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ISSN 2234-2885
SogangLaw Review2014 9 7
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions Yeon-Ju Kim 3 19 45 63 87 (Multilateral) 111 SPS , 137 Interpreting Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act:
Definition of Terms and Allocating Burden of Proof Jeehoon Lee 163 2011398 183
Sogang Law Review Vol.7, September 2014. Sogang Law School
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Sogang Law Review
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3
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
Yeon-Ju Kim1)
. Introduction. The Role of the Outside Director System. Features of Financial Institutions. Problems of the Present System 1. Influence of CEOs and Controlling Shareholders in Appointing
Outside Directors.
2. Lack of Expertise
. How to Improve the Current System 1. Require Independence
1) Mandate Concentrated Voting
2) Adopt the Total Tenure Ceiling System
3) Lengthen the Cooling-Off Period
2. Standards of Professionalism
1) Legislation of Positive Eligibility
2) Continuing Education
. Conclusion
. Introduction
Koreas Outside Director System ("ODS") was primarily designed to increase
1) 5
4
7
transparency and assure legitimacy in corporate management, by : reforming
corporate boards of directors (BOD); ensuring democratization of organizational
management; and improving corporate fundamentals thereby strengthening
competitiveness. The term Outside director has been understood to mean a
'part-time director' who is not an executive or employee and who; participates
only in board decisions. Although the ODS was introduced in Korea immediately
following the financial crisis of 1997 and financial institutions began using outside
directors since then, it was not until January 2009 when the concept of 'outside
directors' actually appeared in Korean Commercial Law. Outside director is
defined as 'director that is not engaged in ordinary courses of business in the
company.2)
Although a significant amount of time has passed since the law was
implemented, there remains controversy over the effectiveness and function of the
outside director. Particularly within financial institutions, the ODS is more heavily
regulated due to the unique risks presented by such institutions.3)
This paper is divided in six parts including introduction and conclusion. Part II
will explain common roles for outside directors. Part III will analyze unique
characteristics of financial institutions regarding the necessity of oversight. Part IV
introduces problems inside Koreas ODS in financial institutions. Part V offers
methods to improve the functioning of the ODS.
. The Role of the Outside Director System
Article 382, Section 3 of Commercial Law provides the definition and grounds
2) Korean Commercial Law, Art. 382, Sec. 3.
3) Jae-Kyu Jeong, Outside Director System of Financial Institutions, Korean J. Comm. L. vol. 29,
2011, pp.9-44.
5
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
disqualifying outside directors, yet it does not define their specific role. Instead, in
2010, the Association of Banks() published the Best Practice Guidelines
for Outside Directors of Banking Institutions (, Best
Practice) and provides detailed criterion, as follows:
Article 13 (Role of Outside Director): An Outside director, as a member of the
board of directors, is bound to establish business goals and oversee the
management of the business executives, to ensure sound management
strategies for the long-term interests of the bank and the shareholders.
Article 14 (Authorities of Outside Director): Outside Director, as a member of
the board of directors, shall require reporting about the situation of
execution of operation and the submission of relevant data.
Article 15 (Responsibilities of Outside Director):
1. Outside directors shall actively participate in the board so that it can
enhance the long-term interests of the Bank and the shareholders, and
shall faithfully preview agendas of the board.
2. Outside directors shall spend over a certain period of time in
participating in activities of the board as required by it, in order to
fulfill the responsibilities of section 1.
3. Outside Directors shall not reveal or use to acquire benefits the bank's
(including its affiliates) confidential business information.
4. Outside directors assume civil and criminal responsibilities in case of
giving damage to the bank or a third party by violating laws or deed
of association, or neglecting the duty.
The roles of outside directors are essentially similar to that of the internal
directors who are usually executives. The main purpose of the ODS is to secure
6
7
transparency of corporate management through the independence and expertise
of outside directors.
. Features of Financial Institutions
Banks more so than financial institutions emphasize the significance of
corporate management because it affects property value evaluation and cost of
capital and stock prices ; however, more importantly, corporate management
performs an essential role allocating resources to the whole economy and
monitoring corporations.4)
The risks related to the bank management are relatively high due to various
interested parties such as account holders, and a possible moral hazard which
arises from the existence of public safety net(e.g., deposit insurance). The
establishment of the system in banks and financial companies has a significant
meaning from this point of view, considering that the ODS aims to effectively
regulate bank management of executives.5) This becomes more evident when
pointing out that the current ratio of outside directors in BOD among Korean
banks and financial institutions is 70.4%, which is much higher than what is
required by law.6) As the table below shows, outside directors make up a large
portion of the main committees inside Banks and financial institutions,
respectively.7)
4) Si-Yeon Lee, "Financial Focus: Implications for operating outside directors system of banks and
financial holding companies", 18/15 Weekly Fin. Brief, 2009, pp. 12-13.
5) For details, see the Supreme Court case 20099086, Feb. 15, 2002.
6) Bank Law art.22; Financial Holding Company Law art. 40.
7) Lee, supra note 2.
7
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
Financial Holding
CompaniesBanks Ratio
averageOSD KB
Total OSD 9 12 9 7 4 7 4 8 8 8 5 5 4 4 5 4 70.4
BOD
Committees12 15 15 8 7 9 8 11 10 11 7 7 6 6 7 6
Steering
Committees
5
(6)
4
(5)
4
(7)
4
(5)
3
(4)
8
(8)
3
(4)
3
(4)
3
(4)77.8
Compensation
Committees
4
(4)
5
(6)
3
(5)
3
(3)
3
(5)
5
(5)
5
(5)
4
(4)87.9
Audit
Committees
5
(5)
4
(4)
3
(4)
4
(4)
2
(3)
2
(3)
3
(4)
3
(4)
5
(5)
4
(4)
2
(3)
2
(3)
4
(5)
2
(3)
2
(3)
4
(5)80.3
Nomination
Committees
4
(4)
4
(5)
4
(6)
4
(5)
3
(4)
4
(4)
4
(5)
8
(8)
3
(3)
4
(5)
2
(3)
3
(3)
2
(3)
4
(5)
3
(4)
4
(6)82.3
Source : each annual report (the end of March 2009)
BOD of Banks and Financial Holding Companies
(Unit : person, %)
. Problems of the Present System
Although the BOD has been the central governance mechanism of Korean
banks, it has often been criticized due to its ineffectiveness at monitoring
management and enhancing shareholder value. Furthermore, outside directors'
shortage of both independence and expertise are contributing to the
ineffectiveness of their monitoring role.
1. Influence of CEOs and Controlling Shareholders in Appointing Outside
Directors
The purpose of the ODS is to prevent arbitrary decisions by CEOs and
controlling shareholders to ensure transparency in management of companies.
Nevertheless, the independence of outside directors is not secured under the
8
7
current system. Since there is no regulation prohibiting controlling shareholders
and executives from participating in the Nomination Committee, their
recommendation on the appointment has a large influence, even though more
than a half of the committee consists of outside directors.8)
According to a survey performed by the Association of Korean Listed
Companies in May 2010, employees responded that up to 48.1% of the whole
outside directors are recommended by controlling shareholders and related parties
and 29.1% by other executives. Outside directors answered that 50% by
controlling shareholders and related parties, and 23.1% by the nomination
committees.9) The Dong-A Ilbo newspaper reported that 30 companies among top
50 domestic sales companies processed 729 agenda in 250 directors' meeting held
during period of from January to September 2009, and dissenting votes were only
two.10) Lately, it was also reported that outside directors in Koreas top 10
companies voted 99.7% in favor of the agenda submitted in recent 5 years.11)
Similar trends can be found in financial institutions as well.
In a survey in which questions were asked to 36 people who have served as
outside directors in banks, 36.1% responded that they were recommended to their
positions by executives, and 19.4%, 16.7% each responded that they were
recommended by government officials financial personnel and major shareholders. It means that they are not free from the influence of management team and
stakeholders as much.12)
8) Byeong-Yoon Lee & Si-Yeon Lee, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director System in Banks", 6
Korean Pol. R. 13, 2009.
9) Kwae-Yeoung Jeong, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director System", 25 Korean J. Cor. L.122,
2011.
10) Jin-Young Hwang &Sang-Woon Kim, "Only Two Oppose Votes in 729 Agendas: 'Rubber Stamp'"
Outside directors Turns Reality, Feb. 4, 2010, Dong-A Ilbo, available at http://news.donga.com/
3/all/20100204/25929045/1 (last visited on June 25, 2014).
11) Ho-joon Lee, "99.7% Consent Rate: Outside directors of Top 10 Companies Become 'Yes Men'",
Apr.23, 2014, KyunghyangShinmun, available at http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?
artid=201404232123525&code=920509&med=khan (last visited on June 25, 2014).
9
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
2. Lack of Expertise
The reason why outside directors do not properly check the management of
executives is not only because of the links between the management team and
outside directors, but also partly due to their lack of expertise. Directors who do
not have sufficient understanding about corporate management cannot produce
independent and careful judgment, and just directly follow the intention of the
management team. Moreover, the current law does not provide grounds for
qualifications of experts (only grounds for disqualifications are mentioned) and
management information of the company is not timely forwarded to outside
directors.
In order for outside directors to properly perform their role of providing
oversight, it is necessary to have a proper institutional environment. Part V
proposes methods of improving the roles of the current ODS, focusing on two
central elements: independence and professionalism.
. How to Improve the Current System
1. Require Independence
1) Mandate Concentrated Voting
Directors shall be elected at the general shareholders' meeting (Article
12) Seung-Jae Seong, "Outside directors are Useless: Independency is Urgent Necessary", Nov.03,
2011, Etoday, available at http://www.etoday.co.kr/news/section/newsview.php?TM=news&SM=
0201&idxno=265843 (last visited on June 25, 2014).
10
7
382,Section 1 of Commercial Law). This is by ordinary resolution, which requires a
majority of voting rights of the present shareholders and more than 25 percent out
of total outstanding shares(Article 368, paragraph 1). The Concentrated Voting
System (CVS)allows directors supported by minority shareholders to get
appointed, preventing adhesion between outside directors and major shareholders,
ensuring independence of outside directors. Under the CVS, general shareholders
meetings may take place to appoint more than one director. Each shareholder
retains the same number of voting rights, as the number of directors appointed
(voting rights is equal to the number of shares multiplied by the number of
directors being appointed). Shareholder may use rights intensively for certain
candidates.
However, the CVS is not effective in current legal system, because Article
382(2)(1) leaves the system to a companys option. As a matter of fact, 92 percent
of publicly traded companies have not adopted the CVS; only four companies
among the top 100 enterprises in the current capital markets are known to have
adopted the system. It is necessary to make the CVS mandatory to ensure its
effectiveness. Particularly regarding outside directors in financial institutions,
expanding the portion of outside directors appointed by the CVS should be
required considering the presence of interested bank depositors, government and
regulatory authorities.
2) Adopt the Total Tenure Ceiling System
Outside directors must retain experience and knowledge about the company.
Short tenures restrict their familiarity with the organization, thereby limiting their
knowledge and effectiveness. However, excessively long tenures may weaken
independence between outside directors and executives. In Korea, most banks
except KB Group (three years) and Foreign Bank() (two years) fix
11
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
1-year-tenure. Such short periods have a tendency to turn outside directors into a
rubber stamps allowing controlling shareholders or management to get
reappointed again.13) The first term should be two to three years, and Korea
should adopt 'the Total Tenure Ceiling System,' so that the total tenure should not
exceed six years. Considering the below survey,14) which shows the difficulty in
making decisions during years three through five, such measure may be an
effective solution.
Number of Response Composition
3 years 5 27.8
5 years 11 61.1
7 years 1 5.6
9years or more 0 0.0
etc 1 5.6
18 100.0
Source : Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 32.
[Poll Results] Tenure during which independent decisions become difficult
3) Lengthen the Cooling-Off period
The 'Cooling-off Period' is a period of time during which one who was in a
close relationship with a certain company is prohibited from becoming an outside
director. According Koreas Commercial and Financial Holding Company Law, an
individual who was a director, auditor, executive or employee in a publicly traded
company or its subsidiaries within the two most recent years are prohibited from
becoming an outside director. (the Commercial Law Article 382, 542/2 Section
2(7), its implementing ordinance Article 13 section 5(1)) However, the current
13) Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 29.
14) Ibid. at 32.
12
7
cooling-off period will be expanded to three years, if considering that CEO's term
of office is three years; most of the developed countries define it three to five years;
Best Practices for Corporate Governance() and Guidelines for Voting() made by Korea Corporate Governance Service() establish a cooling-off period of five years, in order to secure the
possibility of independent decision-making of outside directors.15)
2. Standards of Professionalism
1) Legislation of Positive Eligibility
As before mentioned, current Commercial Law only prescribes negative
disqualifications and does not establish prerequisites. Under such legislation,
anyone who is not in a personal relationship with shareholders or CEOs of a
corporation is permitted to become an outside director; thereby function as a
rubber stamp for the executives; consequently makes the system nominal by
leading to a lack of independence.
It is intensifying that professors from universities or those from authorities such
as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance Director, the Financial Supervisory Service
and etc engross outside directors of financial institutions. What is more
problematic is that directors are unable to serve as an effective check on
executives because they lack sufficient professional knowledge or experience in
the area of management,16) as evidenced by the following table:17)
15) Taeg-Sik Ahn, "Independence of Outside Director", 23 Korean J. Busin. L. () 86 ,2013.16) Yu-Yeon Park &Shin-Young Lee, "Outside Directors of Financial Companies Seized by Professors
and Officials", Chosun Biz, Apr. 4, 2014, available at biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/
04/03/2014040304791.html (last visited on June 25, 2014).
17) Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 17.
13
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
Number of OSD Composition
major shareholder related
person12 11.3
current and former officials 10 9.4
finance professinals 7 6.6
academics 35 33.0
business men 26 24.5
lawyer 12 11.3
Journalist 2 1.9
CPA 1 0.9
Etc 1 0.9
TOTAL 106 100.0
Source : Korea Listed Companies Association, quarterly reports of each bank holding
company (2009)
Occupational Distribution of OSD in Banks and Bank Holding Companies
(Unit : person, %)
Recent revisions of the Best Practices clarify the qualifications although not
mandatory. Moreover, there are several other defects with the Best Practices, e.g.,
not providing clear guidelines on how so-called 'professional managers' can be
considered understanding financial company's operating principles; keeping
silence about the meaning of experience in supervision which may cause
conflicts of interests, detailing process is necessary. The criterion could be
leveraged for the future legislation after the process, in order to increase the
expertise of outside directors.
2) Continuing Education
Considering the attributes of corporate finance which require advanced
knowledge, consistent prior education and up-to-date information should be
provided to increase their level of professionalism, even for those who are familiar
14
7
to such. The table below shows the results of a recent survey:18)
Number of Response Composition
Yes 30 83.3
No 6 16.7
36 100.0
Source : Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 68.
[Poll Results] Whether post-education for expertise is needed when OSD are
newly appointed
(Unit : person, %)
. Conclusion
The Outside Director System was first introduced in Korea 14 years ago. It is
meaningful to review the system, especially at this time when the Ministry of
Justice is now under processing to reform corporate law in Korea. Financial
institutions, although private in nature, also perform public functions by protecting
deposits, extending credit, and maintaining the efficiency of capital markets,
thereby keeping economy stable and prosperous. Therefore, outside directors in
financial institutions shall have higher duties and responsibilities than other
general companies.
This paper has focused on methods of improving the role of the outside director
systemwith emphasis on independence and professionalism. Independence may
be accomplished by mandatory and extended CVS, adopting the Total Tenure
Ceiling System, and increasing the cooling-off period. Professionalism can be
fulfilled through legislation of positive eligibility and extension of post educatio
n.19)
18) Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 68.
15
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
References
[Journals]
Byeong-Yoon Lee & Si-Yeon Lee, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director
System in Banks", 6 Korean Pol. R. 13, 2009.
Jae-Kyu Jeong, Outside Director System of Financial Institutions, Korean J.
Comm. L. vol. 29, 2011.
Kwae-Yeoung Jeong, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director System", 25
Korean J. Cor. L.122, 2011.
Si-Yeon Lee, "Financial Focus: Implications for operating outside directors
system of banks and financial holding companies", 18/15 Weekly Fin.
Brief, 2009.
Taeg-Sik Ahn, "Independence of Outside Director", 23 Korean J. Busin. L.
() 86 ,2013.
[Websites]
Ho-joon Lee, "99.7% Consent Rate: Outside directors of Top 10 Companies
Become 'Yes Men'", Apr.23, 2014, KyunghyangShinmun, available at
http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html? artid=201404232123525&code=
920509&med=khan (last visited on June 25, 2014).
Jin-Young Hwang &Sang-Woon Kim, "Only Two Oppose Votes in 729
Agendas: 'Rubber Stamp'" Outside directors Turns Reality, Feb. 4, 2010,
Dong-A Ilbo, available at http://news.donga.com/3/all/20100204/25929045/1
Seung-Jae Seong, "Outside directors are Useless: Independency is Urgent
19) This report followed the general assorting method analyzing the two factors in parallel.
Considering that it is necessary for outside directors to have expertise in order to properly check
the management team, however, the professionalism factor could be covered under the issue of
independence.
16
7
Necessary", Nov.03,2011,Etoday, available at http://www.etoday.co.kr/news/
section/ newsview.php?TM=news&SM=0201&idxno=265843
Yu-Yeon Park &Shin-Young Lee, "Outside Directors of Financial Companies
Seized by Professors and Officials", Chosun Biz, Apr. 4, 2014, available
at biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/04/03/2014040304791.html (last
visited on June 25, 2014).
[Cases]
Supreme Court case 20099086, Feb. 15, 2002.
17
Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions
ABSTRACT
1997
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-----------------------------------------------------------------
:
Keywords : Outside Director, Financial Institution
Sogang Law Review
Vol.7, September 2014. 19-44
Sogang Law School
2014 9 7 19-44
19
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,
.
2. CISG
1)
(United Nations Conference on Contracts for
International Sale of Goods: CISG)
(CISG 4
), .
CISG
.33)
2) CISG 35
CISG
. , CISG
,
, ,
. CISG 35 44
33) CISG
.
34
7
.34)
.35)
, CISG 35
. 35 ,
(1),
,
.(35 2 a, c)
, 2 a
(Ordinary Use) .
.
.36) , (Resale)
.
.
3)
,
.
,
. ,
. 1995 37)
34) , , , , 2009, 14.
35) , , , 7, , 1998, 216-217.
36) , , 17.
37) Germany; 08/03/1995; unilex VIII ZR 159/94.
35
.
,
.
(Particular purpose) ,
(Ordinary Use)
,
.
,
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CISG 35 2
. ,
CISG 35 2 b ,
,
.39)
4)
CISG
35 ,
38)
.
39) Germany; 08/03/1995; unilex VIII ZR 159/94
. http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-35.html, : 2014.4.13.
36
7
,
.
,
.
.
3.
1) (Free Trade Agreement)
(Regional Trade
Agreement) . , ,
, .
(Substantial)
.
GATT/WTO
. GATT/WTO
WTO
. FTA , EU
FTA , .
WTO FTA
.
. , FTA
.
37
2) FTA
2008 6 26
( FTA) . FTA
,
,
.
, 30
.
.
2008 4 18
40) ,
.41)
,
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,
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, 6 5 9 6072 ,
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12.
38
7
. 5 ,
(BSE, Bovine Spongiform Encephalophy)
. ()
(OIE) ()
.43) .
(OIE)
,
.
WTO SPS 5 7
, OIE
.
.
4)
,
WTO
.
.
43) 5 .
In the event (an) additional case(s) of BSE occur(s) in the United States, the U.S. government
shall immediately conduct a thorough epidemiological investigation and inform the Korean
government of the results of the investigation. the U.S. government will consult with the Korean
government about the findings of the investigation. The Korean government will suspend the
importation of beef and beef products if the additional case(s) results in the OIE recognizing an
adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status.
39
FTA
,
.
IV.
,
.
. 8
.
.
SPS 5 7
,
,
TBT 2
.
.
(CISG) 35
,
40
7
.
,
, 35
,
.
.
.
.
.
1,000
,
.
.
.
41
[ ]
, , , 7, , 1998.
, - II WTO, , 10 2, , 2012.
, , , 15 2, 2008.
, , , , 2009.
, , SPS
, , 29 3, 2007., ,
, 82, 2008.
[]
Schlechtriem, P., The Sellers Obligations under the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, : Galston/Smit(ed.),
International Sales, New York: Matthew Bender, 1984.
[]
Appellate Body Report, Japn-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,
WT/DS245/AB/R., Nov.26.2003.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Product, WT/DS381/AB/R.,
42
7
Sep.15.2014.
Germany; 08/03/1995; unilex VIII ZR 159/94.
[]
, ", WTO ",
http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2013&no=851268, : 2014.04.10.
, WTO SPS, ,
http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=
001&aid=000654080, : 2014.04.10.
TV, , ,
http://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/09/02/2013090290350.html,
: 2014.04.10.
[]
, ( 1) , e-,
http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1317
: 2014.04.10
,
, , 2006.
, http://www.wto.org, : 2014.04.10.
, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu, : 2014.04.10.
43
ABSTRACT
Analysis on Radioactive Contamination on Japanese
Marine Product Problem
- Focusing on an Analysis of Current Regulatory Actions of Korean
Governments and Counterplan for Expected Disputes -
Kim, Yong Sung
In 2013 August, Japanese government officially conceded that 300 tons of
cooling water for the nuclear reactor has been discharged into the sea
everyday. Japan added theres no way to stop the spill at all. Thus, it is not
difficult to foresee secondary damages which are fatal; radioactive
contamination on marine products could be one of them. Still, the access to
related informations is highly restricted by Japanese government.
After the radiation leak has been reported, neighboring countries put an
governmental actions to guarantee food safety. Korean government, for
example, forbids the importation of all marine products from Hukushima
and 7 neighboring provinces, regulates other provinces by asking
certificates when imported products exceed standards. Those governmental
actions are based on SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitory Measures Agreement)
agreement Article 5.7.
This study puts an analysis on those actions. They could violate various
regulatory agreements under the present WTO system. Suspension of
importation can not be continued when Japan provides proper informations
for risk assessment. Asking certificates to japanese marine products only
44
7
could be interpreted as a Technical Barrier which needs to be rid of.
In later part, this study searches what are the options for us when current
regulatory actions are no longer valid. Counteractions can be done in two
levels; one for private contract applying Article 35 of CISG and the other for
Governmental agreement as a part of FTA which is an exception to WTO rules.
Considering precedent cases, claim for damages may rarely be admitted.
So, it is important for each party to put an compensation article before
signing the contract in personnel level. Therefore, government level
agreement would be more effective solution.
Today, Food safety is one of key factors to measure how the government
carries out his duty well. Korean government needs to deal with this matter
in sub-agreement of on going Korea-Japan FTA discussion. Korea-US FTA
experience relating to American Beef Product can be a good reference.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords : Radioactive Contamination on Japanese Marine Products,
Suspension on importation, SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement,
CISG, FTA, WTO
: , , , SPS(
), TBT (
), (CISG),
(FTA), (WTO)
Sogang Law Review
Vol.7, September 2014. 45-61
Sogang Law School
2014 9 7 45-61
45
- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 1) -
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- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 -
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60
7
ABSTRACT
Research on Illegality Standard of Minimum Resale
Price Maintenance; November 25, 2010 (2009du9543)
Kim, Chongwon
Under the Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(hereinafter
MRA) article 29 (1), no enterpriser shall engage in a resale price
maintenance(RPM), but this shall not apply where there exist justifiable
reasons in terms of the maximum price maintenance preventing the
transactions of commodities or services in excess of specified prices.
However, according to 2009du9543 and subsequent precedents, the Korea
Supreme Court held that minimum RPM also could be allowed if its own
pro-competitive effect is larger than its anti-competitive effect.
It seems that the Korea Supreme Court is influenced by the Leegin
decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2007. In
Leegin decision, the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated the principle of per se
illegality and applied the rule of reason in the field of minimum RPM which
means negative effects of RPM are not sufficient reason to treat RPM
agreements as automatically illegal.
However, it raises the interpretative problem of MRA whether exceptions
can also be allowed to the minimum RPM, because exception clause of the
article 29 (1) only allows maximum RPM to be legal if there exist justifiable
reasons. Since the Korea Supreme Court have accepted the rule of reason, it
is required to seek a standard of judgment for substantive management.
61
- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 -
Moreover, legislative amendments of RPM clause or legislation reflecting the
rule of reason in minimum RPM case also need to be considered.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Keywords : 2009du9543, resale price maintenance, minimum resale price
maintenance, Leegin decision, rule of reason
: 20099543 , , ,
Leegin ,
Sogang Law Review
Vol.7, September 2014. 63-85
Sogang Law School
2014 9 7 63-85
63
1)
I.
II.
1.
1) 2)
2.
1)
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84
7
ABSTRACT
Public official election of Korea and freedom of
expression in cyber space
Kim, Jong Hwa
Historically, the definition of "the freedom of expression" that the First
Amendment deals with has been constantly broadened in its meaning.
American law currently covers a wide range of the freedom of expression
compared to the times when it was first established, and now U.S. courts
provide a comprehensive measure, "the rule of clear and present danger." It
can be said that same legal trend appears in Korean judiciary system,
considering that the existing legal system receives more challenges as social
awareness towards the freedom of expression gets momentum. Such
conflict consequently raises a critical question: Is it appropriate to limit the
election campaign regulated by the current Public Official Election Act?
In 2012, the court found real-name policy on the internet unconstitutional.
This decision is a milestone in debating the freedom of expression on the
internet. In principle, the freedom of expression shall be protected and in
particular the right to promote the election campaign on cyberspace should
be guaranteed, in that cyberspace is the place where notion of democracy
and equality could be most effectively realized. It is true that there shall be
a limitation: intentional spreading of false information or personal attack
should be restricted. Yet there is no doubt that this kind of regulation is but
an exception to the principle. The election system compatible with highly
85
sophisticated web environment is urgently requested, considering that the
process of election must guarantee the freedom of expression and allow
citizens crucial role in the center of the politics.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Key words : The First Amendment, the rule of clear and present danger,
freedom of expression, electioneering, the internet real-name
policy
: 1, , ,
,
Sogang Law Review
Vol.7, September 2014. 87-110
Sogang Law School
2014 9 7 87-110
87
1)
. .
1.
2.
3.
4.
. 1. -
2.
. 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
.
I.
,
1) 6
88
7
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.
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,
1,300 ,
.
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. 4
. .2)
.
1.
,
.
, (tribunus)3), (censor)4)
(quaestor)5)
. 2
.6)
2) R. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 1996; O. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome, The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1995 ; J.Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law, Oxford, 1912 ; O. Robinson, Penal Practice and Penal Policy in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 2007, A. Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome, Oxford, 1968 .
3) , 494 .
4) , , .
5) , .
6) G. MacCormack, The Liability of the Judge in the Republic and Principate, Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt Geschichte und Kultur Rons im Spiegel der neueren Forschung Vol.2,1982,pp.3-28.
90
7
2.
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. .
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.
,
.
8)(praetor) (judex quastionis)
.9)
.
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(triumviri capitals, 3)
.11)
.
3 ,
. 3
, 3
.12)
7) J. Strachan-Davidson, ProblemsoftheRomanCriminalLawI,Oxford,1912, p.47.8) , . 1 .
9) B. Frier, Urban praetors and rural violence, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association Vol.113,1983, pp.221-241.
10) Ibid.
11) Ibid.
12) A. Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome, Oxford, 1968, p.79 ; W . Nippel, PolicingRome, The Journal of Roman Studies Vol.74, 1984, pp.20-29.
91
3.
.
, 3 (praefectus
urbi) (praefectus vigilium)
.
, ,
.
.
,
.
1
.
.13)
.
4.
.
.
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,
13) R. Bauman, Some Remarks on the Structure and the Survival of the Quaestio de Adulteriis,
Journal of the Australian Society for Classical Studies Vol.2,1968, pp.68-93.
92
7
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,
.14)
,
.
,
1 . .15)
,
(quaestio perpetuae)
.16)
,
.
,
.17)
.
.
. .
14) J. Balsdon, The history of the extortion court, 123-70 B.C., Papers of the British School at Rome Vol. 14, 1938, pp.98-114.
15) J. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law I, Oxford, 1912, p.187.16) M. Alexander, Repetition of Prosecution and Scope of Prosecution in the Standing Criminal
Courts, Classical Antiquity Vol. 1, 1982, pp.141-166. 17) R. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate,
Johnnesberg, 1967, pp.55-56.
93
.
.
.
,
.
, ,
, .
.
.
.
,
, .
1. -
,
.
.
. .
.
.
,
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.
94
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.
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2.
. ,
.
.
.
.21)
18) ,
.
.
19)
. .
.
/ .
20) J. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law 2, Oxford, 1912, pp.98, 101-102.21) ,
.
. (lex de capite
civis)
.
.
.
95
.22)
.
.
1. 23)
1)
. .
.
. .
.
2)
, , (calumnia)
(tergiversatio) (praevaricatio) .
,
.
.
.
.
22)
.
23) O. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome, The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1995, pp.142-161.
96
7
3)
.
,
. ,
.
.
4)
.
(postulatio),
.
, .
(interrogatio) .
,
(inscripto) .
.
.
.
.
.
97
.
.
2. 24)
1)
10 .
, .
100 .
2)
. ,
.
. ,
, 1 .
3)
30 60
.
24) R. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 1996, pp.52-76.
98
7
. ,
32, 50, 65 100 .
.
.
.
,
.
.
(consilium)
,
.
,
.
,
.
.
,
Q.
.
C.
.
50 .25)
,
.
25) H. Mattingly, The Extortion Law of the Tabula Bembina, The Journal of Roman Studies Vol. 60, 1970, pp.154-168.
99
, .
,
.
.
70 300 100
,
.26)
,
,
. 300 13
4000 .
3. 27)
1)
(1)
. ,
.
.
.
26) B. Marshall, Q. Cicerto, Hortensius and the lex Aurelia, Rheinisches Museum fur Jurisprudenz Vol.118, 1975, pp.136-152.
27) R. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 1996, pp.77-102.
100
7
(2)
,
. .
2 1 .
,
. 8
, 13 18 .28)
.
. 12 1
, .
.
. ,
. ,
8 .
.
.
.
.
(3)
. 17
28) H. Mattingly, Jury-Panel of the lex-repetundarum, Latomus Vol.34, 1975, pp.726-728.
101
.
.
,
5
.
, .
.
. (orator)
,
, . ,
,
.
2)
.
.
.
. .
.
,
.
102
7
,
. ,
.
.
20
.
.
4. 29)
. 1 (non liquit),
(ampliatio) ,
.
.
3 .
.
, .
,
.
.
.
,
.
,
.
29) O. Robinson, Penal Practice and Penal Policy in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 2007, pp.67-122.
103
,
.
.
. .
1)
. (absolvo) A
(condemno) C .
. A .
A C .
.
.
.
,
.30)
2)
.
. ,
.
.
30) J. Cody, The Use of Libero/Damno and Absolvo/Condemno in the Judicial Proceedings of the
Late Republic, Classical Philology Vol.68, 1973, pp.205-208.
104
7
3)
.
, .
.
(fecisse videtur) (non
fecisse videtur) . (non liquit) 3 1
(ampliatio). ,
, .
3 1 ,
. ,
.
.
5.
, .
,
.31) .
31) Robinson, op.cit., pp.64-66.
105
.
,
. .
6.
.
,
,
,
.32)
.
. .
.
.
.
7.
.
.
.
32) Ibid.
106
7
. .
. .
.
,
. ,
, .
,
.
.
,
, ,
,
.
,
.
.
. ,
, ,
.
107
,
,
. ,
(Das Beste was wir von der Geschichte haben ist der Enthusiasmus
den sie erregt).
108
7
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im Spiegel der neueren Forschung, Vol.2,1982.
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J. Balsdon, The history of the extortion court, 123-70 B.C., Papers of the
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Proceedings of the Late Republic, Classical Philology Vol.68,1973.
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110
7
ABSTRACT
Criminal Jury System in Ancient Rome Republic
Na, Gieop
It is well-known that criminal law of ancient Rome interests classical
scholars, because scholars intrigued to it perhaps in the hope of gaining
light upon Roman social habits and political institutions, shall find the task
of reconstruction a perpetual and exhilarating challenge to their learn,
judgment and acumen. On the other hand, study on Roman criminal law is
a significant task even in the field of comparative legal history or historical
science considering that it is almost impossible to track down the
developing process of criminal law in case of many other legal systems
from ancient culture. However, the studies on criminal law of ancient Rome
has not been that successful dragging critical attention from law scholars or
practitioners so far, compared to civil law system which receives keen
interests in all ages. In particular, the field of criminal procedure law still
stands unfamiliar to even those who hold concerns in criminal law of
ancient Rome. The purpose of the short article is to introduce the criminal
jury system of the ancient Roman Republic. Through this, the author tries to
extract the culture and principles inserted in the trial structure, and finally
attempt to find out legal meanings in its implication.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Key words : Criminal procedure law of ancient Roman Republic, Criminal
jury system, Ancient Roman law, Legal history
: , , , ,
Sogang Law Review
Vol.7, September 2014. 111-135
Sogang Law School
2014 9 7 111-135
111
(Multilateral)
- -
1)
I.
II. WTO
1. WTO
2. WTO : Special and Differential Treatment
(S&D)
1)
2) S&D
III. WTO (Dispute Settlement System)
1. WTO
1)
2) (retaliation)
2.
1) 2)
3) IV. :
1. ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law)
2. Public-Private Partnership
3. (Mediation)
V.
1) 5
112
7
I.
WTO WTO
(power-oriented) (rule-
oriented)
.
. WTO
, , (level playing field)
(development) .
, ,
(capacity) .2)
,
(LDCs)
.3) WTO
(S&D)
. WTO (LDCs)
,
. , WTO
ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law)
.
2) Mervyn Martin, WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and Development, Mattinus Nijhoff Publisher 2013, p.67.
3) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing
Countries, SIDA 2004, p.3.
113
(Multilateral)
- -
II. WTO
1. WTO
GATT 1947 23
11 . GATT WTO
2013 3 2 159 WTO
2/3 .4) WTO
(Least Developed Countries, LDCs) UN
WTO 33 .5)
GATT 18 ()
6) .
GATT WTO WTO
(Self-election) .
.7) GATT
.8)
4) : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm (: 2014.06.24.)
5) WTO 11 2 (LDCs) (UN)
.
6) GATT Article XVIII:1 those contracting parties the economies ofwhich can only support low
standards of living* and are in the early stages of development.
7) Ferdinand Adadzi, World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, VDM Verlag Dr. Mller, 2011, p.8.
8) , WTO , 48 3 2003, 23-24.
114
7
2. WTO : Special and Differential Treatment (S&D)
1)
WTO (Most-Favored Nations, MFN)
GATT 1948 (ITO)
(special
treatment) . GATT 18
(Governmental Assistance to Economic Development) 18
A GATT 28 ,
.9) 18 B
(Balance of Payment, BOP)
.10) 12 BOP
.11)
(Special and Differential Treatment, S&D) WTO
.12) GATT 4 1966 , 1979
(Enabling Clause) . 1)GATT
9) GATT XVIII:7(a) If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article
considers it desirable, in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry* with a view
to raising the general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a concession
included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement,
10) GATT XVIII:9 In order to safeguard its external financial position and to ensure a level of
reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development, a
contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to the
provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control the general level of its imports by restricting the
quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported; Provided that the import restrictions
instituted, maintained or intensified shall not exceed those necessary:
11) , , 32-33.
12) , , 5, 2007, 7.
115
(Multilateral)
- -
(GSP) 2)S&D, 3) RIAs , GSTP
(Global System of Trade Preferences) , 4)(LDCs)
.13)
2) S&D
S&D
. WTO 167
S&D , 78 S&D
.14) 89 S&D 71
. 18 S&D
WTO (LDCs)
. WTO
S&D
.15)
S&D
S&D
.16) S&D
13) , , 29-30.
14) Mervyn Martin, op. cit., p.70.
Mervyn Martin , S&D
39 S&D
. 35 S&D , 4
.
15) Ibid., pp.70-71.
116
7
S&D
S&D WTO (best endeavor) ,
S&D S&D
- S&D
.
III. WTO (Dispute Settlement System)
1. WTO
WTO 1947 GATT
1995 WTO WTO
. 1979
.
1) 17)
(1)
WTO WTO
16) Ibid., pp.34-35.
17) : http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm (
: 2014.6.25.)
117
(Multilateral)
- -
(Dispute Settlement Body, DSB)
(consultation) . 60
.
Terms of Reference .
3
. EC-Banana (DS27)
WTO .18)
(panel report) .
20 DSB
DSB
.
, 1989.12.7.
(Appellate Body)
. 1991 DSU
WTO .
WTO
,
.
.19)
(2)
DSB DSB
18) James Smith, Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries and Institutional Change
in WTO dispute Settlement Review of International Political Economy 11:3, August 2004,
pp.565-566.
19) ( 16) , , 2006, 78.
118
7
. 30 DSB
DSB ,
.
DSB
. DSU 21.5
,
90
.
DSU 21.5 .
, , 3
.20)
2) (retaliation)
DSB
WTO DSB (Suspension of Concession)
. WTO DSB
,
. DSU 22.1
(temporary) DSB
.21) WTO
20) ( 16), , 86.
21) DSU Article 22.1: Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not
implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a
119
(Multilateral)
- -
DSB
.22)
DSU 22.3
,
.
(Cross-retaliation)
DSB
.23)
2.
WTO UN
EU
( ).
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.
Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.
22) ( 16), , 86.
23) DSU Article 22.3: In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the
complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures:
(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions
or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate
Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;
(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other
obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other
obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;
(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other
obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances
are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another
covered agreement.
120
7
, , ,
. WTO 24)
WTO
GATT WTO
. WTO
.25)
WTO
,
. ,
WTO
WTO (remedies)
. , ,
(LDCs)
WTO
.26) WTO
.
24) WTO 33 (LDCs) WTO
WTO ,
8(, , , , , , , )
3 . 25
3 ,
. (, , , , , , ,
, , , , , , , , , , ,
, , , , , , 25)
(: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm)
25) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,
WTO Law and Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.196.26) James Smith, op. cit., p.543.
121
(Multilateral)
- -
: WTO
: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/dispu maps e.htm
1)
WTO WTO
(WTO Law) WTO .
WTO (development)
.
.
WTO
.
DSU ,
122
7
.27)
.28)
2)
WTO DSB
.
.
.
WTO
.29) ,
.
. WTO
.30)
WTO WTO
27) DSU Article 4.10, Article 12.11, Article 21.2, 21.7, 21.8
28) Hansel T.Pham, Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in the
DSU, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Spring 2004.29) Ibid.
30) ( 16), , 91.
123
(Multilateral)
- -
.31)
WTO . ,
WTO
. ,
,
.32)
3)
,
WTO
.
WTO
.33) WTO
.
.
31) ( 16), , 92.
32) Hansel T.Pham, op. cit.
33) Niall Meager, Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings,
WTO Law and Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.271-218.
124
7
. WTO
WTO
.34) WTO
,
WTO 1
.35)
, ,
.36) , WTO DSU WTO
.37) ,
,
. , WTO
,
34) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, op. cit., p.3.
35) Ibid., p.3.
36) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, op. cit.
37) Ibid., p.197.
125
(Multilateral)
- -
.38)
IV. :
1. ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law)
2001
ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law) WTO
3
.39) ACWL
Endowment Fund ,
ACWL
ACWL .
ACWL
Roster External Legal Counsel .40) 2014 6 26
4 ACWL
, ACWL
.41)
WTO
.
38) Ibid., p.196.
39) Chad P.Bown and Bernard M.Hoekamn, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, Journal of International Economic Law 8(4), November 2005, pp.874-875.
40) Ibid., p.875.
41) : http://www.acwl.ch/e/disputes/ext_counsel.html (: 2014.06.26.)
126
7
WTO ACWL . ACWL
. , ACWL , , ,
ACWL , ,
.42)
2. Public-Private Partnership
ACWL WTO
.
. 2
, (,
, , NGO )
WTO
, .
2-
.
42) Chad P.Bown and Bernard M.Hoekamn, op. cit., p.875.
127
(Multilateral)
- -
WTO .
WTO
(Capacity) .
.
WTO ,
.
WTO
.43)
pro bono
.
3. (Mediation)
(Alternative Dispute Resolution, ADR) , WTO
ADR
. (Mediation)44)
.
43) Chad P.Bown and Bernard M.Hoekamn, op. cit., p.872 .
44) 3
,
(arbitration) .
128
7
WTO
(consultation) . DSU 5
.
.
WTO
. 3
.
.
WTO DSU WTO S&D
.
.
DSU S&D
.
V.
WTO
Emerging Market
45) ,
129
(Multilateral)
- -
(LDCs) .
WTO WTO
,
.
, ACWL
ACWL
,
. ACWL 1 ,
WTO
. ADR
.46)
S&D
WTO .
GATT WTO
.
23 GATT 2014 WTO 150
45) , 1990
, , , 4 BRICs
Emerging Market .
BRICS . WTO
, WTO
. WTO
.
46)
.
130
7
. WTO GATT
.
.
WTO
(level Playing Field)
.
Recommended