УЧЕЊА О ПРЕИМУЋСТВУ КОПНЕНЕ МОЋИ

(схватање Халфорда Џона Макиндера);

I Kratka biografija II Osnovna učenja III Zaključak

I KRATKA BIOGRAFIJA

Sir Halford John Mackinder, (February 15 1861

– March 6, 1947)

Шкотски географ и геополитичар; професор на више престижних британских Универзитета

Дела: The Geographical Pivot

of History(1904) Democratic Ideals and

Reality (1919) “The Round World and

the Making of Peace”, Foreign Affairs, July 1943

Sir Halford John Mackinder was born at Elswitha Hall, Gainsborough, Lincolnshire, on 15 February 1861, the eldest among six children of Draper Mackinder (1818-1912), medical doctor, and Fanny Anne (1831-1905), daughter of Halford Wotton Hewitt of Lichfield, also a medical doctor.

After early schooling at Queen Elizabeth Grammar School, Gainsborough (1870-1874) Mackinder went to Epsom College, boarding school in Surrey, from 1874-1880, before going up to Christ Church, Oxford. In the years 1880 to 1883 Mackinder studied animal morphology receiving a first class degree in natural science. In his fourth year Mackinder read history, gained a second class degree, and was elected to a research scholarship in geology. In 1885 Mackinder moved to London, studied law and was called to the bar from the Middle Temple (1886).

At the Royal Geographical Society he delivered his famous paper on “The Scope and Methods of Geography” and later in the same year, 1887, was appointed Reader in Geography at Oxford. With help from the RGS, Mackinder founded the Oxford School of Geography in 1899, the year in which he led an expedition that made the first ascent of Mount Kenya.

While at Oxford, Mackinder served as the Principal (1892-1903) of University College Reading, today the University of Reading. In 1903 he became the second director of the London School of Economics, resigning in 1908 to follow a political career. He was a Member of the British Parliament from 1910 to 1922. He was also appointed by the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, to be British High Commissioner to South Russia between 1919 and 1920. 

Mackinder’s major publications include Britain and the British Seas (1902), “The Geographical Pivot of History” (1904) and Democratic Ideas and Reality (1919). Mackinder gave us the concept of a Eurasian Heartland that if controlled by one power or alliance could be a base for world domination. It took two World Wars and the Cold War to prevent the prophecy becoming reality, in the view of James Kurth, “The Decline and Fall of Almost Everything,” Foreign Affairs, LXX 11/2 (1993), p. 159

In 1904 Mackinder gave a paper on "The Geographical Pivot of History" at the Royal Geographical Society, in which he formulated the Heartland Theory. This is often considered as a, if not the, founding moment of Geopolitics as a field of study, although Mackinder did not use the term. Whilst the Heartland Theory initially received little attention outside geography, this theory would later exerce some influence on the foreign policies of world powers.

Possibly disappointed at not getting a full Chair, Mackinder left Oxford and became director of the London School of Economics between 1903 and 1908. After 1908, he concentrated on advocating the cause of imperial unity and lectured only part-time. He was elected to Parliament in January 1910 as Unionist Party member for the Glasgow Camlachie constituency and was defeated in 1922. He was knighted in the 1920 New Year Honours for his services as an MP

His next major work, Democratic ideals and reality: a study in the politics of reconstruction, appeared in 1919. It presented his theory of the Heartland and made a case for fully taking into account geopolitical factors at the Paris Peace conference and contrasted (geographical) reality with Woodrow Wilson's idealism. The book's most famous quote was: "Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World." This message was composed to convince the world statesmen at the Paris Peace conference of the crucial importance of Eastern Europe as the strategic route to the Heartland was interpreted as requiring a strip of buffer state to separate Germany and Russia. These were created by the peace negotiators but proved to be ineffective bulwarks in 1939 (although this may be seen as a failure of other, later statesmen during the interbellum). The principal concern of his work was to warn of the possibility of another major war (a warning also given by economistJohn Maynard Keynes).

Mackinder was anti-Bolshevik and as British High Commissioner in Southern Russia in late 1919 and early 1920, he stressed the need for Britain to continue her support to the White Russian forces, which he attempted to unite.

II OSNOVNA UČENJA

По њему, у историјском и глобалном сукобу поморских и континенталних сила, предност имају ове друге, тј. Оне државе које контролишу средишњи део европског континента, “географски пивот историје” (“предео срца” или “Heartland”)

THE GEOGRAPHICAL PIVOT OF HISTORY(1904)

За Мекиндера, релевантна светска историја се може разделити у три епохе: а) пре-Колумбова б) Колумбова, в) пост-Колумбова.

Kada se istoričari u daljoj budućnosti osvrnu unatrag prema vekovima kroz koje upravo prolazimo, i vide ih sažeto, kako mi danas vidimo egipatske dinastije, vrlo verovatno će opisati poslednjih 400 godina kao Kolumbovsku epohu i reci ce da se završila ubrzo nakon 1900. godine.

Odnedavno, postalo je običaj govoriti o geografskim istraživanjima kao gotovo završenim, i došlo je do saznanja da se geografija mora okrenuti prema ciljevima intenzivnog istraživanja i filozofskih sinteza.

Od sadašnjeg trenutka nadalje, u postkolumbovskom dobu, oper ćemo se morati nositi sa zatvorenim političkim sistemom, i bez sumnje, biće to jedan od svetskih domašaja.

Predlažem da se večeras opišu one fizičke osobine sveta za koje verujem da su najvise podložne Ijudskom delovanju, i predstavljanju neke od glavnih faza istorije kao organski povezane s njima, čak i u doba kad su bile nepoznate geografiji. Moj cilj neće biti raspravljati o uticaju ove ili one osobine, niti proučavati regionalnu geografiju vec, umesto toga, želim da izložim Ijudsku istoriju kao delić života svetskog organizma.

Pokojni profesor Freeman je smatrao da jedina istorija koja vredi ona mediteranske i evropske rase. Donekle, naravno, ovo je tačno, zato što su iz ovih rasa potekle ideje koje su osigurale naslednicima Grčke i Rima dominaciju u svetu. Udrugom, vrlo važnom smislu, međutim, takvo ograničenje ima sužavajući učinak na misao. Ideje koje formiraju naciju, kao suprotnu tek skupini Ijudskih životinja, najčešće su bivale prihvaćene pod pritiskom zajedničke patnje i pod zajedničkom nužnošću otpora spoljašnjoj sili.

Ono što mogu opisati kao doslovnu koncepciju istorije, koncentrišući pažnju na ideje i na civilizacije koje su njihove posledice, pogodno je za gubljenje iz vida elementarnijeg pokreta, ciji pritisak je obično uzbudljiv uzrok težnje za negovanjem velikih ideja.

Odbojna licnost sprovodi značajnu drustvenu funkciju ujedinjavanja svojih neprijatelja, i Evropa je pod pritiskom spoljašnjeg varvarizma postigla svoju civilizaciju. Tražim od vas, stoga, da na trenutak pogledate Evropu i evropsku istoriju kao podređene Aziji i azijatskoj istoriji, jer evropska civilizacija jeste, u jako realnom obliku, proizvod svetovne borbe protiv azijske invazije.

Hiljadama godina skupine Ijudi na konjima provaljivaIe su iz Azije kroz široki međuprostor između planina Urala i Kaspijskog mora, jačuci kroz otvorena područja južne Rusije i udarali u tabor u Mađarskoj, u samom srcu evropskog poluostrva, oblikujući tako, zbog nužnosti suprotstavljanja, istoriju velikih naroda - Rusa, Nemaca, Francuza, Italijana i Vizantinaca.

Suparnička mobilnost bila je mobilnost Vikinga u njihovim brodovima. Spuštajući se iz Skandinavije prema severnim, kao i južnim obalama Europe, prodirali su u unutrašnjost rečnim putevima. AIi, domašaj njihova djelovanja jebio ograničen, jer, šire govoreći, njihova je moć bila delotvorna samo u blizini vode.

Tako su naseljenici Europe ležali zahvaćeni između dva pritiska - azijskih nomada s istoka, a s preostale tri strane pirata s mora.

Po svojoj prirodi, nijedan od pritisaka nije bio prevladavajužćci, i oba su stoga bila stimulativna.

Mobilnost preko okeana prirodna je konkurencija mobilnosti konjima i kamilama u srcu kontinenta. Na plovidbi velikim okeanskim rekama zasnivala se Potamska faza civilizacije (to je rana faza u razvoju društva, odnosi se na civilizacije koje su se razvile na ušću velikih reka), ona Kine na Yangtzeu, Indije na Gangu, Babilonije na Eufratu, Egipta na Nilu. Isključivo na navigaciji Mediteranom zasnivalo se ono sto se opisuje kao Talasokratska faza civilizacije (okeanske civilizacije koje se razvijaju na obalama mora), ona Grka i Rimljana.

Saraceni i Vikinzi održavali su svoj uspon plovidbom na obalama oceana.

Najvažniji rezultat otkrića puta prema Indiji preko Rta, bilo je povezivanje zapadnih i istočnih obalnih plovidba Evroazije, makar i okolnim putem, i na taj nacin neutralizacija strateške prednosti središnjeg položaja stepskih nomada do neke mere, pritiskom iz zaleđa. Revolucija koju su započeli veliki pomorci kolumbovske generacije pružili su hrišćanstvu najveću rnoguću mobilnost snaga, neku vrstu krilate mobilnosti.

O uitcaju Alfrada Tajera mahana na pomorsku moć država.

Široki politički učinak je bio promena odnosa Evrope i Azije, jer dok je u srednjem veku Evropa bila zarobljena između neprohodne pustinje na jugu, nepoznatog okeana na severu i zapadu, ledenih ili sumovitih pustara na severu i severoistoku, te na jugu i jugoistoku konstantno ugrožena superiornom mobilnošću jahača konja i kamila, sada je isplivala na svet, multiplicirajući više od trideset puta površinu mora i obalnih zemalja do kojih je imala pristup, i obavijajući svojim uicajem evroazijske kopnene sile koje su je prestale ugrožavati.

Ali, kopnena sila i dalje ostaje i nedavni su joj događaji povećali važnost. Dok su pomorski Ijudi zapadne Europe prekrili okean svojim flotama, naselili druge kontinente i u razlicitom stepenu učinili dostupnim okeanske rubove Azije, Rusija je organizovala Kozake i, izlazeci iz svojih severnih šuma, patrolirala stepom postavljajući svoje nomade da se susretnu s tatarskirn nomadima.

Samo generaciju pre činilo se da su para (parni pogon) i Suecki kanal pomaknuli mobilnost morske sile u odnosu prema kopnenoj sili. Železnice su služile uglavnom kao podrška trgovini usmerenoj prema okeanu. Ali, transkontinentalne železnice sada menjaju stanje kopnene moći, i nigde taj ucinak nije jači nego u zatvorenom Heartlandu Euroazije, na ogromnim podrucjima u kojima niti drvo, niti kamen nisu bili dostupni za izgradnju puteva. Železnice čine čuda u stepi, jer direktno zamenjuju mobilnost konja i kamila, faza razvoja izgradnje puteva ovde je bila izbegnuta.

Ruske žieleznice imaju čisti put dug 9 600 kilometara od Wirballena (danas Virbalis na granici Litve s Kalinjingradom) na zapadu do Vladivostoka na istoku.

Ruska vojska u Mandžuriji je značajni pokazatelj mobilne kopnene sile kao što je britanska vojska u južnoj Africi bila pokazatelj morske sile.

Prostori unutar Ruskog Carstva i Mongolije toliko su ogromni i njihovi su potencijali u stanovništvu, pšenici, pamuku, gorivu i metalima tako neizrecivo veliki da je neizbežno da će se veliki ekonomski svet, vise ili manje razdeljen tamo razvijati bez pristupa okeanske trgovine.

Kako razmatramo brz pregled širokih istorijskih tokova, ne postaje Ii evidentna određena postojanost geografskih odnosa? Nije Ii regija ose svetske politike taj ogroman prostor Evroazije koji je nepristupačan za brodove, ali od davnine otvoren za nomadske jahače i danas će biti prekriven železničkom mrežom?

Rusija zamenjuje Mongolsku imperiju. Njen pritisak na Finsku, Skandinaviju. Poljsku, Tursku, Persiju Indiju i Kinu nadomešta centrifugalne napade stepskih Ijudi. U svetu kao celini ona zauzima središnji strateški položaj koji Nemacka poseduje u Europi. Ona može zadati udarac sa svih strana i primiti udarac sa svih strana, izuzev sa severa.

Potpuni razvoj njene moderne železničke mobilnosti samo je pitanje vremena. Nije verovatno da će bilo koja moguća društvena revolucija izrmeniti njenu suštinsku povezanost s velikim geografskim ogranicenjima njenog postojanja. Mudro prepoznajući fundamentalna ograničenja svoje moći, njeni vladari su se oprostili od Aljaske: jer jednako je tako zakon politike za Rusiju da ne poseduje ništa preko mora kao sto je za Britaniju zakon da bude najbolja na okeanu.

Izvan ose, u velikom unutrašnjem prstenu nalaze se Nemačka, Austrija, Turska, Indija i Kina a u spoljašnjem prstenu, Britanija, južnaa Afrika. Australija, Sjedinjene Države, Kanada i Japan. U trenutnom stanju ravnoteže moći, država osa, Rusija, nije ekvivalentna perifernim državama, a ima mesta za izjednačavanje u Francuskoj.

Ne utičući na evropsku ravnotežu direktno, već preko Rusije, Sjedinjene Države su nedavno postale istočna sila koja će sagraditi Panamski kanal kako bi učinila svoja dobra s Misisipija i Atlantika dostupna u Pacifiku. S ove tačke gledišta, prava podela istoka i zapada nalazi se u Atlantskom okeanu.

Promena ravnoteže snaga u korist države ose, rezultirajući ekspanzijom nad marginalnim prostorima Evroazije, omogućili bi upotrebu ogromnih kontinentalnih resursa za izgradnju flote i svetska bi imperij tada bila na vidiku. Ovo bi se moglo dogoditi ako bi se Nemacka povezala s Rusijom.

Opasnost od takvog događaja bi, stoga gurnula Francusku u savezništvo s drugirn prekomorskim silama, pa bi Francuska, Italija, Egipat, Indija i Koreja postaIe brojni mostobrani na kojima bi spoljašnje mornarice podupirale vojsku prisiljavajući saveznike države stožera da zaposle kopnene snage i time ih zaustavila u koncentrisanju svoje ukupne snage na brodovima.

Govorio sam kao geograf. Stvarna ravnoteža politicke rnoci u svako doba je, naravno, proizvod, s jedne strane, geografskih uslova, ekonomskih kao i strateških i, s druge strane, relativnog broja, stanivništva, opreme i organizacije suparničkog stanivništva.

Zakljucno, može se izričito istaknuti da zamena tipa kontrole nad unutrašnjim područjem, kao što je Rusija. ne bi smerala smanjivanju geografske važnosti pozicije države stožera. Ukoliko bi Kinezi, na primer, organizovani zajedno s Japancirna, zbacili Rusko Carstvo i osvojili rusku terirotiju, mogli bi stvoriti žutu opasnost za slobodu sveta samo zato što bi dodali okeansku frontu resursima velikog kontinenta, što je prednost koja je još uvek uskraćena ruskim stanovnicima regije geografske ose istorije.

DEMOCRATIC IDEALS AND REALITY (1919)

Ova knjiga, kakva god bila njena vrednost, nije samo rezultat groznicavih razmisljanja tokom Velikog rata; ideje na kojima je zasnovana bile su u glavnim crtama objavljene pre vise od desetak godina. U svom radu , Geografska osovina istorije ", procitanim pred Kraljevskim geografskim drustvom, 1904. godine dao sam osnovne pojmove o Svetskom ostrvu i Srcu kontinenta; a 1905. godine napisao sam za Nacionalnu Reviju clanak na temu “Ljudski resursi kao merilo snage nacije i imperije"; verujem da je u njemu prvi put upotrebljen pojam “ljudski resursi". On podrazumeva ne samo ideju sile u vojnom smislu nego i proizvodnu moc, pre nego puko bogatstvo, kao kljucni momenat u ekonomskom rasudivanju. Moja odluka da pisem o ovim temema nesto opsirnije je posledica toga sto osecam da me Veliki rat nije pokolebao, vec samo ucvrstio u mojim ranijim gledistima.

H.Dz.M. 1. februar 1919. godine

U prirodi ne postoji nesto sto bismo nazvali podjednakim mogucnostima razvoja za sve narode. Ukoliko nisam potpuno pogresno shvatio geografske cinjenice, otisao bih i dalje i rekao da su kopno i mora, kao i plodnost zemljista i prirodni putevi komunikacije u prirodi grupisani na takav nacin da predisponiraju stvaranje imperija, a na kraju krajeva i jedne jedine, globalne imperije. Ukoliko imamo nameru da ostvarimo svoj ideal, olicen u Drustvu naroda, koje ima za cilj da spreci izbijanje , ratova u buducnosti, moramo da prihvatimo ove geografske realnosti i preduzmemo korake da obuzdamo njihov uticaj.

GLEDIŠTE POMORACA

U sustini, u proslosti je postojao samo jedan okean, ali su ljudi za svoje potrebe smatrali da postoje dva, zapadni i istocni, sve dok nisu oplovili Rt dobre nade pre nekih cetiri stotine godina. Tako je ispalo da admiral Mahan,' na samom kraju proteklog veka, jos uvek moze da za sniva svoju novu poruku u pogledu pomorske moci na tekstu iz prvog poglavlja biblijskog .Postanja ". Okean je svo vreme bio jedan, ali prakticni znacaj te cinjenice od ogromnog znacaja nije u potpunosti shvacen sve do pre nekoliko godina - mozda tek sada pocinjemo da uviđamo njen puni znacaj.

Sada svi shvataju da zahvaljujuci povezanosti okeanskog prostora i pokretljivosti flote odsudna bitka na moru ima trenutne i dalekosezne posledice. Cezar je pobedio Antonija" kod Akcijuma, i od tog trenutka su Cezarove naredbe bezpogovomo izvršavane s kraja na kraj Mediterana.

Britanija je pobedila u svojoj kriticnoj bici kod Trafalgara, i mogla je da spreci flotama svojih neprijatelja izlazak na ma koji od okeana, da transportuje svoje armije do ma koje obale koju pozeli kao i da ih povuce odatle, da prevozi robu iz prekomorskih zemalja kuci, kao i da izvrsi pritisak u pregovorima na ma koju zemlju koja ima izlaz na more.

Usled ulaska SAD u rat, 1917. godine je doslo do velikih promena pada carskog rezima u Rusiji i potpunog raspada ruske vojne sile koji je usledio. Globalna strategija nadmetanja među silama je bila potpuno izmenjena. Od tog trenutka smo se borili, i to mogu da kazem, a da ne povredim nijednog od nasih saveznika, da bismo svet u kome zivimo ucinili sigurnijim za razvoj demokratije. Toliko sto se tice idealizma. Podjednako je vazno da imamo na umu i novo lice stvarnosti. Do nedavno, u zavrsnim fazama rata, vodili smo direktan duel izmedu kopnene i pomorske sile, gde je pomorska sila drzala kopnenu pod opsadom.

Pobedili smo, ali da je pobedila Nernacka, razvila bi svoju sopstvenu pomorsku silu oslanjajuci se na siru bazu nego sto se ikada pre dogodilo u istoriji, ustvari na najsiru mogucu bazu."

Zajednička kontinentalna masa Evrope, Azije i Afrike sada i efektivno, a ne samo u teoriji, predstavlja "ostrvo". Da ne bismo to zaboravili, od sada ćemo ga ponovo nazivati Svetskim ostrvom u tekstu koji predstoji.

Jedan od razloga zbog kojih pomorci nikada nisu shvatili koncept koji je izrazavao naziv "Svetsko ostrvo" je taj sto nisu mogli da plove oko njega.

Razmotrimo na trenutak proporcije i odnose ovog Velikog ostrva koje tek odnedavno opazamo. Ono je postavljeno bocno u odnosu na Severni pol. Mereci od Severnog ka Juznom polu duz sredisnjeg azijskog meridijana, prvo nailazimo na nekih 1.600 kilometara ledom okovanog mora sve do severnih obala Sibira, zatim na oko 8.000 kilometara kopna sve do juznog kraja Indije, a potom na preko 11.000 kilometara mora sve do ledenog pokrivaca antarktickog kopna. Ali mereci duz meridijana koji prolazi Bengalskim zalivom ili Arabijskim morem," Azija meri s kraja na kraj tek nekih 5.600 kilometara. Od Pariza do Vladivostoka ima blizu 9.600 kilometara, dok je od Pariza do Rta dobre nade otprilike isto toliko; no, sve ove mere se protem po loptastoj povrsini planete koja ima nesto vise od 40.000 kilometara u obimu.

Na taj nacin sva tri takozvana nova kontinenta u pogledu prostranstva predstavljaju tek satelite "starog" kontinenta. Postoji jedan okean i on pokriva devet dvanaestina povrsine planete; postoji jedan kontinent - Svetsko ostrvo - koji pokriva dve dvanaestine povrsine planete; i postoji mnostvo manjih ostrva, gde Severna i Juzna Amerika predstavljaju dva najveca, koja sva zajedno zauzimaju preostalu dvanaestinu povrsine.

Prema tome izraz "Novi svet", sada kada sagledavamo stvarne relacije, a ne sarno predstave koje su se razvile tokom istorije, sadrzi u sebi pogresnu perspektivu.

Zamislite na karti sveta ovaj tek minuli rat, onako kako su vodjene operacije tokom 1918. godine. Bio je to rat izmedu Ostrvljana i Kontinentalaca, oko toga nema nikakve sumnje. Rat se vodio na kontinentu, uglavnom duz granica poluostrvske Francuske okrenutih glavnoj kopnenoj masi; na istoj strani su se nasle Britanija, Kanada, SAD, Brazil, Australija, Novi Zeland i Japan - sve sami "ostrvljani".

Cinjenice ce se pojaviti u istoj perspektivi i ako razmotrimo stanovnistvo planete. Vise od cetmaest sesnaestina celokupnog covecanstva zivi na Velikom Kontinentu, dok priblizno jos jedna sesnaestina zivi na ostrvima uz njegovu obalu, u Britaniji i Japanu.

Cak i danas, posle cetiri veka emigracije, svega oko jedne sesnaestine svetskog stanovnistva zivi na manjim kontinentima.

Sta ako Veliki kontinent, citavo Svetsko ostrvo ili bar njegov veci deo, u nekom buducem vremenu postane jedinstvena, ujedinjena baza pomorske sile? Zar to nece znaciti da ce ostale "ostrvske“ baze biti daleko nadmasene u gradnji brodova i raspolozivom broju pomoraca? Njihove flote bi se, nema surnnje, borile sa svim onim heroizmom koji predstavlja njihovo istorijsko naslede, all bi konacan ishod bio unapred odreden. Cak i u upravo zavrsenom ratu, ostrvska Amerika je morala da priskoci u pomoc ostrvskoj Britaniji, ne zato sto britanska flota vise nije bila u stanju da odrzi kontrolu nad morima, vec da Nemacka ne bi dosla u priliku da se mirovnim sporazumom, ili bolje primirjem, domogne takve teritorijalne baze za izgradnju flote i regrutovanje pomoraca da bi Britanija za svega nekoIiko godina posle toga bila nadmasena i u brodovima i u ljudstvu.

GLEDIŠTEKONTINENTALACA

Uzeti zajedno, regioni koji se odvodnjavaju ka Arktiku ili unutar kontinenta obuhvataju gotovo polovinu Azije i cetvrtinu Evrope, i obrazuju veliku, neprekinutu teritoriju na severu i u sredistu kontinenta. Cela ta teritorija, koja se proteze od zaledenih, ravnih obala Sibira sve do zarkih, strmih obala Beludzistana i Persije, bila je nedostupna brodovima sa okeana.

Njeno otvaranje putem zeleznice - s obzirom na to da je pre toga bila prakticno bez puteva - i prugama avio-saobracaja u bliskoj buducnosti, predstavlja pravu revoluciju u odnosima izmedu covecanstva i okruzujuceg geografskog prostora u svetu. Ovaj ogromni region cemo nazvati Srcem Kontinenta.'

Srce Kontinenta, u smislu regiona koji se odvodnjava ka Arktiku ili unutar Kontinenta, obuhvata najveci deo Velike nizije i najveci deo Iranske visije; one se, otuda, prostire do dugacke, visoke, izvijugane ivice koju čine Iranske planine, na cijoj daljoj strani se nalazi ulegnuce koje zauzimaju ravnica Eufrata' i Persijski zaliv.

Srce Kontinenta, Arabija i Sahara zajedno Cine sirok, krivudav pojas koji je nepristupacan pomorcima, sa izuzetkom tri plovna puta koji okruzuju Arabiju. Ovaj pojas se proteze preko citavog velikog Kontinenta od Arktika pa sve do obala Atlantika. Preko Arabije on dodiruje Indijski okean, i kao posledicu toga razdvaja ostatak Kontinenta na tri odvojena regiona cije vode oticu u mora koja se ne zarnrzavaju. Ti regioni su: delovi Azije nagnuti ka Pacifiku i Indijskom okeanu; poluostrva i ostrva Evrope i Mediterana; i ogrornno poluostrvo koji cini Afrika juzno od Sahare.

NADMETANJE IMPERIJA

Za nas bi bilo najinteresantnije da uporedimo nastupanje pomoraca iz zapadne Evrope preko okeana i savremeni prodor ruskih kozaka preko step a Srca Kontinenta. Kozak Jermak je na konju presao Ural i zasao duboko u Sibir 1533. godine, svega dvanaest godina peste je Magelanova ekspedicija oplovila Zemljinu kuglu. Tu paralelu bismo mogli da pronademo i u sasvim bliskoj proslosti. Bio je to poduhvat bez presedana kada je 1900. godine Britanija odrzavala cetvrt miliona ljudi u ratu protiv Bura 9.600 kilometara daleko, preko okeana; no, isto tako veliki poduhvat je ucinila i Rusija kada je prebacila zeleznicom armiju sa vise od cetvrt miliona ljudi 1904. godine 6.500 kilometara daleko u Mandzuriju da se suprotstavi Japancima.

NACIONALNA SLOBODA

Ukoliko ne zelite da gomilate nove nevolje u buducnosti, ne mozete prihvatiti ma koji ishod Velikog rata koji definitivno ne resava sukob izrnedu Germana i Slovena u istocnoj Evropi. Morate da uspostavite nekakvu ravnotezu medu njima, kao i potpunu nezavisnost i jednih i drugih. Ne mozete ostaviti takvo stanje stvari u istocnoj Evropi i u Srcu Kontinenta koje bi nudilo mogucnost za razvoj novih ambicija u buducnosti, jer smo se jedva izvukli iz nedavne opasnosti.

Svaki rimski general, koji je posle pobede ulazio u grad Rim, dok su sve oci bile uprte u njega usred raskosi "trijumfa", vozio je u svojim dvokolicama rob a koji je stajao iza njega i saputao mu u uvo da ne zaboravi da je smrtnik.

Kada nasi drzavnici budu razgovarali sa porazenim protivnikom, nekakav leprsavi anđelak bi trebao da im s vremena na vreme prosapuce u usi:

“Ко влада Источном Европом, влада пределом срца.

Ко влада пределом срца, влада светским острвом. Ко влада светским острвом, влада светом.“

BELESKA 0 INCIDENTU U KE D'ORSEJU25. JANUARA 1919. GODINE

Ser Robert Borden je, istupajuci u ime Kanade, upitao ko je i po cijem ovlascenju doneo odluku 0 nacinu na koji ce biti obrazovane komisije; to pitanje je trebalo da bude postavljeno na samoj konferenciji. Delegati Belgije, Brazila, Srbije, Grcke, Portugalije, Cesko-Slovacke, Rumunije, Sijama i Kine su zatim digli glas zahtevajuci posebno predstavnicko telo koje bi ih zastupalo.

Iz toga vidimo da svet i dalje pociva na sili, bez obzira na pravnu pretpostavku jednakosti medju suverenim drzavama, bilo da su velike ili male.

U svakom slucaju, Drustvo bi trebalo iskoristiti za iznosenje misljenja svih delova covecanstva kako bi se izvrsila pravedna revizija raznih zastarelih

medunarodnih ugovora pre nego sto se pretvore u neizdrziv izvor

problema. Ali da prvo prestanemo da ponavljamo: demokratija

mora da prihvati realnost.

“THE ROUND WORLD AND THEWINNING OF THE PEACE”

IHAVE been asked to carry further some of the themes with which I have dealt in my past writings, in particular to consider whether my strategical concept of a "Heartland" has lost any of its significance under the conditions of modern warfare.

In order to set the concept into its context, I must begin with a short account of how it originally came to take shape.

My earliest memory of public affairs goes back to the day in September 1870 when, as a small boy who had just begun attendance at the local grammar school, I took home the news, which I had learned from a telegram affixed to the post office door, that Napoleon III and his whole army had surrendered to the Prussians at Sedan.

During this period the London newspapers were quick to detect evidence of Russian intrigue in every rumor from Constantinople and in every tribal disturbance along the northwest frontier of India.

British sea power and Russian land power held the center of the international stage.

Thirty years later, at the turn of the century, von Tirpitz began to build a German high seas fleet. I was busy at this time setting up the teaching of political and historical geography at the universities at Oxford and London, and was noting current events with a teacher's eye for generalization.

The particular events out of which sprang the idea of the Heartland were the British war in South Africa and the Russian war in Manchuria. The South African war ended in 1902, and in the spring of 1904 the Russo-Japanese war was clearly imminent.

A paper which I read before the Royal Geographical Society early in the latter year, entitled "The Geographical Pivot of History," was therefore topical, but it had a background of many years of observation and thought.

The word Heartland occurs once in the 1904 paper, but incidentally and as a descriptive and not a technical term. The expressions "pivot area" and "pivot state" were used instead, thus: The oversetting of the balance of power in favor of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit of the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia. In conclusion, it may be well expressly to point out that the substitution of some new control of the inland area for that of Russia would not tend to reduce the geographical significance of the pivot position. Were the Chinese, for instance, organized by the Japanese, to overthrow the Russian Empire and conquer its territory, they might constitute the yellow peril to the world's freedom just because they would add an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent.

At the end of the First World War, my book, "Democratic Ideals and Reality,'* was published in London and New York.

Clearly the "pivot" label, which had been appropriate for an academic thesis at the beginning of the century, was no longer adequate to the international situation as it emerged from that first great crisis of our world revolution: hence "Ideals," "Realities“ and the "Heartland." But the fact that, even when additional criteria were brought to bear, the thesis of 1904 still sufficed as the background for an estimate of the position fifteen years later, gave confidence that the formula sought had been found.

We turn now to the main object of the present article — the drafting of an interim estimate of the value of the Heartland concept in a survey of the world preliminary to the coming settlement.

The Heartland is the northern part and the interior of Euro-Asia. It extends from the Arctic coast down to the central deserts, and has as its western limits the broad isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas. The concept does not admit of precise definition on the map for the reason that it is based on three separate aspects of physical geography which, while reinforcing one another, are not exactly coincident.

For our present purpose it is sufficiently accurate to say that the territory of the U.S.S.R. is equivalent to the Heartland, except in one direction. In order to demarcate that exception — a great one — let us draw a direct line, some 5,500 miles long, westward from Bering Strait to Rumania. Three thousand miles from Bering Strait that line will cross the Yenisei River, flowing northward from the borders of Mongolia to the Arctic Ocean. Eastward oi that great river lies a generallz rugged country of mountains, plateaux and valleys, covered almost from end to end with coniferous forests; this I shall call Lenaland, from its central feature, the great River Lena. This is not included in Heartland Russia. Lenaland Russia has an area of three and three-quarter million square miles, but a population of only some six millions, of whom almost five millions are settled along the transcontinental railroad from Irkutsk to Vladivostok. In the remainder of this territory there are on the average over three square miles for every inhabitant. The rich natural resources — timber, water power and minerals — are as yet practically untouched

West of the Yenisei lies what I have described as Heartland Russia, a plain extending 2,500 miles north and south, and 2,500 miles east and west. It contains four and a quarter million square miles and a population of more than 170 millions. The population is increasing at the rate of three millions a year.

The simplest and probably the most effective way of presenting the strategical values of the Russian Heartland is to compare them with those of France. In the case of France, however, the historical background is the First World War while in the case of Russia it is the Second World War.

France, like Russia, is a compact country, as long as it is broad, but not quite so well-rounded as the Heartland and therefore with a rather smaller area in proportion to the length of boundary to be defended. It is encompassed by sea and mountain, except to the northeast. In 1914-18 there were no hostile countries behind the Alps and the Pyrenees, and the fleets of France and her allies dominated the seas. The French and allied armies, deployed across the open northeastern frontier, were therefore well defended on either flank and were secure in the rear. The tragic lowland gateway in the northeast, through which so many armies have surged inward and outward, is 300 miles wide between the Vosges and the North Sea. In 1914, the line of battle, pivoting on the Vosges, wheeled backward to the Marne; and at the end of the war, in 1918, it wheeled forward on the same pivot. Through the four years' interval the elastic front sagged and bent but did not break even in the face of the great German attack in the spring of 1918. Thus, as it proved, there was space within the country sufficient both for defense in depth and for strategical retreat. Unfortunately for France, however, her principal industrial area was in that northeastern sector where the unceasing battle was waged.

Russia repeats in essentials the pattern of France, but on a greater scale and with her open frontier turned westward instead of northeastward. In the present war the Russian army is aligned across that open frontier. In its rear is the vast plain of the Heartland, available for defense in depth and for strategic retreat.

Away back, this plain recedes eastward into the natural bulwarks constituted by the "inaccessible" Arctic coast, the Lenaland wilderness behind the Yenisei, and the fringe of mountains from the Altai to the Hindu Kush, backed by the Gobi, Tibetan and Iranian deserts. These three barriers have breadth and substance, and far excel in defensive value the coasts and mountains which engird France.

The vast potentialities of the Heartland, however, to say nothing of the natural reserves in Lenaland, are strategically well placed. Industries are growing rapidly in such localities as the southern Urals, in the very pivot of the pivot area, and in the rich Kuznetsk coal basin in the lee of the great natural barriers east of the upper Yenisei River.

All things considered, the conclusion is unavoidable that if the Soviet Union emerges from this war as conqueror of Germany, she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe. Moreover, she will be the Power in the strategically strongest defensive position.

The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth.

For the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality

I cannot pretend to exhaust the subject of the Heartland, the citadel of land power on the great mainland of the world, in a short article like this. But a few words should be devoted to another concept to balance it.

Some persons today seem to dream of a global air power which will "liquidate" both fleets and armies. I am impressed, however, by the broad implications of a recent utterance of a practical airman: "Air power depends absolutely on the efficiency of its ground organization.

That is too large a subject to discuss within the limits of this paper. It can only be said that no adequate proof has yet been presented that air fighting will not follow the long history of all kinds of warfare by presenting alternations of offensive and defensive tactical superiority, meanwhile effecting few permanent changes in strategical conditions.

I have described my concept of the Heartland, which I have no hesitation in saying is more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago. I have said how it is set in its girdle of broad natural defenses — ice-clad Polar Sea, forested and rugged Lenaland, and Central Asiatic mountain and arid tableland. The girdle is incomplete, however, because of an open gateway, a thousand miles wide, admitting from Peninsular Europe into the interior plain through the broad isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas. For the first time in all history there is within this vast natural fortress a garrison adequate to deny entry to the German invader. Given that fact, and the defenses to the flanks and rear which I have described, the sheer breadth of the open gateway is an advantage, for it provides the opportunity of defeating the enemy by compelling him to make a broad deployment of his manpower. And upon and beneath the Heartland there is a store of rich soil for cultivation andof ores and fuels for extraction, the equal — or thereabouts — of all that lies upon and beneath the United States and the Canadian Dominion.

On this proposal follows my second geographical concept, that of the Midland Ocean — the North Atlantic — and its dependent seas and river basins. Without laboring the details of that concept, let me picture it again in its three elements — a bridgehead in France, a moated aerodrome in Britain, and a reserve of trained manpower, agriculture and industries in the eastern United States and Canada. So far as war-potential goes, both the United States and Canada are Atlantic countries, and since instant landwarfare is in view, both the bridgehead and the moated aerodrome are essential to amphibious power.

The three remaining concepts I shall do little more than sketch, and only for the sake of globular completeness and balance.

Girdling the twin unit just described — Heartland and the basin of the Midland Ocean — there appears on the globe the mantle of vacancies, constituting a practically continuous land-space covering some twelve million square miles — that is, about a quarter of all the land on the globe. Upon this vast area there lives today a total population of less than thirty millions, or, say, one-seventieth of the population of the globe. Airplanes will, of course, fly along many routes over this girdle of wilderness; and through it will be driven trunk motor roads. But for long to come it will break social continuity between the major communities of mankind on the globe.

The fourth of my concepts embraces on either side of the South Atlantic the tropical rain-forests of South America and Africa.

If these were subdued to agriculture and inhabited with the present density of tropical Java, they might sustain a thousand million people, always provided that medicine had rendered the tropics as productive of human energy as the temperate zones.

Fifthly, and lastly, a thousand million people of ancient oriental civilization inhabit the Monsoon lands of India and China.

They must grow to prosperity in the same years in which Germany and Japan are being tamed to civilization. They will then balance that other thousand million who live between the Missouri and the Yenisei. A balanced globe of human beings. And happy, because balanced and thus free

zatim se umesao gospodin Klemanso sa polozaja predsedavajuceg na sednici, smesten izmedju gospodina Vilsona i gospodina Lojda Dzordza. On je istakao da su u trenutku prekida ratnih operacija velike sile imale dvanaest miliona ljudi na bojnom polju; da su mogle i na svoju ruku da odluce o buducnosti sveta, ali da su, inspirisane novim idealima, pozvale i manje sile da saraduju sa njima. I rezolucija je na kraju usvojena, bez ikakvih izmena.

III ZAKLJUČAK

Mackinder’s ideas have been revived more than once. Indeed, his ideas have had particular resonance at four historical moments: in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Britain, in Nazi Germany, in the United States during the Cold War, and now among both Russian and US strategists. Historically, Mackinder’s ideas emerged in response to the threat to the maritime British Empire from a land-based empire and expressed a deep-seated anxiety about the state and future of Britain. The British desire to prevail over other imperial powers sharpened current worries about socialism; the faltering of national economic dynamism; the need for housing and social reform; and, finally, the rise of military rivals in Germany, the United States, Japan, and Russia. Geopolitics was a view of the world as structured by geographical realities that Mackinder believed undermined any attempt to build a global order on the basis of legalism and pacifism. Force was unavoidable.

In the 1930s, his ideas were taken up by Nazi military planners, anxious to give substance to Mackinder’s warnings about the prospect of a land-based global empire. The explicit association of Geopolitics with Nazism discredited the term but did not really interrupt the discussion of the geographical relations of force, territorial contest, and strategic opportunities that Mackinder expressed so powerfully. Whereas the Nazis put themselves in the position of the land-power keen to break out of its continental shell, after the Second World War strategists in the United States returned to the other pole of Mackinder’s analysis and assumed instead the position of the seapower determined to confine the new land-power, the Soviet Union. These distinct uses of Mackinder resurfaced in the twenty-first century with the expansionist vision of Russian nationalists and the related containment strategies of the United States.

In these ways, Mackinder’s ideas have influenced repeatedly debates over global strategy. Geopolitics was used to: address the dilemma of preserving British supremacy in the face of competition from newly industrializing countries in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century; ground a plan for a Nazi land-based empire; inform a policy of containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War; and, finally, project power abroad in the new world order that has followed the end of the Cold War. On each occasion, the currency of Mackinder’s ideas has been promoted by contemporary concerns over imperial policy

The legacy of Mackinder lies in the interrelations between Geopolitics and Empire, and there are several reasons why Mackinder’s ideas, and ideas very like his, recur.

Another reason Mackinder’s ideas have recurred in the present day is because some of the physical and geographical features of the world have the same significance as they did about a century ago. States still rely upon hydrocarbon sources of energy and some of the largest reserves remain in the region, identified so emphatically by Mackinder, that runs from the Caspian Basin down to the Persian Gulf. To secure access to these resources and deny rivals access, the Great Powers continue to interest themselves militarily in the internal affairs of the band of countries ranging from the eastern Mediterranean, up to the borders of India, including the very same places in which the British were mired during Mackinder’s career: Afghanistan, Iraq, the south Caucasus, and the Caspian Basin.