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Great Britain and the Saar Plebiscite of 13 January 1935Author(s): C. J. HillSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1974), pp. 121-142Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260050.

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r e a t r i t a i n n d t h e S a a rlebiscite o 3 J a n u a r y 9 3 5

C. J. Hill

The Saar Basin, 730 square miles with a population in excessof 800,000, was uniformly German in race, speech, traditionsand culture. The traces of French civilization imposed on thearea during the Great Revolution at the end of the eighteenthcentury had all but disappeared before the advent of the firstworld war. Yet the French Government, determined on com-pensation for the heavy losses during the fighting, eyed theregion keenly as the source of coal for the iron industry ofLorraine now that the French mines in the north of thecountry lay waste. Woodrow Wilson's idealism and LloydGeorge's fear of creating a permanent open sore in CentralEurope thwarted this desire for annexation but they agreedto a compromise whereby the territory would be governed bythe newly created League of Nations through a commissionof five. The coal mines would be ceded outright to France.After fifteen years the Saar population would be allowed toexpress its opinion on the arrangement by a plebiscite, beinggiven the choices of continued League administration orunion with France or with Germany. If, as was widely antici-pated, the plebiscite resulted in a German victory then thatcountry would be entitled to buy back from France theceded mines at a price to be determined by three experts, oneFrench, one German, and one neutral.The arrangement never worked satisfactorily. The League-appointed Governing Commission, efficient but undemo-cratic, was widely seen as an alien administration in occupiedterritory. The activities of its first chairman, a Frenchmannamed Rault, who appeared to view his task as being tosatisfy French industrial needs and to spread French social

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYvalues, seemed to confirm this impression. As one commen-tator noted in 1934, the political history of the Saar since theTreaty of Versailles of 1919 had been 'a long series ofprotests from public bodies, labour organizations and politicalparties against what they have considered, rightly or wrongly,attempts to deprive them of their national institutions, andto force them under the political, cultural and economicinfluence of France'. Indeed, he considered, it was the unani-mous opinion of even the French that if the plebiscite hadbeen held prior to 1933, 'the Saar would have given Germanya vote, variously estimated at from 95 to 99 percent'.' Theadvent to power in Germany of Adolf Hitler in January 1933seemed to transform the situation. Opposition to union withthis new Germany, led by communists, socialists, and Jews,and supported half-heartedly by many Catholics, becamevocal throughout the Saar, and was naturally encouraged byrefugees from the Third Reich and by the right-wing elementsin France. Within a few months estimates of those not likelyto vote for union with Germany in a plebiscite were as highas 40 percent. The Nazi Party in the Saar, under the intransi-gent Alois Spaniol, which during 1933 absorbed the otherrightist and centre rightist political groupings in the territoryinto the so-called Deutsche Front, responded with a cam-paign of violence, boycotts, and threats. The Saar becamepoliticised and polarised, and the Governing Commission,despite some stern measures to maintain public order, founditself increasingly helpless. Its police force and magistrateswere unreliable, making judgments according to personalpreference rather than legal requirements, and a coup againstit seemed not beyond the realms of possibility.The British reaction to these events was negative. Londontook the view that the problem was one for the League, andthe League alone. When the leader of the Saar socialists, HerrBraun, tried in January 1934 to get British support for a callto postpone the plebiscite, now due only one year hence, hewas curtly brushed aside, and Orme Sargent, an assistantunder-secretary of state, warned his junior in a minute on areport of the meeting with Braun that he was not to be

'M. T. Florinsky, The Saar Struggle (New York 1934), 120, 124.122


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEencouraged to feel he could get access to the Foreign Office.2Moreover, although the chairman of the Governing Commis-sion, Mr Geoffrey Knox, was a British diplomat before beingseconded to League service, he was discouraged from report-ing his troubles to London, and told that Britain wouldconsider itself no more concerned with events in the Saarthan would be necessary to fulfil its duty as a member of theCouncil of the League. Indeed, so fearful was the ForeignOffice of being involved in any trouble in Europe that therewas serious discussion as to whether it was possible to with-draw Knox, until the permanent under-secretary, Sir RobertVansittart, finally quashed the notion as being impossiblewhile Germany continued to make press attacks on him.2Considering that the Saar was, together with Austria, thepotential flashpoint in Europe, where one false step couldlead to a new world war, the political wisdom of opting outof responsibility may be seriously questioned.Insofar as any action was taken, it was quietly and un-obtrusively to encourage the French and the Germans tosettle the dispute between themselves and not to involveeither the League or any other Power. This was not veryhelpful advice. Desultory Franco-German conversations in1929 and 1930 proved abortive because the Germans, antici-pating an overwhelming victory in the plebiscite due in 1935,set their price for an out of court settlement too high forthere to be any chance of agreement. By early 1934, when itwas generally felt that Nazi excesses in Germany and in theSaar had tamed the desires of the Saarlanders for union withthe Third Reich, the French resisted any private arrangementfor settling the Saar's future. Thus, when on 30 January,Hitler, in a speech in the Reichstag, proposed negotiationswith France on the subject, and even agreed that any solutionwould have to be submitted to the people of the territory forapproval, Paris remained silent.3 Vansittart, so often pictured

2Public Record Office, London (PRO). Record of a meeting, P. M. Roberts andHerr Braun 11 January 1934, and minute thereon by O. E. G. Sargent; F0371/17718. Sir R. Vansittart to SirJ. Simon (then in Rome), 2 January 1934; MinuteVansittart 16 January 1934 on Sir E. Phipps to Simon 10January 1934, F0371/17718.3Conversation French Ambassador and Vansittart, 17 January 1934, ibid;Phipps to Simon 30 January 1934 and 31 January 1934 F0371/17719.123


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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYas the great anti-appeaser, pondered the possibility of obtain-ing a special treaty with Hitler by an immediate cession ofthe Saar and some compromise over that eastern Europeantrouble spot, the Polish Corridor,4 but there was never anylikelihood of such dreams reaching fruition.WITH THE BRITISH REMAINING in the background, theLeague Council, meeting on 20 January 1934, took its firststep to prepare for the plebiscite by approving a proposalfrom Baron Aloisi of Italy, the League's rapporteur on Saarmatters, that two other members of the Council should beappointed to assist him in preparing a report on the problemsthat would be raised by the plebiscite, and to make recom-mendations for its execution. Assisted by three experts, thisCommittee, on which representatives of Argentina and Spainserved with Aloisi, produced reports for the Council on 15May and on 2 June.5 Certain matters of a technical naturewere answered, it being agreed to establish a Plebiscite Com-mission to organize the voting and a Supreme PlebisciteTribunal to ensure freedom of voting under the law. TheCouncil fixed 13 January 1935 as the date of voting. Thesedecisions, though necessary, did not solve the real issue - viz.how the plebiscite could ever be conducted with anythingapproaching fairness while bands of S.A. and S.S. roamedover the territory, intimidating and bullying the populationwhile the Saar police were too weak or too sympathetic totheir cause to prevent them. In January, Knox warned theCouncil that 'unless special precautions were taken, it wouldbe impossible to hold a plebiscite',6 and in April he pointedout the possibility of the situation getting completely out ofhand and an attempt being made at a coup de main.7 Thedecision of the Council - to authorize an increase in localpolice and gendarmerie during the plebiscite period and, ifnecessary, to support recruitment from outside the Saar-avoided rather than solved the problem. It was soon found

4Gilbert Murray to Lord R. Cecil, 5 December 1933, Cecil Papers, vol. 51132.SLeague of Nations Official Journal (LNOJ), February 1934, 161-163;June1934, 644-50.6Record of secret League meeting of 20January 1934, PRO, FO371/17718.7The Times, 8 May 1934.124


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEthat an insufficient number of impartial candidates werewilling to come forward from within the Saar, and on 3August Knox wrote to the League Council stating that theGoverning Commission would find it necessary to recruitfrom outside the territory and requesting that members ofthe League should be approached to facilitate this.8The Foreign Office remained unimpressed: 'It is obviousthat a police force internationally recruited, even if onlyamong German-speaking countries, will be a heterogeneouscrowd; if non German-speaking elements are added, the con-fusion will be indescribable. There is no time in which totrain elements recruited at this late hour or for them tobecome acquainted with the districts in which they are toexercise their functions... Such a mob would probably notonly be useless, but even dangerous since its incompetence ifit were ever called upon to act might aggravate rather thancontrol a difficult situation. Its introduction into the SaarTerritory at the present juncture might, moreover, well act asa strong political irritant'.9 This recognition that existingLeague policy was at best useless and at worst liable toprovoke a major European crisis did not, however, stimulateLondon to action. On the contrary, it confirmed the deter-mination not to become involved. The League Council wasinformally notified that, although Britain would not impose aveto on the appointment of her nationals to responsible postsin connection with the plebiscite, it would prefer that theywere not made. Those British subjects who wrote to theForeign Office concerning appointments in the Saar werecoldly informed that applications should be sent to theGoverning Commission or the Plebiscite Commission and thatthe British Government had no concern in such matters.

During that summer and autumn of 1934 there were, how-ever, three aspects of the Saar problem that did concern theBritish. First, there was the personal safety of Mr Knox, who,irritating though he made himself to many in the ForeignOffice by his constant calls for a more resolute policy by the8LNOJ, September 1934, 1140-46.9Memorandum on the Proposal of the Saar Governing Commission to recruitan international Police Force for the Saar, 5 September 1934, F0371/17722.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYBritish Government,10 remained an Englishman who couldnot be allowed to suffer assault or assassination whatever hisown indifference to personal safety. A Foreign Office meet-ing on 5 September presided over by Anthony Eden, firstmade the proposal that two or three Scotland Yard menmight be sent as bodyguards." It was not, however, until 5October that Ralph Wigram, head of the Central Departmentof the Foreign Office, eventually drafted a letter to the HomeOffice asking for this protection to be given and adding that,although strictly speaking, Knox was a League official andtherefore his safety was its responsibility, it would be diffi-cult and time-consuming to obtain the cost from that sourceand that he therefore felt the British Government might bearthe burden.12 This occasioned further delay because theexpenditure of any monies required Treasury consent. On 12October the Foreign Office received a note from the Treasuryrefusing to provide the few pounds necessary and urged thatthe Foreign Office should, if it still felt the matter to be ofimportance, persuade Knox to defray the costs out of theSaar budget. This was, of course, ridiculous. It was theForeign Office rather than the pugnacious Knox who wasconcerned over the possibility of assassination and had thelatter felt the need for bodyguards he would have obtainedthem himself without pressure from London. Not until 22October did two CID officers eventually leave Londondestined for the Saar, and then it was largely because OrmeSargent had unwisely presupposed Treasury approval for theexpenditure and on 8 October had so informed Knox, thus,in effect, presenting the Treasury with a fait accompli. Adelay of seven weeks between the original proposal and itsbeing put into effect at a time when Knox's life was dailybeing threatened is a sad comment on civil service efficiency.In regard to safeguarding its own direct interests in theSaar, Britain was equally inactive. If the plebiscite was toresult in a German victory then the coal mines ceded to

0 The Dictionary of National Biography 1951-60 (London 1971), 594-5 saysthat he 'took little pains to endear himself to his superiors'." Memorandum on the Proposal of the Saar Governing Commission to recruitan international Police Force for the Saar, 5 September 1934, FO371/17722.2R. Wigramto Sir R. Scott, 5 October 1934, and reply to Wigram, T160/593/F11340/1.126


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEFrance by the Treaty of Versailles would be repurchased atan agreed figure

- about ?20 million thought the ForeignOffice. Since Germany would not, and probably could not,pay this sum in foreign currency or gold, it was assumed thatshipments of coal from the Saar Basin to France would bethe method of payment. The Mines Department estimatedthat the result would be a decline in French imports of coalof one million tons a year of which the United Kingdomwould bear about 40 percent. The Treasury, however, afterlooking ruefully at the likely increase in unemployment inthe coal industry, concluded that there were no grounds forintervention.13 Another and more important economicconcern was the future of the one million pound loan madeto the city of Saarbricken in October 1928 by MessrsGuiness, Mahon and Co. Although the interest had beenregularly paid since that date the company feared that, ifGermany took over the Saar, it would immediately apply itsown exchange control restrictions to the territory. After suit-able pressure on the Government a letter was sent early inJanuary 1934 from the Treasury to Sir Otto Niemeyer, theBank of England representative on the sub-committee of theFinancial Committee of the League which dealt with Saarmatters, pointing out the dangers of default and requestingassistance. Niemeyer refused. Agreeing that it was monstrousthat the city of Saarbriicken should be forced into defaultbecause of a political arrangement, he nevertheless insistedthat there was no technical question involved and that there-fore the Financial Committee could do nothing. TheTreasury thereupon informed the Foreign Office that itunderstood that if the result of the plebiscite was in favour ofGermany then the return of the Saar was unconditional andthe occasion could not be used to make bargains for specialprivileges for the loan or any other matter.14 A question inthe House of Commons on what steps were being taken tosafeguard the holders of the Saarbriicken loan solicited no-

'3Memorandum, Ashton-Gwatkin, 23 April 1934, F0371/17720; Memorandum,Mines Department, n.d. T160/593/F11340/1; E. Rowe-Dutton (Treasury) toR C. S. Stevenson, 2 February 1934, F0371/17740.'4Sir O. Niemeyer to E. Rowe-Dutton, 19 January 1934, T160/593/F11340/1.E. Rowe-Dutton to R C. S. Stevenson, 2 February 1934.127


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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYthing beyond a promise that HMG would not lose sight of thematter.15 In June, Germany took drastic action to remedythe foreign currency shortage by announcing a transfermoratorium on all foreign debts liabilities. An Anglo-Germantransfer agreement of 4 July was little more than a betrayalof long term creditors such as Guiness, Mahon and Co. sinceinterest payments were to be made in the form of specialbonds and only interest on the interest already due was to bepaid in sterling. Throughout the summer and autumn thisagreement seemed near to collapse, and the probability of afull clearing system being imposed on Germany by the BritishGovernment seemed to increase. Meanwhile the ForeignOffice had decided to entrust the future of the Saarbruckenloan to the Committee of Three, asking it to consider theissue in a note in September 1934.The third concern connected with the Saar to disturbBritain during this period was that of minority interests. TheJews, in particular, continually pressed for some kind ofguarantees against persecution if the Saar was to return toGermany.16 Reaction in London was mixed. The humani-tarian instinct condemned unreservedly the barbarism theNazis were keen to impose on recalcitrant Saarlanders, butthere was a typical reluctance to become involved. In May1934 Berlin had promised that those entitled to vote wouldbe free from danger of persecution but it would give noguarantee for others, on the basis that emigres from the ThirdReich had deliberately moved into the Saar to stir up treach-erous conspiracies in the area and deserved the heaviest penal-ties Nazi law could impose on traitors.17 The Foreign Officehoped to see the guarantees extended to cover all residents,yet equally doubted if any such promise would be worth ajot if Hitler actually won the plebiscite. Moreover, it was feltthat the only satisfactory solution to the vote would be anoverwhelming victory for Germany as anything short of this

"Hansard, 30 April 1934, cols. 17-18.6Interview Lord Cranbome and Neville Laski (Jewish Foreign Committee) 12September 1934, F0371/17723.'7To be entitled to vote it was necessary to be of age at the date of theplebiscite and to have been living in the Saar in 1920. The territory had been usedas a base for anti-Hitler propaganda once all prospect of open opposition withinthe Reich had disappeared.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEwould encourage the French in their talk of maintainingLeague administration or establishing lengthy minorityregimes, solutions which the Foreign Office viewed as mostunwise, and liable to render the area a permanent point ofcontention on the map of Europe poisoning Franco-Germanrelations for generations. Yet to get this massive Germanvictory it was, it appeared, necessary to give free rein to Naziterror tactics. The choice seemed to many in the ForeignOffice to lie between ignoring German brutalities now orlaying another of the foundation stones for a future Franco-German, and therefore full world war. This unpleasantdilemma the Foreign Office tried to avoid by refusing to playany major role in the protection of minority interests.British withdrawal from responsibility could only be otherthan disastrous if the French were prepared to take all stepsnecessary to ensure that the plebiscite did not lead to a majorEuropean crisis. French troops had been stationed in the Saarfor several years, and although these were withdrawn in themid 1920s, it was agreed by the League Council in March1926 that, if the Governing Commission so requested, theymight re-enter if this were necessary to ensure the mainte-nance of public order.18 The Ruhr intervention of 1923 had,however, destroyed any enthusiasm for military adventures.Even disregarding the dangers of a clash with German troops,any movement of soldiers across the French frontier wouldbe ill-regarded in the United States, by the majority ofEnglishmen, and by socialist and liberal opinion in Franceitself. The French aim, therefore, was to appear publicly firmenough to discourage any Nazi coup but in practice to takeno precautions to avert one. It is no exaggeration to say thatBritish hopes for the peace of Europe rested solely on theability of the French to bluff the Nazi regimeTO ENSURE INTERNATIONAL MORAL SUPPORT theFrench Government demanded a renewed mandate from theLeague to enter Saar territory if necessary, and the requestwas immediately discussed in London. There were obviousadvantages in working for a new Council resolution if thereby

18LNOJ,April 1926, 527-28.129


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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYthe French would take full responsibility for security - theNazis would be discouraged from making any rash move, theFrench would be unable to complain of a total British lack ofunderstanding, the League would be protected from thecharge that it had done nothing to prevent a coup, thechances of Britain being dragged into a crisis would be dimin-ished and advocates of collective security would have beensatisfied.19 Yet no action was taken. The reluctance toconfuse the situation at Geneva by pressing for renewedaction, the concern that Germany would certainly be unsym-pathetic to such a move, and the fear that it was unsafe togive to Knox, considered by some in the Foreign Office to bea wild Francophile, the right to decide if French interventionwas necessary, checkmated any hopes of satisfying Frenchneeds as regards international sanction. The assassination ofBarthou, the Foreign Minister, on 9 October and his replace-ment by Laval, less intransigently anti-German, enabled theGeneral Staff's opposition to French intervention to sway theGovernment. By mid-November, Laval could state:

That France undertook to take no action of any kind except inconformity with her treaty obligations;that if there were any conflicts as to the correct interpretation ofthose obligations the French Government would refuse to discuss itanywhere except at Geneva;that not a French soldier had been moved, and that all that hadoccurred was that plans had been prepared against the event, whichthe French Government sincerely hoped would not arise, of theGoverning Commission calling on them for assistance;that if, unfortunately, the event did arise the French Governmentundertook to employ in the first instance nothing but police(gardes mobiles) and that they would only send troops in the verylast resort if the available police forces had been exhausted andfurther reinforcements were called for.20

British hopes of sidestepping a thorny issue by leaving theFrench to deal with it were steadily being eroded. Optimisticreports that Paris was making the necessary preparations for

gCampbell o Sargent,18 October1934;minuteby Wigram, 2 October1934,F0371/17723.20Clerko Simon,15 November1934, F0371/17725.130


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEintervention were received in London with scepticism,21 andas the realisation of probable French timidity began to beappreciated in the Foreign Office so was the fact that thiswould encourage Nazi extremists and revive the possibility ofa putsch against the Governing Commission. If the Frenchfailed to make adequate plans, then even if events did ensuretheir intervention the two or three days delay between anappeal for troops and their arrival 'will at least be adangerous, and might be a fatal, interval. If the putsch wereattempted, and Knox and the remainder of the GoverningCommission fall into the hands of those carrying out theputsch, no-one could tell what their fate might be if they hadto wait some days for rescue.'22 During October andNovember 1934, then, it became increasingly clear that sincethe French wanted to avoid action and Knox's hastily-recruited and heterogeneous police force was incapable ofpreserving order if the Nazis determined to stir up trouble,Britain had to take some measures of her own. Pressure onthe German Government through diplomatic channels wasone obvious possibility and did, indeed, achieve a certainsuccess when on 2 November the authorities in Berlin issuedorders to the S.A. and S.S. formations on the German side ofthe Saar frontier prohibiting, over a belt twenty-five mileswide and for the period of 10 January to 10 February, thewearing of uniforms and any parades, processions, or gather-ings of any kind.23 The following day Himmler decided toestablish frontier police stations to prevent undesirablepersons crossing into the Saar.24 It would seem, in fact, thatthe German Government was losing any enthusiasm it mayhave had for a coup, partly no doubt due to the latestanalyses of public opinion which seemed to indicate that theminority opposing union with Germany would not be as largeas the Nazis feared, but even more to the fear that the anti-

21Campbell to Simon, 1 November 1934, and minute by Sargent, F0371/17724.22Eden to Simon enclosed in Eden to Vansittart, 21 September 1934, F0371/17723.23SirJ. Simon to Sir E. Phipps, 5 November 1934, F0371/17724.24Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series C, III, No. 294.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYNazi forces in the Saar were trying to encourage an attemptedcoup so that they might force the entry of French troops andthe postponement and perhaps total abandonment of anyidea of the reunion of the Reich and the Saar. Hitler wassufficiently concerned over the possibility of German emigrespreparing a putsch to tell his Foreign Minister von Neuraththat he thought it advisable to call in a neutral force com-posed primarily of Swiss nationals to preserve order.25 Thiscame to nothing owing to a Swiss refusal, on constitutionalgrounds, to allow the employment of its forces outsidenational frontiers.It must be said that none of these decisions in Berlin effec-tively checked the Nazi agitators in the Saar; on the contrary,the excitement grew, the threats against Knox became moreviolent, and the dangers of a coup were increasingly evident.As in Austria earlier in 1934, it was easier for the Nazis inBerlin to whip up a fiery nationalist campaign amongGermans outside the Reich than to remain in control of it.Nevertheless it was now clear that any proposal for inter-national action to keep the peace in the Saar during theperiod of the plebiscite would not necessarily invite the out-raged opposition of the German Government. In Paris theForeign Ministry had similar thoughts. Laval told the Ministerat the British Embassy that the responsibility for the conse-quences of the employment of French troops in any emer-gency was a heavy one and that 'It was not fair that Franceshould be asked to bear the whole of the responsibility. Bothon that ground and because of the greater deterrent effect onGermany it was desirable that other countries (he mentionedGreat Britain and Italy) should participate. He did not suggestthey should send large detachments but that they should berepresented in what he called a symbolical manner'.26The chief stumbling block to any international force waspresented by the British Government. The issue had beenbriefly considered months before and rejected out of hand byall concerned. In May the Foreign Secretary, Simon, hadstated: 'It is quite certain that we cannot contribute

2Sibid.No. 346.26Campbellto Simon, 30 October 1934, F0371/17724.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEtroops... we ought to keep in the background for there isnothing but trouble coming out of this business and we don'twant either to quarrel with the French or to give theGermans encouragement.' Four months later he told SirRussell Scott that, 'We must, of course, in all circumstances,avoid taking any responsibility as a Government and it isunthinkable that British troops or police should be lent oremployed'. On 5 November, in reply to a question byLansbury, the leader of the Opposition, the Foreign Secre-tary affirmed that 'There never has been any question of the useof British troops, and nothing of the sort on our part is contem-plated'.27 The first doubts as to the wisdom of the policy cameon 12 November from Anthony Eden who tentatively notedthat from the viewpoint of international peace it was to bepreferred that Britain and Italy should 'show a flag' with theFrench in the Saar, if the latter were called on to enter.28Eden's minute, however short and tentative, started amajor debate within the Foreign Office, which after fourdays had produced a cabinet paper.29 In the production ofthis paper personalities immediately came to the fore. Simon,whose responsibility it was to make the final decision as tothe contents of the paper, was intensely jealous of Eden.Young, dashing, handsome, given to voicing all the popularcatch phrases with a cheerful bonhomie, Eden was rapidlygrowing in stature in official, Parliamentary and public favourand was displacing his cold and reticent chief. While Simonwas being widely assailed as the worst Foreign Secretary ofthe century, his junior was openly adored, and, worse, lookedupon as Simon's obvious successor. The latter's gall may beimagined, it even slipping out in a speech in the House ofCommons when he coldly remarked that a member of theOpposition had 'paid a very nice compliment to the LordPrivy Seal. . . because he wanted it to be inferred that theForeign Office had had nothing to do with it'.30 It was, there-27Minutes by Simon and Vansittart on a Foreign Office Memorandum, 10 May1934, FO371/17720; Simon to Scott, 7 September 1934, F0800/289;Hansard, 5November 1934, cols. 617-18.28Minute by Eden on Campbell to Simon, 30 October 1934, FO371/17724.29PRO, C.P.261 (34) in Cab. 24/251.30Hansard,22 November 1934, 295 H.C. Deb 5s col. 304.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYfore, extremely difficult for Simon as a person, rather than asa Foreign Secretary, to adopt Eden's proposal. Indeed, itwould have been difficult for Simon whoever had made theproposal, for his 'brilliant, analytical mind hated to makedecisions. As a consequence he was tempted to dodge them,for which there was always an ingenious reason, while thedifficulties in Europe grew.'31The cabinet paper eventually produced was somewhatambivalent. Simon, in his diary of a few days later, com-plained that 'some foolish or grudging commentators seem tosuppose the whole thing [that is the use of an internationalpolice force] was a brilliant improvisation at Geneva' byEden, whereas, 'I record here that the suggestion firstappeared in a paper I wrote for the cabinet on 16November.'32 Yet no such suggestion appears, the nearestapproximation being the comment, 'That it would be farbetter to make sure, if we could, that nothing untowardhappened now, than, by shutting our eyes to possible conse-quences, to give the opportunity for a calamity that might beavoided.'33 Simon's disingenuousness and lack of franknessseem to have extended even to his own diary. Nevertheless,Simon's comment is not without a certain twisted basis. Thecabinet paper, though drawn up on 16 November was notconsidered by the cabinet until 21 November, and in themeantime the discussion had extended beyond the confinesof the Foreign Office. Eden's proposal could no longer bequashed as inconvenient; a decision had to be made. Fromthe Treasury, Warren Fisher, permanent under-secretary, whoregularly attempted sallies into the field of foreign affairsregardless of the mischief he caused, declared that 'It wouldbe madness from the point of view of our domestic politicsfor us to send even a single grenadier to the Saar.'34 Simon,

31Avon, op. cit. 28. Simon's cabinet colleague. J. H. Thomas, 'often thoughtthat he lacked initiative and, in fact, he never once acted on his own responsi-bility'. My Story (London 1937), 263.32Simon's diary, 9 December 1934, quoted in E. Segal, Sir John Simon andBritish Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Disarmament in the Early 1930s.(University of California Berkeley Ph.D. 1969), 66.33C.P.261 (34) in Cab. 24/251.34Minute Sir W. Fisher, 20 November 1934 on C.P.261 (34) in T161/631/S39548.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEmeanwhile, had been under further pressure from Eden tosupport the case of British participation in an internationalpeace-keeping force and on 18 November, though still sayingthat it was 'a most difficult question' which would requireimmediate discussion, he had agreed that it was the best andpossibly the only way of guaranteeing peace in the Saar.35Inevitably, therefore, regardless of the contents of Simon'spaper of 16 November, the cabinet on 21 November con-sidered the possibility of the use of British soldiers. TheFrench proposal for a token British force to emphasize theinternational character of any troops sent into the Saar wasthought to be most undesirable on the grounds that theGerman Government, though willing to accept a peace-keeping force, would certainly not agree to the inclusion ofFrench soldiers in that force. It was, however, recognizedthat if no attempt was made to keep order a Nazi putsch waspossible and it was therefore questioned as to whether, ifBerlin was willing to suggest the use of British troops, aninternational force excluding the French might be possible.Nothing was settled but Simon was invited to report furtherif he felt the situation merited it. One matter, however, wasresolved, or rather it was agreed that steps should be taken toresolve it, for Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of theExchequer, Walter Runciman, the President of the Board ofTrade, and Simon were invited to 'confer on the steps to betaken to safeguard British financial interests in the Saar whenthe report of Baron Aloisi's Committee is considered atGeneva'. 36British economic interests in the Saar, over which noaction had been taken since the memorandum of September1934, asking the Committee of Three to put the matterunder their consideration, had come to the fore again withthe opening in Rome of direct Franco-German negotiations,under the aegis of the Aloisi Committee on the price of andthe method of payments for the coal mines which, in theevent of a German plebiscite victory, were to be sold back tothat country. Since both French and German Governments

"Minutes MrA. Eden, 16 November 1934 and SirJ. Simon, 18 November 1934on Sir G. Clerk to SirJ. Simon F0371/17725.36Minutesof cabinet meeting 21 November 1934, Cab. 23/80, 41(34)1,135


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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYwere by now keen to dispose of the issue, agreement betweenthe two proved far easier than had been considered remotelypossible six months before and both sides were willing toaccept a proposal whereby payment for the mines would beby the use of 95 percent of the windfall which was to accrueto Germany in the form of French banknotes circulating inthe Saar.37 The cabinet decision that the relevant Ministershould consider the protection of British interests did notrequire to be put into effect as it was decided to apply theremaining 5 percent of the French notes to repayment offoreign loans and interest thereon, a sum which it wasthought would prove sufficient to protect the SaarbruickenBonds for several years.Meanwhile, the question of sending British troops to theSaar had advanced. Simon, on 20 November, wrote to Edenat Geneva asking him to find out from Knox what were thechances of getting through the plebiscite period withoutdisturbances if there were no reliable police force, and toimpress upon him most strongly the risks involved in callingin French soldiers. On a more positive note he confirmed thatthe possibility of despatching British soldiers as a part of ajoint Anglo-Italian contingent was under consideration.38 Tendays later Eden responded with a lengthy memorandum inwhich he warned that a decision would soon be forced uponBritain because Laval intended to invite the League Councilto ask other interested countries, in particular Britain andItaly, to join France in providing troops to meet any crisis.The result would be either that Britain would have to supporta resolution agreeing to French intervention, and thus rousethe ire of Berlin, or to oppose the resolution and leave theSaar Governing Commission without resources. He proposedthat the only way out of this dilemma was for him to beauthorised to make the first move and suggest a full inter-national force excluding both French and German troops, towhich Britain would contribute a fair proportion.39

37MrMurrayto SirJ. Simon, 24 November 1934, F0371/17726.38SirJ. Simon to MrA. Eden, 20 November 1934, F0800/289.39Avon.op. cit. 103. Laval's intention to make this proposal was first recorded inMr. Patteson to Sir J. Simon, 21 November 1934, F0371/17726 but confirmationof this had only been received later.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITETwo days earlier on 28 November, the cabinet had agreed

'Provisionally to adopt the suggestion that at the meeting ofthe Council of the League next week, the British representa-tive should outline the difficult and dangerous position in theSaar and should indicate our view that the best course wouldbe to send a bona fide international force.'40 This decision,however, did not make Eden's memorandum redundant. Onthe contrary the opposition to involvement from within thecabinet did not consider this decision to be conclusive, stress-ing the word 'provisionally'. At a meeting at noon on 3December, Simon, Eden and Lord Stanhope representing theForeign Office met the Secretary of State for War, LordHailsham, to consider the matter fully,41 Eden pressed theneed for action but Hailsham 'thought that the risks whichwe should take in sending British troops to the Saar wereincalculable, and he disliked very much the idea of beingmixed-up in the trouble... he was so very much afraid ofthe results if difficulties arose. We should be rather in theposition of providing a garrison on top of a powdermagazine.' The cabinet of 28 November had decided thatSimon and Hailsham should report the results of their meet-ing to the Prime Minister, Ramsay Macdonald, to StanleyBaldwin and to Neville Chamberlain, and in the circum-stances their opinions would now be decisive. Between theending of the first meeting and the convening of the second,which was due for 2.45 that same afternoon, Eden, presum-ably forsaking his lunch, hurried to see Stanley Baldwin, hisparty leader and close personal confidant.42 Baldwinpromised his support and, showing a vigour on internationalaffairs most unusual for him, firmly insisted that publicopinion would welcome the sending of troops.43 NevilleChamberlain, had for several months with more enthusiasmthan understanding been urging the creation of an inter-

40Cabinetmeeting 28 November 1934, Cab. 23/80, 43(34)3.41Meeting at Foreign Office 3 December 1934, Cab. 27/573, F.A./D/31(1). Thishad been arrangedat the cabinet of 28 November 1934.42Thereis evidence that Simon rather resented Eden's habit of reporting directlyto Baldwin rather than through him since, though he was the senior Ministerconcerned with foreign affairs, he could on occasions yet find himself uninformedon major issues.43Avon op. cit. 101-102.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYnational police force to assist the victim of any aggressionand resented the constant opposition, on practical grounds,of the armed services to the idea.44 The Saar crisis was there-fore to his mind 'a heaven-sent opportunity to put ourselvesright with the world, take the lead, and incidentally stage anexample of an international police force'.45 With the supportof Baldwin and Chamberlain46 Simon gained a victory overHailsham in that a British contribution to a police force wasfound acceptable. Two conditions, however, were imposed.Firstly, France and Germany would have to approve, andsecondly, it would be desirable if, in addition to British andItalian troops, men could be provided from smaller Europeancountries such as Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. Theformer consideration met general agreement since, at thedinnertime meeting, Simon had said that, 'if Germany failedto give her consent, he would need a very great deal ofpersuading before he would agree to sending any Britishtroops to the Saar... If there was no agreement, he thoughtwe should only have one course open to us, which was tohave nothing to do with the whole matter. He could notconceieve (sic) that the people in this country would everagree to our sending troops into the Saar against the will ofGermany'.47 The suggestion that some of the smallercountries of Europe be invited to provide troops to support

44A report of 28 March 1934 by the Chiefs of Staff concluded, 'that the diffi-culties and disadvantages inseparable from the scheme would make its effectiveapplication in practice very doubtful, and its reliability as a deterrent would becorrespondingly reduced. Moreover, if the deterrent fails, it involves war, and incertain quite conceivable circumstances, unlimited war'. C.O.S. 329 in Cab. 53/4.Full details of Chamberlain's ideas are in C.O.S. 328, Cab. 53/4. One commen-tator thought that Chamberlain saw the international force destined for the Saaras 'a first step towards an ultimate realization of the sole method whereby, intime to come, international peace would be preserved'. V. G. Lennox, 'AnthonyEden' in Foreign Affairs Vol. 16 (1937-38), 696.45Chamberlain diary, 9 December 1934 quoted in K. Feiling, Life of NevilleChamberlain (London 1946), 252.46There is no evidence of MacDonald's viewpoint in the official record, (Meetingat House of Commons, 3 December 1934, Cab. 27/573, F.A./D/31(2)), or to theauthor's knowledge, elsewhere.47Meeting at Foreign Office, 3 December 1934, Cab. 27/573, F.A./D/31(1).138


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITEthe proposed Anglo-Italian contingent came fromChamberlain, and was accepted without opposition.

A decision of such magnitude was, of course, subject tothe approval of the whole cabinet. Therefore, on 5 Decemberthe ministers were provided with a short note written by thePrime Minister explaining the conclusions reached on 3December and asking for a general sanction. Their agreement,it might have been expected, would prove a mere formality.Yet, in the event this did not happen. They looked upon thecontinental scene with fear. In May 1933 Vansittart hadwarned that 'The present regime in Germany will, on pastand present form, loose off another European war just assoon as it feels strong enough' and events since that time hadtragically shown his prophecy coming true. In October 1933Hitler had marched out of both the Disarmament Conferenceand the League of Nations and in July 1934 only Italiandetermination had prevented the creation of a NazifiedAustria. Talk of war to recover the Polish Corridor and toliberate the Germans under Czech rule was common, andthere were even adherents to a campaign to repossess the lostcolonies, many of which had been taken over by Britain orthe Dominions. In support of such a policy Germany wasknown to be pursuing a policy of rapid rearmament, whichneither pleas nor oblique warnings from London seemedcapable of halting.

Many in the cabinet, therefore, concluded that only apolicy of isolationism could prevent Britain being draggedinto a future war, and they looked askance at the proposalnow before them. The total rejection of a policy approved bythe four senior members of the government inevitably provedbeyond their power, but their opposition proved sufficientlystrong that the desirability for a third contingent expressedon 3 December was made a condition for participation, andthe hope was expressed that at least four countries mightagree to play a part. Further, Simon was instructed to obtainspecific approval from Germany before any public statementbe made. A flurry of activity followed immediately.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYEden was due to announce British participation in the forceto the League Council within a few hours and the problemshad to be solved before then. A telegram was urgently rushedto the ambassador in Berlin instructing him to discoverthe reaction to the idea of an international force48and the necessary agreement obtained.49 The requirementof a third contingent, however, could not be met in time.Eden, back in Geneva, had been negotiating with BaronAloisi on the possibility of getting Italian adherence to theinternational force and had met with difficulties. Aloisi,despite his work on the Committee of Three, seemed unable'to appreciate the distinction between an international forcewithout French troops as a prevention and its associationwith French troops as a cure after emergency had arisen'.50The latter had been firmly rejected by Italy, despite prompt-ings from Laval, and it required the strongest effort fromEden, combined with pressure in Rome by the Britishambassador,51 before agreement could be obtained to a jointAnglo-Italian force. Eden, therefore, deduced that the ItalianGovernment was far from enthusiastic over the whole schemeand had only been willing to co-operate because of theprestige involved in a great power intervention. The involve-ment of other countries would lessen the appeal of the ideaof an international force as far as Mussolini was concernedand perhaps wreck the whole plan. Eden decided to ignorethe new cabinet instructions.52

During the Council meeting on 5 December Lavalproposed an international force to maintain order in the Saarover the period of the plebiscite, and offered not to demandFrench participation provided the Germans would act upon asimilar principle. Eden then announced His Majesty's Govern-ment's willingness to supply a suitable proportion of such aforce. The decision of Holland and Sweden to contributecontingents if requested, saved Eden's reputation, though theHague did not communicate its agreement till 8 December

48SirJ. Simon to Sir E. Phipps, 5 December 1934, F0371/17727.49SirE. Phipps to SirJ. Simon, 5 December 1934, ibid.5oMrPatteson to SirJ. Simon, 5 December 1934, ibid."SirJ. Simon to Sir E. Drummond, 5 December 1934, ibid.s2Avon, op. cit. 105.140


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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE SAAR PLEBISCITE

and Stockholm till the 10th. The Swiss, though sympathetic,refused to be involved for the same technical reasons that hadprevented them earlier acceding to Hitler's similar request.The Irish Free State also offered a contingent but it wasthought unnecessary to invoke further assistance. Afterdiscussion with Knox the size of the force was fixed at 3,500of which Britain and Italy would each supply 1,500 and theremainder would come equally from the two smaller partici-pating states.Once the initial impetus had been given the rest proved aneasy pathway. Technical problems certainly occurred, largelyconnected with questions of pay and who was to act ascommander-in-chief53 but the negotiating skill of Major-General Temperley, British military representative at theLeague found answers to all these difficulties.54 On 12December Hailsham could inform the cabinet that acommander-in-chief had been selected, the most importantdetails settled and that no hitch or trouble of any kind wasexpected.55 The presence of 3,500 troops and the determina-tion of Germany that its increasingly rosy prospects for alarge majority in the plebiscite should not be ruined by civildisturbances56 meant that the vote passed without serioustrouble. The result was overwhelmingly one-sided- forunion with Germany 477,119, for union with France2,214 - for retaining some form of League administration46,513. The difficulties of a large minority vote were avoidedand on 17 January the Council of the League formallyapproved the union of the Saar with the Third Reich.

53On pay the Italians objected to the simplest solution, namely that all menwould continue on their normal rates of pay, on the grounds that this wouldproduce friction, British soldiers on the whole receiving higher incomes than theirItalian counterparts. On the issue of who was to command the troops both Romeand London claimed precedence but this thorny issue was eventually settledamicably, when, in return for approving a British commander-in-chief, the Italianswere rewarded with the Presidency of a new committee, consisting of representa-tives of countries sending contingents. Sir E. Drummond to Sir J. Simon, 7December 1934, F0371/17728.s4 Temperley's activities in the Saar are recounted in his memoirs, The Whisper-ing Gallery of Europe (London 1938), 286-95."5Cabinetmeeting 12 December 1934, Cab. 23/80, 46(34)1.56 On 7 December an order was issued strictly forbidding all S.A. and S.S. menfrom entering the Saar unless they were entitled to vote there. Sir E. Phipps to SirJ. Simon, 7 December 1934, F0371/17728.

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CONTEMPORARY HISTORYThe Saar Plebiscite should have taught several important

lessons to British foreign policy-makers. It should, firstly,have shown that the Amery-Rothermere fortress-Britainschool was lacking in realism. Involvement in Europe bydiplomacy was inevitable unless involvement by war was toresult. Regardless of personal preferences Britain was part ofthe Continent; the Empire was, and could be, no substitute.Secondly, as a reinforcement to this, it revealed that theFrench had lost confidence in their own power to contain anexpansive Germany, but that they, and the lesser states ofEurope, would be willing to follow any British lead to thisend. Thirdly, the magnitude of the German victory was clearevidence that nationalism was a stronger attraction thanbarbarism was a repellent and, therefore, that dreams ofGerman public opinion being sufficiently revolted by Naziterror-tactics to move against the Hitler regime were puredelusion. Finally, .the employment of an international forceto keep the peace was shown to be a potent weapon if usedcarefully. Hitler, it is true, was as keen to avoid trouble aswere the other leaders of Europe, but many of his enthusi-astic followers were not. These were kept under control andso the very real danger of civil disturbance producing a waravoided. How, and to what extent, these lessons were learnedduring the remaining four years of peace, other historiansmust answer.

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