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4 .
VOL. 24 | NO.4 | 2010.12
2009 ( ) .
()
(), ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
() ()
William N. Goetzmann(Yale School of Management)
David Hirshleifer(University of California at Irvine)
Sheridan Titman(The University of Texas at Austin)
Jun-Koo Kang(Nanyang Technological University)
Hyung-Song Shin(Princeton University)
Bong-Soo Lee(Florida State University)
Kee-Hong Bae(York University)
Yeon-Koo Che(Columbia University)
Wi Saeng Kim (Hofstra University)
E-mail: [email protected]
100-021 1 4-1
8
02) 3705-6325
( 386-01-021236,
: )
.
,
.
4 .
VOL.24 | NO.4 | 2010.12
Article
/ 1Financial Regulation and Liquidity Risk
(Jong Ku Kang)
/ 49The Impact of International Financial Shocks on the Volatility of Domestic Financial Markets
(Keun Yeong Lee)
/ 87An Analysis of Default and Prepayment in Korean Mortgage Markets
(Doowon Bang), (Sae Woon Park), (Yun Woo Park)
DSGE / 119A Simple, Implementable, and Optimal Monetary Policy in a DSGE Model with Incomplete Financial Markets
(Yongseung Jung)
: , , , ,
1
||||||| Journal of Money & Finance | Vol.24 | No. 4 | 2010. 12 1)
*
**
. Pyle-Hart-Jaffee
BIS
, ,
.
,
.
.
: , ,
JEL : E61, G21, G28
2010 09 13; 2010 10 20; 2010 12 06
* .
** (Tel : 02-759-5418, E-mail : [email protected])
2 24 4 2010
.
(BIS, 2006).
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(Northern Rock) BIS
(Shin, 2009; , 2010). (Bear Sterns)
BIS
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. 1 , 1
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(Liquidity Coverage Ratio : LCR) /30
1)
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4 24 4 2010
.
30
30
. 100%
1 .
1998
1 .
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(Net Stable Funding Ratio : NSFR) .
1
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. 1998 11
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3) 2008 2
27.3% 2008 4 30.7% DB
2008 2 51.6% 2008 4 53.3% .4) 2005. 122007. 12
40 21
. , 2007
12.2% .
6 24 4 2010
2.
(
-)/ 2000
2008 3 33.4% .5) 2000
. 2000 12006 4 2007
12008 3 .
/ , , (+)/
(-)/
.
Commercial Bank's Liquidity Risk Indexes
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
'00.1 '01.1 '02.1 '03.1 '04.1 '05.1 '06.1 '07.1 '08.1 '09.1 '10.10.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
Non Depos it/ TF(left scale)
Loan-Depos it Ratio(right s cale)
(Non Depos it-Safe Asset)/ TF ( left s cale)
(Depos it+Capital)/ Ris ky Asset ( right s cale)
Note) TF stands for Total Funding.
Source : Korea Financial Supervisory Service DB.
5) , , .
. .
7
(-)/
, , .
.
(
-)/ .
.
2004 0
2006 2008 2
. 20002004
. (
-)/
. 2005
2006 2009 2 .
2008 2009
.
(Non Deposit-Safe Asset)/Total Funding Ratio by Bank Group
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
'00 .1 '01 .1 '02 .1 '03 .1 '04 .1 '05 .1 '06 .1 '07 .1 '08 .1 '09 .1 '10 .1
Fo reign Bank B ranches
S pecialized Banks
Nationwide Banks
Local Banks
Source : Korea Financial Supervisory Services DB.
8 24 4 2010
Non Deposit and Safe Asset Ratios by Bank Group
Source: Financial Supervisory Services DB.
(-)/
/ /
/
/ .
/ (-
)/ . 2007
/ /
(-)/
.
3.
(-)/
.
9
(-)/
.
2008 4
.
Liquidity Support to Commercial Banks
year.quarter 2008. 2 2008. 3 2008. 4 2009. 1 2009. 2 2009. 3
Borrowing from the Public Sector1) 83,291 83,745 116,417 109,169 114,358 115,786
Financial Support2) - - 32,672 25,424 30,613 32,041
Degree of Financial Support3) - - 0.34 0.26 0.32 0.34
Note) 1) The sum of commercial banks borrowing from the BOK and the government and the BOK
R/P purchase at end of period.
2) Difference between Borrowing from the Public Sector at 2008. 3q and that at each quarter.
3) ('Financial Support'/Total Liability) Ratio.
Unit : 100 million, %.
Source : Financial Supervisory Service DB.
(-)/
2008 42009 3 6)
2007 4 , 2008 1 , 2 , 3 (
-)/ 0.50 .
(-)/
. 2008 2 2008 3
. 2008 2
(-)/
2008 3 (-
)/ . 2008 2
.
6) 2008. 42009. 3 .
10 24 4 2010
Correlation between(Non Deposit-Safe Asset)/Total LiabililtyRatio and the
Degree of Financial Support
Time of Liquidity Risk Index Period of Financial Support
2007. 4 2008. 1 2008. 2 2008. 3
2008. 42009. 3 0.589 0.701 0.764 0.708
Correlation between Loan-Deposit Ratio and the Degree of Financial Support
Time of L-D Ratio Period of Financial Support
2007. 4 2008. 1 2008. 2 2008. 3
2008. 42009. 3 0.528 0.534 0.616 0.325
. 2008 4
2009 3 2007
4 , 2008 1 , 2 .
.
(-)/
.
.
1.
(bank run) . Diamond and
Dybvig(1983) 3
.
11
(bank run)
.
.
.
Diamond and Dybvig(1983)
.
Bougheas(1999)
. Cooper and
Rossi(2002)
.7) Ennis and Keister(2006)
.
Schotter and Yorulmazer(2009)
.
. Peck and Shell(2010)
.
. Uhlig(2010)
.
.
. Wetmore(2004)
.
7) Merton(1977) .
12 24 4 2010
.
. ,
.
.
Shin and Shin(2010) /
.
.
.
.
.
Kim and Santomero(1988)
2 .
.
.
. ()
(). Rochet(1992)
Kim and Santomero(1998)
(Limited Liability)
. Franck and Krausz(2007)
LLR(Lender of Last Resort)
. 3 (0, 1, 2)
13
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. 1
LLR .
LLR
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2.
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Pyle-Hart-Jaffee (Pyle, 1971; Hart and Jaffee,
1974). Monti-Klein ,
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14 24 4 2010
. 0 , , ,
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. 2 , , ,
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Financial Market Situation and Features
period Financial Market Situation
0 stable
1 stable unstable
(low interest rate of (high interest rate of risky liability) risky liability)
2 (high return on risky asset) (low return on risky asset)
. 0 .8) 1
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. 2010 3
(commercial bank) HHI 1468
. 10) Microeconomics of Banking(2008), pp. 78-79 .11) , ,
() . 12) 0 1
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16 24 4 2010
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18 24 4 2010
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20042007
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2.8%
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20 24 4 2010
2.8%
.
(3) ( = +
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CD, 20042007
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4.5 . 0.039 ,
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((0.039) = (0.028) +
(4.5)) .
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=
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/) 2.9% (2.9%)
(0.68%) 3.58% .
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7.5% . 12% 19)
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(5) =
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(0.075) = (0.12) (12.8)
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20042007 , , ,
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10
0.9 Arrow(1971)
1.0 . 0 2004
2007 9.6 9.6 .
()
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19) 20042007 12% 0.7%,
0.1%, 0.3%. 20) 20042007 ROA(/) 1.06%
2% ROA - 1% < ROA < 0 . 21)
.
22 24 4 2010
20042007 0.001
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3.
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22) negative definite
2 (Chiang, 1984; pp. 332-333),
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.
23
.
.
BIS
, , ,
, ,
.
(1)
. BIS
/
(11)
. (11)
. .
(11)
(7) (11)
. .
. (11) ()
BIS ()
. BIS 8.18% BIS
BIS 8.18%
. (11) 0.0818
. D (), M (),
L (), S (), A .
24 24 4 2010
.
. (M/A)
. (-)/ ((M-S)/A)
. (L/D)
. BIS
.
The Effect of Strengthening Capital Ratio() Regulation
0
5
10
15
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
D M L S
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) Hereafter, D, M, L, S and A stand for Safe Liability, Risky Liability, Risky Asset, Safe Asset and
Total Asset(Total Funding), respectively. The scale of Loan-Deposit Ratio(L/D) is reduced by 10%.
The scale of the horizontal axis represents the difference between regulated capital ratio and the
capital ratio in section 2, Chapter 3.
(2)
. BIS
BIS
.
(/) BIS
.
BCBS(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision)
24)(G-20
(2010. 5)).
25
Koehn and Santomero
(1980), Kim and Santomero(1988), Rochet(1992), Calem and Rob(1996), Blum(1999)
/ ( )
.
Kamada and Nasu(2010)
.
Furlong(1988)
19811986
Shrieves and Dahl(1992)
2
.
BIS
( )
(Stolz, 2002).
.
.
.
BIS
(Net Stable Funding Ratio)
.
24) , , ,
.
26 24 4 2010
. ,
(G-20 (2010)).
.25)
.
.
/
(12) .
(12) .
(12)
.
. (/)
14.64 14.64
. (12) 14.64 .
.
.
.
/ .
(-)/
25) 2009 16.22, 14.15, 13.08,
9.26.
27
.
.
(-)/
. .
The Effect of Strengthening Leverage Ratio() Regulation
0
5
10
15
0 1 2 3 4
D M L S
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0 1 2 3 4
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) D, M, L, S and A stand for Safe Liability, Risky Liability, Risky Asset, Safe Asset and Total
Asset(Total Funding), respectively.
The scale of the horizontal axis represents the difference between regulated leverage ratios and
the leverage ratio in section 2, Chapter 3.
.
(market discipline)
.
.
(3)
(Core Capital) (Supplemen-
28 24 4 2010
tary Capital) .
.
.
.
.
.
(Core Capital)
(Limited Liability).
.
.
.
.
. ,
,
2
(13) .
(14) .
(14)
.
(13)
(14)
29
.
> (13)
< (14) .
(14)
.
.
/ (
-)/ .
(-)/
.26)
Liquidity Risk Indexes depending on Core Capital
key indexes Large Core Capital Small Core Capital
Risky Liability/Total Funding 27.64% 27.80%
Safe Asset/Total Funding 16.45% 15.53%
(Risky Liability-Safe Asset)/Total Funding 11.19% 12.27%
Loan-Deposit Ratio 127.5% 129.1%
26) .
. (16)
. (16)
. (16)
. , ,
, (15) (16)
.
30 24 4 2010
(4)
.
.
.
.
.
. .
(15)
0% 40%
.
The Effect of Raising Taxes on the Bank's Profit( )
0
5
1 0
1 5
0 0 .1 0 .2 0 .3 0 .4
D M L S
10%
20%
30%
0 0 .1 0 .2 0 .3 0 .4
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) D, M, L, S and A stand for Safe Liability, Risky Liability, Risky Asset, Safe Asset and Total
Asset(Total Funding), respectively.
The scale of the horizontal axis represents the rate of tax on bank profit.
31
(
)
.
.27)
. ()
0 0.5% .
/ (-
)/ .
The Effect of Raising Taxes on the Non Deposit Liability( )
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 0 .00125 0 .0025 0 .00375 0 .005
D M L S
0%
10%
20%
30%
0 0.00125 0 .0025 0 .00375 0 .005
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) D, M, L, S and A stand for Safe Liability, Risky Liability, Risky Asset, Safe Asset and Total
Asset(Total Funding), respectively.
The scale of the horizontal axis represents the rate of tax on the non deposit liability
(5)
.
.
.
27) 2010 1 0.15%
.
32 24 4 2010
.
. (16) .
(16)
() 0 20%
(-
)/ .
.
The Effect of Raising Levy on the Bank Profit( )
0
5
10
15
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
D M L S
10%
20%
30%
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) D, M, L, S and A stand for Safe Liability, Risky Liability, Risky Asset, Safe Asset and Total
Asset(Total Funding), respectively.
The scale of the horizontal axis represents the rate of levy on the bank profit.
33
.
.
0 1 .
.
.
()
.
.
() .
.
.
(17)
.
(17)
0% 0.3%
(-)/
.28)
34 24 4 2010
The Effect of Raising Levy on the Non Deposit Liability()
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 0.00075 0.0015 0.00225 0.003
D M L S
0%
10%
20%
30%
0 0.00075 0.0015 0.00225 0.003
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) D, M, L, S and A stand for Safe Liability, Risky Liability, Risky Asset, Safe Asset and Total
Asset(Total Funding), respectively.
The scale of the horizontal axis represents the rate of levy on the non deposit liability.
.
.
.
.29)
28) 10
0.25% . 29) , ,
.
.
. 100% ()
() . ++ = +
- = . (-
)/ .
-(/) . 100%
(-
35
Changes in the Liquidity Risk After Imposing Tax or Levy
type
objectBank Tax Bank Levy
Profit a little change Increase
Non Deposit Decrease a little change
.
.
.
. (
) .
()/
.
.
.
( - )/
2000
20072008 3/4 .
/ .
)/ . 100%
(-)/
.
36 24 4 2010
.
Pyle-Hart-Jaffee
Monti-Klein
. 2, 1
. 1
. 0
.
.
() , () ,
,
.
.
.
BIS
, (
)/ .
.
.
.
.
.
37
.
.
BIS , ,
.
,
.
38 24 4 2010
1. , , , 16 2, 2010, .
2. , ,
, 2010.
3. G-20 , G-20 , G-20
/ , , 2010.
4. Arrow, K. J., Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, Markham, Chicago, IL 1971.
5. Aggeler, Heidi and Ron Feldman, Is the loan-to-deposit ratio still relevant?, Fedgazette,
The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, July 1998.
6. BIS, The Management of Liquidity Risk in Financial Groups, Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, The Joint Forum Paper, May 2006.
7. Blum, Jurg, Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?, Journal of
Banking and Finance 23, 1999, 755-771.
8. Bougheas, S., Contagious bank runs, International Review of Economics and Finance
8, 1999, 131-146.
9. Calem, Paul and Rafael Rob, The Impact of Capital-based Regulation on Bank Risk-
taking : A Dynamic Model, Finance and Economics Discussion Paper, 1996-12, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1996.
10. Cooper, Russel and Thomas Rossi, Bank runs : Deposit insurance and capital require-
ments, International Economic Review 43(1), 2002, 55-72.
11. Diamond, D. W. and P. H. Dybvig, Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity,
Journal of Political Economy 91(3), 1983, 401-19.
12. Ennis, Huberto and Todd Keister, Bank runs and investment decisions revisited,
Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2006, 217-232.
13. Furlong, Frederick, Changes in Bank Risk-Taking, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Review, Spring 1988, 45-56.
14. Franck, Raphael and Miriam Krausz, Liquidity risk and bank portfolio allocation,
International Review of Economics and Finance 16, 2007, 60-77.
15. Hart, O. and D. Jaffee, On the application of portfolio theory of depository financial
intermediaries, Review of Economic Studies 41(1), 1974, 129-146.
39
16. Kamada, K. and K. Nasu, How Can Leverage Regulations Work for the Stabilization
of Financial Systems?, Bank of Japan Working Paper Series, No.10-E-2, March 2010.
17. Kim, Daesik and Anthony Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation, The
Journal of Finance 43(5), 1988, 1219-1233.
18. Koehn, Michael and Anthony Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Potfolio
Risk, Journal of Finance 35, 1980, 1235-1250.
19. Lintner, J., The vluation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in stock
portfolios and capital budgets, Review of Economics and Statistics 47, 1965, 13-37.
20. Markowitz, H., Portfolio selection, Journal of Finance 7(1), 1952, 77-91.
21. Merton, R., An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan
guarantees, Journal of Banking and Finance 1, 1977, 3-11.
22. Morris, S. and H. S. Shin, Financial Regulation in a System Context, Conference Paper
for Brookings Panel meeting on Sep. 2008.
23. Peck, James and Karl Shell, Could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank
runs? Journal of Monetary Economics 57, 2010, 420-427.
24. Pyle, D., On the theory of financial intermediation, Journal of Finance 26(3), 1971,
737-747.
25. Rochet, Jean-Charles, Capital requirements and the behavior of commercial banks,
European Economic Review 36, 1992, 1137-1178.
26. Schotter, Andrew and Tanju Yorulmazer, On the dynamics and severity of bank runs:
An experimental study, Journal of Financial Intermediation 18(2), 2009, 217-241.
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of risk, Journal of Finance 19, 1964, 425-442.
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of Korea Conference Paper 2010.
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World Economy 11, 2009.
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Banks, Journal of Banking and Finance 16, 1992, 439-457.
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Regulation: A Review of the Literature, Kiel Working Paper 1105, Kiel Institute for
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Ratio of Large Commercial Bank Holding Companies [1992~2000], American Business
Review June 2004.
41
()
(M/A) .
. / (M/A) (S/M)
(-)/ ((M-S)/A) .
/
(L/D) .
The Effect of Changes in Safe Debt Funding Cost()
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0.6 0 .8 1 1.2 1 .4
D M L S
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) Hereafter, the scale of Loan-Deposit Ratio(L/D) is reduced by 10%. The horizontal axis represents
the percentage change of each exogenous variable from the basis value in the section 2 Chapter
III.
()
(M/A) .
(S/A) . (-)/
((M-S)/A) (M/A) .
(L/D) .
42 24 4 2010
The Effect of Changes in Risky Debt Funding Cost()
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
D M L S
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
(
)
(S/A) . (-)/
((M-S)/A) (S/A) .
(L/D) () .
The Effect of Changes in Risky Asset Return
0
5
10
15
20
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
D M L S
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
()
(S/A)
(-)/ ((M-S)/A) . (L/D)
.
43
The Effect of Changes in Safe Asset Return
0
5
10
15
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
D M L S
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
()
.
(S/A) (-
)/ ((M-S)/A) .
.
The Effect of Changes in the Probability of Financial Market being Stable
0
5
10
15
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
D M L S
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
Note) The horizontal axis represents changes in
()
(-)/
((M-S)/A) (L/D) .
44 24 4 2010
The Effect of Changes in the Bank Risk Aversion
0
5
10
15
0 1 2 3 4
D M L S
10%
20%
30%
0 1 2 3 4
M/A S/A (M-S)/A L/D
45
The Effect of Introducing both Leverage
Regulation and BIS Capital Regulation
BIS
. . (3) (4) BIS
,
. BIS
(AB)
(CD) .
Bank's Choice under both BIS Capital Regulation and Leverage Regulation
C1
C2
A B1 E1 B2 B3 B
O D2 D1
BIS E1
. E1 E1
E1 .
C2D2 AB2D2O
. AB2 B2D2
46 24 4 2010
. C2D2
B3 B3 ( AB)
( C2D2) .
B1 ( AB)
( C2D2) B2
. AB2 B2D2
AB2 E1 B2 B2D2
B1 B2 . BIS
.
B1 . B1 BIS
BIS
B2 . AB B2
. B2
.
47
< Abstract >30)
Financial Regulation and Liquidity Risk
Jong Ku Kang*
After the global financial crisis, it is widely recognized that liquidity
risk management is indispensible for macro economic stability. Northern
Rock (UK) and Bear Stearns (US) could not avoid bankruptcy due to liquidity
risk problem even though their capital adequacy and asset soundness did
not pose serious threat to the banks stability. Contagion of systemic risk
among banks is contributed mainly by lack of adequate liquidity risk
management.
Banks liquidity risk needs to be measured considering both the asset
and the liability structure. This paper, given that liquidity risk rises when
non deposit liability increases and safe asset decreases, employs the ratio
of (non deposit liability-safe asset) to total funding as an index measuring
liquidity risk.
Since the global financial crisis, the introduction of new financial
regulation has been under discussion. In the light of this, the necessity
of analysing the relationship between financial regulation and liquidity risk
has grown. This paper mentions factors affecting liquidity risk and analyses
the relationship between financial regulation and liquidity risk by setting
up a model and conducting simulation.
The trend of the liquidity risk index can be identified using the ratio
of (non deposit liability-safe asset) to total funding. The liquidity risk of
the commercial banks in Korea had risen from 2000 to the time before the
financial crisis, and it had risen especially rapidly during the period from
2007 to the third quarter of 2008. Meanwhile, the movement of the ratio
of loan to deposit and the ratio of non deposit liability to total fund is
similar to that of the liquidity risk index.
The result of analyzing correlation shows that banks with higher liq-
uidity risk index before the financial crisis tend to have received greater
financial support from the government and the central bank after the fi-
nancial crisis, which implies that the liquidity risk index can be useful in
measuring bank's exposure to liquidity risk.
* Microeconomic Studies Team, Institute for Monetary and Economic Research Bank of Korea
(Tel : 82-2-759-5418, E-mail : [email protected])
48 24 4 2010
The results obtained from setting up a model and conducting simu-
lation are as follows : rise of the safe debt funding cost, decrease in the
risky debt funding cost, decrease in the safe asset return and rise of the
risky asset return contribute to increase in liquidity risk through expansion
of the risky debt and reduction of the safe asset. As the expectation for
the financial market being stable grows, banks hold the safe asset less and
the risky asset more, which increases liquidity risk. When banks become
more risk-averse, banks hold the safe asset more, which leads to decrease
in liquidity risk.
Simulation results show that strengthening BIS capital ratio regu-
lation can bring about decrease in the ratio of (risky debt-safe asset) to
total funding through reduction in the risky asset and expansion of the
safe asset. Raising required core capital ratio restrains banks risk taking
by increasing stockholders responsibility for bank losses, and consequently,
decrease liquidity risk. Strengthening leverage ratio regulation may be a
factor in liquidity risk increase as it leads banks to reduce mostly the safe
asset that has lower return than the risky asset. Imposing bank tax on
non deposit liability can reduce the amount of non deposit and decrease
liquidity risk, while imposing tax on bank profit does not have a significant
effect. And, imposing levy on bank profit can increase liquidity risk as
banks expect more support when in trouble and bank moral hazard problem
becomes more severe. Meanwhile, imposing levy on non deposit liability
does have little effect on liquidity risk. Introducing the loan to deposit
ratio regulation can be a factor which decreases liquidity risk. It is expected
that most regulations currently under discussion can restrain banks' risk
taking activity and decrease liquidity risk, contributing to macro economic
stability. However, there is a possibility that some of them can increase
liquidity risk.
Key words : Liquidity Risk, Financial Regulation, Financial Stability
JEL Classification : E61, G21, G28
49
||||||| Journal of Money & Finance | Vol.24 | No. 4 | 2010. 12 1)
*
**
, , /
, KOSPI, /
. , KOSPI, /
, , /
,
.
: , , VAR , GARCH
JEL : F3, G1
.
1990 , ,
. 1990 3
0.4% 1997 11
2010 04 14; 2010 07 19; 2010 09 30
* 2008 . 2010
.
** (Tel : 02-760-0614, E-mail : [email protected])
50 24 4 2010
10% . 1997
1997 12
.
4%
.
.
1990
.
1992 10% 1998
.
.
/
/
.
/ / .
.
.
.
.
, .
51
.
.
/,
.
.
. block exogeneous
Lastrapes(2005, 2006) VAR
. Rigobon and Sack(2003) GARCH
.
, KOSPI, /
,
, /
,
.
.
. block exogenous
VAR (Lastrapes, 2005, 2006) Rigobon and Sack
(2003) GARCH block exogenous
. 1999 , /,
, , KOSPI, / .
.
.
/,
.
.
52 24 4 2010
.
.
Rigobon and Sack(2003)
GARCH
.
. Flemming, Kirby, and Ostdiek(1998) , ,
GMM . (2002)
, ,
. (2003)
.
Bollerslev(1990)
GARCH EU
(, 2000 ). Longin and Solnik(1995), Tse and Tsui(2002), Engle(2002)
. (2001) Engle(2002) /
/ .
Engle, Ito, and Lin(1990) GARCH
Harvey, Ruiz, and
Shephard(1994) (stochastic)
.1)
, ,
.
1) (2001), (2003)
(2004), (2006)
. (2002) (2010)
.
53
.
1.
( ).
(1)
(1) , , /
3 1 , KOSPI, / 3 1
. ,
, 3 3
3 1 . (1) .
(2)
(3)
(3) (Hamilton, 1994 ).
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(2) (3) OLS .
VAR (4) (7)
.
54 24 4 2010
(A5) (A4) .
(8)
, (9)
(8)
. (A5)
.
(10)
, (11)
2.
(B ).
(12)
vech() = +
+
(13)
(13) vech() (12) 6 6
1 21 1 . , , , , , , , /, , KOSPI, / .
55
(13)
1 . (8)
.
(14)
,
,
,
,
(14) 21 6
, , 4, 5, 6 0 .
(13)
GARCH .
56 24 4 2010
vech() = +
+
(15)
(15) 21 1, 21 6
15 3 0 .
.
, (DJ), /(/$),
, KOSPI, / .
(3) (), CD(91), CP(91
), (3) .
,
(USTB), (DJ), /(/$), (CBR), KOSPI,
/(/$) 6 .2) 1999 1
4 2009 4 23 2539. /
FRB , /
KOSPI Thompson Reuters Datastream Database .
2 .3)
2) / / 2000
(2009) /
/ /
/ . 3) 1 GARCH
.
57
.
1.
4 ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 1979)
PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988) . PP
Newey and West(1987) .
6
. 6
1% .4)
Unit Root Tests(Lag = 4)
In the Table, USTB, DJ, /$, CBR, KOSPI, and /$ imply the U.S. Treasury bill(3-month), Dow Jones
index, yen/dollar exchange rates, corporate bond(3-year), Korea composite stock price index, and
won/dollar exchange rates, respectively. ** denotes significant at the 1% level.
Statistics
Variables
ADF PP
Trend Excluded Trend Included Trend Excluded Trend Included
Level
USTB -0.178 -0.529 -0.173 -0.514
DJ -1.511 -1.229 -1.426 -1.163
/$ -1.501 -1.932 -1.360 -1.745
CBR -1.223 -1.496 -1.104 -1.349
KOSPI -1.190 -1.857 -1.114 -1.729
/$ -0.936 -0.411 -0.848 -0.372
Difference
USTB -21.255** -21.271** -21.593** -21.613**
DJ -20.494** -20.523** -20.865** -20.900**
/$ -19.591** -19.605** -19.965** -19.981**
CBR -17.176** -17.172** -17.068** -17.062**
KOSPI -19.547** -19.542** -20.737** -20.733**
/$ -18.735** -18.760** -19.938** -20.027**
4) .
58 24 4 2010
Johansen(1988)
. , , /
3 VAR Schwarz 9
9 . 2
1 .
(H0 : r = 0) 10%
. 5%
. VAR .
Johansen Cointegration Tests
In the Table, H0 : r = 0 implies the null hypothesis that a cointegrating vector dose not exist.
H0 LagTrend
Included max
Critical Value(95%)
TraceCritical Value
(95%)
r = 0 9 10.493 21.144 15.497 31.618
28.234 24.482 38.397 39.098
2.
(%) .
(3, USTB) -0.17210-2%
10% .
.
(DJ) -0.006% .
2007 11
. /(/$) -0.005%
. / 2000
. (CBR) -0.089 10-2%
. . KOSPI
59
/(/$) 0 .
KOSPI
/ 2000 /
. / KOSPI
.
Summary Statistics of Percentage Changes
In the Table, USTB, DJ, /$, CBR, KOSPI, and /$ imply the U.S. Treasury bill(3-month), Dow Jones
index, yen/dollar exchange rates, corporate bond(3-year), Korea composite stock price index, and
won/dollar exchange rates in order. + denotes significant at the 10% level. Q(10) and Q2(10) imply
Ljung-Box statistics for 10th order correlation in changes and squared changes, respectively. Numbers
in parentheses and brackets present standard errors and the p-values of the asymptotic chi-squared
statistics, respectively.
USTB DJ /$ CBR KOSPI /$
Mean-0.17210-2
(0.10110-2)+-0.006(0.018)
-0.005(0.010)
-0.08910-2
(0.10410-2)0.033
(0.028)0.006
(0.010)
StandardDeviation
0.051 0.902 0.480 0.052 1.426 0.514
Skewness -1.837 -0.329 -0.194 0.548 -0.466 -0.688
Kurtosis 38.205 8.241 5.891 10.957 5.957 38.581
Maximum 0.426 5.555 3.031 0.395 6.781 5.561
Minimum -0.714 -5.459 -3.127 -0.360 -9.393 -7.070
Q(10)685.305[0.000]
498.948[0.000]
599.635[0.000]
996.730[0.000]
647.072[0.000]
812.720[0.000]
Q2(10)1702.788
[0.000]3037.483
[0.000]545.282[0.000]
987.295[0.000]
1113.624[0.000]
2289.770[0.000]
, ,
. , , , , , .
, , /
60 24 4 2010
Level of USTB Difference of USTB
'99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 '07.11.01 09.04.23 '99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 07.11.01 09.04.23
Level of DJ Index Difference of DJ Index
'99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 '07.11.01 09.04.23 '99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 07.11.01 09.04.23
Level of Yen/Dollar Difference of Yen/Dollar
'99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 '07.11.01 09.04.23 '99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 07.11.01 09.04.23
61
Level of Corporate Bond Difference of Corporate Bond
'99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 '07.11.01 09.04.23 '99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 07.11.01 09.04.23
Level of KOSPI Difference of KOSPI
'99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 '07.11.01 09.04.23 '99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 07.11.01 09.04.23
Level of Won/Dollar Difference of Won/Dollar
'99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 '07.11.01 09.04.23 '99.01.04 '01.04.05 '05.01.03 07.11.01 09.04.23
62 24 4 2010
. 2
1 .
. 3
/ 38.205 38.581
. KOSPI, /,
.
.
Q(10) Q2(10) 10
Ljung-Box (Ljung and Box, 1978) . 2
1%
.
.
GARCH .
.
1.
(2) (3) . SIC
(p) 9 .
/
(2) (3)
. 1999 1 2008 8 0,
1 .5) 100
bp(basis point) .
5) 2007 11 2009 4
.
63
-0.065(0.076)
0.005(0.014)
-0.001(0.007)
-0.021(0.071)
0.014(0.019)
-0.002(0.007)
-0.402(0.306)
-0.153(0.056)**
-0.046(0.029)
-0.385(0.291)
0.090(0.079)
0.051(0.030)+
0.000 0.000 0.0000.000
(0.019)0.016
(0.005)**0.000
(0.002)
0.000 0.000 0.0000.021
(0.106)0.247
(0.029)**-0.056
(0.011)**
0.000 0.000 0.0000.436
(0.200)*0.172
(0.054)**0.074
(0.020)**
0.908
(0.020)**-0.003(0.004)
0.004(0.002)*
0.025(0.026)
-0.021(0.007)**
0.001(0.003)
0.037
(0.111)0.834
(0.020)**0.017
(0.011)0.112
(0.138)0.292
(0.038)**-0.085
(0.014)**
0.286
(0.211)0.077
(0.039)*0.860
(0.020)**0.140
(0.263)-0.111(0.072)
0.021(0.027)
-0.836
(0.027)**-0.007(0.005)
-0.005(0.003)*
-0.085(0.030)**
0.020(0.008)*
0.004(0.003)
-0.082(0.142)
-0.812(0.026)**
-0.034(0.014)*
-0.115(0.162)
-0.021(0.004)**
0.048(0.016)*
0.122
(0.275)-0.105
(0.050)*-0.773
(0.026)**-0.293(0.301)
0.152(0.082)+
-0.059(0.031)+
0.609
(0.031)**0.004
(0.006)0.000
(0.003)0.083
(0.031)**-0.019
(0.009)*-0.006(0.003)+
0.292
(0.164)+0.748
(0.030)**0.020
(0.016)0.361
(0.177)*0.288
(0.048)**-0.029(0.018)
0.028
(0.314)0.067
(0.057)0.672
(0.030)**0.062
(0.324)-0.168(0.088)+
0.058(0.033)+
-0.520
(0.032)**-0.001(0.006)
0.003(0.003)
-0.066(0.032)*
0.016(0.009)+
0.002(0.003)
0.008
(0.176)-0.643
(0.032)**-0.025(0.017)
-0.090(0.185)
-0.194(0.050)**
0.024(0.019)
0.346
(0.334)-0.100(0.061)
-0.584(0.032)**
-0.389(0.336)
0.112(0.092)
0.049(0.034)
0.461
(0.032)**0.004
(0.006)-0.008
(0.003)*0.063
(0.032)*-0.029
(0.009)**0.001
(0.003)
Estimation Results for the VAR(9) Model with Exogenous Variables
In the Table, TB, DJ, /$, CBR, KOSPI, and /$ imply the U.S. Treasury bill(3-month), Dow Jones
index, yen/dollar exchange rates, corporate bond(3-year), Korea composite stock price index, and
won/dollar exchange rates in order. +, *, and ** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
64 24 4 2010
0.119
(0.181)0.519
(0.033)**-0.007(0.017)
0.123(0.185)
0.273(0.051)**
-0.042(0.019)**
-0.408(0.341)
0.015(0.062)
0.479(0.033)**
-0.022(0.335)
-0.103(0.091)
-0.003(0.034)
-0.454
(0.032)**-0.015(0.006)
0.004(0.003)
-0.092(0.031)**
0.021(0.009)*
-0.001(0.003)
-0.204(0.176)
-0.443(0.032)**
-0.017(0.017)
-0.109(0.178)
-0.150(0.049)**
0.025(0.018)
0.329
(0.333)-0.031(0.061)
-0.349(0.032)**
-0.393(0.322)
0.124(0.088)
0.020(0.033)
0.389
(0.031)**0.018
(0.006)**-0.003(0.003)
0.051(0.030)+
-0.028(0.008)**
-0.003(0.003)
0.052
(0.163)0.335
(0.030)**-0.002(0.016)
0.162(0.165)
0.143(0.045)**
-0.025(0.017)
-0.366(0.311)
0.045(0.057)
0.278(0.030)**
0.641(0.300)*
-0.092(0.082)
0.010(0.030)
-0.248
(0.027)**-0.008(0.005)+
0.002(0.003)
-0.016(0.026)
0.020(0.007)**
-0.004(0.003)
-0.007(0.142)
-0.227(0.026)**
0.006(0.014)
-0.124(0.142)
-0.029(0.039)
0.006(0.014)
0.434
(0.273)-0.035(0.050)
-0.178(0.026)**
-0.213(0.261)
0.022(0.071)
0.003(0.027)
0.137
(0.020)**0.001
(0.004)-0.001(0.002)
0.012(0.019)
-0.011(0.005)*
-0.002(0.002)
0.013
(0.111)0.096
(0.020)**-0.004(0.011)
0.043(0.114)
0.050(0.031)
-0.030(0.012)**
-0.314(0.209)
0.024(0.038)
0.096(0.020)**
0.160(0.201)
0.030(0.055)
0.023(0.020)
0.000 0.000 0.0001.031
(0.020)**-0.007(0.006)
-0.002(0.002)
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.008(0.076)
0.847(0.021)**
0.006(0.008)
0.000 0.000 0.0000.031
(0.207)-0.064(0.056)
0.884(0.021)**
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.881
(0.029)**0.002
(0.008)0.003
(0.003)
0.000 0.000 0.0000.108
(0.099)-0.848
(0.027)**-0.030
(0.010)**
0.000 0.000 0.0000.010
(0.273)0.005
(0.074)-0.747
(0.028)**
0.000 0.000 0.0000.800
(0.033)**-0.007(0.009)
0.002(0.003)
65
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.018(0.117)
0.740(0.032)**
0.001(0.012)
0.000 0.000 0.0000.442
(0.309)0.118
(0.084)0.535
(0.031)**
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.653
(0.036)**-0.005(0.010)
0.000(0.004)
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.006(0.127)
-0.663(0.035)**
0.002(0.013)
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.414(0.323)
-0.047(0.088)
-0.518(0.033)**
0.000 0.000 0.0000.556
(0.037)**0.008
(0.010)-0.02
(0.004)
0.000 0.000 0.0000.166
(0.130)0.508
(0.035)**0.014
(0.013)
0.000 0.000 0.0000.973
(0.329)**0.128
(0.090)0.442
(0.033)**
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.421
(0.036)**-0.009(0.010)
0.008(0.004)*
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.075
(0.126)**-0.375
(0.034)**-0.009(0.013)
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.331(0.326)
-0.177(0.089)*
-0.298(0.033)**
0.000 0.000 0.0000.286
(0.033)**0.008
(0.009)-0.008
(0.003)*
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.015(0.115)
0.259(0.031)**
0.020(0.012)+
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.221(0.312)
0.202(0.085)*
0.211(0.032)**
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.175
(0.028)**-0.013(0.008)+
0.008(0.003)**
0.000 0.000 0.000-0.032(0.098)
-0.148(0.027)**
-0.015(0.010)
0.000 0.000 0.0000.111
(0.273)-0.097(0.074)
-0.162(0.028)**
0.000 0.000 0.0000.089
(0.020)**0.007
(0.005)-0.004
(0.002)*
0.000 0.000 0.0000.144
(0.073)*0.078
(0.020)**0.018
(0.007)*
0.000 0.000 0.0000.002
(0.203)0.138
(0.055)*0.047
(0.021)*
R2 0.479 0.438 0.448 0.554 0.571 0.542
66 24 4 2010
(2) (3) .
/
10% .
KOSPI KOSPI
.
(3, USTB), (DJ), /(/$) .
KOSPI
, , / 1% KOSPI
0.016%, 0.247%, 0.172% 1% . /
/
1% -0.056% 0.074% 1%
. KOSPI
/ . / KOSPI /
.
/ .
. , KOSPI, /
.
, CD, CP
.
.
2.
. (13)
.
~ .
GARCH
. (1)
67
.
Estimation Results of and
In the Table, TB, DJ, /$, CBR, KOSPI, and /$ imply the U.S. Treasury bill(3-month), Dow Jones
index, yen/dollar exchange rates, corporate bond(3-year), Korea composite stock price index, and
won/dollar exchange rates in order. +, *, and ** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
1.000-0.257
(0.062)**-0.084(0.123)
0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.010
(0.004)*1.000
0.204(0.055)**
0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.010
(0.002)**-0.130
(0.020)**1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.022(0.015)
-0.145(0.089)
-0.441(0.151)**
1.0000.071
(0.101)-0.657
(0.239)**
-0.018
(0.004)**-0.236
(0.025)**-0.134
(0.042)**-0.027
(0.008)**1.000
0.445(0.064)**
0.005
(0.002)**0.008
(0.008)-0.164
(0.012)**-0.003(0.002)+
0.026(0.007)**
1.000
(=
)
1.003 0.262 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.008 0.976 -0.198 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.011 0.130 0.975 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.024 0.190 0.506 1.000 -0.089 0.696
0.024 0.255 0.026 0.026 1.009 -0.432
-0.004 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.027 1.013
=
(16)
(16) . 4
68 24 4 2010
1bp
0.022bp .6) / 1%
0.145bp 0.441bp .
10% / 1%
. .
5 1bp KOSPI
0.018% . / 1% KOSPI
0.236% 0.134% . 1% .
6 1bp /
0.005% . 1% / 0.008% .
/ 1% / 0.164% .
.
= =
(17)
(16) 1 1%
0.257bp . 0.257bp
/
1%
(17) 0.262bp .
. .
6) 4 (A1) .
1% 0.022bp .
69
.
1% .
. 1
. 1 .
Estimation Results of and
In the Table, TB, DJ, /$, CBR, KOSPI, and /$ imply the U.S. Treasury bill(3-month), Dow Jones
index, yen/dollar exchange rates, corporate bond(3-year), Korea composite stock price index, and
won/dollar exchange rates in order. +, *, and ** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
i USTB DJ /$ CBR KOSPI /$
0.239
(0.038)**0.002
(0.001)**0.004
(0.001)**0.158
(0.045)**0.005
(0.002)**0.024
(0.002)**
0.002
(0.001)**0.021
(0.004)**0.004
(0.002)**0.018
(0.005)**0.000
(0.000)**0.672
(0.097)**
Estimation Results of
In the Table, TB, DJ, /$, CBR, KOSPI, and /$ imply the U.S. Treasury bill(3-month), Dow Jones
index, yen/dollar exchange rates, corporate bond(3-year), Korea composite stock price index, and
won/dollar exchange rates in order. +, *, and ** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Ij
USTB DJ /$ CBR KOSPI /$
USTB0.715
(0.018)**0.000
(0.000)**0.002
(0.000)**0.000 0.000 0.000
DJ0.000
(0.000)0.925
(0.008)**0.001
(0.000)0.000 0.000 0.000
/$0.000
(0.000)0.000
(0.000)0.918
(0.016)**0.000 0.000 0.000
CBR0.000
(0.000)0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.882
(0.014)**0.080
(0.061)0.000
(0.000)**
KOSPI0.000
(0.000)0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.908
(0.015)**0.000
(0.000)
/$0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**
. 1
70 24 4 2010
. , , /
. /
. KOSPI . /
.
. / /
.
.
.
Estimation Results of
In the Table, TB, DJ, /$, CBR, KOSPI, and /$ imply the U.S. Treasury bill(3-month), Dow Jones
index, yen/dollar exchange rates, corporate bond(3-year), Korea composite stock price index, and
won/dollar exchange rates in order. +, *, and ** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
i j
USTB DJ /$ CBR KOSPI /$
USTB0.348
(0.026)**0.001
(0.000)**0.002
(0.001)*0.000 0.000 0.000
DJ0.000
(0.000)+0.066
(0.008)**0.004
(0.001)**0.000 0.000 0.000
/$0.000
(0.000)0.003
(0.001)*0.035
(0.007)**0.000 0.000 0.000
CBR0.001
(0.000)**0.069
(0.071)0.000
(0.000)**0.101
(0.013)**0.002
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**
KOSPI0.000
(0.000)0.017
(0.005)**0.001
(0.000)**0.001
(0.000)**0.068
(0.011)**0.000
(0.000)
/$0.000
(0.000)0.024
(0.004)**0.053
(0.010)**0.000
(0.000)**0.000
(0.000)**0.315
(0.031)**
1
.
1 .
71
Estimation Results of and
0.715 0.015 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.006 0.248 -0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.008 0.032 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.017 0.047 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.017 0.064 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.003 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.925 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.126 -0.192 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.182 -0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.242 -0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.006 -0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.918 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.016 0.477 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.032 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 -0.002 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 -0.004 0.022 0.883 0.079 -0.431
0.000 0.052 0.004 0.023 -0.078 0.004
0.000 -0.001 0.078 0.003 0.002 -0.002
0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.908 -0.165
0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.024 0.004
0.000 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.348 -0.019 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.003 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.004 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.008 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.008 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.066 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.008 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.013 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.004 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.003 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.084 0.003 0.101 0.002 0.101
0.000 -0.003 -0.014 0.003 -0.006 -0.093
0.000 0.018 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.217
0.000 0.023 0.009 0.001 0.068 0.045
0.000 -0.011 -0.020 0.000 -0.002 -0.134
0.000 0.025 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.315
72 24 4 2010
. .
(13) GARCH , , ,
GARCH
. GARCH .
,
.
1998
2000 30%
50%
.
/ /
.
.
.
.
~ (USTB), (DJ), /
(/$), (CBR), KOSPI, /(/$)
. 1
.
. KOSPI
/ KOSPI
73
Impulse Response of Volatility of Bond market
: USTB : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
Impulse Response of Volatility of Stock Market
: USTB : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
Impulse Response of Volatility of Foreign Exchange Market
: USTB : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
74 24 4 2010
Impulse Response of Volatility of Bond market
: Federal Funds Rate : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
Impulse Response of Volatility of Stock Market
: Federal Funds Rate : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
Impulse Response of Volatility of Foreign Exchange Market
: Federal Funds Rate : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
75
Impulse Response of Volatility of Money market
: Federal Funds Rate : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
Impulse Response of Volatility of Stock Market
: Federal Funds Rate : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
Impulse Response of Volatility of Foreign Exchange Market
: Federal Funds Rate : DJ Index : Yen/Dollar
76 24 4 2010
. . 1 /
. /, /
. / 1
( ) 0 .
~ (USTB)
.
1
.
.
~ (USTB)
.
1 .
.
/ .
.7)
.
Lastrapes(2005, 2006) Rigobon and Sack(2003)
, , / block exogenous
, KOSPI, /
.
, KOSPI, /
7) CD CP
.
77
,
, /
,
.
. /
/
.
.
.
.
.
.
/ .
.
.
,
.
78 24 4 2010
1. , ,
, 7 3, 2001, 23-45. 2. , , , 9
1, 2003, 1-86.
3. , , , 11 2, 2006, 167-201.
4. , :
, , 16 1, 2010, 161-191. 5. , - - , , 6
3, 2000, 45-70.
6. , : / / , , 49 4, 2001, 311-338.
7. , , , , , 8 1, 2002, 191-212.
8. , , , 51 3, 2003, 53-96.
9. , / , , 15 2, 2009, 23-53.10. , : ,
, , , 8 1, 2002, 136-191.11. ,
, , 21 2, 2006, 125-151.12. Bollerslev, T., Modelling the Coherence in Short Run Nominal Exchange Rates : A
Multivariate Generalized ARCH Model, Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 1990,
498-505.
13. Dickey, D. A. and W. A. Fuller, Distribution of the Estimation for Autoregressive Time
Series with a Unit Root, Journal of the American Statistical Association 74, 1979,
427-431.
14. Engle, R. F., Dynamic Conditional Correlation : A Simple Class of Multivariate
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity Models, Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics 20, 2002, 339-350.
79
15. Engle, R. F., T. Ito, and W. Lin, Meteor Showers or Heat Waves? Heteroskedastic
Intra-Daily Volatility in the Foreign Exchange Market, Econometrica 58, 1990, 525-542.
16. Fleming, J., C. Kirby, and B. Ostdiek, Information and Volatility Linkages in the Stock,
Bond, and Money Markets, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 1998, 111-137.
17. Hamilton, J. D., Time Series Analysis, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994.
18. Harvey, A., E. Ruiz, and N. Shephard, Multivariate Stochastic Variance Models, Review
of Economic Studies 61, 1994, 247-264.
19. Johansen, S., Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control 12, 1988, 231-254.
20. Lastrapes, W. D., Estimating and Identifying Vector Autoregressions under Diagonality
and Block Exogeneity Restrictions, Economics Letters 87, 2005, 75-81.
21. Lastrapes, W. D., Inflation and the Distribution of Relative Prices : The Role of
Productivity and Money Supply Shocks, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 38,
2006, 2159-2198.
22. Ljung, L. M. and G. E. P. Box, On a Measure of Lack of Fit in Time Series Models,
Biometrica 65, 1978, 297-303.
23. Longin, F. M. and B. Solnik, Is the Correlation in International Equity Returns
Constant : 1960~1990?, Journal of International Money and Finance 14, 1995, 3-26.
24. Newey, W. K. and K. D. West, A Simple Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica 55, 1987, 703-708.
25. Phillips, P. C. B. and P. Perron, Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression,
Biometrika 75, 1988, 335-346.
26. Rigobon, R. and B. Sack, Spillovers Across U.S. Financial Markets, Working Paper,
Sloan School of Management, MIT and NBER, 2003.
27. Tse, Y. K. and A. K. C. Tsui, A Multivariate Generalized Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity Model with Time-Varying Correlations, Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics 20, 2002, 351-362.
80 24 4 2010
Hamilton(1994) Lastrapes(2005, 2006) 3
VAR .
(A1)
(A2)
(A1) (structural model) (A2) (A1)
(reduced form model) . . , , / 3 1
, KOSPI, / 3 1 .
6 6 . ,
, (A1)
.
(A3)
(A1) (A2) MA(moving average)
.
(A4)
(A5)
81
(A1), (A2), (A4), (A5)
.
(A6)
( ) 33 .
.
(A7)
. block exogenous
0 . (A2) (1)
.
82 24 4 2010
VAR VAR
. Lastrapes(2005, 2006)
(A3) (8) lower
triangular .
. lower triangular
.
.
VAR
.
Rigobon and Sack(2003)
GARCH .
(B1)
(B1) . , , / 3 1
, KOSPI, / 3 1 .
6 1 . 6 6 (A6)
.
(B2)
(B3)
83
. block exogenous Rigobon and Sack(2003)
33 0 .
GARCH
- (13)
GARCH .
84 24 4 2010
< Abstract >8)
The Impact of International Financial Shocks on the Volatility of Domestic
Financial Markets
Keun Yeong Lee*
This study analyzes the impact of international financial shocks on
the volatility of domestic financial markets. It simultaneously investigates
casual relations between domestic and foreign financial markets such as
equity, foreign exchange, and money or bond markets. It combines and ex-
tends the models of Lastrapes (2005, 2006) and Rigobon and Sack (2003).
It is assumed that foreign variables such as U.S. interest rates, Dow Jones
Index, and yen/dollar exchange rates are block exogenous, following Last-
rapes (2005, 2006).
Lastrapes (2005, 2006) used Cholesly factorization to recognize pa-
rameters in structural VAR models. But this method cannot reflect con-
temporaneous relations in financial markets well, because it unilaterally
restricts causal relations between financial variables. Therefore, the paper
estimates contemporaneous parameters in structural VAR models under the
assumption that conditional variance-covariance matrix is time varying
like in Rigobon and Sack (2003). In addition, it is also assumed that foreign
variables in conditional variance-covariance matrix are block exogenous
in order to reduce the number of excessive parameters which should be
estimated.
The whole sample period is from January 4, 1999 to April 21, 2009
and the sample size is 2539. Two days average return data are considered
to avoid time lag between Korea and U.S.
The empirical results show that news shocks in domestic stock, for-
eign exchange, and money or bond markets cannot significantly influence
volatility of the other domestic financial variables, when foreign financial
variables are considered together. On the other hand, news shocks to for-
eign variables such as U.S. interest rates, Dow Jones Index, and yen/dollar
exchange rates have relatively large impact on volatility of domestic finan-
cial variables. Particularly, shocks to Dow Jones Index and yen/dollar ex-
* School of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University(Tel : 82-2-760-0614, E-mail : [email protected])
85
change rates have stronger impact on volatility of domestic financial mar-
kets than shocks to U.S. Treasury bill and federal funds rates.
Volatility of domestic money and bond markets is powerfully influ-
enced by shocks to U.S. federal funds rates rather than Treasury bill rates.
Shocks to federal funds rates also have much stronger effect on volatility
of call rates than volatility of corporate bond yield rates. Volatility of cor-
porate bond yield rates is more affected by shocks to Dow Jones Index than
shocks to yen/dollar exchange rates. On the other hand, volatility of call
rates is more strongly influenced by shocks to yen/dollar exchange rates
than shocks to Dow Jones Index. The empirical results suggest that the
domestic monetary policy is closely associated with the foreign exchange
policy because a balance of current accounts is very important in a small
open economy.
Key words : Foreign News Shocks, Volatility, Structural VAR and GARCH
Models
JEL Classification : F3, G1
87
||||||| Journal of Money & Finance | Vol.24 | No. 4 | 2010. 12 1)
******
.
, LTV(MLTV) , DTI
. . 2004 2007
.
0.78%, 1.40%, 1.10% .
, MLTV
.
20.06%, 20.55%, 17.73% .
Kaplan-Meier product limit (CDR)
(CPR)
CDR 50~100% SDA, 50~150% SDA, CPR 150~
250% PSA, 100~200% PSA .
: , , , ,
JEL : G10, G20, G21
2010 05 06; 2010 06 17; 2010 10 01
* (Tel : 02-2014-8157, E-mail : [email protected])
** (Tel : 055-213-3345, E-mail : [email protected])
*** , (Tel : 02-820-5793, E-mail : [email protected])
88 24 4 2010
.
2008
.
, 2004
2003 153 2009 264
64.5% .
ALM
.1)
MBS , 2000
MBS , 2009 12 24 9,298 .
MBS
.
(conditional de-
fault rate, CDR) (conditional prepayment rate, CPR)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1) .
89
.
.
.
(Asay, Guillaume, and Mattu, 1987; Richard
and Roll, 1989; Schwartz and Torous, 1989; Chinloy, 1991; Schorin, 1992)
. Deng,
Quigley, and Van Order(2000) Deng, Zheng and Ling(2005) ,
Deng and Liu(2009) , (2008) .
Foot, Gerardi, Goette,
and Willen(2008) , Sanders(2008), Daglish(2009) .
Asay, Guillaume, and Mattu(1987)
.2)
.
.
Richard and Roll(1989) , ,
, (burn-out effect)
.3)
Schwartz and Torous(1989)
2) Brazil(1988), Carron and Hogan(1988), Davidson, Herskovits,
and Drunen(1988), Schwartz and Torous(1989), Chinloy(1991), Schorin(1992) .3)
.
90 24 4 2010
.
Chinloy(1991) , , (age)
GNMA MBS
.
.
.
Schorin(1992) GNMA 30 MBS 1 (pooling)
, , , ,
, 3 , , ,
.
,
.
(2008)
MBS
.
, Schorin(1992)
.
Daglish(2009) (real option)
.
.
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order(2000)
. LTV ,
.
Deng, Zheng and Ling(2005)
. ,
, . ,
91
, .
.
. .
Deng and Liu(2009)
,
.
. LTV ,
. ,
. ,
.
.
(2008)
. (+)
. LTV
(-)
.
. 1
.
6 (+) ( 10%)
.
.
1.
Kaplan-Meier product limit(Kaplan and Meier, 1958) CDR
CPR .
92 24 4 2010
Cox PHM(proportional hazard model)
, , Cox PHM
.
.
(1) Kaplan-Meier product limit
(data generating process) .
.4)
(distribution family)
.
Kaplan-Meier product limit
.
Kaplan-Meier product limit T
.
(1)
CDR , ,
1, 0, t .
(2) Cox PHM
4)
(Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1973; Kalbfleisch, 1974; Cox 1972, 1975 ).
, (Lancaster,
1979) , , ,
(Engle and Russell, 1998; Zhang et al., 2001).
93
. Cox(1972, 1975)
(proportional hazard model : PHM) , PHM
. Vandell et al.(1993), Deng et al.(2000),
Deng et al.(1996) Cox PHM
.
Cox(1972) PHM
(partial likelihood)
. PHM
(full likelihood)
. .
PHM (2) .
(2)
,
PHM (2)
. (baseline hazard) Cox(1972)
.
PHM .
Cox PHM
Relative hazard Cox PHM
t hazard proportional hazard .5)
Cox PHM
Cox PHM. ,
. ,
5) Relative hazard cohort .
94 24 4 2010
,
, .
.6)
(3) .
,
.
(4) .
(5)
. Cox PHM .
(3)
(4)
(5)
,
,
,
.
6)
.
95
.
.
.
. LTV
.
. , DTI , ,
, .
LTV, , DTI, .
.
.
.
(LTV)
LTV MLTV
. DTI
.
. LTV
. LTV LTV
LTV .
12 36
.
, , .
96 24 4 2010
variables description
Cumulative rate of
house price change
2.
2004 1 2007 12
145,782 . 21,069, 12,503
. 20, LTV 70%
. 1 2%, 3
1.5%, 5 1%, 5 .
BIS Basel 90
.7)
, , LTV(mark-to-market LTV :
MLTV), t , , , DTI(debt-to-in-
come), , ,
. .
, t
, t 1,816,543 .
.
(+) . LTV 60.3%,
57.8%, 60.9% 74 , 111
, 66 .
Variable definition and description
7) .
, 60 , 90
. BIS Basel (395) 90
. Medema. Koning and Lensink(2009), Qi and
Yang(2009) .
97
variables description
: house price change at time s
Interest rate spread between the contract rate and the market
rate at t period
contract rate-market rate
MLTV (mark-to-
market LTV)
: initial loan amount, : initial house value M : maturity, : contract rate, : house price change at time s.
Loan balance
at t period
,
: initial loan amount, M : maturity, : contract rate
Credit credit rate (1-5)
Tenant dummy
DTI initial DTI (1-7)
Borrowers age
dummy
Male dummy
Occupation dummy
Regional dummy
(Seoul, Pusan)
Prepayment penalty
dummy
13~15 months dummy
37~39 months dummy
98 24 4 2010
variable N Mean SD Min Max
A : Overall market
Cumulative rate ofhouse price change(%)
1,816,543 0.276 0.744 -1.86 3.828
Interest rate spreadbetween contract rate and market rate at t period(%)
1,816,543 0.444 0.552 -1.80 1.68
Mark-to-marketloan-to-value ratio(%)
1,816,543 60.3 11.3 1.10 70.0
Loan balanceat t period(thousand won)
1,816,543 69,024 42,919 913 300,000
Loan amount(thousand won) 145,782 74,712 46,673 1,000 300,000
B : Seoul
Cumulative rate ofhouse price change(%)
537,658 0.288 0.24 -0.264 0.84
Interest rate spreadbetween contract rate and market rate at t period(%)
537,658 0.456 0.564 -1.80 1.68
Mark-to-marketloan-to-value ratio(%)
537,658 57.8 13.2 1.40 70.0
Loan balanceat t period(thousand won)
537,658 104,103 53,014 3.654 300,000
Loan amount(thousand won) 21,069 111,499 56,789 4,000 300,000
C. Pusan
Cumulative rate ofhouse price change(%)
304,428 1.38 1.368 -0.552 3.828
Interest rate spreadbetween contract rate and market rate at t period(%)
304,428 0.456 0.54 -1.68 1.56
Mark-to-marketloan-to-value ratio(%)
304,428 60.9 11.0 4.20 70.0
Loan balanceat t period(thousand won)
304,428 62,289 32,853 2,779 300,000
Loan amount(thousand won) 12,503 66.075 34,886 3,000 300,000
Descriptive statistics
99
.
1.
1,142 0.78%, 296
1.4% , 138 1.1%
. 0.3%
1% .
6.75 .
29,246 20.06%, 4,329
20.55% . 2,217
17.73% . 2.82% ,
.
1.99 .
Default and prepayment in Seoul and Pusan
Overallmarket
Seoul (a) Pusan (b)difference
(a-b)t statistics
p value
A : Default
No. of loan 145,782 21,069 12,503
Remaining loans 144,640 20,773 12,365
No. of default 1,142 296 138
Default rate(%) 0.78 1.40 1.10 0.30 2.36 0.0096
Average loan life atdefault(month)
12.96 19.72 -6.75 7.43 0.0001
B : Prepayment
No. of loan 145,782 21,069 12,503
Remaining loans 116,536 16,740 10,286
No. of prepayment 29,246 4,329 2,217
Prepayment rate(%) 20.06 20.55 17.73 2.82 6.29 0.0001
Average loan life atprepayment(month)
20.74 18.74 1.99 -7.45 0.0001
100 24 4 2010
2. Kaplan-Meier product limit
(1)
Kaplan-Meier product limit
. (hazard rate) (monthly conditional
default rate) (conditional default rate;
CDR) . (Bond Market Association)
CDR SDA(Standard Default Assump-
tion) . 100% SDA . 1 0.02%
0.02% 30 0.6% 60
. 61 120 0.0095% 120
0.03% . SDA (6) .
(6)
The 100% SDA(Standard Default Assumption) benchmark
Source : Lakhbir Hayre, Salomon Smith Barney Guide to Mortgage-Backed and Asset-Backed Securities,
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2001, p. 168.
101
CDR SDA .
SDA SDA
.
(Aging) .8)
SDA . SDA
Pool CDR
Kaplan-Meier product limit CDR
SDA .
50% SDA 100% SDA .
.
. .
50% SDA 100% SDA , 50% SDA 150% SDA
.
.
2004
.
2004
,
.9) 2004
, , .10)
8)
. 9)
, .
.10) 2003 10 29 , LTV 40%
.
102 24 4 2010
The Relationship Between the Default Rate and the Loan Age by Region
A : Overall market
B : Seoul
C : Pusan
SDA : Standard Default Assumption(Fabozzi, 1996).
Mortgage Age(Months)
Mortgage Age(Months)
Mortgage Age(Months)
103
(2)
PSA(Public Securities Association)
Standard Prepayment Benchmark
. PSA (7) .
(7)
t . PSA
.
Kaplan-Meier product limit
(CPR)
.
. 12 36
.
, ,
. 30 ,
. PSA 36
30
.
150% PSA 250% PSA
, 100% PSA 200% PSA
.
. , ,
PSA .
104 24 4 2010
The Relationship Between the Prepayment Rate and the Loan Age by Region
A : Overall market
B : Seoul
C : Pusan
PSA : Public Securities Association(Fabozzi, 1996).
Mortgage Age(Months)
Mortgage Age(Months)
Mortgage Age(Months)
105
3. Cox PHM
(1)
Cox PHM .
, , MLTV, , ,
, DTI, , ,
. ,
(-) (+)
. MLTV, DTI (+)
, . Deng and Liu(2009)
LTV, (+)
.
(2008) LTV (+)
MLTV (-)
. LTV MLTV (+)
.
(-)
(+)
.
.
, .
(-)
(-) .
.
.
106 24 4 2010
. (+). ,
.
.
.
Apartment prices in Seoul, Pusan and Overall Market
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
1999
:01
2000
:01
2001
:01
2002
:01
2003
:01
2004
:01
2005
:01
2006
:01
2007
:01
2008
:01
2009
:01
Apartment prices in KoreaApartment prices in PusanApartment prices in Seoul
Note) All time series data are set to 100 in 1999 : 1(Kookmin Bank).
(2)
.
(+)
. , , (-)
. , ,
.
107
108 24 4 2010
109
110 24 4 2010
111
d13, d37 3
. (2008)
(-)
.
(+) . MLTV
. (-)
. (+)
MLTV (+)
.
(robustness test) Cox PHM ,
, Cox PHM
.
. LTV
LTV .11)
.
SDA/PSA
. .
. 0.78%,
1.40%, 1.10% . 12
11) LTV LTV LTV . : LTV = LTV
if LTV < 60%, LTV = 60% if LTV > = 60%.
112 24 4 2010
. , 2004
.
.
,
, MLTV, ,
DTI, , , .
DTI ,
.
, MLTV (+) .
20.06%, 20.55%, 17.73% .
.
Kaplan-Meier product limit CDR 50~100% SDA,
50~150% SDA , CPR 150~250% PSA, 100~
200% PSA .
.
(PSA SDA) CDR CPR
. CDR
CPR SDA/PSA
pool
.
.
113
ALM .
.
114 24 4 2010
1. , MBS
: OAS , 08-04, 2008. 2. , , ,
16 3, 2008, 5-26.
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117
< Abstract >12)
An Analysis of Default and Prepayment in Korean Mortgage Markets
Doowon Bang*, Sae Woon Park**, Yun Woo Park***
The purpose of this study is to investigate the default and the prepay-
ment behaviors in the Korean mortgage ma