IN THE CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

Appellate Jurisdiction

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF GUYANA

CCJ Application No CV 11 of 2013

GY Civil Appeal No 115 of 2004

BETWEEN

DANIEL RAMLAGAN substituted by

RAMKUMARIE RAMLAGAN APPLICANT

AND

NARINE SINGH substituted by SAIOJINE SINGH RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT SUMMARY

[1] The dispute underlying this application for special leave relates to a two-acre parcel of

land, which was itself part of a larger parcel of twelve acres.

[2] The Applicant for special leave, Mr. Ramlagan (now substituted by his wife), contended

that he and his predecessors in title were always in possession of the disputed parcel. The

Ramlagans claimed they had acquired a possessory title which was formally recognized

by an order of the Land Court Judge which matured into a transport No. 48 of 1984. The

Respondent, Narine Singh, however, claimed that in 1975 he purchased a plot of land

including the disputed parcel and occupied that parcel from 1975 to 1991.

[3] The trial judge held that the disputed two acres should not have been included in

transport No. 48 of 1984. The learned trial judge did not accept that the Ramlagans were

occupying the disputed two-acre parcel of the twelve acres at the time the Land Court

[2014] CCJ 5 (AJ)

Judge made his order so title to the two-acre parcel should therefore be set aside for

fraud.

[4] The Court of Appeal refused to set aside Ramlagan’s title in relation to the disputed two-

acre parcel for fraud, thus impliedly accepting that the Ramlagans, and not Narine Singh,

were in occupation at the time of the order of the Land Court Judge. Nonetheless, the

Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s finding of fact that Narine Singh was already

in possession of the disputed two-acre parcel and had been there since 1975.

[5] In that context, the Court held that because of what might appear to be conflicting

conclusions of the Court of Appeal in respect of the occupation of Narine Singh of the

disputed two-acre parcel and the trial judge’s order (as drawn up) apparently declaring

that Narine Singh had title to the disputed land, exceptional circumstances existed which

would warrant the grant of special leave to appeal what was essentially an issue of fact.

[6] The Court granted special leave to appeal, but found there was insufficient evidence to

grant leave to appeal as a poor person. The Court further ordered costs to follow the

event of the appeal.

This summary is not intended to be a substitute for the reasons of the Caribbean Court of

Justice or to be used in any later consideration of the Court’s reasons.