almost about 3 years of monitoring- Svetlana “Mona” Arkhipova as a gamekeeper- IBM qRadar as a log collector- IBM Guardium for DB- IBM XGS + StoneGate for the network- Verdasys Digital Guardian for the OS- OSSEC as a HIDS- Something about 3000 of kiwis in the wild- And many more other wild animals

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SOC KPI’s

- All that CISSP guys recommendations are outdated- There is no need to measure garbage like:

- Resolution time- Number of employee certification- Total count of the incidents

- You need to know it’s real efficiency

- One metric: ratio of registered attacks to performed attacks

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Sidestep: Penetration testing

- Hope that I have no need to explain what is it and what for

- In case of dramatic sclerosis:- Independent security audit- Hackers simulation attempts- Fast and dirty assessment

- Activity in three separated fields:- Perimeter- Internal network- Social

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About the classic approach

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Red team exercise

- Reinventing the wheel. Today with SOC realities.

- Survival game

- As close as possible to the real world hacking

- Challenge between the offensive and defensive lords

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Basic rules

- Game lasts until victory- Only CISO has “red stop button”. If he will press it –

red team wins- No restrictions on the attack surface or methods- Worst scenario for the blue team:

- Insider with tech expertise- No daytime limits

- Devices hijacking allowed- Drop-ins are welcome- Real life field operations - Any social attacks

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Team “Red”

- Cooperation of d0znpp with ONSEC team + BeLove with DSEC team

- Target: getting access to any sensitive information

- Must record all their actions to the timeline table

- Perfectly balanced pool of skills

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Team “Blue”

- QIWI security team

- Target: defend your home

- KPI: register at least 80% of the attacks

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One slide for the results

- 3 month of hell- Red team won- Aprox. 70% of attacks were registered- Gained access to the security team laptop- Disappointment in all the security toys- Lot of black holes in the monitoring - More in my ZeroNights 2015 presentation

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Let’s get back to the SOC

- Correlation of the attack table and monitoring results

- Real attack = real vectors- Now learn your systems to detect them- Not enough? Make honeypot and monitor it to

create patterns- Try to hack yourself if you can

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Learning your SOC to defend

- Practice. Only practice. - Don’t be lazy! Simulate attacks, perform pentests- There is no magic configuration, that suites

everyone- Get experienced team with at least one hacker in it- Don’t expect it will save you- Sometimes good compliance management shows better results

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That’s all. Questions?

- As usual thanks to my team for the great performance and endurance.

- Join us at the defensive section of the ZeroNights 2016

- [email protected]

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See ya!