Kosovo War

Kosovo WarGroup 5

Topics1. Historical Background

2. Key tipping points

3. Failures of the international community

4. Wheeler’s criteria

Historical Background

Historical Background

Capital: Pristina

Ethnic: 88% Albanians 7% Serbs 5% others

Area: 10,908 km2

Population: 1,733,872

Historical BackgroundAlbanians Strive for Independence

Albanians opposed Serbia’s attempts to relocate Serbs into Kosovo

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution: received substantially increased autonomy, including de facto veto power in the Serbian parliament.

The 1989 Serbia Constitution: limited Kosovo‘s autonomy. 1991: Albanians accounted for 90% of the population of

Kosovo. Kosovo’s Albanian leaders attempted to break free from Serbia using non-violent resistance.

The government of Serb president: Slobodan Milosevic

Historical Background

Kosovo Conflict

1996 -1999: Yugoslav Army and Serbian forces and the people, for independence of Kosovo Albanian terrorist organization in Kosovo Liberation Army fighters.

1999: March 24 from June 10 was held over to NATO by the Allied Force operation.

Attacks in rural areas by a small, clandestine Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) formed by Kosovo Albanian radicals brought heavy retaliation by Serbian security forces; fighting across the Kosovo countryside through 1998 (killing most of the villagers which were attacked e.g. Dorenitsa) leaving 1,500 Albanians dead, 400,000 homeless by October.

Historical Background President of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

He served as the President of Socialist Republic of Serbia and Republic of Serbia from 1989 until 1997 in three terms and as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1997 to 2000.

In 1999, NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Milosevic was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Slobodan Milosevic (1941-2006)

Tipping points and important decisions

beginningLDK( ) underground referendum 9.1991Dayton negotiation 1995UCK employed clandestine tactics during 1996-1998 and finally launched an offensive in 1998

Reaction

The Clinton Administration condemned Kosovars. 3.1998UN Resolution 1160 31.3.1998

During the war• NATO “we will act” 9.1998• UN Resolution 1199 23.9.1998• Kofi Annan’s report 5.10.1998• NATO activation order for air strikes 13.10.1998• October Agreement 10.1998• UN Resolution 1203 24.10.1998• Breakdown of Paris talk 15.3.1999

End of WarNATO’s air strike 23.3.1999EU-Russian peace plan and NATO-led multinational force 3.6.1999A big Russian-led debate on NATO’s lack of authorization of SC.

Failures of the International Community

Exclusion of Kosovo during the Dayton Agenda

1995-Dayton Agreement: peace accord between Bosnia and Herzegovina and former YugoslaviaThis agenda could have been an opportunity for the international community to bring up the problems in Kosovo and initiate an earlier start to preventing conflict

Lack of Conviction from the Contact Group

The Contact Group: group of nations (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) that had interest and influence in the Balkans. The Contact Group, with significant military power, did not take any direct action, but only condemned both the Serbs and the UCK.

Lack of Media Coverage

There was not much media interest regarding the cases in Kosovo It was mainly Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign minister Robin Cook who initiated the argument for Britain and the Alliance to prepare using force to prevent Serbian ethnic cleansing.

Resolution 1199The resolution demanded for cessation between FRY and Albanian leadership, but it was not backed up by military forceThe resolution was not a big enough threat for preventing the conflict between the two groups.

NATO Bombing Escalated Serbian forcesOnce NATO started bombing Serbian forces, ethnic cleansing was escalated.

….However, without NATO force, the Serbian force may have not stopped ethnic cleansing

NATO Bombing TargetsIn order to avoid NATO causalities, the bombing was conducted from high air, making it difficult to accurately target Serbian forces.NATO harmed not only Serbian forces, but also innocent civilians.

NATO was unable to restore peace

Even though NATO intervened and restored political rights to the Albanians, it was unable to restore peace and security to Serbs, who felt a great threat of revenge from the Albanians.

Lack of Assistance after intervention (Long-term

Consequences )

There still remains tension between Kosovars and SerbsKosovo was under control of the international community from 1998-2008, yet its economy suffers from weak political institutions. Law, government corruption, unemployment, etc..

Wheeler’s Criteria

1・Supreme Humanitarian 　　　　　　　Emergency

Yes

Over people killed

2 ・ Necessity, last resort

Yes

NATO tried to seek other measures to avoid use of force 　→ October AgreementFailure of October Agreement

Failure of October Agreement

Albanians were not involved in the October Agreement.They were dissatisfied of the conditions

UCK continued attacking Serb forcesSerbs responded by killing civiliansCease fire failed to hold

Failure of October Agreement

Peace talks in Rambouillet with Serbs and AlbaniansMilosevic objected the proposal

Negotiation breaks downSerbs start new round of ethnic cleansingAll options gone

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 Last resort

3 ・ Proportionality

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　NoLimitations of air p.270“Air power alone cannot stop paramilitary action”

– Gen. Wesley ClarkeInternational community reluctant to send ground troops after SomaliaCivilian casualtyIneffectiveness of air strike, with Serbs hiding weapons

4 ・ Positive humanitarian outcome

short term Yes Although far bloodier than expected, saved

millions of lives (p.274) Kosovo gained independence

4 ・ Positive humanitarian outcome Long Term No Failed to stop new round of ethnic

cleansing(p.274) Tension still continues today

5 ・ Humanitarian Motives Yes

They argued that their action was first aimed at “averting an impeding humanitarian catastrophe”

6 ・ Humanitarian Justification

“Risk-free” limited intervention.Russia questioned US motive“Bill Clinton wants to win… He hopes Milosevic will capitulate, give up the whole of Yugoslavia, make it America’s protectorate”- Boris YeltsinNATO’s face keeping