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8/9/2019 ῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato (Drew A. Hyland)
1/15
'Epc,'E7rmOu,ta,
nd
acxa
in Plato
DREW A. HYLAND
The encomium
proper
is
preceded by a
preliminary dialectical discussion with
Agathon, the
object of which is to clear the ground of some popular misconcep-
tions of the
nature
of Eros.
The
notion of
Eros, it is
shown, is equivalent to that
of
desire
(Ipcoq
=
s6
&iwLOuIAo5v)
..
a
quality, not
a
person.
Bury, R. G. The
Symposium
of
Plato, page
XXXVI-XXXVII, in a discussion of Socrates'
speech.
The subject of
conversation (in the Lysis) is
friendship (qX(a). But behind
this word,
it is
clear,
as will
be
briefly sketched,
hides
the
more
powerful
Eros...
There is hardly
any terminological distinction
between
love
and friendship,
so
that, first,
desire
is
said
to wish
that
of
which
it is
in
want,
and then
that
the
congenial
be the
object
of
'love, friendship,
and desire'
(,roil
IxkLou
6
re
Epwqxal
h
cpLXEa
al
t
sIouFdm
'ryX&vyL
5av,
221
E).
Friedlander, Paul, Plato, An Introduction,
page
50-51.
is
the purpose
of this
essay
to take some
first steps
towarddis-
pelling
the
popular conception, exemplified
by
the
two above
quotations,
that there
is
little
or no
difference
in
Plato's
dialogues
between the
three important terms
Epwq,
eTctE,
and
ptL?.1
I
say
first
steps
because
the vast
number
of
significant
occurrences
of
these terms
in
the dialogues
makes
it
impossible
to
give
an ex-
haustive
treatment in one short paper.
Consequently,
I
propose
to
do the
following: first,
I
shall elicit the
relevant distinctions
between
these
terms, and
the basis for the distinctions,by a carefulexamination
of
two
significant passages, Symposium
200a-201b,
and
Lysis
221-222.
I
shall attempt
to show therein that
although indeed these terms
have an
important connection with each other, nevertheless there
1
D. N. Levin, Some Observations Concerning Plato's Lysis , (presented at a
meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy,
Amherst, Massachusetts,
August 17, 1964), notes several different positions
taken on the
controversy
(see especially pages 12-18 including footnotes), and
he himself seems to come
out in favor of some distinction at least between
'Epcog
and
yWLX(
(pages
15-17)
However, since the distinction in question is not the
central theme of his
essay,
he does not offer decisive evidence for his view. I propose to do so in this essay.
32
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1968), pp. 32-46
8/9/2019 ῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato (Drew A. Hyland)
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are distinct
and
significant
differences.
I
shall
then consider several
relevant passages
from other dialogues
in which
I find the distinctions
I draw supported.
My
claim
is
not,
indeed cannot
be,
that
Plato
always
consistently distinguishes
the terms in
question,
that he never
uses
them
interchangeably.
To do so would necessitate
a consideration
of
every
occurrence
of one
or more of these terms
in the
dialogues.
Besides,
there are
undoubtedly
contexts in which
such
subtle
distinc-
tions
are
entirely
irrelevant to the
point being
made.
In
such
cases,
need we
doubt the
sincerity
or the wisdom
of
Socrates' words in
the
Theaetetus
that
To use words and
phrases
in an
easy-going
way
without scrutinizing
them too
seriously
is
not,
in
general,
a
mark of
ill breeding; on the contrary there is something lowbred in being too
precise. 2
Rather
my
more cautious claim will be that
in
at
least
several
important passages
where
the distinctions
would
be
relevant,
Plato
maintains them
consistently. My
suspicion
is
that
this
con-
sistency
is
maintained
more
broadly;
but this
cannot be
proved
in a
short
paper. Finally,
I
shall
offer a few
suggestions
as to
possible
philosophic consequences
that
would derive from a
realization of
these differences.
Let me
begin
with the discussion
between
Socrates
and
Agathon at
Symposium
200a-201b.
Socrates is concerned to
show
Agathon
that
'Epus
is
always
directed,
that
is,
it is
always
'Ep;
of
something
and
not
in
itself,
and also that it
is
always
of
something
which
it lacks.
I shall be concerned not
so
much
with the
establishing
of
these points
as with the careful
and distinct use of the terms
in
question.
Let
me
first arrange
the order
of
the
argument,
with
special emphasis
on the
interchange
of the relevant terms, then comment on the way in
which the
argument develops.
The crucial passage
begins
at
200a2
when, having
established
that
'Epco
always
has
an
object, Socrates
asks
Agathon
to remember
what he thinks the
object
to
be,
and
then
asks,
Does
'Epw;
desire that of which it
is
'Epco? (o vEps 'exeLvou
0o5
I=v
p@,
Out& ouTo5 i
o5;).
This
establishes what
I
shall cal
for reference
step
one,
that desire
(&VnQua4x)
s a
possible predicate
of
'Epco.3
'
EpG.;desires. This thing that it desires and loves, does it
desire
and love it
having
it
or
not
having
it?
(H6orepov
cwv
ocaur6
i5
2
Plato, Theaetetus, 184c. Translation
by F. M. Cornford.
'
I do not mean to imply by the
use of the term steps that these are necessarily
logical steps, that, say, step
four
follows
logically
from
step three.
I am simply
distinguishing the stages
in the
argument
relevant to
my paper.
33
8/9/2019 ῎Ερως, ᾿Επιθυμία, and Φιλία in Plato (Drew A. Hyland)
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s7rLOu)e
'r
xaXpI,
elZ'
I
tnUlIeZ
xre X
pI ,
O-
II
oV;).4 Probably
not
having,
says Agathon.
This
I shall
call
step two,
that 'Epod
both desires
and loves,
in other
words,
that love
is in
a
way
self-
predicative,
and that besides
this it
also
desires.
Consider,
says
Socrates,
whether,
rather than probable,
it
is
not necessary
that desire
desires
what
it
lacks,
or does not desire
if
it
does
not
lack.
(x67nC
8&1,
vXL
lo
eLX6toq
e
M&vcyxz
u'r
0'
Z'7rLOLouv
OtWVLU.ZV
Vi
VW;
'=LV,
'
'MtOU1?LV
&&v
-?
C'
ae;
i;).5
Here
we
have
step
three,
which
states
only (as
opposed
to
step
two) that
desire
desires
what it lacks.
An
important
element
in step
three then,
is
that
it
says
nothing
explicitly
about
'Epw;.
To this Agathon
assents.
Socrates next enters upon some examples which both illustrate and
expand
his point.
The object
of the
examples
is this:
if
someone
who
is strong
wishes
to be
strong,
or
if
someone
who is
healthy
wishes to
be healthy,
what he
really
wishes
is to
continue
to be strong
or
healthy
in
the
future,
something
which
he at present lacks.6
But
in the course
of
these
examples,
a
new
word
is
introduced
to
express
that
element
of
desire,
namely
ouXecaOL.
It
may
seem
at first
that
3ou'caoot
and
e7rLtieZvare used interchangeably in this passage, but if this were so,
Socrates
could be accused
of
ignoring
the obvious difference
that
e7r&LOtLdv
s
primarily,
if
not
exclusively,
a
passion,
whereas
PoUAeaOvL
has
the more
intellectual
connotation
of
wishing
or
willing.
But
he does
not,
I
think,
ignore
this.
Thus
Socrates
says
at 200d,
Con-
sider,
then,
whether
whenever
you
say
that
'I
desire
things
now
present,'
you mean
anything
else
than
this, that
'I
wish to possess
the things
I now
have
in the
future
also. '
This
suggests
that the
desire
for
present
possessions
in the future
somehow
loses
the
pas-
sionate
force
of a
present
desire
(ChLOupdc)
so
that
the more intellectual
PoU'Xo,uim
s
appropriate.
Let
us
call this
introduction
of
Poi'Xo,oa?
to
refer
to desire
for
future
possession
step
four.
Socrates
then
switches
back
to
?p&-v
o draw
his
conclusion
from
the examples.
But this
is
to love
that
which is
not
yet
ready
at
hand
for
one,
nor in
one's possession,
the
possession
and
preservation
of
these things in future time. 7 Step five seems to establish that Epwg
4
Plato,
Symposium,
200a5.
6 Ibid., 200a8.
6
Ibid.,
200b8-200e.
7
Ibid.,
200d8. ouxo5v ?o5Yr6
y'&a-lv &xeEvou
&p&v, ou'nwco
?tOL[LOV
MUrT45
&adv
0o8e
1XCL,
6
?et
t6V 17rCL'X
Xp6vov
'rac3rox
tvot
orCp
cO6Lxcvac
xodt
nop6vro;
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is also
applicable
to the
possession
of
present
blessings
in the
future
- that
locution
to which
the
verb
Poi')?eaO
is appropriate.
This
man
and
anyone
else
who desires,
says Socrates,
desires
what
is not ready
at hand
nor
present
to him,
and
what he does
not
have, and
what he
is not himself
and
what
he
lacks,
such are the
kinds
of things
of which
desire
and love are. 8 Step
six thus
asserts
that
both
Ep(o
and ZatLOufL
are
of what
one does not have,
what
one
is not himself,
and of
what
one
lacks.
Finally
Socrates
sums
up
the
argument
by
establishing
that
vEpw4
is first
of
something,
and
second,
of
something
which one at
present
lacks (&Xo
7L
C'=tv
6o
Ep&g
np&-ov
,ev
'v
mVov,
?7rsoo'Cro&v
)v
&oXv
gv8eo ncpj
ocUs&
).9
The seventh and final step consists of droppingoff
the interest
in
e'tLOUpa
and
concluding
exclusively
concerning
`EpwG.
Let
us
now
examine the argument
more closely to
see
what
dis-
tinctions
develop.
Step
one establishes
that
'Epcjg
desires,
that is,
that
desiring
is a
possible predicate
of
Ep,og.
It does
not establish
that
desire
is
the
only
predicate
of
`Epws,
nor,
certainly,
does it even
hint
that
'Ep&o;
nd
EtLOvCu-.
re identical,
as
Bury
would have
us
believe.
Step two increases the dubiousness of Bury's hypothesis when it
adds that vEpco&
oth
desires and loves what it
lacks. The
only way
this
could
be construed
as
implying
that
'Ep&o
and
eOur[Am
re
identical
would
be to
interpret
the presence
of
the
conjunction
here
as a rather sophomoric
redundancy
on Plato's
part.
If
vEpco=
VXLOU.dm,
hen
the
conjunction
of the two
is
entirely
unnecessary.
A much more plausible
explanation
would be that by ascribing
both
loving
and desiring
as
predicates
of
'Ep&g,
having just
ascribed
desiring
individually,
Plato is
indicating
to us that there
is
at least
some
difference
between
them.
What the
difference
is
has as yet
not
even been
hinted at.
We see here
only
the
suggestion
that
there is a
difference.
Step three
is
characterized
by
the
fact
that it
tells us
nothing
directly
about
`Epco.
It
does,
however,
tell
us
something
about
enu&Aoc.10
t tells us that
desire
desires,
that it is self-predicative
in
S
Ibid., 200el. xxl
o5roq
&pm
al
&XXoq
iq
6
&kntOu(13v
ro5
ph
&'rotLou
xl
SroV 0v?
7rpOvrO;
xoc
6
* lXCL
XMt
8
IAj
a-LV
XT6q
xma
o5
kvgt4 &aCrt,
roLat
r',r-m
ta'rlv &v
J
&rLOuJAC
-C
xOd
6
Ip@
&FTEV;
9
Ibid., 200e8.
10
Liddell and
Scott, under
&1=0u[&
say
that 'r
IntOu?.ov
... equals
&tOU[Eda.
Although this may
at times
be
debatable,
it serves the
point here; step
three
is
about
kMOu)imd,
ot
'Epw,.
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the same
way
as
'Epcoc.
Epo~
and
sLOu&4o hus have this
much in
common:
they
both desire.
'Epco,
however loves
(4p5)
as
well,
i.e.,
it too is
self-predicative. One
possible
distinction
between
'Epco
and
6t0u,LOa
now begins to emerge: they both desire, but only Epc?
has
been said to
love. It
may be that
an0u[u(m
an
only
desire,whereas
'Epcog
can
both
desire and love.
Nor
ought we
to be
surprised that
such
a
difference arises.
After all,
VmOu,ul0
s
characterized by
Plato
in
the
Phaedrus as
but the
lowest
faculty of
the soul,
as an unruly
monster which
must
be
constrained, sometimes
violently
constrained,
by
the
higher
faculties in order to
prevent it
from
gaining
complete
mastery over
the
soul,1 whereas
'Epco
is
portrayed in the
same
dialogue as divine
madness,
the source of
inspiration
to
divine
philosophy.112
There
must,
then,
be
some other
element
in
'Epco&
n
addition to its
capacity
to
desire,
which
gives
it the
divine status
which
ehr&[da
lacks.
Looking
forward to
the ascent
passage
of
the
Symposium, the charioteer
image
of the
Phaedrus,
and even the
cave
analogy
of the
Republic,
we could
well
suspect
that
it
will
be some
element
of
rationality
which will
accomplish
this
enhancement
of
'Epco. When we think of the brute desire
(EtLOu[da)
of which 'Epco
is
capable,
modified
by
a more rational
element,
our
thought
ought
to turn to the
possibilities offered
by
y6ac
as a source
of
insight.
Perhaps qtXEm
s
also involved in
'Epo
in a
way
which
distinguishes
'Epw
from
e.mOuiEa.
o
explore
this
possibility,
we
must turn to certain
importantpassages
in
Plato's
dialogue
on
(pLkax,
he
Lysis.
The
Lysis
is a
dialogue
whose ostensible concern
is
the nature of a
friend (pLX6;) r more broadly, of friendship
(pLXcx).'8
t might be
pointed
out that the
very
fact that Plato wrote one
dialogue
on
friendship
(ypXoc)
nd
two
on
'Epco
indicates that he at least makes a
distinction between these two
terms,
even if his commentators do
not.
What
concerns
us
here, however,
are
certain
illuminating
statements
on the
possible
relationship
between
'Epw4,
9c0LX,
and
C7nLO04dc.
Near
the end of the
dialogue,
Socrates
is
pointing
out that
cXLai
eed not
be of what
is
absolutely
evil or
absolutely
good,
but
possibly
of
something neither evil nor good. He says at one point, Is it possible
for one
desiring
and
loving
not to befriend
(p6elv)
that which he
desires
and
loves?
(otov
re
oi9v
earLv
i7Ou&oUvrx'
x
?L&pAv'a
orouTOU
I
Plato, Phaedrus, 246ff.
12
Ibid., 244-246.
18
See D. N. Levin, op. cit. (n. 1), pages
9-10 for a
discussion
of
this.
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0o
eOtU.tL
Xm,L
P T
(pLXBEZV;).14
o
which
Lysis replies,
It
seems to
me
not.
This
sentence
is most
instructive,
for
it
directly mentions
and relates the
three terms
in
question.
It
suggests
that
it
is
impossible
for
one
desiring
and
loving
(7rtLOouivat. xocL
pxv-dr) not to
befriend
(FI?
t9Xev)
ts
object.
That
is,
if
one
both desires
and
loves
(erLOUie
xal
kp-),
he must
also
befriend
(pLXd)
as well.
Now,
we
would
hardly
want
to say
that if one
simply
desired, he
would
also befriend.
'ETLOu-
tLCx,
as the lower
passion,
would
hardly
deserve
such
a
close
association
with the
more rational
yLX(c.
The
question
as
to
whether one
who
loves
(4p)
also
befriends
(pXct)
is
more
difficult,
but
probably con-
tains
the
crux
of our
problem.
I
offer
the
following
suggestion:
it
begins to look as though qLX6must be more closely associated with
'Epw;
than
with
C'mOulA.
A
hierarchy
begins to
emerge, with &rLOu-
.daCt the
bottom
and
(pLXLt
the
top,
and
these two
terms
mediated,
as
it
were, by
'Epwg,
which
contains
elements of
both.
The criterion
of
this
hierarchy
clearly
is
involved
with
the
degree of
rationality
implicit
in the
terms.
'E=Oufao,
the
lower
passion,
contains
virtually
no
rationality.
In
fact, it
is a
constant hindrance to
reason,
as
we learn
in the Phaedrus.'L Ep&s, as we learn from Diotima's revelation,
contains
a
considerable element
of
reason
or
deliberative
ability.
It
acts as
the mediator between
gods and men.16
In
its
mythical pre-
sentation
as
the son
of Poros and
Penia, it
is described as
...
plotting
after
beautiful
things and
good
things, being
manly
and energetic
and
impetuous, a
clever
hunter,
always weaving
plots,
desirous of
thoughtfulness,
inventive,
a
philosopher
throughout
its
life.. .17
Moreover,
in
the
famous
ascent
passage ,'8
we
leam
that
as the
degree
of
reason
in
'Epcs
increases, whereby
one
turns his
attention
to
increasingly higher
objects
of
love,
'Ep&q
becomes
transformed,
in its
highest
manifestation, into
p)LX,
indeed the
cpLXEm
or
aocptx,
1
Plato,
Lysis, 221b. I have
adopted
to befriend
for
qlXtlv ,
because
it
seemed
the most
plausible
way to
maintain
the
connection
between
qLxelv
and
TOA
(friendship).
However, it
is in fact an
inadequate
translation, because it
fails to
bring
out
the
subtlety
of the distinction
between
(pOXcv,
nd
&p&.v
n
this
sentence. The point is that
9LxCLv
has less
17:LO[uLEa
n it than does &p&v. ut to
befriend is
too weak.
Both
Ip&cv
nd
9LXclv
should really
be translated
to love
with the
former understood to
be
somewhat
stronger than the
latter.
15
Plato, Phaedrus,
247b,
and
elsewhere.
16
Plato, Symposium,
202e.
17
Ibid., 203b-204, not
to
mention that
in
this
description
'Epcq
is the veritable
image
of
Socrates.
Is
Ibid.,
210-212b.
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or philosophy.
00kXa, hen, is 'Epcosmodified by an increased
degree
of rationality.
At the risk of
being
capricious
we
could say that the
highest pursuit
of man
is not
erosophy but philosophy
because
by the time man reacheshis highest condition, the erotic drive which
started
him on his way has
been modified, but not sublimated,
by
an
increased
rationality,
so that it becomes
a
pXtoc
or wisdom. In
fact, it is precisely
this
increased
degree
of
rationality
which has
enabled
man to settle his erotic drive on
its
most
proper
and
highest
object, wisdom itself.
To
hold such a view is
not,
of
course, to
maintain
that
there
is
no relation whatsoever between
these terms. That even
the two extremes,
pL?E
and
e.LOUVd4x,
are
somewhat related
is shown
by a statement which Socrates
makes shortly after the last quotation
from
the
Lysis,
at 221d. Desire
is the
cause
of
friendship,and that
which desires
is a friend
to
that which it desires, at the time
when it
desires.
(4
F
tOuliEm
rn
?tLcx,
oclx(a,
xal
'o
Z7rL0uLoiUvrp[LXov
'oTv
'O6'Z o6
C7tlOu4LC
xal'
6o'-e
6
7LOt
i
u...).19
Thus the
desiring
(so
ZmLOt)ou)v)
ecomes
a friend to that which it desires
in
order o
possess
it.
This
illustrates that the two terms
are
related but different.
Again,
that
Z'nu&.da
is the cause of friendshipalso indicates that at least the
extremes, cpL?,L
and
etLOuj.do
re
different,
unless we wanted to hold
the
unlikely
view that tLEot
s a causa sui. This is
reiterated
in another
way
a few
sentences
later when Socrates argues that although we
desire what
we
lack, nonetheless,
Love and
friendship
and
desire,
as
it seems happens
to
be
of
what
belongs
to it.
(soiu
o'Lxetou
,
c
gOtX?V,
0
T
9p
O
aL
Yn
TqLX(
XOCl
)
C7MOUpLLOCL
UyXxVEL
o?ia).20
The fact
that all three terms are mentioned again indicates that they are
different, yet
the content of the statement itself
suggests
another
important
similarity. Although
all three
are
of what
they
do not
have,
their
objects
nonetheless
are what
belong
to
them,
what is
proper
to them.21
Let us
now return to the order
of
argument
in
the
Symposium.Step
four
contains the introduction
of
Po&'sXaeOt
o
apply
to the desire for
present possessions
in the future. It is
important
to see that
PoUAXaOt
has at least this much in common with spavand
&C70utOZV;
it too is
19
Plato, Lysis,
221d3.
30
Ibid., 221e3.
31
Let us remind ourselves
again
that to construe the ascription
of the
same
predicate
to these terms
as an
indication
of their identity
would be
a wholly
unsatisfactory
procedure.
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always of
that which it lacks.22But 3Ou'XeAocthas the sense
of deli-
beration
or
reasoning
for what
one
wishes,
which sense
&rntOuV.C
acks.
That is, the
difference
between
the
simple present
desire
(C'tMOUpit)
and the assessment
that the
object
is
also desirable
in the future
(for
which
Poi'XeaOa
is employed)
is that the latter
requires
some element
of
deliberation
as
to the
value
(or
at least
desirability)
of the
object.
At Republic
438 aff., a passagewe
shall
consider
later,
Socrates satisfies
Glaucon that an
&ItLOuji(
like
thirst,
makes
no
value
judgment
as
to
its
object;
it desires
not
good drink,
but
simply
drink.
Poueaott,
on the other hand, suggests
the deliberative
or rational element
whereby we
assess
the
object
of our desire as worth
having in the
future. Socrates' examples in the present passage are instructive in
this
regard.
His examples of
things which we
wish for
(3ouX6,eOoc)
n
the future are strength, health,
and
wealth.23
Evidence for
my
view
that these
things require
some deliberation
before one seeks them
(and
are not simply objects
of
erLu&.do)
s
that these
are
precisely
the three examples which Glaucon uses at
Republic
357c to convince
Socrates of
a third class
of goods
which
require
activities painful
and unpleasant in themselves (exercise, being healed, working) but
which are tolerated
and consideredgood because
of their
good conse-
quences.
As step
five
indicates,
this reasoned desire for present
possessions
in
the future qualifies as
`Epw4.
This is
to love that which
is
not
present
to one, and which he does not have... ('Ouxo5v oi5t6
y'ea'sV
~xexsou
9pV,
8
O57rcW
roL[Lov
c-rx
IarV
oi
&
ZXeL...),24
This too suggests
that the introduction of the
deliberation
involved in
Po'X?rOoct
ifts
the status of the
merely
passionate
&97c&4doo
the level
of
Ep&g.
Again
we can
argue
that central to the distinction
between
es;tu41(a
and 'Epcs
is the presenceof
rationality in
'Epw;.
Thus,
concludes
Socrates
in
step six,
both desire
and love are of
what one does
not have, of what one is not,
and of what
one
lacks.
This
is consistent,
because as we have seen,
both Epco
and
e&irLQt
desire,
and one
desires what
one lacks. This conclusion,
then,
concerns
only the fundamental similarity between Epto and Our?LEaocrates
does not
state
explicitly
the difference
between
these terms.
That
remains
the enterpriseof the reader.
In the
summary of his
discussion with
Agathon, Socrates
ceases
22
Plato,
Symposium,
200b.
23
Ibid.,
200d.
'4
Ibid., 200d8.
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mentioning
both
'Ep;
and
krOupia
and concludes exclusively con-
cerning
Epw.
This is because the
stated topic of conversation s 'Epcoc
not
C'Ovudca.
We have
learned
about
&7rLOutLm
oo in this discussion,
as well as about
cpOEm,
but the explicit purpose in the context of
the Symposium
has been to determine
certain
things about
Epco;.
We have learned
that Epoj is always directed towards
an object,
and that its object
is
always
something that it
lacks.
In the context of these remarks
about the
nature of
'Epwq
in the
Symposium,
we
have seen the
necessity
of
making
a
more complex
distinction between
three related
but different terms:
C7LOu['to,
'Epo;,
and
cptXM.
et
me try to sum up in a coherent fashion
the distinctions
which have so far emerged.
'EmtOu[da
e know to be the lowest
faculty of the
soul, the brute desire
to possess what one lacks.
'Epco;
also desires,but unlike
mLOutita,
which only
desires,
Epwo
both
desires
and loves.
The difference
between
'Epo
and
?tLOu,u(a,
hen
must
lie in this
and loves.
I
have suggested that the qualitative
differencebetween
'Epco&
nd
'r=Ouda(
ies
in the
presence
of
rationality
in
'Epwg.
In
its purest form,
the modification
of the
desire
for
possession
by rationality or contemplation is y&X6.The aspect of Epwsand
ctoc
is thus a rational or contemplative aspect
which is
usually
accompaniedby desire.
I
propose now
to cite several passages both
in
the Symposium
and
in
other dialogues,
in
which
the thesis that there
is
a
distinction
between
L7tOUi.to,
Ep&gand
ytEa,
and
that the distinction hinges
on
the presence
and degree
of
reason
in
each,
is
borne
out.
At
the
same time I shall begin to suggest certain philosophic consequences
whichfollow therefrom.
To take the
ascent passage
of the Symposium
first;
in that
pas-
sage
we
are
presented
with the
erotic ascent
of a
lover and
potential
philosopher from
the love of one beautiful body,
through the
love of
all
physical beauty, through the
love
of increasingly higher objects,
to
the
love of
the beauty of knowledge,
and
finally
to the
love
of
Beauty itself.
This ascent is endlessly
rich with philosophicpossibilities,
but we must confine ourselves here to an examination of what it can
tell us
about
the distinction
between
'Epco;,
mOu,i(m
and
ypLX(m.
The first thing to notice is the first
step: It is necessary
says Diotima,
for
one
rightly
pursuing this business to begin
when
he is
young by
pursuing beautiful bodies, and first
if he is rightly
led by
his
leader,
he will
love one body and in it
he
will
beget beautiful
speeches. 25
25
Ibid., 210a4.
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We see here that
although
Plato
begins
the erotic ascent to
philosophy
on
a much more
concrete level
than
many
philosophers
would
be
willing
to grant, he has still not
begun
at the
most concrete
level.
For Plato has Diotima
begin
this
ascent at what
is
already
a
fairly
advanced
stage
of
development;
the
young person
in
question has
already
discerned the
beauty
of the
physical
body,
and
picked
out
that
quality
as
worthy
of love. The
higher
level of this first
step
is
also
indicated by
the manner of
generation
which
results;
the
lover
will
generate not human
children,
or even sexual
gratification,
but
beauti-
ful
speeches
(?o6you
ocXoi))
n the
soul of
the
beloved. A
prior
stage
of
development, then, would have
been
an
undiscerning
or
indiscri-
minate desire for the possession of the physical body, a desire whose
generative
issue
would have been sexual
gratification,
or
at best
(if
the affair
were
heterosexual)
human
children.
But what else
would
that
desire be but
&7rLOuutO
This
ascent
is an
ascent of
Ep&o,
and
therefore does
not
begin with
the
absolutely
lowest
level,
which
would
be
&7rOu,(ac.
A
complete
ascent would
necessitate a
beginning with
pure
i'mOultm,
or
desire for
the possession of a
physical
body, that
is,
for sexual intercourse.Plato has given us that beginning in an earlier
ascent
just
prior
to
the
present
one,
which was
stated
in
terms of
the desire
(ZhrOudoc)
or
generation.26
There,
the
ascent
began
with the
lOUpd
for
procreation,which was
characteristic even of
beasts,
and
ascended to such
higher
procreations as
the
works of
Homer and
Hesiod, and
the
laws of
Solon
and
Lycurgos. If we
were
now to
juxta-
pose
these two
ascents,
we would
see
that
the first
ascent
constituted
the
absolute
beginning,
whereas
the
beginning
of
the second
ascent,
the
one now in
question,
already
represents a
certain
stage of
deve-
lopment. And
what
precisely is that
stage? It is
the
stage
of dis-
criminatingor
reasoningcapacity
which our
earlier
analysis suggested
differentiates
Epoc
from
Cr&LOdcu.
It
is
also worth
noting that
the
highest
stage
of the
earlier ascent
(of desire for
procreation),
aws
and
politics
(exemplified
by Solon
and
Lycurgus)
27
is
but a
middle
level in
the more
famous ascent of the
love of beauty.28 Whatever the deeper reasons for this, it reveals
that
m7rOu[Aoc
nd
'Ep&4
overlap, but
'Ep(o
has
higher
manifestations
than
does
'LmOu[da,
n
particular
the
two
highest
steps
on the philo-
sophic
ascent, love of
knowledge
(popOL,a6E)
nd love
of
Beauty
26
Ibid.,
207-210.
27
Ibid.,
209d.
28
Ibid.,
210c.
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Itself
(ypXoaopc).
This was indicated in our
analysis
by the fact that
'Ep&o
and
C'=Ouda
both desire
-
this is where they overlap
-
yet the
reasoning ability of which Epwg
s capable makes it higher.
A look at the transitions in the erotic ascent to Beauty Itself
again shows the involvement of
reason and
Epcoq.
or the redirection
of
one's Ep&o rom one step
to another, for instance from the love
of one beautiful body
to
the
love of all physical beauty, is accomplish-
ed
when one realizes
(VVonamV
O)29
that the beauty of all physical
things
is
related.
Thus the ascent of
Epcog,he redirection of one's
'Epwg
on
increasingly worthy
objects, is possible because of the
in-
creased presenceof reason
in
Ep&o.
In the last two steps of the ascent, the love of all knowledge, and
the love of Beauty Itself, one's
Ep&;has become so imbued
with
reason that
it is
more properly
called
(cpLoc,
ndeed, the
pL?Wa
for
aop6x.
For
in the
next
to the last step, the love of the beauty of
all
knowledge
(ZhUaTn[),
the aspirant
is
partaking
in
unencumbered
philosophy
(v
pXoaoptoc
Op06v),30
and of
course,
in
the
last
step,
the glimpse
of
Beauty Itself,
one is at
the level of
philosophy
too.
This also supports the results of our earlier analysis; the difference
between Ep&g nd cpcao
s
one
of
degree.
And
the
degree
in
question
is
the degree of reason
which
is
present
in
one's Ep&g.
Thus the
''ascent
passage
is
entirely
consistent
with
the results
of our
earlier
analysis, both
in
regard
to the
order
of
the
hierarchy
(efLQu[dc-'Epwq-
ypaLXL)
and
in
regard
to
the
principle
of
differentiation:
the
presence
and
degree
of reason.
My thesis also finds ample support in Plato's other great dialogue
on
'Ep&o,
the
Phaedrus. To
take
the
negative way first;
in the
speech of Lysias, and
more
importantly,
in the
first
speech
of
Socrates
for
which
he
must later
offer
a
recantation,
Ep(o4
s
indeed
identified
with
ehnNu,i..
He
defines
Epcog
n this
speech
as irrationaldesire
('
&veu
Xoyou ebtLOtdo)31
which,
far from
inspiring
one
to
philosophy
as
the Symposium suggests,
rather
prevents
both
the
lover
and
his
beloved
from
pursuing
divine
philosophy. 32
t
is clear
throughout
these first two speeches that Epc is interpreted, and censured, as
irrational
and harmful
sexual
lust,
or
ehr&tLta.
his is
why
both
speeches
advocate
that
one
avoid
relationships
with
lovers.
Yet
Socrates
29
Ibid.,
210b.
20
Ibid.,
210d6.
al
Plato,
Phaedrus,
238b7.
32
Ibid.,
239b.
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insists
that he
make a recantation for
this
speech because it was a
sin
against
'Epw, 33
the sort
of thing one would
expect
to hear
from
sailors
who
had never
experienced
any higher
love.34
Clearly then,
this
interpretation
of
Epwg
s to be
rejected.
The
more positive
statement of
the nature and function
of the
soul's
'Epwq
in
Socrates'
second speech offers even
stronger
support
for
my
thesis. There the famous
charioteer
image
is
presented; the
soul
is
likened
to a team
of
horses and
a
charioteer.
The black,
ugly,
unmanageable
horse,
it is
usually agreed,
represents
desire, or
entOu[LEo.
he handsome white
horse,
more obedient to the
orders
of
the
charioteer,
represents spirit
(Ouli6q).
The
distinction
between
'Epw; and kn&Ou[Aa.s clear from the outset;
?shOur.ta,
represented by
the black
horse,
is the lowest and
most
unruly faculty
of
the soul, a
constant danger
to its higher functions.
'Epcoq,
however,
is divine
madness
which
pervades
the whole
soul.
Indeed,
one
crucialdifference
between
'Epw~ and
inOuti?M
is
the relation of each to
the
charioteer,
reason.
'En&sL'o.c,he black
horse, resists and
disobeys the
charioteer
whenever possible.35 Ep&o,
on the
contrary,
finds its fulfillment (in
philosophy) only when the charioteer is in proper command. Per-
vading
the
whole
soul,
Epwq
ontains
in
its nature
desire,
spirit,
and
reason. But its fulfillment
requires
that
the
reason
which is
part
of
its
nature exhibit its
presence
and control
over its
?tnLOU[.da
6
This
should
be sufficient to
show that
it is
only when
reason
is
sufficiently
present and
active
in
'Ep&q
hat
'Epw;
can
achieve its
highest mani-
festation,
in
philosophy.
Remembering
that at this
highest mani-
festation, Epcos
s
indeed
a
cpLXEa,
e can
see that this
passage
alsois
consistent
with the
distinction,
however
slight,
between
Epwq
and
tEoc,
a distinction of
which Plato indicates he is
aware at
Phaedrus
255e,
where the
young beloved mistakes
his
feelings
of
Ep&g or
cpLXt.
Thus all the distinctions which
we found
present
in
the
Sym-
posium
are also
present
in
the
Phaedrus;
'Epco, kbrOupdo,
and
cpLtX
are
all
differentiated,
and the
principle
of
differentiation is
the pre-
sence and
degree
of reason.
I wish now to turn briefly to the Republicwhere support is also
present for my view. It
will
be
remembered that one
stage
in
my
88
Ibid.,
242e4.
84
Ibid.,
243c5.
85
Ibid.,
253e,
254a,
254c,
el.
al.
Il
This
is a constant theme
throughout
the
speech.
See
especially
the remark
of
of
Socrates at 256a8.
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argument
from
the Symposium
concerned
the
introduction
of the
term
PoueafxL
which
was to
be
distinguished
from ?UL#OuLCZV
nd
which pointed
the
way to
4p&v.37
The
distinction between
?7rVrLOUZV
and
poUAeaOaL
s indicated
in the Republicat
437b-c,
where Socrates
is
establishing
the
tripartite
division
of the soul.
He
wants
to show
that
desire
(e7tOu[L(a)
s
one of these
parts,
and in so doing says,
What then,
said
I,
of thirst and
hunger
and the desires generally,
and
again
(my italics)
willing
and wishing... (-r[ou'v;
jv
'y6')c
aLt4v
xalJ~
t?lVmV XMt
6X,( e'7r&
OUtL'M
XOcdt5
'r O
XeLv
xaL
'rs
po,a...)
My
point here is
that
by distinguishing
the
desires
(k
e'7vOu[Eoc;)
from
wishing ('r6
PouieaOoc),
indeed emphasizing
the distinction
by
the use of and again (xot oa5),we see that that distinction is held
consistently
in this
dialogue
too.38
Again,
this
by
way
of
support
for
the difference
between 'Epw
and
ehr&u,uL,
Socrates at
438a
is satis-
fying
Glaucon
that
desire, qua
desire,
is only
of its object,
with
no
further qualifications.
He
warnsGlaucon,
'Let no one then,'
said
I,
'disconcert
us when off our guard
with
the
objection
that everybody
desires not drink but good drink
(4g
oC8clg
noTro5
ntLOu Zt
X
Xp ro'roo3)nd not food but good food because all men desire good
(7r6iv'T?
yip
&pa
-r&v
&yaxO&v
n&rOto5atv)
nd so if thirst is
desire
it would
be
of good
drink
or
of
good
whatsoever it
is;
and so similarly
of other desires. '
8
Since
hrrLu.Ltca
s not to
be understood
as discriminating
between
objects
as to their goodness,
it
must surely
be differentiated
from
'Epus
which
in
the Symposium
is
defined
as of the eternal
possession
of the
good. 40
Finally, to point to one of the so-called earlierdialogues, the
Charmides
offers
appropriate
support
for some of
the distinctions
I
have drawn.4
At
Charmides
167e,
Socrates
is concerned
to
call
into
question
the
possibility
that wisdom
should
have
no
subject
matter
of
its own,
but
rather be the science of sciences.
To
repudiate
this,
87
Above, pp. 38-39.
38
On
the other
hand,
see
Republic
439a9,
where Socrates
uses
Po6Xvrau
s
virtual-
ly synonymous
with
kn&Outet,
here
the subtle distinction
between
them is not
important.
39
Translation
is that of
Paul
Shorey.
See also
439a-b.
40
Plato, Symposium,
206a. Notice
that
at Symposium
205a,
Diotima, by way
of correcting
Aristophanes,
asserts that people
will even
cut off a
part
of
them-
selves if they think
it will bring them good.
41
I
wish to thank David
Gallop
for
pointing
out
these
passages
to me.
The
interpretation
of them
presented
here is of course
my
own responsibility.
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he cites
several
parallel
cases
where,
he suspects,
the implausibility
wil
be obvious.
Three of these examples
are especially relevant
to
the present problem,
for they again
indicate a consistent
maintenance
of the
relevant distinctions
on Plato's
part.
Socrates
says
at 167e,
Could there
be
any
desire
(7rt0upAm)
hich
is not the desire of
any
pleasure,
but of itself
and of all other desires? Certainly
not. Or
can
you imagine
a
wish
(Po0X7atq)
which wishes
(Ao6XrcxL)
for no
good,
but
only
for itself
and all
other
wishes? I should
answer no. Or would
you
say that
there is a love
(fpcom)
which
is not the
love of
beauty,
but
of
itself
and
of other loves?
I should
not. '2
We
notice first that
the three terms
are
distinguished, supporting
the thesis
of this
paper.
But the
way
in which
they
are
distinguished,
namely, according to their objects, is also significant. The object of
&vutAa
s
pleasure.
This differentiates it
from
'Epcos
both
in
this
dialogue
and
in
Socrates' speech
in the
Symposiun.
Significantly
enough,
the
object
of
Epcos
s the Charmides
s
beauty (sorxocX6v)
whereas that of
Pou'-aL
is
the good
(ro6
&yaO6v).
n the Symposium
both
Agathon
and the
young
Socrates
begin
with the view that
'Epco;'
object
is the beautiful but
are
corrected
by
Diotima,
who shows
that
'Ept' true object is the good. Perhapswe could say that this transi-
tion
was
prefigured
by the transition
which
I
treated
earlier from
?7mOlutoA
o
'Epco;,
where these two terms
were
mediated,
as
it were,
by ,Bou')CGaO,
hose object,
we learn now
in the Charmides,
s the good.
If
so,
we see again the remarkable
consistency
with
which Plato used
these
important terms.
Still
further,
we see
again
that one
consequence of the
different
objects
of
Oupidcx
nd
Pou'i)Xa
(pleasure
and
the good) is that
PoUA-mLq
equires, over and above the simple desire for the object,
the
deliberative ability wherewith to
assess that
its object
is good,
once
again supporting
the distinction
drawn earlier between
these
two terms.46
Such
is
the evidence
I
wish to put forward
for
the
hierarchical
distinction
between
brLOu,da,
Epus, and
cpara
based on the
degree
and presence
of
reason. Some
of the consequences
of this view
for the
4I
Translation is
that of Jowett.
48
Plato,
Symposium, 205-206a.
44 Above, pp.
38-39.
6
That the object
of
'Epws
also involves this
deliberative ability
is
supported
by
a
general
consideration of
Socrates's speech
in
the Symposium,
but
especially
by the
correction
mentioned above, that
'Epcw
most proper object
is
really the
good.
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Symposium, and in particular for
the important ascent passage ,
I
have already noted.
I
would like to conclude by suggesting a far
more pervasive consequence. If
Plato is indeed suggesting, as I
maintain, that reason is not
merely occasionally interrelated with,
but indeed
part
of the
very
nature of
Epcoq,
s
opposed
to
desire,
then he forces us to reconsiderthe
notion, popular
in
his day as it is
today, that love
is
necessarily and
unambiguously
in
the realm of
the irrational.
By
extension he
forces
us to reconsider
such clear-
cut distinctions in Greek thought as
Nietzsche popularized between
the Dionysian
and
the Apollonian.
Finally by lifting 'Ep&o
from
the
realm of irrational feeling, Plato avoids the rather bizarre conse-
quence that philosophy, which is after all a species of love, would,
while standing
as the
champion
of
rationality,
have its base
in
the
utterly, exclusively,
irrational.
As
Nietzsche
himself
said in Thus
Spoke
Zarathustra:
True,
we
love
life,
not
because we are
used
to
living but because
we
are
used to
loving.
There
is
always
some madness
in love.
But
there is
always
some
reason n
madness. 46
46 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, translated by Walter Kaufmann in The
Portable
Nietzsche,
Viking Press,
New York, page
153.
Trinty
College,Hartford,
Connecticut.