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The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component processmodelKlaus R. Scherer a

a Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

To cite this Article Scherer, Klaus R.'The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for the component process model',Cognition & Emotion, 23: 7, 1307 — 1351To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/02699930902928969URL:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699930902928969

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8/18/2019 2009 Scherer C&E


The dynamic architecture of emotion: Evidence for thecomponent process model

Klaus R. SchererSwiss Centre for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

Emotion is conceptualised as an emergent, dynamic process based on an

individual’s subjective appraisal of significant events. It is argued that theoreticalmodels of emotion need to propose an architecture that reflects the essential natureand functions of emotion as a psychobiological and cultural adaptation mechan-ism. One proposal for such a model and its underlying dynamic architecture, thecomponent process model , is briefly sketched and compared with some of its majorcompetitors. Recent empirical evidence in support of the model is reviewed. Specialemphasis is given to the dynamic aspect of emotion processes, in particular thesequence of appraisal checks and the synchronisation of response systems, as wellas the capacity of the model to predict individual differences in emotionalresponding.

Keywords: Emotion theories; Component processes; Appraisal; Responsesynchronization; Emotion categories and words.

Although there is now increasing consensus on a componential approach toemotion and the need to consider appraisal as one of the central underlyingmechanisms (Frijda, 2007a, 2007b; Scherer, 2005b), four central designfeatures of emotions often receive little more than lip service and continue tobe seriously under researched: (i) the dynamic, recursive nature of emotionalprocessing; (ii) the central, and causal, role of multilevel cognitive processingof both antecedent events and response options; (iii) the importantdistinction between the emotion episode as a multicomponent process as awhole and one of its components: subjective feeling or conscious emotionalexperience; and (iv) the essential role of individual differences in both

Correspondence should be addressed to: Klaus R. Scherer, Swiss Centre for AffectiveSciences, University of Geneva, 7, Rue des Battoirs, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland. E-mail:[email protected]

Preparation of this paper was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation throughthe National Center for Competence in Research in the Affective Sciences grant.

The author acknowledges precious comments and suggestions by Tatjana Aue, GeraldineCoppin, Didier Grandjean, and Sylvia Kreibig.

COGNITION AND EMOTION2009, 23 (7), 1307 1351

# 2009 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa businesswww.psypress.com/cogemotion DOI: 10.1080/02699930902928969

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cognitive event appraisal and response dispositions. In recent years, it hasbeen mostly the protagonists of appraisal theories (Ellsworth & Scherer,2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001; Scherer, 1999a; Schorr, 2001) who haveattempted to model these design features in a principled fashion. One of thetheoretical models in that tradition, the component process model (CPM) of emotion, specifically focuses on the dynamic unfolding of emotion (Scherer,1984a, 1984b, 1986, 2001, 2004). This contribution aims to demonstrate theutility of this model for our understanding of individual differences inemotion components and dynamics and to review the empirical evidencethat has accumulated over the years in support of the model ’s predictions.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CPMFigure 1 shows the architecture of the model, including the dynamic,recursive emotion processes following an event that is highly pertinent to theneeds, goals, and values of an individual. An important feature of the modelis that it does not include overt instrumental behaviour. In line with thedominant functional or adaptational approach pioneered by Darwin (1872/1998), emotion is seen as a reaction to significant events that prepares actionreadiness and different types of alternative, possibly conflicting, action

tendencies but not as a sufficient cause for their execution (see also Frijda,2007b). The assumption is that even highly emotional behaviours such asaggression or flight are prepared by emotions such as anger or fear but thattheir execution is multiply determined , with emotion being only one, albeitpotentially important, factor.

As shown in the flow diagram, the CPM suggests that the event and itsconsequences are appraised with a set of criteria on multiple levels of processing (the appraisal component). The result of the appraisal willgenerally have a motivational effect, often changing or modifying the

Figure 1. The dynamic architecture of the component process model.

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motivational state before the occurrence of the event. Based on the appraisalresults and the concomitant motivational changes, efferent effects will occurin the autonomic nervous system (e.g., in the form of cardiovascular andrespiratory changes) and in the somatic nervous system (in the form of motor expression in face, voice, and body). All of these components,appraisal results, action tendencies, somatovisceral changes, and motorexpressions are centrally represented and constantly fused in a multimodalintegration area (with continuous updating as events and appraisals change).Parts of this central integrated representation may then become consciousand subject to assignment to fuzzy emotion categories as well as beinglabelled with emotion words, expressions, or metaphors.

As recent descriptions of the model can be found elsewhere (Scherer,

2001, 2004, 2005a), in the following section only those elements directlyrelevant to the focus on individual differences and dynamic unfolding of emotion processes are discussed in detail. To aid the comprehension of thereader and to allow interpretation of some of the figures, Table 1synthetically recapitulates some of the central elements of the CPM. Asshown in the table, the model suggests that there are four major appraisalobjectives to adaptively react to a salient event: (a) How relevant is this eventfor me? Does it directly affect me or my social reference group? (relevance);(b) What are the implications or consequences of this event and how do they

affect my well-being and my immediate or long-term goals? (implications);(c) How well can I cope with or adjust to these consequences? (copingpotential); (d) What is the significance of this event for my self-concept andfor social norms and values? (normative significance). To attain theseobjectives, the organism evaluates the event and its consequences on anumber of criteria or stimulus evaluation checks (SECs; shown in column 1 of Table 1), with the results reflecting the organism ’s subjective assessment(which may well be unrealistic or biased) of consequences and implicationson a background of personal needs, goals, and values (see Ellsworth &Scherer, 2003; Sander, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2005; Scherer, 2001, for furtherdetails and references).

It is important to note that the appraisal process does not necessarilyrequire a complex cognitive calculus but often occurs in an automatic,unconscious, and effortless fashion. A powerful example is the appraisalprocess underlying emotional attention. Recent research using functionalbrain imaging in human subjects has revealed low-level neural substrates bywhich sensory processing and attention can be modulated by the affectivesignificance of stimuli. The amygdala plays a crucial role in providing bothdirect and indirect top-down signals on auditory and visual sensorypathways, which can influence the representation of emotional events,especially when related to threat (Grandjean et al., 2005; Pourtois, Grand- jean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; Vuilleumier, 2005).

DYNAMIC ARCHITECTURE OF EMOTION 1309

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TABLE 1Synthetic recapitulation of central elements of the component process model (CPM) of em

Stimulus Evaluation Checks(SECs)

Organismic/Social functions Component patterning

Relevance (A stimulus event is considered as requiring attention deployment, further information processing, and pot

Novelty (Abrupt onset,familiarity, predictability)Goal relevance (Does theevent have consequences formy needs or goals?)

Novel and goal relevant :Orienting, Focusing/Alerting

Orienting response; EEG alpha changes, moduldeceleration, vasomotor contraction, increased sdilatation, local muscle tonus changes; brows andinterruption of speech and action, raising head (subsequent effort investment given relevance apincreased cardiac contractility as indicated by, e

Intrinsic pleasantness (Is theevent intrinsically pleasant orunpleasant, independently of my current motivationalstate?)

Pleasant :Incorporation/Recommending

Sensitisation; inhalation, heart rate deceleration, open mouth and nostrils, lips part and corners pupharyngeal expansion, vocal tract shortened andvoice ’’ * increase in low frequency energy, F1 fcentripetal hand and arm movements, expanding

Unpleasant :Rejection/Warning

Defence response, heart rate acceleration, increasalivation, pupillary constriction; slight muscle ttightening, eye closing, nose wrinkling, upper liplip press, nostril compression, tongue thrust, gazconstriction, vocal tract shortened and tensing of frequency energy, F1 rising, F2 and F3 falling, nanasality, resonances raised); centrifugal hand anorifices, shrinking posture, avoidance locomotion

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TABLE 1 (Continued )



Implications (Following attention deployment, the pertinent characteristics of the stimulus event and its implications odetermined)

Outcome probability (Howlikely is it that theconsequences will occur?)

Discrepancy from expectation(How different is the situationfrom what I expected it to be?)Conduciveness (Is the event

conducive or obstructive toreaching my goals?)

Conducive : Relaxation/

Stability

Trophotropic shift, rest and recovery; decrease in

decrease, bronchial constriction, increase in gastsphincters; decrease in general muscle tone; relarelaxation of vocal apparatus ( ‘‘relaxed voicemoderate amplitude, balanced resonance with slicomfort and rest positions; plus elements from pconduciveness appraisal is accompanied by plansto be expected)

Obstructive : Activation/Reactivity

Ergotropic shift, preparation for action; corticostadrenaline secretion; deeper and faster respirationvolume, vasoconstriction in skin, gastrointestinal in heart and striped musculature, increase of glu

decreased gastrointestinal motility, sphincter conttion of m. arrectores pilorum, decrease of glandconductance level, pupillary dilatation strongly itighten, lips tighten, chin raising; gaze directed; ovoice ’’ * F0 and amplitude increase, jitter and shenergy, narrow F1 bandwidth, pronounced formantask-dependent instrumental actions; plus elemen

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TABLE 1 (Continued )



Control possible/Low power :Protection/Submission

Extreme ergotropic dominance; faster and more heart rate and heart stroke volume, increase in spressure, increase in pulse volume amplitude, vaskin temperature), gastrointestinal tract, and sexstriped musculature, decreased gastrointestinal mbronchial relaxation, contraction of m. arrectoressecretion, secretion of sweat (increase in skin comuscular hypertonus, particularly in locomotor amouth stretch and corner retraction, switching betregister phonation ( ‘‘thin voice ’’ * raised F0, wenergy); protective hand/arm movements, fast lo

Adjustment (If control isimpossible, how well can Iadjust to the consequences?)Normative significance (Overall assessment of the event with respect to compatibility with self-concept, values, soci

Compatibility with internal and external standards (Doesthe event or my behaviourcorrespond to (a) my self-concept or my values, is it just given my entitlement; (b)

social norms, values, beliefsabout justice, or moralprinciples

Requirements met orsurpassed :Relaxation, Bolsteringself-esteem, Normconfirmation

Ergotropic shift plus elements of pleasantness an

Incompatible : Activation,Self-consciousness,Highlighting norms

Ergotropic shift plus elements of unpleasantnessblood flow to face, blushing; body movements: acontact)

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All of the appraisal criteria can be processed at different levels of processing such as (a) a low-level neural circuit as described above, in whichthe checking mechanisms are mostly genetically determined and the criteriaconsist of appropriate templates for pattern matching and similar mechan-isms (cf. the notion of ‘‘biological preparedness ’’, e.g., for snakes, O¨ hman,1986; or baby faces, Brosch, Sander, & Scherer, 2007); (b) a schematic level,based on memory traces from social learning processes and occurring in afairly automatic, unconscious fashion; (c) an association level, involvingvarious cortical association areas, which may occur automatically andunconsciously or in a deliberate, conscious fashion, and (d) the conceptuallevel, involving propositional knowledge, and underlying cultural meaningsystems, requiring consciousness and effortful calculations in prefrontal

cortical areas. The different levels continuously interact, producing top-down and bottom-up effects (see Leventhal & Scherer, 1987; Power &Dalgleish, 1997; Scherer, 2005a; van Reekum & Scherer, 1997).

The appraisal mechanism requires interaction between many cognitivefunctions and their underlying neural circuits to compare the features of stimulus events to stored schemata, representations in memory and self-concept, and expectations and motivational urges of high priority. Inaddition, this process controls attention deployment and relies heavily onimplicit or explicit computation of probabilities of consequences, coping

potential, and action alternatives. As shown in Figure 2, the architectureassumes bidirectional influences between appraisal and various cognitivefunctions. For example, minimal attention needs to be given for appraisal tostart, but a relevance outcome will immediately deploy further attention tothe stimulus. Stimulus features are compared with schemata in memory butstrongly relevant stimulus features will, following appropriate appraisal, bestored as emotional schemata in memory. Event consequences are comparedwith current motivational states, but particular appraisal outcomes willchange motivation and produce adaptive action tendencies. These bidirec-tional effects between appraisal and other cognitive functions are illustratedby the arrows in the upper part of Figure 2.

As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the fundamental assumption of the CPM isthat the appraisal results drive the response patterning in other componentsby triggering efferent outputs designed to produce adaptive reactions thatare in line with the current appraisal results (often mediated by motivationalchanges). Thus, emotion differentiation is the result of the net effect of allsubsystem changes brought about by the outcome profile of the SECsequence. These subsystem changes are theoretically predicted on the basisof a componential patterning model , which assumes that the differentorganismic subsystems are highly interdependent and that changes in onesubsystem will tend to elicit related changes in other subsystems. Asillustrated in Figure 2, this process, similar to appraisal, is highly recursive,

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How does the CPM, via the mechanism described above, predict specificemotions? Contrary to basic emotion theories (see Scherer, 2009; Scherer &Ellgring, 2007, for reviews), the CPM does not assume the existence of alimited set of discrete emotions or affect programmes, but considers thepossibility of an infinite number of different types of emotion episode. Asshown below, the beginning of an emotion episode is defined by thesynchronisation or coherence of organismic subsystems beyond a certainthreshold and its end by the coherence dropping below threshold. Thenature of the emotion episode is exclusively determined by the pattern of appraisal results and the specific patterning over time driven by therecursively generated appraisal results (see Scherer, 2004). This is why Ihave suggested (ever since the first full presentation of the CPM; Scherer,1984a, p. 311) that the ‘‘kaleidoscopic ’’ arrangement of appraisal results cangenerate many different kinds of emotion processes without clear categoricalboundaries. However, in that chapter I also suggested the existence of certainmodal outcomes that occur more frequently due to event contingencies andpsychobiological prewiring. Prime candidates for such frequent andimportant contingencies are major patterns of adaptation in the life of animate organisms that reflect frequently recurring patterns of environ-mental evaluation and adaptation (see also Ortony & Turner, 1990; Plutchik,1980). I have suggested using the term modal emotions for emotion episodesresulting from predominant SEC outcomes that are due to generalconditions of life, constraints of social organisation, and similarity of innateequipment (Scherer, 1984a, 1994). These modal emotions are predicted bythe CPM on the basis of prototypical appraisal profiles, e.g., modal angeroften occurring as a result of an appraisal profile that includes novelty, highgoal relevance, other agent and intent, high outcome probability, dissonantexpectations, goal obstructiveness, high urgency, high control and power, aswell as injustice or immorality. In contrast, the fear profile, while similar

with respect to relevance and obstructiveness, is characterised by low controland low power appraisals. The detailed CPM predictions are shown in Table5.4 in Scherer (2001).

The elements of the model described so far are highly comparable toother appraisal theories, although some of the labels for particular appraisalcriteria and details of the assumed mechanisms may vary (see Ellsworth &Scherer, 2003; Roseman & Smith, 2001). However, the CPM differs fromother appraisal theories with respect to two aspects, which are of centralimportance to our focus on individual differences and the temporal

dynamics of emotional processes * the sequence assumption and the notionof integration and synchronisation of components, including, in particular,the experiential feeling component.

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Sequential processing of appraisal checks

As shown in Figure 2, the CPM claims that the SECs are processed in

sequence, following a fixed order, consisting of four stages in the appraisalprocess that corresponds to the appraisal objectives described above. Thissequence assumption is justified in terms of systems economy and logicaldependencies * the results of the earlier SECs need to be processed beforelater SECs can operate successfully, that is, yield a conclusive result.Expensive information processing should occur for only those stimuli thatare considered relevant for the organism. In consequence, relevancedetection is considered to be a first selective filter that a stimulus or eventneeds to pass to merit further processing. Extensive further processing and

preparation of behavioural reactions are indicated only if the event concernsa goal or need of major importance or when a salient discrepancy with anexpected state is detected, suggesting that the implications for the organismare assessed next in the sequence. Further, the causes and implications of theevent need to be established before the organism ’s coping potential can beconclusively determined, as the latter must be evaluated for a specificsituational demand structure.

I have suggested that the microgenetic unfolding of the emotion

antecedent appraisal processes parallels both phylogenetic and ontogeneticdevelopment in the differentiation of emotions. The earlier SECs, particu-larly the novelty and the intrinsic pleasantness checks, are present in mostanimals, including newborn humans, and one can argue that these low-levelprocessing mechanisms take precedence as part of our hard-wired detectioncapacities and occur rapidly after a stimulus event occurs. More complexevaluation mechanisms are successively developed at more advanced levelsof phylogenetic and ontogenetic development: Natural selection operatestoward more sophisticated information processing ability in phylogenesis,and maturation and learning increase the individual ’s cognitive capacity inontogenesis (see Scherer, 1984b, pp. 313 314; Scherer, Zentner, & Stern,2004b).

This sequence assumption is often criticised as being overly restrictive andinconsistent with the idea that massively parallel processing of informationoccurs in different systems. This criticism overlooks the CPM ’s postulatethat external or internal event changes maintain a recursive appraisal processuntil the monitoring subsystem signals termination of or adjustment to thestimulation that originally elicited the appraisal episode. Thus, the checkingprocess repeats the sequence continuously, constantly updating the appraisalresults that change rapidly with changing events and evolving evaluation.The level of processing can be expected to move up during this sequentialcourse, given both the nature of the computation and the likelihood thatlower levels have been unable to settle the issue. The normative significance


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of the event, that is its consequences for the self and its normative or moralstatus, is expected to be appraised last, as it requires comprehensiveinformation about the event and comparison with high-level propositionalrepresentation.

The proposed mechanism is highly compatible with the assumption of parallel processing as all SECs are expected to be processed simultaneously,starting with relevance detection. It should be noted that the essentialcriterion for the sequence assumption is not the occurrence of the event andthe start of the specific appraisal process but the time at which a particularcheck achieves preliminary closure , that is yields a result that warrantsefferent commands to response modalities, as shown by the descendingarrows in Figure 2 (see Scherer, 2004, for details). In this way the assumption

of continuously parallel processing is entirely compatible with the notion of a sequence of primary outcomes . The sequence theory postulates that, for thereasons outlined earlier, the result of a prior processing step (or check) mustbe in before the consecutive step (or check) can produce a conclusive resultwith efferent consequences. It is indeed feasible to assume that the results of parallel processes for different evaluation criteria will be available at differenttimes, given differential depth of processing.

Integration and central representation of components

The CPM assigns a special status to the feeling component in the emotionprocess, which should not be confused with the complete componentialpackage of emotion (see Scherer, 2005b), as it monitors and regulates thecomponent process and enables the individual to communicate its emotionalexperience to others. Subjective experience needs to integrate and centrallyrepresent all information about the continuous patterns of change and theircoherence in all other components , especially if it is to serve a monitoringfunction. Thus, feeling is an extraordinarily complex conglomerate of information from different systems. Scherer (2004) has presented a CPMaccount of how feelings integrate the central representation of appraisal-driven response organisation in emotion. This proposal is briefly summarisedin this section.

Psychologists generally assume that feelings are conscious phenomenaand that the only way to access and measure feelings is via verbal report (butsee Lacewing, 2007). However, this widespread assumption holds only forthe visible tip of a huge iceberg. The CPM (Scherer, 2004, 2005a)conceptualises the problem, as shown in Figure 3, with a Venn diagram inwhich a set of overlapping circles represents the different aspects of feeling.The first circle (A) represents the sheer reflection or representation of changes in all synchronised components in some form of monitoringstructure in the central nervous system (CNS), which receives massive

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projections from both cortical and subcortical CNS structures (includingproprioceptive feedback from the periphery). To my knowledge, there iscurrently neither an established technical term nor a precise definition forthis type of integrated unconscious representation. Clearly, to stand outfrom the stream of booming, buzzing neural activation, an organisingprinciple must be at work. Given my emphasis on dynamic synchronisation,I suggest that this principle might correspond to coherence spreading . Thismechanism has been described for sensory perception (Henkel, 2000) as ahighly nonlinear selection operation between independently operatingdisparity units that is achieved quickly and reliably by neural hardware.Coherence spreading is robust because only the data available within thecoherent cluster are fed forward to later processing stages, and only the tinycoherent portion of the neural information streams is transmitted for furtheranalysis. Although several neural realisations of this process may be possible,the simplest and most common would rely on the synchronisation propertiesof pools of neural oscillators (for example, the phase at low frequencies insubcortical regions may tune the rhythms of high-frequency bursts related tocortical activities). If this mechanism works for exogenous perception, it mayvery well do the job for endogenous interoception. In consequence, I suggestthat the content of circle A be called a neural coherence cluster .

The second circle (B), which only partially overlaps with the first,represents that part of the integrated central representation that becomesconscious. This circle corresponds most directly to what is more generallycalled ‘‘feelings ’’ or qualia . I have suggested that the degree of synchronisa-tion of the components (which might in turn be determined by the

Figure 3. The re ection of component emotion processes in a monitor system, circle A, theemergence of consciousness, circle B, and categorisation and verbalisation, circle C (reproduced withpermission from Scherer, 2004). To view this gure in colour, please visit the online version of thisissue.


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pertinence of the event as appraised by the organism) generates awareness(Scherer, 2005a; see also Grandjean, Sander, & Scherer, 2008).

This suggested architecture depends in large part on the processes of synchronisation and integration within and between components (Grand- jean et al., 2008). Within-component integration is required becausedifferent structures and processes interact in a complex fashion duringemotion episodes. Thus, information integration within the cognitivecomponent is required, given the parallel and sequential processing fordifferent evaluation criteria on different levels. As shown in Figure 3, theproprioceptive (both intero- and exteroceptive) feedback information fromdifferent response components (such as vocal and facial expression orpsychophysiological changes) is integrated with the representation of theappraisal results to yield a neural coherence cluster. I suggest that the veryprocess of multicomponent integration and synchronisation constitutes thecritical defining feature of emotion episodes . In trying to understandintegration at different points in the emotion episode and the rules likelyto underlie this process, the key issue concerns the relative weight given tothe different components * appraisal, physiological responses, motor expres-sion, motivation, and action tendencies. Research to examine the nature of this multimodal integration has hardly started. Although there is renewedinterest in interoception and its neural basis (Craig, 2002; Wiens, 2005), fewattempts have been made to examine how the peripheral representation isintegrated with the representation of other subsystems.

An important feature of emotion processes is that they are alsodynamically integrated over time. The term ‘‘emotional state ’’ is misleading,as it suggests a static, unitary phenomenon rather than a flow of continuously changing component states that constitute emotion episodes.Although humans can focus on micro-momentary changes of feeling, wetend to become aware of our feelings in experiential chunks that providephenomenal unity to a particular feeling quality or quale . Temporalintegration, in the sense of experiential chunking, is most likely determinedby the period during which a certain level of component synchronisationpersists.

Contrary to discrete or basic emotion theories (Ekman, 1984, 1992; Izard,1977, 1993; Tomkins, 1984), the CPM does not share the assumption of alimited number of innate, hard-wired affect programmes * even for basicemotions such as anger, fear, joy, sadness, and disgust. Rather, as shownabove, the emotion process is considered as a continuously fluctuatingpattern of change in several organismic subsystems that become integratedinto coherence clusters and thus yields an extraordinarily large number of different emotional qualities, virtually as many as there are differentintegrations of appraisal results and consequent response patterns (Scherer,

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1984b, 2001). In consequence, there should be an almost unlimited numberof qualia.

Before proceeding, it may be useful to examine this concept in greaterdetail, as it defines the content of circle B. Lewis (1929) pioneered the use of the term ‘‘qualia ’’ in its generally agreed modern sense as follows:

There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated indifferent experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these qualia. Butalthough such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one toanother experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. . . .The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible errorbecause it is purely subjective. (p. 121; see also Metzinger, 2004)

Dennett (1988) has identified four properties that are commonly ascribedto qualia: (i) ineffable (cannot be communicated or apprehended by anymeans other than direct experience); (ii) intrinsic (nonrelational properties,which do not change depending on the experience ’s relation to other things);(iii) private (interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically im-possible); and (iv) directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness (toexperience a quale is to know one experiences a quale and to know all thereis to know about that quale). Although there is a lot of philosophical debateabout the concept, and despite Dennett ’s (2001) warning about thefunctional use of the term qualia in neuroscience, I feel that its considereduse is preferable to the complete absence of an appropriate term for whatTolman (1935) meant by immediate experience or ‘‘raw feels ’’ (see also Kirk,1996). I feel that it fits the conscious representation of an integratedmultimodal coherence cluster as personal, subjective experience of anemotion episode rather well. It is particularly important to insist on Lewis ’description of qualia as universals being stable over experiences of a similartype and thus memorisable and recognisable.

In consequence, it is the qualia that constitute the core of affectiveexperience, the most fundamental, raw, untouched (in the sense of furtherprocessing) representation of the underlying appraisal and consequentresponse processes. This is very different from Russell ’s (2003, and 2009this issue) notion of ‘‘core affect ’’, which is defined as a single point in a two-dimensional valence arousal space. Qualia, in contrast, are seen as centralrepresentations of integrated multimodal coherence clusters and thus theirformation should in principle be predictable, observable, and explainable *

although researchers currently lack the required theoretical modelling toolsas well as the appropriate methodology. Qualia are reflections of complexmultidimensional feature spaces; which, like any other high-dimensionaldata set, can be projected into lower-dimensional space (see below; Scherer,2005b).


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Categorisation and verbalisation of feeling

Although a richly textured conscious feeling that fits the situation a person

experiences like a glove is highly functional for fine-tuned adaptation andregulation, it is less well suited for cognitive manipulation, memorisation, orcommunication. Of course the same is true for all perception, which is whycategorisation plays such a major role in all of cognitive processing.

How can one envisage feeling categorisation on the basis of thecomponent process architecture? Rosch (1973) proposed two generalprinciples for the formation of categories that have been widely accepted:(i) cognitive economy, reducing the infinite differences among stimuli tobehaviourally and cognitively manageable scope; and (ii) reflection of

perceived structures and regularities in the world. In addition, Roschproposed a distinction between vertical (inclusiveness of a category) andhorizontal (differentiation of categories at any one layer) levels of categorisation. Finally, she proposed that the use of prototypes , containingthe most representative attributes inside a category, will increase theflexibility and distinctiveness of categories along the horizontal dimension.Shaver and his collaborators (Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O ’Connor, 1987)have shown the utility of this approach for understanding the emotionvocabulary, distinguishing between superordinate (positive, negative emo-tions), basic (joy, anger, sadness), and subordinate (irritation, rage) categorylevels. But categorisation clearly occurs before verbalisation, and numerouspreverbal categories for emotional feelings are to be expected. In fact, theseprelinguistic groupings form the basis for the acquisition of concepts andwords in very young children (e.g., Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007;Hirschfeld, 2001). In each of these cases, the perception of some regularityin the differences between objects or actions seems to be involved. Onewould imagine that the same is true for the formation of prelinguisticemotion categories. Individuals would need to perceive some regularity inthe differential patterning of different emotional experiences in order toform such preverbal qualia categories.

Not only on the ontogenetic level, but equally so at the microgenetic level,prelinguistic categories must precede verbalisation (if only to reduce thecandidate sets of words for which the semantic features need to be checkedagainst felt experience), and one needs to pose the question of the processesthat have led to the formation of such preverbal emotion categories. Mostlikely, the lowest level of inclusiveness is that of the preverbal qualia, asthey represent qualitative types of experiences that can be recognised andremembered. This level can be expected to be idiosyncratic and fuzzy.Using Rosch ’s principles, one would expect that more inclusive categories areformed through a constraint satisfaction procedure between cognitive economyoptimisation and the practical importance of certain structures and regularities

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encountered during emotion episodes. It is thus of primary importance for anunderstanding of qualia categorisation to identify these structures andregularities. Even though the content of the qualia is likely to consist of anintegrated representation of the individual components, one might imaginethat some components, especially those that best differentiate types of qualia,are more important than others in determining categorisation.

One candidate for determining category formation is somatovisceralfeedback, which adherents of a peripheralist tradition founded by Jamesand Lange (Mandler, 1975; Schachter & Singer, 1962) tend to emphasise(Barrett, 2006, uses the term ‘‘embodied ’’ categories). While somatovisceralfeedback is certainly one of the determinants of categorisation, an exagger-ated emphasis on this factor, to the exclusion of other factors, may prove to be

an impediment in trying to understand the process. The reason is that certaintypes of physiological activation occur in a similar form in several emotions(e.g., increase in heart rate and muscle tension) because sympatheticactivation serves urgent action preparation, a feature shared by severalemotions. In consequence, it seems unlikely that this modality is the onlydeterminant of category formation (as many critics of the James/Langeposition, have argued over the last century). The ‘‘perception of bodilychanges ’’ may well add colour to the emotional experience (as James, 1890,argued), for example, concerning the intensity and vividness of the feeling, but

it is unlikely to account for the bulk of differentiation and categorisation of feelings. One can reasonably argue that appraisal configurations (Scherer,1997a, 2001), core relational themes (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1993),or action tendencies (Frijda, 1986, 1987) are more promising candidates.

Thus, I assume that qualia representing integrated appraisal configura-tions and action tendencies (probably including the accompanying somato-visceral response patterns as part of the integrated package), which occurrelatively frequently and are of central importance to the individual ’s well-being, the modal emotions described earlier, will serve as the basis forcategorisation of qualia clusters into more inclusive categories on Rosch ’svertical dimension. As suggested early on (Scherer, 1984a, p. 311), I believethat it is those modal categories that are generally labelled with a single wordor a brief expression in most languages of the world and that the availabilityof such linguistic labels imposes a large degree of separateness anddiscreteness to particular types of experiences. I also think that thesecategories correspond to both the subordinate and basic levels of categor-isation in Shaver ’s system.

I now turn to the issue of the labelling of one ’s preverbal feelings and theircommunication. This process is one of the most neglected and least wellunderstood components of emotion research. Presumably, the same experi-ential chunks that form the coherence clusters described earlier serve as thebasis for verbalisation. Again, the partial overlap of circle C in Figure 3


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indicates that the use of linguistic labels or expressions to describe theconscious part of feeling rarely covers the complete conscious experience,which may be due to the lack of appropriate verbal concepts or strategiccommunication intentions. On the other hand, the implications of the chosenverbal description may go beyond the content of the emotional experience, asthe denotation and connotation of the concepts used in the verbalisation mayadd surplus meaning (or even modify the meaning to some extent). In anycase, verbal report always relies on language and thus on the semantic fields of emotion words or metaphors to express conscious experience. The extra-ordinarily rich texture of the qualia concerned is likely to be expressed to onlya small degree. Apart from capacity constraints (the constantly changingstream of conscious content cannot be appropriately represented by a discrete

utterance), the available words and expressions in a language constrain thepotential complexity of differentiation, despite the fact that most languagesoffer a choice of several hundred emotion terms. Given strong individualdifferences in category width and verbal ability (including alexithymia), thisindeterminacy may account for much of the variance in emotion reports. Aninteresting question is whether the act of categorisation that is implied byverbal labelling, which will undoubtedly affect the representation of theemotional experience, may impoverish the rich qualia experience and mould itinto socioculturally determined schemata.

Another interesting question concerns the labelling mechanism. Does theintegrated central representation described earlier first activate a preverbalcategory that can then be verbally labelled if so desired? Or does theindividual check the semantic features of emotion words and expressionsagainst the centrally represented experience if the need arises? Of course,languages differ somewhat with respect to emotion vocabulary, and it is thusimperative to better understand the nature and origin of the differencesbetween the semantic fields of emotion terms in different languages acrossthe world. Together with a large group of international collaborators, I havestarted to examine this issue with the help of the GRID approach (askingnative speakers to evaluate a standard set of emotion terms on a featurevector of 144 items representing all components of emotion; Scherer, 2005b).Currently, data for about 30 languages have been collected. First resultssuggest that four dimensions are necessary to define the affective space ontowhich the meaning of major individual emotion terms can be projected *

valence, power/control, arousal, and unpredictability, in this order(Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, & Ellsworth, 2007).

Individual differences and regulationApart from its emphasis on components and dynamic unfolding of emotion,the CPM has, like all appraisal theories, the advantage of being particularly

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useful for the conceptualisation and prediction of individual differences inemotional reactions * even in cases in which the eliciting event is objectivelythe same. Take baggage loss in the airport, for example. One might thinkthat this event would produce the same emotion in all passengers concernedby such a loss. But this is not the case. In a study of 109 airline passengerswaiting in vain for their baggage to materialise (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997), wefound that there were virtually no two passengers who reported feelingexactly the same ‘‘pure ’’ emotion. Rather, all of them reported variousmixtures or blends of several different emotions. When we systematicallyquestioned these passengers about their appraisals of the event (usingquestions based on the CPM checks), we could show that specific appraisalresults and predicted response types clustered closely together in three-dimensional space (see Figure 6 in Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). In analysing thevideotaped interaction between the passengers and the airline agentsprocessing their claims, we could also show that certain types of appraisaldifferentiate the occurrence of true (Duchenne) smiles or false smiles,demonstrating that the predictive validity of appraisal goes beyond verbalreport (Scherer & Ceschi, 2000).

Similarly, in a series of experiments Kuppens and his collaborators havedemonstrated that anger can occur in combination with different patterns of appraisals, varying as a function of situation but also person characteristics.Thus, while for some individuals frustration is sufficient for becomingangered, for others, the thwarting has to be appraised as norm violation aswell as unfair and deliberate in order for them to experience anger (Kuppens,Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007).

TABLE 2Voice type predictions for specific types of affect disorders (reproduced from

Scherer, 1987)

Vocal tract

Pharynx setting Tension Register

Euphoria Wide Medium tense Slightly fullMania Wide Extremely tense Extremely fullAnhedonia Very narrow Slightly tense NeutralHelplessness Narrow Lax ThinAnxiety disorder Narrow Medium/high tense ThinAgitated fear Narrow Extremely tense Very thinChronic frustration Narrow Medium tense Medium full

Indifference, apathy Neutral Slightly NeutralShame, guilt Narrow Slightly tense Thin

Note : For the discussion of voice types , see column 3 in Table 1.


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These examples show the utility of appraisal theories, and thus of theCPM, to model and predict individual differences. In particular, thesetheories predict that emotions are elicited entirely on the basis of anindividual ’s subjective evaluations of the event and his or her role in it ratherthan its ‘‘objective ’’ characteristics * given that the latter may be perceiveddifferently and evaluated on the basis of the individual ’s goals and values aswell as on his or her coping potential. In consequence, as the baggage-lossexample shows, if one knows the results of an individual ’s event appraisal onthe major checks, one can approximately predict (see Table 5.4 in Scherer,2001) what kind of emotion he or she will most likely experience (or moreprecisely, what label the person is likely to use to refer to the experience).Furthermore, it can be predicted (based on the component patterning

model; see Table 1, Scherer, 1987, and Tables 5.3 and 5.4 in Scherer, 2001)what motor expressions, action tendencies, and physiological changes can beexpected to underlie this experience. Alternatively, again based on thecomponent patterning model, if one observes particular motor expressionsof an individual in a given situation, one can try to infer the results of theperson ’s specific appraisal of an event (and predict the likely emotion, or thelabel used, on that basis; Scherer, 1988, 1992). To my knowledge, none of competing emotion theories is structurally able to account for individualdifferences in such a detailed fashion or to make concrete a priori

predictions.Apart from this general approach to individual differences in emotionalresponses to given events or situations, our group has attempted to identifydispositional factors that may lead to stable tendencies to appraise events ina particular fashion. These tendencies or biases can systematically affect anindividual ’s evaluations and cause him or her to stray from a possible modalresponse to a given event, to the point of pathological responding.

In consequence, Scherer (1987) suggested conceptualising different typesof emotional disorders on the basis of appraisal malfunctioning. Theunderlying assumption is that although appraisal is subjective and mayvary from individual to individual, it must remain * within certain limits *

appropriate to the objective situation (e.g., through reality testing) and to thecoping potential that is commonly perceived to be within the individual ’smeans. Violation of these appraisal reality constraints, as one might callthem, will lead to the resulting emotion being considered as abnormal ordisordered, at least by an individual ’s social environment, if not by him- orherself. For example, Scherer (1987) has suggested that one particular formof depression, helplessness, might be partly due to a consistent under-estimation of one ’s coping potential. An important distinction is that anindividual who truly lacks the means to deal with a particularly difficultsituation would be described as ‘‘dejected ’’, whereas someone described as‘‘depressed ’’ is implicitly assumed to appraise the situation, particularly his

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or her coping potential, in an inappropriate or unrealistic fashion. Table 2shows the predictions for vocal signatures of specific emotional disturbancesas based on the combination of the appraisal bias predictions and thecomponent patterning model. Kaiser and Scherer (1998) extended thisanalysis and suggested four possible types of long-term malfunction and thechronic emotionality disturbances that can result: (a) inappropriate orinadequate appraisal of a situation and events; (b) inappropriate orinadequate level of processing; (c) inappropriate or inadequate motorexpression or signalling; and (d) inappropriate or inadequate relationshipsbetween aspects of feeling. Appraisal biases in the form of inappropriate orinadequate appraisal of a situation and events in specific can be linked to the

TABLE 3Facial action units predicted as indicators of selected types of affect disorder

Affect disorders Inadequate appraisalsRelated action units(shorthand descriptions)

Euphoria Excessively positivepleasantness andconducivenessevaluation

5 (lids up), 26 (open mouth),38 (open nostrils); or 6 (crows feetwrinkles), 12 (lip corners up),25 (lips part)

Anhedonia Excessively negative

pleasantness evaluation

4 (brow lowering), 7 (lid tightening),

9 (nose wrinkling), 10 (upper lipraising), 15 (lip corners down &chin raised), 24 (lip press),39 (nostrils closed)

Chronic dissatisfaction,frustration

Strong bias toward habitualnegative conducivenessevaluation

4 (brow lowering), 7 (lid tightening),17 (chin raised), 23 or 24(lips tight or pressed together)

Indifference, apathy Malfunctioning of conduciveness check

Hypotonus of facial musculature

Mania Overestimation of powerand control

4, 5 (eyebrows contracted, eyeswidened), or 7 (lids tight, eyes

narrowed); 23, 25 (lips tight &parted, bared teeth)

Hopelessness Underestimation of control 15 (lip corner depression), 25 or26 (lips part or jaw drop), 41 or43 (lids droop or eyes closed),if tears 1 4 (inner brow raised &contracted)

Helplessness Underestimation of power 1, 2, 5 (brows & upper lid raising),20 (mouth stretch), 26 (jaw drop),or 32 (lip bite)

Anxiety disorders Excessive concern about

adequacy of power

4 (eyebrows contracted), 1, 2,

5 (brows and upper lid raising),20 (mouth stretch), 23, 24 (lips tightor pressed), 32, 37 (lip bite or wipe)


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TABLE 4Potential sources of systematic individual differences (dispositions, biases) in event appraisal and response disposi

emotion component and type of origin or processing

Individual differences (IDs)

Hardwired / constitutional Automatic Sensorimotor

Learned / dispositional Schematic Unconscious

Appraisal process Genetic or cultural factors, braincircuitry biases (chemosensory signalsensitivity; speed and structure of cognitive system, e.g., category width,illusions; value systems)

Personal learning history (conditionedperception and judgement tendencies;dispositional appraisal biases due to wishfulthinking, stable personal or situationalschemata)

Motivationalchange Reflexivity, impulsivity Dispositional reaction and copingtendencies, personality

Physiologicalresponses

Vagal tone, temperament, stable labileautonomic nervous system

Physiological response schemata A

Motor expression Constitutional and cultural expressivity Motor attitudes, habitual expressions Strategic

Subjective feeling Temperamental affectivity Trait affectivity, nonverbal categorisationschemata, contagion/information effect of others

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efferent expressions generated by specific appraisals, as predicted in thecomponent patterning model, which may give rise to inappropriate facialexpressions (see Table 3).

Van Reekum and Scherer (1997) further extended the analysis of appraisal biases as stable dispositions and distinguished between (a)appraisal biases with respect to the form or process of appraisal such asspeed, thoroughness or completeness, width of the categories used ininference and classification, vigilance, or degree of top-down control of lower-level processing (e.g., sensitisation or automatisation); and (b)appraisal biases with respect to content such as agency or power attributionbias, over sensitisation, valence appreciation, over- or underestimation of relevance, conduciveness, control and coping potential, fairness, or moral

appropriateness (see Table 1 for greater detail on these SECs). Van Reekumand Scherer also reviewed the literature on potential sources for individualdifferences in appraisal tendencies such as organismic predispositions,cognitive styles, need for cognition, personality traits (e.g., extroversion,repression sensitisation, neuroticism, rigidity, dysphoria, worrying, sensa-tion-seeking, openness), attitudinal structures, self-concept, or self-image.The main origin of these interindividual differences are probably stronglyrelated to early differences (genetics and epigenetics) in the development of the central nervous system, particularly in terms of executive functions or

perception biases. For example, Canli et al. (2006) found support for a modelby which life stress interacts with the effect of 5-HTTLPR genotype onamygdala and hippocampal resting activation that may provoke a chronicstate of negative cognitive bias including increased vigilance, threat, orrumination and may thus constitute a neural mechanism for epigeneticvulnerability for depression.

These theoretical analyses are currently pursued and extended to othercomponents of emotion. Table 4 shows a preliminary attempt, produced forthe purposes of this article, to categorise the sources of individual differencesin emotional responding by the components and their potential origins.There is not sufficient space to discuss these suggestions in detail. However,there is now copious evidence for the powerful role of dispositional factors(both constitutional and learned) for emotional reactions, in particular therole of personality factors and trait affect for both appraisal and motiva-tional aspects (Griner & Smith, 2000; Matthews, Derryberry, & Siegle, 2000;Reisenzein & Weber, in press; Revelle & Scherer, 2009). Kuppens and hiscollaborators have illustrated these links for the case of anger. Thus, theydemonstrated that trait anger is negatively correlated with agreeableness andperceived social esteem (especially for individuals who attach high impor-tance to social relations; Kuppens, 2005) and showed situation-specificindividual differences in the appraisal of threatened self-esteem and other-blame, which showed differential relationships with dispositional variables


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(unstable self-esteem, neuroticism, and BIS sensitivity in unpleasantevaluative situations vs. feeling lowly valued by others in non-evaluativesituations; Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007).

Based on this earlier work, Wranik and Scherer (2009) developed a modelof how such appraisal biases may systematically privilege the occurrence of anger experiences, arguing that individuals differ in how they selectivelyattend to specific elements of a situation or event, how these elements arecognitively encoded, and how these encodings activate and interact withother cognitions and affects in the overall personality system (Mischel &Shoda, 1995). This may explain why some people experience anger morefrequently or intensely or why they generally experience certain types of emotions under specific conditions. For example, a perfectionist maychronically overestimate the importance of events, an impatient personmay overestimate the urgency of situations, or a person particularly sensitiveto injustice will evaluate many situations as unjust. Table 5 illustrates thisapproach for the emotion of anger, listing individual difference variables that

TABLE 5Individual difference variables potentially biasing appraisal toward anger outcomes

Appraisal dimension Individual difference variables

Relevance detectionNovelty Speed of habituation, extent of inhibitionIntrinsic pleasantness Anhedonia (Germans & Kring, 2000)Goal relevance Human motivation, achievement motivation, affiliation

motivation (McClelland, 1985)

Implication assessmentCausal attribution Explanatory style (Seligman et al., 1979)Outcome probabilitycheck

Optimism pessimism (Scheier & Carver, 1985)

Discrepancy fromexpectation

Openness to experience/conservatism (Costa & McCrae, 1992)

Goal/needconduciveness

Perfectionism (Stoeber & Otto, 2006)

Urgency Realism

Coping potential determinationControl Locus of control (Rotter, 1966); illusion of controlPower Self-esteem (Kuppens, 2005; Kuppens & Van Mechelen, 2007); self-

efficacy (Bandura, 1977)Adjustment Openness to experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992); flexibility, agree-

ableness (Kuppens, 2005)

Normative significance evaluation(a) Internal standards Individual human values (Schwartz, 1992)(b) External standards Cultural values (Hofstede, 1984; Schwartz, 2006)

Note : Adapted from Wranik and Scherer (2009).

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could systematically influence specific appraisal dimensions as postulated bythe CPM (Scherer, 1984a, 1984b, 2001), including traditional personalitytraits, social-cognitive and motivational dispositions (e.g., self-efficacy, self-esteem, optimism), and differences in lower-level cognitive processing (e.g.,inhibition, processing speed). The underlying idea is that these individualdifferences influence specific appraisal dimensions in a relatively stablemanner and thus help explain why some people are more likely to experiencecertain types of emotions under specific conditions than other people do.

Recently, Scherer and Brosch (2009) have made a first effort to develop apreliminary theoretical analysis of the effect of specific appraisal tendenciesor biases on emotion dispositions and trait affect such as trait anxiety, traitanger, or trait positive/negative affect. Based on the theoretical suggestions

outlined above, we developed the compilation shown in Table 6, illustratingpossible links between certain appraisal tendencies or biases and specificemotion dispositions or trait affects. In addition, we made an attempt toillustrate how culture-based goal, belief, and value systems can produceappraisal biases by affecting the perception of events and the criteria used intheir evaluation.

So far, only individual differences with respect to dispositions, biases, anddistortions in the use of the different appraisal check criteria have beendiscussed. Of course, individual differences go way beyond this aspect of

emotion processing. Thus, individuals may differ with respect to the levels of analysis that are preferentially used in appraisal or in the rapidity of switching between levels or the capacity to integrate levels. Furthermore,individuals may differ as regards the rules underlying the integration of theresults produced by different appraisal checks. For example, Kuppens andhis collaborators showed that whereas some individuals react with approachbehaviour to anger, others prefer avoidance (often coupled with socialsharing; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Meulders, 2004) and that the relation-ships between appraisals and the resulting emotional experience can be verydifferent for different angry individuals (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Rijmen,2008).

I have suggested using Anderson ’s (1989) model of integration functions tounderstand the process whereby subjective appraisal results are transformedinto an implicit response (Scherer, 2004). Individuals may develop, stronglyaffected by their current goals, specific integration rules for the combina-tions of specific appraisal criteria. For example, we found empirically (vanReekum et al., 2004) that different levels of coping potential have verydifferent effects upon psychophysiological responses as a function of goalconduciveness, reflecting the fact that coping ability is of less relevance whenthings are going according to plan. In Anderson ’s approach, this would bemodelled by a configuration rule, predicting that the importance of one of the criteria depends on the level of another. As mentioned above, individual


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TABLE 6Individual difference variables and cultural goal, belief, and value dimensions potentially biasing appraisal pr

trait affect (reproduced from Scherer & Brosch, 2009)

Emotion disposition / Traitaffect (emotional disorder) Appraisal tendencies or biases(motivational and cognitive) cu

Trait sadness :Resignation, dejection,acquiescence (depression)

Mot : Strong attachment to people and propertyCog : Low self-esteem, underestimation of control, coping, and adjustment potential;tendency to ruminate

Goa : IBel : HVal : Cbenevo

Trait anger:Irritation, irascibility, choleric(hostility, psychoticism)

Mot : Strong goal orientation, high expectationsCog : High self-esteem, external attribution,blaming, overestimation of control, power,coping, and adjustment potential; exaggerated

optimism

Goa : IBel : HVal : Cautono

Trait anxiety:Worrier, apprehensiveness,neuroticism (generalanxiety disorder)

Mot : PerfectionismCog : Exaggerated sensitivity for novelty,uncertainty, and urgency (looming); low self-esteem,underestimation of control, coping, andadjustment potential; exaggerated pessimism

Goa : IBel : HVal : Cautono

Trait shame/guilt:Embarrassment, unworthiness,disconcertment, abashment(clinical shame/guilt syndromes)

Mot : High need for self-worth and social recognition;conformity; perfectionismCog : Internal attribution

Goa : IBel : HVal : Cbenevo

Trait positive affect:

Joyfulness, buoyancy,cheerfulness, good spirits(manic euphoria)

Mot : Hedonism, realistic aims

Cog : Optimism; high self-esteem, overestimationof control, coping, and adjustment potential

Goa : I

Bel : HVal : Eopenne

Note : Mot : motivational, Cog : cognitive; Goa : goal pursuit; Bel : beliefs about human nature; Val : va

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differences in cognitive or motivational dispositions, as well as stablesociocultural factors and the immediate social context, may have a verypowerful effect on the weighting of specific criteria and may, in and of itself,bias the integration of the appraisal criteria toward configuration rules. Tomodel such individually different integration functions we may need toadopt nonlinear dynamic system analysis (Scherer, 2000a) as a moreappropriate framework for emotion modelling than the classic assumptionof linear functions dominating our current statistics toolbox (e.g., regressionanalysis).

Similarly, individuals may vary in the process of integration of the otherorganismic subsystems involved in emotion, such as autonomic variabilityand muscular expression. Individuals are likely to differ with respect to theircapacity for interoception and the use of proprioceptive cues in the differentresponse components of the emotion process, which will affect feedback andintegration mechanisms. The most important integration mechanism,elicited and organised by the process of synchronisation that I have proposedas the hallmark of the emotion phenomenon, is the integration of all thesynchronised components (see Figure 3), which probably occurs outside of awareness. Anderson (1989, p. 147) suggested: ‘‘What does attain conscious-ness is often, perhaps always, a result integrated across different sensemodalities at preconscious stages ’’. The nature of this integration processhas not yet been addressed: Are the widely varying types of representationsexchanged into a common currency? Or does even the final product of integration still consist of a heterogeneous amalgam of representationsreflecting the specific nature of the various components? Individuals maydiffer in how this process works and they will most likely differ as regards therelative weights attributed to different components. Thus the qualia of anemotion experience may be more strongly determined by appraisal resultswhereas another gives greater importance to self-perceived action tendencies.

One individual may strongly weight internal physiological arousal whereasanother places more emphasis on proprioceptive motor cues. The olddistinction between internalisers vs. externalisers may well be relevant here(see Cacioppo et al., 1992). Another source for individual differences may bethe threshold of synchronisation or coherence that is needed for anemotional process to become conscious. Finally, we do know that thereare major individual differences with respect to linguistic labelling (circle Cin Figure 3) based on factors such as pathology (alexithymia), verbalintelligence or experience (especially knowledge of vocabulary), socialisation

(e.g., verbal interaction with mothers; Dunn & Brown, 1994), or pastexperiences.


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COMPARISON WITH OTHER EMOTION THEORIES

As one might expect, the CPM is highly compatible with other appraisal

theories (see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Scherer, 1999a). Although not alltheorists subscribe to all aspects of the model, the issues concerned are fairlyminor and can be settled by empirical evidence. The CPM is continuouslyupdated on the basis of new findings. The CPM is also largely compatiblewith theories that stress the importance of particular aspects of emotionsuch as relationships to goals (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), causalattribution (Weiner, 1985), or action tendencies (Frijda, 1987, 2007b). TheCPM also postulates a major role for these aspects, and adjustments can bemade once new evidence comes in. There seem to be major differences with

discrete or basic emotion theories in the tradition of Ekman (1992) andIzard (1993), especially about the small number of emotions addressed andthe rather rigid notion of affect programmes leading to prototypicalresponse patterns (see Scherer & Ellgring, 2007). However, these differencesare much less decisive than they appear at first sight, as these theorists havestressed in their recent writings that they: (a) consider complex emotions inaddition to basic emotions; (b) postulate emotion families that allow formany gradations within each family; (c) assume affect programmes to beflexible; (d) postulate interactions between subsystems; and (e) consider bothautomatic and elaborated appraisal as differentiating elicitors (see Scherer,2009, for further detail).

In contrast, the CPM architecture is incompatible with recent constructi-vist theories suggested by Russell (2003) and Barrett (2006). Implicitly,Barrett (2006, p. 31) considers the CPM as a ‘‘natural kinds ’’ model, likemost theories other than her own, and declares them as obsolete. It is to behoped that the preceding description of the model has convinced the readerthat it is anything but a ‘‘natural kinds ’’ model, postulating fuzzy sets of modal emotions (as a result of a categorisation of qualia) on the backgroundof an infinite variety of emotional processes and their qualia representations.Barrett has made the issue of feeling categorisation the centrepiece of herneo-constructivist theory claiming that emotions are exclusively constitutedby the individual ’s categorisation (through a ‘‘conceptual act ’’) of ‘‘coreaffect ’’ (valence arousal), as determined by personal memories andcultural concepts.

The CPM is in strong disaccord with several aspects of these claims, as isevident from comparing the model described above with the two constructivistapproaches in this volume (Barrett, 2009 this issue; Russell, 2009 this issue).

First, both Russell and Barrett redefine the word ‘‘emotion ’’ to referexclusively to ‘‘categorised feeling ’’, following William James, who alsotreated the terms emotion and feeling as synonyms (Scherer, 2005b, p. 699),thereby giving rise to a century of fruitless debate (Ellsworth, 1994). The

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CPM treats feeling as one of the components of the emotion process (albeitan important one, as feeling monitors the emotion episode throughintegration and representation of changes in the other components). Usingthe words ‘‘emotion ’’ and ‘‘feeling ’’ interchangeably (as is sometimes done inna ıve language) muddles the important conceptual distinction made bydefining these words differentially as technical terms. In the context of acomponential approach to emotion, such a semantic confusion is logicallyproblematical, as it implies treating a part or component as equivalent to thewhole (a pars pro toto problem).

Second, both Russell and Barrett claim that ‘‘core affect ’’, a point in a lowdimensional valence arousal space, is the central psychological ‘‘primitive ’’for affective feeling and the basis for all additional processing, i.e., the

construction of an emotion category. This claim is neither justifiedtheoretically nor demonstrated empirically. It is not clear in what senseand why valence and arousal feelings are considered as more ‘‘core ’’,‘‘primitive ’’, or ‘‘basic ’’ than other internal representations. The core affecttheorists may argue that people can reliably describe their feelings on thesedimensions. However, this is easily explained by a projection from a high-dimensional qualia space to a lower dimensional space (see above),especially if a person is invited to engage in such integration and projectionby being given valence and arousal scales. This does not mean that the low-

dimensional projection is ‘‘core ’’ in the sense of being logically prior or moreraw or primitive in the sense of the extent of processing. On the contrary, alow-dimensional projection is most likely a highly processed product. Thisview is buttressed by findings showing that when one asks people what theyhave felt during a certain emotional episode, they rarely spontaneouslyanswer in terms of valence and arousal gradation. We asked a representativesample of the Swiss population what emotion they experienced on theprevious day. They described the situation and labelled their subjectiveexperience, their feelings, in their own words . Only a very small percentage of the more that 1000 respondents used general or positive valence labels(5.8%), and almost none used direct arousal terms (Scherer, Wranik,Sangsue, Tran, & Scherer, 2004a). Obviously, if we had provided themwith scales for valence and activation of the experience, they would havegladly complied. But the low-dimensional description does not sponta-neously come to mind * which is what one would expect if it were a primitive.

Maybe Russell and Barrett mean the word ‘‘core ’’ in the sense of the mostimportant dimensions in low-dimensional space (valence and arousal). SinceWundt there have been many efforts to establish the set of dimensions thatmost economically accounts for the similarities and differences in emotionalexperience, and there has been considerable disagreement about the numberand nature of the dimensions (see Gehm & Scherer, 1988). While there islittle doubt that valence is central, arousal is a more difficult case as it is not


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clear what kind of arousal or activation is meant * mental activation,sympathetic arousal, parasympathetic arousal? These are all quite different.The two-dimensional valence by arousal space seems to be considered basicon the basis of countless factor analyses that show stability for only thesetwo dimensions. However, it is questionable whether this is not an artefact of methodology (the choice of the objects for similarity ratings, especiallyverbal labels; see Scherer, 2000b, pp. 184 185). As mentioned above, recentwork, using a more adequate, theoretically anchored feature profile-basedsimilarity assessment yields four reliable factors for many differentlanguages, with arousal coming in only third, after a control/mastery/powerfactor (Fontaine et al., 2007). It seems reasonable to assume that control/mastery/power are very prominent criteria for adaptive responses and should

be part of a primitive or core feeling read-out. The same is true forunexpectedness or novelty, which weighs in as the fourth factor. Indeed,there is an enormous amount of literature showing the ‘‘basicness ’’ and‘‘primitivity ’’ of novelty detection in all organisms. Why should this centralfactor in perceiving and evaluating the world not be represented in ‘‘coreaffect ’’? Particularly as it is one of the central determinants of emotionalattention (as a central aspect of relevance; Brosch & Scherer, 2009).

A central problem with the core affect notion as proposed by Russell(2003, and 2009 this issue) and Barrett (2006, and 2009 this issue) is that

there is little attempt to describe the mechanisms whereby core affect isproduced. The authors provide a general list of factors involved in thisprocess, including appraisal. However, no hypotheses or mapping rules,comparable to the appraisal predictions, are suggested that could beempirically tested. It is thus not clear how core affect is differentiated.This omission is particularly worrisome, as an enormous amount of information needs to be compressed and integrated to yield a single pointin low-dimensional space, reflecting only evaluation (valence) and (arousal)response information. How does this work? One also wonders what happensto the large number of factors that are supposed to influence core affect. Arethey not represented in feeling space or do the representations get lost onceprojection into low-dimensional space has occurred? And would those notbe important to fine tune the adaptive action?

It is equally unclear how, out of the constant flux of valence by arousalvariation, an attribution to an object (Russell, 2003) or the assignment of aconceptual category (Barrett, 2006, and 2009 this issue) occur. As core affectis supposedly primitive and primary, waxing and waning, there must be somequality of core affect, a threshold or another criterion, that triggers theattribution and categorisation processes. What are these? It cannot be theevaluation of the objects or events, because if it were, it would not be clearhow the theories differ from appraisal theories, except for an underspecification of the respective mechanisms.

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Third, regarding categorisation, Barrett (2006) essentially enumerates alist of well-known categorisation mechanisms but refrains from making anytheoretical predictions that can be empirically tested. In her paper in thisissue she announces ‘‘four specific hypotheses ’’, namely: (1) there arepsychological primitives (e.g., core affect); (2) emotions are like books of recipes (not mechanisms) with psychological primitives as elements in a well-stocked pantry that can be used to make any number of different dishes; (3)cognitions and perceptions are emotional in nature; and (4) emotion wordsare powerful in affecting experience. While the latter can be taken forgranted, there are serious issues with the first three. Most importantly, it isdifficult to consider these as ‘‘specific hypotheses ’’. How can they befalsified, especially as much seems to rest on definitional matters (and what

does it mean that cognitions are emotional)?Fourth, the constructivist approach, as exemplified by the papers in this

issue, adopts an outright ideographic approach by asserting that eachindividual ‘‘constructs ’’ the category felt to fit the ‘‘core affect ’’ in a givencontext on the basis of idiosyncratic input. Although it is certainly the casethat the categorisation of immensely variable qualia feeling involves manyidiosyncratic features that will be difficult to predict and examineempirically, the complete abandonment of the nomothetic approachthreatens to lead to the abandonment of theory-guided empirical investiga-

tion, the hallmark of a scientific approach (Scherer, 1995). Barrett (2009 thisissue) uses the metaphor of a ‘‘book of recipes ’’ for her theory. But recipesgenerally imply rules for combining ingredients, not free construction. Andthese rules can be investigated: The proof of the pudding lies in the testing.

REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Appraisal theories of emotion have stimulated numerous empirical studiesover the last 20 years and there is now substantial experimental evidence formany of the predictions made. For an overview, the reader is referred toreviews in separate chapters of a volume on appraisal theories (Scherer,Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001; in particular, chapters by Johnstone, van Reekum,& Scherer; Kaiser & Wehrle; Pecchinenda, Roseman, & Smith; Scherer; Smith& Kirby). The research reviewed in this volume demonstrates that appraisaltheorists have not only relied on self-report, but have also made extensive useof objectively measured indicators of appraisal processes such as physiologicalparameters and expressive behaviour. The use of self-report in this domain isoften prematurely dismissed with the claim that individuals are not aware of rapid, implicit evaluation processes. Although this claim is true, it does notnecessarily mean that individuals cannot recover or reasonably infer some of this information later. In addition, some appraisal processes occur on


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schematic or propositional levels that are accessible to awareness. Even if, inrecall and report, participants rely in part on established schemata oncanonical appraisals of certain types of events, this does not mean that theinformation is necessarily wrong, as social schemata contain a representationof regularities that often amounts to more than a kernel of truth. In any case,when one needs to resort to self-report on cognitive processes, this usuallymeans no other method is available to gain access to the processes of interest.Under such circumstances, an imperfect approximation to assessment thatwill not produce proof but possibly plausibility is preferable to not studyingthe phenomenon at all (see Locke, 2009).

In what follows, I review pertinent work from the Geneva EmotionResearch Group that has empirically examined the CPM prediction that the

different appraisal checks occur in a fixed sequence during a series of recursive cycles (the results for each check are continuously updated). Inconcluding, I describe preliminary studies on the important role of coherence or synchronisation in the emotion episode.

I limit the following review of the evidence for efferent effects of theappraisal checks and the experimental investigation of the sequencehypothesis of the CPM as described earlier. Because of the rapidity of appraisal processing, often in the millisecond range, and the inaccessibilityof much of these processes to consciousness, let alone to verbal description,

appraisal markers other than verbal report have to be used. In consequence,the first part of the review of work in our laboratory concerns our attempt toconfirm the theoretical assumption that appraisals have reliable signatures inthe domains of brain electric activity, peripheral physiological changes, andexpressive signals.

The efferent effects of appraisal checks on somatovisceralchanges and motor expression as markers of appraisal results

We used a computer game to study the psychophysiological signatures of appraisal outcomes by manipulating intrinsic pleasantness (pleasant vs.unpleasant sounds accompanying central events) and goal conduciveness(winning * reaching the next level in the game, or losing * the destruction of one ’s spaceship) of game events in a factorial design (Johnstone, van Reekum,Hird, Kirsner, & Scherer, 2005; van Reekum et al., 2004). Participants playedthe game while cardiac activity, skin conductance, skin temperature, andmuscle activity, as well as emotion self-reports, were assessed. Self-reportsshowed that game events altered levels of felt pride, joy, anger, and surprise.Goal conduciveness had little effect on forearm muscle activity (extensor) butwas associated with significant autonomic effects, including changes tointerbeat interval, pulse transit time, skin conductance, and finger tempera-ture. The results of the autonomic measures are consistent with the CPM

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prediction of a higher level of sympathetic arousal related to obstructivecompared to conducive events (provided an assessment of high copingpotential). The manipulation of intrinsic pleasantness produced significantchanges in skin conductance activity only. The obvious explanation for thelack of effects of intrinsic pleasantness manipulations on autonomic nervoussystem physiology is that intrinsic pleasantness rarely produces strong actiontendencies that require increased sympathetic arousal.

Speech following obstructive events was higher in energy and had a higherlevel of fundamental frequency (f0, heard as pitch), as indicated by f0 floor(lowest 5% of f0 values), than was speech following conducive events. Theseresults suggest that physiological arousal was higher following the destruc-tion of a ship than it was following the completion of a game level. This

interpretation is supported by measurements of skin conductance (a measurethat reflects sympathetic autonomic nervous system arousal), taken in aconcurrent study, which were higher following obstructive events than theywere following conducive events (van Reekum et al., 2004). In summary, thisexperiment revealed that variations in the intrinsic pleasantness of an eventcause changes to spectral energy distribution , but not to overall energy, f0, orthe measured temporal parameters and that changes to the conduciveness of an event are associated with changes to the latter set of variables but not tospectral energy distribution.

Aue, Flykt, and Scherer (2007) presented participants, in the context of amemory task, with pictures displaying biological and cultural threat stimulior neutral stimuli (stimulus relevance manipulation) with superimposedsymbols signalling monetary gains or losses (goal conduciveness manipula-tion). Facial electromyogram and heart rate (HR) served as dependentvariables. Results for the facial muscle innervation showed differentialefferent effects for both stimulus relevance and goal conduciveness appraisal.Biological threat stimuli were associated with increased activity over thecheek region, which was explained by the participant ’s adoption of aresponse pattern that resembled the ‘‘fear grin ’’ in chimpanzees (Van Hooff,1972). Consistent with the idea of a stronger need for effortful processing,because younger in human history, the vision of cultural threat stimuli led tohigher activity over the brow region than the vision of both biological threatstimuli and neutral stimuli. Furthermore, as expected, increased activity overthe cheek region (zygomaticus, smiling) was observed in the winningcondition and over the brow region (corrugator, frowning) in the losingcondition (but the latter for neutral pictures only). HR, in contrast, wasinfluenced by the stimulus relevance manipulation only. As expected, HRacceleration was positively related to goal relevance, with strongest resourcemobilisation for biological threat and least for neutral stimuli.

The importance of stimulus relevance was confirmed by Aue and Scherer(2008), who had participants view unpleasant and pleasant pictures (intrinsic


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pleasantness appraisal), asking them to concurrently perform either an armextension or an arm flexion, leading to an increase or a decrease in picturesize. Increasing pleasant stimuli and decreasing unpleasant stimuli wereconsidered goal conducive; decreasing pleasant stimuli and increasingunpleasant stimuli were considered goal obstructive (goal conducivenessappraisal). Facial electromyogram and HR were measured as dependentvariables. As predicted by the CPM, the two appraisals differentially affectedzygomaticus and corrugator responses, showing similar patterns of changes(i.e., pleasant events produced similar changes as conducive events;unpleasant events produced similar changes as obstructive events). However,results for HR did not support CPM predictions. Unpleasant images wereassociated with lower * not higher * HR change scores than were pleasant

images. Comparison with earlier studies suggests that the adaptive cardio-vascular effects of both appraisals may be mediated by stimulus proximityand motivational factors in the experimental setting.

These results suggest that the predictions for facial muscle responses thatare related to appraisal of stimulus valence, but not directly involved inaction tendencies, can be conveniently studied in experimental settings thatprovide only indirect exposure to stimuli. As predicted, the zygomaticus andcorrugator muscles, in particular, have proven to be reliable signatures forvalence appraisals, both intrinsic pleasantness and goal conduciveness (see

Aue & Scherer, 2008). In contrast, CPM predictions for sympathetic arousal,based on naturally occurring events such as imminent threat requiringimmediate action, cannot be generalised to experimental situations that donot require vigorous action (as in Aue & Scherer, 2008). As shown by Aue etal. (2007), powerful biologically anchored threat stimuli (such as snakes andspiders) or cultural danger symbols (such as guns) may be appraised assufficiently relevant to produce such rudimentary action tendencies. Experi-mental paradigms that present such highly relevant stimuli or that use goalconduciveness manipulations that have immediate consequences in thelaboratory setting, such as winning or losing money or reputation, doshow the predicted autonomic effects (Kreibig, Gendolla, & Scherer, 2009).

Johnstone et al. (2007) examined voice and skin conductance changesfollowing the appraisal of difficulty and reward in a computer task in whichparticipants lost or gained points under two levels of difficulty. The rate atwhich the vocal folds open and close (fundamental frequency; f0) andchanges in skin conductance were higher for loss than for gain, particularlywhen difficulty was high, suggesting high sympathetic arousal in challengingsituations. The results provide evidence for the specificity of the efferentphysiological effects of particular appraisal check combinations.

An alternative approach to testing CPM patterning conditions consists inthe analysis of expression patterns produced by actors asked to portrayemotions that are characterised by specific appraisal profiles. Banse and

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Scherer (1996) used digital acoustic analysis to measure the vocal parametersin emotion portrayals by a group of professional actors and confirmed asizeable proportion of the CPM predictions. Scherer and Ellgring (2007)used the same corpus to analyse the facial action units consistently used byactors to express certain emotions. The results are consistent with theassumption that particular appraisal checks generate facial expression unitsthat can be interpreted as a functional consequence of certain appraisalresults (Scherer, 1992). Although this type of evidence is indirect, it addsplausibility to the assumption that there are specific efferent effects of appraisal checks on somatovisceral changes and motor expression.

Sequential processing of appraisal checks

As described earlier, the CPM postulates that the SECs are processed insequence, following a fixed order. This assumption concerning the micro-genetic process is based on logical, phylogenetic, and ontogenetic arguments(Scherer, 1984b, 2001; Scherer et al., 2004b). In a first indirect test of thisassumption, Scherer (1999b) demonstrated that the recognition of emotionsconsistent with scenarios that provide the information corresponding to theSECs is faster and more accurate if the information is given in the predictedorder. Tests that are more direct must use the signatures for appraisal checks,

as discussed in the preceding section.Thus, Aue et al. (2007) tested the sequence assumption with a memorytask in which participants were presented with pictures displaying biologicaland cultural threat stimuli or neutral stimuli (stimulus relevance manipula-tion) with superimposed symbols signalling monetary gains or losses (goalconduciveness manipulation). Results for HR and facial electromyogramshowed differential efferent effects of the respective appraisal outcomes andprovided direct evidence for sequential processing. Specifically, as predicted,muscle activity over the brow and cheek regions marking the process of relevance appraisal occurred significantly earlier than did facial muscleactivity markers of goal conduciveness appraisal. HR, in contrast, wasinfluenced by the stimulus-relevance manipulation only.

Lanctoˆ t and Hess (2007) empirically tested the CPM hypothesis that theintrinsic pleasantness evaluation occurs before the goal conducivenessevaluation. In two studies, intrinsically pleasant and unpleasant imageswere used to manipulate pleasantness, and a specific event in a Pac-Man-type video game was used to manipulate goal conduciveness. Facial EMGwas used to measure facial reactions to each evaluation. As predicted, facialreactions to the intrinsic pleasantness manipulation were faster than facialreactions to the goal conduciveness manipulation. The authors interpretedthese results as providing strong empirical support for the sequential natureof the appraisal process.


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Delplanque et al. (2009) investigated the effects of odours on appraisalprocesses and consequent emotional responses. The main goal was to testwhether an odour is detected as novel or familiar before it is evaluated aspleasant or unpleasant. Participants performed a recognition task in whichthey were presented with pairs of unpleasant or pleasant odours (sample andtarget odours). Within a pair, the sample and target were either identical ordifferent to assess participants ’ novelty detection; unpleasant and pleasanttarget odours were contrasted to examine participants ’ appraisal of intrinsicpleasantness. The authors measured facial expressions using electromyo-graphy and physiological reactions using electrocardiogram and electro-dermal activity in response to odours. The earliest effects on facial musclesand heart rate occurred in response to novelty detection. Later effects onfacial muscles and heart rate were related to pleasantness evaluation,confirming the existence of a sequence of appraisal checks for odourseliciting an emotional reaction.

Grandjean and Scherer (2008) systematically manipulated novelty, goalrelevance, intrinsic pleasantness, and goal conduciveness SECs in visualstimuli to test the sequence hypothesis in two experiments with electro-encephalographic (EEG) recordings (characterised by a high temporalresolution). Topographical analyses of the event-related potentials (ERPs)revealed a specific electrical map related to novelty ( 90 ms after the onsetof the stimulus) preceding another topographical map related to task goalrelevance, indicating that the occurrence of the novel map precedes the task

goal relevance map by about 50 ms. To investigate the effects of manipulatedappraisals not revealed by the topographical analyses, Grandjean andScherer further analysed the global field power (GFP), which revealed earlyeffects related to novelty and later effects related to the intrinsic pleasantnessfactor. For the second experiment, in which intrinsic pleasantness and goalconduciveness were manipulated, the results confirmed that neuronal

processing of intrinsic pleasantness precedes the effects related to goalconduciveness checks (see Figure 4). The frequency analyses revealed lateeffects in the gamma band, indicating an effect of goal conduciveness on theso-called induced gamma (e.g., Tallon-Baudry, Bertrand, Delpuech, &Pernier, 1996) at about 600 ms after the onset of the stimuli, suggestingthat a high level of cognitive processing is involved in this type of appraisal.The results of these two experiments support the CPM predictions andsuggest that novelty and intrinsic pleasantness may be appraised early, on anunconscious, automatic, and possibly schematic level, whereas goal con-

duciveness tends to be evaluated later in the sequence, on a conscious,controlled, and possibly propositional level (as predicted by Leventhal &Scherer, 1987). The results of the two studies are summarised in Figure 5.

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Synchronisation and the emergence of consciousness

Scherer (2005a) suggested that the emergence of the reflections of component changes into consciousness (see Figure 3) may occur when thedegree of synchronisation of the different subsystems reaches a critical

Figure 4. Electroencephalographic brain activity maps as markers of speci c checks in the appraisalsequence * results of the topographical analyses and the global eld power (GFP) analyses (seeGrandjean & Scherer, 2008, for further details). Note : Five panels with different results for Experiment1: (A) Topographical results are shown for the experimental condition ‘‘familiar/non-relevant ’’ (thedifferent shades of grey in the graph for the time course correspond to the different topographicalmaps observed); the different maps (light grey corresponding to the positive, dark grey corresponding

to the negative part of the electrical eld, and the upper part of the topographical maps correspondingto the anterior part of the head) are not speci c for this experimental condition. (B) Speci c noveltymap for the second section. (C) Speci c task/goal relevance map for the third section. (D) Timing of the two speci c event-related potential topographical maps: the novelty map and the task/goalrelevance map after the onset of the stimuli. (E) Timing of the GFP for the negative, positive, andneutral levels of intrinsic pleasantness after onset of the stimuli. The superimposed red rectangleindicates the time windows for which the positive and negative levels are signi cantly different fromthe neutral level ( pB .05). To view this gure in colour, please visit the online version of this issue.


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threshold. This hypothesis is exceedingly difficult to test, given the problemssurrounding the definition and measurement of consciousness, as well as theabsence of established models to determine the degree of synchronisation.However, recently Dan Glauser and Scherer (2008) reported a firstinvestigation into the processes involved in the emergence of a subjectivefeeling. Assuming that the oscillatory brain activity presumed to underlie theemergence of a subjective feeling can be measured by EEG frequency bandactivity (similar to that shown in the literature for the conscious representa-tion of objects), emotional reactions were induced in participants by usingvisual stimuli. Episodes for which participants reported a subjective feelingwere compared with those that did not lead to a conscious emotionalexperience, in order to identify potential differences between these two typesof reactions at the oscillatory level. Discrete wavelet transforms of the EEGsignal in gamma (31 63 Hz) and beta (15 31 Hz) bands showed significantdifferences between these two types of reactions. In addition, whereas beta-band activities were widely distributed, differences in gamma-band activitywere predominantly observed in the frontal and prefrontal regions. However,contrary to our hypothesis, more oscillatory activity is present when the taskof emotional monitoring is maintained throughout the image presentationwithout resulting in a subjective feeling report. The results are interpreted interms of the complexity and dynamics of the processes required to performthe affective monitoring task and report a conscious feeling. In future

Figure 5. Mental chronography of the sequence of appraisal checks (see Grandjean & Scherer, 2008,for details). To view this gure in colour, please visit the online version of this issue.

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studies, it will be necessary to include modifications of the time windowexamined and an extension of the frequency range of the oscillationsanalysed. However, the data demonstrate that the monitoring of electricbrain activity at the surface is a potential means to examine synchronisationand the emergence of consciousness.

The categorisation and verbalisation of emotional experience

As shown in Figure 3 and described earlier, the next step concernscategorisation and verbalisation of the conscious feeling. Again, one facesa complex phenomenon that has rarely been the object of controlledempirical investigations. Our own efforts have been mainly directed towardthe study of the dimensionality of the affective space. However, unlikeproponents of circumplex models (Russell, 2003), we do not believe that atwo-dimensional valence arousal space maps a primitive core affectsystem. On the contrary, we submit that a rich representation of qualiacan be projected, if a person is required to do so, into lower dimensionalspace. We have evidence against the claim that there are only two majordimensions, valence and arousal, and that emotion categories are arrangedas a circle in this space. As suggested above, such a circle, which is not a truecircumplex in the sense of Guttman (1954), may be the result of a biasedchoice of categories for similarity judgement tasks (Scherer, 2005b, p. 720). If a large and/or representative number of emotion categories are used, theyare distributed over the total space and at least three, if not four, dimensionsare needed to minimally account for important distinctions in this set, forexample, between fear and anger. We can show that following valence, acontrol or power dimension is more important for emotionquality distinction than is arousal (Fontaine et al., 2007; Gehm & Scherer,1988).

Conclusion

This contribution outlined the emergent dynamic architecture of emotionand briefly sketched the current state of the component process model of emotion, compared it with some of its major competitors, and summarisedrecent research from our laboratory. The dynamic aspect of emotionprocesses was emphasised, in particular the sequence of appraisal checksand the synchronisation of response systems. Lack of space prevented ademonstration of the model ’s architecture as being ideally suited to explainthe mechanisms that underlie group and cultural differences in emotionalexperience, even in highly similar situations (see Scherer, 1997b).

Much remains to be done. For example, the CPM needs extension in thedirection of event characteristics, particularly in terms whether it is a real orimagined event and whether it happened (or did not happen, even if it was


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possible) in the past or expected for the future. But it is hoped that thisoverview sensitises emotion researchers to a number of central, and oftenneglected, issues concerning the nature of the emotion architecture and itsimplications for temporal dynamics and individual differences. It will haveserved its purpose if it contributes to a strengthening of theory-guidedempirical research on emotion.

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2009

Documents

2009 Scherer C&E