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Lantoria vs. Bunyi

Facts:

Cesar Lantoria sought disciplinary action against Bunyi, counsel for Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas in certain civi

cases

Allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge (Vicente Galicia of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur) and

bribery

in cases for ejectment of squatters in Mascarinas land, Bunyi all egedly was the

o one who prepared the decisions and judge simply signed them

Issue: WON Bunyi is guilty of unethical conduct

Held: YES

Ratio:

letters show that he indeed prepared draft decisions for the judge to sign does not matter if it was clearly shown

that the judge consented to such act or even asked for it

violated canon 3: attempts to exert personal influence on the court

violated:

o CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which

tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for

cultivating familiarity with judges.

SUSPENDED FOR A YEAR.

PRESIDENT JOSEPHEJERCITO ESTRADA,petitioner, vs. THEHONORABLESANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

-Attorney Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have violated Rule 5.10 oftheCode of Judicial Conduct by attending theEDS A 2 Rally and by authorizing th e assumption of Vice-President

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution.

o Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But to avoid suspicion

of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly

endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.

Also, petitioner contended that the justices have prejudged a case that would assail the legality of the act taken

by President Arroyo. The subsequent decision of theCourt in Estrada v. Arroyo (353 SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108

is, petitioner states, a patent mockery of justice and due process.

According to Atty. Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong Pangr ekonsiderasyon on 11 Jun e 2003, the three

justices of the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest their bias and partiality against his client.

Thus, he

ave

rre

d, Pre

siding Justice

Minita V.C

hico-Nazario suppose

dlye

mploye

d foul and disre

spe

ctful language

when she blurted out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and Justic e Teresita Leonardo-De

Castro characterized the motion as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its comments or

opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in open court that to grant Estradas motion would r esult in chaos

and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial attitud e of th e Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney

Paguia filed, on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification.

The petitioner also asked theCourt to include in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts ofChief Justice

Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:

a. going to EDSA 2;

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b. authorizing the proclamation of Vice-President Arroyo as President on the ground of permanent

disability even without proof of compliance with the corresponding constitutional conditions, e.g.

written declaration by either the President or majority of his cabinet; and

c. actually proclaiming Vice-President Arroyo on that same ground of permanent disability.

In a letter, dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Associate JusticeArtemio V

Panganiban, he has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping, for several advisory opinions on

matters pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Subsequently, the court ruled that the instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be DISMISSED for

gross insufficiency in substance and for utter lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse ofdiscretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a recourse to theextraordinary relief ofetition for certiorar

under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCivil Procedure.

In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, theCourt strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of disciplinary

sanction, to desist from further making, directly or indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members

Unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by theCourt, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.

o In fact, on the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say -Wh at is the

legaleffectofthatviolation ofPresidentEstradas rightto due process oflaw?Itrenders the decision in

Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutionaland void. Therudiments offairplaywere notobserved. Therewas no

fair play since it appears that when President Estradafiledhis petition, Chief Justice Davide and his

fellow justices hadalreadycommitted to the other party - GMA - witha judgmentalready madeand

waitingto beformalizedafterthe litigants shallhave undergonethecharade ofaformalhearing. Afte

the justices hadauthorizedthe proclamation ofGMA as president, can they beexpectedto voluntarily

admitthe unconstitutionality oftheirown act?

Issue: WON Atty. Paguia committed a violation of theCode of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a

decision of the Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction can enlighten the court and

contribute to the correction of an error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.) However, Attorney Paguia has

not limited his discussions to the merits of his clients cas e within the judicial forum. Indeed, he has repeated his

assault on theCourt in both broadcast and print media.

o R ule 13.02 ofthe Code ofProfessionalResponsibility prohibits a memberofthe barfrom making suchpublic statements on any pendingcasetendingto arouse public opinionfororagainsta party. Byhis acts

Attorney Paguia mayhave stokedthefires ofpublic dissension and poseda potentially dangerous threa

to theadministration ofjustice.

It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory cont ext, relates to acts designed

to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates who have filed certificates of

candidacy to a public office in an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the

Republic before theChief Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The

assailed presence of other justices of theCourt at such an event could be no different from their appearance in

such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the Nation Address by the President of the

Philippines before the Legislative Department.

The

Supre

me

C

ourt doe

s not claim infallibility; but it will not counte

nance

any wrongdoing nor allow the

e

rosionof our peoples faith in th e judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in

the Philippines.

Canon 11 of theCode of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the

respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally

imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members

of theCourt, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of

justice.

TheCourt has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave

responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of theCourt. Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.

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WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon his

receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of theCourt.

VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA,vs. ATTYAMADO R. FOJAS

DAVIDE JR.,J.:

In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred fo

"malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint." They

attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically allege:

1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in theCourt ofAppeals Case No. CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to

our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious

misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the

performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case. That the said attorney without

informing us the reason why and riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either abandoned

failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge

Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced [sic] in default.

2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in order. That he had already

answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy he continued to

deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it after all because according to him he was a

very busy man. Please refer to Court ofAppeals decision dated August 17, 1993.

3. That because ofAtty. Amado Foja's neglect and malpractice of law we lost the JudgeCapulong case and

our appeal to theCourt ofAppeals. So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in

the practice of his profession.

In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91

but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the court. He

asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the complainants because it was based on theexpulsion of the

plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision

in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake bu

rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e.,the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants (complainants herein

illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed

this case to harass him because he refused to share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The

respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured

and, even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his disbarment o

suspension from the practice of the law profession.

The

complainants file

d a Re

ply to the

re

sponde

nt'sC

omme

nt.

Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this case for decision on

the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative.

The facts in this case are not disputed.

Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice

President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The

latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare

illegal his expulsion from the union.

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In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's expulsion and directed the

union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges

appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complain

against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21

of theCivil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res judicataby virtue o

the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an

intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to dismiss.

The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvador's

motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the

complainants herein to file their answer within a nonextendible period of fifteen days from notice.

Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case. This motion having

been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to theCourt ofAppeals

and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.

Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent still did not file thecomplainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's motion, the complainants were declared in

default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidenceex-parte.

The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop theex-parte reception ofevidence before the

Clerk ofCourt, but to no avail.

Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador

the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as

attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.

The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to theCourt ofAppeals, which, however, affirmed in

toto the decision of the trial court.

The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the

complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.

The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary

action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were declared in

default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his

client. He has the right to declineemployment, 1subject, however, to Canon 14 of theCode of Professional Responsibility

Once

he

agree

s to take

up the

cause

of a clie

nt, the

lawye

r owe

s fide

lity to such cause

and must always be

mindful of the

trustand confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and champion the latter's cause

with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm

zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and theexertion of his utmost learning and ability to theend that

nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is

entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his

lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because theentrusted privilege

to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A

lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves theends o

justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7

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The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his failure to do so in this

wise:

[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court,8

[he] instead, thru honest mistake and

excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the HonorableCourt, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .

And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he again

"inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated

earlier. . . . "

In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but was "deliberate

malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in

his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the

complainants want to impress upon this Court that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file

an answer.

We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non

filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work

while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to

question the denial order of the trial court.

Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and

separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answe

which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a reversibleerror or grave abuse o

discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion

to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.

Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an

answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court

committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the

Court ofAppeals' decision in thecertioraricase. There is no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision

before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to

challenge the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that thecomplainants had a meritorious defense. 10And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one o

theerrors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of discretion in denying

his motion to lift that order.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the

performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and

competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

All told, the respondent committed a breach ofCanon 18 of theCode of Professional Responsibility which requires him to

serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawye

shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the

complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the

complainants' act ofexpelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades

us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the

complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of theCode of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:

A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results

of the client's case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case.

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Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble of filing a

motion to dismiss on the grounds ofres judicataand lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon

initially with this Court and then with theCourt ofAppeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the

disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They

could prove that the plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask

for a reduction of the amounts thereof.

We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of the complainants. He

is liable for inexcusable negligence.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, more careful in the

performance of his duty to his clients.

SO ORDERED.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,INC., and BENA. NICOLAS vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO

A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005

Facts: Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the before the National Labo

Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, La Union. Herein, complainants accuse AttyArquillo of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by representing conflicting

interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge

and recommended a penalty of suspension for 6 months. The governors of the IBP increased the penalty for 2 years.

Issue: Whether or not the acts ofArquillo merits his suspension from the practice of law.

Held: TheCode of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings

and transactions with their clients. Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except with al

the concerned clients writt en consent, given after a full disclosure of the facts. When a lawyer represents two or more

opposing parties, there is a conflict of interests, theexistence of which is determined by three separate tests: (1) when

in re

pre

se

ntation of one

clie

nt, a lawye

r is re

quire

d to fight for an issue

or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose

it foranother client; (2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an act that may

injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use against the first one any knowledge

acquired through their professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the ful

discharge of an attorneys duty to giv e undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of

unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is a

hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyers r epresentation of both sides of an issue is highly improper

The proscription applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter, however slight

such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney acts from honest intentions or in good faith.

In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended for 1 year from the practice of law.

LOLITAARTEZUELAVS. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO

A.C. NO. 4354. APRIL 22, 2002

Facts: Artezuela filed before the SupremeCourt a verified complaint for disbarment against the respondent. She alleged

that respondent grossly neglected his duties her lawyer in a damage suit and failed to represent her interests with zea

and enthusiasm. According to her, when her case was scheduled for pre-trial conference, respondent asked for its

postponement although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainants p ersistent and repeated follow-up

respondent did not do anything to keep the case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainants

consent.

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Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical to her interests. While acting as her counsel

respondent prepared Echavias Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in

respondents offic e. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who sought the dismissal of the case

misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Held:

Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03 ofCanon 15 of theCode of ProfessionaResponsibility. To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be

counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party

nor make his efforts to advance the adverse partys conflicting int erests of record--- although these circumstances are

the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the

preparation of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client

To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and

reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

PNB vs Cedo

Administrative Matter in the SC. Violation ofCanon 6, Rule 6.03 of theCode of Professional Responsibility

Complainant PNB charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. VP of theAsset Mgt. Group, with

violation ofCanon 6, Rule 6.03 CPR by appearing as counsel for individuals who had transactions w/ complainant

bank in w/c Cedo during his employment w/ aforesaid bank, had intervened. Particularly, Cedo:

o Had participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for P200K

o Noted th e gate passes issued by his subordinate, Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Ong Siy authorizing

pull-out of steel sheets

o who had since left theemploy of PNB, appeared as one of Ong Siys couns els in a civil action bet Ong Siy

& PNB w/c arose from the pull-out transaction

o while being theAsst. VP of PNBs Asset Mgt. Group, intervened in the handling of a loan account of the

spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda w/ complainant bank by writing demand letters to the coupleAnd when a civil action ensued bet. PNB and the spouses, the latter were represented by the law firm

Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Assocs of w/c Cedo is one of the Senior Partners

Cedo admitted he appeared as counsel of Ong Siy but only w/ respect to theexecution pending appeal. He

denied ever appearing as counsel for theAlmedas, cont ending that the case was only handled by Atty. Pedro

Ferrer and that their law firm is not really a partnership since they handle their own cases independently.

The case was referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. IBP found:

o that Cedo was previously fined for forum shopping Milagros Ong Siy v. Hon. SalvadorTensuan, et. al.

o that charges made by PNB are fully substantiated

o that his averment that their firm is not really a partnership cannot beentertained given that although he

did not enter his appearance, he was practically dictating to Atty. Ferrer what to say and argue before

the court in theAlmeda case. He also impliedly admitted being the partner ofAtty. Ferrer.o That assuming the alleged set-up of the firm were true, it is in itself a violation ofCPR (Rule 15.02) since

the clients s ecrets and confidential records andinformation areexposed to the other lawyers and staff

members at all times

o In sum, that Cedo deliberately devised ways and means to attracts as clientformer borrowers of PNB

since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former employer. The IBP thus

recommended a 3-yr suspension.

Issue:WON Cedo violated the aforesaid Canons and Rules ofCPR&CPE

YES. While the SC agreed with the findings of the IBP, it also emphasized the importance of avoiding

representation of conflicting interests.

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It cited the case ofPasay Lawand Conscience Union, Inc. v. Paz w/c cited Nombrado v. Hernandez:

o Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information given

to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him

from appearing as counsel for the other side

o This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as

well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice the question is not

necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper

professional standard.

He is also in violation ofCanon 6, CPE on adverse influence and conflicting interests

Holding: Suspended for 3 years

REGALA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN [1996]

Special Civil Action in the SC. Certiorari

RP instituted a Complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB), through the Presidential Commission on Good Govt

(PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill

gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled

"RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."

Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein private respondent Raul S. Roco,

who all were then partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices

ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these services, the members

of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings.

In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the

assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of theACCRA Law Firm

petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the

companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees

stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.

PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from

the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as party defendant, Roco having promised hell r eveal the identity of the

principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case # 33

Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted, devised, schemed, conspired &confederated w/each other in setting up, through the use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate

framework & structures that led to establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than

20 other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares & its institutionalization

through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA

Investments Corp., became the holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged that their participation in the acts w/

w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering

Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a separate answer denying the

allegations in the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.

Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion that PCGG exclude them as parties

de

fe

ndants like

Roco. PCGG set the ff. precedent for theexclusion of petitioners:

a. the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

b. submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

c. the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering thei

respective shareholdings.

Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance by Roco of the same conditions

precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco didnt r efute petitioners' contention that he did actually not

reveal the identity of the client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of

the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.

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In a Resolution, SB denied theexclusion of petitioners, for their refusal to comply w/ the conditions required by

PCGG. It held, A CCRA lawyers cannot excuse themselves from the consequences of their acts until they have

begun to establish the basis for recognizing the privilege; theexistence and identity of the client.

ACCRA lawyers filed MFR w/c was denied. Hence, ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari. Petitione

Hayudini, likewise, filed his own MFR w/c was also denied thus, he filed a separate petition for certiorari

assailing SBs r esolution on essentially same grounds averred by petitioners, namely:

o SB gravely abused its discretion in subjecting petitioners to the strict application of the law of agency.

o SB gravely abused its discretion in not considering petitioners & Roco similarly situated &, thus

deserving equal treatmento SB gravely abused its discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the attorney-client

privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other information

requested by the PCGG.

o SB gravely abused its discretion in not requiring that dropping of party defendants be based on

reasonable & just grounds, w/ due consideration to constitutional rights of petitioners

PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the

client is not w/in the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required

(deeds of assignment) protected, because they areevidence of nominee status.

WONPCGG has a valid cause of action as against the petitioners

NO. It is quite apparent from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal with petitioners that petitioners were

impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their clients.

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners

are being prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the course of their duties as

lawyers. Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely being used as

leverage to compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to nail these clients. Such

being the case, PCGG has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and should exclude them from the 3rd

Amended Complaint.

WON attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners from revealing the identity of their client(s) & the other

information requested by thePCGG

YES. Nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio operarum

(contract of lease of services) where one person lets his services and another hires them without reference tothe object of which the services are to be performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by

honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be placed

makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person who requested him

But the lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.

An attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he possesses special powers of trust and confidence

reposed on him by his client. An attorney occupies a "quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the

Court & exercises his judgment in the choice of courses of action to be taken favorable to his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life

into it, among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting and confidentia

character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith, that is required by reason of necessity and

public inte

re

st base

d on the

hypothe

sis that abstine

nce

from see

king le

gal advice

in a good cause

is ane

viwhich is fatal to the administration of justice.

Attorney-client privilege, is worded in Rules ofCourt, Rule 130: Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxxAn attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, beexamined as to any communication made

by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professiona

employment, can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk beexamined, without the consent of

the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such

capacity.

Further, Rule 138 of the Rules ofCourt states:

Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney:

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(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his

client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with

his knowledge and approval.

This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17, CPR (A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shal

be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.) Canon 15, CPE also demands a lawyer's fidelity to client

An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence which exists between

lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and flow

of information.

Thus, theCourt held that this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in

the case at bar.

The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his

client.

Reasons advanced for the general rule:

o Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is

flesh and blood.

o Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established.

o Privilege generally pertains to subject matter of relationship

o Due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his

adversary.

Exceptions to the gen. rule:

o Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would

implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.

- Ex-Parte Enzor and U.S. v. Hodge and Zweig: The subject matter of the relationship was so

closely related to the issue of the client's identity that the privilege actually attached to both.

o Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.

- Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp.: couldnt r eveal name of his client as this would expose the

latter to civil litigation.

- Matter of Shawmut Mining Company: We feel sure that under such conditions no case has

ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the instance of a hostile litigant, to

disclose not only his retainer, but the nature of the transactions to w/c it related, when such

information could be made the basis of a suit against his client.

o Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing theclient's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony

necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client's name is privileged.

- Baird vs. Korner: a lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of clients who employed

him to pay sums of money to govt voluntarily in s ettlement of undetermined income taxes

unsued on, & w/ no govt audit or inv estigation into that client's income tax liability pending

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as exceptions to the

general rule:

o if the content of any client communication to a lawyer is relevant to the subject matter of the lega

problem on which the client seeks legal assistance

o where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed & it is the identity

w/c is inte

nde

d to be

confide

ntial, the

ide

ntity of the

clie

nt has bee

n he

ld to be

privile

ge

d, since

suchrevelation would otherwise result in disclosure of theentire transaction.

Summarizing theseexceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of the

privilege when the client's name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then revea

client confidences.

Instant case falls under at least 2 exceptions to the general rule.

First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's connection with the very fact in

issue of the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject

matter or the substance (without which there would be no attorney-client relationship).

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The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought was duly established in

the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself as can be seen in the 3 specific conditions laid down by the PCGG

which constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto.

From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the clients indeed consulted the

petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up

of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of, among others

the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's shareholdings.

Petitioners have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate them in the very activity fo

which legal advice had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in the aforementionedcorporations.

Secondly, under the third main exception, revelation of the client's name would obviously provide the necessary

link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwiseexists.

While the privilege may not be invoked for illegal purposes such as in a case where a client takes on the services

of an attorney, for illicit purposes, it may be invoked in a case where a client thinks he might have previously

committed something illegal and consults his attorney. Whether or not the act for which the client sought advice

turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the

hands of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against him.

The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the principal policy behind the privilege

i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of

compelled disclosure from attorneys must beeliminated. What is sought to be avoided then is theexploitation

of the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.

In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution has a

case against their clients, the latter's case should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from

their own sources and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients

information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which may or may not be

illegal.

The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's

loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but

extends even after the termination of the relationship.

We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the

breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the facts of the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized

exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not privileged information. Otherwise, it would expose thelawyers themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility imposed on

them in exercise of their duties

WONPCGG s exclusion violates equal protection

YES. Respondents failed to show - and absolutely nothing exists in the records of the case at bar - that private

respondent actually revealed the identity of his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking happens to be the

leitmotif of theentire arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an undertaking which is so material as to

have justified PCGG's special treatment exempting the private respondent from prosecution, SB should have

required proof of the undertaking more substantial than a "bare assertion" that private respondent did indeed

comply with the undertaking.

Thus, the

C

ourt he

ld that the

condition pre

ce

de

nt re

quire

d by the

re

sponde

nt PC

GG of the

pe

titione

rs for the

iexclusion as parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege &

constitutes a transgression by SB & PCGG of theequal protection clause of theConstitution.

The PCGG's demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients but also on documents

related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of the

constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free

ride at theexpense of such rights.

Lastly, the invocation by petitioners of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage of the

proceedings is not premature and that they should not have to wait until they are called to testify and examine

as witnesses as to matters learned in confidence before they can raise their objections. The petitioners are not

mere witnesses but are co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. The case against

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petitioners should never be allowed to take its full course in the SB. Petitioners should not be made to suffer the

effects of further litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the complaint arose from a privileged

attorney-client relationship and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of their clients.

Holding: SB Resolutions ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, petitioners excluded as parties defendants in SB CC No.

CYNTHIA B. ROSACIAvs. ATTY. BENJAMIN B. BULALACAO

Complainant Cynthia B. Rosacia, president of Tacma, Phils., Inc., a duly registered corporation, filed a complaint for disbarment dated October 25, 1991, against herein respondent Atty

Benjamin B. Bulalacao. Acting on the complaint, theCourt in a resolution dated February 24, 1992, resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation

report and recommendation. Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, the IBP investigating commissioner, found that respondent breached his oath of office and accordingly recommended

respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. 1 In a resolution dated July 30, 1994, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the commissioner'

report and recommendation. 2

As found by the IBP, the undisputed facts are as follows:

On June 1, 1990, by virtue of a written Agreement (Exh. "3-a"), respondent Atty. Benjamin B. Bulalacao was hired as retained counsel of a corporation by the name

of Tacma Phils., Inc.

On October 31, 1990, the lawyer-client relationship between the respondent and Tacma Phils., Inc. was severed as shown by another agreement ofeven date (Exh

"3-b").

On July, 1991, or after almost nine (9) months from the date respondent's retainer agreement with Tacma, Phils.

Inc. was terminated, several employees of the corporation consulted the respondent for the purpose of filing an

action for illegal dismissal. Thereafter, he agreed to handle the case for the said employees as against Tacma, Phils

Inc. by filing a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission, and appearing in their behalf.3

The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not respondent breached his oath of office for representing theemployees of his former client, Tacma, Phils., Inc., after the termination of thei

attorney-client relationship. We agree with the findings of the IBP that respondent breached his oath of office. Respondent does not now dispute this. In fact, in his motion fo

reconsideration, respondent admitted that he "did commit an act bordering on grave misconduct, if not outright violation of his attorney's oath". 4 However, respondent is pleading for the

Court's compassion and leniency to reduce the IBP recommended threemonths suspension to either fine or admonition with the following proffered grounds: that he is relatively new in the

profession having been admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990 at the age of 46 when the complained conduct was committed on August 1991; that he is of humble beginnings and

his suspension will deprive his family of its only source of livelihood he being the sole bread winner in the family; that he has fully realized his mistake and the gravity of his offense for which

he is fully repentant; that he has severed his attorney-client relationship with theemployees of Tacma, Phils., Inc. by inhibiting himself and withdrawing his appearance as counsel in the

labor case against Tacma, Phils., Inc.; and that he pledges not to commit the same mistake and to henceforth strictly adhere to the professional standards set forth by the Code o

Professional Responsibility.

TheCourt reiterates that an attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has terminated as it i

not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the forme

case. 5 It behooves respondent not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants beencouraged

to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 6 The relation of attorney and client is one of confidence and trust in the highes

degree. 7A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he ought to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.8An attorney not only becomes familiar with all the fact

connected with his client's cause, but also learns from his client the weak and strong points of the case. No opportunity must be given attorneys to take advantage of the secrets of client

obtained while the confidential relation of attorney and client exists. Otherwise, the legal profession will suffer by the loss of the confidence of the people. 9

Respondent's plea for leniency cannot be granted. We note that respondent is new in the profession as he was just admitted to the Philippine Bar on April 10, 1990, when the breach of hi

oath of office occurred more than a year after. Having just hurdled the bar examinations which included an examination in legal ethics, surely the precepts of theCode of Professiona

Responsibility to keep inviolate the client's trust and confidenceeven after the attorney-client relation is terminated10 must have been still fresh in his mind. A lawyer starting to establish hi

stature in the legal profession must start right and dutifully abide by the norms of conduct of the profession. This will ineluctably redound to his benefit and to the upliftment of the lega

profession as well.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three months. Let this resolution be attached to respondent's record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and

copies thereof furnished to all courts and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

LORENZANA FOODCORPORATION vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO L.DARIA

The respondent lawyer, Atty. Francisco L. Daria, is administratively charged1 on two counts, to wit:

1. Negligence and

2. Betrayal of his former client's confidences.

A verified complaint dated February 22, 1985 was filed by Lorenzana Food Corporation LFC, hereinafter), and received by theCourt on February 25, 1985.2

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TheCourt, on June 10, 1985, resolved to refer this case to theOffice of the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and recommendation.

After proper proceedings, theOffice of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation," dated February 21, 1990 and received by theCourt on February 26, 1990.

From the findings made by the Solicitor General, the pertinent facts may be summarized as follows:

Respondent Francisco L. Daria is charged with negligence and betrayal of his former client's confidences. The following facts are in connection with the charge o

negligence:

Respondent was hired by complainant Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC) on January 8, 1981 as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six

months later (tsn. pp. 6-7, Dec. 9, 1985). On May 23, 1983, LFCemployee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims agains

complainant before the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment (MOLE). On May 30, 1983, summons was served on the parties with the requiremen

that position papers be submitted (Exh. G).

During the initial hearing on June 13, 1973 * (sic) Hanopol and respondent tried to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. Since no agreement wa

reached the hearing was reset to June 17, 1983. On the pretext that Hanopol was supposed to go to his office on that date respondent failed to appear for th

second setting (tsn. pp. 14-15, Dec. 9, 1985). So, the Labor Arbiter was constrained to further reset the hearing to June 28, 1983. Respondent received on June 23

1983 theOrder for the resetting to June 1983 (Exh. J).

In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting the hearing therein also on June 28, 1983 (Exh. H-6). Faced with a

conflicting schedule, respondent decided to move to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case. However, instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he

opted to call, through his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to move for postponement (Exh. H-5; tsn. p. 16, Dec. 9, 1985). Respondent's telephone message

apparently failed to reach the Labor Arbiter, because at the hearing on June 28, 1983, he considered the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol'

complaint and affidavit (Exh. G-1). Respondent had not submitted a position paper.

After a month, on July 29, 1983, the Labor Arbiter issued a Decision directing LFC to pay Hanopol the total sum of P6,469.60 in labor benefits, on the basis o

Hanopol's evidence alone.

Respondent Daria appealed the Decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on August 23, 1983 (Exh. 4). The case was remanded to the Labo

Arbiter for further proceedings. The casewas set for hearing on June 25, 1984 and July 12, 1984 wherein attempts for an amicable settlement still proved futile. The

Labor Arbiter set two more dates for hearing: July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984 (tsn. pp. 21-22, Dec. 9, 1985).

In the meantime, the middle of June 1984, respondent signified to management his intention to resign. In the light of this development, management hired Atty

Rogelio Udarbe to take his place on July 16, 1984, theeffective date of his resignation (Exh. 2). Respondent endorsed the cases of complainant to Atty. Udarbe (tsn

pp. 23-25, Dec. 9, 1985).

During the hearings in the Hanopol case on July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984, no one appeared for complainant. So, on August 15, 1984, Hanopol filed

"Manifestation and Motion" praying that theearlier Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 29, 1983 be revived. (Exh. 5).

On September 1, 1984, Atty. Jose Loy, Jr. was hired by complainant LFC viceAtty. Udarbe and he immediately came across the abovementioned "Manifestation and

Motion". On September 5, 1984, he filed an Opposition (Exh. 6) thereto, and on September 19, 1984, he followed this up with a position paper for LFC (Exh. 7

However, the Labor Arbiter had already revived his earlier Decision dated July 29, 1983 in another Decision dated September 4, 1984, thereby prompting Atty. Loy

to appeal the latter Decision (Exh. 3). In a resolution dated May 9, 1985, theNLRC ordered anew the remand of the case for further proceedings (Exh. 8).

In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client's confidences, the following facts appear on record:

While respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes, issued a memorandum dated February 28, 1984 (Exh. C) to it

employee, Roberto San Juan, requiring him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double liquidation and unliquidated cash advances. Anothe

memorandum dated March 15, 1984 (Exh. D) was issued this time by complainant's internal auditor, Rosario L. Bernardo, addressed to complainant's president

summing up San Juan's unliquidated advances amounting to P9,351.15. Respondent was furnished a copy of this memorandum (Exh. D-3). Theexecutive committe

to which respondent belongs, investigated San Juan on his unliquidated advances. On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan unde

preventive suspension, per his letter to him dated April 25, 1984 (Exh. E).

On September 20, 1984, when respondent had already resigned, complainant sent a demand letter to San Juan

requiring him to restitute the amount of P9,351.15 (Exh. N-2). Since he failed to pay the amount demanded, a

complaint for estafa was lodged against him before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal. San Juan thereafter resigned

and sought the assistance of respondent in the preparation of his counteraffidavit in January 1985 (tsn. p. 35, Nov5, 1985). Respondent prepared San Juan's counteraffidavit and signed it (Exh. F). San Juan then submitted his

counteraffidavit to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal (tsn. p. 42, Nov. 5, 1985). 3

xxxxxxxxx

For failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and to submit a position paper in the Hanopol casewhich resulted in complainant LFC's default and judgment against it by the Labor Arbite

the respondent is faulted for negligence. The respondent avers that Hanopol should have seen him in his office to work out a compromise agreement, on the scheduled day of the second

hearing, June 17, 1983, but did not. 4

It is the finding of the Solicitor General that this excuse by the respondent is not borne by theConstancia 5 setting the case for hearing. TheConstancia clearly states: "By agreement of the

parties, case reset to June 17, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. as previously scheduled." 6 Since it was signed by both Hanopol and the respondent, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent'

explanation is manifestly unsatisfactory.

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With regard to his second non-appearance for the hearing on June 2, 1983, the respondent justified his absence by claiming that he had another hearing on the same date and that he told

his secretary to call up theOffice of the Labor Arbiter to have the hearing of the Hanopol case postponed.7 The Solicitor General avers:

. . . It is submitted that respondent's actuation was not warranted by the circumstances. As it turned out, the

telephone request apparently did not reach the Labor Arbiter, thereby constraining him to declare complainant in

default and render judgment against it. 8

In an effort to extricate himself from this charge, the respondent submits that since he was able to persuade the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal to set aside the

Decision of the Labor Arbiter and to remand the case for further proceedings, then the charge of negligence should be considered moot and academic already. 9 We find this submission no

meritorious. Instead, we agree ,with the position of the Solicitor General:

Respondent's plea is untenable. The setting aside of the adverse Decision of the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate

theeffects of respondent's negligence. Indeed, had respondent attended the two scheduled hearings and filed the

required position paper, then at least, there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case, which

perhaps, would have been in favor of complainant. The delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant because i

deprived successor-counsel Atty. Loy of time which he should be devoting to other cases of complainant. In fact he

had to prepare complainant's position paper which respondent should have doneearlier (Exh. 7). 10

From the foregoing, it is manifest that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of theCode of Professional Responsibility: 11

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

The other accusation against the respondent by the Solicitor General was that he had betrayed complainant LFC's confidences in violation of the then Canon 37 of the old Canons o

Professional Ethics, to wit:

It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employee's and neither of them

should accept employment which involves or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private advantages of the client, without hi

knowledge and consent, and even though there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should not continueemployment when he discovers tha

this obligation prevents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new client.

xxxxxxxxx

Superseded by theCode of Professional Responsibility, the appropriateCanon now is:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENC

REPOSED IN HIM.

The Solicitor General further found that the respondent assisted Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the counter-affidavit,12 submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation ofestafa

filed against San Juan by LFCAs a matter of fact, the respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped prepare. It is also a fact that the responden

investigated this same charge ofestafa while hewas still the lawyer of the complainant and San Juan still likewise an employee of LFC

Again, we concur with the findings and evaluation of theOffice of the Solicitor General:

. . . Respondent, however, tried to extricate himself from his predicament by testifying that the counteraffidavit was prepared by a lawyer-friend, Atty. Joselito R

Enriquez, who had his (respondent's) name typed on it; that after reading it, he called up Atty. Enriquez so that he will delete his name and signature thereon; tha

he instructed San Juan to bring the counteraffidavit to Atty. Enriquez so that hewill delete his name and signature, but San Juan did not obey him; and that San Juan

filed the counteraffidavit with the office of the Provincial Fiscal with his name and signature still on it (tsn. pp. 47-51, Dec. 9, 1985).

It is submitted that, apart from being a mere afterthought, respondent's explanation is incredible. His foregoing

testimony is not reflected in his comment on the complaint . . . 13

We are convinced that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client.

. . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the

relation of attorney and client has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in

another case other persons against his former client under the pretext that the case is distinct from and

independent of the former case. 14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is found guilty of both the charge of negligence, a transgression of Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and the charge of betrayal of his former client'

confidences, in violation ofCanon 17 of theCode of Professional Responsibility.

The respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

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Let this Decision beentered in the personal records of the respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts and IBP chapters.

SO ORDERED.

UNITY FISHINGDEVELOPMENTCORPORATION,complainant, vs. ATTY. DANILO G. MACALINO, Respondent.

Under consideration is this petition by way of a complaint for disbarment filed by Unity Fishing Development Corporation against Atty. Danilo Macalino for having violated Canon 16 of the Code of Professiona

Responsibility.

In its resolution of June 26, 1996, theCourt required respondent to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from notice.[1]

On July 26, 1996, respondent filed a motion for extension of thirty (30) days within which to file comment,[2] which motion was granted by theCourt in its resolution ofAugust 21, 1996.[3]

On August 26, 1996, respondent filed another motion for extension, this time for an additional period of fifteen (15) days.[4] The motion was similarly granted by theCourt in its resolution of October 7, 1996.[5]

Still, on September 19, 1996, respondent filed a third and last extension of time to file comment.[6]Again, this was granted by theCourtvia its resolution of November 27, 1996.[7]

Unfortunately, no comment was ever filed by respondent.

Hence, and taking note of complainants Motion to Conduct Further Proceedings, filed on March 23, 1998,[8] theCourt, in its resolution ofApril 27, 1998,[9] referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP

for investigation, report and recommendation.

Acting on the referral, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline designated Atty. Cesar R. Dulay as investigating commissioner.

It appears, however, that even while the case was already under formal investigation, respondent displayed the same attitude of lack of concern. As reported by Atty. Dulay:

TheCommission issued a notice setting the case for hearing on October 8, 1998, at which hearing complainant represented by its legal counsel and respondent appeared. Again, respondent asked for fifteen days from

October 8, 1998 to file his Answer. Complainant also asked the same period within which to file his reply.

On November 5, 1998, respondent filed an urgent motion for extension of time to file answer.

On November 9, 1998, respondent again filed an urgent motion for last extension of time or a period of fifteen (15) days from November 15, 1998 to file answer, which was granted by theCommission.

Since the respondent has not filed his answer as required by the Honorable SupremeCourt and theCommission, the case was again set for hearing on November 9, 1999.

On said date, only the counsel for complainant appeared. Respondent was absent. However, records show the notice sent to him was returned unserved with the annotation Moved. Records also show that respondent ha

not filed his answer and again he was given a last chance to file his answer within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order dated November 9, 1999 and the hearing of the case was reset to December 9, 1999.

On December 9, 1999, only counsel for complainant appeared and moved that respondents right to file answer be deemed waived and that complainant be allowed to file Memorandum after which, the case shall b

deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 14, 1999, respondent again filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of fifteen (15) days from December 4, 1999 within which to file his answer.

On January 7, 2000, the complainant filed a Memorandum, a copy of which was furnished to respondent and which was not controverted by respondent.

All told, respondent filed six (6) motions for extension of time to fileAnswer and up to this time, which is almost seven (7) years from the time the Honorable SupremeCourt required respondent to file his answer to th

complaint, respondent has not filed any answer,[10]

on account of which the investigating commissioner considered the case as now ready for resolution.[11]

Thereafter, the investigating commissioner submitted his Report. Dated January 20, 2003,[12] the Report recites the factual background of the case and the commissioners discussion and findings thereon, thus:

Frabal Fishing and Ice Plant Corporation (hereinafter, Frabal) was the owner of a parcel of land located along Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard, Sta. Mesa, Manila which was leased to Wheels Distributors, Inc. (hereinafte

Wheels), an authorized dealer of cars a nd motor vehicles of various make;

A dispute arose between Frabal and Wheels regarding the terms and conditions of the lease contract. The disputeeventually led to a lawsuit. Frabal hired the services of respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino as counsel fo

the purpose of representing its interest in the said lawsuit;

Frabal merged and was absorbed by Petitioner corporation on February 12, 1991, with the former conveying, assigning and transferring all its business assets and liabilities to the latter, including all judicial and extra

judicial claims. Hence, Petitioner was substituted in lieu of Frabal in the formers lawsuit with Wheels;

As Petitioners legal counsel, Respondent advised Petitioner to severe all contractual relationship with Wheels as a step towards eventually evicting the latter from the property they were occupying;

Hence, upon advice of Respondent, the contract of lease between Frabal and Wheels was terminated. Respondent likewise advised Petitioner to return the guarantee deposit equivalent to two (2) months rental or th

amount of P50,000.00 to Wheels;

On March 2, 1988, Petitioner prepared Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for the amount of P50,000.00. The check was crossed and made payable to the Wheels Distributors, Inc. (AnnexA).

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Respondent volunteered to bring the check to the office of Wheels himself and to make them accept it. Hence, on March 3, 1988, Respondent sent his representative to Petitioners office to get the said check;

Respondents representative duly received the said check from Petitioner, as proof of which he signed Check Voucher No. 3-012 (Annex B);

Thereafter, Respondent represented to Petitioner that he was able to deliver the check to Wheels Distributors, Inc.;

The suit between Petitioner and Wheels continued for several years. In the meantime, Petitioner changed counsels, replacing Respondent with someoneelse;

Finally, sometime in May 1994, the suit ended in amicable settlement. In the process of negotiating the terms and conditions of the settlement, Wheels informed Petitioner that it never received therefund (sic) guarante

deposit in the amount of P50,000.00;

Petitioner was shocked to learn this piece of information from Wheels Distributors as all along Respondent had represented to Petitioner that Wheels has already received the guarantee deposit of P50,000.00;

Petitioner searched its files for the subject check. After locating the check, Petitioner noted that at the back of the check was a rubber stamp marking indicating that it was deposited with the United Savings Bank Hea

Office on May 13, 1988 to Account No. CA-483-3. United Savings Bank has since been acquired by the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and is now known as UCPB Savings Bank;

Petitioner checked with Wheels Distributors from whom it later learned that the latter never maintained an account with the United Savings Bank, now the UCPB Savings Bank;

Petitioner wrote to Respondent on May 19, 1994 to explain why the check in issue never reached Wheels Distributors and how it was endorsed and encashed despite the fact that it was a crossed check (Copy of said lette

is AnnexC);

Despite receipt of said letter, however, Respondent never responded nor attempted to explain his side to what strongly appears to be a gross misappropriation of the money for his own personal use;

Hence, Petitioner was constrained to institute an action for damages against Respondent Danilo G. Macalino as well as UCPB Savings Bank with the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72 where the same is now

docketed as Civil Case No. 2382-MN;

That Re

sponde

nt misappropriate

d the

amount of P50,000.00 for his own pe

rsonal use

cannot be

de

nie

d. Ane

mployee

of UC

PB in the

pe

rson of Eduardo Estre

madura te

stifie

d in the

afore

state

d case

for damage

s thaRespondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was the one maintaining Account No. CA-483-37 at UCPB, to which the crossed check payable to Wheels was deposited (TSN, p. 8, Aug. 24, 1995, copy of the TSN is Annex D);

The Metrobank Check No. MB350288 dated March 8, 1988 for the amount of P50,000.00 was deposited to Respondents account is further shown in United Savings Bank Current Account Deposit Slip accomplished b

Respondent when he deposited said check with United Savings Bank on May 13, 1988 (Copy of said deposit slip is Annex E).

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS:

Respondent Atty. Danilo G. Macalino was given all the opportunity to answer and present his defenses to the complaint. Regrettably, the records show that despite the orders of the SupremeCourt and this Commissio

respondent has not taken any step to verify and inquire as to the status of the complaint against him. Almost three years since the submission of the complainants memorandum, respondent has not reacted nor made an

move to protect himself and answer the complaint. Due process consists in being given the opportunity to be heard and we believe that in this case respondent has been given all the opportunity to be heard.

On the basis of the above, the investigating commissioner concluded his Report with the following -

RECOMMENDATION

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and be ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00. Respondent should be warne

that a similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.[13]

On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2003-341,[14] adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner with a modification as to the penalty, t

wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as AnnexA; an

finding the recommendation fully supported by theevidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification as to the penalty to conform to theevidence, and considering respondents failure to account fo

the funds received by him in trust from complainant in gross violation ofCanon 16 of theCode of Professional Responsibility, as well as for respondents lax, remiss and untroubled attitude in this case, Atty. Danilo G

Macalino is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and Ordered to account to complainant the amount of P50,000.00 with a Warning that a similar offense will merit a more severe penalty.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is highly fiduciary; it requires a high degree of fidelity and good faith. It is designed to remove all such temptation and to prevent everything of that kind from being done fo

the protection of the client.[15] So it is that theCode of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 16 -A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 -A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 -A lawyer shall keep the funds ofeach client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.

Rule 16.03 -A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy hi

lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the sameextent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided fo

in the Rules ofCourt.

TheCanon of Professional Ethics is even moreexplicit when it states:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

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Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstances be commingled wit

his own or be used by him. (par. 11)

Here, we are in full accord with the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent misappropriated the money entrusted to him and which he failed to account for to his clien

despite demand therefor.

Respondents failure to rebut complainants evidence clearly reveals his failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the lawyers oath and theCode of Professional Responsibility. His repeated failur

without any valid reason to comply with the orders of theCourt requiring him to comment on the complaint lends credence to the allegations thereof and manifests his tacit admission of the same. As aptly found b

Commissioner Dulay, the following uncontroverted facts as supported by the annexes of the complaint had been established:

1. that Metrobank Check No. MB350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 payable to Wheels Distributors (AnnexA of Petition) was prepared by Frabal Fishing & Ice Plant Corporation (Annex B Petition) and released t

respondents representative;

2. that the said Metrobank Check No. [MB350288] was deposited to Account No. 0110004833 under Account Name Danilo G. Macalino at the United Savings Bank (Annex E of Petition);

3. that on 19 May 1994 complainant wrote a letter to respondent (AnnexC of Petition) advising the latter that the Metrobank Check intended for Wheel Distributors, Inc. was not received by them (Wheels Distributors) ye

it was endorsed and encashed. Respondent was therefore requested to explain how the particular check was encashed. Respondent received the letter on May 23, 1994 (AnnexC-3 of Petition) and the records do not show

that respondent replied to the latter requiring him to explain; and

4. that complainant filed a civil case against UCPB Savings Bank, and Danilo Macalino before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila docketed as Civil Case No. 2382-MN (Annex D of Petition) and at the hearin

of said case on August 24, 1995, witness Eduardo Estremadura, a bookeeper of UCPB Bank positively testified that Danilo G. Macalino was the maintainer ofAccount No. CA-483-3 of the UCPB Savings Bank, Legaspi Branc

(page 8 & 9 Annex D, TSN of hearing ofCivil Case No. 2382-MN) and that Check No. 350288 was deposited to theAccount of Danilo G. Macalino under CA-483-3 on May 13, 1988 (page 9 ofAnnex D, TSN of hearing); an

was credited to the account of Danilo G. Macalino (page 12 ofAnnex D, TSN of hearing ofCivil Case No. 2382-MN)[16],

from which established facts, the investigating commissioner made the following conclusions:

1. that Metrobank Check No. 350288 in the amount of P50,000.00 which was intended for Wheels Distributors, Inc. was deposited and the amount credited to Account No. 483-3 of respondent Danilo G. Macalino with th

UCPB Savings Bank.

2. that respondent when required by the complainant to explain and account for the amount of P50,000.00 caused by Metrobank Check No. 350288 which was not intended for him failed to reply and give any accountin

of such funds to complainant.[17]

Respondents wanton failure to make an accounting and to return to his client the amount entrusted to him upon demand give rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it, in violation of the trust and confidenc

reposed on him. His act of holding on to complainants mon ey without its acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.[18]A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for mone

and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.[19]

It is clear, therefore, that respondent, by depositing the check in his own account and subsequently deceiving his client into believing that he delivered the same to Wheels is undoubtedly guilty of deceit, malpractice, gros

misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not merely to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorabl

diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.[20] Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the peoples faith in the justice system remain

undisturbed.[21]

What is more, respondents repeated failures to comply with the orders of theCourt requiring him to comment on the complaint indicate a high degree of irresponsibility on his part.

We have no hesitance, then, in confirming the resolution passed by the IBP Board of Governors suspending respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year. We could have taken a more drastic action agains

respondent, but considering that he has no prior administrative record, it is our sentiment that the recommended penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the public and the legal profession. After al

in Espiritu vs. Cabredo,[22] we

impose

d the

same

pe

nalty on an attorne

y who similarly faile

d to account the

mone

y re

ce

ive

d from his clie

nt and to re

stitute

it without any re

ason.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo G. Macalino is hereby declared guilty of violation ofCanon 16 of theCode of Professional Responsibility, for his failure to immediately return and deliver the funds of his former client upo

demand, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING tha