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113. THIRD DIVISION

FILAMER NOT EMPLOYER OF FUNTECHA BECAUSE HE IS A WORKNG STUDENT.

GRANTING HE IS AN EMPLOYEE, FILAMER IS STILL NOT LIABLE BECAUSE HIS ACT OF DRIVINGTHE TRUCK IS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.

ALLAN SHOULD BE THE ONE IMPLEADED AS HE WAS THE EMPLOYER OF FUNTECHA AS OWNEROF PINOYJEEP AND THE LATTER AS DRIVE. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the

wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of eventsleading to the accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan

G.R. No. 75112 October 16, 1990

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,

vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of theRegional Trial Court,. Branch XIV, Roxas City and the late POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., as substituted byhis heirs, namely: LEONA KAPUNAN TIANGCO, CICERO KAPUNAN, JESUS KAPUNAN, SANTIAGOKAPUNAN, POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, JR., PAZ KAPUNAN PUBLICO, SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO andERLINDA KAPUNAN TESORO, respondents.

Aquilina B. Brotarlo for petitioner.

Rhodora G. Kapunan for the Substituted Heirs of the late respondent.

FERNAN, C.J .:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 14 in Civil Case No. V-4222 which found petitioner Filamer Christian Institute and DanielFuntecha negligent and therefore answerable for the resulting injuries caused to private respondent PotencianoKapunan, Sr.

Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), wasstruck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr.was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident,Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.

Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning.Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorizeddriver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought theunconscious victim to the hospital.

Thereafter, Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court of Roxas City for seriousphysical injuries through reckless imprudence. Kapunan, Sr. reserved his right to file an independent civil action.The inferior court found Funtecha guilty as charged and on appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the then Court ofFirst Instance of Capiz. 2

Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages 3 before the RTC of Roxas City.Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, thedirector and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his personal capacity in that he personally authorized andallowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in questiondespite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to drive saidvehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the time of the accident, was notimpleaded as a co-defendant. 4

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On December 14, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be atfault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. Thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the averments in the complaint as supported by preponderance of evidence to be reasonableand justified, and that defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are at fault andnegligent of the acts complained of which causes (sic) injury to plaintiff, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of theplaintiff and against the defendants, namely: Daniel Funtecha and Filamer Christian Institute, the employer whose

liability is primary and direct, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:

(1) to pay the sum of TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS(P2,950.50) as medical expenses (Exh. "A");

(2) to pay TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P241.00) as doctor's fee (Exh. "C");

(3) to pay THREE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P390.00) as additional expenses incurred forthirty-nine days at P10.00 a day, for remuneration of plaintiff's helper while recuperating;

(4) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation expenses;

(5) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as loss of earnings capacity;

(6) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages;

(7) to pay FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) as attorney's fees;

(8) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)as insurance indemnity on the policycontract;

and without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to demand from co-defendant Daniel Funtecha part-time employee and/or Allan Masa a full time employeereimbursement of the damages paid to herein plaintiff.

The defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian Institute has also failed to

exercise the diligence required of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employee AllanMasa, being his son. However, the court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personalliability with respect to the complaint filed against him in his personal and private capacity, cause hewas not in the vehicle during the alleged incident.

For failure to prove their respective counterclaims filed by the defendant Daniel Funtecha, Dr.Agustin Masa, and Filamer Christian Institute, as against the herein plaintiff, same are herebydismissed.

The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to prove that there was apolicy violation made by the defendant Filamer Christian Institute which absolves them from liabilityunder the aforesaid insurance policy. The record shows that the defendant Daniel Funtecha whiledriving the said vehicle was having a student drivers license marked Exh. "1" and accompanied by

Allan Masa who is the authorized driver of said vehicle with a professional drivers license as shown

by Exh. "3".

This Court finds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle is considered asauthorized driver in accordance with the policy in question marked Exh. "2-Masa and FCI".

Finding the averments in the third party complaint filed by defendant Filamer Christian Institute assupported by preponderance of evidence as shown by their exhibits to be reasonable and justified,

judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the said defendant and third party plaintiff Filamer ChristianInstitute as against third party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation.

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The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant is hereby ordered to pay in favor of thedefendant and third party plaintiff, Filamer Christian Institute, the following:

(1) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as third party liability asprovided in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy (Exh. "2");

(2) to pay TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)as moral damages;

(3) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation and actualexpenses;

(4) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as attorney's fees;

The defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and thirdparty defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation are hereby ordered jointlyand severally, to pay the costs of the suit. 5

Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court's judgmentto the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court's decision became final as to Funtecha. For failure of

the insurance firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17, 1985,the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court's decision in toto.6 Hence the presentrecourse by petitioner Filamer.

It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on theground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them. We agree.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existingcontractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisionsof this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts oromissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by theiremployees and householdhelpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged inany business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned provethat they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasissupplied).

The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitionerFilamer with reference to Funtecha.

In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7specifically Section 14, RuleX of Book III which reads:

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Sec. 14. Working scholars. There is no employer-employee relationship between students onthe one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the latterin exchange for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students are given realopportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen courtunder such arrangement. (Emphasis supplied).

It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's

employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange forfree tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean theschool passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admittedby Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll. 8

The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To dismiss the implementing ruleas one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there isalready a third person involved, as espoused by private respondents, is to read into the law something that was notlegislated there in the first place. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to e liminate an erstwhile gray areain labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to thelearning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education.

But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for hiswrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been

satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was tosweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy

jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting inmultiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the timeof the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but forsome purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence.Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.

Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured party underArticle 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the authorized driver ofthe Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the wheels ofthe vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to the accident resultingin injuries to Kapunan, Sr. But under the present set of circumstances, even if the trial court did find Allan guilty ofnegligence, such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It must be recalled that Allan was never impleaded in the

complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's judgment is concerned. It isaxiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. 9

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. The

complaint for damages 10is ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer Christian Institute for lack of cause ofaction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.