ESCOLA DE ECONOMIA DE SÃO PAULO DA FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS

CENTRO DO COMÉRCIO GLOBAL E INVESTIMENTO

Coordenadoras

Vera Thorstensen Luciana Maria de Oliveira

RELEITURA DOS ACORDOS DA OMC COMO INTERPRETADOS PELO ÓRGÃO DE APELAÇÃO:

Efeitos na aplicação das regras do comércio internacional

Acordo Antidumping

Organizadoras

Leanne Cornet Naidin Marta Calmon Lemme

Autores

Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins Bruno Herwig Rocha Augustin

Fernanda Dalla Valle Martino Gisela Sarmet Isadora Souza

Leanne Cornet Naidin Luciano Inácio de Souza

Lucas Spadano Mariana Chacoff

Maria Angela Jardim Oliveira Maria Carolina Mendonça Barros

Marina Pantoja Marta Lemme

Rubens Romero Tatiana Lins Cruz

INTRODUÇÃO

Análise do texto de lei do Acordo sobre a Implementação do Artigo VI do GATT 1994 (Acordo Antidumping) e da jurisprudência consolidada pelo Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (DSB) da OMC.

ACORDO SOBRE A IMPLEMENTAÇÃO DO ARTIGO VI DO GATT 1994

(ACORDO ANTIDUMPING)

Ø Artigo 1 Maria Angela Jardim Oliveira IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 1 Principles

An antidumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated (1) and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. The following provisions govern the application of Article VI of GATT 1994 in so far as action is taken under antidumping legislation or regulations. Footnote 1: The term “initiated” as used in this Agreement means the procedural action by which a Member formally commences an investigation as provided in Article 5. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 1 Princípios

Uma medida antidumping deve ser aplicada somente quando da ocorrência de uma das circunstâncias expressamente previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 e perseguindo as investigações iniciadas1 e conduzidas de acordo com as previsões desse Acordo. As disposições seguintes coordenam a aplicação do artigo VI do GATT 1994 na medida em que sejam tomadas medidas antidumping, de acordo com a legislação do GATT. (Decreto nº 1.355, de 30 de dezembro de 1994) IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução Nada a observar. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 1 1. Artigo 1

a) “medidas Antidumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandantes: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R; Japão, WT/DS162/AB/R, paras. 119 Em US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que a expressão “medidas Antidumping” não se                                                                                                                          1 No presente texto entende-se o termo “iniciadas” como o ato pelo qual um Membro dá início a uma investigação segundo o disposto no artigo 5.  

refere apenas às medidas Antidumping definitivas, compromissos sobre preços e medidas provisórias. O Órgão de Apelação manifestou-se no sentido de que o significado comum da expressão “medidas Antidumping”, prevista no Artigo 1, engloba quaisquer medidas que sejam tomadas contra o dumping. Assim, a Lei de 1916 foi considerada inconsistente com o Artigo VI do GATT, por limitar as medidas apenas à medidas definitivas, provisórias ou acordo de preços. Para. 119. “The first sentence of Article 1 states that “an Antidumping measure” must be consistent with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement. However, as the United States concedes, the meaning of an “Antidumping measure” in this sentence is “not immediately clear”. The United States argues, on the basis of the history of this provision, that the phrase “Antidumping measure” refers only to definitive Antidumping duties, price undertakings and provisional measures. However, the ordinary meaning of the phrase “an Antidumping measure” seems to encompass all measures taken against dumping. We do not see in the words “an Antidumping measure” any explicit limitation to particular types of measure.”

b) “iniciadas e conduzidas segundo o disposto neste Acordo”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/R, para. 6.208 No caso US - 1916 Act, o Painel concluiu que, havendo a violação de um dispositivo do Acordo Antidumping, ficará demonstrado que a investigação Antidumping não foi “iniciada e conduzida segundo o disposto no Acordo Antidumping,” e, consequentemente, haverá uma violação ao Artigo 1. Para. 6.208. “The EC argues that the 1916 Act prohibits dumping under different conditions than those laid down in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement and applies different procedures and remedies than provided therein. The EC claims the violation of Articles 1, 2.1, 2.2, 3, 4 and 5.5 of the Antidumping Agreement. As far as Article 1 is concerned, we note that if we find a violation of other provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, it will be demonstrated that an antidumping investigation under the 1916 Act is not “initiated or conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement” and a breach of Article 1 will be established.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - AntiDumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, paras. 7.106-7.107 No caso EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, o Painel afastou a alegação no sentido de que, na hipótese de desvalorização monetária no 4º trimestre do período de investigação, o Artigo 1 do Acordo Antidumping e o Artigo VI do GATT exigiriam que autoridade investigadora se baseasse, para a determinação do dumping, apenas no período subsequente à desvalorização para verificar se o dumping atual estaria causando dano. Portanto, o Artigo 1 do Acordo Antidumping não exige que a autoridade investigadora reavalie sua própria determinação com base em uma análise de dados anteriores à imposição da medida Antidumping fundada em evento (a desvalorização) ocorrida durante o período objeto de investgação e, portanto, apoiou a rejeição do Painel dos argumentos do Brasil. Para. 7.106. “Brazil's argument seems to centre on the proposition that “[a]ny calculation or methodology, however compatible with the technical requirements of the Antidumping Agreement, which would ultimately defeat the object and purpose of the Antidumping Agreement, constitutes a violation of these rules”. Brazil refers to a “general obligation” under which the European Communities was bound not to impose, or at least to withhold, Antidumping measures. As we are bound to apply the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” to the provisions of the Agreement, it would be essential to have a textual basis that imposes an obligation of the kind suggested by Brazil. Any departure from the requirement to apply the provisions of the Agreement in a precise and methodical way would have to be explicitly provided for. However, we see no

foundation in the text of the Agreement for Brazil's argument that this provision does not apply “in the same way” in this case, nor for a requirement that an investigating authority re-assess its own determination made on the basis of an examination of data pertaining to the IP prior to the imposition of an Antidumping measure in the light of an event which occurred during the IP. We decline to read such a provision into the text. Moreover, the Agreement provides mechanisms to address situations where dumping decreases or terminates following an affirmative determination of dumping on the basis of historical data from a recent past IP, for example, in Articles 9.3 (full or partial refund of duties paid) and 11 (review).” Para. 7.107. “Thus, absent any such explicit caveat or conditionality, Article 1 of the Antidumping Agreement does not require an investigating authority to re-assess its own determination made on the basis of an examination of data pertaining to the IP prior to the imposition of an Antidumping measure in the light of an event that occurred during the IP.” 2. Relação com outros Artigos do Acordo

a) “Artigo 15” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports fo Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.231-6.232 Em EC - Bed Linen, o Painel, com base na leitura do Artigo 1, concluiu que o significado ordinário do termo “direitos Antidumping” contido no Artigo 15 deve ser interpretado como referente a direitos Antidumping definitivos impostos ao final do processo de investigação. Para. 6.231. “In this regard, we note Article 1 of the AD Agreement, which provides that:

An Antidumping measure shall be applied only under the circumstances provided for in Article VI of GATT 1994 and pursuant to investigations initiated and conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. (footnote omitted)

In our view, this implies that the phrase “before applying Antidumping duties” in Article 15 means before the application of definitive Antidumping measures. Looking at the whole of the AD Agreement, we consider that the term “provisional measures” is consistently used where the intention is to refer to measures imposed before the end of the investigative process. Indeed, in our view, the AD Agreement clearly distinguishes between provisional measures and Antidumping duties, which term consistently refers to definitive measures. We find no instance in the Agreement where the term “Antidumping duties” is used in a context in which it can reasonably be understood to refer to provisional measures. Thus, in our view, the ordinary meaning of the term “Antidumping duties” in Article 15 is clear – it refers to the imposition of definitive Antidumping measures at the end of the investigative process.” Para. 6.232. “Consideration of practical elements reinforces this conclusion. Provisional measures are based on a preliminary determination of dumping, injury, and causal link. While it is certainly permitted, and may be in a foreign producer's or exporter's interest to offer or enter into an undertaking at this stage of the proceeding, we do not consider that Article 15 can be understood to require developed country Members to explore the possibilities of price undertakings prior to imposition of provisional measures. In addition to the fact that such exploration may result in delay or distraction from the continuation of the investigation, in some cases, a price undertaking based on the preliminary determination of dumping could be subject to revision in light of the final determination of dumping. However, unlike a provisional duty or security, which must, under Article 10.3, be refunded or released in the event the final dumping margin is lower than the preliminarily calculated margin (as is frequently the case), a “provisional” price undertaking could not be retroactively revised.

We do not consider that an interpretation of Article 15 which could, in some cases, have negative effects on the very parties it is intended to benefit, producers and exporters in developing countries, is required.” b) “Artigos 9 e 18” Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.296 Em Guatemala - Cement II, após ter reconhecido a ocorrência de diversas violações ao Acordo Antidumping, o Painel entendeu que as demais alegações de violação aos Artigos 1, 9 e 18 do Acordo Antidumping eram alegações “dependentes”, no sentido de que elas dependeriam inteiramente de ter-se constatado uma violação a outros dispositivos do Acordo Antidumping. Dessa maneira, tendo em conta a natureza dependente de tais alegações, o Painel entendeu não haver propósito útil em apreciar a alegada ofensa ao Artigo 1, uma vez que não havia fundamento independente para tanto. Para. 8.296. “We note that Mexico's claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994, are dependent claims, in the sense that they depend entirely on findings that Guatemala has violated other provisions of the AD Agreement. There would be no basis to Mexico's claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994, if Guatemala were not found to have violated other provisions of the AD Agreement. In light of the dependent nature of Mexico's claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994, we see no useful purpose to deciding them. In particular, deciding such dependent claims will provide no additional guidance as to the steps to be undertaken by Guatemala in order to implement our recommendation regarding the violations on which they are dependent.”

c) “Artigo VI do GATT”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: Coreia, WT/DS179/R, para. 8.296  

Em US - Stainless Steel, o Painel defrontou-se com a alegação de que, tendo havido a violação de alguns dispositivos do Acordo Antidumping, o Artigo VI do GATT 1994 e o Artigo 1 do Acordo Antidumping também teriam sido, via de consequência, violados. Considerando que as alegações tinham natureza “dependente”, o Painel entendeu que não era necessário analisá-las. Para. 8.296. “Korea has also asserted that the United States has acted inconsistently with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the AD Agreement, “which only permit Antidumping measures to be imposed in the circumstances provided for in Article VI and pursuant to investigations conducted in accordance with the Antidumping Agreement.” We note that Korea's claims in respect of these two articles are dependent claims, i.e., Korea argues that because certain provisions of the AD Agreement have been violated, Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 1 of the AD Agreement are consequently violated. Because of their dependent nature, we can perceive of no useful purpose that would be served by ruling on these claims. Accordingly, we do not consider it necessary to address them.” III. Comentários O Acordo Antidumping implementa o Artigo VI do Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio 1994 (GATT 1994), o qual garante o direito dos Membros imporem medidas Antidumping para defesa comercial. Não há muitos casos analisados pelo DSB sobre o alcance do Artigo 1 do Acordo Antidumping. Tal como visto acima, no caso US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação da OMC deixou claro que, para efeito

do Artigo 1, o significado comum da expressão “medidas Antidumping” alcança quaisquer medidas que tenham sido tomadas contra o dumping. Esse entendimento se coaduna com a interpretação ampla do Órgão de Apelação do conceito de atos dos Membros que podem ser revistos pelo sistema de solução de controvérsias. É uma interpretação não limitada à formalidade dos atos em si, nem a tipos específicos de medidas e, portanto, engloba, como se pode ver neste caso, quaisquer ações governamentais desde que tenham sido executadas para combater o dumping. Nesse mesmo caso US - 1916 Act, o Painel concluiu que, em havendo uma violação a dispositivos do Acordo Antidumping, a investigação Antidumping não foi iniciada e conduzida segundo o disposto neste Acordo, o que, segundo o Painel, levou, consequentemente, à violação dos princípios previstos no Artigo 1 do Acordo Antidumping. É de se notar que o Órgão de Apelação manteve a conclusão do Painel (WT/DS136/AB/R para. 155, letra “e”), embora não tenha se pronunciado explicitamente sobre o tema. As alegações de ofensa ao Artigo 1 por arrastamento, ou seja, em razão de violações de outros dispositivos do Acordo Antidumping, foram descritas pelo Painel em Guatemala - Cement II como alegações dependentes (dependent claims). A natureza dependente (dependent nature) da alegação de violação ao Artigo 1, quando for constatada a ofensa a outros Artigos do Acordo Antidumping, - o que acarretaria que a investigação Antidumping não foi “iniciada e conduzida segundo o disposto no Acordo Antidumping” - foi novamente examinada no Painel do caso US - Stainless Steel com relação ao Artigo VI do GATT. No entanto, o Painel do caso US - Stainless Steel entendeu que, em razão da natureza dependente da alegada violação ao Artigo 1, seria despiciendo analisar tais violações para o deslinde da questão. Esse último posicionamento do Painel, em US - Stainless Steel, reflete uma tendência de economia processual do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC, que busca aplicar uma exegese suficiente para dar solução positiva ao caso, evitando-se obter dicta e conclusões desnecessárias. Tal tendência decorre da cultura organizacional da OMC, no sentido de que é uma organização dirigida por seus Membros e que as decisões do sistema de solução de controvérsias não devem alterar ou diminuir os direitos e as obrigações previstos nos Acordos abrangidos (DSU, Artigo 3.2). Em outras palavras, é da cultura organizacional que não se decide mais do que o estritamente necessário para solucionar a questão. Enquanto o Painel inicial decidiu que haveria uma violação ao Artigo 1 por arrastamento, outros Painéis se limitaram a não apreciar essa questão, por considerarem-na desnecessária para a solução da controvérsia.

Ø Artigo 2 Maria Carolina Mendonça Barros Lucas Spadano IA. Texto do Artigo em Ingles

Article 2 Determination of Dumping

2.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped, i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.

2.2 When there are no sales of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic

market of the exporting country or when, because of the particular market situation or the low volume of the sales in the domestic market of the exporting country (2), such sales do not permit a proper comparison, the margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third country, provided that this price is representative, or with the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling and general costs and for profits. 2.2.1 Sales of the like product in the domestic market of the exporting country or sales to a

third country at prices below per unit (fixed and variable) costs of production plus administrative, selling and general costs may be treated as not being in the ordinary course of trade by reason of price and may be disregarded in determining normal value only if the authorities (3) determine that such sales are made within an extended period of time (4) in substantial quantities (5) and are at prices which do not provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. If prices which are below per unit costs at the time of sale are above weighted average per unit costs for the period of investigation, such prices shall be considered to provide for recovery of costs within a reasonable period of time.

2.2.1.1 For the purpose of paragraph 2, costs shall normally be calculated on the basis

of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, provided that such records are in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration. Authorities shall consider all available evidence on the proper allocation of costs, including that which is made available by the exporter or producer in the course of the investigation provided that such allocations have been historically utilized by the exporter or producer, in particular in relation to establishing appropriate amortization and depreciation periods and allowances for capital expenditures and other development costs. Unless already reflected in the cost allocations under this sub-paragraph, costs shall be adjusted appropriately for those non-recurring items of cost which benefit future and/or current production, or for circumstances in which costs during the period of investigation are affected by start-up operations. (6)

2.2.2 For the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for administrative, selling and general

costs and for profits shall be based on actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of trade of the like product by the exporter or producer under

investigation. When such amounts cannot be determined on this basis, the amounts may be determined on the basis of:

(i) the actual amounts incurred and realized by the exporter or producer in

question in respect of production and sales in the domestic market of the country of origin of the same general category of products;

(ii) the weighted average of the actual amounts incurred and realized by other exporters or producers subject to investigation in respect of production and sales of the like product in the domestic market of the country of origin;

(iii) any other reasonable method, provided that the amount for profit so established shall not exceed the profit normally realized by other exporters or producers on sales of products of the same general category in the domestic market of the country of origin.

2.3 In cases where there is no export price or where it appears to the authorities concerned that the

export price is unreliable because of association or a compensatory arrangement between the exporter and the importer or a third party, the export price may be constructed on the basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent buyer, or if the products are not resold to an independent buyer, or not resold in the condition as imported, on such reasonable basis as the authorities may determine.

2.4 A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value. This

comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability. (7) In the cases referred to in paragraph 3, allowances for costs, including duties and taxes, incurred between importation and resale, and for profits accruing, should also be made. If in these cases price comparability has been affected, the authorities shall establish the normal value at a level of trade equivalent to the level of trade of the constructed export price, or shall make due allowance as warranted under this paragraph. The authorities shall indicate to the parties in question what information is necessary to ensure a fair comparison and shall not impose an unreasonable burden of proof on those parties. 2.4.1 When the comparison under paragraph 4 requires a conversion of currencies,

such conversion should be made using the rate of exchange on the date of sale (8), provided that when a sale of foreign currency on forward markets is directly linked to the export sale involved, the rate of exchange in the forward sale shall be used. Fluctuations in exchange rates shall be ignored and in an investigation the authorities shall allow exporters at least 60 days to have adjusted their export prices to reflect sustained movements in exchange rates during the period of investigation.

2.4.2 Subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in paragraph 4, the existence of

margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis. A normal value established on a weighted average basis may be compared to prices of individual export transactions if the authorities find a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an explanation is provided as to why such differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction comparison.

2.5 In the case where products are not imported directly from the country of origin but are exported to the importing Member from an intermediate country, the price at which the products are sold from the country of export to the importing Member shall normally be compared with the comparable price in the country of export. However, comparison may be made with the price in the country of origin, if, for example, the products are merely transshipped through the country of export, or such products are not produced in the country of export, or there is no comparable price for them in the country of export.

2.6 Throughout this Agreement the term “like product” (“produit similaire”) shall be interpreted

to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.

2.7 This Article is without prejudice to the second Supplementary Provision to paragraph 1 of

Article VI in Annex I to GATT 1994. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 2 Determinação de Dumping

2.1 Para as finalidades do presente Acordo considera-se haver prática de dumping, isto é, oferta de um produto no comércio de outro país a preço inferior a seu valor normal, no caso de o prego de exportação do produto ser inferior àquele praticado no curso normal das atividades comerciais para o mesmo produto quando destinado ao consumo no país exportador.

2.2 Caso inexistam vendas do produto similar no curso normal das ações de comércio no mercado

doméstico do país exportador ou quando, em razão de condições específicas de mercado ou por motivo do baixo nível de vendas no mercado doméstico do país exportador2 tais vendas não permitam comparação adequada, a margem de dumping será determinada por meio de comparação com o preço do produto similar ao ser exportado para um terceiro país adequado, desde que esse preço seja representativo ou com o custo de produção no país de origem acrescido de razoável montante por conta de custos administrativos, comercialização e outros além do lucro.

2.3 (a) Vendas do produto similar no mercado Interno do país exportador ou vendas a terceiro

país a preços inferiores aos custos unitários de produção (fixos e variáveis) mais os gastos de venda gerais e administrativos poderão ser consideradas como não incorporadas nas relações normais de comércio por motivo de preço e desprezadas na determinação do valor normal somente no caso de as autoridades3 determinarem que tais vendas são realizadas dentro de um lapso de tempo dilatado4 em quantidades substanciais5 e a pregos que não permitem cobrir os custos dentro de lapso razoável de tempo. Preços abaixo do custo no momento da venda mas acima do custo médio ponderado obtido no período da investigação deverão ser considerados como destinados a permitir recuperação de custos durante lapso de tempo razoável;

                                                                                                                         2 Serão normalmente considerados como em quantidade suficiente para a determinação de valor normal as vendas de produto similar destinadas ao consumo do mercado interno do país exportador que constitua 5 por cento ou mais das vendas do produto em questão ao país importador admitindo-se percentual menor quando for demonstrável que vendas internas nesse porcentual inferior ocorrem, ainda assim, em quantidade suficiente que permita cooperação adequada. 3 Quando usado neste Acordo, o termo “autoridades” deverá ser interpretado como autoridades em nível de chefia adequada. 4 O lapso de tempo dilatado deverá ser normalmente de um ano, mas não deverá ser nunca inferior a 6 meses. 5 Venda abaixo do custo unitário ocorre em quantidade substancial quando as autoridades estabelecem que o preço médio ponderado de venda nas transações investigadas para a determinação do valor normal está abaixo do custo médio ponderado ou que o volume de vendas abaixo do custo unitário responde por 20 por cesto ou mais de volume vendido nas transações examinadas para a determinação do valor normal.

(b) Para os efeitos do parágrafo 2, os custos deverão ser normalmente calculados com base em registros mantidos pelo exportador ou pelo produtor objeto de investigação, desde que tais registros estejam de acordo com os princípios contábeis geralmente aceitos no país exportador e reflitam razoavelmente os custos relacionados com a produção e a venda do produto em causa. As autoridades deverão levar em consideração todas as informações disponíveis sobre a correta distribuição de custos, inclusive aquelas fornecidas pelo exportador ou produtor durante os procedimentos da investigação, desde que tal distribuição tenha sido regularmente utilizada pelo exportador ou produtor, particularmente no que tange à determinação dos prazos adequados de amortização e depreciação e deduções por conta de despesas de capital e outros custos de desenvolvimento. A menos que já refletidos na distribuição de custos contemplada neste subparágrafo, os custos devem ser ajustados adequadamente e em função daqueles itens não-recorrentes que beneficiem produção futura e/ou corrente ou ainda em função de circunstâncias nas quais os custos observados durante o período de investigação sejam afetados por operações de entrada em funcionamento6.

(c) Para as finalidades do parágrafo 2, valores adotados para os custos administrativos de

comercialização e outros e para o lucro deverão basear-se em dados reais relativos à produção e à venda no curso normal dos atos de comércio do produto similar praticados pelo exportador ou pelo produtor sob investigação. Quando tais valores não puderem ser determinados nessa base eles poderão ser determinados por meio de: (i) os valores reais despendidos e auferidos pelo exportador ou produtor em

questão relativos à produção e à venda da mesma categoria geral de produtos no mercado interno do país de origem;

(ii) a média ponderada dos valores reais despendidos e auferidos por outros exportadores e produtores sob investigação em relação à produção e à comercialização do produto similar no mercado interno do país de origem;

(iii) qualquer outro método razoável, desde que o montante estipulado para o lucro não exceda o lucro normalmente realizado por outros exportadores ou produtores com as vendas de produtos da mesma categoria geral no mercado interno do pais de origem.

2.4 Naqueles casos em que não exista preço de exportação ou em que ás autoridades competentes

pareça duvidoso o preço de exportação por motivo de combinação ou entendimento compensatório entre o importador e o exportador ou uma terceira parte, o preço de exportação poderá ser construído a partir do preço pelo qual os produtos importados forem revendidos ao primeiro comprador independente, ou, no caso de os produtos não serem revendidos a comprador independente, ou, ainda, no caso de não serem revendidos na mesma condição em que foram importados, a partir de uma base razoável que venha a ser determinada pelas autoridades.

2.5 Comparação justa será efetuada entre o preço de exportação e o valor normal. Essa

comparação deverá efetuar-se no mesmo nível de comércio, normalmente no nível ex fábrica, e considerando vendas realizadas tão simultaneamente quanto possível. Razoável tolerância será concedida caso a caso de acordo com sua especificidade, em razão de diferenças que afetem comparação de preços, entre elas diferenças nas condições e nos termos de venda, tributação, níveis de comércio, quantidades, características físicas e quaisquer outras diferenças que igualmente se demonstre afetam a comparação de preços7. Nos casos tratados

                                                                                                                         6 As correções efetuadas em razão da entrada em funcionamento devem refletir os custos verificados ao final do período de entrada em funcionamento ou, caso tal período se estenda além daquele coberto pelas investigações, os custos mais recentes que as autoridades possam razoavelmente tomar em conta durante a investigação. 7 Entende-se que alguns dos fatores acima podem incidir cumulativamente e, nesse caso, as autoridades devem zelar para que não se dupliquem acomodações que já tenham sido efetuadas ao abrigo destas disposições.

no parágrafo 4 deverão ser tolerados ajustes em função de custos, entre eles tarifas e taxas que incidam entre a importação e a revenda e também em função dos lucros auferidos. Se em tais casos a comparação de preços tiver sido afetada, as autoridades deverão estabelecer o valor normal em nível de comércio equivalente àquele do preço de exportação apurado ou aplicar a tolerância prevista neste parágrafo. As autoridades devem informar as partes envolvidas da necessidade de informação que assegure comparação justa e não deverão impor às partes excessivo ônus de prova.

2.6 (a) Se a comparação prevista no parágrafo 5 exigir conversão cambial, tal procedimento

deverá servir-se da taxa de câmbio em vigor no dia da venda8, desde que, na ocorrência de venda de moeda estrangeira em mercados futuros diretamente ligada à exportação em causa, a taxa de câmbio dessa venda futura seja utilizada. Flutuações na taxa de câmbio deverão ser ignoradas e, no caso de uma investigação, as autoridades deverão permitir aos exportadores pelo menos 60 dias para ajustar seus preços de exportação para que reflitam alterações relevantes ocorridas durante o período da investigação.

(b) De acordo com o disposto acerca de uma comparação justa no parágrafo 5, a

existência de margens de dumping durante a investigação deverá ser normalmente determinada com base em comparação entre o valor normal médio ponderado e o preço médio ponderado de todas as exportações equivalentes ou com base em comparação entre o valor normal e os preços de exportação apurados em cada transação. O valor normal estabelecido por meio de média ponderada poderá ser comparado com o preço de uma exportação específica no caso de as autoridades estabelecerem padrão de preços de exportação que difira significativamente do universo de compradores, regiões ou momentos e também caso seja fornecida explicação de porque tais diferenças não podem ser consideradas adequadamente por meio de comparação entre médias ponderadas ou entre transações.

2.7 Na hipótese de um produto não ser importado diretamente de seu país de origem, mas, ao

contrário, ser exportado ao país importador a partir de terceiro país intermediário, o preço pelo qual o produto é vendido a partir do país de exportação ao Membro importador deverá ser normalmente comparado com o preço equivalente praticado no país de exportação. Poder-se-á, porém, efetuar a comparação com o preço praticado no país de origem se, por exemplo, ocorre mero transbordo do produto no país de exportação ou se o produto não é produzido no país de exportação ou ainda se não houver preço comparável para o produto no país de exportação.

2.8 Ao longo deste Acordo o termo produto similar (like product - produit similaire) deverá ser

entendido como produto idêntico, i.e., igual sob todos os aspectos ao produto que se está examinando ou, na ausência de tal produto, outro produto que embora não exatamente igual sob todos os aspectos apresenta características muito próximas às do produto que se está considerando.

2.9 O presente Artigo não prejudica o disposto na segunda Disposição Suplementar ao parágrafo 1

do Artigo VI do anexo I ao GATT 1994. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução A tradução contida na Ata Final contendo os resultados da Rodada Uruguai, apensa ao Decreto nº 1.355/1994, numerou os subitens do Artigo 2 de modo distinto da versão original, de modo que o Artigo 2.6 da versão original, corresponde ao Artigo 2.8 na versão traduzida.

                                                                                                                         8 Em situações normais, o dia da alienação deverá ser o da data do contrato da ordem de compra, da confirmação de encomenda ou da fatura, utilizando-se dentre esses documentos aquele que estabeleça as condições de venda.  

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 2 1. Aspectos Gerais Relatório do caso Guatemala - Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, paras. 7.58 e 7.61-7.67 O Painel considerou que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala não cumpriu com os requisitos dos Artigos 2.1 e 2.4 do Acordo Antidumping, uma vez que deu início à investigação sem possuir indícios que permitissem estabelecer a existência de dumping, ainda que de forma preliminar. De acordo com o Painel, para que seja iniciada uma investigação a autoridade deve ser capaz, com base nos documentos apresentados, de determinar, de forma imparcial e objetiva, que há indícios da prática de dumping que justifiquem o início de uma investigação. O dumping a que se refere o Artigo 5.2 é o mesmo do Artigo 2.1, devendo ser apurado de acordo com os critérios expostos no Artigo 2.1, quais sejam, venda de um produto no país importador por um preço abaixo do valor normal no curso normal do comércio. Portanto, para se iniciar uma investigação a autoridade deve possuir elementos suficientes que a permitam concluir, de forma imparcial e objetiva, que há indícios de que ocorreu a entrada de um produto no país importador por um preço abaixo do preço que este mesmo produto é vendido no país exportador. No caso concreto, a Guatemala, ao estabelecer o preço de importação e o valor normal, também não cumpriu o disposto no Artigo 2.4 do Acordo Antidumping, que estabelece que a autoridade deve realizar uma comparação justa entre o preço de exportação e o valor normal. É com base nesta comparação que se estabelece a diferença de preços e, portanto, a margem de dumping. O Artigo 2.4 dispõe que, caso seja necessário, a autoridade deve realizar ajustes nos preços de forma a permitir que a comparação seja justa. O Painel considerou que a Guatemala, ao realizar a comparação, não efetuou os ajustes claramente necessários para uma comparação justa, uma vez que comparou os preços apurados em diferentes níveis de comércio e com base em transações que envolviam volumes de mercadorias significativamente diferentes. De acordo com o Painel, o Artigo 2 fornece os elementos técnicos que devem constar no cálculo do dumping, incluindo os requisitos necessários para sua determinação e para a determinação do valor normal, preço de exportação e ajustes necessários para que a comparação de preços seja justa. Por outro lado, o Painel entende que o volume e a qualidade das informações necessárias para que seja dado o início à investigação não é o mesmo necessário na determinação final do dumping, porém deve ser suficiente para, como dito acima, que uma pessoa razoável e objetiva perceba indícios suficientes da prática, dentro dos parâmetros fornecidos pelo Artigo 2. Sendo necessário realizar os ajustes acima mencionados para possibilitar a comparação justa, não pode a autoridade argumentar que estes não foram realizados por conta da ausência de informação, até porque isto é comum na fase preliminar de uma petiçãoto de abertura de investigação. No entanto, este argumento não é suficiente para que uma investigação seja aberta sem que os requisitos do Artigo 2 sejam apurados, ainda que preliminarmente, de forma tecnicamente correta. Caso a autoridade não logre obter as informações necessárias para apuração preliminar de dumping ou para realizar os ajustes eventualmente necessários (como era o caso em tela), não deve dar início à investigação. Nestes casos, o Painel indicou que a autoridade poderia, por exemplo, analisar a própria experiência de sua indústria doméstica para obter informações necessárias para a realização dos ajustes nos preços antes de realizar a comparação. O Painel considerou que realizar uma comparação justa é uma obrigação da autoridade investigadora, e não uma faculdade. No caso analisado, o Painel entendeu que o valor normal apurado e o preço de exportação apontado pelo demandante não eram comparáveis para se apurar a margem de dumping, o que só seria possível com a adequação dos preços (ajustes). Desta forma, conclui que “in our view, based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the evidence and information before it in this case, the Ministry could not properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of the investigation.” A Guatemala notificou sua intenção de apelar da decisão do Painel em 4 de agosto de 1998 e em 2 de novembro do mesmo ano o Órgão de Apelação circulou seu Relatório no qual conclui que o México não apresentou o caso perante o Painel da forma apropriada e, como consequência, o Órgão de Apelação não analisou qualquer outra questão de mérito, inclusive o Artigo 2 do Acordo Antidumping: “Having found that this dispute was not properly before the Panel, we consider that the merits of Mexico's claims in this case are not properly before us. Therefore, we cannot consider any of the substantive issues raised in the

alternative by Guatemala in this appeal. Accordingly, we have no choice but to come to no conclusions as to whether the Panel was right or wrong in finding that Guatemala had acted inconsistently with its obligations under Articles 5.3 and 5.5 of the Antidumping Agreement or in making its recommendations and suggestion under Article 19.1 of the DSU. Our finding that the Panel was not entitled, under its terms of reference, to examine Mexico's claims in this case in no way precludes Mexico from seeking consultations with Guatemala regarding the latter's imposition of definitive antidumping duties on imports of portland cement from Mexico and from pursuing another dispute settlement complaint under the provisions of Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement and of the DSU.” Para. 7.58. “While the parties seem largely in accord that the application must contain evidence and information on the essential elements of dumping, injury, and causal link, they disagree on what types of evidence and information are required. Thus, Mexico argues that the substantive provisions governing determinations of dumping and injury in Articles 2.1, 2.4, and 3.7, must be taken into account in evaluating the evidence in an application to determine its sufficiency. Guatemala, on the other hand, argues that Article 2 does not apply to the decision whether to initiate an investigation, but only to the preliminary or final determination of dumping (…). Thus, Guatemala argues that information of the type referred to in Articles 2 and 3.7 need not be included in the application, and is not relevant to the evaluation of whether there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation.” Para. 7.61. “With regard to dumping, the application states that the retail price of grey portland cement in Mexico ranged between (…). The price in Mexico was substantiated by two invoices showing the prices for two separate Sales. (…) The price of imported Mexican cement in Guatemala was substantiated by import certificates, invoices and bills of lading for two transactions on the same date (…). There is no indication that any other information on dumping was available to or considered by the Ministry.” Para. 7.62. “The two invoices reflect two separate sales at the retail level of one sack of cement of unspecified weight each. The import documents reflect two separate import transactions at the distributor (or wholesale) level of several thousand sacks of cement, (…). The alleged margin of dumping is calculated in the application by comparing the average retail price for the cement bought in Mexico (…) with the average c.i.f. value of the cement imported into Guatemala (…). The Ministry recommended initiation based on this information. In our view, this comparison ignores obvious problems with the data: (1) the transactions involve significantly different volumes; and (2) the transactions occurred at different levels of trade.” Para. 7.63. “While in general we agree with Guatemala that there is not a “minimum” of documentation which must be submitted to substantiate an assertion of dumping, this does not mean that any documentation will be sufficient to justify initiation in a particular case. Guatemala also argues that the considerations outlined above are addressed only in Article 2 of the ADP Agreement, which is not referenced in Article 5.2, and are therefore irrelevant to the determination to initiate. We cannot accept Guatemala's interpretation of the ADP Agreement in this regard. In this case, we consider that based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the information before it, the Ministry could not properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of the investigation.” Para. 7.64. “In our view, in assessing whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation, an investigating authority may not ignore the provisions of Article 2 of the ADP Agreement. Article 5.2 of the Agreement requires an application to include evidence of “dumping” and Article 5.3 requires a determination that there is “sufficient” evidence to justify initiation. Article 2 of the ADP Agreement sets forth the technical elements of a calculation of dumping, including the requirements for determining normal value, export price, and adjustments required for a fair comparison. In our view, the reference in Article 5.2 to “dumping” must be read as a reference to dumping as it is defined in Article 2. This does not, of course, mean that the evidence provided in the application must be of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping. However, evidence of the relevant type is, in our view, required in a case such as this one where it is obvious on the face of the application that the normal value and export price alleged in the application will require adjustments in order to effectuate a fair comparison. At a minimum, there

should be some recognition that a fair comparison will require such adjustments.” Para. 7.65. “Guatemala argues that at the time of initiation, it was not possible to make adjustments, as the precise information needed is within the control of the exporting company, which bears the burden of showing that adjustments should be made. We do not accept this position.” Article 2.4 provides, in pertinent part:

A fair comparison shall be made between the export price and the normal value. This comparison shall be made at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time. Due allowance shall be made in each case, on its merits, for differences which affect price comparability, including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, levels of trade, quantities, physical characteristics, and any other differences which are also demonstrated to affect price comparability.  (It is understood that some of the above factors may overlap, and authorities shall ensure that they do not duplicate adjustments that have been already made under this provision”. In our view, this provision establishes an obligation for investigating authorities to make a fair comparison. Investigating authorities can certainly expect that exporters will provide the information necessary to make adjustments, and demonstrate that particular differences for which adjustments are sought affect price comparability. However, the authorities cannot, in our view, ignore the question of a fair comparison in determining whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation, particularly when the need for adjustments is apparent on the face of the application. Moreover, the exporting country or company may not even be aware that an application has been filed and the initiation of an investigation is being considered, and is in any event generally not a participant in the initiation decision, and can therefore not provide this information prior to initiation. Thus, Guatemala's position would make it more likely that investigations will be initiated on the basis of insufficient or incorrect evidence of dumping.)”

Para. 7.66. “In this case it is apparent on the face of the application that the alleged normal value and the alleged export price are not comparable for purposes of considering whether dumping exists without adjustment. The recommendation to the Director of the Department of Economic Integration reflects this lack of comparability when it states that the normal value is the average price “to the final consumer”, and the export price is the average of “the c.i.f. values”. However, there is no recognition of the need for any adjustments in either the recommendation or the notice of initiation. While we would not expect the authorities to have, at the initiation stage, precise information on the adjustments to be made, we find it particularly troubling that there is not even any recognition that the normal value and export price alleged in the application are not comparable, nor any indication that more information on this issue was requested from the applicant or otherwise sought by the Ministry. When, as in this case, it is evident from the information before the investigating authority that some form of adjustment will be required to make a fair comparison and establish a dumping margin, an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not, in our view, properly determine that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation in the absence of such adjustment, or at least without acknowledging the need for such adjustment.” Para. 7.67. “As noted above, while there is clearly a different standard applicable to making a preliminary or final determination of dumping, than to determining whether there is sufficient evidence of dumping to justify initiation of an investigation, we cannot agree with Guatemala's position that Article 2 is irrelevant to the initiation determination. The subject matter, or type, of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that needed to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping, although the quality and quantity is less. Thus, in our view, based on an unbiased and objective evaluation of the evidence and information before it in this case, the Ministry could not properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to justify the initiation of the investigation.” 2. Artigo 2.2 Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, paras. 6.66, 6.69 e 6.73

O Painel considerou que o Artigo 2.2.1.1 indica que o dispositivo “princípios de contabilidade, geralmente aceitos no país exportador”, aplica-se apenas aos registros mantidos pelo exportador com relação à venda em questão. Desta forma, o Painel decidiu que as projeções realizadas com base no estudo de Flamm (preparado por um consultor externo da empresa exportadora) não constituíam “registros mantidos pelo exportador” por ter o estudo realizado projeções relativas a custos futuros, com base em dados históricos de custos e não em registros mantidos pelo exportador. Além disso, ao argumentar o motivo de sua discordância relativa à exclusão (não aceitação) pelos EUA, no procedimento de revisão do direito Antidumping imposto na venda de DRAM, do estudo de Flamm, a Coreia apenas indicou que não estava de acordo com a posição do Departamento do Comércio por considerar ser o referido estudo “econometricamente válido” sem, no entanto, apresentar qualquer evidência ou argumento que justificasse essa afirmativa, levando o Painel a concluir que a Coreia não estabeleceu um caso prima facie que indicasse que uma autoridade investigadora objetiva e imparcial não poderia ter concluído que o estudo de Flamm não refletia de forma razoável os custos associados à produção e venda de DRAM. Não tendo a Coreia apresentado um caso prima facie relativa a esta questão, não pode o Painel analisar a o mérito do assunto (adequação do uso do estudo e pertinência de seu resultado no procedimento de revisão de direito Antidumping perante o Departamento do Comércio dos EUA). Para. 6.66. “Korea claims that the United States violated Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement because it disregarded cost data in the Flamm study which (1) were in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of Korea and (2) accurately reflected costs. Korea's claim is effectively based on an interpretation of Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement that requires a Member to accept projections for future costs based on historical cost data provided those projections are ”in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration.” Article 2.2.1.1, however, clearly indicates that the provisos concerning generally accepted accounting principles and reflection of costs of production and sale only apply to “records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation”. As the projections for the Flamm study, which were prepared by an outside consultant on behalf of Hyundai, do not constitute “records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation”, we believe that the two provisos contained in the first sentence of Article 2.2.1.1 do not apply to the US treatment of the projections for that study. Accordingly, we must reject Korea's claim based on those provisos, i.e., that the United States violated Article 2.2.1.1 because it rejected projections for future costs based on historical cost data that are “in accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the exporting country and reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale of the product under consideration.” Para. 6.69. “In failing to advance anything beyond conclusory arguments in support of its claim that the DOC should not have rejected the Flamm study, we consider that Korea has failed to “establish a prima facie case” that an objective and impartial investigating authority could not properly have found that the study did not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale” of DRAMs.” Para. 6.73. “In its Final Results Third Review, the DOC stated that its review of LGS cost data for the second half of 1996 “indicates that there are serious questions whether the reported costs were understated due to significant changes in LGS' depreciation schedule and write-offs of foreign exchange losses.” These “serious questions” were then dDSUribed in greater detail by the DOC in the Final Results Third Review. However, Korea has failed to challenge the DOC's finding of “serious questions”, and has failed to identify anything in the record to indicate that, in light of such “serious questions”, an unbiased and objective investigating authority could not properly have considered that the LGS cost data for the second half of 1996 did not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale” of DRAMs. Korea merely states that the DOC's “failure to treat properly Respondents' actual cost and price data (…) violates Article 2.2.1.1”. In failing to advance anything beyond conclusory arguments in support of its claim that the DOC should not have rejected the LGS cost data for the second half of 1996, we consider that Korea has failed to establish a prima faciecase

that an objective and impartial investigating authority could not properly have found that the LGS cost data for the second half of 1996 did not “reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production and sale” of DRAMs. Accordingly, we must reject Korea's claim that the United States violated Article 2.2.1.1 of the AD Agreement by rejecting the LGS cost data for the second half of 1996.” Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H. Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, paras. 7.105, 7.112-7.113, 7.119, 7.121-7.123, 7.125 e 7.128 Neste Painel, a Polônia argumentou que os valores utilizados como lucro no cálculo do valor normal estavam superestimados, impossibilitando um resultado “razoável”. A Polônia argumentou que foram apresentados na investigação outros dados relativos ao lucro, os quais eram inferiores aos utilizados e que foram desconsiderados pela Tailândia. A Polônia afirmou que os textos dos Artigos 2.2 e 2.2.2 do Acordo Antidumping obrigam a realização de um teste separado para a apuração do valor “razoável” de lucro: enquanto o Artigo 2.2 fala em quantidade razoável de lucro, o Artigo 2.2.2 fala que as metodologias descritas nos itens (i) a (iii) podem (“may”) ou não ser utilizadas (não há uma imposição, a autoridade pode ou não se valer dessas metodologias - caso assim fosse, a palavra “shall” constaria do Acordo Antidumping no lugar da palavra “may”) e, caso a autoridade se valha desta metodologia, deve apurar se o resultado é razoável. No entanto, tendo em vista a existência de dados relativos a lucro, a Polônia afirma que a Tailândia deveria ter se valido destes dados ao invés de se valer dos procedimentos descritos nos itens (i) a (iii) do Artigo 2.2.2 para a apuração do lucro do exportador. De acordo com a Tailândia, as metodologias do Artigo 2.2.2 (i) a (iii) devem ser utilizadas sempre que as condições necessárias estiverem presentes, ou seja, sempre que a previsão do caput do Artigo 2.2.2 (“actual data pertaining to production and sales in the ordinary course of the trade”) não puder ser aplicada, sendo que, neste caso, o resultado obtido com a utilização da metodologia será sempre razoável per se. Isso porque a autoridade investigadora só se utiliza dessas metodologias quando estão presentes as condições descritas nos referidos itens (i) a (iii), o que torna impossível apurar o lucro de outra forma que não aplicando as metodologias ali descritas, tornando o resultado razoável por definição. No caso analisado, a autoridade investigadora considerou que os dados referentes a lucro, apresentados na investigação, não se referiam a produto similar e, portanto, foram excluídos. Em seu lugar, a autoridade se valeu dos números referentes a vendas de uma categoria mais específica do produto, conforme permite o item (i) do Artigo 2.2.2. Os dados apresentados pela Polônia relativos a lucros se referiam a vendas de uma categoria mais ampla de produtos, tendo a autoridade investigadora da Tailândia optado por estreitar a categoria. O Painel considerou correta a posição da Tailândia, afastando a necessidade de dois testes de razoabilidade, e esclarecendo que sempre que os dados relativos ao lucro, apresentados pela empresa investigada, não puderem ser utilizados, a autoridade investigadora deve se valer dos métodos previstos nos itens (i) a (iii), sendo que, neste caso, o resultado será presumidamente considerado razoável. De acordo com o Painel, sempre que a metodologia do item 2.2.2 (i) for aplicada corretamente, necessariamente o resultado será um valor razoável da margem de lucro, não havendo necessidade de aplicação de outro teste para confirmar tal razoabilidade. Além disso, o Painel considerou que a Tailândia, ao excluir a categoria HS 7216 (angles, shapes and sections of iron or non-alloy steel) por entender não ser ela pertencente à mesma “categoria geral do produto”, não infringiu o Artigo 2.2.2 (i), uma vez que a redação do dispositivo não impede que a autoridade restrinja a gama de produtos que considera como sendo “similar”. Na verdade, de acordo com o Painel, quanto mais restrita a categoria, menor a possibilidade de serem incluídos na investigação produtos que não sejam similares ao investigado, que é o que o Artigo analisado pretende. Desta forma, o Painel concluiu que a Tailândia não infringiu o Artigo 2.2 do Acordo Antidumping, tendo o Órgão de Apelação mantido essa decisão com relação a este Artigo. Para. 7.105. “In assessing this claim, we are confronted by two issues which are purely matters of legal interpretation: first, whether Thailand has incorrectly applied Article 2.2.2 (i) by defining the “same general category of products” too narrowly, (i.e., as all H-beams), rather than as a broader “general category”; and second, whether an amount for profit calculated pursuant to Article 2.2.2 (i)

is ipso factoreasonable (assuming that the methodology is applied correctly) or must be subjected to a separate reasonability test.” Para. 7.112. “In particular, we note that, in general, Article 2.2 and Article 2.2.2 concern the establishment of an appropriate proxy for the price “of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country” when that price cannot be used. As such, as the drafting of the provisions makes clear, the preferred methodology which is set forth in the chapeau is to useactualdata of the exporter or producer under investigation for the like product. Where this is not possible, subparagraphs (i) and (ii) respectively provide for the database to be broadened, either as to the product (i.e., the same general category of products produced by the producer or exporter in question) or as to the producer (i.e., other producers or exporters subject to investigation in respect of the like product), but not both. Again this confirms that the intention of these provisions is to obtain results that approximate as closely as possible the price of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country.” Para. 7.113. “This context indicates to us that the use under subparagraph (i) of a narrower rather than a broader”same general category of products” certainly is permitted. Indeed, the narrower the category, the fewer products other than the like product will be included in the category, and this would seem to be fully consistent with the goal of obtaining results that approximate as closely as possible the price of the like product in the ordinary course of trade in the domestic market of the exporting country.” Para. 7.119. “Having found that Thailand has not incorrectly applied Article 2.2.2(i), we turn to the second element of Poland's claim under Article 2.2/Article VI:1(b)(ii) of GATT 1994, namely whether the profit amount thus calculated by Thailand was “unreasonable” in violation of Article 2.2. To resolve this issue, we must consider the legal question of whether, as Poland argues, Article 2.2 and Article VI:1(b)(ii) of GATT 1994 impose an obligation to apply a separate reasonability test to the results of a correct calculation under Article 2.2.2 (i).” Para. 7.121. “We recall that the text of Article 2.2 states (…). This text thus establishes the basic principle that when constructed value is used, it shall include, inter alia, a “reasonable amount” for profit. The text of the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 cross-references this provision, stating that “for the purpose of paragraph 2, the amounts for (…) profits” shall be determined as set forth in that provision. This text thus establishes that the methodologies outlined in Article 2.2.2 are to be used “for the purpose of “determining the “reasonable amount” for profit (inter alia) to be used in a constructed normal value, as required under Article 2.2.” Para. 7.122. “We note Poland's argument that the methodologies set forth in Article 2.2.2 are reasonable per se, but that the results of applying any of these methodologies are, at best, rebuttably presumed to be reasonable. We find no trace in the texts of the relevant provisions of such a rebuttable presumption, however. To the contrary, the ordinary meaning of the text seems rather to indicate that, if one of the methodologies is applied, the result is by definition reasonable.” Para. 7.123. “Second, we note that the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 provides that where the methodology in the chapeau “cannot” be used, one of the methodologies in subparagraphs (i), (ii) or (iii) “may” be used. Poland argues that the word “may” only provides for the possibility of using such methodologies and implies that any results derived thereby would be subject to a reasonability test arising under Article 2.2. We disagree, as in our view the word “may” constitutes authorization to use the methodologies in the subparagraphs where the methodology in the chapeau, which is the preferred methodology, “cannot” be used. We note that the text of Article 2.2.2 establishes no hierarchy among the subparagraphs and that there is no disagreement between the parties concerning this issue.” Para. 7.125. “We note also the requirement in the chapeau of Article 2.2.2 as well as in subparagraphs (i) and (ii) that actual data be used. In our view, the notion of a separate reasonability test is both illogical and superfluous where the Agreement requires the use of specific types of actual data. (…)

Thus, in our view, Article 2.2.2's requirement that actual data be used (and its establishment of a cap where this is not the case) are intended precisely to avoid the outcome that Poland seeks, namely subjective judgments by national authorities as to the “reasonability” of given amounts used in constructed value calculations.” Para. 7.128. “For the foregoing reasons, we find that AD Article 2.2.2 (i), when applied correctly, necessarily yields reasonable amounts for profits, and that no separate reasonability test is required in respect of those amounts. As there is no requirement of a separate reasonability test, we find that Thailand has not violated AD Article 2.2 by not having applied such a test to the results that it obtained under AD Article 2.2.2 (i). Moreover, even if such a test were required, Poland has not demonstrated that the profit amount calculated is “unreasonable” nor how a correctly calculated profit amount could be characterized as unreasonable.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.59, 6.61, 6.70-6.71, 6.74, 6.84-6.86, 6.96 e 6.99 Para. 6.59. “Looking first at the text of Article 2.2.2, we see nothing that would indicate that there is a hierarchy among the methodological options listed in subparagraphs (i) to (iii). Of course, they are listed in a sequence, but this is an inherent characteristic of any list, and does not in and of itself entail any preference of one option over others. Moreover, we note that where the drafters intended an order of preference, the text clearly specifies it. (…) Thus, in context, it seems clear to us that the mere order in which the options appear in Article 2.2.2 has no preferential significance.” Para. 6.61. “In our view, there is no basis on which to judge which of these three options is “better”. (…) Given, as explained above, that each of the three options is in some sense “imperfect” in comparison with the chapeau methodology, there is, in our opinion, no meaningful way to judge which option is less imperfect – or of greater authority – than another and, thus, no obvious basis for a hierarchy.” Para. 6.70. “We first consider the language of Article 2.2.2(ii). India's argument has two principal elements – the use of the plural in the text of Article 2.2.2(ii), and the phrase “weighted average”. With respect to the first element, the European Communities argues that a phrase in the plural form is often used, in general and in the AD Agreement, with the intention of including the case where there is only one such person or thing. We agree. The phrase “other exporters or producers” as a general matter, admits of an understanding where the plural form includes the singular case – the case where there is only one other producer or exporter. In both common speech and legal texts, it is accepted that the ordinary meaning of the plural form may include the singular case.” Para. 6.71. “With respect to the second element, India argues that because a weighted average must be based on more than one data point, there must be more than one “other” producers' or exporters' data under consideration. However, we do not consider that the phrases “weighted average” and “other producers and exporters” constitute two separate requirements. Rather, we are of the opinion that the concept of weighted averaging is relevant only when there is information from more than one other producer or exporter available to be considered. In our view, the obligation to consider a weighted average of the information of other producers or exporters eliminates the possibility of a result-oriented or otherwise biased or discriminatory choice among available data. However, when the data available is from only one source, such a possibility does not arise.” Para. 6.74. “However, in this case, the European Communities did not arbitrarily pick one producer's data to use in its calculation. Rather, it was faced with the factual situation that there was only one producer whose data was available for the calculation under Article 2.2.2(ii). It is true that there was at least one other exporter which had domestic sales of the like product during the period of investigation. However, that producer was not in the sample on which the European Communities based its calculations in the dumping investigation.”

Para. 6.84. “Looking first at the text of Article 2.2.2(ii), we note that there is no reference to sales in the ordinary course of trade. Thus, we would agree with the view that exclusion of sales not in the ordinary course of trade is not mandated by that provision. However, we do not understand the European Communities to be arguing that it was required to exclude those sales in its determination of the profit rate, merely that it was permitted to do so, based on the general principle allowing the exclusion of sales not in the ordinary course of trade from the calculation of normal value.” Para. 6.85. “We consider that this principle may be properly understood to apply to all provisions falling within Article 2.2, including Article 2.2.2(ii). We do not consider that a Member is obligated to exclude sales not in the ordinary course of trade for purposes of determining the profit rate under the subparagraphs of Article 2.2.2, merely that such exclusion is not prohibited by the text.” Para. 6.86. “We recall that the “ordinary course of trade” limitation forecloses the possibility of calculating profits on the basis of sales at prices below cost. The profit amount on sales at prices below cost would be negative. In our view, to require the calculation of constructed normal value including such sales would not be in keeping with the overall object and purpose of the provision – to establish methodologies for the determination of a reasonable amount for profit to be used in the calculation of a constructed normal value. If sales that are considered not in the ordinary course of trade because they are below cost were used for the calculation of the profit rate, the constructed value could be equal to cost and thus would not include a reasonable amount for profit. This would render the calculation of a constructed value meaningless, and not consistent with Article 2.2. In this context, we recall that one reason an investigating authority would construct a normal value is because the actual sales of the investigated exporter or producer are deemed inappropriate to serve as the basis of normal value because they are made below cost. To conclude that such sales below cost must then be taken into account in the construction of normal value in these circumstances makes no sense.” Para. 6.96. “The text thus indicates that the methodologies set out in Article 2.2.2 are outlined “for the purpose” of calculating a reasonable profit amount pursuant to Article 2.2. There is no specific language establishing a separate reasonability test, or indicating how such a test should be conducted. In these circumstances, we consider that there is no textual basis for such a requirement. Thus, the ordinary meaning of the text indicates that if one of the methods of Article 2.2.2 is properly applied, the results are by definition “reasonable” as required by Article 2.2.” Para. 6.99. “We note further that the methodology set out in the chapeau of Article 2.2.2, as well as those in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), rely on actual data from the books of the producer(s) or exporter(s) being used as sources. India, however, argues that even where the chapeau methodology is applied, which requires the use of actual data concerning the product under investigation sold by the producer being investigated, the results are subject to a separate test of reasonability. (…) Thus, the use of actual data itself ensures that subjective judgments about the reasonability of the results do not affect the calculation of constructed normal value. We consider that no purpose would be served by testing the results obtained under the chapeau and subparagraphs (i) and (ii) against some arbitrary or subjective standard of reasonability.” 3. Artigo 2.4.2 (zeroing) Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.102, 6.112, 6.114-6.117 e 6.119 A Índia argumentou que as CE agiram em desconformidade com o Artigo 2.4.2, ao zerar a margem de dumping negativa para alguns produtos investigados no momento de calcular a margem ponderada de dumping para o produto similar ao bed linen. A prática do zeroing é comumente realizada pelos EUA e pelas CE e consiste em zerar a margem de dumping negativa obtida na comparação do valor normal com o preço de exportação. Neste caso, a margem negativa de dumping passa a ser considerada zero,

o que faz com que a média ponderada das margens de dumping seja aumentada. Com relação a este assunto, os EUA apresentaram documento sustentando que o Artigo 2.4.2 não proíbe a prática de zeroing, afirmando que da comparação do valor normal com o preço de exportação, pode-se chegar a resultados positivos e negativos. Se positivos, significa que o país importador pode impor medidas Antidumping para aquele produto ou para aquele grupo de transação comercial e, se negativo, significa o montante no qual o preço de exportação excedeu o valor normal. No entanto, os EUA entendem que o Acordo Antidumping não impõe ao Membro importador a obrigação de pagar ao Membro exportador um valor pela inexistência de margem de dumping para o produto em questão. Nesse sentido, afirmam os EUA que a margem de dumping negativa significa apenas que não existe dumping para aquele produto (ou seja, a margem de dumping é igual a zero). Com efeito, o valor do direito antidumping o qual o país importador pode cobrar é igual a zero. O Painel considerou que, não obstante o Artigo 2.4.2 não proíba explicitamente a prática de zeroing, isso não significa que a prática seja permitida caso ela produza resultados inconsistentes com as obrigações contidas no referido Artigo. Ademais, ao zerar a margem de dumping negativa, as CE, na realidade, alteraram os preços de exportação naquelas transações em que a margem final seria negativa, impedindo uma comparação adequada com o valor normal. Isso ocorre porque o zeroing faz com que a média ponderada do preço de exportação seja igual à média ponderada do valor normal para aquela transação na qual a margem de dumping foi negativa quando, na realidade, a média ponderada do preço de exportação é maior que a média ponderada do valor normal. Assim, entendeu o Painel que neste tipo de prática ocorre uma manipulação do preço de exportação individual utilizado no cálculo da sua média ponderada, de maneira que a margem de dumping final para aquele produto (calculada com base na média ponderada das margens de dumping individuais em cada transação) não se baseie em comparações que reflitam de forma correta o preço de exportação, o que torna a prática inconsistente com o Artigo 2.4.2. Em 1 de dezembro de 2000, as CE notificaram a sua intenção de apelar de alguns pontos decididos pelo Painel. Em 1 de março de 2001, o Órgão de Apelação circulou sua decisão, a qual: (i) manteve a decisão do Painel com relação à pratica de zeroing, considerando que as CE agiram de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 2.4.2; (ii) reverteu a decisão do Painel com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – dados de outros exportadores - entendendo que uma média ponderada pressupõe a utilização de dados de mais de um produtor ou exportador, e que o fato do Artigo mencionar “exportadores e produtores sob investigação”, no plural, significa que deve necessariamente ser mais de um; e (iii) reverteu a decisão do Painel com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – produção e comercialização - valores “despendidos e auferidos” – acrescentando que a autoridade investigadora não pode excluir de seu cálculo valores de SG&A e lucro de vendas efetivamente despendidos e auferidos pelas empresas investigadas, por inexistir no Artigo indicação de que apenas dados de vendas ocorridas dentro do curso normal do comércio devam ser consideradas, pois o Artigo prevê claramente que todos os valores apurados que tenham sido efetivamente incorridos e auferidos devam ser utilizados, independente de serem oriundos de vendas tidas como fora do curso normal do comércio. Para. 6.102. “The practice of “zeroing” arises in situations where an investigating authority makes multiple comparisons of export price and normal value, and then aggregates the results of these individual comparisons to calculate a dumping margin for the product as a whole. In this case, the European Communities compared weighted averages of export prices and normal value for each of several models or product types of bed linen. (…) The European Communities counted as zero the dumping amount for those models where the margin was negative. (…) It is this aspect of the calculation, the assigning of a value of zero to the comparisons yielding a “negative” margin, which constitutes the challenged practice of zeroing which is the subject of India's claim under Article 2.4.2.” Para. 6.112. “(…) we note that Article 2.4.2 requires that normally, except in circumstances not applicable here, the existence of “margins of dumping” is to be established on the basis of “a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions” or on the basis of comparison of individual transactions.” Para. 6.114. “(…) Article 2.4.2 sets out the permissible bases for comparison of normal value and export price in order to establish the existence of margins of dumping. In light of Article 2.1 of the AD

Agreement, we consider that the “margins of dumping” established under Article 2.4.2, based on the comparison methodologies set forth, must relate to the ultimate question being addressed: whether the product at issue is being dumped. Thus, in our view, a margin of dumping, that is, a determination that there is dumping, can only be established for the product at issue, and not for individual transactions concerning that product, or discrete models of that product.” Para. 6.115. “(…) By counting as zero the results of comparisons showing a “negative” margin, the European Communities, in effect, changed the prices of the export transactions in those comparisons. It is, in our view, impermissible to “zero” such “negative” margins in establishing the existence of dumping for the product under investigation, since this has the effect of changing the results of an otherwise proper comparison. This effect arises because the zeroing effectively counts the weighted average export price to be equal to the weighted average normal value for those models for which “negative” margins were found in the comparison, despite the fact that it was, in reality, higher than the weighted average normal value. This is the equivalent of manipulating the individual export prices counted in calculating the weighted average, in order to arrive at a weighted average equal to the weighted average normal value. As a result, we consider that an overall dumping margin calculated on the basis of zeroing “negative” margins determined for some models is not based on comparisons which fully reflect all comparable export prices, and is therefore calculated inconsistently with the requirements of Article 2.4.2.” Para. 6.116. “We recognize that Article 2.4.2 does not, in so many words, prohibit “zeroing”. However, this does not mean that the practice is permitted, if it produces results inconsistent with the obligations set forth in that Article, as we believe it does.” Para. 6.117. “(…) the use of the word comparable in Article 2.4.2 indicates to us that investigating authorities may insure comparability either by making necessary adjustments under Article 2.4, or by making comparisons for models which are, themselves, comparable. However, in arriving at a conclusion whether the product as a whole is being dumped, we consider that Article 2.4.2 obligates an investigating authority to make its determination in a way which fully accounts for the export prices on all comparable transactions. The European Communities' methodology, which focuses on those models which are, in its view, dumped, and takes less than full account of those models where the comparison results in a negative margin, does not accomplish this goal.” Para. 6.119. “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the European Communities acted inconsistently with Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement in establishing the existence of margins of dumping on the basis of a methodology which included zeroing negative price differences calculated for some models of bed linen.”

4. Artigo 2.6

a) Ausência de diretrizes para definição do “produto sob consideração”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber V), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS264/R, paras. 7.152-7.153 e 7.156-7.157 Neste caso, o Painel examinou o argumento do Canadá de que o Artigo 2.6 requer uma definição apropriada de “produto similar” e de “produto que se está considerando”. O Painel entendeu que o produto similar deve ser definido em conformidade com o citado Artigo, mas registrou não ter encontrado nenhum dispositivo que defina como deve ser determinado o “produto em consideração”. Ressaltou, ainda, que os mesmos critérios foram utilizados para definir tanto o “produto em consideração” quanto o “produto similar”, tendo concluído que os EUA não violaram o Artigo 2.6 na metodologia utilizada para tal definição. Por fim, o Painel rejeitou o argumento canadense de que

necessariamente deve haver similaridade entre os “produtos em consideração” individualmente analisados, o que impediria a definição destes como um grupo de produtos mais abrangente. Para. 7.152. “In our view, this means that the “like product”, for purposes of the dumping determination, is the product which is destined for consumption in the exporting country. The “like product” is therefore to be compared with the allegedly dumped product, which is generally referred to in the AD Agreement as the “product under consideration”. In the case of the injury determination (and the determination of domestic industry support for the application), the word “like product” refers to the product being produced by the domestic industry allegedly being injured by the dumped product. In both instances it is clear that the starting point can only be the product allegedly being dumped and that the product to be compared to it for purposes of the dumping determination, and the product the producers of which are allegedly being injured by the dumped product, is the “like product” for purposes of the dumping and injury determinations, respectively.” (nota de rodapé omitida) Para. 7.153. “Article 2.6 therefore defines the basis on which the product to be compared to the “product under consideration” is to be determined, that is, a product which is either identical to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration. As the definition of “like product” implies a comparison with another product, it seems clear to us that the starting point can only be the “other product”, being the allegedly dumped product. Therefore, once the product under consideration is defined, the “like product” to the product under consideration has to be determined on the basis of Article 2.6. However, in our analysis of the AD Agreement, we could not find any guidance on the way in which the “product under consideration” should be determined.” Para. 7.156. “As stated in paragraph 0, supra, we could find no explicit guidance in the AD Agreement as to how the investigating authority should define the product under consideration. In this case, DOC defined the product under consideration, certain softwood lumber, on the basis of a technical definition involving narrative description and tariff classification. For the purpose of establishing normal value, DOC based itself upon goods destined for consumption in the exporting country which fell within exactly the same definition. Similarly, when considering whether the application was made by, or on behalf of, the domestic industry, DOC identified the domestic industry on the basis of the same definition. Canada has not identified any instance in which DOC has defined the like product differently than it has defined the product under consideration. Specifically, Canada has not suggested that there was any difference between the product under consideration and the like product in respect of bed frame components, finger-jointed flangestock, Eastern White Pine and Western Red Cedar. In other words, having defined the “product under consideration”, it seems to us that DOC has used an identical definition for the “like product”. In particular, both the product under consideration and the like product included the products Canada argues should have been excluded from the investigation. On its face, therefore, it would appear that DOC has defined the “like product” in this investigation in a manner consistent with the definition found in Article 2.6.” (nota de rodapé omitida) Para. 7.157. “Canada has a different interpretation of Article 2.6. In effect, Canada considers that, rather than comparing the overall scope of the product under consideration with the overall scope of the like product, Article 2.6 requires that each individual item within the “like product” must be “like” each individual item within the “product under consideration”. This in effect means that there must be “likeness” within both the product under consideration and within the like product. As Canada itself has stated, “[t]he terms 'product under consideration' and 'like product' must be limited to a single group of products sharing characteristics”. Once again, however, we see no basis to imply such a condition into the AD Agreement. While there might be room for discussion as to whether such an approach might be an appropriate one from a policy perspective, whether to require such an approach is a matter for the Members to address through negotiations. It is not our role as a panel to create obligations which cannot clearly be found in the AD Agreement itself.” (nota de rodapé omitida).

III. Comentários A Índia argumentou que o Artigo 2.2.2 (“determinação do volume de lucro apresenta 3 (três) possibilidades para a apuração dos valores dos custos administrativos de comercialização do produto investigado, assim como do lucro (“SG&A” costs, que é a sigla utilizada neste Painel para designar “administrative, selling and general costs”). Tais valores são utilizados na construção do valor normal, havendo uma escala nas opções descritas no Artigo. A primeira opção encontra-se no caput do Artigo 2.2.2 e as demais nos itens (i) a (iii). Nesse sentido, o item (iii) do Artigo seria a quarta opção que a autoridade investigadora teria na construção do valor normal. Em outras palavras, existindo uma hierarquia no Artigo 2.2.2, a autoridade investigadora deve primeiro apurar o valor do lucro do exportador conforme o descrito no caput do Artigo (dados reais do produtor) e, caso isso não seja possível, deve passar para a metodologia do item (i), e assim por diante. A opção contida no item (iii) seria a mais desfavorável ao produtor investigado, uma vez que ela o priva não apenas de verificar a sua margem de dumping (ao menos no sistema utilizado pelas CE), mas também de saber se está realmente praticando dumping. As CE entendem que não existe uma ordem de preferência nos métodos do Artigo 2.2.2 e que não há nada na linguagem do Artigo que indique a existência de qualquer hierarquia entre as metodologias, posição sustentada também pelos EUA ao participar do Painel como terceiro interessado. Para os EUA, o caput do Artigo 2.2.2 expressa clara preferência pelo uso dos dados reais sobre produção e comercialização do produto investigado, sendo que, na ausência de tais dados, quaisquer das três metodologias constantes dos itens (i) a (iii) do Artigo podem ser utilizados sem qualquer preferência. O Painel considerou que não há nada na linguagem do Artigo 2.2.2 que indique uma ordem de hierarquia nos métodos dos itens (i) a (iii), e que tais métodos estão listados em sequência apenas porque isso é inerente a qualquer lista, mas este fato não sugere qualquer preferência entre as metodologias ali descritas. Fosse a intenção dos autores do Artigo que tais itens trouxessem uma ordem de preferência, esta intenção teria sido explicitada. Assim, o Painel considerou que as CE agiram em conformidade com o Artigo ora analisado. Com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii), a China argumentou que o método descrito no item (ii) pressupõe a utilização de dados de mais de um produtor para se chegar à média ponderada citada no dispositivo, não sendo possível se valer de dados de apenas um produtor para apurar-se o SG&A, uma vez que, para calcular uma média ponderada é necessária a utilização de dados de pelo menos dois produtores. Além disso, o produtor considerado pelas CE é, de acordo com a Índia, atípico e peculiar, e não reflete os demais produtores do produto investigado. Desta forma, o resultado obtido pelas CE não pode ser considerado razoável na acepção do caput do Artigo 2.2. As CE, por sua vez, afirmam que é possível a utilização de dados de apenas um produtor na construção do valor normal quando as circunstâncias assim exigirem. Tanto isso é plausível que o Artigo 2.4.2, por exemplo, usa a noção de comparação entre média ponderada de valor normal com média ponderada do preço de exportação e essa comparação pode ser realizada quando há apenas uma venda em ambos os lados da equação. A pergunta que o Painel procurou responder com relação a esta demanda é se é necessário existir dados de mais de um produtor ou exportador para que a metodologia do item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2 seja utilizada. Para tanto, o Painel analisou os dois principais elementos do argumento da Índia: (a) o uso do plural na linguagem do texto analisado (“outros exportadores e produtores sob investigação”); e (b) o sentido da frase “média ponderada”. Com relação ao item ”a”, o Painel concordou com o argumento das CE de que a forma plural é frequentemente utilizada no Acordo Antidumping, com a intenção de incluir os casos nos quais apenas um produto ou uma empresa estão envolvidos. Tanto na linguagem comum quanto nos textos legais é aceitável, de acordo com o Painel, a utilização da forma plural para incluir um caso singular. Com relação ao item ”b”, o Painel considerou que o conceito de média ponderada é relevante apenas quando há informações de mais de um exportador ou produtor para serem consideradas na

investigação. O cálculo da média ponderada dos dados dos produtores/exportadores investigados é a forma encontrada para se evitar o uso tendencioso ou uma escolha discriminatória pela autoridade investigadora de dados de apenas um produtor. No entanto, se no caso prático há apenas dados de um único produtor ou exportador, o risco aqui descrito não existe e o uso de média ponderada não é pertinente ou mesmo possível. No caso em tela, as CE não se utilizaram de dados de um produtor de forma aleatória, mas o fez diante da ausência de dados de outros produtores de produto similar ao investigado. Isso porque, não obstante a existência de ao menos outro exportador que possuía venda de produto similar no mercado doméstico durante o período de investigação, este produtor não foi inserido na amostragem dos cálculos das CE durante a investigação Antidumping (e a Índia não apresentou nenhum argumento persuasivo relativo à pertinência da exclusão e sobre se as CE estariam obrigadas a considerar, na sua análise, informações de uma empresa que não fazia parte da amostragem). Assim, a conclusão do Painel foi no sentido de que o fato de se possuir dados de apenas um exportador não impede a autoridade investigadora de se valer da metodologia do item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2 tendo as CE, portanto, agido em conformidade com o Artigo em questão. Com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii), que versa sobre a produção e comercialização - valores “despendidos e auferidos”, a China argumentou que as CE não poderiam ter excluído do cálculo do valor normal dados de vendas considerados pela autoridade investigadora como sendo não representativos – as CE excluíram da investigação dados relativos a vendas abaixo do custo, por não considerá-los presentes no curso normal do comércio. O Painel também apurou se o princípio contido no Artigo 2.2, - dados associados a vendas não representativas não são confiáveis – pode ser aplicado em todas os casos regulados pelo Artigo 2.2. De acordo com o Painel, o item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2 não faz referência específica a vendas ocorridas no “curso normal do comércio”. Ou seja, o Artigo não impõe a obrigação da autoridade investigadora de excluir dados relativos a vendas não consideradas como ocorridas no curso normal do comércio, na apuração da margem de lucro a ser utilizada na construção do valor normal. Por outro lado, o texto também não proíbe que isso seja feito. O Artigo 2 do Acordo Antidumping estabelece que os Membros devem basear seus cálculos para apuração do valor normal apenas nos dados das vendas do produto investigado, ocorridas no curso normal do comércio (este é o princípio geral do Artigo). Nesse sentido, excluir vendas abaixo do custo (e, portanto, consideradas fora do curso normal do comércio) está em conformidade com o princípio do Artigo 2 aqui descrito. Desta forma, o Painel entendeu que a exclusão, pelas CE, das vendas consideradas como não realizadas no curso normal do comércio é permitida com base no Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) do Acordo Antidumping. De acordo com a Índia, as CE agiram de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 2.2 (“razoabilidade”), ao valer-se de dados relativos à SG&A e lucros erroneamente apurados pela metodologia do item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2. Isso porque os valores utilizados como SG&A para fins do Artigo 2.2 devem ser razoáveis (o caput do Artigo 2.2 dispõe que o preço deve ser acrescido de “razoável montante por conta de custos administrativos, comercialização e outros, além de lucro”), não existindo essa recomendação de razoabilidade na metodologia do item (ii) do Artigo 2.2.2. Dessa forma, seria necessária a realização de um teste de razoabilidade para fins do Artigo 2.2. Na visão das CE, o resultado obtido com a utilização dos métodos do Artigo 2.2.2, itens (i) a (iii) já resultam em um montante razoável de SG&A e lucro, não sendo necessária a realização de um teste em separado para a verificação da razoabilidade do resultado obtido com a aplicação das metodologias previstas no Artigo 2.2.2 (i) a (iii). O Painel considerou que a linguagem do caput do Artigo 2.2.2 já indica que os resultados obtidos com a aplicação dos métodos previstos nos itens (i) a (iii) serão, por definição, razoáveis. O caput deste Artigo dispõe que as metodologias dos itens (i) a (iii) deverão ser utilizadas “para as finalidades do parágrafo 2” (ou seja, Artigo 2.2), que, por sua vez, prevê que os valores utilizados como SG&A e

lucro na construção do valor normal devem ser razoáveis. Ou seja, o próprio Artigo 2.2 remete à utilização das metodologias dos itens (i) a (iii) do Artigo 2.2.2 sempre que não haja dados disponíveis de SG&A e lucro, o que faz com que tais metodologias, se aplicadas corretamente, resultem sempre em valores razoáveis, na acepção do Artigo 2.2, sendo, portanto, desnecessária a realização de qualquer outro teste de razoabilidade nos resultados oriundos da aplicação das metodologias contidas no Artigo 2.2.2, como pretendia a Índia. Assim, o Painel considerou que as CE agiram em conformidade com o Artigo ora analisado. No que se refere à alegação ao Artigo 2.4.2 (zeroing), o Painel considerou que não obstante o Artigo 2.4.2 não proíba explicitamente a prática de zeroing isso não significa que a prática seja permitida caso ela produza resultados inconsistentes com as obrigações contidas no referido Artigo, como afirma o Painel ser a prática recorrente. O Painel entendeu que, ao zerar a margem de dumping negativa, as CE modificaram os preços de exportação naquelas transações nas quais a margem final seria negativa, impedindo uma comparação adequada com o valor normal. Isso ocorre porque o zeroing faz com que a média ponderada do preço de exportação seja igual à média ponderada do valor normal para aquela transação na qual a margem de dumping foi negativa, quando, na realidade, a média ponderada do preço de exportação é maior que a média ponderada do valor normal. Assim, entendeu o Painel que em práticas como essa ocorre uma manipulação do preço de exportação individual utilizado no cálculo da sua média ponderada, fazendo com que a margem de dumping final para aquele produto (calculada com base na média ponderada das margens de dumping individuais calculadas em cada transação) não se baseie em comparações que reflitam de forma correta o preço de exportação, o que torna a prática inconsistente com o Artigo 2.4.2. Em 1 de dezembro de 2000, as CE notificaram da sua intenção de apelar de alguns pontos decididos pelo Painel. Em 1 de março de 2001, o Órgão de Apelação circulou sua decisão, a qual: “(i) manteve a decisão do Painel com relação à pratica de zeroing, considerando que as CE agiram de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 2.4.2; (ii) reverteu a decisão do Painel com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – dados de outros exportadores - entendendo que para que uma média ponderada pressupõe a utilização de dados de mais de um produtor ou exportador e que o fato do Artigo mencionar “exportadores e produtores sob investigação” no plural significa que deve necessariamente ser mais de um; e (iii) reverteu a decisão do Painel com relação ao Artigo 2.2.2 (ii) – produção e comercialização - valores “despendidos e auferidos” – entendendo que a autoridade investigadora não pode excluir de seu cálculo valores de SG&A e lucro de vendas efetivamente despendidos e auferidos pelas empresas investigadas, por inexistir no Artigo indicação de que apenas dados de vendas ocorridas dentro do curso normal do comércio devam ser consideradas, pois o Artigo prevê claramente que todos os valores apurados que tenham sido efetivamente incorridos e auferidos devam ser utilizados, independente de serem oriundos de vendas tidas como fora do curso normal do comércio. Como vista acima, no único caso envolvendo a análise substancial do Artigo 2.6, o Painel, em considerações não revistas pelo Órgão de Apelação, entendeu não haver diretrizes no Acordo Antidumping sobre a definição de “produtos sob investigação”. Confere-se, portanto, ampla discricionariedade aos Membros da OMC para definirem o escopo da investigação, embora se deva observar a regra da similaridade após a definição deste escopo. A linguagem do Artigo 2.6 sugere, a princípio, uma definição mais estrita de produto similar em relação aos demais Acordos da OMC, tendo em conta a referência a “produto idêntico” ou, na ausência deste, outro, com características “muito próximas”. Tal conceito, de fato, não consta nos demais Acordos, como, por exemplo, o próprio GATT, razão pela qual ainda se aguarda esclarecimento jurisprudencial sobre as eventuais diferenças de interpretação do conceito de similaridade para os fins de investigações Antidumping. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 2: Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country shall normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the determination of the normal value if such sales constitute 5 per cent or

more of the sales of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a lower ratio should be acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless of sufficient magnitude to provide for a proper comparison. Footnote 3: When in this Agreement the term “authorities” is used, it shall be interpreted as meaning authorities at an appropriate senior level. Footnote 4: The extended period of time should normally be one year but shall in no case be less than six months. Footnote 5: Sales below per unit costs are made in substantial quantities when the authorities establish that the weighted average selling price of the transactions under consideration for the determination of the normal value is below the weighted average per unit costs, or that the volume of sales below per unit costs represents not less than 20 per cent of the volume sold in transations under consideration for the determination of the normal value. Footnote 6: The adjustment made for start-up operations shall reflect the costs at the end of the start-up period or, if that period extends beyond the period of investigation, the most recent costs which can reasonably be taken into account by the authorities during the investigation. Footnote 7: It is understood that some of the above factors may overlap, and authorities shall ensure that they do not duplicate adjustments that have been already made under this provision. Footnote 8: Normally, the date of sale would be the date of contract, purchase order, order confirmation, or invoice, whichever establishes the material terms of sale.

Ø Artigo 3 Roberto Kanitz Gisela Sarmet Mariana Chacoff Isadora Souza IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 3 Determination of Injury (9)

3.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products.

3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigating authorities shall consider

whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.

3.3 Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject to

antidumping investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of such imports only if they determine that (a) the margin of dumping established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de minimis as defined in paragraph 8 of Article 5 and the volume of imports from each country is not negligible and (b) a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like domestic product.

3.4 The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned

shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.

3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set

forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.

3.6 The effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in relation to the domestic production of the like product when available data permit the separate identification of that production on the basis of such criteria as the production process, producers’ sales and profits. If such separate identification of that production is not possible, the effects of the dumped imports shall be assessed by the examination of the production of the narrowest group or range of products, which includes the like product, for which the necessary information can be provided.

3.7 A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts and not merely on

allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which would create a situation in which the dumping would cause injury must be clearly foreseen and imminent. (10) In making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the authorities should consider, inter alia, such factors as: (a) a significant rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market indicating

the likelihood of substantially increased importation;

(b) sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter indicating the likelihood of substantially increased dumped exports to the importing Member’s market, taking into account the availability of other export markets to absorb any additional exports;

(c) whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports; and

(d) inventories of the product being investigated. No one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of the factors considered must lead to the conclusion that further dumped exports are imminent and that, unless protective action is taken, material injury would occur.

3.8 With respect to cases where injury is threatened by dumped imports, the application of antidumping measures shall be considered and decided with special care.

Footnote 9: Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article. Footnote 10: One example, though not an exclusive one, is that there is convincing reason to believe that there will be, in the near future, substantiallu increased importation of the product at dumped prices. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 3 Determinação de Dano2

3.1 A determinação de dano para as finalidades previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 deverá basear-se em provas materiais e incluir exame objetivo: (a) do volume das importações a preços de dumping e do seu efeito sobre os preços de produtos similares no mercado interno e (b) do consequente impacto de tais importações sobre os produtores nacionais desses produtos.

3.2 No tocante ao volume das importações a preços de dumping, as autoridades deverão ponderar

se houve aumento significativo das importações nessas condições, tanto em termos absolutos quanto em relação à produção ou ao consumo no Membro importador. Com relação ao efeito

                                                                                                                         2 Para os efeitos deste acordo o termo “dano” deve ser entendido como dano material causado a uma indústria nacional, ameaça de dano material a uma indústria nacional ou atraso real na implantação de tal indústria, e deverá ser interpretado de acordo com o disposto neste Artigo.

das importações a preços de dumping sobre os preços, as autoridades encarregadas da investigação deverão levar em conta se os preços dos produtos importados a preços de dumping são significativamente menores do que os preços dos produtos similares no Membro importador ou ainda se tais importações tiveram por efeito deprimir significativamente os preços ou impedir aumentos significativos de preços que teriam ocorrido na ausência de tais importações. Nem Isoladamente, nem em conjunto, porém, deverão tais fatores ser considerados necessariamente como indicação decisiva.

3.3 Se as importações de um produto provenitentes de mais de um país forem objeto de

investigações antidumping simultâneas, as autoridades responsáveis pela investigação somente poderão determinar cumulativamente os efeitos de tais importações se se verificar que (a) a margem de dumping determinada em relação às importações de cada um dos países é maior do que a margem de minimis, como definida no parágrafo 8 do artigo 5, e que o volume de importações de cada país não é negligenciável, e (b) a avaliação cumulativa dos efeitos daquelas importações é conveniente em vista da concorrência entre as diferentes importações e da concorrência entre os produtos importados e o similar nacional.

3.4 O exame do impacto das importações a preços de dumping sobre a indústria nacional

correspondente deverá incluir avaliação de todos os fatores e índices econômicos relevantes que tenham relação com a situação da referida indústria, inclusive queda real ou potencial das vendas, dos lucros, da produção, da participação no mercado, da produtividade, do retorno dos investimentos ou da ocupação, da capacidade instalada, fatores que afetem os preços internos, a amplitude da margem de dumping, efeitos negativos reais ou potenciais sobre o fluxo de caixa, estoques, emprego, salários, crescimento, capacidade para aumentar capital ou obter investimentos. A enumeração acima não é exaustiva, nem poderão tais fatores isoladamente ou em conjunto ser tomados necessariamente como indicação decisiva.

3.5 É necessário demonstrar que as importações a preços de dumping, por meio dos efeitos

produzidos por essa prática, conforme estabelecido nos parágrafos 2 e 4, estão provocando dano no sentido em que este último termo é adotado neste Acordo. A demonstração de nexo causal entre as importações a preços de dumping e o dano à indústria nacional deverá basear-se no exame de todos os elementos de prova relevantes à disposição das autoridades. Estas deverão, igualmente, examinar todo e qualquer outro fator conhecido, além das importações a preços de dumping que possam estar causando dano à indústria nacional na mesma ocasião e tais danos, provocados por motivos alheios às importações a preços de dumping, não devem ser imputados àquelas importações. Fatores relevantes nessas condições incluem, inter alia, os volumes e os preços de outras importações que não se vendam a preços de dumping, contração na demanda ou mudanças nos padrões de consumo, práticas restritivas ao comércio e concorrência entre produtores nacionais e estrangeiros, progresso tecnológico, desempenho exportador e produtividade da indústria nacional.

3.6 O efeito das importações a preços de dumping serão avaliados com relação à produção interna

do produto similar quando os dados disponíveis permitirem a identificação individualizada daquela produção a partir de critérios tais como o processo produtivo, as vendas do produtor e os lucros. Se tal identificação individualizada da produção não for possível, os efeitos das importações a preços de dumping serão determinados pelo exame da produção daquele grupo ou linha de produtos mais semelhante possível que inclua o produto similar para o qual se possam obter os dados necessários.

3.7 A determinação de ameaça de dano material deverá basear-se em fatos e não meramente em

alegações, conjecturas ou possibilidades remotas. Mudanças circunstanciais capazes de gerar situação em que o dumping causaria dano devem ser claramente previsíveis e iminentes3. Na

                                                                                                                         3 Um exemplo dessa situação, embora não o único, é a existência de motivo convincente para acreditar que haverá, em futuro próximo, aumento substancial na importação de produtos a preços de dumping.  

determinação de existência de ameaça de dano material, as autoridades deverão considerar, inter alia, os seguintes fatores: (a) significativa taxa de crescimento da disponibilidade no mercado interno de produtos

importados a preços de dumping, indicativa de provável aumento substancial nas importações;

(b) suficientes quantidades disponíveis ou iminente aumento substancial na capacidade do exportador que indiquem a probabilidade de significativo aumento das exportações a preços de dumping para o mercado do Membro importador, considerando-se a existência de outros mercados de exportação que possam absorver o possível aumento das exportações;

(c) se as importações são realizadas a preços que terão significativo efeito em deprimir ou suprimir preços internos e que provavelmente aumentarão a demanda por novas importações;

(d) estoques do produto sob investigação.

Nenhum desses fatores tomados isoladamente poderá fornecer orientação decisiva, mas a totalidade dos fatores considerados deverá necessariamente levar à conclusão de que mais importações a preços de dumping são iminentes e que, a menos que se tomem medidas de proteção, ocorrerá dano material. 3.8 Nos casos em que existe ameaça de dano por motivo de importações a preços de dumping, a

aplicação de medidas antidumping deverá ser avaliada e decidida com especial cuidado. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução 3.1. A primeira sentença do item 3.1 seria mais bem vertida ao português com o seguinte texto: “A determinação de dano para as finalidades previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 deverá basear-se em provas positivas e incluir exame objetivo (...)”. Ao invés do texto oficial: A determinação de dano para as finalidades previstas no Artigo VI do GATT 1994 deverá basear-se em provas materiais e incluir exame objetivo (...). (g.n.) Porque o significado literal de “positive” não sugere entendimento semelhante ao da palavra material. O termo “provas positivas” faria mais sentido, neste caso, para indicar uma análise realizada com base nos fatos. 3.4. Há um erro de pontuação na primeira sentença do item 3.4: não deveria existir a vírgula após a palavra “ocupação”. Texto oficial:

O exame do impacto das importações a preços de dumping sobre a indústria nacional correspondente deverá incluir avaliação de todos os fatores e índices econômicos relevantes que tenham relação com a situação da referida indústria, inclusive queda real ou potencial das vendas, dos lucros, da produção, da participação no mercado, da produtividade, do retorno dos investimentos ou da ocupação, da capacidade instalada (...) (g.n.).

É necessário excluir a vírgula uma vez que este item trata, entre outros, da ocupação da capacidade instalada e não da “ocupação dos investimentos” como dá a entender a versão em português do Acordo Antidumping.

3.6. A primeira sentença do item 3.6 seria mais bem vertida ao português com o seguinte texto: O efeito das importações a preços de dumping serão avaliados com relação à produção doméstica do produto similar (...)

Texto oficial:

O efeito das importações a preços de dumping serão avaliados com relação à produção interna do produto similar (...). (g.n.)

A expressão “produção doméstica” é coerente com o texto do Acordo Antidumping em inglês e com a legislação brasileira. A versão do texto oferecida na segunda sentença do item 3.6 causa imprecisões sobre o texto original do Acordo. A palavra “determinados” deveria ser substituída pela palavra “analisados”, conforme abaixo:

Se tal identificação individualizada da produção não for possível, os efeitos das importações a preços de dumping serão analisados pelo exame da produção daquele grupo ou linha de produtos mais semelhante possível que inclua o produto similar para o qual se possam obter os dados necessários.

Porque a autoridade investigadora não define a existência do dano, mas avalia os indicadores para poder se manifestar sobre a existência ou inexistência do dano, causado pelas importações a preços de dumping. 3.7. A versão em português deste item se desvirtua totalmente do texto original. A expressão “mudanças circunstanciais” deveria ser substituída pela expressão “mudanças de circunstâncias”, uma vez que a atual redação altera o sentido do Acordo Antidumping. Assim, a tradução correta seria:

Mudanças de circunstâncias capazes de gerar situação em que o dumping causaria dano devem ser claramente previsíveis e iminentes.

(a) A versão em inglês deste item se refere ao “rate of increase of dumped imports into the domestic market”. A expressão “taxa de crescimento da disponibilidade no mercado interno”, constante na versão em português, pode levar ao entendimento equivocado de que houve aumento de volume de produto em estoque. Na verdade, este item se refere à avaliação da taxa de crescimento da iferta das importações a preços de dumping no mercado interno, que serve para demonstrar o provável aumento substancial nas importações. (b) Este item seria melhor vertido ao português com o seguinte texto:

(...) suficientes quantidades disponíveis ou iminente aumento substancial da capacidade do exportador (...).

Texto oficial:

(...) suficientes quantidades disponíveis ou iminente aumento substancial na capacidade do exportador (...). (g.n.)

A atual redação do Artigo em português pode levar ao entendimento equivocado de que está se falando da quantidade de produto em estoque. (c) Para que haja maior coerência entre a versão do Acordo Antidumping em português e o texto original, em inglês, sugere-se a seguinte redação para este item:

(...) se as importações entram no mercado a preços que terão significativo efeito em deprimir ou suprimir preços internos (...).

Texto oficial:

(...) se as importações são realizadas a preços que terão significativo efeito em deprimir ou suprimir preços internos e que provavelmente aumentarão a demanda por novas importações (...). (g.n.)

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 3

1. Artigo 3.1

a) “Exame objetivo” O entendimento do DSB da OMC, a partir dos Relatórios de Painéis e do Órgão de Apelação a seguir, revela que um “exame objetivo” indica uma investigação conduzida de maneira e com metodologia imparcial. O termo está relacionado ao processo investigativo em si. O que importa é como a investigação é conduzida no sentido de como as provas são obtidas, coletadas, analisadas e avaliadas. O termo “objetivo” exige que o exame seja realizado de acordo com os princípios da imparcialidade, justiça e boa fé. Esta é uma obrigação da autoridade investigadora, pois se reconhece que o resultado da investigação será influenciado por essa objetividade ou por sua falta. Nos casos específicos analisados, esses critérios foram avaliados em relação à: metodologia de amostragem de exportadores para fins de cálculo da margem de dumping – o Painel concluiu que, o termo em questão exige que o exame da indústria doméstica, e dos efeitos das importações a preços de dumping, seja feito de forma imparcial, sem privilegiar interesses de Partes interessadas específicas. Ainda, o exame de um setor da indústria doméstica, ou uma parte dele, requer uma avaliação das demais partes ou uma explicação de porque esse exame da indústria como um todo não é necessário, de formaa não se privilegiar a análise de partes que possam estar com desempenho negativo e outras não. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 132-133 Para. 132. “(…) The examination was not “objective” because its result is predetermined by the methodology itself. Under the approach used by the European Communities, whenever the investigating authorities decide to limit the examination to some, but not all, producers - as they are entitled to do under Article 6.10 - all imports from all non-examined producers will necessarily always be included in the volume of dumped imports under Article 3, as long as any of the producers examined individually were found to be dumping (…).” Para. 133. “For these reasons, we conclude that the European Communities' determination that all imports attributable to non-examined producers were dumped - even though the evidence from examined producers showed that producers accounting for 53 percent of imports attributed to examined producers were not dumping - did not lead to a result that was unbiased, even-handed, and fair. Therefore, the European Communities did not satisfy the requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 3 to determine the volume of dumped imports on the basis of an examination that is “objective”.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.226 Para. 7.226. “(...) the term “objective examination” is concerned with the investigative process itself. We see the term “examination” as relating to the way in which the evidence is gathered, inquired into and, subsequently, evaluated. Thus, this term relates to the conduct of the investigation generally. The qualifying term, “objective”, indicates that the “examination” process must conform to the dictates of

the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. We understand that an “objective examination” requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation. The duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an “objective examination” recognises that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any lack thereof, of the investigative process.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/R, para. 7.28 Para. 7.28. “In this regard, we have kept in mind statements of the Appellate Body regarding the meaning of “positive evidence” and “objective examination”. While “positive evidence” involves the facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination, “objective examination” is concerned with the investigative process itself (…).” The Appellate Body has defined an “objective examination”:

The term “objective examination” aims at a different aspect of the investigating authorities' determination (...). The word “examination” relates, in our view, to the way in which the evidence is gathered, inquired into and, subsequently, evaluated; that is, it relates to the conduct of the investigation generally. The word “objective”, which qualifies the word “examination”, indicates essentially that the “examination” process must conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness.

The Appellate Body summed up the requirement to conduct an “objective examination” as follows:

In short, an “objective examination” requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favoring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation. The duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an “objective examination” recognizes that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any lack thereof, of the investigative proces.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Holled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 193, 204 e 206 Para. 193. “(...) In short, an “objective examination” requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation. The duty of the investigating authorities to conduct an “objective examination” recognizes that the determination will be influenced by the objectivity, or any lack thereof, of the investigative process.” Para. 204. “(...) Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement requires that such a sectoral examination be conducted in an “objective” manner. In our view, this requirement means that, where investigating authorities undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry, they should, in principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up the industry, as well as examine the industry as a whole. Or, in the alternative, the investigating authorities should provide a satisfactory explanation as to why it is not necessary to examine directly or specifically the other parts of the domestic industry. Different parts of an industry may exhibit quite different economic performance during any given period. Some parts may be performing well, while others are performing poorly. To examine only the poorly performing parts of an industry, even if coupled with an examination of the whole industry, may give a misleading impression of the data relating to the industry as a whole, and may overlook positive developments in other parts of the industry. Such an examination may result in highlighting the negative data in the poorly performing part, without drawing attention to the positive data in other parts of the industry. We note that the reverse may also be true – to examine only the

parts of an industry which are performing well may lead to overlooking the significance of deteriorating performance in other parts of the industry”.” Para. 206. “Accordingly, an examination of only certain parts of a domestic industry does not ensure a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic industry as a whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the requirements of “objectiv[ity]” in Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement”.”

b) “Provas materiais”

O entendimento do DSB, a partir dos Relatórios dos Painéis e do Órgão de Apelação a seguir, revela que o termo “provas materiais” faz referência aos fatos que dão suporte e justificam a determinação do dano, os quais determinam a qualidade das provas utilizadas pelas autoridades na investigação, e que devem transparecer imparcialidade e lógica. O termo “positivo” indica que a prova deverá ser afirmativa, objetiva e verificável, ou seja, confiável. Ademais, a determinação de dano deve ser baseada na totalidade das provas materiais, incluindo todas as informações prestadas (confidenciais e não-confidenciais). Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.75-7.76 Para. 7.75. “While we need not, and do not, opine on the exact nature of the “positive evidence” requirement of Article 3.1, (...). Moreover, we note that there are any number of bases on which a price undercutting analysis could be performed, and we do not find the IA's justification of the basis that it used to be illogical on its face or not objective, nor do we see in it any evidence of bias”.” Para. 7.76. “(...) we find that Turkey has not established that an objective and unbiased investigating authority could not have found price undercutting on the basis of the evidence of record. We therefore find that Turkey has not established that the IA's price undercutting finding was not based on “positive evidence” in violation of Article 3.1”.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.226 Para. 7.226. “The term “positive evidence” relates to the quality of the evidence upon which the authorities may rely in making a determination. The word “positive” may be understood as meaning that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible. While the term “positive evidence” focuses on the facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination (...)”.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/R, para. 7.28 Para. 7.28. “In this regard, we have kept in mind statements of the Appellate Body regarding the meaning of “positive evidence” and “objective examination”. While “positive evidence” involves the facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination, “objective examination” is concerned with the investigative process itself. The Appellate Body has interpreted “positive evidence” as follows:

The term “positive evidence” relates, in our view, to the quality of the evidence that authorities may rely upon in making a determination. The word “positive” means, to us, that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 107 Para. 107. “We recall that the legal issue before us is whether the terms “positive evidence” and “objective examination” in Article 3.1 require that “the reasoning supporting the determination be 'formally or explicitly stated' in documents in the record of the investigation to which interested parties (and/or their legal counsel) have access at least from the time of the final determination”, and, further, that “the factual basis relied upon by the authorities must be discernible from those documents”. We note that the Panel stated that the dictionary meaning of the term “positive” suggests that “positive evidence” is “formally or explicitly stated; definite, unquestionable (positive proof)”. Likewise, the Panel reasoned that the dictionary meaning of “objective” suggests that an “objective examination” is “concerned with outward things or events; presenting facts uncoloured by feelings, opinions, or personal bias; disinterested”. Even if we accept that the ordinary meaning of these terms is reflected in the dictionary definitions cited by the Panel, in our view, the ordinary meaning of these terms does not suggest that an investigating authority is required to base an injury determination only upon evidence disclosed to, or discernible by, the parties to the investigation. An antidumping investigation involves the commercial behaviour of firms, and, under the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, involves the collection and assessment of both confidential and non-confidential information. An injury determination conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article 3 of the Antidumping Agreement must be based on the totality of that evidence. We see nothing in Article 3.1 which limits an investigating authority to base an injury determination only upon non-confidential information.”

c) “Volume das importações a preços de dumping”

O entendimento do DSB com relação ao efeito das importações a preços de dumping é de que deve ficar claro que o termo “efeito” não é utilizado em relação ao volume das importações e sim ao consequente impacto que a variação desta causaria. Dessa forma, a variação no volume das importações a preços de dumping afetaria a relação entre um aumento de tais importações e o consumo sobre os produtores nacionais desses produtos. Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.235 Para. 7.235. “(...) The provision therefore focuses upon the assessment of effects of imports. Article 3.2 refers to “the effect of the dumped imports on prices” (emphasis added). Article 3.2 does not utilise the term “effects” with regard to volume, nor does Article 3.1, which refers in paragraph (a) to volume and price effects of imports and, in paragraph (b), to the “consequent impact” of the volume and price effects of imports (...)”.”

d) “Exame objetivo” com base em “prova material”

O entendimento do DSB, como mencionado anteriormente, sugere que o parágrafo 3.1 exige que as autoridades investigadoras realizem uma investigação com base nos princípios de justiça e boa-fé, assegurando um tratamento imparcial das informações e dados obtidos, utilizados e analisados na investigação. Para que essa exigência seja cumprida com base em provas materiais, é necessário que as informações sejam relevantes e pertinentes à questão a ser resolvida (e não a fatos não-relacionados). O processo de determinar se importações a preços de dumping causaram dano material à indústria doméstica deve ser baseado em informações confiáveis e completas, e relacionar-se a um período factível de comparação com a realidade.

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, paras. 7.289, 7.292 e 7.297 Para. 7.289. “The Panel examines Brazil's allegation that the investigation and finding by the European Communities of significant price undercutting is inconsistent with Articles 3.2 and 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement as no adjustment was made for differences in production methods between “white-” vs. “black-” heart varieties of malleable fittings.” Para. 7.292. “(...) We are conscious that the requirement in Article 3.1 to conduct an “objective examination” on the basis of “positive evidence” is that the investigating authorities examination conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. The investigating authority must therefore ensure an even-handed treatment of the information and data on the record of the investigation (...).” Para. 7.297. “(...) we find that the European Communities did not violate Articles 3.2 and 3.1 in not granting an adjustment for price comparability in its comparison of prices of sales of black heart and white heart fittings in the context of its consideration of price undercutting.” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Beef and Rice (Mexico - Antidumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/R, paras. 7.55, 7.61 e 7.64-7.65 e 7.77 Para. 7.55. “(...) In our view, positive evidence is in the first place evidence which is material to the case at hand, in other words it is to be relevant and pertinent with respect to the issue to be decided. It is positive which make it “evidence” as opposed to unrelated facts. In addition, it must have the characteristics of being inherently reliable and creditworthy. (11) An objective examination, in turn, requires in our view that the investigative process establishing the facts be objective and unbiased. We agree with what the Appellate Body stated in this respect in the US - Hot-Rolled Steel case:

The term “objective examination” aims at a different aspect of the investigating authorities' determination. While the term “positive evidence” focuses on the facts underpinning and justifying the injury determination, the term “objective examination” is concerned with the investigative process itself. The word “examination” relates, in our view, to the way in which the evidence is gathered, inquired into and, subsequently, evaluated; that is, it relates to the conduct of the investigation generally. The word “objective”, which qualifies the word “examination”, indicates essentially that the “examination” process must conform to the dictates of the basic principles of good faith and fundamental fairness. (12)

Para. 7.61. “(...) It is therefore necessary to base a determination of dumping causing injury on data that is pertinent or relevant with regard to the current situation, taking into account the inevitable delay caused by the practical need to conduct an investigation. To impose antidumping duties without objectively examining relevant evidence on the dumping causing injury which is on one side of the balance would thus clearly run counter to the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.64. “(...) A great deal could have happened – or changed – over a fifteen month period, and there is simply no evidence on record in respect of it. A hiatus of such a duration is, in our view, sufficiently long as to impugn the reliability of the period of investigation to deliver, for the purposes of a determination, evidence that has the requisite pertinence or relevance (see para. 7.55 supra). In other words, given the passage of time and the uncertainty about the factual situation in that relevant interim, the information lacks credibility and reliability, thereby failing to meet the criterion of “positive evidence” pursuant to Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.65. “In light of all these considerations, we find that by choosing to base its determination of injury on a period of investigation which ended more than fifteen months before the initiation of the

investigation, Mexico failed to comply with the obligation set forth in Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement to make a determination of injury which is based on positive evidence and which involves an objective examination of the volume and price effects of the alleged dumped imports or of the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of the like product at the time measures were imposed (...).” Para. 7.77. “(...) We are of the view, however, that the requirement to base a determination of injury on positive evidence and pursuant to an objective examination nevertheless imposed certain obligations on the Mexican investigating authorities with regard to the completeness of the data used as the basis for its determination (...).”

2. Artigo 3.2

a) “Da escolha da metodologia de análise”

(i) Análise geral

Não há uma metodologia específica e prescrita às autoridades investigativas a ser aplicada no curso de qualquer investigação. Ademais, não há qualquer exigência de que a análise de subcotação de preços deva ser realizada em algum nível específico de comércio. Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, para. 7.159 Para. 7.159. “We consider that it is for the investigating authorities in the first instance to determine the analytical methodologies that will be applied in the course of an investigation, as Article 3 contains no requirements concerning the methodology to be used. While it could possibly be shown in a given case that a particular methodology has introduced a flaw in an authority's analysis, in this case Poland has not demonstrated any specific flaw that has resulted from the application of Thailand's methodology. Thus, we do not consider this issue further.” Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Turquia - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, para. 7.73 Para. 7.73. “On the basis of the plain text of Article 3.2, we find no requirement that the price undercutting analysis must be conducted in any particular way, that is, at any particular level of trade. Therefore, we find that Turkey has not established that there was a legal obligation on the IA to perform the price undercutting analysis in the way asserted by Turkey. Rather, we find that an objective and unbiased investigating authority could have performed an undercutting analysis on the basis used by the IA. We therefore find that the IA's price undercutting finding is not inconsistent with Article 3.2.”

(ii) Frequência da análise Segundo o Acordo Antidumping, uma análise anual dos dados de importações de um período composto de vários anos é suficiente. Dependento do caso específico e da metodologia em questão, a frequência e a seleção dos períodos da análise do volume das importações pode ser necessária. Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R e WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 7.168 Para. 7.168. “In our view, it is clear on the face of Article 3.2 that a quarterly analysis of the trend in import volume is not required, and indeed that no particular analytical approach is required or even

alluded to in Article 3.2. Given that on an annual basis over a multi-year period, imports from Poland increased in every period examined, we do not believe that quarter-to-quarter fluctuation in import volumes during one of the twelve-month periods examined invalidates the Thai authorities’ finding that the import volume of the subject imports “increased continuously”.” Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.265 Para. 8.265. “We first examine Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala confined itself to considering the maximum and minimum imports during the period of investigation. We note that the Ministry did a month by month examination of the total volume of imports of grey portland cement as well as of the volume of Mexican imports. Although in the text of the resolution Guatemala reported the end to end and highest and lowest point results of their analysis of the volume of dumped imports, it is evident from Table 10 of the Injury Report that the authorities considered the situation during each of the intervening months during the period they chose for data collection. The Panel does not agree with Mexico's assertion that “Guatemala confined itself to maximum and minimum volumes imported during the investigation period”. Thus, we do not consider that Guatemala acted inconsistently with Article 3.2 in this respect.”

(iii) Extensão do período sob investigação Segundo a recomendação do Comitê de Práticas Antidumping da OMC, o período de coleta de dados para determinação de dano deverá ser de pelo menos três anos, salvo circunstâncias excepcionais. O Painel concluiu no caso específico que embora um período maior de coleta de dados seja preferível, não há qualquer previsão no Acordo que impossibilite um exame dos dados de importação para um período menor, como, por exemplo, de um ano. Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.266 Para. 8.266. “We next consider Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala used a data collection period of one year and failed to compare the volume of dumped imports during that period to earlier periods in order to analyse long-term trends in imports. In this regard, we recall that Guatemala chose a period of data collection of one year from June 1995 to May 1996. A recent recommendation of the Committee on Antidumping Practices calls on Members to use a data collection period of at least three years. This recommendation reflects the common practice of Members. (13) That said, there is no provision in the Agreement which specifies the precise duration of the period of data collection. Thus, it cannot be said a priori that the use of a one-year period of data collection would not be consistent with the requirement of Article 3.2 to consider whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in the circumstances of a particular case. In this case, Guatemala argues that the reason for the short period of data collection was that exports by Cruz Azul did not become significant until 1995. The record of the investigation supports this conclusion. (14) Under these circumstances, while a longer data collection period might have been preferable, we are unable to find that the use by Guatemala of a one-year data collection period was inconsistent with Guatemala's obligation under Article 3.2 to consider whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports.”

b) “Do aumento significativo do volume das importações a preço de dumping” O Artigo 3.2 não requer que o termo “significativo” seja usado para caracterizar um aumento nas importações objeto da investigação, embora seja recomendável que a autoridade de investigação apresente uma caracterização explícita sobre se o aumento das importações é significativo e apresente

uma explicação dessa caracterização. Não obstante, deve estar aparente nos arquivos do processo que a autoridade de investigação conferiu atenção e examinou se houve um aumento significativo das importações. Ademais, é dever da autoridade investigadora considerar todas as importações referentes ao produto investigado, inclusive as realizadas pela indústria doméstica. Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R e WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 7.161 Para. 7.161. “We examine the nature of the obligation in Article 3.2. We note that the text of Article 3.2 requires that the investigating authorities “consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports”. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines “consider” as, inter alia: “contemplate mentally, especially in order to reach a conclusion”; “give attention to”; and “reckon with; take into account”. We therefore do not read the textual term “consider” in Article 3.2 to require an explicit “finding” or “determination” by the investigating authorities as to whether the increase in dumped imports is “significant”. While it would certainly be preferable for a Member explicitly to characterize whether any increase in imports as “significant”, and to give a reasoned explanation of that characterization, we believe that the word “significant” does not necessarily need to appear in the text of the relevant document in order for the requirements of this provision to be fulfilled. Nevertheless, we consider that it must be apparent in the relevant documents in the record that the investigating authorities have given attention to and taken into account whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, in absolute or relative terms.” Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.266 e 8.268-8.269 Para. 8.266. “We next consider Mexico's claim that Guatemala's consideration whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports was inconsistent with Article 3.2 because Guatemala used a data collection period of one year and failed to compare the volume of dumped imports during that period to earlier periods in order to analyse long-term trends in imports. In this regard, we recall that Guatemala chose a period of data collection of one year from June 1995 to May 1996. A recent recommendation of the Committee on Antidumping Practices calls on Members to use a data collection period of at least three years. This recommendation reflects the common practice of Members. That said, there is no provision in the Agreement which specifies the precise duration of the period of data collection. Thus, it cannot be said a priori that the use of a one-year period of data collection would not be consistent with the requirement of Article 3.2 to consider whether there has been a significant increase in the volume of dumped imports in the circumstances of a particular case. In this case, Guatemala argues that the reason for the short period of data collection was that exports by Cruz Azul did not become significant until 1995. The record of the investigation supports this conclusion. Under these circumstances, while a longer data collection period might have been preferable, we are unable to find that the use by Guatemala of a one-year data collection period was inconsistent with Guatemala's obligation under Article 3.2 to consider whether there was a significant increase in dumped imports.” Para. 8.268. “Finally, we turn to Mexico's claim that Guatemala violated Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.5 by failing to take into account certain undumped imports of the product under investigation imported by an importer named MATINSA, which is associated with the petitioner, Cementos Progreso. Although Mexico's arguments on this point are unclear, we understand Mexico to be arguing that Guatemala considered MATINSA's imports to be of non-pozzolanic cement which differed from the like domestic product and thus were not taken into consideration during the investigation. Mexico considers however that the product imported by MATINSA was in fact the same product as that under investigation. In Mexico's view, the failure by Guatemala to correctly characterise the imports by MATINSA carried the following consequences (i) the resulting volume of total imports of the product under investigation was lower; (ii) the share of allegedly dumped imports in total imports of the product under

investigation was artificially inflated; (iii) the consideration of a faulty and incomplete figure for total imports of the product under investigation yielded a distorted figure for apparent domestic consumption; (iv) because of this incorrect figure for apparent domestic consumption, the relationship between the increase in dumped imports and consumption was ultimately incorrect; (v) by considering that MATINSA's imports did not concern the product under investigation, the investigating authority failed to assess other factors which were injuring the domestic industry at the same time, such as imports that were not sold at dumped prices.” Para. 8.269. “The consequences listed as number (i) through (iv) above constitute a violation of Article 3.1 and 3.2 in that an exclusion of MATINSA's imports from the figures for domestic consumption of the like product affects the comparison that is made with the figures for volume of dumped imports for purposes of determining that there has been a significant increase in dumped imports relative to domestic consumption in the importing Member.” (15) Item (v) above constitutes a violation of Article 3.5 in that this provision establishes:

The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices (…).

Imports by MATINSA of grey portland cement would constitute the type of imports which are recognized in the AD Agreement as a possible source of injury different from the dumped imports. Thus, a failure to examine such imports as another known factor causing injury would constitute a violation of Article 3.5. We recognize the merit in Mexico's arguments on this issue and to the extent that Mexico presents us with evidence to support the argument it has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case that Guatemala has violated Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5. It would be then for Guatemala to rebut the existence of a violation under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5. We shall now examine whether it has succeeded in doing so.

c) “Do efeito das importações a preço de dumping nos preços” Uma investigação imparcial e objetiva pode concluir que há efeitos negativos das importações nos preços da indústria doméstica a partir da análise de queda de preços e incapacidade de atingir os níveis de preços estabelecidos, coincidindo com as importações a preços de dumping mais baixos. Ademais, o Painel concluiu que a análise do efeito negativo das importações sobre os preços pode ocorrer apenas em uma região específica, caso os produtores ali estejam concentrados, caracterizando o dano à indústria doméstica. No que se refere à avaliação regional sobre os efeitos das importações a preços de dumping sobre a indústria doéstica, no caso específico foi considerado que não se aplicaria a análise de uma “indústria regional” apenas pelo mero fato de certas regiões terem sido examinadas e foi apropriada a comparação com os preços domésticos. Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.276- 8.277 Para. 8.276. “We shall first address Mexico's argument that Guatemala lacked the elements to support its conclusion that there had been a negative price effect on the prices for the domestic like product by the dumped imports. We note that Mexico's argument on the lack of support for Guatemala's finding on price effect depends on Mexico's assertion that Guatemala should have done a comparison with the prices that the domestic industry charged for a period prior to the period of investigation. We have already found that Guatemala did not violate the AD Agreement in establishing a period of data collection of injury of only one year, and consequently it was not obliged to review data outside that period. Moreover, Guatemala submitted evidence (16) that was part of the record of the investigation, and that supports the determination that: i) prices for the domestic industry declined after the Mexican imports entered the market, configuring a situation of price depression; ii) that those prices declined to

a level below the maximum price authorized by the Government, and; iii) that although the maximum price increased at the end of the period the domestic producer could not increase its prices accordingly, configuring a situation of price suppression. (17) Based on the evidence of declining prices and inability to achieve established price levels, coinciding with imports at lower prices we find that an objective and unbiased investigating authority could have properly concluded that the dumped imports were having a negative effect on the prices of the domestic industry. Moreover, Mexico did not adduce any evidence to convince us otherwise. Thus, we reject Mexico's claim of an improper and unsupported Article 3.2 analysis by Guatemala.” Para. 8.277. “We shall now address Mexico's argument that Guatemala improperly conducted a regional evaluation of the effect the dumped imports had on the prices of the domestic like product. The mere fact that Guatemala mentions that the greatest differential between the government fixed ceiling price and the actual price was felt in the Departments of San Marcos, Quetzaltenango and Retalhuleu does not, in our view, mean that the analysis was limited to these regions alone, to the exclusion of Guatemala as a whole. In fact, the mention that these were the departments with the greatest differential indicates to us that other departments were analysed. Moreover, there is only one producer of cement in Guatemala, thus, even if the negative effect of the dumped imports on the prices of the domestic like product was only evidenced in the region bordering Mexico, this could still be viewed as causing injury to Cementos Progreso. Based on these considerations we find that Guatemala acted in accordance with its obligation under Article 3.2 to conduct an examination of the effect the dumped imports had on the domestic industry. Therefore, we reject Mexico's claim of violation of Article 3.2 on the basis of an improper regional injury evaluation.”

d) “Subcotação de preços”

O Artigo 3.2 não estabelece qualquer exigência de que a análise da subcotação deva ser conduzida de forma particular, isto é, em qualquer nível específico de comércio, mas uma explicação do nível de comércio e do método adotado deve ser apresentada. O Painel concluiu que as autoridades investigadoras deverão considerar todas as importações como “importações realizadas a preços de dumping” após uma determinação positiva e não existe qualquer exigência de se considerar unicamente as transações que envolvam essa prática para a determinação do dano. Ademais, o Artigo 3.2 exige que as autoridades investigadoras considerem se a subcotação dos preços é “significativa”, mas não estabeleceu qualquer exigência específica quanto ao método de cálculo da margem de subcotação, de metodologia específica a ser seguida. Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, para. 7.73 Para. 7.73. “On the basis of the plain text of Article 3.2, we find no requirement that the price undercutting analysis must be conducted in any particular way, that is, at any particular level of trade. Therefore, we find that Turkey has not established that there was a legal obligation on the IA to perform the price undercutting analysis in the way asserted by Turkey. Rather, we find that an objective and unbiased investigating authority could have performed an undercutting analysis on the basis used by the IA. We therefore find that the IA's price undercutting finding is not inconsistent with Article 3.2.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brazil, WT/DS219/R, paras. 7.281 e 7.276-7.277 Para. 7.281. “We disagree with Brazil's assertion that this unadopted panel report can provide no useful guidance because it preceded the Panel and Appellate Body reports in EC - Bed Linen. We note that the provision under consideration by the Panel and the Appellate Body in the EC - Bed Linen dispute was Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement, and that the part of the particular

antidumping investigation in question was the calculation of the dumping margin. Therefore, those reports do not relate specifically to the matter before us here. By contrast, we deal here with a price undercutting analysis under Article 3.2 and 3.1 in the context of the “injury” stage of this antidumping investigation. Unlike Article 2 (in particular Article 2.4.2) of the Antidumping Agreement, which contains specific requirements relating to the calculation of the dumping margin, Article 3.2 requires the investigating authorities to consider whether price undercutting is “significant” but does not set out any specific requirement relating to the calculation of a margin of undercutting, or provide a particular methodology to be followed in this consideration. In view of the stark contrast in the text, context, legal nature and rationale of the provisions, we are firmly of the view that the Panel and Appellate Body's reasoning in the EC-Bed Linen dispute cannot be directly transposed here.” Para. 7.276. “The text of Article 3.2 refers to domestic “prices” (in the plural rather than singular). This textual element supports our view that there is no requirement under Article 3.2 to establish one single margin of undercutting on the basis of an examination of every transaction involving the product concerned and the like product. In addition, the text of Article 3.2 refers to the “dumped imports”, that is, the imports of the product concerned from an exporting producer that has been determined to be dumping. (18) Thus, investigating authorities may treat any imports from producers/exporters for which an affirmative determination of dumping is made as “dumped imports” for purposes of injury analysis under Article 3. There is, however, no requirement to take each and every transaction involving the “dumped imports” into account, nor that the “dumped imports” examined under Article 3.2 are limited to those precise transactions subject to the dumping determination. This view is supported by the absence of a specific provision concerning time periods in the Agreement; an importing Member may investigate price effects of imports in an injury investigation period which may be different than the IP for dumping. These considerations do not, of course, diminish the obligation of an investigating authority to conduct an unbiased and even-handed price undercutting analysis.” Para. 7.277. “We take note of the shared view of the parties that “the Panel should accord a considerable discretion to the investigating authorities to choose a methodology which produces a meaningful result while avoiding unfairness”. (19) One purpose of a price undercutting analysis is to assist an investigating authority in determining whether dumped imports have, through the effects of dumping, caused material injury to a domestic industry. In this part of an antidumping investigation, an investigating authority is trying to discern whether the prices of dumped imports have had an impact on the domestic industry. The interaction of two variables would essentially determine the extent of impact of price undercutting on the domestic industry: the quantity of sales at undercutting prices; and the margin of undercutting of such sales. Sales at undercutting prices could have an impact on the domestic industry (for example, in terms of lost sales) irrespective of whether other sales might be made at prices above those charged by the domestic industry. The fact that certain sales may have occurred at “non-underselling prices” does not eradicate the effects in the importing market of sales that were made at underselling prices. Thus, a requirement that an investigating authority must base its price undercutting analysis on a methodology that offset undercutting prices with “overcutting” prices would have the result of requiring the investigating authority to conclude that no price undercutting existed when, in fact, there might be a considerable number of sales at undercutting prices which might have had an adverse effect on the domestic industry.” 3. Artigo 3.3

a) “Condições para a cumulação dos efeitos das importações”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Antidumping Dutires on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/AB/R, paras. 109-110 e 116 Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação ratificou a conclusão do Painel no sentido de que as condições previstas no Artigo 3.3 para a determinação cumulativa dos efeitos das importações de origens

diversas são exaustivas. Em particular, foi rejeitado o argumento do Brasil de que uma autoridade investigadora deve primeiramente considerar o volume e preço das importações de cada país específico, antes de cumulá-las. Para. 109. “The text of Article 3.3 expressly identifies three conditions that must be satisfied before an investigating authority is permitted under the Antidumping Agreement to assess cumulatively the effects of imports from several countries. These conditions are:

(a) The dumping margin from each individual country must be more than de minimis; (b) the volume of imports from each individual country must not be negligible; and (c) cumulation must be appropriate in the light of the conditions of competition between the imported products; and (d) between the imported products and the like domestic product.

By the terms of Article 3.3, it is “only if” the above conditions are established that an investigating authority “may” make a cumulative assessment of the effects of dumped imports from several countries.” (nota de rodapé omitida) Para. 110. “We find no basis in the text of Article 3.3 for Brazil's assertion that a country-specific analysis of the potential negative effects of volumes and prices of dumped imports is a pre-condition for a cumulative assessment of the effects of all dumped imports. Article 3.3 sets out expressly the conditions that must be fulfilled before the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess the effects of dumped imports from more than one country. There is no reference to the country-by-country volume and price analyses that Brazil contends are pre-conditions to cumulation. In fact, Article 3.3 expressly requires an investigating authority to examine country-specific volumes, not in the manner suggested by Brazil, but for purposes of determining whether the “volume of imports from each country is not negligible”.” Para. 116. “The apparent rationale behind the practice of cumulation confirms our interpretation that both volume and prices qualify as “effects” that may be cumulatively assessed under Article 3.3. A cumulative analysis logically is premised on a recognition that the domestic industry faces the impact of the “dumped imports” as a whole and that it may be injured by the total impact of the dumped imports, even though those imports originate from various countries. If, for example, the dumped imports from some countries are low in volume or are declining, an exclusively country-specific analysis may not identify the causal relationship between the dumped imports from those countries and the injury suffered by the domestic industry. The outcome may then be that, because imports from such countries could not individually be identified as causing injury, the dumped imports from these countries would not be subject to antidumping duties, even though they are in fact causing injury. In our view, therefore, by expressly providing for cumulation in Article 3.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, the negotiators appear to have recognized that a domestic industry confronted with dumped imports originating from several countries may be injured by the cumulated effects of those imports, and that those effects may not be adequately taken into account in a country-specific analysis of the injurious effects of dumped imports. Consistent with the rationale behind cumulation, we consider that changes in import volumes from individual countries, and the effect of those country-specific volumes on prices in the importing country's market, are of little significance in determining whether injury is being caused to the domestic industry by the dumped imports as a whole.” (20) 4. Artigo 3.4 II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 3.4

a) “Importações a Preços de Dumping”

Uma vez alcançada uma determinação positiva da prática de dumping nas importações do produto investigado de um produtor específico, esta conclusão será aplicável a todas as operações de importações do produto deste exportador. O Painel da OMC rejeitou o argumento de que “as importações objeto de dumping” devem ser entendidas como referentes apenas às importações que são objeto de operações em que o preço de exportação estava abaixo do valor normal, para fins de determinação da existência de dano. Uma vez determinada que tais importações são objeto de dumping, a autoridade de investigação tem o direito de considerar todas essas importações para fins de sua análise dos Artigos 3.1, 3.4 e 3.5 do Acordo Antidumping. Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.136 e 6.139-6.140 Para. 6.136. “However, consideration of the ordinary meaning of the phrase “dumped imports” in its context, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 3 of the AD Agreement, leads us to the conclusion that the interpretation proposed by India is not required. As discussed above, we consider that dumping is a determination made with reference to a product from a particular producer/exporter, and not with reference to individual transactions. That is, the determination of dumping is made on the basis of consideration of transactions involving a particular product from particular producers/exporters. If the result of that consideration is a conclusion that the product in question from particular producers/exporters is dumped, we are of the view that the conclusion applies to all imports of that product from such source(s), at least over the period for which dumping was considered. Thus, we consider that the investigating authority is entitled to consider all such imports in its analysis of “dumped imports” under Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 6.139. “Our conclusion that investigating authorities may treat all imports from producers/exporters for which an affirmative determination of dumping is made as “dumped imports” for purposes of injury analysis under Article 3 is bolstered by our view that the interpretation proposed by India, which entails the conclusion that the phrase “dumped imports” refers only to those imports attributable to transactions in which export price is below normal value, would lead to an unworkable result in certain cases. One of the objects and purposes of the AD Agreement is to establish the conditions under which Members may impose antidumping duties in cases of injurious dumping. An interpretation which would, in many cases, make it impossible to assess one of the necessary elements, injury, is not consistent with that object and purpose.” Para. 6.140. “An assessment of the volume, price effects, and consequent impact, only of imports attributable to transactions for which a positive margin was calculated would be, in many cases, impossible, or at least impracticable. Attempting to segregate individual transactions as to whether they were “dumped” or not, even assuming it could be done, would leave investigating authorities in a quandary in cases in which the dumping investigation is undertaken for a sample of companies or products. Such sampling is specifically provided for in the AD Agreement, yet it would not be possible, in such cases, accurately to determine the volume of imports attributable to “dumped” transactions. Similarly, if dumping is determined on the basis of a comparison of weighted average normal value to weighted average export price, there would be no comparisons concerning individual transactions which could serve as the basis for segregating imports in “dumped” and “not-dumped” categories.”

b) “Indústria Doméstica”

(i) Análise setorial

As autoridades investigadoras podem realizar uma avaliação de partes, setores ou segmentos específicos dentro de uma indústria doméstica, desde que respeitem a obrigação fundamental do Artigo 3.1 de realizar uma análise objetiva. Sendo o exame objetivo, a identificação, investigação e

avaliação dos fatores relevantes deve ser imparcial e com base em evidências positivas. No entanto, as autoridades investigadoras devem, em princípio, examinar de igual modo todas as partes que compõem a indústria ou, alternativamente, deverão fornecer uma explicação satisfatória da razão da não necessidade de examinar direta ou especificamente as outras partes da indústria doméstica. Além disso, ao examinar apenas uma parte da indústria a autoridade pode falhar ao avaliar a relação econômica entre a parte da indústria analisada e as demais partes, ou a indústria como um todo. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 195-197 e 204-206 Para. 195. “We see nothing in the Antidumping Agreement which prevents a Member from requiring that its investigating authorities examine, in every investigation, the potential relevance of a particular “other factor”, not listed in Article 3.4, as part of its overall “examination” of the state of the domestic industry. Similarly, it seems to us perfectly compatible with Article 3.4 for investigating authorities to undertake, or for a Member to require its investigating authorities to undertake, an evaluation of particular parts, sectors or segments within a domestic industry. Such a sectoral analysis may be highly pertinent, from an economic perspective, in assessing the state of an industry as a whole.” Para. 196. “However, the investigating authorities' evaluation of the relevant factors must respect the fundamental obligation, in Article 3.1, of those authorities to conduct an “objective examination”. If an examination is to be “objective”, the identification, investigation and evaluation of the relevant factors must be even-handed. Thus, investigating authorities are not entitled to conduct their investigation in such a way that it becomes more likely that, as a result of the fact-finding or evaluation process, they will determine that the domestic industry is injured.” Para. 197. “Instead, Articles 3.1 and 3.4 indicate that the investigating authorities must determine, objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence, the importance to be attached to each potentially relevant factor and the weight to be attached to it. In every investigation, this determination turns on the “bearing” that the relevant factors have “on the state of the [domestic] industry”.” Para. 204. “We have already stated that it may be highly pertinent for investigating authorities to examine a domestic industry by part, sector or segment. However, as with all other aspects of the evaluation of the domestic industry, Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement requires that such a sectoral examination be conducted in an “objective” manner. In our view, this requirement means that, where investigating authorities undertake an examination of one part of a domestic industry, they should, in principle, examine, in like manner, all of the other parts that make up the industry, as well as examine the industry as a whole. Or, in the alternative, the investigating authorities should provide a satisfactory explanation as to why it is not necessary to examine directly or specifically the other parts of the domestic industry. Different parts of an industry may exhibit quite different economic performance during any given period. Some parts may be performing well, while others are performing poorly. To examine only the poorly performing parts of an industry, even if coupled with an examination of the whole industry, may give a misleading impression of the data relating to the industry as a whole, and may overlook positive developments in other parts of the industry. Such an examination may result in highlighting the negative data in the poorly performing part, without drawing attention to the positive data in other parts of the industry. We note that the reverse may also be true – to examine only the parts of an industry which are performing well may lead to overlooking the significance of deteriorating performance in other parts of the industry.” Para. 205. “Moreover, by examining only one part of an industry, the investigating authorities may fail properly to appreciate the economic relationship between that part of the industry and the other parts of the industry, or between one or more of those parts and the whole industry. (…)”

Para. 206. “Accordingly, an examination of only certain parts of a domestic industry does not ensure a proper evaluation of the state of the domestic industry as a whole, and does not, therefore, satisfy the requirements of “objectiv[ity]” in Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement.”

(ii) Produtores domésticos não incluídos na amostra

Mesmo que a autoridade investigadora considere uma amostra da indústria doméstica para a análise da existência de dano, ela não é obrigada a ignorar informações disponíveis relativas às outras empresas que compõem a indústria doméstica, uma vez que a autoridade deve basear suas conclusões em um exame objetivo das evidências. Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.181 Para. 6.181. “It is clear from the language of the AD Agreement, in particular Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5, that the determination of injury has to be reached for the domestic industry that is the subject of the investigation. Article 3.4 specifically requires that “The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry (…)” (emphasis added). In this case, the European Communities defined the domestic industry as 35 producers of the like product. In our view, it would be anomalous to conclude that, because the European Communities chose to consider a sample of the domestic industry, it was required to close its eyes to and ignore other information available to it concerning the domestic industry it had defined. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the fundamental underlying principle that antidumping investigations should be fair and that investigating authorities should base their conclusions on an objective evaluation of the evidence. It is not possible to have an objective evaluation of the evidence if some of the evidence is required to be ignored, even though it relates precisely to the issues to be resolved. Thus, we consider that the European Communities did not act inconsistently with Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement by taking into account in its analysis information regarding the Community industry as a whole, including information pertaining to companies that were not included in the sample.”

(iii) Empresas não incluídas no conceito de indústria doméstica

Informações de empresas que não fazem parte da indústria doméstica, como definida pela autoridade de investigação, não fornecem nenhuma base para conclusões sobre o impacto das importações objeto de dumping sobre a indústria. Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.182 Para. 6.182. “(…) As we have noted, the determination of injury has to be reached for the domestic industry as defined by the investigating authorities, in this case the 35 producers comprising the “Community industry” as defined by the European Communities. In our view, information concerning companies that are not within the domestic industry is irrelevant to the evaluation of the “relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry” required under Article 3.4. This is true even though those companies may presently produce, or may have in the past produced, the like product, bed linen. Information concerning the Article 3.4 factors for companies outside the domestic industry provides no basis for conclusions about the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry itself. If other present or former bed linen producers had been considered part of the domestic industry, the fact that some of them went out of business would be relevant to the evaluation of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. But given that the European Communities defined the domestic industry as 35 producers of bed linen, information concerning other companies does not inform the evaluation of “factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry”

under Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement, and thus cannot serve as the basis of findings regarding the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry.”

(iv) Todos os Fatores e Índices Econômicos Relevantes que tenham Relação com a

Situação da Referida Indústria c) “Caráter Obrigatório ou Ilustrativo da Lista de Fatores”

O exame do impacto das importações objeto de dumping sobre a indústria doméstica em questão deve incluir, obrigatoriamente, uma avaliação de cada um dos quinze fatores enumerados no Artigo 3.4, mesmo que a autoridade investigadora conclua que um determinado fator não seja probatório da situação de determinada indústria ou de determinado caso. A análise de cada um dos fatores listados no Artigo 3.4 deve ser apresentado e estar evidente/aparente na determinação final da autoridade investigadora. Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.154, 6.156-6.157 e 6.159 Para. 6.154. “(…) The use of the phrase “shall include” in Article 3.4 strongly suggests to us that the evaluation of the listed factors in that provision is properly interpreted as mandatory in all cases. That is, in our view, the ordinary meaning of the provision is that the examination of the impact of dumped imports must include an evaluation of all the listed factors in Article 3.4.” Para. 6.156. “With regard to the use of the word “including”, we consider that this simply emphasises that there may be other “relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry” among “all” such factors that must be evaluated. We recall that, in the Tokyo Round AD Code, the same list of factors was preceded by the phrase “such as”, which was changed to the word “including” that now appears in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. The term “such as” is defined, inter alia, as “Of the kind, degree, category being or about to be specified; for example”. (21) By contrast, the verb “include” is defined, inter alia, to mean “enclose”; “contain as part of a whole or as a subordinate element; contain by implication, involve”; or “place in a class or category; treat or regard as part of a whole”. (22) We thus read the phrase “shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including (...)” as introducing a mandatory list of relevant economic factors which must be evaluated in every case. The change in the wording that was introduced in the Uruguay Round in our view supports an interpretation of the current text of Article 3.4 as setting forth a list that is mandatory, and not merely indicative or illustrative.” (23) Para. 6.157. “The European Communities also focuses on the semicolons in the list of factors in Article 3.4. However, in our view, neither the presence of semicolons separating certain groups of factors in the text of Article 3.4, nor the presence of the word “or” within the first and fourth of these groups, serves to render the mandatory list in Article 3.4 a list of only four “factors”. We further note that the two “ors” appear within – rather than between – the groups of factors separated by semicolons. Thus, we consider that the use of the term “or” here does not detract from the mandatory nature of the textual requirement that “all relevant economic factors” shall be evaluated. With respect to the second “or,” it appears in the phrase “ability to raise capital or investments”, which clearly indicates that the factor that an investigating authority must examine is the “ability to raise capital” or the “ability to raise investments”, or both.” Para. 6.159. “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that each of the fifteen factors listed in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement must be evaluated by the investigating authorities in each case in examining the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.128 Para. 7.128. “In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a particular case, consideration of which would also be required. In a threat of injury case, for instance, the AD Agreement itself establishes that consideration of the Article 3.7 factors is also required. But consideration of the Article 3.4 factors is required in every case, even though such consideration may lead the investigating authority to conclude that a particular factor is not probative in the circumstances of a particular industry or a particular case, and therefore is not relevant to the actual determination. Moreover, the consideration of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final determination of the investigating authority.” (24) Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping on Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non- Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, paras. 7.225 e 7.229-7.230 Para. 7.225. “We note Thailand's argument that the list of factors in Article 3.4 is illustrative only, and that no change in meaning was intended in the change in drafting from the “such as” that appeared in the corresponding provision in the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code to the “including” that now appears in Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement. (25) The term “such as” is defined as “[o]f the kind, degree, category being or about to be specified” (…) “for example”. (26) By contrast, the verb “include” is defined to mean “enclose”; “contain as part of a whole or as a subordinate element; contain by implication, involve”; or “place in a class or category; treat or regard as part of a whole”. (27) We thus read the Article 3.4 phrase “shall include an evaluation of all relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including (…)” as introducing a mandatory list of relevant factors which must be evaluated in every case. We are of the view that the change that occurred in the wording of the relevant provision during the Uruguay Round (from “such as” to “including”) was made for a reason and that it supports an interpretation of the current text of Article 3.4 as setting forth a list that is not merely indicative or illustrative, but, rather, mandatory. (28) Furthermore, we recall that the second sentence of Article 3.4 states: “This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.” Thus, in a given case, certain factors may be more relevant than others, and the weight to be attributed to any given factor may vary from case to case. Moreover, there may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a particular case, consideration of which would also be required.” Para. 7.229. “We are of the view that the language in Article 3.4 makes it clear that all of the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all cases. The provision is specific and mandatory in this regard. We do not consider that the presence of semi-colons separating certain groups of factors in the text of Article 3.4, nor the presence of the word “or” within the first and fourth of these groups serve to render the mandatory list in Article 3.4 a list of only four “factors”. We note that the two “ors” appear within - rather than between - the groups of factors separated by semi-colons. The first “or” in Article 3.4 appears at the end of a group of factors that may indicate declines in the domestic industry (i.e. “actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity” (emphasis added)). In our view, the use of the word “or” here is textually linked to the phrase “actual and potential decline”, and may indicate that such “declines” need not occur in respect of each and every one of the factors listed in this group in order to support a finding of injury. Thus, we do not consider that the use of the term “or” here detracts from the textual requirement that “all relevant economic factors” be evaluated. Moreover, we note that this first group of factors in Article 3.4 contains factors that all relate to, and are indicative of, the state of the industry.” (29)

Para. 7.230. “With respect to the second “or,” we note that it appears in the phrase “ability to raise capital or investments”. In our view, this “or” indicates that the factor that an investigating authority must examine is “ability to raise capital” or “ability to raise investments”, or both.”

d) “Outros Fatores Não-Listados no Artigo 3.4”

A obrigação de avaliação imposta às autoridades investigadoras, no Artigo 3.4, não se limita aos fatores listados, mas se estende a todos os fatores econômicos relevantes. O exame de todos os fatores listados é obrigatório, inclusive nos casos de determinação de ameaça de dano. Não há nada no Acordo Antidumping que impeça um Membro de solicitar às suas autoridades investigadoras que examinem, em toda investigação, a potencial importância de um “outro fator”, não enumerado no Artigo 3.4, como parte de seu exame geral sobre o estado da indústria doméstica. O exame desses fatores deve ser apresentado e estar aparente/evidente na determinação final da autoridade. Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.128 Para. 7.128. “The question which next must be answered is what is the nature of the consideration of the Article 3.4 factors required in a threat of injury determination.” The text of Article 3.4 is mandatory:

The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including (…). (emphasis added).

In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a particular case, consideration of which would also be required. In a threat of injury case, for instance, the AD Agreement itself establishes that consideration of the Article 3.7 factors is also required. But consideration of the Article 3.4 factors is required in every case, even though such consideration may lead the investigating authority to conclude that a particular factor is not probative in the circumstances of a particular industry or a particular case, and therefore is not relevant to the actual determination. Moreover, the consideration of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final determination of the investigating authority. (30) Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 194 Para. 194. “As we noted, the obligations in Article 3.1 inform the obligations imposed in the remainder of that provision. An important aspect of the “objective examination” required by Article 3.1 is further elaborated in Article 3.4 as an obligation to “examin[e] the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry” through “an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry”. Article 3.4 lists certain factors which are deemed to be relevant in every investigation and which must always be evaluated by the investigating authorities. (31) However, the obligation of evaluation imposed on investigating authorities, by Article 3.4, is not confined to the listed factors, but extends to “all relevant economic factors”.”

(i) que tenham relação com

A expressão “que tenham relação com” pode significar “relevante” ou “tendo a ver com a situação da indústria”, e nesse sentido é consistente com o fato de que muitos dos fatores enumerados no Artigo 3.4 são descritivos ou indicadores da situação da indústria doméstica. De forma geral, esses fatores

estão mais relacionados à natureza dos efeitos dos mesmos do que das suas causas. A análise de outros fatores no que se refere à “não atribuição” é pertinente ao Artigo 3.5 do Acordo Antidumping. Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.62-7.64 Para. 7.62. “Turkey's argument that Article 3.4 requires a full “non-attribution” analysis appears to stem from its reading of the term “having a bearing on” as having to do exclusively with causation, (i.e., as meaning factors having an effect on the state of the industry). There is another meaning of this term which we find more pertinent in the overall context of Article 3.4, however. In particular, the term “having a bearing on” can mean relevant to or having to do with the state of the industry (32), and this meaning is consistent with the fact that many of the factors listed in Article 3.4 are descriptors or indicators of the state of the industry, rather than being factors having an effect thereon. For example, sales levels, profits, output, etc. are not in themselves causes of an industry's condition. They are, rather, among the factual indicators by which that condition can be judged and assessed as injured or not. Put another way, taken as a whole, these factors are more in the nature of effects than causes.” Para. 7.63. “This reading of “having a bearing on” finds contextual support in the wording of the last group of factors in Article 3.4, namely “actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, (…)” (emphasis added). Further contextual support is found in the cross-reference to Article 3.4 contained in the first sentence of Article 3.5: “(…) the effects of dumping as set forth in paragraph[ ] 4 [of Article 3]”.” (emphasis added) Para. 7.64. “We note in addition that if Turkey were correct that the full causation analysis, including non-attribution, were required by Article 3.4, this would effectively render redundant Article 3.5, which explicitly addresses causation, including non-attribution. Such an outcome would not be in keeping with the relevant principles of international treaty law interpretation, or with consistent practice in WTO dispute settlement.” (33)

e) “Avaliação dos Fatores Relevantes”

(i) Conceito de avaliação

Cada um e todos os fatores enumerados no Artigo 3.4 devem ser avaliados, não apenas para saber se é “relevante” ou “irrelevante”. Tal avaliação deve ser minuciosa sobre o estado da indústria em questão e conter uma explicação convincente de como a avaliação dos fatores relevantes levaram à determinação do dano. Na avaliação das evidências de um determinado fator de dano, a autoridade investigadora não deve apenas coletar os dados, e sim analisar e interpretar esses dados. O conceito de “avaliação” implica também a análise dos dados examinados em seu contexto, em termos da evolução particular dos dados relativos a cada fator individualmente, assim como em relação a outros fatores analisados. Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping on Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non - Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, para. 7.236 Para. 7.236. “We are of the view that the “evaluation of all relevant factors” required under Article 3.4 must be read in conjunction with the overarching requirements imposed by Article 3.1 of “positive evidence” and “objective examination” in determining the existence of injury. Therefore, in determining that Article 3.4 contains a mandatory list of fifteen factors to be looked at, we do not mean to establish a mere “checklist approach” that would consist of a mechanical exercise of merely ensuring that each listed factor is in some way referred to by the investigating authority. It may well be in the circumstances of a particular case that certain factors enumerated in Article 3.4 are not relevant, that their relative importance or weight can vary significantly from case to case, or that some other

non-listed factors could be deemed relevant. Rather, we are of the view that Article 3.4 requires the authorities properly to establish whether a factual basis exists to support a well-reasoned and meaningful analysis of the state of the industry and a finding of injury. This analysis does not derive from a mere characterization of the degree of “relevance or irrelevance” of each and every individual factor, but rather must be based on a thorough evaluation of the state of the industry and, in light of the last sentence of Article 3.4 (34), must contain a persuasive explanation as to how the evaluation of relevant factors led to the determination of injury.” Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.43-7.44 Para. 7.43. “We first consider the ordinary meaning of the word “evaluation”. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “evaluation” as follows:

(1) The action of appraising or valuing (goods, etc.); a calculation or statement of value. (2) The action of evaluating or determining the value of (a mathematical expression, a physical quantity, etc.), or of estimating the force of (probabilities, evidence).” (35) (emphasis added)

The Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines “evaluation” as follows:

(1) To determine or fix the value of. (2) To determine the significance, worth, or condition of usually by careful appraisal or study. (36) (emphasis added)

The Merriam-Webster's Thesaurus lists as synonyms for “evaluation” the following:

(1) appraisal, appraisement, assessment, estimation, valuation (with related words: interpreting; judging, rating); (2) appraisal, appraisement, assessment, estimate, judgement, stock (with related words: appreciation; interpretation; decision). (37)

Para. 7.44. “We find significant that all of these definitions and synonyms connote, particularly in the context of “evaluation” of evidence, the act of analysis, judgement, or assessment. That is, the first definition recited above refers to “estimating the force of” evidence, evoking a process of weighing evidence and reaching conclusions thereon. The second definition recited above - to determine the significance, worth, or condition of, usually by careful appraisal or study - confirms this meaning. Thus, for an investigating authority to “evaluate” evidence concerning a given factor in the sense of Article 3.4, it must not only gather data, but it must analyze and interpret those data.” Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (EC - Tube or Pipe), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, para. 7.314 Para. 7.314. “The term “evaluate” is defined as: “To work out the value of (…); To reckon up, ascertain the amount of; to express in terms of the known;” (38) “To determine or fix the value of; To determine the significance, worth of condition of usually by careful appraisal or study.” (39) These definitions reveal that an “evaluation” is a process of analysis and assessment requiring the exercise of judgement on the part of the investigating authority. (40) It is not simply a matter of form, and the list of relevant factors to be evaluated is not a mere checklist. (41) As the relative weight or significance of a given factor may naturally vary from investigation to investigation, the investigating authority must therefore assess the role, relevance and relative weight of each factor in the particular investigation. Where the authority determines that certain factors are not relevant or do not weigh significantly in the determination, the authority may not simply disregard such factors, but must explain their conclusion as to the lack of relevance or significance of such factors. (42) The assessment of the relevance or

materiality of certain factors, including those factors that are judged to be not central to the decision, must therefore be at least implicitly apparent from the determination. Silence on the relevance or irrelevance of a given factor would not suffice. (43) Moreover, an evaluation of a factor, in our view, is not limited to a mere characterisation of its relevance or irrelevance. (44) Rather, we believe that an “evaluation” also implies the analysis of data through placing it in context in terms of the particular evolution of the data pertaining to each factor individually, as well as in relation to other factors examined. (45)(46)

(ii) Avaliação de todos os fatores listados

A avaliação/exame de todos os fatores listados deve ser apresentada e estar evidente nas conclusões das autoridades investigadoras. As autoridades devem analisar todos os fatores e podem determinar que alguns fatores não são relevantes ou não têm um peso significativo na sua determinação do impacto das importações a preços de dumping sobre a situação da indústria doméstica. No entanto, essa avaliação deve decorrer do exame dos mesmos, não podem simplesmente ignorar tais fatores, devendo explicar a sua conclusão quanto à falta de relevância dos mesmos. Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.162 Para. 6.162. “In other words, while the authorities may determine that some factors are not relevant or do not weigh significantly in the decision, the authorities may not simply disregard such factors, but must explain their conclusion as to the lack of relevance or significance of such factors. We agree. Thus, we are of the view that every factor in Article 3.4 must be considered, and that the nature of this consideration, including whether the investigating authority considered the factor relevant in its analysis of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry, must be apparent in the final determination.” Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.283 Para. 8.283. “Before turning to Guatemala's analysis with respect to the factors in Article 3.4 we would like to outline what is the task before us in this review. We note that Article 3.4 lists a series of factors which it characterizes as relevant in an examination of whether the dumped imports had an impact on the domestic industry. It also mentions that the list is non exhaustive, in other words, there may also be other factors which although not listed may give guidance on the state of the industry. We also note that Article 3.4 provides that the examination “shall include” all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry and specifies that among those factors which are considered relevant are those which listed therein. Thus, it is essential, in order to satisfy the requirements in Article 3.4, to examine each of the factors listed in that provision. In our view Article 3.4 establishes a rebuttable presumption that those factors listed are relevant in giving guidance on whether the dumped imports have had an effect on the domestic industry. It is only after consideration of the listed factors that the investigating authority may dismiss some of them as not being relevant for the particular industry, thus in effect rebutting the presumption established in Article 3.4. We are also of the view that the consideration of the factors in Article 3.4 must be apparent in the determination so the Panel may assess whether the authority acted in accordance with Article 3.4 at the time of the investigation.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, para. 161 Para. 161. “Accordingly, because Articles 3.1 and 3.4 do not regulate the manner in which the results of the analysis of each injury factor are to be set out in the published documents, we share the Panel's

conclusion that it is not required that in every antidumping investigation a separate record be made of the evaluation of each of the injury factors listed in Article 3.4. Whether a panel conducting an assessment of an antidumping measure is able to find in the record sufficient and credible evidence to satisfy itself that a factor has been evaluated, even though a separate record of the evaluation of that factor has not been made, will depend on the particular facts of each case. Having said this, we believe that, under the particular facts of this case, it was reasonable for the Panel to have concluded that the European Commission addressed and evaluated the factor “growth”.” 5. Artigo 3.5

a) “Requisitos para a autoridade investigadora”

Esta disposição exige que as autoridades investigadoras examinem, em primeiro lugar, “todos os fatores conhecidos”, “além das importações objeto de dumping”, as quais estão causando dano à indústria nacional, “na mesma ocasião”. Em segundo lugar, as autoridades investigadoras devem assegurar que os danos causados à indústria nacional por fatores conhecidos, outros que não as importações objeto de dumping, não sejam “atribuídos às importações objeto de dumping”. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 221-222 Para. 221. “We observe that the issue raised on appeal is confined to the Panel's interpretation and application of the non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement, and does not relate to the Panel's finding that there is no requirement that dumped imports alone be capable of causing injury.” The relevant part of Article 3.5 reads:

It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports.

Para. 222. “This provision requires investigating authorities, as part of their causation analysis, first, to examine all “known factors”, “other than dumped imports”, which are causing injury to the domestic industry “at the same time” as dumped imports. Second, investigating authorities must ensure that injuries which are caused to the domestic industry by known factors, other than dumped imports, are not “attributed to the dumped imports.”

b) “Não atribuição” Esse texto se aplica “apenas à situações em que as importações objeto de dumping e outros fatores conhecidos estejam causando dano à indústria doméstica ao mesmo tempo”. Logicamente, essa avaliação envolve a separação e a distinção do dano causado por outros fatores, daquele dano causado pelas importações a preços de dumping. A ausência de tal separação não fornece às autoridades investigadoras uma base racional para concluir que o dano está sendo causado pelas importações a preços de dumping, em lugar de ser causado por outros fatores. Assim, na ausência de tal separação e distinção as autoridades de investigação não disporão de uma base racional para concluir que as importações a preços de dumping estão causando o dano, justificando a imposição de direitos Antidumping.

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 223 Para. 223. “The non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement applies solely in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time. In order that investigating authorities, applying Article 3.5, are able to ensure that the injurious effects of the other known factors are not “attributed” to dumped imports, they must appropriately assess the injurious effects of those other factors. Logically, such an assessment must involve separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. If the injurious effects of the dumped imports are not appropriately separated and distinguished from the injurious effects of the other factors, the authorities will be unable to conclude that the injury they ascribe to dumped imports is actually caused by those imports, rather than by the other factors. Thus, in the absence of such separation and distinction of the different injurious effects, the investigating authorities would have no rational basis to conclude that the dumped imports are indeed causing the injury which, under the Antidumping Agreement, justifies the imposition of antidumping duties.”

c) “Importações a preços de dumping”

A expressão “importações a preços de dumping” se refere ao volume das importações originário do produtor/exportador de um país, em relação ao qual uma determinação positiva de dumping foi alcançada, e não as transações específicas desse produtor/exportador. A determinação do dumping é feita com base na análise de operações de venda que envolva um produto específico de determinados produtores/exportadores. Se a conclusão desse exame for de que o produto em questão é exportado a preços de dumping, tal conclusão se aplicará a todas as importações desse produto com origem idêntica. Assim, a autoridade investigadora tem o direito de considerar todas as importações em sua análise de “importações objeto de dumping”, nos termos dos Artigos 3.1, 3.4 e 3.5 do Acordo Antidumping. O Painel no caso EC - Bed Linen rejeitou o argumento de que “as importações objeto de dumping” deveriam ser entendidas como referentes apenas às importações ojeto de operações cujo preço de exportação estava abaixo do valor normal. Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.134-6.136 Para. 6.134. “There is no dispute between the parties as to the facts with respect to the consideration of imports as dumped during the period of the dumping investigation. The European Communities explicitly acknowledges that it considered all imports from the three countries investigated, India, Egypt and Pakistan, as dumped, and considered the volume and price effects of all imports from those countries during that period in evaluating whether injury was caused by dumped imports. India asserts that the European Communities was only entitled to consider as dumped imports in its injury analysis those imports attributable to specific transactions as to which dumping was actually found during the period of the dumping investigation.” Para. 6.135. “Thus, we are faced with the question of the interpretation of the term “dumped imports” in Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement, rather than an assessment of the facts as such. If we were to conclude that the term “dumped imports” may be understood to comprise the volume of imports of the product in question from the country for which an affirmative determination of dumping has been made then we must, under the standard of review set forth in Article 17.6 (ii), find in favor of the European Communities on this issue, at least with respect to the consideration of imports during the period of the dumping investigation. On the other hand, to sustain India's position, we would have to conclude that the phrase “dumped imports” must be understood to refer only to imports which are

the subject of transactions in which export price was below normal value, which India considers to be “dumping” transactions.” Para. 6.136. “However, consideration of the ordinary meaning of the phrase “dumped imports” in its context, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 3 of the AD Agreement, leads us to the conclusion that the interpretation proposed by India is not required. As discussed above, we consider that dumping is a determination made with reference to a product from a particular producer/exporter, and not with reference to individual transactions. That is, the determination of dumping is made on the basis of consideration of transactions involving a particular product from particular producers/exporters. If the result of that consideration is a conclusion that the product in question from particular producers/exporters is dumped, we are of the view that the conclusion applies to all imports of that product from such source(s), at least over the period for which dumping was considered. Thus, we consider that the investigating authority is entitled to consider all such imports in its analysis of “dumped imports” under Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5 of the AD Agreement.”

d) “Qualquer outro fator conhecido, além das importações a preços de dumping”

(i) Conceito de “fatores conhecidos”

Outros fatores “conhecidos” mencionados no Artigo 3.5 do Acordo Antidumping que não as importações a preços de dumping as quais possam, simultaneamente, estar causando dano à indústria doméstica, incluem variáveis “claramente suscitadas perante a autoridade investigadora pelas partes interessadas, no curso de uma investigação Antidumping”, e as autoridades investigadoras não são obrigadas a buscar esses fatores por sua própria iniciativa. Ademais, fatores “conhecidos” pelas autoridades em uma parte da investigação não podem deixar de ser conhecidos em outra parte da mesma investigação. Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 7.273 Para. 7.273. “The text of Article 3.5 refers to “known” factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry but does not make clear how factors are “known” or are to become “known” to the investigating authorities. We consider that other “known” factors would include those causal factors that are clearly raised before the investigating authorities by interested parties in the course of an AD investigation. We are of the view that there is no express requirement in Article 3.5 AD that investigating authorities seek out and examine in each case on their own initiative the effects of all possible factors other than imports that may be causing injury to the domestic industry under investigation. Of course, they would certainly not be precluded from doing so if they chose to. We note that there may be cases where, at the time of the investigation, a certain factor may be “known” to the investigating authorities without being known to the interested parties. In such a case, an issue might arise as to whether the authorities would be compelled to examine such a known factor that is affecting the state of the domestic industry. However, it has not been argued that such factors are present in this case.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fitings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/AB/R, para. 178 Para. 178. “Thus, we agree with the Panel that “the European Communities did examine these factors, and, in light of its findings, did not perceive of them as 'known' causal factors.” However, we disagree with the Panel's apparent understanding of the term “known” in Article 3.5. We understand the Panel, in rejecting this aspect of Brazil's claim under Article 3.5, to have stated that the alleged causal factor was “known” to the European Commission in the context of its dumping and injury analyses, but that

the factor was nevertheless not “known” in the context of its causality analysis. In our view, a factor is either “known” to the investigating authority, or it is not “known”; it cannot be “known” in one stage of the investigation and unknown in a subsequent stage. This does not, however, affect our finding, which is premised on the fact that once the cost of production difference was found by the European Commission to be “minimal”, the factor claimed by Brazil to be “injuring the domestic industry” had effectively been found not to exist. As such, there was no “factor” for the European Commission to “examine” further pursuant to Article 3.5.” Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.289 Para. 8.269. “In our examination concerning the Ministry's evaluation of the volume of the dumped imports we found that Guatemala acted in violation of Article 3.5 by failing to consider other factors known to the investigating authority which may also be a cause of injury. In light of that finding, we are of the view that it is neither necessary nor appropriate for us to further consider Mexico's claims concerning a violation of Article 3.5.”

(ii) Lista ilustrativa dos “fatores conhecidos”

A linguagem do Artigo 3.5 não é mandatória quanto aos fatores a serem analisados. A lista de outros fatores conhecidos que possam estar causando dano, enumerados no Artigo 3.5, é meramente ilustrativa. Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, para. 7.274 Para. 7.274. “We note Poland's argument that the final determination shows “no examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities, including no examination of why the factors enumerated in Article 3.5 Antidumping Agreement were or were not themselves relevant”. We do not agree with the apparent view of Poland that the factors enumerated in Article 3.5 AD constitute a mandatory list of factors that must necessarily be examined by the investigating authorities in every case. Consequently, we do not view it as necessary for the relevant documents to reflect that each and every factor enumerated in Article 3.5 was examined. In our view, the language of the text of Article 3.5 (“factors which may be relevant… include…”) is in stark contrast to the specific and mandatory language we have addressed above in the context of Article 3.4. The text of Article 3.5 indicates that the list of other possible causal factors enumerated in that provision is illustrative. Thus, while the listed factors in Article 3.5 might be relevant in many cases, and the list contains useful guidance as to the kinds of factors other than imports that might cause injury to the domestic industry, the specific list in Article 3.5 is not itself mandatory.”

e) “Metodologia de não atribuição”

As autoridades investigadoras devem fazer uma avaliação adequada do dano causado à indústria doméstica por outros fatores conhecidos, e devem separar e distinguir os efeitos prejudiciais das importações investigadas a preços de dumping dos efeitos prejudiciais dos outros fatores que possam estar causando dano ao mesmo tempo à indústria doméstica. Isso requer uma explicação satisfatória sobre a natureza e extensão dos efeitos prejudiciais dos outros fatores, distinguindo-os dos efeitos prejudiciais das importações objeto de dumping, pois sem essa separação e distinção as autoridades não estarão aptas a concluir que o dano é causado pelas importações a preços de dumping. O Órgão de Apelação ressaltou que não há uma previsão no Acordo Antidumping sobre os métodos ou abordagens pelos quais os Membros da OMC realizam esse processo de separação dos efeitos dos “outros fatores”. A linguagem do Artigo 3.5 também não exige que esses outros fatores sejam analisados em

conjunto, desde que, segundo as especificidades de cada caso, a autoridade não atribua às importações objeto de dumping o dano causado por outros fatores. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 223-224 e 228 Para. 223. “The non-attribution language in Article 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement applies solely in situations where dumped imports and other known factors are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time. In order that investigating authorities, applying Article 3.5, are able to ensure that the injurious effects of the other known factors are not “attributed” to dumped imports, they must appropriately assess the injurious effects of those other factors. Logically, such an assessment must involve separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of the other factors from the injurious effects of the dumped imports. If the injurious effects of the dumped imports are not appropriately separated and distinguished from the injurious effects of the other factors, the authorities will be unable to conclude that the injury they ascribe to dumped imports is actually caused by those imports, rather than by the other factors. Thus, in the absence of such separation and distinction of the different injurious effects, the investigating authorities would have no rational basis to conclude that the dumped imports are indeed causing the injury which, under the Antidumping Agreement, justifies the imposition of antidumping duties.” Para. 224. “We emphasize that the particular methods and approaches by which WTO Members choose to carry out the process of separating and distinguishing the injurious effects of dumped imports from the injurious effects of the other known causal factors are not prescribed by the Antidumping Agreement. What the Agreement requires is simply that the obligations in Article 3.5 be respected when a determination of injury is made.” Para. 228. “(…) We recognize, therefore, that it may not be easy, as a practical matter, to separate and distinguish the injurious effects of different causal factors. However, although this process may not be easy, this is precisely what is envisaged by the non-attribution language. If the injurious effects of the dumped imports and the other known factors remain lumped together and indistinguishable, there is simply no means of knowing whether injury ascribed to dumped imports was, in reality, caused by other factors. Article 3.5, therefore, requires investigating authorities to undertake the process of assessing appropriately, and separating and distinguishing, the injurious effects of dumped imports from those of other known causal factors.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fitings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/AB/R, paras. 191-192 Para. 191. “In contrast, we do not find that an examination of collective effects is necessarily required by the non-attribution language of the Antidumping Agreement. In particular, we are of the view that Article 3.5 does not compel, in every case, an assessment of the collective effects of other causal factors, because such an assessment is not always necessary to conclude that injuries ascribed to dumped imports are actually caused by those imports and not by other factors.” Para. 192. “We believe that, depending on the facts at issue, an investigating authority could reasonably conclude, without further inquiry into collective effects, that “the injury (…) ascribe[d] to dumped imports is actually caused by those imports, rather than by the other factors.” At the same time, we recognize that there may be cases where, because of the specific factual circumstances therein, the failure to undertake an examination of the collective impact of other causal factors would result in the investigating authority improperly attributing the effects of other causal factors to dumped imports. We are therefore of the view that an investigating authority is not required to examine the collective impact of other causal factors, provided that, under the specific factual circumstances of the

case, it fulfills its obligation not to attribute to dumped imports the injuries caused by other causal factors.” 6. Artigo 3.6

a) “Da análise da produção da indústria doméstica”

O Acordo Antidumping não determina um método específico de análise da indústria doméstica a ser utilizado, porém, circunstâncias e segmentos específicos da indústria podem vir a ser analisados, desde que todos os fatores relevantes sobre o estado da indústria doméstica tenham sido considerados pelas autoridades investigadoras. Também não consta no Acordo Antidumping qualquer impedimento para uma análise setorial da indústria ou mercado. No entanto, uma análise restrita a uma parcela apenas da produção nacional que seja vendida em um setor específico do mercado não será suficiente para a determinação do dano ou da ameaça de dano à indústria doméstica, definida no caso específico como constituída pelo total dos produtores domésticos. O Artigo 3.6 se aplica à situação distinta, quando não é possível se identificar os dados específicos da indústria doméstica, e nesses casos se autoriza a utilização de dados de um conjunto mais amplo de produtores. Ademais, uma vez definidas as entidades/empresas que compõem a indústria doméstica, as autoridades investigadoras deverão procurar basear as suas determinações nos dados dessas entidades/empresas. Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructosa Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demadndante: México, WT/DS132/R e WT/DS132/AB/RW, paras. 7.154, 7.157 e 7.160 Para. 7.154. “It is important to differentiate the consideration of factors relevant to the injury analysis on a sectoral basis, so as to gain a better understanding of the actual functioning of the domestic industry and its specific markets and thus of the impact of imports on the industry, from the determination of injury or threat of injury on the basis of information regarding only production sold in one specific market sector, to the exclusion of the remainder of the domestic industry's production. There is certainly nothing in the AD Agreement which precludes a sectoral analysis of the industry and/or market. Indeed, in many cases, such an analysis can yield a better understanding of the effects of imports, and more thoroughly reasoned analysis and conclusion. However, this does not mean that an analysis limited to that portion of the domestic industry's production sold in one market sector is sufficient for establishing injury or threat of injury to the domestic industry, consistently with the AD Agreement. It is undisputed in this case that SECOFI defined the domestic industry as consisting of all sugar producers. What SECOFI failed to do, however, was assess the question of injury to those producers on the basis of their production of the like product, sugar. Instead, it assessed the question of threat of injury only with reference to that portion of sugar producers' production that was sold in the industrial market, and took no account of the fact that almost half of production was sold in the household market.” Para. 7.157. “Article 3.6 does not, on its face, allow the determination of injury or threat of injury on the basis of the portion of the domestic industry's production sold in one sector of the domestic market, rather than on the basis of the industry as a whole. Indeed, Article 3.6 relates to a situation different from that at issue here. Article 3.6 provides for the situation where information concerning the production of the like product, such as producers' profits and sales, cannot be separately identified. In such cases, Article 3.6 allows the authority to consider information concerning production of a broader product group than the like product produced by the domestic industry, which includes the like product, in evaluating the effect of imports. Nothing in Article 3.6 allows the investigating authority to consider information concerning production of a product sub-group that is narrower than the like product produced by the domestic industry. In particular, nothing in Article 3.6 allows the investigating authority to limit its examination of injury to an analysis of the portion of domestic production of the like product sold in the particular market sector where competition with the dumped imports is most direct.”

Para. 7.160. “SECOFI's approach amounts to determining threat of injury to a sector of the domestic industry, that producing sugar for the industrial market, rather than on the basis of the domestic industry as a whole, despite the fact that the sugar sold in one market is indistinguishable from that sold in the other (except by the identity of the purchaser) and all sugar producers apparently sold sugar in both markets. SECOFI's reasoning for undertaking this approach was basically that sugar production destined for household consumption cannot be hurt by dumped imports of HFCS. In SECOFI's view, injury or threat of injury should be determined only for that segment of domestic production which directly competes with subject imports. As noted above, while an analysis of the particular sector in which the competition between the domestic industry and dumped imports is most direct is certainly allowed under the AD Agreement, such an analysis does not excuse the investigating authority from making the determination required by that Agreement – whether dumped imports injure or threaten injury to the domestic industry as a whole. By limiting its analysis to the portion of the domestic industry's production sold in the industrial market, SECOFI ignored possible effects of imports on the portion of the domestic industry's production sold in the household sector, and ignored the effect of the household sector on the condition of the domestic producers of sugar. Thus, SECOFI failed to make a determination of threat of material injury to the domestic industry as a whole consistently with the requirements of the AD Agreement.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (Japan - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R e WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 195 Para. 195. “In our view, the AD Agreement thus clearly requires an investigating authority to make a final determination as to “injury” as defined in the Agreement to the industry as a whole. However, the Agreement does not prescribe a particular method of analysis. Specific circumstances might well call for specific attention to be given to various aspects of the industry's performance or to specific segments of the industry, as long as the end-result of this analysis is consistent with the Agreement's requirement to examine and evaluate all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the industry and demonstrate a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry.” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala (Mexico - Steel Pipes and Tubes), Demandante: Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, paras. 7.325-7.326 Para. 7.325. “We turn to the issue raised by Guatemala that Mexico violated Article 3.1 and other relevant obligations in Article 3 as it did not use a consistent and representative data-set pertaining to the “domestic industry”, as this was defined by Economía, in conducting its injury analysis. Within this context, we consider whether Economía's collection and reliance upon economic injury data relating to three firms constituting 88 per cent of national production, and financial injury data pertaining to only one firm constituting 53 per cent of national production was consistent with Mexico's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 concerning injury to the “domestic industry” as that term is defined in Article 4.1.” Para. 7.326. “We are of the view that once an investigating authority defines which entities comprise the domestic industry that will form the basis for its injury analysis, it should seek and use a consistent data-set reflecting the performance of those entities. We understand that, in practice, an investigating authority could have partial information to start an investigation, which might then be supplemented as the investigation proceeds. An investigating authority may also be confronted with problematic incomplete data furnished by one or more domestic producers. In such a case, it should request supplementary information, or, if that is not practicable, resort to a reasonable estimation methodology which will yield results that are reflective of the state of the domestic industry. This is because the requirement is to determine whether the domestic industry, as defined, is injured by dumped imports or not.’

7. Artigo 3.7

a) “Mudanças de circunstâncias” A questão central na determinação da ameaça de dano é identificar se haverá uma “mudança de circunstância” que fará com que o dumping praticado comece a causar dano à indústria doméstica. Para avaliar a probabilidade da ocorrência de mudança nas circunstâncias, as quais façam com que a indústria comece a sofrer dano no presente, é necessário conhecer em primeiro lugar a condição inicial da indústria doméstica, e avaliar também o impacto que essas importações teriam sobre os produtores do produto investigado. Ademais, todos os fatores listados no Artigo 3.4 devem ser analisados em qualquer investigação, independente de qual conceito de dano esteja sendo utilizado na investigação. Relatório do Painel no caso Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.91 e 7.93 Para. 7.91. “Thus, the text of this provision makes explicit that in a threat of injury investigation, the central question is whether there will be a “change in circumstances” that would cause the dumping to begin to injure the domestic industry. Solely as a matter of logic, it would seem necessary, in order to assess the likelihood that a particular change in circumstances would cause an industry to begin experiencing present material injury, to know about the condition of the domestic industry at the outset. For example, if an industry is increasing its production, sales, employment, etc., and is earning a record level of profits, even if dumped imports are increasing rapidly, presumably it would be more difficult for an investigating authority to conclude that it is threatened with imminent injury than if its production, sales, employment, profits and other indicators are low and/or declining.” Para. 7.93. “Applying this definition to Article 3.1, it is clear that any injury investigation, whether the question is present material injury, threat thereof, or material retardation, must “involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic producers of such products” (emphasis added). It is in turn Article 3.4 which governs “the examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry”. Thus, in short, the Article 3.4 factors must be examined in every investigation, no matter which particular manifestation or form of injury is at issue in a given investigation.”

b) “Exigência de se ‘considerar’ os fatores do Artigo 3.7”

A fim de se determinar se houve uma mudança nas circunstâncias, faz-se necessária a análise de todos os fatores constantes no Artigo 3.7, cumulativamente. Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Investigation of the International Trade Comission in Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/AB/RW, para. 158 Para. 158. “We also note that, according to Article 3.7 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 15.7 of the SCM Agreement, a finding of threat of material injury must be based on the “totality of the factors considered”. In this case, several closely inter-related factors are at play in the USITC's determination of threat of material injury. Contested facts underlie the analysis of both the specific threat factors and of those factors acting collectively. For example, in order to assess whether the evidence supports the USITC's determination that imports were increasing at a “significant” rate, indicating a likelihood of “substantially” increased importation, we would have to review the data on the trends in the volume of imports, the effects of the SLA during the period of investigation, and the impact of its expiration, as well as the USITC's findings concerning Canadian excess capacity. The record indicates that the effect of the SLA is a matter that is highly contested between the participants. Indeed, at the oral hearing, Canada referred to this as “the single most litigated issue” before the

USITC during the initial investigation. Canada also contested the USITC's findings concerning the SLA in these Article 21.5 proceedings. (47) Likewise, Canada challenged the USITC's findings concerning Canadian capacity in these Article 21.5 proceedings. (48) The USITC's finding of adverse price effects is premised on its finding of likelihood of increased imports. Thus, it would not be possible to assess the USITC's finding of price effects without having reached a conclusion on the USITC's finding of increased importation. The task of assessing the USITC's examination of price effects is further complicated by the need to review extremely detailed factual issues, such as the comparability between species and the use of composite price index.”

c) “Indicativa de provável aumento substancial nas importações” Para que se realize uma análise adequada de indicativa de provável aumento substancial nas importações é necessário avaliar os fatos e fornecer uma explicação fundamentada das conclusões relacionadas aos efeitos de tais indicativas de aumento das importações. Não descartar a possibilidade de aumento das importações não é uma demonstração positiva do provável aumento substancial destas importações. Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Frutose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (México - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 7.174-7.175 e 7.177 Para. 7.174. “A first question in this regard is whether the existence of the alleged agreement could, or should, have been determined by SECOFI as a matter of fact on the basis of the investigative record. Mexico asserts that SECOFI lacks authority to make determinations in this regard. In our view, the question for purposes of an antidumping investigation is not whether an alleged restraint agreement in violation of Mexican law existed, an issue which might well be beyond the jurisdiction of an antidumping authority to resolve, but whether there was evidence of and arguments concerning the effect of the alleged restraint agreement, which, if it existed, would be relevant to the analysis of the likelihood of increased dumped imports in the near future. If the latter is the case, in our view, the investigating authority is obliged to consider the effects of such an alleged agreement, assuming it exists. This is the analysis Mexico argues SECOFI undertook.” Para. 7.175. “The question before us is whether SECOFI's analysis provides a reasoned explanation for its conclusion that, assuming such an agreement existed, there was nonetheless a likelihood of substantially increased importation.” Para. 7.177. “Mexico's contention that users of imported HFCS other than soft-drink bottlers could have increased their consumption in amounts sufficient to constitute a substantial increase in imports is in our view questionable. However, even assuming this to be the case, there is no discussion in the final determination of the share of imports and domestic production consumed by soft-drink bottlers, other beverage manufacturers, and other industrial users, and the degree of substitutability of HFCS and sugar in their products. Moreover, the alleged restraint agreement affected purchasers accounting for 68 per cent of the imports, suggesting that it would at least slow any further increases in imports. In addition, most other purchasers' ability to substitute HFCS for sugar was limited, suggesting that, if the alleged restraint agreement existed, any further increases in imports would be less than they had been in the past. None of these elements is addressed in SECOFI's final determination. We note, moreover, that the final determination states that the alleged restraint agreement does not “rule out the possibility” (emphasis added) that bottlers and other users would continue their purchases of imported HFCS. However, not ruling out the possibility that imports would continue does not support the conclusion that there is a “likelihood of substantially increased importation” (emphasis added), as provided for in Article 3.7(i).”

d) “Análise do Consequente Impacto das Importações a Preços de Dumping na Indústria Doméstica”

Apesar do Artigo 3.7 não requerer expressamente que se faça a análise do consequente impacto das importações a preços de dumping nos indicadores da indústria doméstica, tal análise deve ser realizada nos termos do Artigo 3.4. Uma determinação da ocorrência de dano material, não pode ser alcançada apenas com base nos fatores indicados no Artigo 7, pois os fatores contidos neste Artigo não se referem à análise do impacto das importações objeto de dumping sobre a indústria doméstica. Mesmo que não exista uma metodologia determinada para a avaliação do “consequente impacto” das importações, as autoridades investigadoras devem avaliar: (i) a evolução dos preços das importações investigadas; (ii) o efeito desses preços sobre os preços do produto similar no mercado doméstico; e (iii) a demanda por novas importações. Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Frutose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (México - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 7.125-7.128 Para. 7.125. “Moreover, it is clear that in making a determination regarding the threat of material injury, the investigating authority must conclude that “material injury would occur” (emphasis added) in the absence of an antidumping duty or price undertaking. A determination that material injury would occur cannot, in our view, be made solely on the basis of consideration of the Article 3.7 factors. Rather, it must include consideration of the likely impact of further dumped imports on the domestic industry.” Para. 7.126. “While an examination of the Article 3.7 factors is required in a threat of injury case, that analysis alone is not a sufficient basis for a determination of threat of injury, because the Article 3.7 factors do not relate to the consideration of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry. The Article 3.7 factors relate specifically to the questions of the likelihood of increased imports (based on the rate of increase of imports, the capacity of exporters to increase exports, and the availability of other export markets), the effects of imports on future prices and likely future demand for imports, and inventories. They are not, in themselves, relevant to a decision concerning what the “consequent impact” of continued dumped imports on the domestic industry is likely to be. However, it is precisely this latter question – whether the “consequent impact” of continued dumped imports is likely to be material injury to the domestic industry - which must be answered in a threat of material injury analysis. Thus, we conclude that an analysis of the consequent impact of imports is required in a threat of material injury determination.” Para. 7.127. “Turning to the question of the nature of the analysis required, we note that Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement sets forth factors to be evaluated in the examination of the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry. Nothing in the text or context of Article 3.4 limits consideration of the Article 3.4 factors to cases involving material injury. To the contrary, as noted above, Article 3.1 requires that a determination of “injury”, which includes threat of material injury, involve an examination of the impact of imports, while Article 3.4 sets forth factors relevant to that examination. Article 3.7 requires that the investigating authorities determine whether, in the absence of protective action, material injury would occur. In our view, consideration of the Article 3.4 factors in examining the consequent impact of imports is required in a case involving threat of injury in order to make a determination consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1 and 3.7.” Para. 7.128. “The question which next must be answered is what is the nature of the consideration of the Article 3.4 factors required in a threat of injury determination.” The text of Article 3.4 is mandatory:

The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including (…). (emphasis added).

In our view, this language makes it clear that the listed factors in Article 3.4 must be considered in all cases. There may be other relevant economic factors in the circumstances of a particular case, consideration of which would also be required. In a threat of injury case, for instance, the AD Agreement itself establishes that consideration of the Article 3.7 factors is also required. But consideration of the Article 3.4 factors is required in every case, even though such consideration may lead the investigating authority to conclude that a particular factor is not probative in the circumstances of a particular industry or a particular case, and therefore is not relevant to the actual determination. Moreover, the consideration of each of the Article 3.4 factors must be apparent in the final determination of the investigating authority.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/AB/RW, para. 151 Para. 151. “Article 3.7(iii) of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 15.7(iv) of the SCM Agreement state that investigating authorities should consider, as part of their determination of threat of injury, “whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and would likely increase demand for further imports”. These provisions do not prescribe a particular methodology for the examination of the price effects of dumped/subsidized imports. Regardless of the methodology followed by an investigating authority, it is clear from the plain language of these provisions that the authority must examine: (i) the trends in the prices at which “imports are entering”; (ii) the “effect” of those prices on “domestic prices”; and (iii) the “demand for further imports”. Discerning the “effect” of prices of imports on domestic prices necessarily calls for an analysis of the interaction between the two. Otherwise, the links between the prices of imports and the depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and the consequent likelihood of a “demand for further imports” may not be properly established.” 8. Artigo 3.8

a) “Especial cuidado”

O adjetivo “especial” é definido como: excepcional, incomum, fora do comum. E o substantivo “cuidado” é definido como: séria atenção, cautela, esforço, respeito. Espera-se, portanto, que ao determinar a ameaça do dano, ou seja, antes da aplicação de uma medida, seja verificada por parte da autoridade de investigação, a existência de todos os pré-requisitos para tal, agindo com cuidado reforçado. Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/R, para. 7.33-7.34 Para. 7.33. “The adjective “special” is defined as, inter alia, “Exceptional in quality or degree; unusual; out of the ordinary”. The noun “care” is defined, inter alia, as “Serious attention, heed; caution, pains, regard”. Thus, it seems clear to us that a degree of attention over and above that required of investigating authorities in all antidumping and countervailing duty injury cases is required in the context of cases involving threat of material injury. We note that Articles 3.8 and 15.8 explicitly state that “the application of measures shall be considered and decided with special care” (emphasis added). Thus, it might be argued that the provision comes into play only after the investigation and consideration of all the relevant factors set out in other provisions of Articles 3 and 15 concerning the analysis of injury. However, we consider that such a conclusion is not appropriate in the context of Article 3.8 of the AD Agreement or Article 15.8 of the SCM Agreement. These provisions are part of the Article of each Agreement, Articles 3 and 15, which, governs the overall determination of injury, which under both Agreements is defined as including threat of material injury. Articles 3.7 and 15.7, set forth factors specific to the determination of threat of material injury, and state that investigating authorities shall base a determination of threat of material injury on facts and not allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. In our view, Articles 3.8 and 15.8 reinforce this fundamental obligation. Thus,

we consider that Article 3.8 and Article 15.8 apply during the process of investigation and determination of threat of material injury, that is, in the establishment of whether the prerequisites for application of a measure exist, and not merely afterward when final decisions whether to apply a measure are taken.” Para. 7.34. “Thus, we are faced with the question of what is entailed by this obligation to act with an enhanced degree of attention, so as to demonstrate compliance with the “special care” obligation. The Agreements require, as noted above, an objective evaluation based on positive evidence in making any injury determination, including one based on threat of material injury. Canada has not asserted any specific legal requirements with respect to special care – it has made no arguments as to what it considers might constitute the special care required by the Agreements in threat cases. It is not clear to us what the parameters of such “special care” in the context of an objective evaluation based on positive evidence would be. In these circumstances, we consider it appropriate to consider alleged violations of Articles 3.8 and 15.8 only after consideration of the alleged violations of specific provisions. While we do not consider that a violation of the special care obligation could not be demonstrated in the absence of a violation of the more specific provision of the Agreements governing injury determinations, we believe such a demonstration would require additional or independent arguments concerning the asserted violation of the special care requirement beyond the arguments in support of the specific violations.” III. Comentários Como visto acima, a jurisprudência até o momento sobre a “cumulação” dos efeitos das importações para fins de determinação de dano em investigações antidumping deixa claro que não se requer que haja uma análise em separado dos volumes e preços das importações originárias de cada origem, antes de serem acumuladas, independentemente de se as importações de determinada origem ou os impactos de seus preços sejam significativos ou não (excetuadas as margens de minimis e os volumes negligenciáveis): tais importações poderão ser cumuladas com as demais para fins de determinação de seus efeitos, em conjunto, sobre a indústria nacional. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 11: We note that in the US – Hot-Rolled Steel case, the Appellate Body stated that: “The word 'positive' means, to us, that the evidence must be of an affirmative, objective and verifiable character, and that it must be credible.” Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-rolled Steel, para.192. (emphasis added). Footnote 12: Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 193. Footnote 13: The recommendation provides that: “(c) the period of data collection for injury investigations normally should be at least three years, unless a party from whom data is being gathered has existed for a lesser period, and should include the entirety of the period of data collection for the dumping investigation;” (Recommendation Concerning the Periods of Data Collection for Antidumping Investigations, adopted by the ADP Committee on 5 May 2000, G/ADP/6). We note that this recommendation is a relevant, but non-binding, indication of the understanding of Members as to appropriate implementation practice regarding the period of data collection for an antidumping investigation. Footnote 14: See, Table 10 of the Injury Report. Footnote 15: We note that Guatemala establishes that there was both an increase of the dumped imports in absolute terms and also an increase relative to domestic consumption and production (see Injury Report Table 10 and Guatemala's first submission para. 359). Guatemala relied on both of these finding to determine that there was material injury to the domestic industry. So, to the extent that one of the findings on the increased volume of dumped imports was proved to be inappropriate Guatemala's determination under Articles 3.1 and 3.2 would be inconsistent with its obligations. Footnote 16: Annex Guatemala-68. Footnote 17: Guatemala presented evidence indicating that before the arrival of the imports prices were to the level of the maximum price. We are of the view that as this price is calculated on the basis of costs and inflation it constitutes a reasonable benchmark to establish the price at which the domestic producer of cement in Guatemala could have expected to increase its prices but for the competition from the dumped imports. Footnote 18: See Panel Report, EC - Bed Linen, supra, note 77, para. 6.139. Footnote 19: EC first written submission, para. 277; Brazil second written submission, para. 143. Footnote 20: “We do not suggest that trends in country-specific volumes are always irrelevant for an investigating authority's consideration. For example, such trends may be relevant in the context of an investigating authority's evaluation of the conditions of competition between imported products, and between imported products and the domestic like product, as provided for in Article 3.3(b). Brazil raised the relationship between import volumes and conditions of competition as the

basis for a claim under that provision before the Panel. (Panel Report, para. 7.252) The Panel found that the divergences in volume trends between Brazilian imports and those of other countries did not compel a finding by the European Commission that the effects of Brazilian imports could not be appropriately assessed on a cumulated basis with the effects of imports from other countries. (Ibid., paras. 7.253-7.256) Brazil has not appealed the Panel's finding in this respect.] O Órgão de Apelação deste caso não fez quaisquer comentários sobre a conclusão/determinação do Painel, já que este ponto não foi recorrido por nenhuma das partes.” Footnote 21:  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. Footnote 22:  Id. Footnote 23:  Article 3.2 of the DSU directs panels to clarify the provisions of the covered agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”, which are set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, pp.10-12. Here, we look to negotiating history pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Footnote 24:  In this regard, we note the text of Article 12.2.2, which provides: “A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all   relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures (…)”. Footnote 25:  As a third party, the European Communities was also of the view that the list in Article 3.4 was illustrative despite the change in language from “such as” in the relevant Tokyo Round Code provision to “including” in current Article 3.4. See EC third party submission, Annex 3-1, para. 41 and EC Response to Panel Question 13, Annex 3-7. Japan submitted that the change in terminology indicated that each factor listed in Article 3.4 must be evaluated. See Response of Japan to Panel Question 13, Annex 3-8. The United States was of the view that the change in terminology “clarified the need for the authority to evaluate each and every listed factor that is relevant to the state of the industry”. See US Response to Panel Question 13, Annex 3-9. Footnote 26:  The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1993). Footnote 27: Id. Footnote 28:  Article 3.2 DSU directs panels to clarify the provisions of the covered agreements “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law”, which are set out in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See e.g. Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, pp.10-12. Here, we look to negotiating history pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the general rule of interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Footnote 29: “We note that Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, which contains a requirement that the investigating authorities “shall evaluate all relevant factors…having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, (…) changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment” has been interpreted to require an evaluation of each of these listed factors having a bearing on the state of the industry. See Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000, para. 136 and Panel Report, Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WT/DS121/R, adopted 12 January 2000, para. 8.123. While the standard for injury in safeguards cases (“serious injury”) is different from that applied to injury determinations in the antidumping context (“material injury”), the same type of analysis is provided for in the respective covered agreements, i.e. evaluation or examination of a listed series of factors in order to determine whether the requisite injury exists.” Footnote 30:  In this regard, we note the text of Article 12.2.2, which provides: “A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures (…)”. Footnote 31:  Appellate Body Report, Thailand - Steel, supra, footnote 36, para. 128. Footnote 32:  For example, Webster's New World Dictionary, 2nd College Edition, 1986, at p.123, includes as a definition of “bearing”: “relevant meaning, appreciation, relation [the evidence had no bearing on the case]”. Footnote 33:   Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (“US - Gasoline”), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I,3. On page 23 of the Appellate Body Report it is stated: “(…) One of the corollaries of the 'general rule of interpretation' in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.” Footnote 34:  This sentence reads: “This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.” Footnote 35: Oxford English Dictionary Online: http://dictionary.oed.com. Footnote 36: Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary online: http://www.m-w.com. Footnote 37: Merriam-Webster's Thesaurus online: http://www.m-w.com. Footnote 38: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Footnote 39:  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary online: http://www.m-w.com. Footnote 40: Panel Report, Egypt – Rebar, supra note. Footnote 41:  We find support for our view in Appellate Body Report, US-Lamb, para. 104. Footnote 42: Panel Report, EC – Bed Linen , para. 6.162. Footnote 43: Ibid., para. 6.168. Footnote 44: We find support for this view in Panel Report, Thailand-H-Beams. Footnote 45: Panel Report, US-Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note, paras. 7.232- 7.233. Footnote 46: Thus, we agree with the view of the Appellate Body that “Articles 3.1 and 3.4 indicate that the investigating authorities must determine, objectively, and on the basis of positive evidence, the importance to be attached to each potentially relevant factor and the weight to be attached to it. In every investigation, this determination turns on the “bearing” that the relevant factors have “on the state of the [domestic] industry”.” See Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, supra note, para. 197.

Footnote 47: Canada argued before the Panel that the studies relied upon by the USITC “do not address the key issue of whether the SLA had any significant restraining effect at the time it expired.” (Panel Report, para. 4.23 (original emphasis)) Canada stated that a study introduced by petitioners in the Section 129 proceedings had serious methodological deficiencies. (para. 4.24) At the oral hearing, the United States denied that the USITC had relied exclusively on this study. In addition, Canadian interested parties had asserted before the USITC that the SLA had resulted in a e distribution, among Canadian provinces, of exports of softwood lumber to the United States. The USITC  concluded that “[t]he record does not show that the SLA merely led to a redistribution of exports from Canadian provinces not covered by the SLA, particularly the Maritime Provinces, and that upon its expiration, pre-SLA provincial trade patterns returned.” (Section 129 Determination, p. 26 (footnote omitted) Footnote 48: According to Canada, the capacity of Canadian producers was projected to increase only slightly, and excess capacity would be used primarily to supply markets other than the United States. (See Panel Report, paras. 4.37-4.40)

Ø Artigo 4

Tatiana Lins Cruz

I. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 4 Definition of Domestic Industry

4.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products, except that:

(i) when producers are related (49) to the exporters or importers or are

themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term “domestic industry” may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers;

(ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory. In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated market and provided further that the dumped imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such market.

4.2 When the domestic industry has been interpreted as referring to the producers in a certain area,

i.e. a market as defined in paragraph 1(ii), Antidumping duties shall be levied (50) only on the products in question consigned for final consumption to that area. When the constitutional law of the importing Member does not permit the levying of Antidumping duties on such a basis, the importing Member may levy the Antidumping duties without limitation only if (a) the exporters shall have been given an opportunity to cease exporting at dumped prices to the area concerned or otherwise give assurances pursuant to Article 8 and adequate assurances in this regard have not been promptly given, and (b) such duties cannot be levied only on products of specific producers which supply the area in question.

4.3 Where two or more countries have reached under the provisions of paragraph 8(a) of

Article XXIV of GATT 1994 such a level of integration that they have the characteristics of a single, unified market, the industry in the entire area of integration shall be taken to be the domestic industry referred to in paragraph 1.

4.4 The provisions of paragraph 6 of Article 3 shall be applicable to this Article. Footnote 49: For the purpose of this paragraph, producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers only if (a) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly controlled by a third person; or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person, provided that there are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause the producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers. For the purpose of this paragraph, one shall be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position to exercise restraint or direction over the latter. Footnote 50: As used in this Agreement “levy” shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment or collection of a duty or tax.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 4 Definição de Indústria doméstica

4.1 Para os propósitos deste Acordo, o termo “indústria doméstica” deve ser interpretado como a totalidade dos produtores nacionais do produto similar, ou como aqueles dentre eles cuja produção conjunta do mencionado produto constitua a maior parte da produção nacional total do produto, a menos que:

(i) os produtores estejam relacionados4 aos exportadores ou importadores ou

sejam eles próprios do produto que alegadamente se importa a preços de dumping, situação em que a expressão “indústria doméstica” poderá ser interpretada como alusiva ao restante dos produtores;

(ii) em circunstâncias excepcionais, o território de um Membro poderá, no caso do referido produto, ser dividido em dois ou mais mercados competitivos; os produtores em cada um desses mercados poderão ser considerados como indústrias independentes se (a) os produtores em atividade em um desses mercados vendem toda ou quase toda a sua produção do bem em questão no interior desse mercado e (b) a demanda desse mercado é suprida em proporção substancial por produtores daquele mesmo bem estabelecidos em outro ponto do território. Em tais circunstâncias, dano poderá ser encontrado mesmo quando a maior parte da produção nacional não esteja sofrendo dano, desde que haja concentração das importações e, mais ainda, desde que as importações a preços de dumping estejam causando dano aos produtores de toda ou quase toda a produção efetuada dentro daquele mercado.

4.2 No caso de o termo indústria doméstica ter sido interpretado como o conjunto de produtores

de uma certa área, i.e., um mercado, tal como este é definido no parágrafo 1(b), direitos Antidumping serão aplicados5 apenas sobre os produtos em causa destinados ao consumo final naquela área. Quando o direito constitucional do Membro importador não permitir a aplicação de direito Antidumping nessas bases, o Membro importador poderá aplicar direito Antidumping de maneira ilimitada apenas se: (a) aos exportadores tiver sido dada a oportunidade de cessar as exportações a preço de dumping destinadas à área em causa ou, alternativamente, de oferecer garantias nesse sentido, de acordo com o Artigo 8, e que tais garantias adequadas não tiverem sido imediatamente oferecidas; e (b) o direito não puder ser aplicado apenas sobre produtos ou produtores específicos que abastecem a área em questão.

4.3 Quando dois ou mais países tiverem atingido tal nível de integração, de acordo com o disposto

no parágrafo 8(a) do Artigo XXIV do GATT de 1994, que suas economias apresentem características de um único mercado, será a totalidade da área de integração considerada como indústria doméstica nos termos do parágrafo 1 acima.

4.4 O disposto no parágrafo 6 do Artigo 3 será aplicável a este Artigo.                                                                                                                          4  Para os efeitos deste parágrafo, produtores serão considerados relacionados com os exportadores apenas no caso de a) um deles direta ou indiretamente controlar o outro; ou b) ambos serem controlados direta ou indiretamente por um terceiro; ou c) juntos, ambos controlarem, direta ou indiretamente, um terceiro, desde que haja motivos para acreditar-se, ou disto suspeitar-se, que tal relação pode levar o produtor em causa a comportar-se diferentemente dos que não integram tal relação. Para fins deste parágrafo, considera-se que um controla o outro quando o primeiro está em condições legais ou operacionais de impedir ou induzir as decisões do segundo.  5  No contexto deste Acordo, “aplicados” significa a determinação ou recebimento legais, finais ou definitivos, de imposto ou taxa.  

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução O Artigo 4.1 em sua versão original estabelece que o termo “indústria doméstica” deve ser interpretado como os produtores nacionais do produto similar como um todo ou “a major proportion” da produção nacional total do produto. Na tradução para o português, a indústria doméstica deve ser interpretada como a totalidade dos produtores nacionais do produto similar ou a maior parte da produção nacional total do produto. O termo “a maior parte” constante da tradução pode dar a equivocada idéia de que seria necessário mais de 50% dos produtores nacionais do produto similar, como já sustentado pelo Brasil no DS241 (Argentina – Poultry Anti- Dumping Duties) e não aceito pelo Painel que definiu, conforme detalhado na Parte II, “a major proportion” como “an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production”. Para tal interpretação, sustentou o Painel que o Artigo 4.1 menciona “a major proportion” e não “the major proportion” e que nesse último caso, seria claro que haveria a obrigação de mais de 50% dos produtores da indústria doméstica. A decisão do Painel menciona ainda a tradução espanhola “una proporción importante” que se revela em consonância com a decisão do Painel e, portanto, mais adequada que a tradução em português. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 4

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/R, paras. 6.212-6.214 As CE alegaram que a Lei Antidumping norte-americana de 1916 não obedece a uma série de requisitos procedimentais e processuais estabelecidos no Artigo 4 do Acordo Antidumping, particularmente no requisito de que um pedido de investigação deve ser feito em nome da indústria doméstica e ser apoiada por uma proporção mínima da indústria doméstica. Neste caso, foi concluído que a Lei de 1916 violou os Artigos 1, 4 e 5.5 do Acordo Antidumping. Houve apelação (WT/DS136/AB/R e WT/DS162/AB/R), porém não relativa ao Artigo. Para. 6.212. “The EC also claims that the 1916 Act fails to respect a number of procedural and due process requirements set forth in Article 4 of the Antidumping Agreement, in particular the requirement that a complaint be made on behalf of the domestic industry and be supported by a minimum proportion of the domestic industry.” Para. 6.213. “We note that civil proceedings under the 1916 Act are available to “any person injured in his business or property” by reason of a violation of the 1916 Act. This term is nowhere qualified by a statement that this person should be sufficiently representative of the industry of the United States, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Antidumping Agreement. We note that the 1916 Act refers to the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States. However, we have no evidence that a minimum representation level for a given industry must be established by the complainant before filing a case before a federal court. On the contrary, we note that all cases so far have in fact been initiated by individual companies under their own responsibility. In light of the terms of the 1916 Act and, in particular, the term “any person injured in his business or property”, which is particularly clear, we have no reason to believe that US federal courts will be in a position to interpret that provision consistently with Article 4 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 6.214. “For that reason, we find that the 1916 Act, because it does not require a minimum representation of a US industry, violates Article 4 of the Antidumping Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS162/R, paras. 6.255-6.257 e 6.261 O Japão alega que a Lei Antidumping norte-americana de 1916 não obedece a uma série de requisitos procedimentais e processuais estabelecidos nos Artigos 4 e 5 do Acordo Antidumping. Em particular, no que se refere ao Artigo 4, o pedido de investigação deve ser feito por ou em nome da indústria doméstica. Para esta finalidade, o Artigo 4.1 define o conceito de “indústria doméstica.” O Painel concluiu que houve violação dos Artigos 1, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 18.1 e 18.4 do Acordo Antidumping. Houve apelação (WT/DS162/AB/R, porém não relativa ao Artigo 4). Para. 6.255. “Japan claims that Articles 4 and 5 of the Antidumping Agreement set forth requirements limiting the party or parties that may properly pursue an Antidumping claim. Article 5.1 requires that a request for initiation of an Antidumping investigation be made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. Article 4.1 defines “domestic industry” for the purpose of the Antidumping Agreement. Article 5.4 requires the investigating authorities to determine that an application is supported by “those producers which collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product” of those producers supporting or opposing the application. Moreover, under no circumstances can an investigation be initiated if those supporting the application account for less than 25 per cent of total domestic production of the like product. In contrast, as evidenced by the most recent cases initiated under the 1916 Act, a complaint under the 1916 Act can be initiated by a single United States producer. Article 5 also requires that applications contain evidence of the three elements of dumping, injury and causation, and sets a de minimis threshold applicable to the dumping element. The 1916 Act contains none of these elements. On the contrary, Japan argues that, under the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complainant under the 1916 Act needs only to present a short and plain statement of its claims. Finally, Article 5.10 of the Antidumping Agreement requires Members to complete their investigations and decide whether or not to impose duties within 18 months. The 1916 Act contains no such deadline.” Para. 6.256. “We note that Japan's claims under Article 4 and 5 of the Antidumping Agreement are closely linked because one of the conditions for the initiation of an investigation under Article 5.1 is that the application be made on behalf of the domestic industry, which is defined in Article 4.1.” Para. 6.257. “We recall that civil proceedings under the 1916 Act are available to “any person injured in his business or property” by reason of a violation of the 1916 Act. This term is nowhere qualified by a statement that this person should be sufficiently representative of an industry of the United States, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Antidumping Agreement. We note that the 1916 Act refers to the intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establishment of an industry in the United States. However, we have no evidence that a minimum representation level for a given industry must be established by the complainant before filing a case before a federal court. On the contrary, we note that all cases so far have, in fact, been initiated by individual companies under their own responsibility. The fact that, in certain cases, these companies may have represented a very large portion of the US industry in the economic sector concerned does not seem to be linked to any legal requirement of representation under the 1916 Act and is most probably fortuitous. We have not been referred to any provisions of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which would qualify the terms of the 1916 Act in line with the terms of Article 4 and 5 of the Antidumping Agreement. In light of the terms of the 1916 Act, especially the term “any person injured in his business or property” which is clear, we have no reason to believe that US federal courts will be in a position to interpret that provision – which conflicts with the terms of the Antidumping Agreement - to meet the requirements of Articles 4 and 5 of the Antidumping Agreement in terms of representation of the complainants.” Para. 6.261. “We therefore find that the 1916 Act, because it does not require a minimum representation of a US industry in applications for the initiation of proceedings under the 1916 Act, violates Article 4.1 and Article 5.1, 5.2 and 5.4 of the Antidumping Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), WT/DS184/R, paras. 7.188-7.195, 7.199, 7.204 e 7.214-7.215 O Japão alegou que o tratamento dado pela Lei norte-americana no que se refere à produção cativa por si só, e, especificamente em relação às importações de aço laminado a quente, violam os dispositivos do Artigo 4. O Painel concluiu que na seção 771(7)(c)(iv) da Lei de Tarifas de 1930, a disposição emendada sobre produção cativa não é “on its face” inconsistente com os Artigos 3 e 4 do Acordo Antidumping e sua aplicação neste caso foi consistente com os Artigos 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 e 4.1 do Acordo Antidumping. Assim, entendeu que os EUA não agiram de modo inconsistente com as suas obrigações sob os Artigos 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 e 4.1 do Acordo Antidumping ao aplicar aquela disposição na determinação de dano pela indústria norte-americana. O Japão apelou e o Órgão de Apelação manteve a conclusão do Painel no que se refere ao fato da não violação da mencionada Seção da Lei norte-america “on its face”, mas reverteu a conclusão quanto à sua aplicação no caso em análise e considerou que os EUA não a aplicaram a provisão acerca de consumo cativo, neste caso, de forma consistente com os Artigos 3.1 e 3.4 do Acordo Antidumping. Para. 7.188. “In addressing Japan's claim that the US statute is inconsistent with the AD Agreement on its face, we must resolve two questions. First, we must determine what is required by the AD Agreement, that is, whether the investigating authority is in all cases required to make a determination of injury to the domestic industry as a whole. If so, we must then consider whether the primary focus on the merchant market with respect to market share and financial performance set out in the “captive production” provision of the US statute is inconsistent, on its face, with this requirement?” Para. 7.189. “We consider that the definition of the domestic industry of Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement provides a clear answer to the first question. The domestic industry consists of the domestic producers as a whole of the like products, or of those producers whose collective output constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products. The terms “domestic industry” and domestic producers are also used interchangeably in Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Agreement. Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement provides that a determination of injury has to involve inter alia an objective examination of the “impact of these imports on domestic producers of such like products”. Article 3.4 of the AD Agreement expands on this obligation and provides that the “examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned” shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors having a bearing on the state of the industry. Article 3.5 of the AD Agreement requires that a causal relationship be demonstrated “between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry”. We conclude that the requirement to make a determination of injury to the domestic industry read in light of the definition of the domestic industry of Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, implies that the injury must be analysed with regard to domestic producers as a whole of the like product or to those whose collective output constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products.” Para. 7.190. “In our view, the AD Agreement thus clearly requires an investigating authority to make a final determination as to “injury” as defined in the Agreement to the industry as a whole. However, the Agreement does not prescribe a particular method of analysis. Specific circumstances might well call for specific attention to be given to various aspects of the industry's performance or to specific segments of the industry, as long as the end-result of this analysis is consistent with the Agreement's requirement to examine and evaluate all relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the industry and demonstrate a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry.” Para. 7.191. “We thus must examine whether the US “captive production” provision is on its face inconsistent with the established requirement of the Agreement to determine injury for the industry as a whole, as Japan is alleging. We note that the United States agrees with Japan that the AD Agreement

requires a determination concerning injury with respect to the industry as a whole. According to the United States, the US statute is fully consistent with this obligation as it requires USITC to consider the industry as a whole. The United States asserts that the captive production provision, on its face, only affects some statutory factors required to be considered under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) and does not affect the general requirement to determine injury for the domestic industry as a whole, which is set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) and which governs the entire determination of injury.” Para. 7.192. “The question before us is whether the captive production provision and the required “primary focus” on one segment of the market, the merchant market, with respect to market share and financial performance of the industry, is inconsistent with the obligations imposed on WTO Members in conducting an injury analysis for the purpose of an Antidumping investigation. It is established GATT/WTO practice that the consistency of a law on its face may be challenged independently from any application thereof only in so far as the law is mandatory and not discretionary in nature. In other words, only if a law mandates WTO inconsistent action or prohibits WTO consistent action can the legislation be challenged on its face in a dispute settlement proceeding.” Para. 7.193. “We do not doubt that the captive production of the US statute is mandatory in nature and may thus be challenged before a panel. The language of the provision (“shall focus primarily”) makes it clear that USITC is required by statute to focus primarily on the merchant market in certain circumstances and under certain conditions. The question remains however whether the statute mandates action that is inconsistent with the United States' obligations under the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.194. “We recall that in relevant part, the captive production provision provides that “the Commission, in determining market share and the factors affecting financial performance set forth in clause (iii), shall focus primarily on the merchant market for the domestic like product”. The key to answering the question posed lies in the ordinary meaning of the words “focus primarily”. Japan argues that the use of the word “focus” skews the analysis to the merchant market at the expense of the rest of the domestic industry and the modifier “primarily” narrows the focus even more.” Para. 7.195. “The verb “to focus” is defined as “to concentrate” on something. “Primary” is defined as “of the first importance, chief”. Literally, the captive production provision thus requires USITC to concentrate in chief on the merchant market when considering market share and financial performance of the industry. Such a specific direction to focus the analysis of certain factors with attention for a particular segment of the domestic market does not, in our view, necessarily imply that the overall injury analysis is not performed with respect to the industry as a whole. The statute does not require a general and exclusive focus on the merchant market when considering market share and industry performance, but only a “primary” focus. It certainly does not require a determination of injury based only on consideration of the merchant market.” Para. 7.199. “We therefore find that the captive production provision is not on its face inconsistent with Articles 3 and 4 of the AD Agreement. Having reached that conclusion, we also conclude that the United States did not act inconsistently with its obligations under Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement and Article 18.4 of the AD Agreement in maintaining this statutory provision. We next turn to the question whether the USITC, in applying that provision in the investigation underlying this dispute, acted inconsistently with Articles 3 and 4 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.204. “The question before us is whether the USITC's determination of injury is consistent with the requirements of Articles 3 and 4 of the AD Agreement, in light of the focus on the merchant market by some Commissioners with respect to some factors examined, or whether that focus so taints the determination that we cannot conclude that an objective and unbiased investigating authority could make the determination the USITC made, on the basis of the facts on the record and in light of the explanations given. Under the applicable standard of review, we are not to overturn the evaluation of the administering authority if the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation unbiased and objective, even though we might have reached a different conclusion.”

Para. 7.214. “We conclude that the analysis performed by USITC established injury with regard to the industry as a whole, in spite of, or regardless of, the application of the captive production provision by three of the Commissioners. We note that in any case all six commissioners made an affirmative injury or threat of injury determination whether they applied the captive production provision or not. This to us confirms our view that the application of the captive production provision did not undermine the examination of injury to the industry as a whole which is required under the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.215. “We therefore find that the USITC's analysis was consistent with the obligations of the United States under Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 4.1 of the AD Agreement in so far as it examined and determined injury to the domestic industry as a whole.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 187-190 e 240(g) Para. 187. “The Panel concluded by finding that the captive production provision is not, on its face, inconsistent with Articles 3 and 4 of the Antidumping Agreement. The Panel also concluded that the captive production provision was applied consistently with Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 4.1 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 188. “Japan appeals the Panel's findings, arguing that the captive production provision on its face, and as applied in this investigation, distorts the USITC's analysis of the domestic industry as a whole because only one part of the market is the subject of special examination. Further, by “focus[ing] primarily” on the merchant market, the USITC focused on the part of the industry which was most likely to be injured. Such an examination is not “objective” under Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement. Japan also argues that the Panel misunderstood the meaning of the words “focus primarily” in the United States statute.” Para. 189. “We recall first that the Antidumping Agreemen provides that “injury” means “material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry”. (emphasis added) It emerges clearly from this definition that the focus of an injury determination is the state of the “domestic industry”.” Para. 190. “Article 4.1 of the Antidumping Agreement defines the term “domestic industry” as the “domestic producers as a whole of the like products” or “[domestic producers] whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production”. It follows that an injury determination, under the Antidumping Agreement, is a determination that the domestic producers “as a whole”, or a “major proportion” of them, are “injured”. This is borne out by the provisions of Articles 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 of the Agreement, which impose certain requirements with respect to the investigation and examination leading to an injury determination. Investigating authorities are directed to investigate and examine imports in relation to the “domestic industry”, the “domestic market for like products” and “domestic producers of [like] products”. The investigation and examination must focus on the totality of the “domestic industry” and not simply on one part, sector or segment of the domestic industry.” Para. 240. “For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body: “(g) upholds the Panel's finding, in paragraph 8.2(b) of the Panel Report, that section 771(7)(C)(iv) of the United States Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the captive production provision, is not, on its face, inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 4.1 of the Antidumping Agreement; reverses the Panel's finding, in that same paragraph, that the United States did not act inconsistently with the Antidumping Agreement in its application of the captive production provision in its determination of injury sustained by the United States' hot-rolled steel industry; and finds, instead, that the United States acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Antidumping Agreement in the application of the captive production provision in this case.”

Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - Poultry Ant-Dumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, paras. 7.328- 7.333 e 7.337-7.344 O contencioso se refere à definição do termo “indústria doméstica” contido no Artigo 4.1 do Acordo Antidumping, mais especificamente se há obrigação de interpretação do termo “indústria doméstica” como definido no Artigo 4.1 e se a expressão “a major proportion” significa que a indústria doméstica deve incluir os produtores domésticos que sejam a maioria da produção nacional, ou seja, mais de 50% da produção doméstica total como alegado pelo Brasil. O Painel concluiu que o Artigo 4.1 impõe uma obrigação expressa aos Membros de interpretar o termo “indústria doméstica” da maneira especificada no citado Artigo. O Painel concluiu ainda que o termo “major proportion” não implica uma obrigação quantitativa de definição da indústria doméstica como sendo constituída por parcela igual ou maior que 50% da produção nacional, mas sim uma proporção importante, séria ou significante da produção doméstica total, e que no caso específico a Argentina não violou o Artigo 3.1 por definir a indústria doméstica como os produtores que representam 46% da produção nacional. Não houve apelação. Para. 7.328. “This claim concerns the definition of the term “domestic industry” contained in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.329. “Brazil notes that Article 4.1 defines the term “domestic industry” as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes “a major proportion” of the total domestic production of those products. Brazil submits that the reference in Article 4.1 to “a major proportion” means “the majority”, or the greater part in relation to the whole (i.e., 50+ per cent). Brazil submits that Argentina violated Article 4.1 because the CNCE defined the domestic industry as – and collected injury data for – those producers whose collective output constitutes 46 per cent – and therefore less than the majority – of total domestic production.” Para. 7.330. “Argentina argues that Article 4.1 deliberately failed to define exactly what is meant by “a major proportion”. Argentina denies that “a major proportion” must be greater than 50 per cent, and notes that the practice of other Members supports Argentina's interpretation.” Para. 7.331. “The United States asserts that Article 4.1 merely contains a definition of “domestic industry”, and does not impose any obligation on Members. The United States also asserts that “a major proportion” does not necessarily mean “the majority”, but may also mean “unusually important, serious, or significant”. The United States further argues that the drafters of the AD Agreement were quite explicit when they intended to impose a majority requirement for a particular obligation, such as the 50 per cent standing requirement in Article 5.4.” Para. 7.332. “According to the European Communities, the phrase “major proportion” does not mean the majority of the domestic production, but rather an important part thereof, which may be less than 50 per cent. The European Communities relies on the same definition of “major proportion” as does the United States. The European Communities also notes that Article 4.1 refers to “a” major proportion, and not “the” major proportion, suggesting that there may be more than one major proportion.” Para. 7.333. “The European Communities further asserts that its interpretation is supported by Article 5.4, which provides that an investigation shall not be initiated unless the authorities determine that the application has been made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry (...).” Para. 7.337. “Article 4.1 provides in relevant part:

I. For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like

products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products (…).”

Para. 7.338. “We must first determine whether or not Article 4.1 imposes any obligation on Members, i.e., whether or not Argentina could be found to have acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 (as opposed to any other provision of the AD Agreement) by using a definition of “domestic industry” other than that prescribed by Article 4.1. We note that Article 4.1 provides that the term “domestic industry” “shall” be interpreted in a specific manner. In our view, this imposes an express obligation on Members to interpret the term “domestic industry” in that specified manner. Thus, if a Member were to interpret the term differently in the context of an Antidumping investigation, that Member would violate the obligation set forth in Article 4.1.” Para. 7.339. “Having found that Article 4.1 does contain an obligation that Argentina could potentially have violated, we must now determine whether or not it did so by defining the “domestic industry” as producers of 46 per cent of total domestic production. In particular, we must consider whether or not the phrase “a major proportion” means that the “domestic industry” must include domestic producers whose collective output constitutes the majority, i.e., 50+ per cent, of domestic total production.” Para. 7.340. “Regarding the ordinary meaning of the phrase “major proportion”, Brazil asserts that the term “major proportion” is synonymous with “major part”, which in turn is defined as “the majority”. Brazil submits that “the majority” is understood to mean “the greater number or part”. Brazil submits that 46 per cent of total domestic production cannot be considered as the greater part of 100 per cent of total domestic production. The European Communities and the United States assert that the word “major” does not necessarily mean “majority”, but may also mean “unusually important, serious, or significant”.” Para. 7.341. “In considering these different dictionary definitions, we note that the word “major” is also defined as “important, serious, or significant”. Accordingly, an interpretation that defines the domestic industry in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production is permissible. Indeed, this approach is entirely consistent with the Spanish version of Article 4.1, which refers to producers representing “una proporción importante” of domestic production. Furthermore, Article 4.1 does not define the “domestic industry” in terms of producers of the major proportion of total domestic production. Instead, Article 4.1 refers to producers of a major proportion of total domestic production. If Article 4.1 had referred to the major proportion, the requirement would clearly have been to define the “domestic industry” as producers constituting 50+ per cent of total domestic production. However, the reference to a major proportion suggests that there may be more than one “major proportion” for the purpose of defining “domestic industry”. In the event of multiple “major proportions”, it is inconceivable that each individual “major proportion” could – or must – exceed 50 per cent. This therefore supports our finding that it is permissible to define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production. For these reasons, we find that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not require Members to define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers representing the majority, or 50+ per cent, of total domestic production.” Para. 7.342. “There is nothing on the record to suggest that, in the circumstances of this case, 46 per cent of total domestic production is not an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production. Accordingly, we reject Brazil's claim that Argentina violated Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement by defining “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers representing 46 per cent of total domestic production.” Para. 7.343. “Finally, Brazil has argued that if the AD Agreement provides no specific benchmark for what would constitute a major proportion of total domestic production, then the investigating authorities are under the obligation to expressly elucidate how they found that a percentage lower than

50 per cent could be considered a major proportion. However, we see no basis for any such obligation in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.344. “In light of the above, we conclude that Argentina did not violate Article 4.1 by defining domestic industry in terms of domestic producers accounting for 46 per cent of total domestic production.” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tunes from Guatemala (México - Steel Pipes and Tubes), Demandante: Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, paras. 7.296-7.299 e 7.313-7.324 e 8.1 Alegou a Guatemala que a análise de dano foi baseada no uso seletivo e inconsistente da informação relativa à indústria doméstica e que, portanto, foi inconsistente com o requisito do Artigo 3.1 de conduzir um “objective examination” de “positive evidence” e, consequentemente, com os requisitos dos Artigos 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 e 4.1. No que se refere ao Artigo 4.1, alegou a Guatemala que há dois critérios para a definição da indústria doméstica que não poderiam ter sido utilizados de forma alternada pelo México no decorrer da investigação. O Painel concluiu que o México agiu de forma inconsistente com os Artigos citados do Acordo Antidumping. Não houve apelação. (i) Guatemala Para. 7.296. “Guatemala argues that Economía's injury analysis was based on the selective and inconsistent use of information pertaining to the domestic industry. Without any proper explanation, Economía collected and relied upon data for part of its injury analysis referring to three of the four companies that constituted the domestic industry, and for other parts of its analysis, data referring to only one of those companies (that is, the petitioner).” Para. 7.297. “In Guatemala's view, the selective and inconsistent gathering and analysis of factors indicating the state of the industry is contrary to the requirement in Article 3.1 to conduct an “objective examination” of “positive evidence”, and consequently to the requirements Articles 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 4.1.” (iii) Mexico

Para. 7.298. “Mexico argues that it complied with its obligations under Article 3.1 to conduct an “objective examination” of “positive evidence”, and consequently with those under Articles 3.2, 3.4, 3.5 and 4.1. Mexico asserts that Article 4.1 allows two meanings for the term “domestic industry”: (i) the domestic producers “as a whole” or (ii) those whose collective output constitutes “a major proportion” of the total domestic production. According to Mexico, an investigating authority can comply with the “domestic industry” requirement by using either of those definitions, that is, by examining either the domestic producers “as a whole” or those whose collective output constitutes “a major proportion” of total domestic production. Mexico turns to Article 5.4 to inform its interpretation of the “major proportion” element in Article 4.1, arguing that, if a producer alone satisfies the Article 5.4 threshold of 50 per cent of the domestic industry expressing support or opposition to the application, then an objective examination of injury factors may rely upon data pertaining solely to that producer.” Para. 7.299. “In this case, Mexico contends, the data collected and analysed by Economía for the economic injury factors pertained to three firms accounting for 88 per cent of domestic production. Furthermore, as Hylsa accounted for 53 per cent of the domestic industry, and the whole of the domestic industry supported the request for initiation, Mexico argues that Economía was justified in collecting and relying upon financial injury data pertaining solely to the applicant.”

Para. 7.313. “Based on the parties' evidence and arguments, the question before us is whether Economía made an objective examination based on positive evidence, as required by Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5, in its collection and evaluation of data pertaining to injury to the “domestic industry” as that term is defined in Article 4.1.” Para. 7.314. “Economía defined the domestic industry for the purposes of the Final Determination as being constituted of four firms: Hylsa, Tuberías Procarsa, Tubería Nacional y Compañía Mexicana de Tubos. This was the domestic industry defined by Economía for the purposes of the injury analysis. However, Economía's analysis of the economic and financial indicators was based on sets of information that at no point referred to the whole industry as this had been defined by Economía. For the purpose of the injury analysis in the Final Determination, Economía relied upon information on the economic indicators of three firms constituting 88 per cent of the domestic industry. Regarding financial information, Economía only sought and relied upon information accounting for 53 per cent of the domestic industry, from Hylsa and/or its Tubing Division, Hylsa-DAT.” Para. 7.315. “Therefore, the specific issue that arises before us on the facts of this case is whether Economía's collection and reliance upon economic injury data relating to three firms constituting 88 per cent of national production, and financial injury data pertaining to only one firm constituting 53 per cent of national production was consistent with Mexico's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 concerning the determination of injury to the “domestic industry” as that term is defined in Article 4.1.” Para. 7.316. “At the outset, we wish to emphasize our understanding that the issue before us, as raised by Guatemala, does not include the consistency with the cited provisions of Economía's reliance upon financial injury data pertaining to both Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT. In our view, Economía's reliance on data of both Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT could introduce considerable distortions into the injury analysis, as the record indicates that Hylsa-DAT revenue accounted for 8 per cent of Hylsa's total sales from 1998-2000. The record further indicates that Economía considered Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT's information together for the purposes of its financial injury analysis. Apart from indicating that Economía analysed the financial information of Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT in accordance with standard accounting principles, we find no clear indication in the record as to how Economía ensured that it took Hylsa-DAT's financial performance into account only once, that is, on its own, and not also again as part of Hylsa's overall financial performance. Mexico has certainly not clarified how and the extent to which Economía reduced the possibility of “double-counting” of Hylsa-DAT's experience as part of the domestic industry. We are left unclear as to how the experience of Hylsa-DAT, which accounted for a relatively small proportion of Hylsa's overall sales, could have been reflective of Hylsa's overall situation. However, although Guatemala makes reference to the use by Economía of various combinations of companies as sources of information, it does not specifically identify the use of Hylsa and/or Hylsa-DAT's information as a specific issue for our consideration. Accordingly, our findings below are without prejudice to our views on this issue. As regards Hylsa and Hylsa-DAT, the issue before us focuses upon the consistency with the cited provisions of Economía's approach in seeking and relying upon data relating to no more than 53 per cent of the domestic industry for the purposes of its analysis of financial indicators in its injury analysis.” Para. 7.317. “In addressing the issue before us, we first consider Mexico's main justification for Economía's approach.” Para. 7.318. “Mexico argues that, in respect of the various injury factors, Economía was justified in examining data relating either to all (or almost all) of the domestic industry, or to “a major proportion” thereof. According to Mexico, this was consistent with the Article 4.1 definition of “domestic industry”, as either the totality or “a major proportion” thereof. Regarding the analysis of economic injury indicators, Mexico argues that the use of data from three firms covering 88 per cent of national production was “representative” of the domestic industry. In respect of the “major proportion” element, Mexico invokes Article 5.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, which sets out the “standing” rule and threshold percentages for initiation of an investigation “by or on behalf of the domestic

industry”. According to Mexico, because Hylsa alone represented 53 per cent of the domestic industry – that is, more than the 50 per cent threshold set out in Article 5.4 – then an objective examination of injury factors could rely upon data pertaining solely to that producer. In Mexico's view, this is sufficient to consider that the result of such an analysis reflects the situation of the domestic industry.” Para. 7.319. “Guatemala counter-argues that Article 5.4 relates to the “standing” requirement to initiate an investigation whereas Article 4.1 defines the meaning of “domestic industry” “for the purposes of the Agreement”.” Para. 7.320. “We recall the relevant legal framework for our analysis. We have already cited the text of the relevant provisions of Article 3 and of Article 4.1 above. Article 3.1 requires that a determination of injury shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of, inter alia, the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic producers of the like product. Article 3.4 provides for an examination of “the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic industry concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the [domestic] industry ...” (emphasis added) and Article 3.5 states that “It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury ... to the domestic industry” (emphasis added). The focus of an injury determination is thus the state of the “domestic industry”, as that term is defined in Article 4.1. The title of Article 4 of the Antidumping Agreement is “Definition of domestic industry”. The term “domestic industry” is defined in Article 4.1, which reads, in part:

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products (...).

Para. 7.321. “The provision in Article 4.1 and footnote 9, which defines injury as “material injury to a domestic industry,[…] interpreted in accordance with the provisions of [this] Article [3]”, inescapably requires the conclusion that the domestic industry with respect to which injury is considered and determined must be the domestic industry as defined in accordance with Article 4.1. It follows that an Antidumping injury determination is, in fact, a determination that the domestic producers “as a whole”, or a “major proportion” of them, are “injured”. Indeed, the concept of “domestic industry” is critical to an injury determination, as it defines the framework for data collection and analysis.” Para. 7.322. “Article 4.1 defines the domestic industry in two ways, either as “referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products” or “to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products”. The text of Article 4.1 indicates no hierarchy of preference between these two options. However, this does not lead us to conclude that an investigating authority is permitted to switch back and forth between these two possibilities in the course of a single injury analysis (or to oscillate back and forth between various allegedly “major proportions” of the domestic industry in the course of the same injury analysis). Article 4.1, and in particular the term “a major proportion”, permits a degree of flexibility in defining the domestic industry or “major proportion” thereof, but once an investigating authority has identified the framework for its analysis - whether an entire domestic industry or a major proportion thereof - it must use this identified framework consistently and coherently throughout an investigation.” Para. 7.323. “Article 5.4 reads:

An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the authorities have determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the application expressed by domestic producers of the like product, that the application has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. The application shall be considered to have been made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry” if it is supported by those domestic

producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.” (footnotes omitted)

Para. 7.324. “The introductory clause of Article 4.1 indicates that the definition of “domestic industry” applies “[f]or the purposes of this Agreement”, i.e. throughout the Agreement. It would therefore also define the term “domestic industry” as used in Article 5.4. Article 5.4 commences with the phrase: “An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless ...”. This is a clear textual indication that Article 5.4 sets out a fundamental requirement that must be respected in initiating an investigation. However, as we have concluded that Article 4.1 does not permit an investigating authority in the course of a single injury analysis to switch back and forth between the two possible definitions of “domestic industry” – i.e. (i) the domestic producers as a whole of the like products; or (ii) those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products – we do not believe that Article 5.4 is strictly germane to the issue before us. This is because the issue raised by Guatemala's claim is not the definition of the domestic industry per se, or the identification of “a major proportion of” the domestic industry as the “domestic industry” for the purposes of the injury analysis. Rather, Guatemala's claim relates to the consistency and representativeness of the data set relied upon by Economía in its analysis of the state of the domestic industry, as this had been defined by Economía. We therefore reject the relevance of the legal premise underlying Mexico's argument pertaining to Articles 4.1 and 5.4.” Para. 8.1. “For the reasons set out above, we conclude that Mexico's initiation of the investigation, the conduct of the investigation and the imposition of a definitive Antidumping measure on imports of black and galvanized steel pipes and tubes from Guatemala is inconsistent with the requirements of the Antidumping Agreement, in that:

(d) Economía acted inconsistently with Mexico's obligations under Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 of the Antidumping Agreement to conduct an objective examination on the basis of positive evidence of injury to the domestic industry – as that term is defined in Article 4.1 – by failing to gather and analyse representative and consistent data pertaining to the domestic industry, in particular the data concerning the financial indicators of the domestic industry as a whole, as this had been defined by Economía;”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.107-7.125 e 8.1 Trata-se de alegação de inconsistência na determinação da Indústria Doméstica pelas CE com o Artigo 4.1 do Acordo Antidumping, por ter excluído certas empresas da definição de indústria doméstica. O Painel concluiu que as CE agiram em desacordo com os requisitos estabelecidos no Artigo 4.1 (i) e 4.1 (ii), pois não há nada no Artigo 4.1 que dê suporte à noção de que exista outra circunstância que permita exclusões. Não houve apelação. Para. 7.107. “There are three basic questions raised by Norway's domestic industry claims – first, whether the EC erred in not including certain categories of enterprises in the domestic industry based on the nature of their specific activities (filleting-only undertakings, organic producers, and producers of “certain kinds” of salmon), their silence concerning the investigation, or their failure to provide information in the format requested. The second question is whether the EC's interpretation of Article 4.1 as allowing the investigating authority to conclude that, so long as the producers included in the domestic industry accounted for a major proportion of total domestic production, it was entitled to ignore other producers, is permissible. The third question is whether the EC was entitled to engage

in sampling of the domestic industry in the context of its injury analysis. We will begin our analysis by considering the text of the relevant provision, Article 4.1.” Para. 7.108. “Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement provides, in pertinent part:

For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products (...).”

Thus, domestic producers of the “like product” are the starting point for the determination of the domestic industry. “Like product” is defined in Article 2.6 of the AD Agreement as:

A product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.

As discussed above, the EC defined the product under consideration in this case as “farmed (other than wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen,” finding in addition that “all farmed salmon constitutes a single product. The different presentations all serve the same end use and are readily capable of being substituted between each other. Therefore, they are considered to constitute a single product for the purposes of the proceeding.” The EC specifically excluded from the product under consideration “other similar farmed fish products such as large (salmon) trout, biomass (live salmon) as well as wild salmon and further processed types such as smoked salmon.” Para. 7.109. “With respect to like product, the EC found “the basic physical characteristics of farmed salmon produced and sold by the Community industry in the Community, farmed salmon produced and sold on the domestic Norwegian market, and farmed salmon imported into the Community from Norway are the same and [ ] they have the same use.” The EC therefore provisionally concluded that “the product concerned and the farmed salmon produced and sold on the domestic market of Norway, as well as the farmed salmon produced and sold in the Community by the Community industry have the same basic physical characteristics and uses and are therefore considered to be alike ....” It confirmed this conclusion in its Definitive Regulation.” Para. 7.110. “Thus, it is clear that the EC like product was found to be coextensive with the product under consideration. Therefore, the like product perforce included the specified “farmed (other than wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen”. In our view, the plain language of Article 4.1 establishes that the domestic industry in this case was therefore to be defined as producers “as a whole” of this product, or those producers whose output of this product constitutes a major proportion of total EC production of this product.” Para. 7.111. “Putting aside for the moment the question of whether producers of the like product “as a whole” or producers of a “major proportion of total domestic production” of the like product are to be considered the domestic industry, it is clear that Article 4.1 is unqualified in providing that the term “domestic industry” is to be interpreted by reference to “producers” of the like product. The text subsequently sets out circumstances in which some producers of the like product may be left out of the domestic industry. Thus, Article 4.1(i) provides for exclusion of producers related to the exporters or importers, or producers who are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product. Article 4.1(ii) provides that, in the exceptional circumstances of two or more competitive markets within the territory of a Member, producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if certain conditions are satisfied.” Para. 7.112. “However, nothing in the text of Article 4.1 gives any support to the notion that there is any other circumstance in which the domestic industry can be interpreted, from the outset, as not

including certain categories of producers of the like product, other than those set out in that provision . Thus, we see no basis in the text of Article 4.1 which would allow for the exclusion from the domestic industry, as a category or group, of producers of any form of the like product – in this case, producers of any of the “presentations” identified by the EC as the like product – “farmed (other than wild) salmon, whether or not filleted, fresh, chilled or frozen”. By this, we do not mean to suggest that a determination based on information from fewer than all domestic producers of the like product will necessarily be insufficient as an element of a decision to impose Antidumping duties. However, we do see a clear distinction between the definition of the domestic industry as set out in Article 4.1, and whether the information obtained during the investigation concerning the domestic industry, as defined, is sufficient to form the basis of a determination of injury and causation.” Para. 7.113. “The EC asserts, however, that enterprises engaged in filleting are not “producers” as “fillets do not result from a process of “production”, but merely transformation of one presentation to another presentation.” Thus, the EC argues that filleting-only undertakings are “not really concerned with bringing the product concerned (farmed salmon) into existence, or producing it. Rather, if anything, they are concerned with the process of consuming it.” The EC considers that the interests of filleting-only undertakings are properly taken into account under Article 6.12 of the AD Agreement and focuses on the analytical problems that it considers would arise if filleting-only undertakings were considered “producers” in this case and treated as part of the domestic industry.” Para. 7.114. “The EC's assertion is difficult to square with the ordinary meaning of the term “produce”. The verb “to produce” is defined, inter alia, as “[b]ring (a thing) into existence” and ““bring into existence by mental or physical labour (a material object)”. There can be no doubt, in our view, that an enterprise engaged in, as the EC puts it, “gutting, beheading, and filleting” is engaged in “producing”, that is, bringing into existence, by physical labour, salmon fillets. We do not dispute that undertakings that only engage in filleting operations, as opposed to operations engaged in growing live salmon, and selling them whole, and/or beheaded, and/or gutted, and/or filleted, and/or fresh, and/or frozen, or any combination thereof, may have different economic interests. Thus, an investigation concerning a domestic industry comprising enterprises with more than one of these various economic interests may well involve complicated questions regarding data collection and analysis. Such complications cannot, however, override the plain meaning of the text of Article 4.1.” Para. 7.115. “There is no dispute that filleted salmon is within the scope of the like product identified by the EC in this case. Thus, based on our interpretation of the plain language of Article 4.1, we consider that any enterprise that produced any form of the like product should be considered, at least in the first instance, a “producer” of the like product, and as such, part of the domestic industry.” Para. 7.116. “It is clear that the investigating authority never considered EC producers of salmon fillets who did not also farm salmon fish to be part of the domestic industry. This is apparent from the fact that the volume of production cited by the EC as “total domestic production”, 22,000 tonnes, is, as we understand it, the EC's estimate of the volume of salmon fish farmed by EC salmon growers. It certainly does not include the volume of salmon fillets produced by enterprises that produced salmon fillets from purchased salmon fish. In our view, this wholesale exclusion of an entire category of producers from the domestic industry is not compatible with the definition of domestic industry as set out in Article 4.1.” Para. 7.117. “The EC, however, argues that since Article 4.1 is a definitional provision, it imposes no obligation, and therefore cannot be the basis of a finding of violation. In our view, merely that Article 4.1 sets out a definition does not preclude a panel finding that the decision of the investigating authority concerning the appropriate domestic industry is inconsistent with the AD Agreement. The question whether the EC defined the domestic industry in a proper manner may well be decisive in the consideration of other claims in dispute, i.e., subsidiary claims regarding initiation, as well as claims regarding injury and causation. In our view, it is necessary to address Norway's claims concerning the

definition of the domestic industry in order to establish whether other determinations were made in relation to a domestic industry defined consistently with Article 4.1.” Para. 7.118. “In our view, regardless of whether Article 4.1, as a definitional article, itself imposes obligations on Members which can be the basis of a finding of violation, it is necessary and appropriate to address Norway's claims under Article 4.1 in this dispute. If the EC's approach to defining domestic industry in this case resulted in an investigation concerning a domestic industry that did not comport with the definition set forth in Article 4.1, then it seems clear to us the EC analyzed the wrong industry in determining the adequacy of support for the initiation of the investigation under Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement, and in considering injury and causation under Article 3, committing an error which is potentially fatal to the WTO-consistency of the investigating authority's determinations on those issues.” Para. 7.119. “We note that the question of whether definitional provisions can be the basis of a finding of a violation under a covered agreement has been addressed by several panels, whose decisions support our views on the matter. Thus, the Panel in United States – Softwood Lumber V noted with respect to Article 2.6, which defines like product,

Article 2.6 is a definitional article, and as such it is not clear to us that it contains in itself obligations on Members, or in any event that it could be the basis for an independent violation. On the other hand, it appears to us that Canada's claim is predicated on the proposition that DOC took an approach to the definition of like product which deviated from that in Article 2.6. Thus, a threshold and potentially dispositive issue is whether DOC in fact took an approach to like product which deviated from that of Article 2.6.”

The Panel in Argentina – Poultry, considering the same provision as is at issue here, concluded that Article 4.1 “imposes an express obligation on Members to interpret the term “domestic industry” in that specified manner” and stated that “if a Member were to interpret the term differently in the context of an Antidumping investigation, that Member would violate the obligation set forth in Article 4.1”. In US – Lamb, the Appellate Body found that the United States violated the definition of “domestic industry” in Article 4.1(c) of the Agreement on Safeguards. In US – Hot-Rolled Steel, the Panel and Appellate Body both found that the United States had violated Article 2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, which defines the term “dumping”. In EC – CVDs on DRAMS, the Panel found that the EC violated Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which defines a “subsidy”.” Para. 7.120. “The only textual basis the EC proposes in support of its view that filleting-only enterprises were properly not considered part of the domestic industry is Article 6.12. However, that provision deals with an entirely different issue than the definition of the domestic industry. Article 6, as a whole, deals with various issues pertaining to evidence in an Antidumping investigation. Article 6.12 specifically requires an investigating authority to provide opportunities for information to be provided by certain entities that are not “interested parties” – inter alia, industrial users of the product under investigation. In our view, even granting that filleting-only undertakings might be considered “industrial users” of imported salmon, in that they “use” one presentation of the like product (salmon fish, in some form), they cannot properly be considered to be exclusively industrial users, as they themselves are engaged in producing another presentation of the like product (fillets). As producers of salmon fillets, which is within the scope of the like product, such enterprises should, at least initially, be considered as part of the domestic industry. As we noted above, there may be circumstances in which an investigating authority might conclude that certain enterprises whose output is part of the like product should not be considered “producers”, as their level of activity is so low as to suggest that they do not actually bring the like product into existence. There was no consideration of any such possibility in the investigation at issue here, however, and thus we need not resolve this question, either as a matter of law or on the facts of this case.” Para. 7.121. “We recognize that, as argued by the EC, this conclusion has certain implications which may need to be addressed by an investigating authority, particularly with respect to the collection and

analysis of data for different presentations of the like product. However, we do not see how problems of data collection and evaluation could possibly trump the plain meaning of the text of Article 4.1. Moreover, there is no prohibition in the AD Agreement on the examination of different sectors of a domestic industry, so long as all sectors are included in the analysis and determination on an even-handed basis, without favoring any one sector. Thus, we see no bar to gathering and analysing information for different categories of producer in the course of an investigation. That this might result in a more complicated investigation and more complex analysis does not undermine our conclusion based on the text of Article 4.1.” Para. 7.122. “Similar considerations apply to our consideration of the EC's treatment of producers of organic salmon, which again is within the like product as defined by the EC, and “silent” producers. The EC has not argued that these enterprises are not producers of the like product, and has not made any argument concerning the different nature of these producers, as it did for filleting-only undertakings. Thus, in our view, there is no support for the exclusion of these producers, as a group, from the domestic industry.” Para. 7.123. “With respect to producers of “certain types” of salmon, producers of organic salmon, “silent” producers of salmon, and producers of salmon that did not provide information in the format requested, the EC argues that since the producers it did include in the domestic industry accounted for a major proportion of domestic production of the like product, it was entitled to not include producers of these types. These arguments raise the second question which we identified above, whether once producers of the like product accounting for a major proportion of domestic production of that product are included in the domestic industry, other producers need not even be considered. While this is a very interesting issue, of some import, it is not necessary for us to decide it in the context of this dispute. We have concluded that the EC erred in excluding certain enterprises from the domestic industry. Thus, it is clear that the EC's assessment of whether the producers it did include accounted for a “major proportion” of domestic production of the like product is based on incorrect information concerning the volume of total domestic production of the domestic like product. The EC not having even obtained information on, insofar as we can determine, much less made a determination of the proportion of total production of the domestic like product accounted for by individual producers, any assessment by us would be entirely de novo, which is, of course, an exercise we are prohibited from undertaking. Therefore, we exercise judicial economy in not addressing this aspect of Norway's claims.” Para. 7.124. “We therefore conclude that the EC's approach to defining the domestic industry in this case resulted in an investigation concerning a domestic industry that did not comport with the definition set forth in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement. As a consequence, the EC's determination of support for the application under Article 5.4 was based on information relating to a wrongly-defined industry, and is therefore not consistent with the requirements of that Article. Furthermore, the EC's analyses of injury and causation were based on information relating to a wrongly-defined industry, and are therefore necessarily not consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5.” Para. 7.125. “Having concluded that the EC's approach to defining domestic industry was erroneous, we also consider that the sample of that industry relied upon by the EC necessarily is itself erroneous, as it relates to a wrongly-defined domestic industry. Nonetheless, we consider it appropriate to address Norway's claims on the issue of sampling in more detail, as they fall within the range of issues which we believe it appropriate to address despite our exercise of judicial economy. This is because this issue may well arise in the context of any actions taken by the EC in implementing our decision. We therefore go on to consider it.” Para. 8.1. “In the light of the findings we have set out in the foregoing sections of our Report, we conclude that the European Communities Acted inconsistently with:

(i) Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement because its approach to defining the domestic industry in this case resulted in an investigation concerning a

domestic industry that did not comport with the definition set forth in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, and consequently - Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement in determining support for the application for initiation of the basis of information relating to wrongly-defined domestic industry, and - Articles 3.1, 3.4 and 3.5 of the AD Agreement in undertaking injury and causation analyses on the basis of information relating to a wrongly-defined domestic industry”;

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fastners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R, paras. 7.209-7.219, 7.222-7.230 e 8.3 O Painel analisa a alegação de que as CE teriam agido de forma inconsistente com o Artigo 4.1 do Acordo Antidumping ao definir como indústria doméstica, por meio de uma metodologia de amostragem, o conjunto de produtores representando 27% do total estimado da produção de prendedores de aço das CE. A China alegou que a metodologia não estaria em conformidade com o Acordo Antidumping; questionou também a base de dados utilizada do Eurostat e que a metodologia implicou a exclusão dos produtores que não apoiavam a petição. O Painel concluiu, com base nas evidências do caso específico, que a China não apresentou evidências de que a metodologia adotada pelas CE implicou a exclusão dessa “categoria” de produtores e nesse aspecto concluiu que as CE não agiram de forma incompatível com o Artigo 4.1 do Acordo Antidumping. No que se refere à reclamação do limiar de 27%, o Painel se baseou no caso Argentina-Frangos e concluiu que as CE não agiram de forma inconsistente com os Artigos 4.1 e 3.1 do Acordo Antidumping. O Órgão de Apelação manteve a decisão do Painel no que se refere a não consideração das manifestações fora do prazo, mas considerou que o Painel errou ao considerar que não houve violação dos Artigos 4.1 e 3.1 do Acordo Antidumping, e que o percentual de 27% seria “major proportion”. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que uma apropriada interpretação do termo “major proportion”, segundo o Artigo 4.1, requer que a indústria doméstica definida compreenda produtores que coletivamente representem uma proporção relativamente alta e reflita substancialmente a produção doméstica total. O Órgão de Apelação interpretou ainda, que ao limitar a definição de indústria doméstica para os produtos que apoiavam a petição a Comissão reduziu a abrangência dos dados que seriam considerados na análise de dano e introduziram um risco material de distorção na determinação do dano. Para. 7.209. “Before turning to the parties' arguments, we set out below our conclusions with respect to the facts surrounding the definition of domestic industry in this case. Some of these facts were disputed by the parties, and we have resolved those disputes as necessary in order (make) our decision.” Para. 7.210. “In this Antidumping investigation, the Commission did not specifically set out a “definition” of the domestic industry per se. However, its views on the subject are clear from the Definitive Regulation. First, the Commission defined the “product concerned” in the investigation, as:

I. certain iron or steel fasteners, other than of stainless steel, i.e. wood screws (excluding coach screws), self-tapping screws, other screws and bolts with heads (whether or not with their nuts or washers, but excluding screws turned from bars, rods, profiles or wire, of solid section, of a shank thickness not exceeding 6 mm and excluding screws and bolts for fixing railway track construction material), and washers, originating in the People's Republic of China (all together hereinafter referred to as fasteners or product concerned). II. The product concerned is normally declared within CN codes 7318 12 90, 7318 14 91, 7318 14 99, 7318 15 59, 7318 15 69, 7318 15 81, 7318 15 89, ex 7318 15 90, ex 7318 21 00 and ex 7318 22 00. III. Fasteners are used to mechanically join two or more elements in construction, engineering, etc., and are used in a wide variety of industrial sectors, as well as by consumers. Based on their basic physical and technical characteristics and end uses, all fasteners are considered to constitute a single product for the purpose of the proceeding. Within the same national or international standards, fasteners should comply with the same basic physical

and technical characteristics including notably strength, tolerance, finishing and coating.”

Para. 7.211. “At paragraphs 48-56 of the Definitive Regulation, the Commission addressed various arguments of the parties to the investigation concerning the issue of like product, and concluded at paragraph 57 that:

The fasteners produced and sold by the Community industry in the Community, fasteners produced and sold on the domestic market in the PRC and those produced and sold on the domestic market in India, which served as an analogue country, and fasteners produced in the PRC and sold to the Community are alike within the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic Regulation.”

Para. 7.212. “Referring to the indication at the outset of the investigation, in the Notice of Initiation, that sampling might be used, the Definitive Regulation states that:

In view of the large number of producers, sampling of the domestic industry was proposed... In order to enable the Commission to decide whether sampling would be necessary, and if so to select a sample, Community producers were requested to make themselves known within 15 days from the date of the initiation of the investigation and to provide basic information on their production and sales, and the names and activities of all their related companies involved in the production and/or selling of the product concerned.... Community producers that produced the product concerned in the Community during the investigation period and expressed a wish to be included in the sample within the aforesaid period were considered as cooperating companies and were taken into account in the selection of the sample.... These Community producers represented over 30% of the estimated production in the Community in 2006. These producers are considered to constitute the Community industry as mentioned in recital 114.”

The Commission concluded, at recital 114 of the Definitive Regulation, that:

The production of the Community producers that supported the complaint and fully cooperated in the investigation represents 27,0% of the production of the product concerned in the Community. It is therefore considered that these companies constitute the Community industry within the meaning of Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the basic Regulation.

Para. 7.213. “In response to questions from the Panel, the European Union clarified that, at the time of initiation, it sent sampling forms to 318 EU producers of fasteners, asking for certain basic information concerning their operations, which could be used to determine the composition of the intended sample, and setting a 15-day deadline. Five national associations of producers were also sent letters, and the Notice of Initiation invited any other domestic producers who so wished to come forward and provide the requested information within the 15-day period. Another 54 producers, whose names had been provided by exporters, were subsequently contacted by the Commission, which sent sampling forms to 45 and received 10 completed forms in return, but none of these producers were ultimately included in the domestic industry. The sampling forms do not contain any questions concerning support for or opposition to the application. China asserts that this does not mean the EU investigating authority was not aware of the positions of all companies with respect to the investigation. In this respect, China notes that the Information Document, sent to the parties at the time it was decided not to impose provisional measures, indicates that of 114 companies who came forward with relevant information, those who produced the product under investigation and expressed a wish to be included in the sample were considered as “cooperating” and were taken into account in the selection of the sample. Of these cooperating companies, 86, representing 36 per cent of estimated EU production, supported the complaint, while 25, accounting for 9 per cent of EU production, opposed the complaint, and three did not express an opinion.”

Para. 7.214. “We note that the Definitive Regulation suggests, by using the term “producers that supported the complaint”, that, as alleged by China, only producers expressing support for the complaint were included in the domestic industry. While the Information Document also seems to support this conclusion, we accept that, as asserted by the European Union, this is a working document reflecting progress in the investigation to that point, with no legal status in EU law, which was made available to the parties despite there being no obligation to do so, and is not the measure before us. Thus, we do not consider the representations in the Information Document as constituting part of the measure which we must evaluate. We note that the European Union indicates that at least one producer which was not a complainant, and had remained silent prior to initiation, was not only included in the domestic industry, but was selected for the sample. The European Union indicates that, based on arguments made by Chinese exporters, it continued to consider the question of standing after the initiation, that this continued examination confused the question of the definition of the domestic industry, and that the “unfortunate standard formulation” in the Definitive Regulation (referring to the use of the term “producers that supported the complaint” with respect to the domestic industry), did not affect the definition of the domestic industry, with respect to which no distinction was made between producers who supported the complaint and those that did not.” Para. 7.215. “We are sympathetic to China's position with respect to the question of whether producers who do not support the complaint may be excluded from the domestic industry in the abstract. Issues might arise should an investigating authority systematically exclude from the domestic industry companies that produce the like product but do not support the complaint. On the other hand, we also have sympathy for the European Union's view that producers who do not support the complaint are not likely to cooperate, and thus cannot effectively be considered as part of the domestic industry unless they specifically come forward and agree to participate in the investigation. We consider that, on the facts before us, China has not demonstrated that the EU investigating authority in this case did, in fact, exclude producers that did not support the complaint from the domestic industry. In our view, this is demonstrated by the fact that at least one producer who did not affirmatively state support for the complaint was included in the domestic industry. In addition, while it seems clear that producers who did not make themselves known within the 15-day period established at initiation were not included in the domestic industry, we find that the investigating authority did not act to exclude such producers. There seems to have been a process of considering additional producers for inclusion in the domestic industry, based on arguments made by the exporters. While none of the producers so considered were in the end included in the domestic industry, in our view, the fact that the Commission considered including them the domestic industry supports our view that it did not simply exclude producers who did not come forward within the 15-day period.” Para. 7.216. “Finally, we note that the Definitive Regulation indicates that the Commission chose the sample by selecting, from the 46 producers constituting the Community industry, those with the largest production volumes, “so as to achieve the largest representative volume of production of the like product produced in the Community which could reasonably be investigated within the time available”. From the completed sampling forms received from domestic producers, the investigating authority selected a sample comprising seven producers, accounting for approximately 70 per cent of the production of the Community industry, as defined by the Commission, that is, the 46 producers. Subsequently, one sampled producer was considered as not cooperating, and dropped from the sample, resulting in a sample comprising six producers accounting for approximately 65 per cent of the production of the Community industry as defined by the Commission. Questionnaires were sent to the sampled companies and replies from all of them were received within the deadlines established by the Commission.” Para. 7.217. “Turning to the first aspect of China's claim, we recall that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement provides:

4.1 For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “domestic industry” shall be interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or to those of them whose collective output of the products

constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of those products, except that: (i) when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, the term “domestic industry” may be interpreted as referring to the rest of the producers; (ii) in exceptional circumstances the territory of a Member may, for the production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question located elsewhere in the territory. In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where a major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is a concentration of dumped imports into such an isolated market and provided further that the dumped imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such market.”

Para. 7.218. “Thus, the plain language of Article 4.1 makes it clear that domestic producers of the “like product” are the starting point for the definition of the domestic industry. It is also clear from the plain language of Article 4.1 that the domestic industry is to be defined as producers “as a whole” of the like product defined in the investigation, or, in the alternative, those producers whose output of that product constitutes a major proportion of total domestic production of this product. In addition, it is clear that Article 4.1 sets out circumstances in which some producers of the like product may be left out of the domestic industry. Thus, Article 4.1(i) provides for exclusion of producers related to the exporters or importers, or producers who are themselves importers of the allegedly dumped product, while Article 4.1(ii) provides that, in the exceptional circumstances of two or more competitive markets within the territory of a Member, producers within each market may be regarded as a separate industry if certain conditions are satisfied. However, we agree with the views of the panel in EC – Salmon (Norway), that:

Nothing in the text of Article 4.1 gives any support to the notion that there is any other circumstance in which the domestic industry can be interpreted, from the outset, as not including certain categories of producers of the like product, other than those set out in that provision. Thus, we see no basis in the text of Article 4.1 which would allow for the exclusion from the domestic industry, as a category or group, of producers of any form of the like product (...).”

Para. 7.219. “On its face, it is clear that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not establish any particular procedure or methodology for investigating authorities in defining the domestic industry. There is nothing in Article 4.1which would preclude investigating authorities from establishing deadlines for companies to come forward in order to be considered for inclusion in the domestic industry. We have concluded, on the basis of the facts before us, that the Commission, the EU investigating authority, did not act to exclude the “category” of producers asserted by China, that is, “producers that did not support the complaint”, from the definition of the domestic industry. As noted, at least one producer that did not support the complaint was, in fact, included in the domestic industry, and in the sample. In addition, we consider, and China does not disagree, that it is reasonable for investigating authorities to impose deadlines for domestic producers to make themselves known and then define the domestic industry on the basis of those that come forward within that deadline. While China suggests that the 15-days allowed by the Commission was insufficient, it does not substantiate this position, and we see no basis for concluding that the 15-day period was necessarily insufficient. Moreover, it seems clear that the Commission did consider the possible inclusion of additional producers in the domestic industry, although it ultimately did not include any. In our view, the mere fact that the domestic industry as ultimately defined does not include any particular proportion of producers expressing different views with respect to the complaint, or producers who did not come forward within the 15-day period, does not demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement in defining the domestic industry. Thus, we find that China has failed to demonstrate that the European Union excluded producers that did not support the complaint,

and has failed to demonstrate that the definition of the domestic industry was inconsistent with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement in this regard.” Para. 7.222. “China's second allegation of error has two aspects: (a) whether, in the circumstances of this investigation, the Eurostat data considered by the Commission constituted a reliable basis for estimating total EU production of fasteners in assessing whether the producers included in the domestic industry accounted for a “major proportion” of total domestic production of the like product, and (b) whether the 27 per cent of total EU production accounted for by the producers found to constitute the domestic industry was sufficient to constitute a “major proportion” of total domestic production of the like product, under Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.223. “We note that China's arguments concerning the first aspect essentially reprise its arguments in the context of its claim with respect to standing. As discussed in more detail above, and for the same reasons, we do not consider that the European Union erred in relying on the Eurostat data in estimating total EU production of fasteners. China acknowledges that the specific data used, PRODCOM statistics, are gathered according to objective rules, but asserts that these rules themselves make the data unsuitable for calculating domestic production. However, similar to the standing determination, the definition of the domestic industry takes place at an early stage of the proceedings, when the information available to the investigating authority is necessarily limited. In our view, reliance on a set of data gathered and maintained on an objective basis for reasons not linked to the Antidumping investigation is a reasonable basis for an investigating authority to make decisions concerning the definition of the domestic industry, including whether a group of producers accounts for a sufficient proportion of total domestic production to be considered a “major proportion” of that production. We do not preclude the possibility that such a decision might be revisited at a later stage of the proceedings, when more information has become available to the investigating authority. However, there is nothing in the facts before us that would support the view that the Commission should have approached the Eurostat data with suspicion.” Para. 7.224. “China contends that the alleged underestimation of production volumes in the data was confirmed by evidence provided by interested parties during the investigation. Even assuming that to be true, we fail to see how this could be taken into account at the beginning stages of the investigation when the Commission was assessing whether producers considered for inclusion in the domestic industry accounted for a major proportion of total EU production of fasteners. Although China asserts that other information was available to the investigating authority on EU production of fasteners, we note that this information at best relates to only some production, in Italy and for the automotive industry, and we cannot see how such partial information would constitute a more appropriate basis for estimating total domestic production than the data actually relied upon. Thus, we conclude that the European Union did not violate Article 4.1 by relying on Eurostat data in estimating total EU production for purposes of defining the domestic industry.” Para. 7.225. “The principal issue raised by China is whether the European Union violated Article 4.1 in defining producers accounting for 27 per cent of estimated total EU production of fasteners as the domestic industry on the basis that these producers accounted for a “major proportion” of total domestic production within the meaning of Article 4.1. China argued that the Commission wrongly relied on a presumption that producers accounting for 25 per cent of total domestic production constitute a major proportion of domestic production. Whether or not the Commission relied on such a presumption, it is for China to make a prima facie case that the Commission's definition of domestic industry is inconsistent with Article 4.1 in the investigation in dispute. Although China's first written submission asserted that a “major proportion” must be as close as possible to domestic production “as a whole”, at the first meeting of the Panel, China's representative acknowledged that there is no proportion, in the abstract, that must be satisfied to constitute a “major proportion”, and that depending on the circumstances, even something less than 25 per cent might be sufficient. In our view, the assertion that the Commission relied on a presumption is not alone sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that the definition of domestic industry in this case is inconsistent with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement.We therefore do not consider it necessary to address China's argument that the

European Union erred by presuming that producers accounting for 25 per cent of total domestic production will constitute a major proportion, and thus satisfy the requirements of Article 4.1 in this regard. We now turn to the question whether, in this case, the European Union erred in concluding that producers of 27 per cent of estimated total EU production of fasteners accounted for a “major proportion” of total domestic production within the meaning of Article 4.1.” Para. 7.226. “We recall the provisions of Article 4.1, quoted above, which do not define the term “major proportion”. As the parties have recognized, a “major” proportion is one that is “important, serious, or significant”. The parties also agree that the “major proportion” referred to in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement may be something less than 50 per cent, and that the lower limit is not determinable in the abstract, but will depend on the facts of the case. This is consistent with the views of the panel in Argentina - Poultry, which concluded:

An interpretation that defines the domestic industry in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production is permissible. Indeed, this approach is entirely consistent with the Spanish version of Article 4.1, which refers to producers representing “una proporción importante” of domestic production. Furthermore, Article 4.1 does not define the “domestic industry” in terms of producers of the major proportion of total domestic production. Instead, Article 4.1 refers to producers of a major proportion of total domestic production. If Article 4.1 had referred to the major proportion, the requirement would clearly have been to define the “domestic industry” as producers constituting 50+ per cent of total domestic production. However, the reference to a major proportion suggests that there may be more than one “major proportion” for the purpose of defining “domestic industry”. In the event of multiple “major proportions”, it is inconceivable that each individual “major proportion” could – or must – exceed 50 per cent. This therefore supports our finding that it is permissible to define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers of an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production. For these reasons, we find that Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement does not require Members to define the “domestic industry” in terms of domestic producers representing the majority, or 50+ per cent, of total domestic production.”

The panel in that case went on to observe that there was “nothing on the record to suggest that, in the circumstances of this case, 46 per cent of total domestic production is not an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production”, and accordingly rejected Brazil's claim that Argentina violated Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement by defining “domestic industry” as consisting of domestic producers accounting for 46 per cent of total domestic production.” Para. 7.227. “We agree with these views, and consider it appropriate to apply them in our analysis in this dispute. Thus, the question for us is whether, in light of the facts on the record of the Antidumping investigation before us, there is anything that supports China's contention that 27 per cent of estimated EU production of fasteners is not an important, serious, or significant proportion of total domestic production of that product.” Para. 7.228. “In its first written submission, China did not make any arguments with respect to the facts of this case, but did raise such arguments at the first meeting of the Panel with the parties, and in subsequent submissions. We note that the European Union asserts that China fails to make a prima facie case with respect to this claim, as it failed to provide any relevant evidence of why 27 per cent of total domestic production does not constitute a “major proportion” of total domestic production. In its second written submission, China asserted the following specific circumstances in support of its contention that 27 per cent of domestic production did not satisfy the major proportion requirement: (a) that the domestic producers included in the domestic industry are not representative of the whole of domestic production, (b) that it was feasible, as a practical matter, to include more domestic producers, (c) that the producers included represent only a small portion of the total number of domestic producers, and (d) that the domestic industry definition excluded producers other than those referred to in Article 4.1(i) and (ii). China also argues that investigating authorities are required to

examine and determine, in light of the specific circumstances of each case whether the major proportion test has been satisfied, including not only quantitative elements, but also aspects such as those set out in (a) – (d) above. According to China, the EU investigating authority simply failed to consider the circumstances of the case, and instead rested on the fact that 27 per cent is more than 25 per cent, and therefore was sufficient. China asserts that this failure cannot be cured by the fact that the domestic industry as defined did, in fact, include large and smaller companies and producers of different types of the like product.” Para. 7.229. “We recall that Article 4.1 is a definitional provision. Thus, while it does impose an obligation on an investigating authority to ensure that it defines a “domestic industry” in a manner consistent with that provision, Article 4.1 does not set out any requirements with respect to how an investigating authority is to do this. We see no basis in the text of Article 4.1 for the proposition put forward by China that an investigating authority must, of its own accord, “examine and determine” whether the major proportion test has been satisfied by considering the specific circumstances of the case with reference to the criteria proposed by China. We do not mean to suggest that an investigating authority may ignore relevant evidence, and in particular arguments made by interested parties, suggesting that a particular definition of domestic industry is inconsistent with Article 4.1. But the only requirement clearly set out in that provision is that the domestic industry consist of “domestic producers of the like product”, either as a whole, or those of them accounting for a major proportion of total domestic production. We see no basis in the text of the AD Agreement to impose on investigating authorities an affirmative obligation to examine non-quantitative factors in defining a domestic industry on the basis of producers accounting for a major proportion of domestic production of the like product. Nor, in our view, does the report in Argentina – Poultry suggest otherwise. While the panel in that dispute did note that “[t]here is nothing on the record to suggest that, in the circumstances of this case, 46 per cent of total domestic production is not an important, serious or significant proportion of total domestic production”, we do not understand this to impose an affirmative obligation on the investigating authority to examine and determine unspecified “circumstances” in defining the domestic industry. We note that this does not mean that we agree that any domestic industry which includes producers accounting for more than 25 per cent of total domestic production will necessarily be consistent with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement, nor that an examination of injury to such an industry will necessarily be consistent with the provisions of Article 3 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.230. “Even assuming non-quantitative factors are relevant to the definition of a domestic industry under Article 4.1, we do not consider that the factors China raises in this regard are relevant in this case, or in general. For instance, we see nothing in Article 4.1 that would require an investigating authority, in defining the domestic industry, to examine and determine whether producers accounting for a major proportion, are, in addition, somehow “representative” of the whole of domestic production. Nor do we see anything in the text of Article 4.1 that would require an investigating authority to include as many producers as is “practically feasible”, so long as the producers that are included account for a sufficient quantity of domestic production to be considered a “major proportion”. Similarly, we consider irrelevant whether the number of producers included in the domestic industry is a small or a large portion of the total number of producers. Article 4.1 refers to the volume of production accounted for by producers, a consideration which is, in our view, not addressed by taking account of the number of producers. Moreover, as the European Union observes, it is precisely in the situation of a “fragmented” industry with many producers that a definition of the domestic industry based on the “major proportion” is most likely, and to require that an industry in that situation must include a major proportion of the number of the producers would vitiate the effectiveness of the major proportion option. Finally, as noted above, we have rejected as a matter of fact China's contention that the Commission wrongly excluded certain categories of producers. We therefore conclude that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement in defining a domestic industry comprising producers accounting for 27 per cent of total estimated EU production of fasteners.”

Para. 8.3. “In the light of the findings we have set out in the foregoing sections of our Report, we conclude that China has not established that the European Union acted inconsistently with:

(b) Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the AD Agreement with respect to the definition of domestic industry in the fasteners investigation”;”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fastners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/AB/R, paras. 411-417, 419, 427-430, 458-460, 464, 468 e 624 Para. 411. “Article 4.1 of the Antidumping Agreement provides that the term “domestic industry” must be defined as referring to the “domestic producers as a whole of the like product” or “those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production”, except in two specific circumstances that are not relevant in this dispute. Article 4.1 thus juxtaposes two methods for defining the term “domestic industry”. By using the term “a major proportion”, the second method focuses on the question of how much production must be represented by those producers making up the domestic industry when the domestic industry is defined as less than the domestic producers as a whole. In answering this question, Article 4.1 does not stipulate a specific proportion for evaluating whether a certain percentage constitutees “a major proportion.”

Para. 412. “The absence of a specific proportion does not mean, however, that any percentage, no matter how low, could automatically qualify as “a major proportion”. Rather, the context in which the term “a major proportion” is situated indicates that “a major proportion” should be properly understood as a relatively high proportion of the total domestic production. Specifically, when read in the light of the phrase “the domestic producers as a whole”, the term “those of them” in the second method for defining the domestic industry clearly refers to those producers among “domestic producers as a whole”. Thus, the collective output of “those” producers must be determined in relation to the production of the domestic producers as a whole. Moreover, the term “a major proportion” is immediately followed by the words “of the total domestic production”. “A major proportion”, therefore, should be understood as a proportion defined by reference to the total production of domestic producers as a whole. “A major proportion” of such total production will standardly serve as a substantial reflection of the total domestic production. Indeed, the lower the proportion, the more sensitive an investigating authority will have to be to ensure that the proportion used substantially reflects the total production of the producers as a whole.” Para. 413. “In our view, the above interpretation is confirmed by the purpose of defining the domestic industry under the Antidumping Agreement. As footnote 9 to Article 3 of the Antidumping Agreement indicates, the domestic industry forms the basis on which an investigating authority makes the determination of whether the dumped imports cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic producers. In this respect, Article 3.1 requires that an injury determination be based on “positive evidence”. Pursuant to Article 3.4, such “positive evidence” includes relevant economic factors and indices collected from the domestic industry, which have a bearing on the state of the industry. Naturally, the “positive evidence” to be used in an injury determination requires wide-ranging information concerning the relevant economic factors in order to ensure the accuracy of an investigation concerning the state of the industry and the injury it has suffered. Thus, “a major proportion of the total domestic production” should be determined so as to ensure that the domestic industry defined on this basis is capable of providing ample data that ensure an accurate injury analysis.” Para. 414. “Moreover, Article 3.1 requires that a determination of injury “involve an objective examination” of, inter alia, the impact of the dumped imports on domestic producers. The Appellate Body has found that an “objective examination” in accordance with Article 3.1 “requires that the domestic industry, and the effects of dumped imports, be investigated in an unbiased manner, without favouring the interests of any interested party, or group of interested parties, in the investigation”. In other words, to ensure the accuracy of an injury determination, an investigating authority must not act

so as to give rise to a material risk of distortion in defining the domestic industry, for example, by excluding a whole category of producers of the like product. The risk of introducing distortion will not arise when no producers are excluded and the domestic industry is defined as “the domestic producers as a whole”. Where a domestic industry is defined as those producers whose collective output constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production, it follows that the higher the proportion, the more producers will be included, and the less likely the injury determination conducted on this basis would be distorted. Therefore, the above interpretation is also consistent with the requirement under Article 3.1 that an injury determination be based on an objective examination of the impact of the dumped imports on domestic producers.” Para. 415. “We recognize that obtaining information regarding domestic producers may be difficult, particularly in special market situations, such as a fragmented industry with numerous producers. In such special cases, the use of “a major proportion” within the meaning of Article 4.1 provides an investigating authority with some flexibility to define the domestic industry in the light of what is reasonable and practically possible. The practical constraint on an authority's ability to obtain information regarding the domestic producers may also mean that, in such special cases, what constitutes “a major proportion of the total domestic production” may be lower than what is ordinarily permissible in a less fragmented market.” Para. 416. “Nonetheless, while the proportion of total production that qualifies as “a major proportion” in such a special market situation may be lower than in a normal case, this does not change the purpose of defining the domestic industry, that is, to provide the basis for the injury determination. As in a normal case, the domestic industry defined in such a special case also must ensure that the subsequent injury analysis is based on positive evidence and involves an objective examination pursuant to Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement. An injury determination regarding a fragmented industry must therefore cover a large enough proportion of total domestic production to ensure that a proper injury determination can be made pursuant to Article 3.1. Thus, even if what constitutes “a major proportion” may be lower in the light of the practical constraints on obtaining information in a special market situation, an investigating authority bears the obligation to ensure that the way in which it defines the domestic industry does not introduce a material risk of skewing the economic data and, consequently, distorting its analysis of the state of the industry.” Para. 417. “Finally, we turn to examine the interpretation advanced by the European Union that Article 5.4 of the Antidumping Agreement provides important contextual guidance concerning the interpretation of the term “a major proportion” in Article 4.1 of that Agreement. Article 5.4, which contains the standing requirement for the initiation of an investigation, provides certain numerical benchmarks for evaluating whether a complaint to initiate an Antidumping investigation has sufficient support by domestic producers. Specifically, Article 5.4 states that an investigation “shall not be initiated” unless the application “has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry”. It then provides that “[t]he application shall be considered to have been made 'by or on behalf of the domestic industry' if it is supported by those domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support or opposition to the application.” Furthermore, “no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.” Para. 419. “In sum, a proper interpretation of the term “a major proportion” under Article 4.1 requires that the domestic industry defined on this basis encompass producers whose collective output represents a relatively high proportion that substantially reflects the total domestic production. This ensures that the injury determination is based on wide-ranging information regarding domestic producers and is not distorted or skewed. In the special case of a fragmented industry with numerous producers, the practical constraints on an authority's ability to obtain information may mean that what constitutes “a major proportion” may be lower than what is ordinarily permissible in a less fragmented industry. However, even in such cases, the authority bears the same obligation to ensure that the process of defining the domestic industry does not give rise to a material risk of distortion. A

complainant alleging an inconsistency under the second method for defining the domestic industry bears the burden to prove its claim and to demonstrate that the domestic industry definition does not meet the standard of “a major proportion”. Nonetheless, a domestic industry defined on the basis of a proportion that is low, or defined through a process that involves active exclusion of certain domestic producers, is likely to be more susceptible to a finding of inconsistency under Article 4.1 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para 427. “In our view, by defining the domestic industry on the basis of willingness to be included in the sample, the Commission's approach imposed a self-selection process among the domestic producers that introduced a material risk of distortion. First, we fail to see the reason why a producer's willingness to be included in the sample should affect its eligibility to be included in the domestic industry, which is a universe of producers that is by definition wider than the sample. As China argues on appeal, the Commission's approach “confuses two different steps”, because the domestic industry should be defined first, before a sample may be selected from the producers included in the domestic industry.” Para 428. “We note that the Panel expressed “sympathy for the European Union's view that producers who do not support the complaint are not likely to cooperate, and thus cannot effectively be considered as part of the domestic industry unless they specifically come forward and agree to participate in the investigation.” However, the evidence on the record shows more producers “specifically [came] forward” than were ultimately included in the domestic industry definition. As the European Union explained before the Panel, the Commission contacted 318 known producers requesting certain basic information, and 70 companies responded by providing the requested information within the 15-day deadline, including information on their production and sales. Thus, as China submits, the Commission identified, and obtained information from, more producers than those it ultimately included in the domestic industry definition.”

Para. 429. “According to the European Union's explanation, the Commission excluded 25 of these 70 producers from the domestic industry definition for various reasons, one of which was the producers' expressed unwillingness to be part of the sample. However, as noted above, the sample of domestic producers is a smaller universe than the domestic industry, and the unwillingness to be part of the sample should not affect whether a producer should be part of the domestic industry. This is confirmed by the relevant facts in the fasteners investigation. Specifically, the Commission selected six producers as part of the sample, obtained relevant information from them, and verified the information on their premises. The Commission then used the information obtained from the sampled producers for its analysis of the “microeconomic” injury factors, but conducted its analysis of the “macroeconomic” injury factors on the basis of information obtained from all of the 45 producers included in the domestic industry definition. Thus, by including only those willing to be part of the sample in the domestic industry definition, the Commission's approach shrank the universe of producers whose data could have been used for part of the injury determination. Even though, due to the fragmented nature of the fasteners industry, the practical constraints on obtaining information may justify the inclusion of a smaller proportion of domestic production in the domestic industry definition, the Commission's approach in excluding those who provided relevant information but were unwilling to be part of the sample was unrelated to, and cannot be justified by, such practical constraints.” Para 430. “In sum, in the fasteners investigation, the collective output of those producers included in the domestic industry definition, which accounted for 27 per cent of the total domestic production, represented a low proportion in relation to the total. The fragmented nature of the fasteners industry, however, might have permitted such a low proportion due to the impracticality of obtaining more information, provided that the process with which the Commission defined the industry did not give rise to a material risk of distortion. Yet, we note that the Commission applied a minimum benchmark of 25 per cent in defining what constituted “a major proportion of total domestic production”, even though this benchmark does not address the standard of “a major proportion” or the practicality of achieving a higher proportion. Moreover, by limiting the domestic industry definition to those

producers willing to be part of the sample, the Commission excluded producers that provided relevant information. In so doing, the Commission reduced the data coverage that could have served as a basis for its injury analysis and introduced a material risk of distorting the injury determination. Therefore, we consider that the Panel erred in finding that “the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the [Antidumping Agreement] in defining a domestic industry comprising producers accounting for 27 per cent of total estimated EU production of fasteners.”

Para 458. “Thus, the evidence on the record, including the Definitive Regulation and the European Union's explanations, shows that the Commission excluded producers who did not make themselves known within the 15-day deadline from the definition of domestic industry. The Panel, in reaching its finding that the Commission “did not act to exclude” such producers, stated that “[t]here seems to have been a process of considering additional producers for inclusion in the domestic industry, based on arguments made by the exporters”. On the basis of the European Union's explanations, this “process of considering additional producers” was conducted for purposes of re-examining the issue of standing, and was not done in order to define the domestic industry.” Para. 459. “Nonetheless, even though the Panel mistakenly concluded that the Commission did not exclude producers not responding within the 15-day deadline, this did not affect the Panel's final conclusion. The Panel found that “none of the producers [considered after the deadline] were in the end included in the domestic industry”. Moreover, the Panel found it “reasonable for investigating authorities to impose deadlines for domestic producers to make themselves known and then define the domestic industry on the basis of those that come forward within that deadline”. The Panel also found that there was “no basis for concluding that the 15-day period was necessarily insufficient” for purposes of defining the domestic industry. The Panel therefore found that the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, even if it did not include producers not responding within 15 days.” Para. 460. “In our view, in applying Article 4.1 to the facts of the case, the Panel correctly found that it was reasonable for the Commission to set a deadline by which producers were required to make themselves known. Given the multiple steps that must be carried out in an Antidumping investigation and the time constraint on an investigation, an investigating authority must be allowed to set various deadlines to ensure an orderly conduct of the investigation. Indeed, as Article 5.10 of the Antidumping Agreement provides, “[i]nvestigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation.” Moreover, Article 6.14 states that the rules of procedures set out in Article 6 of the Antidumping Agreement “are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from proceeding expeditiously”.(…).”

Para. 464. “In sum, we do not consider that the Panel erred in its interpretation or application of Article 4.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, or acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU, when finding that “the mere fact that the domestic industry as ultimately defined does not include any particular proportion of producers expressing different views with respect to the complaint, or producers who did not come forward within the 15-day period, does not demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the [Antidumping Agreement] in defining the domestic industry.” We therefore decline to uphold China's appeal in this respect.” Para. 468. “In sum, with regard to China's other appeal of the Panel's findings under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, we have reached the following findings. We find that the Panel erred in finding that “the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the [Antidumping Agreement] in defining a domestic industry comprising producers accounting for 27 per cent of total estimated EU production of fasteners” on the basis that the collective output of these producers represented “a major proportion” of the total domestic production. However, we find that the Panel did not err in finding that China failed to establish that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement by making an injury determination on the basis of a sample of producers that was allegedly not representative. We also do not consider that the Panel erred in its interpretation or application of Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Antidumping

Agreement, or acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU, when finding that “the mere fact that the domestic industry as ultimately defined does not include any particular proportion of producers expressing different views with respect to the complaint, or producers who did not come forward within the 15-day period, does not demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the [Antidumping Agreement] in defining the domestic industry” or acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of that Agreement.” X. Findings and Conclusion Para. 624. “For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body:

(b) with respect to the Panel's findings under Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement:

(i) finds that the Panel erred in finding, in paragraph 7.230 of the Panel Report, that “the European Union did not act inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the [Antidumping Agreement] in defining a domestic industry comprising producers accounting for 27 per cent of total estimated EU production of fasteners” on the basis that the collective output of these producers represented “a major proportion” of the total domestic production;

(ii) finds that the Panel did not err in finding, in paragraph 7.241 of the Panel Report, that China failed to establish that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement in the selection of a sample of the domestic industry for purposes of making an injury determination; and

(iii) finds that the Panel did not err in its interpretation or application of Articles 4.1 and 3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, or acted inconsistently with Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement, when finding, in paragraph 7.219 of the Panel Report, that “the mere fact that the domestic industry as ultimately defined does not include any particular proportion of producers expressing different views with respect to the complaint, or producers who did not come forward within the 15 day period, does not demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 4.1 of the [Antidumping Agreement] in defining the domestic industry” or acted inconsistently with Article 3.1 of that Agreement;”

III. Comentários Da análise acima apresentada, três contenciosos se destacam por trazerem importantes conclusões acerca das análises realizadas pelos Painéis e Órgão de Apelação para a interpretação do Artigo 4.1 e definição do termo “indústria doméstica”. Inicialmente, cabe destacar o caso Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties, em que o Painel analisou se havia a obrigação de interpretação do termo “indústria doméstica” como definido no Artigo 4.1 e se o termo “major proportion” deveria significar mais de 50% da produção doméstica total como alegado pelo Brasil. O Painel foi assertivo ao afirmar que o Artigo 4.1 estabelece que o termo “indústria doméstica” “deve” ser interpretado de forma específica e que na opinião do Painel, impõe-se uma obrigação expressa aos Membros de interpretar o termo “indústria doméstica” de forma específica. Portanto, segundo o Painel, se um Membro interpretar o termo diferentemente em uma investigação antidumping, este Membro violaria a obrigação contida no Artigo 4.1. Outra importante contribuição trazida pelo Painel diz respeito à interpretação do termo “a major proportion” no Artigo 4.1, ao estabelecer que tal termo não significa mais de 50% dos produtores

nacionais (ou “a maior parte”), mas sim uma proporção importante, séria ou significante da produção doméstica total. Nesse sentido, vide comentários sobre a tradução em português do Acordo. No caso EC - Salmon, em que o Painel esclareceu que o Artigo 4.1 é claro ao definir as circunstâncias que permitem que alguns produtores do produto similar possam não ser considerados como indústria doméstica. Tais circunstâncias estão definidas no Artigo 4.1 (i) e 4.1 (ii). Concluiu o Painel que nada no Artigo 4.1 dá suporte à noção de que exista outra circunstância que permita exclusões. Além de tal conclusão, este Painel cita o caso Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties no que se refere à interpretação específica do Artigo 4.1. No caso EC - Fastners, além de mencionar o Artigo 4.1 como um “definitional provision”, foi discutido principalmente se o percentual utilizado pela EU na definição da indústria doméstica (27% da produção) seria suficiente para se ter “major proportion”. O Órgão de Apelação considerou que uma apropriada interpretação do termo “major proportion” segundo o Artigo 4.1 requer que a indústria doméstica definida compreenda produtores que coletivamente representem uma proporção relativamente alta que reflita substancialmente a produção doméstica total e considerou que o Painel errou ao considerar que não houve violação dos Artigos 4.1 e 3.1 do Acordo Antidumping, ao considerar que percentual de 27% seria “major proportion”. O Órgão de Apelação considerou ainda que ao limitar a definição de indústria doméstica para os produtores que apoiavam a petição, a Comissão reduziu a abrangência dos dados que seriam considerados na análise de dano e introduziram um risco material de distorção na determinação do dano.

Ø Artigo 5 Fernanda Dalla Valle Martino Luciano Inácio de Souza IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 5 Initiation and Subsequent Investigation

5.1 Except as provided for in paragraph 6, an investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any alleged dumping shall be initiated upon a written application by or on behalf of the domestic industry.

5.2 An application under paragraph 1 shall include evidence of (a) dumping, (b) injury within the

meaning of Article VI of GATT 1994 as interpreted by this Agreement and (c) a causal link between the dumped imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain such information as is reasonably available to the applicant on the following:

(i) the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the domestic

production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written application is made on behalf of the domestic industry, the application shall identify the industry on behalf of which the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers of the like product (or associations of domestic producers of the like product) and, to the extent possible, a description of the volume and value of domestic production of the like product accounted for by such producers;

(ii) a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the country or

countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question;

(iii) information on prices at which the product in question is sold when destined for

consumption in the domestic markets of the country or countries of origin or export (or, where appropriate, information on the prices at which the product is sold from the country or countries of origin or export to a third country or countries, or on the constructed value of the product) and information on export prices or, where appropriate, on the prices at which the product is first resold to an independent buyer in the territory of the importing Member;

(iv) information on the evolution of the volume of the allegedly dumped imports, the

effect of these imports on prices of the like product in the domestic market and the consequent impact of the imports on the domestic industry, as demonstrated by relevant factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 3.

5.3 The authorities shall examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the

application to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation.

5.4 An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph 1 unless the authorities have

determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for, or opposition to, the application expressed (51) by domestic producers of the like product, that the application has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. (52) The application shall be considered to have been made “by or on behalf of the domestic industry” if it is supported by those

domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25 per cent of total production of the like product produced by the domestic industry.

5.5 The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to initiate an investigation, any

publicizing of the application for the initiation of an investigation. However, after receipt of a properly documented application and before proceeding to initiate an investigation, the authorities shall notify the government of the exporting Member concerned.

5.6 If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation

without having received a written application by or on behalf of a domestic industry for the initiation of such investigation, they shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of dumping, injury and a causal link, as described in paragraph 2, to justify the initiation of an investigation.

5.7 The evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered simultaneously (a) in the

decision whether or not to initiate an investigation, and (b) thereafter, during the course of the investigation, starting on a date not later than the earliest date on which in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement provisional measures may be applied.

5.8 An application under paragraph 1 shall be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated

promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. There shall be immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis, or that the volume of dumped imports, actual or potential, or the injury, is negligible. The margin of dumping shall be considered to be de minimis if this margin is less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage of the export price. The volume of dumped imports shall normally be regarded as negligible if the volume of dumped imports from a particular country is found to account for less than 3 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member, unless countries which individually account for less than 3 per cent of the imports of the like product in the importing Member collectively account for more than 7 per cent of imports of the like product in the importing Member.

5.9 An antidumping proceeding shall not hinder the procedures of customs clearance. 5.10 Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, and in no

case more than 18 months, after their initiation. Footnote 51: In the case of fragmented industries involving an exceptionally large number of producers, authorities may determine support and opposition by using statistically valid sampling techniques. Footnote 52: Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members employees of domestic producers of the like product or representatives of those employees may make or support an application for an investigation under paragraph 1. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 5 Início e Condução das Investigações

5.1 Com exceção do disposto no parágrafo 6, uma investigação para determinar a existência, o grau e o efeito de qualquer dumping alegado será iniciada por meio de petição formulada por escrito pela indústria doméstica, ou em seu nome.

5.2 A petição mencionada no parágrafo 1 deverá incluir demonstração de (a) dumping, (b) dano,

no sentido do disposto no artigo VI do GATT 1994, tal como interpretado neste Acordo, e (c)

nexo causal entre as importações a preços de dumping e o dano alegado. Simples declarações, desacompanhadas de demonstração bem fundamentada, não poderão ser consideradas suficientes para satisfazer o requerido neste parágrafo. Dentro dos limites que se possa razoavelmente esperar estejam ao alcance do peticionário, a petição deverá conter informações sobre os seguintes pontos:

(a) identidade do peticionário e indicação do volume e do valor da produção doméstica do

similar nacional pelo peticionário. No caso de a petição escrita ter sido feita em nome da indústria doméstica, o documento deverá indicar a indústria em nome da qual foi feita a petição por meio de lista com todos os produtores domésticos conhecidos do similar (ou associações de produtores nacionais do similar) e, na medida do possível, incluir indicação do volume e do valor da produção doméstica do similar nacional por que respondem aqueles produtores;

(b) descrição completa do produto alegadamente introduzido a preços de dumping, nomes

do país ou dos países de origem ou de exportação, identidade de cada exportador ou produtor estrangeiro conhecido e lista das pessoas conhecidas que importam o produto em questão;

(c) informação sobre os preços pelos quais o produto em questão é vendido quando

destinado ao consumo no mercado doméstico do país ou países de origem ou de exportação (ou, quando for o caso, informação sobre o preço pelo qual o produto é vendido pelo país ou países de origem ou de exportação a um terceiro país ou países, ou sobre o preço construído do produto) e informação sobre o preço de exportação ou, quando for o caso, sobre os preços pelos quais o produto é vendido ao primeiro comprador independente situado no território do Membro importador;

(d) informação sobre a evolução do volume alegadamente importado a preços de dumping,

os efeitos de tais importações sobre os preços do similar no mercado doméstico e o conseqüente impacto das importações sobre a indústria doméstica, tal como demonstrado por fatores e índices significativos que tenham relação com o estado da indústria doméstica, a exemplo daqueles arrolados nos parágrafos 2 e 4 do Artigo 3.

5.3 As autoridades examinarão a correção e a adequação das comprovações oferecidas na petição

com vistas a determinar a existência de suficientes motivos que justifiquem o início de uma investigação.

5.4 Não se deverá iniciar investigação nos termos do parágrafo 1 a menos que as autoridades

tenham confirmado, com base em exame do grau de apoio ou de rejeição à petição, expresso6 pelos produtores domésticos do similar, que a petição foi efetivamente feita pela indústria doméstica ou em seu nome7. Considerar-se-á como feita “pela indústria doméstica ou em seu nome” a petição que for apoiada por aqueles produtores cuja produção agregada constitua 50 por cento da produção total do similar, produzida por aquela porção da indústria doméstica que tenha expressado seu apoio ou sua rejeição à petição. No sentido oposto, nenhuma investigação será iniciada quando os produtores nacionais que expressamente apóiam a petição reúnam menos de 25 por cento da produção total do similar realizada pela indústria nacional.

5.5 A menos que se tenha tomado a decisão de iniciar a investigação, as autoridades evitarão

divulgar a petição que solicita início de investigação. Após receber petição devidamente

                                                                                                                         6 No caso de indústrias fragmentárias, que compreendem número excepcionalmente grande de produtores, as autoridades poderão confirmar apoio ou rejeição por meio de técnicas de amostragem estatísticas aceitáveis. 7 Os Membros estão conscientes de que no território de certos Membros os empregados da indústria nacional do similar em causa, ou seus representantes, poderão fazer ou apoiar uma petição de investigação ao abrigo do parágrafo 1.

documentada, porém, e antes de proceder ao início da investigação, as autoridades deverão notificar o Governo do Membro exportador respectivo.

5.6 Se, em situação especial, as autoridades responsáveis decidem iniciar investigação sem ter

recebido petição por escrito apresentada pela indústria doméstica, ou em seu nome, em que se solicite o início de tal investigação, aquelas autoridades somente poderão agir se tiverem suficiente comprovação de dumping, dano e nexo causal, conforme descritos no parágrafo 2, que justifiquem início de investigação.

5.7 As comprovações de dumping e de dano serão consideradas simultaneamente (a) na tomada

de decisão sobre se se deve ou não iniciar investigação; e (b) posteriormente, durante os procedimentos de investigação, em data não posterior àquela em que, de acordo com o disposto neste Acordo, direitos provisórios venham a ser aplicados.

5.8 Deverá ser rejeitada a petição que se faça sob a égide do parágrafo 1, e deverá ser

imediatamente encerrada a investigação, sempre que as autoridades responsáveis estejam convencidas de que não há suficiente comprovação quer de dumping quer de dano que justifique o prosseguimento do caso. Deverá ocorrer imediato encerramento da investigação naqueles casos em que as autoridades determinem que a margem de dumping é de minimis, ou que o volume de importações a preços de dumping, real ou potencial, ou o dano causado, é desprezível. A margem de dumping deverá ser considerada como de minimis quando for inferior a 2 por cento, calculados sobre o preço de exportação. O volume de importações a preços de dumping deverá ser habitualmente considerado como desprezível caso tal volume, proveniente de um determinado país, seja considerado como responsável por menos de 3 por cento das importações do similar pelo Membro importador, a menos que o conjunto de países que, tomados individualmente, representem, cada um, menos de 3 por cento das importações do similar pelo Membro importador, atinja, se tomado agregadamente, mais de 7 por cento das importações do similar pelo Membro importador.

5.9 Investigações antidumping não deverão constituir entrave aos procedimentos de liberação

alfandegária. 5.10 As investigações, exceto em circunstâncias especiais, deverão ser concluídas no prazo de um

ano após seu início, e nunca em mais de 18 meses. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 5 1. Artigo 5

a) “Treaty interpretation” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Comunidade Europeia, WT/DS294/R, para. 7.222 Este é um dos casos em que é discutida a metodologia americana de cálculo de margem de dumping conhecida como “zeroing’, na qual sempre que o preço de exportação supera o valor normal, ou seja, a margem de dumping é negativa, esta será considerada como “zero” pela autoridade americana. O Painel enfatiza que as regras do direito internacional público, com destaque para o Artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena, devem ser levadas em consideração para a interpretação dos dispositivos do Acordo. No caso, o Painel concluiu que o Artigo 2.4.2 está limitado ao estabelecimento da margem de dumping para as investigações nos termos do Artigo 5. Concluiu o Painel que os EUA não violaram o Artigo 2.4.2 ao usar uma metodologia assimétrica de comparação entre o valor normal e o preço de exportação, na qual não é contabilizado nenhum valor quando o preço de exportação é maior que o valor normal.

Para. 7.222. “Based on an analysis in accordance with customary rules of treaty interpretation, we conclude that the scope of Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement is limited to the establishment of the existence of margins of dumping in the context of investigations under Article 5 of the AD Agreement. In any event, we cannot find that an interpretation that restricts the scope of application of Article 2.4.2 to investigations within the meaning of Article 5, thereby excluding its application to Article 9.3, is not permissible within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii).” 2. Artigo 5.2

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, para. 7.66

Ao analisar a alegação da Polônia de que a autoridade investigadora da Tailândia teria supostamente violado os Artigos 5.2 e 5.3 do Acordo Antidumping, o Painel inicialmente analisa de forma genérica o Artigo 5.2, que dispõe acerca dos requisitos que deve conter um requerimento para o início de uma investigação antidumping, quais sejam, a demonstração de dumping, dano e nexo causal, além das informações específicas citadas nos parágrafos subsequentes.

Para. 7.66. “Article 5.2 governs the contents of an application for initiation of an AD investigation. The chapeau of Article 5.2 requires that an application must include “evidence” of dumping, injury and a causal link. The subsequent paragraphs of Article 5.2 list certain specific information regarding a series of factors which must be included in the application.”

(ii) Evidence of…dumping Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.35

Neste caso, o Painel analisou a alegação do México de que a autoridade investigadora de Guatemala teria supostamente violado o Artigo 5.2 ao iniciar uma investigação antidumping sem que provas suficientes da existência de dumping tenham sido apresentadas no requerimento. O Painel enfatizou a questão sobre se os elementos do “dumping” exigem suficientes provas sob o Artigo 5.3, baseando sua análise na definição do termo “dumping” contida no Artigo 2. Por uma análise do Artigo 5.3 no contexto do Artigo 5.2, entende-se que as comprovações que serão avaliadas pela autoridade para justificar o início de uma investigação são exatamente a existência de dano, dumping e nexo causal. O Painel deixa claro que será no processo de investigação que a existência do dumping será averiguada, mas antes da instauração deve existir evidência suficiente para que uma autoridade objetiva e imparcial possa determinar a existência de comprovações suficientes de dumping, no sentido do Artigo 2, a fim apenas de justificar a abertura da investigação, e não em quantidade suficiente para garantir a aplicação de uma medida antidumping provisória ou final. No caso concreto, como considerou o Painel que esta condição mínima a justificar a abertura da investigação não existiu, decidiu que houve violação do Artigo 5.3 por parte da autoridade investigadora de Guatemala.

Para. 8.35. “(…) We further observe that the only clarification of the term “dumping” in the AD Agreement is that contained in Article 2. In consequence, in order to determine that there is sufficient evidence of dumping, the investigating authority cannot entirely disregard the elements that configure the existence of this practice as outlined in Article 2. This analysis is done not with a view to making a determination that Article 2 has been violated through the initiation of an investigation, but rather to provide guidance in our review of the Ministry's determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping to warrant an investigation. We do not of course mean to suggest that an investigating authority must have before it at the time it initiates an investigation evidence of dumping within the

meaning of Article 2 of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to support a preliminary or final determination. (..). However, the evidence must be such that an unbiased and objective investigating authority could determine that there was sufficient evidence of dumping within the meaning of Article 2 to justify initiation of an investigation (53).”

(iii) Evidence of …injury Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.45 Para. 8.45. “(…) Thus, when considering whether there is sufficient evidence of threat of injury to justify the initiation of an investigation, an investigating authority cannot totally disregard the elements that configure the existence of threat of injury outlined in Article 3. (54) We do not mean to suggest that an investigating authority must have before it at the time it initiates an investigation evidence of threat of material injury within the meaning of Article 3 of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to support a preliminary or final determination of threat of injury. However, the investigating authority must have before it evidence of threat of material injury, as defined in Article 3, sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation.”

Neste caso, o Painel examinou a alegação do México de que a autoridade da Guatemala não tinha provas suficientes de danos materiais para justificar o início da investigação. Neste caso, seria necessário verificar a definição de dano, contida no Artigo 3. A autoridade investigadora da Guatemala argumentou que o Artigo 3.7 não se aplicac às autoridades investigadoras neste caso, uma vez que o Artigo 5.2 (iv), que contém algumas informações as quais devem constar no requerimento, refere-se à informação sobre: a evolução do volume alegadamente importado a preços de dumping; os efeitos de tais importações sobre os preços do similar no mercado doméstico; e o consequente impacto das importações sobre a indústria doméstica, a exemplo daqueles arrolados nos Artigos 3.2 e 3.4, mas não se refere aos fatores ensejadores do dano, citados no Artigo 3.7. O Painel enfatizou que antes da instauração devem ser reunidas evidência suficiente para que uma autoridade, de modo objetivo e imparcial, possa determinar a existência de comprovações suficientes de dano, no sentido do Artigo 3, a fim de apenas justificar a abertura da investigação, e não em quantidade suficiente para garantir a aplicação de uma medida antidumping provisória ou final. No caso concreto, por entender que esta condição mínima para justificar a abertura da investigação não existiu, o Painel decidiu que houve violação ao Artigo 5.3 por parte da autoridade investigadora da Guatemala.

(iv) Evidence of…a causal link Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.57 Como consequência do argumento da falta de evidência quanto à existência de dumping e dano para justificar a abertura da investigação por parte da autoridade de Guatemala, o México também alegou a falta de nexo causal. Embora Guatemala tenha contra-argumentado que bastaria o preenchimento de algumas condições previstas no Artigo 5.2 (iii e iv) para justificar o nexo, o Painel decidiu que por decorrência lógica de sua decisão quanto à insuficiência de dumping e dano, também não há nexo causal. Assim, concluiu o Painel que a Guatemala violou o Artigo 5.3 do Acordo Antidumping ao iniciar a investigação em questão. Para. 8.57. “We are of the view that, having determined that the Ministry did not have sufficient evidence of dumping and injury to justify the initiation of an investigation, it follows logically that there was also insufficient evidence of the causal link between the two to justify initiation.”

(v) Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia WT/DS122/R, para. 7.76-7.77 Neste caso, a Polônia alegou que em relação ao dumping o requerimento apresentado pela Tailândia era insuficiente, de acordo com o Artigo 5.2, uma vez que continha apenas “simples declarações” na forma de dados numéricos brutos e não era possível encontrar qualquer informação sobre a evolução do volume alegadamente importado a preço de dumping, efeitos de tais importações sobre o preço do similar no mercado doméstico e, consequente, impacto das importações sobre a indústria doméstica, conforme requerimento do Artigo 5.2 (iv). Por fim, o Painel entendeu que a apresentação de dados numéricos brutos constituiria uma prova relevante e não apenas uma simples declaração. Para. 7.76. “We agree with this view of the requirements imposed by Article 5.2 with respect to evidence that must be contained in the application. In the present case, we would have preferred the application to have contained more explanation and a more robust analysis of the evidence pertaining to dumping. However, the fact that the application contains data that is relevant to dumping but does not contain explanation or analysis of much of this data does not, in and of itself, lead to a violation of Article 5.2 AD.”

Para. 7.77. “(…) We consider that raw numerical data would constitute “relevant evidence” rather than merely a “simple assertion” within the meaning of this provision. (…) While paragraph (iv) of Article 5.2 requires the application to contain “information”, in the sense of evidence, on certain identified factors, we do not read this provision as imposing any additional requirement that the application contain analysis of the data submitted in support of the application.”

(vi) subparágrafo (ii) - significado de “ou” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping measures on farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.171 e 7.173 No caso, o Painel analisou a alegação de violação contida no Artigo 6.10 e o significado semântico da conjunção “ou”. Neste contexto, ao analisar o sentido de “ou” em outros parágrafos, surgiu a discussão acerca de alguns dispositivos do Acordo. Quanto ao Artigo 5.2, o Painel não entendeu que seria necessário exigir do peticionário o fornecimento da identidade do exportador e do produtor conhecidos, em que pese a presença do “ou” no texto legal, principalmente se considerar-se que a investigação deva ser centralizada em apenas um das partes interessadas. Para. 7.171. “(…) Because of the nature of the functions of the word “or”, its meaning in different provisions of the AD Agreement will very much depend upon the obligations at issue and the specific context in which it appears (…).” Para. 7.173. “Likewise, the ordinary meaning of the word “or” does not imply that it must have a conjunctive meaning, in all circumstances, in the context of Articles 5.2(ii) and 9.5. In the case of Article 5.2(ii), we see no reason why an applicant must be compelled to provide information on the identity of both known exporters and producers, especially if it considers that it would be appropriate to focus the investigation only on one or the other interested parties. Likewise, we see no reason why an investigating authority that focused its original investigation on only producers in accordance with Article 6.10, could not also permissibly focus on producers for the purpose of any newcomer review conducted pursuant to Article 9.5.” (vii) subparágrafo (iv) - “relevant” e “such as” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 7.73-7.74 e 7.76

Neste caso, os EUA alegaram que o requerimento pleiteando o início da investigação antidumping pelo México não preencheu os requisitos do Artigo 5.2, no que tange à demonstração de dano. A principal questão nos casos em que se discute a demonstração de dano é definir quais fatores dispostos no Artigo 3.4 do Acordo Antidumping e qual informação referente à existência de nexo causal devem ser fornecidas na petição inicial, nos termos do Artigo 5.2 (iv). Ao analisar o Artigo 5.2, o Painel entendeu que o requerimento deve conter informações suficientes para que se demonstre o impacto desta impostação à indústria doméstica, mas a inclusão dos termos “significativos” (relevant) e “a exemplo” (such as) demonstra que a petição não precisa conter informações sobre todos os fatores dos Artigos 3.2.e 3.4. Assim, a alegação dos EUA foi rejeitada pelo Painel. Para. 7.73. “However, the inclusion in Article 5.2(iv) of the word “relevant” and the phrase “such as” in the reference to the factors and indices in Articles 3.2 and 3.4 in our view makes it clear that an application is not required to contain information on all the factors and indices set forth in Articles 3.2 and 3.4. Rather, Article 5.2(iv) requires that the application contain information on factors and indices relating to the impact of imports on the domestic industry, and refers to Articles 3.2 and 3.4 as illustrative of factors which may be relevant.” Para. 7.74. “Obviously, the quantity and quality of the information provided by the applicant need not be such as would be required in order to make a preliminary or final determination of injury. Moreover, the applicant need only provide such information as is “reasonably available” to it with respect to the relevant factors.” Para. 7.76. “(…) However, Article 5.2 does not require an application to contain analysis, but rather to contain information, in the sense of evidence, in support of allegations. (…)” 3. Artigo 5.3

a) “Distinção dos requisitos do Artigo 5.2” Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.31, 8.35 e 8.62 Neste caso, ao analisar a reclamação do México de que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala teria iniciado a investigação sem apresentar provas suficientes, violando, portanto, o Artigo 5.3, o Painel enfatizou o seu entendimento de que o fato de um requerimento preencher os requistos do Artigo 5.2, não significa que, necessariamente, satisfaça as condições do Artigo 5.3. O Painel acrescentou que o padrão legal a ser avaliado não é a veracidade e adequação das provas apresentadas per se, mas sim a suficiência das provas no caso concreto. Por fim, acrescentou que a consequência desta distinção é a necessidade de que a autoridade investigadora obtenha informações por si só, e não fique apenas restrita às informações fornecidas pela parte na petição, para preencher o requisito de suficiência de provas e decidir quanto ao início da investigação. Para. 8.31. “We recall that, in accordance with our standard of review, we must determine whether an objective and unbiased investigating authority, looking at the facts before it, could properly have determined that there was sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an anti-dumping investigation. Article 5.3 requires the authority to examine, in making this determination, the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence in the application. Clearly, the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence is relevant to the investigating authorities' determination whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation. It is however the sufficiency of the evidence, and not its adequacy and accuracy per se, which represents the legal standard to be applied in the case of a determination whether to initiate an investigation.” Para. 8.35. “(…) In other words, Article 5.2 requires that the application contain sufficient evidence on dumping, injury and causation, while Article 5.3 requires the investigating authority to satisfy itself

as to the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence to determine that it is sufficient to justify initiation. (…)” Para. 8.62. “It is evident to us that the Guatemalan authorities relied on the same evidence that was presented in the application for purposes of the initiation. We have expressed the view that Articles 5.2 and 5.3 contain different obligations. One of the consequences of this difference in obligations is that investigating authorities need not content themselves with the information provided in the application but may gather information on their own in order to meet the standard of sufficient evidence for initiation in Article 5.3.” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 7.102-7.105

Os EUA alegaram que o requerimento apresentado pelo México não apresentou provas suficientes de dano e nexo causal e, portanto, o início da investigação constituiu uma infração ao Artigo 5.3 do Acordo Antidumping. Embora o Painel tenha entendido que não houve violação ao Artigo 5.2 na petição apresentada pelo México, isto não quer dizer que não houve violação ao Artigo 5.3 por parte da autoridade mexicana. No caso, o Painel entendeu que o Artigo 5.3 apenas exige a existência de provas suficientes para justificar o início da investigação, o que difere do grau de provas a serem obtidas ao longo do processo e que serão necessárias para a determinação preliminar e determinação final. Neste sentido, concluiu que também não houve violação ao Artigo 5.3 por parte dos EUA.

Para. 7.102. “Article 5.3 requires investigating authorities to “examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application”. This examination of the evidence has a purpose – “to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation”. However, in our view, Article 5.3 only requires the investigating authority to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation. As discussed above, we have concluded that SECOFI made such a determination consistently with the requirements of Article 5.3. In our view, Article 5.3 does not impose an obligation on the investigating authority to set out its resolution of all underlying issues considered in making that determination.”

Para. 7.103. “Our conclusion in this regard is bolstered by consideration of the differences between the public notices required at the initiation of an investigation, and following a preliminary or final determination. As noted above, in notices of preliminary and final determinations, pursuant to Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2, the investigating authority is required to set forth findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material, as well as respond to the arguments of parties. That is, a notice of preliminary or final determination must set forth explanations for all material elements of the determination. A notice of initiation, on the other hand, pursuant to Article 12.1, must set forth specific information regarding certain factors, but need not contain explanations of or reasons for the resolution of all questions of fact underlying the determination that there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation.”

Para. 7.104. “This distinction, in our view follows from the fact that the notice of initiation merely begins the process of investigation, putting the public on notice of the fact of initiation, and the product, countries, parties, and allegations involved. The interested parties, in addition to the notice of initiation, are provided a non-confidential version of the application pursuant to Article 6.1.3, which provides more detailed information relevant to their participation in the investigation. During the investigation, parties are entitled to participate in the proceeding, make their arguments to the investigating authority, and have access to certain information developed in the investigation. However, at the point of preliminary or final determination, when a stage of the process of investigation is completed, the investigating authority reaches its conclusions based on the information and arguments developed to that point in the investigation, and preliminary or definitive anti-dumping measures are either imposed or not. The parties', and the public's, interest in a full understanding of the

reasons for the imposition of measures, or of a negative determination, is much greater, and the requirement in Article 12.2 that the investigating authority set forth “in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material” is directed at that interest.”

Para. 7.105. “Thus we conclude that Article 5.3 does not establish a requirement for the investigating authority to state specifically the resolution of questions concerning the exclusion of certain producers involved in defining the relevant domestic industry in the course of examining the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation.”

(i) accuracy and adequacy of the evidence Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.198-6.200 Neste caso, a Índia alegou que as CE não cumpriram com sua obrigação de examinar a adequação das evidências apresentadas no requerimento antes de iniciar a investigação antidumping, violando, portanto, o Artigo 5.3 do Acordo Antidumping. Ao avaliar os parâmetros do exame, em conformidade com este dispositivo, entendeu o Painel que é difícil definir a infração, uma vez que não é estabelecido nenhum processo específico para o exame das evidências realizado pelas autoridades. Assim, a priori, o início da investigação significa que a autoridade examinou as evidências apresentadas e concluiu que existiam evidências suficientes para o início da investigação. Portanto, o Painel concluiu que não houve violação ao Artigo 5.3 por parte das CE. Para. 6.198. “(…) Thus, we must determine what the parameters are of the requirement to “examine” the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence, and on what basis can it be assessed whether the necessary examination was carried out. It is difficult to see a basis on which a violation of Article 5.3 could be found based purely on the claim that the investigating authorities failed to examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence in the application unless we conclude that the text of Article 5.3 establishes a specific process requirement, that is, a requirement as to how the examination of the evidence must be conducted. Further, it is difficult to see a basis on which a violation of Article 5.3 could be found on the basis of India's claim unless we conclude that Article 5.3 establishes how the fact of and sufficiency of that examination must be made known, beyond the notice required by Article 12.1, which as noted is not at issue here. We can find no such requirements in the text of Article 5.3. It is clear that Article 5.3 requires an investigating authority to examine the evidence, and that the examination has a purpose – to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation of the investigation. However, Article 5.3 says nothing regarding the nature of the examination to be carried out. Nor does it say anything requiring an explanation of how that examination was carried out.” Para. 6.199. “The only basis, in our view, on which a panel can determine whether a Member's investigating authority has examined the accuracy and adequacy of the information in the application is by reference to the determination that examination is in aid of - the determination whether there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation. That is, if the investigating authority properly determined that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation, that determination can only have been made based on an examination of the accuracy and adequacy of the information in the application, and consideration of additional evidence (if any) before it.” Para. 6.200. “However, in this case India has made no claim that the European Communities violated Article 5.3 of the AD Agreement by initiating this investigation without sufficient evidence to justify doing so. Even assuming that India had actually raised such a claim, India has failed to present a prima facie case that the European Communities erred in concluding that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation. India has presented no arguments or evidence to support such a contention - rather, it has relied on the particular argument that the European Communities failed to examine the evidence. It is difficult to imagine how a defending Member might demonstrate that it has “examined” evidence in

the face of India's allegations in this dispute, except by reference to the determination that there was sufficient evidence to justify initiation, which is not at issue before us.”

(ii) Sufficient evidence Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Duties on Steel Pipes and Tubes from Guatemala (México - Steel Pipes and Tubes), Demandante: Guatemala, WT/DS331/R, para. 7.24 Neste caso, a Guatemala alegou que o México teria violado os Artigo 5.2 e 5.3 do Acordo Antidumping, pois o requerimento de início da investigação antidumping não continha indícios da existência de dumping e dano, e a autoridade investigadora não havia examinado corretamente as informações que lhe foram fornecidas antes do início da investigação, caso contrário não teria aberto o referido procedimento. O México contra argumentou, citando o precedente do próprio DSB no caso EC - Bed Linen, o qual o Painel considerou que não se aplicava a este caso concreto. Assim, o Painel concluiu que seria necessária a existência de prova suficiente de dumping, dano e nexo causal para justificar o início da investigação, e que a autoridade investigadora precisa certificar-se sobre a adequação destas provas. Para. 7.24. “(…) In this context, we are mindful that a piece of evidence that on its own might appear to be of little or no probative value could, when placed beside other evidence of the same nature, form part of a body of evidence that, in totality, was “sufficient”.” 4. Artigo 5.4

a) “Degree of support for or opposition” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) (US - Offset Act), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, Coreia e Tailândia, WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 283 Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Artigo 5.4 exige, nada mais do que, um exame formal para constatar que um número suficiente de produtores domésticos manifestaram apoio ao requerimento inicial da investigação antidumping, e que não há a exigência de que as autoridades examinem os motivos os quais levaram os produtores a apoiarem o pleito. Por fim, concluiu que é importante o exame do grau de apoio ao requerimento pelos produtores domésticos, sendo mais valorizada a quantidade do que a qualidade. O Órgão de Apelação reverteu o entendimento do Painel que havia considerado que os EUA agiram em desconformidade com este Artigo. Para. 283. “A textual examination of Article 5.4 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 11.4 of the SCM Agreement reveals that those provisions contain no requirement that an investigating authority examine the motives of domestic producers that elect to support an investigation. Nor do they contain any explicit requirement that support be based on certain motives, rather than on others. The use of the terms “expressing support” and “expressly supporting” clarify that Articles 5.4 and 11.4 require only that authorities “determine” that support has been “expressed” by a sufficient number of domestic producers. Thus, in our view, an “examination” of the “degree” of support, and not the “nature” of support is required. In other words, it is the “quantity”, rather than the “quality”, of support that is the issue.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from Índia (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.211-6.216 Neste caso, a Índia alegou que as CE teriam supostamente violado o Artigo 5.4 por não preencher o requisito de que a investigação apenas seria iniciada quando os produtores nacionais expressamente

apoiassem o requerimento, reunindo no mínimo 25% da produção total do similar realizada pela indústria nacional. Segundo a Índia, teria sido erroneamente considerado o apoio da associação dos produtores, no lugar de considerar-se o apoio dos Membros individualmente. Além disso, também faltou uma análise prévia, ou seja, antes do início da investigação quanto a este ponto. Entretanto, seguindo uma linha de raciocínio similar ao empregado na análise do Artigo 5.3, o Painel considerou neste caso que era difícil definir a ocorrência da infração, pois não havia a especificação de um requisito no Artigo 5.4, ou um método que devesse ser seguido para que esta determinação fosse feita pela autoridade. No caso em tela, a Índia apresentou os documentos e as evidências mínimas suficientes para provar que seus produtores nacionais representavam ao menos 25% da produção total do similar desenvolvida pela indústria doméstica. Assim, concluiu o Painel que as CE não violaram o Artigo 5.4 do Acordo Antidumping. Para. 6.211. “Article 5.4 thus sets up two separate calculations to determine that a minimum level of “support” for the application is shown by domestic producers. The first requires that producers accounting for more than 50 per cent of production of those producers expressing either support or opposition express support for the application (…).” Para. 6.212. “The second calculation requires that producers accounting for at least 25 per cent of total production of the like product by the domestic industry support the application. It is the European Communities' determination in this regard, both as a legal and as a factual matter, that is challenged by India.” Para. 6.213. “(…) As with Article 5.3, Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement requires that the investigating authorities make certain determinations before an investigation may be initiated, and establishes the substance of the determinations to be made, including that the application is supported by producers accounting for at least 25 per cent of domestic production, but does not set out any specific requirements as to the process by which that determination must be made. In our view, whether the necessary examination of the degree of support for the application was carried out prior to the initiation can only be assessed by reference to the determination that was actually made, and the evidence before the authority at the time it made the determination. In this case, the EC investigating authority clearly concluded that the application was supported by producers accounting for more than 25 per cent of total EC production of bed linen, and we have before us documents which it asserts contain the relevant evidence on which it relied. We therefore turn first to the facts of this matter.” Para. 6.214. “We have carefully examined the documents submitted by both parties. These documents are photocopies, and in some cases photocopies of photocopies, of faxes of (1) letters of support sent by individual producers of bed linen to the investigating authority indicating support for the application, (2) letters of support sent by national associations of producers of bed linen to the investigating authority expressing support on behalf of individual producers listed in annexes, and (3) letters of support from national associations of producers of bed linen sent to the investigating authority expressing support on behalf of their members. It appears that these letters of support were first sent, by fax, to Eurocoton, which then sent them on, again by fax, to the EC investigating authority. All of the letters themselves are dated prior to the initiation of the investigation by the European Communities on 13 September 1996. Based on the letters themselves, individual producers of bed linen individually communicating support for the application directly to the investigating authorities accounted for 26.7 per cent of total EC production of bed linen. This is more than the minimum necessary under Article 5.4 of the AD Agreement to find sufficient support for the application.” Para. 6.215. “India asks us to conclude that these letters were not, in fact, received by the EC investigating authority prior to initiation, that the EC investigating authority did not, in fact, examine them prior to initiation, and that the European Communities has tried to cover this fundamental error by manufacturing evidence post hoc and misrepresenting the facts before us. This we decline to do. We recognise that the dates in the fax headers and footers in the photocopied documents submitted to us are inconsistent with one another and with the dates of the letters themselves. However, all these

dates are prior to the relevant date, that of initiation on 13 September 1996. We note that the European Communities has offered to submit the originals of the faxes for our (and India's) inspection in this dispute, should we deem it necessary to resolve this issue.” Para. 6.216. “As noted above, India bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case that the European Communities failed to act consistently with its obligations under Article 5.4 to determine the necessary level of support prior to initiation. We presume that Members act in good faith in the context of dispute settlement proceedings, and are unwilling to assume possible malfeasance in the absence of evidence to that effect. We consider that the “doubts” which India has as to the European Communities' actions in this regard do not establish the necessary prima facie case in this context – the “evidence” of the fax headers relied on by India does not, in our view, constitute evidence of fraud sufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith. Moreover, we believe it is more probable that these inconsistencies in the photocopies are attributable to the photocopying itself, rather than to the perpetration of a massive fabrication of fax headers and footers by the EC investigating authority to hide a failure to make a determination of standing prior to initiation. We therefore do not consider it necessary to examine the originals of the documents in question.”

(ii) Impact of a wrongly-defined industry Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Measures on farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.107 e 7.124 O Painel entendeu que a autoridade investigadora havia definido erroneamente a indústria doméstica, ao excluir algumas classes de produtores como: os produtores de salmão que não expressavam uma opinião sobre a investigação; os produtores que não forneciam informação à autoridade investigadora; os produtores de salmão orgânico; e, os produtores de salmão em cultura. O Painel concluiu que a avaliação da autoridade sobre se os produtores incluídos corresponderiam à “maior proporção” da produção doméstica do produto similar foi, portanto, baseada em informação incorreta acerca do volume total da produção doméstica do produto similar, já que a informação utilizada relacionava-se à uma definição errônea de indústria doméstica. Consequentemente, concluiu-se que a determinação desrespeitava o Artigo 5.4. Como as CE não conseguiram obter informação sobre a produção dos produtores excluídos, o Painel desistiu de fazer sua própria avaliação, posto que isso poderia ser proibido. Para. 7.107. “There are three basic questions raised by Norway's domestic industry claims – first, whether the EC erred in not including certain categories of enterprises in the domestic industry based on the nature of their specific activities (filleting-only undertakings, (55) organic producers, and producers of “certain kinds” of salmon), their silence concerning the investigation, or their failure to provide information in the format requested. The second question is whether the EC's interpretation of Article 4.1 as allowing the investigating authority to conclude that, so long as the producers included in the domestic industry accounted for a major proportion of total domestic production, it was entitled to ignore other producers, is permissible. The third question is whether the EC was entitled to engage in sampling of the domestic industry in the context of its injury analysis.” Para. 7.124. “We therefore conclude that the EC's approach to defining the domestic industry in this case resulted in an investigation concerning a domestic industry that did not comport with the definition set forth in Article 4.1 of the AD Agreement. As a consequence, the EC's determination of support for the application under Article 5.4 was based on information relating to a wrongly-defined industry, and is therefore not consistent with the requirements of that Article. Furthermore, the EC's analyses of injury and causation were based on information relating to a wrongly-defined industry, and are therefore necessarily not consistent with the requirements of Articles 3.1, 3.4, and 3.5.”

5. Artigo 5.5

a) “Notify the government of the exporting Member”

(i) oral notification Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, para. 7.89-7.90 Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que o dever de notificação da autoridade investigadora ao governo do Membro exportador, acerca do início da investigação, nos termos do Artigo 5.5, pode ser realizado oralmente. Assim, a comunicação verbal sobre o assunto entre as autoridades da Polônia e da Tailândia, em uma reunião, foi suficiente para cumprir com esta obrigação, não sendo necessária a existência de um documento escrito comprovando a ciência da parte. Para. 7.89. “Article 5.5 AD does not specify the form that the notification must take. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the term “notify” as: “inform or give notice to (a person)”; “make known, announce or report (a thing)”. We consider that the form of the notification under Article 5.5 must be sufficient for the importing Member to “inform” or “make known” to the exporting Member certain facts. While a written notification might arguably best serve this goal and the promotion of transparency and certainty among Members, and might also provide a written record upon which an importing Member could rely in the event of a subsequent claim of inconsistency with Article 5.5 of the AD Agreement, the text of Article 5.5 does not expressly require that the notification be in writing.” Para. 7.90. “We consider that a formal meeting between government officials could satisfy the notification requirement of Article 5.5, provided that the meeting is sufficiently documented to support meaningful review by a panel. For these reasons, we find that the fact that Thailand notified Poland under Article 5.5 orally in the course of a meeting between government officials, rather than in written form, does not render the notification inconsistent with Article 5.5.”

b) “Content of notification”

Relatório do Painel no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/R, para. 7.91 Neste caso, o Painel decidiu avaliar a reunião realizada entre as autoridades da Polônia e Tailândia, na qual ocorreu a comunicação oral acerca do início da investigação antidumping, no que tange ao conteúdo da notificação. Verificou que o Artigo 5.5 não dispõe acerca do conteúdo da notificação. A única exigência do dispositivo é que já tenha ocorrido o recebimento do requerimento devidamente documentado, antes da notificação. Por fim, concluiu o Painel que a Tailândia não agiu em desconformidade com o Artigo 5.5 em relação ao tempo, forma e conteúdo da notificação, ao informar a Polônia apenas oralmente na reunião oficial entre as autoridades dos países, acerca do início da investigação antidumping. Para. 7.91. “(…) The text of Article 5.5 does not specify the contents of the notification. It provides: “after receipt of a properly documented application and before proceeding to initiate an investigation, the authorities shall notify the government of the exporting Member concerned”. Because the text of the provision specifies that notification necessarily follows the receipt of a properly documented application, we consider that the fact of the receipt of a properly documented application would be an essential element of the contents of the notification.”

(ii) before proceeding to initiate

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 7.34 Neste caso, o México alegou que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala não havia notificado o governo do México antes do início da investigação, incorrendo em suposta violação ao Artigo 5.5. Nesta análise, o Painel esclareceu que a nota de rodapé 1 do Acordo Antidumping define em que momento a investigação deve ter início, ou seja, a partir da data da publicação no Diário Oficial. O Painel rejeitou o argumento da Guatemala de que não poderia ter iniciado a investigação até que tivesse notificado o México, nos termos de sua legislação e Constituição, uma vez que ao aderir à OMC, o país está automaticamente sujeito ao Acordo Antidumping. O Painel entendeu que houve violação ao Artigo 5.5 conforme alegado pelo México. Para. 7.34. “In our view, footnote 1 to the ADP Agreement is helpful in this regard. Footnote 1 defines the term “initiated” as follows:

The term “initiated” as used in this Agreement means the procedural action by which a Member formally commences an investigation as provided in Article 5.

When combined with this definition of “initiated”, Article 5.5 requires a Member to notify the government of the exporting Member before proceeding to the “procedural action by which it formally commences the investigation”.” (iii) Harmless error Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 7.43 Neste caso, a Guatemala alegou, com base no conceito de “harmless error”, que o seu atraso em notificar as autoridades do México não prejudicou o curso da investigação. O Painel rejeitou o argumento da Guatemala, segundo o qual, de acordo com as regras de interpretação do Direito Internacional Público, seria responsabilidade do Painel examinar os atos da Guatemala e determinar se o não preenchimento de uma condição processual poderia ser relevado, tendo em vista que a omissão não teria prejudicado os direitos do país. Por fim, o Painel considerou que esta interpretação de “harmless error” apresentada pela Guatemala não seria suficiente para anular a obrigação do país, nos termos Artigo 5.5. Para. 7.43. “(…) Thus, we do not consider that the assertion that an error is “harmless” should prevent us from reaching the issue whether a violation of a provision of the ADP Agreement nullifies or impairs benefits under that Agreement. However, we do not preclude that the notion of “harmless error” could be relevant to the question of what steps a Member should take in order to implement the recommendation of a panel in a particular dispute. Since we do not view the principle of harmless error as one which would prevent us from determining that there was a violation of the ADP Agreement which nullified or impaired benefits under that Agreement, we believe it would be improper for us to fail to make a recommendation under Article 19.1. However, the effects of a particular error may, we believe, be relevant in determining what remedial actions might be appropriate - that is, what if any suggestions a panel might make as to how its recommendation may be implemented.” 6. Artigo 5.7

a) “Both dumping and injury” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/RW, paras. 6.112-6.115

O Painel entendeu que a obrigação do Artigo 5.7, de se comprovar a existência de dumping e dano, simultaneamente, deve ocorrer apenas durante o período de condução da investigação, em que pese o título “início e condução das investigações”. Para. 6.112. “As always, we apply the rules of the Vienna Convention to elucidate our understanding of this provision.” Para. 6.113. “Article 5.7 requires that the evidence of dumping and injury be considered simultaneously in certain circumstances. It is found in Article 5 of the AD Agreement, which is entitled “Initiation and Subsequent Investigation”. Thus, at first glance, Article 5.7 would be expected to apply in those two situations – initiation and investigation. Of course, a closer look must be taken at the specific text of Article 5.7, in its context and in light of its object and purpose, to see whether it should be understood to apply in other situations.” Para. 6.114. “It is clear to us that the text of Article 5.7 is specific as to when it applies. As might be anticipated from the title of Article 5, Article 5.7 specifies that the obligation in that provision applies first, in the initiation decision, and subsequently, during the course of the investigation. We agree with the view stated by another panel that, “In the context of Article 5 of the AD Agreement, it is clear to us that the term “investigation” means the investigative phase leading up to the final determination of the investigating authority”. Thus, we consider that the obligation set out in Article 5.7 to consider evidence of dumping and injury simultaneously simply does not apply in the circumstances of the redetermination and subsequent Regulations at issue here.” Para. 6.115. “We note, moreover, that to find otherwise could have absurd consequences. Assume a dispute under the AD Agreement in which only the determination of injury is challenged. Assume further that the Panel finds a violation of the AD Agreement in the determination of injury, and the DSB recommends that the measure be brought into conformity with the requirements of the AD Agreement. In principle, the Member whose measure was found to be inconsistent with the AD Agreement may undertake to bring its measure into conformity by re-examining the injury determination and issuing a redetermination. There would be no need in such a case to re-examine the calculation of the dumping margin, as the finding of violation in connection with the injury determination could have no effect on the calculation of the margin. Yet under India's theory, the redetermination in such a situation would violate Article 5.7. India, in response to this proposition, asserts that “once both dumping and injury are under review the synchronicity requirement should be respected”. However, while this might be a useful principle, it finds no support in the text of Article 5.7. We therefore consider that the obligation of Article 5.7 applies only during the course of original investigations, and thus that India’s claim under Article 5.7 does not have merit.” 7. Artigo 5.8

a) “Rejection of an application to initiate an investigation” Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.72 Neste caso, o México alegou que a Guatemala violou o Artigo 5.8 por não rejeitar o requerimento apresentado pelo produtor doméstico e por não encerrar a investigação devido à falta de comprovações suficientes da existência de dumping e dano a justificar o início da investigação. Apesar de a Guatemala contra argumentar que este Artigo é aplicado apenas após o início da investigação, o Painel aceitou o argumento do México e entendeu que houve violação ao Artigo 5.8 por parte da autoridade da Guatemala. Para. 8.72. “(…) We are of the view that, if the drafters intended that Article 5.8 apply only after initiation, the reference to promptly terminating an investigation would have sufficed. By referring to the rejection of an application Article 5.8 addresses the situation where an application has been

received but an investigation has not yet been initiated. That the text of Article 5.8 continues after the quoted section to describe situations in which an initiated investigation should be terminated, does not support Guatemala's argument that the whole of Article 5.8 applies only after the investigation has been initiated. On the contrary, the second sentence of Article 5.8, by specifying that “there shall be immediate termination in cases” confirms that the first sentence of Article 5.8 expressly contemplates its application pre-initiation by including a reference to the rejection of an application. Otherwise, mere reference to the termination of an investigation, as in the second sentence of Article 5.8, would have been all that was needed in the first sentence to make it clear that it applied once an investigation was underway.”

(i) margin “de minimis” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Measures on farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.625 Neste caso, a Noruega alegou que as importações decorrentes de um certo exportador norueguês, ao qual foi atribuído uma margem de dumping de minimis, não deveria ser computada para a determinação do dano. O Painel discutiu o conceito de produtos importados a preços de dumping. Como o próprio Artigo 5.8 dispõe que deverá ocorrer imediato encerramento da investigação naqueles casos em que as autoridades determinem que a margem de dumping é de minimis, concluiu o Painel que as importações procedentes do exportador avaliado com margem de minimis não devem ser levadas em consideração para fins de cálculo do dano total na referida investigação. Para. 7.625. “We consider that imports attributable to a producer or exporter for which a de minimis margin of dumping is calculated may not be treated as “dumped” for purposes of the injury analysis in that investigation. Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement provides that there shall be “immediate termination in cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping is de minimis”. Thus, it is clear that no antidumping duties can be imposed on such imports. In our view, a finding of de minimis dumping margins is a finding that there is no legally cognizable dumping by the producer or exporter in question.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, paras. 6.85-6.91 Neste caso, a Coreia alegou que os EUA teriam violado o Artigo 5.8 ao estipular como margem de dumping de minimis a alíquota de 0.5% para o cálculo do valor do direito antidumping aplicado (Artigo 9.3), ao invés do patamar de 2%. A discussão é se a margem de minimis prevista no Artigo 5.8 do Acordo Antidumping aplica-se tanto às investigações antidumping, quanto aos procedimentos para a determinação do valor do direito antidumping. O Painel rejeitou o argumento da Coreia, por entender que não há uma razão lógica a justificar o mesmo patamar de minimis em ambos os Artigos, uma vez que, sob o Artigo 5.8 procura-se determinar se um exportador está sujeito a uma medida antidumping e, sob o Artigo 9.3, o objetivo é determinar se um exportador deve pagar um valor pecuniário. Para. 6.85. “Essentially, the parties disagree as to whether the second sentence (and therefore the de minimis standard contained in the third sentence) of Article 5.8 applies to both antidumping investigations and Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures (referred to in US parlance as “administrative reviews”), or only to antidumping investigations.” Para. 6.86. “In our view, the scope of the obligation in the second sentence of Article 5.8 is defined by the term “cases”. However, the ordinary meaning of that term does not clarify whether it refers to both antidumping investigations and Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, or only to the former. To resolve this matter, therefore, we must consider the following context of Article 5.8, second sentence.”

Para. 6.87. “First, the term “case” is used in the first sentence of Article 5.8. The first sentence is concerned explicitly and exclusively with the circumstances in which an “application” (“under [Article 5,] paragraph 1”) shall be rejected and an “investigation” terminated as a result of insufficient evidence to justify proceeding with the “case”. As the treatment of the “application” and conduct of the “investigation” is dependent on the sufficiency of evidence concerning the “case”, we consider that the term “case” in the first sentence must at least encompass the notions of “application” and “investigation”. In our view, it would meaningless for the term “case” in the first sentence to also encompass the concept of an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure, since we fail to see how the sufficiency of evidence concerning a subsequent duty assessment could be relevant to the treatment of an “application” or the conduct of an “investigation”, both of which precede the Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure. As we consider that the term “case” in the first sentence of Article 5.8 does not include the concept of “duty assessment”, we see no reason to adopt a different approach to the term “cases” in the second sentence of that provision.” Para. 6.88. “Second, we consider that note 22 of the AD Agreement effectively provides that a finding in a US duty assessment procedure that no duty is to be levied “shall not by itself require the authorities to terminate the definitive duty.” According to note 22, therefore, a finding in an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure of a zero percent margin of dumping, which is de minimis under both the US 0.5 percent standard and the 2 percent standard advocated by Korea on the basis of Article 5.8, shall not by itself lead to termination of the duty. Nevertheless, by arguing that Article 5.8, including the second sentence thereof, applies in the context of Article 9.3 duty assessments, Korea is effectively arguing that a zero percent, i.e., de minimis, margin of dumping shall lead to “immediate termination” of the duty. Thus, to the extent that Korea's interpretation of Article 5.8, second sentence, requires “immediate termination” of the duty in circumstances where termination “shall not” be required by note 22 of the AD Agreement, Korea's interpretation renders note 22 meaningless.” Para. 6.89. “For these reasons, we conclude that Article 5.8, second sentence, does not apply in the context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures. As Article 5.8, second sentence, does not require Members to apply a de minimis test in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, it certainly cannot require Members to apply a particular de minimis standard in such procedures.” Para. 6.90. “Korea argues that there is “no logical reason why the de minimis level during the [Article 9.3.1] review stage of a proceeding should be different than at the investigation stage. That which is the legal equivalent of a zero margin for purposes of determining whether to impose an antidumping duty is also the legal equivalent of zero for collecting antidumping duties.” As explained above, we consider that the text of Article 5.8, when read in its context, does not require that a Member apply the Article 5.8 de minimis test in an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure. In any event, there are possible logical explanations for applying different de minimis standards in investigations and Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures. Article 5.8 requires the termination of investigations in cases where the margin of dumping is de minimis. Thus, in the context of Article 5.8, the function of the de minimis test is to determine whether or not an exporter is subject to an antidumping order. In the context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, however, the function of any de minimis test applied by Members is to determine whether or not an exporter should pay a duty. A de minimis test in the context of an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure will not remove an exporter from the scope of the order. Thus, the implications of the de minimis test required by Article 5.8, and any de minimis test that Members choose to apply in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, differ significantly. Accordingly, we are not convinced that Korea's policy argument requires us to abandon our conclusion that the text of Article 5.8, when read in its context, does not require that a Member apply the Article 5.8 de minimis test in an Article 9.3 duty assessment procedure.” Para. 6.91. “In light of our conclusion that Article 5.8, second sentence, does not apply in the context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, we reject Korea's claim that the United States violates Article 5.8 by applying a 0.5 percent de minimis standard in the context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures.”

(ii) Margem de dumping individual / volume negligenciável Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Beef and Rice (Mexico - Antidumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/R, para. 7.141 e WT/DS295/AB/R, para. 216 Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou o argumento do México de que, nos termos do Artigo 5.8, deve ser encerrada a investigação apenas quando a margem de dumping no país é de minimis e confirmou o entendimento do Painel, segundo o qual o termo “margem de dumping”, definido no dispositivo, refere-se à margem de dumping individual de um exportador ou produtor ao invés da margem de dumping a nível do país. Em 2002, o Comitê de Práticas Antidumping emitiu as “Recomendações referentes ao tempo a ser considerado em caso de determinação do volume negligenciável, nos termos do Artigo 5.8 do Acordo Antidumping”. Para. 7.141. “(…) According to Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, negligibility is to be determined in respect of the volume of dumped imports “from a particular country”. In short, in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement, the margin of dumping is juxtaposed to the volume of dumped imports. While it is expressly stipulated that the latter is to be examined on a country-wide basis, no such stipulation is made with regard to the margin of dumping. This further confirms our view that the reference to the margin of dumping in Article 5.8 of the AD Agreement is, as is the case in the other provisions of the AD Agreement referred to above, a reference to the individual margin of dumping which is to be determined on an exporter-specific basis.” Para. 216. “The Panel's position - that the term “margin of dumping” in Article 5.8 refers to the individual margin of dumping of an exporter or producer rather than to a country-wide margin of dumping - is consistent with the use of the term “margins of dumping” in Article 2.4.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (...).” III. Comentários

O Artigo 5 contém os procedimentos e requisitos para o início de uma investigação antidumping. Os destaques são os Artigos 5.2 e 5.3, os quais, por algumas vezes, foram avaliados pelo DSB. O Artigo 5.2 contempla os pontos essenciais, os quais devem constar no requerimento que dará início ao processo antidumping, dentre os quais: a prova de dumping, dano e nexo causal, e informações dos subitens. Segundo o Artigo 5.3, deve a autoridade do Membro importador examinar a exatidão e adequação das provas no requerimento. Conforme demonstrado pelo entendimento dos julgados, apesar de relacionados, a possível violação a um dos Artigos não significa que também houve violação a outro. Além disso, como não há qualquer método específico acerca do exame, é difícil para o Painel configurar a ocorrência desta infração. Outro ponto importante, refere-se ao Artigo 5.8 ao esclarecer as hipóteses em que a investigação deve ser encerrada definitivamente, ou seja, quando a margem de dumping é de minimis ou quando o volume de importações é insignificante (Guatemala - Cement II, Mexico - Antidumping Measures on Rice, US - DRAMS, EC - Salmon). Há que se destacar a decisão do DSB, no sentido de que as importações procedentes do exportador avaliado com margem de minimis não serão levadas em consideração para fins de cálculo do dano total na referida investigação. A legislação brasileira respeita todos os dispositivos do Artigo, e contempla prazos pormenorizados acerca do processo de abertura da investigação.

FOOTNOTES: Footnote 53: On this question we concur fully with the reasoning of the Guatemala - Cement I panel when they state that: “In our view, the reference in Article 5.2 to “dumping” must be read as a reference to dumping as it is defined in Article 2. This does not, of course, mean that the evidence provided in the application must be of the quantity and quality that would be necessary to make a preliminary or final determination of dumping. However, evidence of the relevant type is, in our view, required in a case such as this one where it is obvious on the face of the application that the normal value and export price alleged in the application will require adjustments in order to effectuate a fair comparison. At a minimum, there should be some recognition that a fair comparison will require such adjustments.” Guatemala - Cement I, WT/DS60/R, para. 7.64. Footnote  54:  “We recall that, at para. 136 of its first written submission, Guatemala asserted that it is not suggesting that Articles 2 and 3 are totally irrelevant during the initiation phase. Articles 2 and 3 contain definitions which give meaning tothe expressions 'dumping', 'injury' and 'causal link' used in Article 5.2. When the authorities examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence submitted in the application, those definitions help to establish whether there is 'sufficient evidence' in the meaning of Article 5.3 to justify the initiation of the investigation.” Footnote 55: A “filleting-only undertaking” as used in this report is an undertaking which transforms acquired farmed (other than wild) salmon that is not filleted, into farmed (other than wild) salmon fillets.

Ø Artigo 6 Fernanda Dalla Valle Martino IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 6 Evidence

6.1 All interested parties in an Antidumping investigation shall be given notice of the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question. 6.1.1 Exporters or foreign producers receiving questionnaires used in an Antidumping

investigation shall be given at least 30 days for reply. (56) Due consideration should be given to any request for an extension of the 30-day period and, upon cause shown, such an extension should be granted whenever practicable.

6.1.2 Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, evidence presented in

writing by one interested party shall be made available promptly to other interested parties participating in the investigation.

6.1.3 As soon as an investigation has been initiated, the authorities shall provide the full text

of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article 5 to the known exporters (57) and to the authorities of the exporting Member and shall make it available, upon request, to other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information, as provided for in paragraph 5.

6.2 Throughout the Antidumping investigation all interested parties shall have a full opportunity

for the defence of their interests. To this end, the authorities shall, on request, provide opportunities for all interested parties to meet those parties with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be presented and rebuttal arguments offered. Provision of such opportunities must take account of the need to preserve confidentiality and of the convenience to the parties. There shall be no obligation on any party to attend a meeting, and failure to do so shall not be prejudicial to that party's case. Interested parties shall also have the right, on justification, to present other information orally.

6.3 Oral information provided under paragraph 2 shall be taken into account by the authorities only in so far as it is subsequently reproduced in writing and made available to other interested parties, as provided for in subparagraph 1.2.

6.4 The authorities shall whenever practicable provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases, that is not confidential as defined in paragraph 5, and that is used by the authorities in an Antidumping investigation, and to prepare presentations on the basis of this information.

6.5 Any information which is by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure would be

of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person from whom that person acquired the information), or which is provided on a confidential basis by parties to an investigation shall, upon good cause shown, be treated as such by the authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without specific permission of the party submitting it. (58)

6.5.1 The authorities shall require interested parties providing confidential information to furnish non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such parties may indicate that such information is not susceptible of summary. In such exceptional circumstances, a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible must be provided.

6.5.2 If the authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the

supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form, the authorities may disregard such information unless it can be demonstrated to their satisfaction from appropriate sources that the information is correct. (59)

6.6 Except in circumstances provided for in paragraph 8, the authorities shall during the course of

an investigation satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based.

6.7 In order to verify information provided or to obtain further details, the authorities may carry

out investigations in the territory of other Members as required, provided they obtain the agreement of the firms concerned and notify the representatives of the government of the Member in question, and unless that Member objects to the investigation. The procedures described in Annex I shall apply to investigations carried out in the territory of other Members. Subject to the requirement to protect confidential information, the authorities shall make the results of any such investigations available, or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to paragraph 9, to the firms to which they pertain and may make such results available to the applicants.

6.8 In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide,

necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation, preliminary and final determinations, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of Annex II shall be observed in the application of this paragraph.

6.9 The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested parties of the

essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient time for the parties to defend their interests.

6.10 The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for each known

exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation. In cases where the number of exporters, producers, importers or types of products involved is so large as to make such a determination impracticable, the authorities may limit their examination either to a reasonable number of interested parties or products by using samples which are statistically valid on the basis of information available to the authorities at the time of the selection, or to the largest percentage of the volume of the exports from the country in question which can reasonably be investigated.

6.10.1 Any selection of exporters, producers, importers or types of products made under

this paragraph shall preferably be chosen in consultation with and with the consent of the exporters, producers or importers concerned.

6.10.2 In cases where the authorities have limited their examination, as provided for in

this paragraph, they shall nevertheless determine an individual margin of dumping for any exporter or producer not initially selected who submits the necessary information in time for that information to be considered during the course of the

investigation, except where the number of exporters or producers is so large that individual examinations would be unduly burdensome to the authorities and prevent the timely completion of the investigation. Voluntary responses shall not be discouraged.

6.11 For the purposes of this Agreement, “interested parties” shall include:

(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to investigation, or a trade or business association a majority of the members of which are producers, exporters or importers of such product;

(ii) the government of the exporting Member; and

(iii) a producer of the like product in the importing Member or a trade and business

association a majority of the members of which produce the like product in the territory of the importing Member.

This list shall not preclude Members from allowing domestic or foreign parties other than those mentioned above to be included as interested parties. 6.12 The authorities shall provide opportunities for industrial users of the product under

investigation, and for representative consumer organizations in cases where the product is commonly sold at the retail level, to provide information which is relevant to the investigation regarding dumping, injury and causality.

6.13 The authorities shall take due account of any difficulties experienced by interested parties, in

particular small companies, in supplying information requested, and shall provide any assistance practicable.

6.14 The procedures set out above are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from

proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating an investigation, reaching preliminary or final determinations, whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final measures, in accordance with relevant provisions of this Agreement.

 Footnote 56: As a general rule, the time-limit for exporters shall be counted from the date of receipt of the questionnaire, which for this purpose shall be deemed to have been received one week from the date on which it was sent to the respondent or transmitted to the appropriate diplomatic representative of the exporting Member or, in the case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, an official representative of the exporting territory. Footnote 57: It being understood that, where the number of exporters involved is particularly high, the full text of the ritten application should instead be provided only to the authorities of the exporting Member or to the relevant trade association. Footnote 58: Members are aware that in the territory of certain Members disclosure pursuant to a narrowly-drawn protective order may be required. Footnote 59: Members agree that requests for confidentiality should not be arbitrarily rejected. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 6 Provas

6.1 Todas as partes interessadas em uma investigação Antidumping deverão ser postas ao corrente das informações requeridas pelas autoridades e ter ampla oportunidade de apresentar, por escrito, todas as provas que considerem relevantes com respeito à investigação em apreço.

6.2 (a) Exportadores ou produtores estrangeiros que recebem questionários destinados a uma investigação Antidumping deverão dispor de pelo menos 30 dias para respondê-los15. Deverão ser devidamente considerados pedidos de prorrogação do prazo inicial de 30 dias e, caso demonstrada sua necessidade, tal prorrogação deverá ser autorizada sempre que exequível.

(b) Reservado o direito de requerimento de confidencialidade para as informações

prestadas, as provas apresentadas por escrito por uma parte interessada serão prontamente colocadas à disposição das outras partes interessadas que estejam participando da investigação.

(c) Tão logo iniciada uma investigação, as autoridades deverão fornecer o texto completo

da petição escrita que lhes tenha sido dirigida por determinação do parágrafo 1 do Artigo 5 aos exportadores conhecidos16 e às autoridades do Membro exportador e deverão, caso requeridas, colocá-lo à disposição das outras partes interessadas envolvidas na investigação. Será levado na devida conta o requerimento de proteção de confidencialidade, como se encontra disposto no parágrafo 6.

6.3 Ao longo das investigações Antidumping, todas as partes interessadas devem dispor de

completa possibilidade de defesa de seus interesses. Para essa finalidade, as autoridades deverão, caso assim requeridas, propiciar oportunidade para que todas as partes interessadas possam encontrar-se com aquelas partes que tenham interesses antagônicos, de forma a que interpretações opostas e argumentação contrárias possam ser expressas. O propiciamento de tais oportunidades deverá levar em consideração a necessidade de ser preservada a confidencialidade e a conveniência das partes. Não deverá existir qualquer obrigatoriedade de comparecimento a tais encontros e a ausência de qualquer parte não poderá ser usada em prejuízo de seus interesses. As partes interessadas deverão ter o direito, se devidamente justificado, de apresentar informações adicionais oralmente.

6.4 As autoridades deverão considerar informações fornecidas oralmente, conforme previsto no

parágrafo 2, somente no caso de as mesmas serem reproduzidas subsequentemente por escrito e colocadas à disposição das outras partes interessadas, conforme o disposto no subparágrafo 2 (b).

6.5 As autoridades deverão, sempre que possível atempadamente oferecer oportunidade a todas as

partes interessadas para que examinem toda e qualquer informação relevante para a apresentação de seus casos, desde que não seja confidencial, conforme definido no parágrafo 6 e que seja utilizada pelas autoridades em Investigação Antidumping. Da mesma forma, as autoridades deverão oferecer oportunidade para que as partes interessadas preparem apresentações com base em tais informações.

6.6. Qualquer informação que seja confidencial por sua própria natureza (por exemplo, no caso da

informação cuja revelação daria substancial vantagem competitiva a um competidor ou daquela que teria efeito substancialmente negativo sobre a pessoa que a está prestando ou sobre a pessoa que forneceu a informação àquela que a está prestando) ou que seja fornecida em base confidencial pelas partes de uma investigação deverá, desde que bem fundamentada,

                                                                                                                         15 Como princípio geral, a data-limite para os exportadores deverá ser contada a partir da data de recebimento do uestionário, que, para essa finalidade deverá ser considerado como recebido uma semana após a data na qual a correspondência foi enviada ao implicado ou transmitida ao representante diplomático competente do Membro exportador, ou, no caso de território-Membro da OMC com poder alfandegário próprio, ao representante oficial do território exportador. 16 Fica entendido, no caso de o número de exportadores envolvidos ser especialmente alto, que o texto completo da petição escrita seja alternativamente fornecido apenas às autoridades do Membro exportador ou à associação comercial correspondente.

ser tratada como tal pelas autoridades. Tal informação não deverá ser revelada sem autorização específica da parte que a forneceu17.

6.7. (a) As autoridades deverão requerer às partes interessadas que forneçam informações

confidenciais a entrega de resumos ostensivos das mesmas. Tais resumos deverão conter pormenorização suficiente que permita compreensão razoável da substância da informação fornecida sob confidencialidade. Em circunstâncias excepcionais, aquelas partes poderão indicar que tal informação não é suscetível de resumo. Nessas circunstâncias excepcionais, deverá ser fornecida declaração sobre o porquê de o resumo não ser possível.

(b) Se as autoridades considerarem que uma informação fornecida sob confidencialidade

não traz plenamente justificado tal caráter, e se o fornecedor da informação não estiver disposto a torná-la pública ou a autorizar sua revelação quer na totalidade, quer sob forma resumida, as autoridades poderão desconsiderar tal informação, a menos que lhes possa ser demonstrado de forma convincente e por fonte apropriada que tal informação é correta18.

6.8. Salvo nas circunstâncias previstas no parágrafo 10, as autoridades deverão, no curso das

investigações, certificar-se de que são corretas as informações fornecidas pelas partes sobre as quais aquelas autoridades basearão suas conclusões.

6.9. Com o propósito de verificar as informações fornecidas ou de obter pormenores adicionais, as

autoridades poderão realizar investigações no território de outros Membros na medida de suas necessidades, desde que, para tanto, obtenham autorização das empresas envolvidas, notifiquem os representantes do Governo do Membro em questão e que este não apresente objeção à investigação. Serão aplicados às investigações realizadas no território de outro Membro os procedimentos descritos no Anexo I. Reservado o direito de requerimento de confidencialidade para as informações prestadas, as autoridades deverão tornar accessíveis os resultados de quaisquer investigações dessa natureza, ou permitir sejam revelados esses resultados de acordo com o disposto no parágrafo 11, às empresas de que se originaram e poderão tornar tais resultados igualmente acessíveis aos peticionários.

6.10. Nos casos em que qualquer das partes interessadas negue acesso à informação necessária ou

não a forneça dentro de período razoável, ou ainda interponha obstáculos de monta à investigação, poderão ser formulados juízos preliminares e finais afirmativos ou negativos com base nos fatos disponíveis. Será observado o disposto no Anexo II para a aplicação deste parágrafo.

6.11. Antes de formular juízo definitivo, as autoridades deverão informar todas as partes

interessadas sobre os fatos essenciais sob julgamento que formam a base para a decisão de aplicar ou não medidas definitivas. Tal informação deverá ocorrer com antecipação suficiente para que as partes possam defender seus interesses.

6.12. Por princípio geral, as autoridades deverão determinar a margem individual de dumping para

cada exportador ou produtor singular conhecido do produto sob investigação. No caso em que o número de exportadores, produtores, importadores ou tipos de produtos sob investigação seja tão grande que torne impraticável tal determinação, as autoridades poderão limitar-se a examinar quer um numero razoável de partes interessadas ou produtos, por meio de amostragem estatisticamente válida com base nas informações disponíveis às autoridades no

                                                                                                                         17 Os Membros estão conscientes de que, no território de alguns dos Membros, poderá ser necessário revelar uma informação em obediência a medida cautelar exarada em termos muito precisos. 18 Os Membros acordam em que não ser deverão recusar arbitrariamente os pedidos de confidencialidade.

momento da seleção, quer o maior percentual razoavelmente investigável do volume de exportações do país em questão.

6.13. (a) Qualquer seleção de exportadores, produtores, importadores ou tipos de produtos que

se faça ao abrigo do parágrafo 12 será preferivelmente efetuada após consulta aos exportadores, produtores ou importadores envolvidos e obtenção de sua anuência;

(b) No caso de as autoridades terem limitado seu exame segundo o disposto no parágrafo

12, elas deverão, não obstante, determinar a margem individual de dumping para cada exportador ou produtor individual que não tenha sido inicialmente incluído na seleção mas que venha a apresentar a necessária informação a tempo de que esta seja considerada durante o processo de investigação, com exceção das situações em que o número de exportadores ou produtores seja tão grande que a análise de casos individuais resulte em sobrecarga despropositada para as autoridades e impeça a conclusão da investigação dentro dos prazos prescritos. Não deverão ser desencorajadas as respostas voluntárias.

6.14. Para as finalidades deste Acordo considerar-se-ão “partes interessadas”:

(a) exportadores ou produtores estrangeiros ou importadores de um produto objeto de investigação, ou associação comercial ou empresarial, das quais a maioria dos membros seja de produtores, exportadores ou importadores de tal produto;

(b) o Governo do Membro exportador; e

(c) o produtor do similar nacional no Membro importador, ou associação comercial ou

empresarial na qual a maioria dos membros produz o similar nacional no território do Membro importador.

Essa lista não impedirá que os Membros incluam como interessadas na investigação outras partes nacionais ou estrangeiras, além daquelas mencionadas acima. 6.15. As autoridades deverão oferecer oportunidade para que os usuários industriais do produto

objeto de investigação e as organizações de consumidores mais representativas, nos casos em que o produto é habitualmente vendido no varejo, possam fornecer informações sobre dumping, dano e causalidade pertinentes à investigação.

6.16. As autoridades levarão na devida conta quaisquer dificuldades encontradas pelas partes

interessadas no fornecimento das informações solicitadas, em especial as pequenas empresas, e deverão proporcionar toda a assistência possível.

6.17. Os procedimentos estabelecidos acima não têm por objetivo impedir as autoridades de um

Membro de agir com presteza em relação ao início de uma investigação, a determinação de conclusões preliminares ou finais, quer afirmativas, quer negativas, ou de estabelecer medidas provisórias ou finais de acordo com as disposições pertinentes deste Acordo.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução Nada a comentar. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 6 1. Artigo 6.1 a) “Geral: devido processo legal”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews) (Article 21.5, Argentina), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, paras. 241-242 Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação enfatiza o princípio do devido processo legal garatido nas investigações antidumping, de acordo com os Artigos 6.1 e 6.2 do Acordo Antidumping. Estes artigos dispõem sobre a ampla possibilidade de defesa às Partes interessadas. Entretanto, tal direito não é ilimitado, sendo importante o estabelecimento de prazos para garantir o próprio direito de outras Partes interessadas. Para. 241. “These provisions set out the fundamental due process rights to which interested parties are entitled in Antidumping investigations and reviews. Articles 6.1 and 6.2 require that the opportunities afforded interested parties for presentation of evidence and defence of their interests be “ample” and “full”, respectively. In the context of these provisions, these two adjectives suggest there should be liberal opportunities for respondents to defend their interests. Nevertheless, we agree with the United States that Articles 6.1 and 6.2 do not provide for “indefinite” rights, so as to enable respondents to submit relevant evidence, attend hearings, or participate in the inquiry as and when they choose. Such an approach would “prevent the authorities of a Member from proceeding expeditiously” in their reviews, contrary to Article 6.14. It would also affect the rights of other interested parties. In this regard, we recall that the Appellate Body has previously recognized the importance for investigating authorities of establishing deadlines and controlling the conduct of their investigations.” Para. 242. “Therefore, the “ample” and “full” opportunities guaranteed by Articles 6.1 and 6.2, respectively, cannot extend indefinitely and must, at some point, legitimately cease to exist. This point must be determined by reference to the right of investigating authorities to rely on deadlines in the conduct of their investigations and reviews. Where the continued granting of opportunities to present evidence and attend hearings would impinge on an investigating authority's ability to “control the conduct” of its inquiry and to “carry out the multiple steps” required to reach a timely completion of the sunset review, a respondent will have reached the limit of the “ample” and “full” opportunities provided for in Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.”

b) “informação requisitada pela autoridade” Relatório do Painel no litígio Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy (Argentina - Ceramic Tiles), Demandante: Itália, WT/DS189/R, paras. 6.54 Nesta controvérsia, ao avaliar se a autoridade está autorizada a formular juízo com base nos fatos disponíveis, conforme o Artigo 6.8, o Painel analisou preliminarmente a obrigação da autoridade de requisitar informações às partes interessadas, nos termos do Artigo 6.1. Conclui que a autoridade não poderá punir uma parte interessada por não fornecer alguma informação que não lhe tenha sido claramente requisitada. Para. 6.54. “In considering this question, we first observe that a basic obligation concerning the evidence-gathering process is for the investigating authorities to indicate to the interested parties the information they require for their determination. This obligation is set forth in Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement (..). Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement thus requires that interested parties be given notice of the information which the authorities require. In our view, it follows that, independently of the purpose for which the information or documentation is requested, an investigating authority may not fault an interested party for not providing information it was not clearly requested to submit.”

c) “ampla oportunidade para apresentar prova” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.118-8.119 Nesta controvérsia, o México alegou que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala violou o Artigo 6.1 ao não estipular um limite de tempo para a apresentação de argumentos e provas durante a fase final da investigação (nota de determinação preliminar), mas, ao contrário, ter estipulado um prazo limite para a apresentação de argumentos e provas na fase inicial (nota pública de início da investigação antidumping). O Painel rejeitou este argumento, uma vez que o Artigo 6.1 exige apenas o prazo mínimo de 30 dias para a resposta aos questionários e a concessão de ampla oportunidade de defesa, e não a definição de qualquer prazo específico posteriormente. Assim, a não determinação de prazos na fase final da investigação não configura per se uma infração ao Artigo 6.1 do Acordo Antidumping. Para. 8.118. “We do not consider it necessary to determine whether, in fact, the Ministry did set periods for the presentation of arguments and evidence during the final stage of the investigation. This is because we find Mexico's claim to be without merit as a matter of law. In our view, Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement does not require investigating authorities to set time-limits for the presentation of arguments and evidence during the final stage of the investigation. The only time-limit provided for in Article 6.1 is that contained in Article 6.1.1, whereby exporters shall be given at least 30 days for replying to questionnaires (...).” Para. 8.119. “Article 6.1 requires investigating authorities to provide interested parties “ample opportunity” to present in writing certain evidence. Article 6.1 does not explicitly require an investigating authority to set time limits for the submission of arguments and evidence during the final stage of an investigation. Article 6.1 simply requires that interested parties shall have “ample” opportunity to present evidence and “full” opportunity to defend their interests. Interested parties may have such opportunity without the investigating authority setting time limits for the submission of evidence. In other words, these provisions impose substantive obligations, without requiring those obligations to be met through any particular form (except as provided for in sub-paragraphs 1 through 3 of Article 6.1). What counts is whether, in practice, sufficient opportunity was provided, not whether time limits for the submission of evidence were set. Thus, even if the Ministry had failed to set time-limits for the submission of arguments and evidence during the final stage of the investigation, this would not ipso facto constitute a violation of Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/AB/R, para. 615 Neste caso, a China alegou violação ao Artigo 6.1.1, referente ao prazo para o preenchimento do “MET/IT Claim Form”, espécie de “questionário” enviado pela União Europeia para exportadores e produtores de países considerados de economia de mercado, a fim de determinar se algum exportador/produtor específico poderia obter um tratamento de economia de não mercado e/ou um tratamento individual na determinação da margem de dumping. A autoridade investigadora da União Europeia anexou, à notificação enviada aos exportadores chineses, o documento requerendo as informações necessárias, e concedeu um prazo de 15 dias a contar da data da publicação de início da investigação para o envio da resposta. O Painel e o Órgão de Apelação rejeitaram o argumento da China de que este fato constituiria violação ao Artigo 6.1.1 do Acordo Antidumping, pois consideraram que o documento mencionado emitido não configurava um “questionário” no sentido definido no Acordo Antidumping. Entretanto, destaca-se a ressalva de que caso a China tivesse alegado o Artigo 6.1, poderia ter sido analisado, mesmo que o MET/IT não se enquadrasse no conceito de “questionário”.

Para. 615. “We recall that Article 6.1 of the Antidumping Agreement requires investigating authorities to give all interested parties “ample opportunity” to submit evidence that they consider relevant to the investigation, and that this obligation applies also to information requests that cannot be considered “questionnaires”. In our view, the determinations made regarding MET and IT treatment are important for NME exporters and foreign producers. The MET/IT Claim Form was the first request for information received by the Chinese exporters in the fasteners investigation, and their responses were subject to verification. While much of the information requested would seem to be readily accessible to the responding party, the form requests certain production and sales data for “the product concerned” that may need to be collected and reported in a form that is not regularly kept by the company, and could therefore involve a certain amount of time and effort for completion. Given the consequences of MET/IT status for exporters and foreign producers, and the amount of information solicited in the MET/IT Claim Form, we consider that, under the requirements of Article 6.1, a deadline of 15 days from the date of publication of the Notice of Initiation was too short and did not provide parties with “ample opportunity” to submit all evidence in support of their requests for MET or IT treatment. However, China has not invoked Article 6.1 in this case. Rather, China has limited its claim to the specific time period required for the submission of “questionnaires” under Article 6.1.1, and it is under this provision that we are called upon to make findings.”

d) “Abrangência do Artigo 6.1” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.178 Nesta controvérsia, o México alegou que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala teria supostamente violado o Artigo 6.1 do Acordo Antidumping ao prorrogar o período de investigação durante o procedimento investigatório e não responder ao requerimento de informações de um produtor mexicano referente a esta extensão, impedindo, assim, que o produtor mexicano tivesse oportunidade de defender seus interesses quanto a esta prorrogação. O Painel rejeitou este argumento, por considerar a interpretação do México muito expansiva. Para. 8.178. “(...) In addressing Mexico's Article 6.1 claim first, we consider that Mexico's interpretation of that provision is too expansive. The plain language of Article 6.1 merely requires that interested parties be given (1) notice of the information which the authorities require, and (2) ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation. First, we note that Cruz Azul was given two weeks in which to present data concerning the extended POI. Cruz Azul therefore had two weeks' notice of the information required by the Ministry in respect of the extended POI. Second, Mexico has made no claim to the effect that Cruz Azul was prevented from adducing written “evidence” concerning the extended POI. Whereas Mexico claims that Cruz Azul was denied any opportunity to comment on the extension of the POI per se, Article 6.1 does not explicitly require the provision of opportunities for interested parties to comment on decisions taken by the investigating authority in respect of the information it requires. We therefore reject Mexico's claim that the Ministry's extension of the POI violated Guatemala's obligations under Article 6.1 of the AD Agreement.” Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews (Article 21.5, Argentina), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/RW, para. 7.116 Nesta controvérsia, o Painel entendeu que a impossibilidade de emissão de questionários suplementares ou a falta de decisões preliminares não constituem, necessariamente, uma violação per se aos Artigos 6.1 e 6.2 do Acordo Antidumping, visto que estes dispositivos não contêm tais obrigações específicas.

Para. 7.116. “Turning to the specific violations alleged by Argentina, we note that, with the exception of the issue of a hearing, the instances cited by Argentina as violating Articles 6.1 and 6.2 seem to be rather vague in nature. We do not consider that failure to issue supplemental questionnaires or a preliminary determination necessarily constitutes such a violation because neither Article 6.1 nor 6.2 contains such specific obligations. We are cognizant that issuing supplemental questionnaires or deficiency letters and/or a preliminary determination may be the common practice of some WTO Members, and may be highly commendable. The fact, remains, however, that neither Article 6.1 nor 6.2 requires that an investigating authority do so. Nor can a mere allegation regarding the failure to establish a schedule that would allow interested parties to submit comments violate these provisions.81

Argentina has not explained with sufficient clarity how the timetable applied by the USDOC violated Article 6.1 or 6.2.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Mexico - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Beef and Rice, Complaint with Respect to Rice (Mexico - Antidumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/AB/R, para. 247 e 249-251 Nesta controvérsia, o Órgão de Apelação examinou o texto dos Artigos 6.1, 6.1.3 e 12.1, os quais tratam da notificação das Partes interessadas e conhecidas pelas autoridades na investigação antidumping. De acordo com o Artigo 12.1, a notificação é obrigatória apenas às Partes as quais a autoridade investigadora efetivamente possui conhecimento do interesse na ação e não àquelas que a autoridade deveria ter conhecimento. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que os exportadores que devem ser notificados a prestar informações, nos termos do Artigo 6.1, devem ser os mesmos que receberão o texto completo da petição escrita, conforme determinação do Artigo 6.1.3. Como o Artigo 6.1.3 expressamente contém o termo “exportadores conhecidos”, entende-se que deva ser aplicado ao Artigo 6.1. Uma interpretação extensiva do texto de lei, ampliando o dever de notificação aos exportadores os quais a autoridade “poderia razoavelmente ter conhecimento”, tal como pretendido pelo Painel, seria onerosa, pois exigiria uma prévia investigação por parte da autoridade. Assim, o Órgão de Apelação reverteu o entendimento do Painel, de acordo com o qual o México teria violado os Artigos 6.1 e 12.1, por não ter investigado exportadores que supostamente deveriam ter conhecimento, uma vez que no caso em questão a autoridade investigadora do México enviou questionários a todas as empresas as quais tinham efetivamente conhecimento. Para. 247. “The Panel found that the term “interested parties known to the investigating authorities” in Article 12.1 covers not only the exporters known to the investigating authority, but also the exporters of which “it can reasonably obtain knowledge”. In our view, the extensive interpretation given by the Panel to this term is incorrect. The text of Article 12.1 is not ambiguous: the investigating authority is under the obligation to notify the initiation of the investigation to the exporters known to it at the time it is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of the investigation. Nothing in the text of Article 12.1 suggests that the notification requirement applies to importers other than those of which the investigating authority had actual knowledge at that time.” Para. 249. “(...) In our view, exporters that were given notice of the required information under Article 6.1 should be understood to be the same exporters entitled to receive the text of the application under Article 6.1.3, namely, the “known” exporters.” Para. 250. “Thus, the explicit reference in Article 6.1.3 to “known exporters” supports the view that the exporters that shall be given notice of the required information under Article 6.1 are the exporters known to the investigating authority. These exporters include not only those referred to in the application, but also the exporters who might have made themselves known to the investigating authority following the issuance of the public notice required by Article 12.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, and those that otherwise might have become known to it subsequent to the notice of initiation.” Para. 251. “The Panel found that, under Article 6.1, the investigating authority has a duty to give notice of the required information to exporters of which “it can reasonably obtain knowledge”. As we

explained above, Article 6.1 requires the investigating authority to give notice to the exporters known to it. Extending the duty to give notice under Article 6.1 to exporters of which the investigating authority does not know, but of which it might have obtained knowledge, would imply that, under Article 6.1, the investigating authority is subject to a duty to undertake an inquiry, which may be extensive, to identify the exporters. We cannot find, in Article 6.1 or anywhere else in the Antidumping Agreement, any legal basis for such an obligation, which in some circumstances could be onerous.”

e) “Artigo 6.1.1 – conceito de questionário e prazos”

No caso Egypt - Steel Rebar, o Painel se manifestou acerca da abrangência do termo “questionário”, mencionado no Artigo 6.1.1. Nesse sentido, é discutido se o termo inclui apenas o questionário original em uma investigação ou também outros tipos de requerimentos para informação, como requerimentos suplementares. O Painel entendeu, que o termo questionário não está definido em nenhum lugar no Acordo Antidumping e, portanto, deve ser entendido em sentido estrito, até mesmo para evitar eventuais problemas operacionais para a conclusão da investigação no prazo legal, caso a autoridade seja obrigada a conceder prazo de resposta de questionário a todo requerimento de informação enviado ao longo da investigação. Posteriormente, o mesmo entendimento foi adotado no caso EU - footwear from China, ao decidir o Painel que a União Europeia não violou o Artigo 6.1.1 ao conceder apenas o prazo de 15 dias para a resposta das informações requisitas aos exportadores chineses, e não 30 dias como seria necessário caso o documento fosse considerado um questionário. Relatório do Painel no litígio Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.276-7.277 Para. 7.276. “The term “questionnaire” as used in Article 6.1.1 is not defined in the AD Agreement, and in fact, this term only appears in Article 6.1.1, and in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Annex I. In our view, the references in Annex I, paragraphs 6 and 7 provide strong contextual support for interpreting the term “questionnaires” in Article 6.1.1 as referring only to the original questionnaires sent to interested parties at the outset of an investigation. In particular, both of these provisions refer to “the questionnaire” in the singular, implying that there is only one document that constitutes a “questionnaire” in a dumping investigation, namely the initial questionnaire, at least as far as the foreign companies (producers and exporters) that might be visited are concerned. Paragraph 6 refers to visits by an investigating authority to the territory of an exporting Member “to explain the questionnaire”. Paragraph 7 provides that “on-the-spot investigation … should be carried out after the response to the questionnaire has been received (…).” Para. 7.277. “If any requests for information other than the initial questionnaire were to be considered “questionnaires” in the sense of Article 6.1.1, a number of operational and logistical problems would arise in respect of other obligations under the AD Agreement. First, there is no basis in the AD Agreement on which to determine that some, but not all, information requests other than the initial questionnaire also would constitute “questionnaires”. Thus, even if an investigating authority was not obligated to provide the minimum time-period in Article 6.1.1 in respect of every request for information, it would not be able to determine from the Agreement which of its requests were and were not subject to that time-period. On the other hand, if all requests for information in an investigation were “questionnaires” in the sense of Article 6.1.1, this could make it impossible for an investigation to be completed within the maximum one year (or exceptionally, 18 months) allowed by the AD Agreement in Article 5.10. Moreover, a 30- or 37-day deadline for requests for information made in the context of an on-the-spot verification - i.e., the “obtain[ing of] further details” explicitly referred to in Article 6.7 to as one of the purposes of such verifications - obviously would be completely illogical as well as unworkable. Finally, such an interpretation would render superfluous the requirement in Annex II, paragraph 6 to allow a “reasonable period …” for the provision of any explanations concerning identified deficiencies in submitted information.”

Relatório do Painel no litígio European Union - Antidumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (EU - footwear) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, paras. 7.553-7.554 Para. 7.553. “As the panel in EC - Fasteners (China) observed, these questions are not relevant in all investigations, and are not directly related to the determinations of dumping, injury and causation required by the AD Agreement. Rather, they are questions which are properly treated as preliminary requests for information, necessary for the investigating authority to determine, inter alia, which interested parties will receive the comprehensive questionnaires that are within the scope of Article 6.1.1. While we recognize that the resolution of MET and IT claims is important for the Chinese exporting producers in an Antidumping investigation, we do not consider that this changes the nature of the MET/IT claim form, or brings it within the scope of Article 6.1.1.” Para. 7.554. “We therefore conclude that the “Form for Companies Claiming Market Economy Status and/or Individual Treatment in Antidumping Proceedings” at issue in this dispute is not a “questionnaire” within the meaning of Article 6.1.1, and that therefore, the European Union did not violate Article 6.1.1 of the AD Agreement by not providing Chinese exporters with 30 days to submit their responses.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 73-74 Nesta controvérsia, a autoridade investigadora americana não aceitou as informações apresentadas por dois exportadores japoneses fora do prazo estipulado no Artigo 6.1.1 para a resposta do questionário, tendo calculado a margem de dumping com base nos fatos disponíveis. O Órgão de Apelação confirmou o entendimento do Painel de que seria necessária a determinação de alguns prazos como forma de garantir que a investigação fosse concluída no período legal (12 meses, em geral, ou no máximo 18 meses, se prorrogado), embora o prazo não seja absoluto e imutável. Para. 73. “We observe that Article 6.1.1 does not explicitly use the word “deadlines”. However, the first sentence of Article 6.1.1 clearly contemplates that investigating authorities may impose appropriate time-limits on interested parties for responses to questionnaires. That first sentence also prescribes an absolute minimum of 30 days for the initial response to a questionnaire. Article 6.1.1, therefore, recognizes that it is fully consistent with the Antidumping Agreement for investigating authorities to impose time-limits for the submission of questionnaire responses. Investigating authorities must be able to control the conduct of their investigation and to carry out the multiple steps in an investigation required to reach a final determination. Indeed, in the absence of time-limits, authorities would effectively cede control of investigations to the interested parties, and could find themselves unable to complete their investigations within the time-limits mandated under the Antidumping Agreement. We note, in that respect, that Article 5.10 of the Antidumping Agreement stipulates that Antidumping investigations shall normally be completed within one year, and in any event in no longer than 18 months, after initiation. Furthermore, Article 6.14 provides generally that the procedures set out in Article 6 “are not intended to prevent the authorities of a Member from proceeding expeditiously ”. (emphasis added) We, therefore, agree with the Panel that “in the interest of orderly administration investigating authorities do, and indeed must establish such deadlines.” Para. 74. “While the United States stresses the significance of the first sentence of Article 6.1.1, we believe that importance must also be attached to the second sentence of that provision. According to the express wording of the second sentence of Article 6.1.1, investigating authorities must extend the time-limit for responses to questionnaires “upon cause shown ”, where granting such an extension is “practicable ”. (emphasis added) This second sentence, therefore, indicates that the time-limits imposed by investigating authorities for responses to questionnaires are not necessarily absolute and immutable.”

f) “Artigos 6.1.2” No caso Guatemala - Cement II, o México alegou que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala teria supostamente violado os Artigos 6.1.2, 6.2 e 6.4 ao recusar a um produtor mexicano o acesso aos autos da investigação em certa data durante o procedimento e ao não cumprir com o seu compromisso de disponibilizar imediatamente ao produtor uma cópia do pedido apresentado pelo demandante. No caso concreto, o Painel considerou o acesso aos autos essencial para garantir que as provas apresentadas pelo produtor da Guatemala fossem colocadas prontamente à disposição do produtor mexicano (Artigo 6.1.2), de modo a possibilitar que este, em tempo hábil, examinasse qualquer informação relevante. Em relação ao Artigo 6.1.2, o Painel rejeitou o argumento de que a informação poderia ser confidencial, a fim de justificar o prazo de 20 dias para a disponibilização à parte contrária. Ainda, em relação à obrigação do Artigo 6.4, o Painel enfatizou que poderiam ser oferecidas várias maneiras de acesso das informações relevantes às Partes, inclusive por meio do fornecimento de cópias mediante pagamento. O problema no caso concreto foi a falta de informação quanto ao valor e/ou forma de cálculo e meios de pagamento, inviabilizando à Parte o cumprimento do requisito. Assim, o Painel entendeu que houve violação aos Artigos 6.1.2 e 6.4 por parte da autoridade da Guatemala em sua conduta de negar ao México o acesso aos autos da investigação e ao não providenciar as cópias dos autos, conforme solicitado pelo produtor mexicano. Quanto ao mesmo tema, discutido no Painel acima e em outro Painel analisado posteriormente (EU - footwear from China), o Painel rejeitou o argumento da China (demandante) de que a União Europeia teria violado o Artigo 6.1.2, uma vez que, nesse caso, existiam informações confidenciais que não poderiam ser reveladas, sob pena de infração ao Artigo 6.5, além de ter sido de apenas 9 dias o suposto prazo máximo de atraso. Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.133, 8.142 e 8.152-8.155 Para. 8.133. “Article 6.1.2 of the AD Agreement provides that evidence presented by one interested party shall be “made available promptly” to other interested parties. Article 6.4 provides that an interested party shall have “timely opportunities” to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of its case. On their face, neither Article 6.1.2 nor Article 6.4 necessarily require access to the file. For example, if an investigating authority required each interested party to serve its submissions on all other interested parties, or if the investigating authority itself undertook to provide copies of each interested party's submission to other interested parties, there may be no need for interested parties to have access to the file. If, however, there is no service of evidence by interested parties, or no provision of copies by the investigating authority, access to the file may be the only practical means by which evidence presented by one interested party could be “made available promptly” to other interested parties (consistent with Article 6.1.2), or by which interested parties could have “timely opportunities” to see information relevant to the presentation of their cases (consistent with Article 6.4). Assuming access to the file is the only practical means of complying with Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4, access to the file need not necessarily be unlimited. Nor need the file be made available on demand. Provided access to the file is regular and routine, we consider that the requirements of Articles 6.1.2 and 6.4 would be satisfied.” Para. 8.142. “(...)In principle, we consider that a 20-day delay is inconsistent with the Ministry's Article 6.1.2 obligation to make this submission available to Cruz Azul “promptly”.” Para. 8.153. “There are various ways in which an investigating authority could satisfy the Article 6.4 obligation to provide “whenever practicable … timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases (…).” Para. 8.152. “There are various ways in which an investigating authority could satisfy the Article 6.4 obligation to provide “whenever practicable … timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases (…).” In the present case, the Ministry

chose to offer interested parties copies of the file, against payment of a fee. Mexico does not challenge the Ministry's decision to comply with its obligations under the AD Agreement by offering copies of the file against payment of a fee. Rather, Mexico challenges the Ministry's failure to provide the relevant copies, despite Cruz Azul's offer to pay the relevant fee.” Para. 8.154. “(...) An investigating authority cannot “provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases” if it conditions the provision of copies on the payment of a fee without at least informing the requesting party how much the fee would be, or without at least providing the requesting party with the information it would need (e.g., the number of pages in the file) to calculate the fee for itself.” Para. 8.155. “In these circumstances, we consider that the Ministry did not comply with its Article 6.4 obligation to “provide timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases”.” Relatório do Painel no litígio European Union - Antidumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (EU - footwear) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, paras. 7.580 e 7.583 Para. 7.580. “We recall that the obligation to make evidence available “promptly” in Article 6.1.2 is “subject to” the requirement to protect confidential information. In this case, the European Union has explained that the Commission delayed the release of the “non-confidential” questionnaire responses of the producers concerned in order to ensure that it did not disclose information concerning their identities which had been granted confidential treatment. We see nothing in the AD Agreement, including in Article 6.1.2, that would preclude an investigating authority from seeking to ascertain the confidential status of information submitted by an interested party in order to ensure that the investigating authority does not violate Article 6.5 by disclosing information it has a justified reason to believe may be confidential. In this case, we agree with the European Union that, having granted confidential treatment to the identities of EU producers, when the Commission received questionnaire responses which appeared to contain information which, if made available to interested parties, would disclose the identities of the producers submitting the information, the Commission was entitled to ascertain the facts to avoid itself violating Article 6.5. We note in this regard that we have found that the European Union's grant of confidential treatment to this information was not inconsistent with Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement. In these circumstances, we reject China's arguments in this regard.” Para. 7.583. “The word “promptly” is defined as “in a prompt manner, without delay” (60) and “[i]n a prompt manner; readily, quickly; at once, without delay; directly, forthwith, there and then”. (61) In our view, these definitions do not support the conclusion that information must be made available immediately in order to comply with Article 6.1.2. We consider that to make evidence available promptly must be understood in the context of the proceeding in question. In the context of a proceeding lasting months, where there are numerous opportunities for the parties to participate in the investigation after the evidence has been made available, we consider that the delays in this case do not establish a violation of Article 6.1.2, and we therefore reject China's claim with respect to Companies B, C and G.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.153 Nesta controvérsia, o Painel enfatiza que o Artigo 6.1.2 não menciona apenas “partes interessadas”, mas “partes interessadas que estejam participando da investigação”, sendo imprescindível que a parte já tenha tomado alguma atitude no processo que possa qualificá-la, efetivamente, como participante. Assim, entendeu o Painel que a autoridade investigadora não está obrigada a colocar as provas apresentadas por uma parte à disposição das outras partes interessadas, caso estas não tenham ainda conhecimento da investigação. Com este fundamento, o Painel rejeitou o argumento do Brasil de que a Argentina teria supostamente violado o Artigo 6.1.2 por não ter prontamente disponibilizado a certos exportadores brasileiros as provas apresentadas pelas partes, uma vez que estes exportadores não

tinham conhecimento da investigação e, portanto, não eram “partes interessadas participantes da investigação”, nos termos do Artigo 6.1.2. Para. 7.153. “We note that Article 6.1.2 does not refer to “interested parties” but to “interested parties participating in the investigation.” Thus, the term “interested parties” is qualified by the term “participating”. In our view, had the drafters intended to extend the obligation imposed by Article 6.1.2 to all interested parties as defined in Article 6.11 of the AD Agreement, they would not have included the term “participating”. We must first determine what the ordinary meaning of the term “participating” is. We note that Article 6.1.2 uses the term “parties participating in the investigation.” The ordinary meaning of the term “participate” is “share or take part (in)”. This definition of the term “participating” suggests to us that, in order to participate in an investigation, a party must undertake some action. In our view, the mere knowledge by an interested party of an ongoing investigation does not make that party an interested party “participating in the investigation” within the meaning of Article 6.1.2 unless it actively takes part in the investigation.”

g) “Artigo 6.1.3” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.101-8.102 Nesta controvérsia, o Painel entendeu que a autoridade da Guatemala violou o Artigo 6.1.3, uma vez que forneceu o texto completo da petição escrita que lhe foi dirigida apenas 18 dias ou mais após o início da investigação, sendo que o dispositivo mencionado dispõe que o texto deve ser fornecido “tão logo iniciada a investigação”. Para. 8.101. “We note that Article 6.1.3 does not specify the number of days within which the text of the application shall be provided. What it does specify is that the text of the application be provided “as soon as” the investigation has been initiated. In this regard, the term “as soon as” conveys a sense of substantial urgency. In fact, the terms “immediately” and “as soon as” are considered to be interchangeable. We do not consider that providing the text of the application 24 or even 18 days after the date of initiation fulfils the requirement of Article 6.1.3 that the text be provided “as soon as an investigation has been initiated.” Para. 8.102. “We further consider that the timeliness of the provision of the text of the application should be evaluated in the context of its purpose and function. Timely access to the application is important for the exporters to enable preparation of the arguments in defence of their interests before the investigating authorities. Moreover, once the investigation has been initiated the timetable of the investigation commences and the timing for many events in the proceeding are counted from initiation including the 12 or 18 months total for completion of the investigation provide for in Article 5.10. Since deadlines in the timetable of the investigation are counted from the date of initiation it is critical that the investigating authority provide the text of the application “as soon as an investigation has been initiated”, for the exporter to be able to devise a strategy to defend the allegations it is being confronted with. Also, Article 7.3 of the AD Agreement allows a Member to impose provisional measures as early as sixty days after the date of initiation of an investigation. Access to the text of the application is crucial for the exporter to prepare its defence, and even more so if the authorities are likely to consider applying a provisional measure which may come as early as 60 days after initiation.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.170 Nesta controvérsia, o Painel fez uma distinção semântica entre as obrigações da autoridade, nos termos do Artigo 6.1.3, devido à utilização dos verbos fornecer (provide) e disponibilizar (make

available). Enquanto, o primeiro termo expressou uma ação positiva, enquanto, o segundo, retratou uma atitude mais passiva por parte da autoridade investigadora. Para. 7.170. “In our view, with the use of different verbs in the first sentence of Article 6.1.3, “provide” on the one hand and “make available” on the other, the drafters intended to impose different obligations on investigating authorities depending on the party concerned. The first obligation requires a positive action on the part of the investigating authority, while the second envisages only a passive act.” 2. Artigo 6.2

a) “Prevalência do argumento mais específico sobre o mais generic” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.162 Neste caso, é interessante destacar que foram feitas alegações relativas ao Artigo 6.2, alegações estas não analisadas por razões de economia processual. Isto pode ser explicado, uma vez que o Artigo 6.2 contempla um dever genérico das autoridades investigadoras, de garantir às partes interessadas a completa possibilidade de defesa de seus interesses. Assim, quando a demandante alegar um outro dispositivo mais específico aplicado aos fatos em análise, este deverá ser utilizado pelas autoridades para a recomendação final. Para. 8.162. “Whereas this provision clearly imposes a general duty on investigating authorities to ensure that interested parties have a full opportunity throughout an Antidumping investigation for the defence of their interests, it provides no specific guidance as to what steps investigating authorities must take in practice. By contrast, other more specific provisions apply to the facts at hand, in respect of which Mexico has also made claims. Although there may be cases in which a panel will nevertheless need to address claims under Article 6.2, we do not consider it necessary for us to do when we have already made findings concerning the conduct allegedly violating Article 6.2 under other, more specific provisions of the AD Agreement.”

b) “Ampla oportunidade de defesa” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.179 e 8.238 Neste caso, o Painel interpretou a primeira parte do Artigo 6.2 no sentido de que as partes devem dispor de completa possibilidade de defesa de seus interesses, em atenção ao princípio do direito fundamental ao devido processo legal. Com base neste argumento, o Painel entendeu que a autoridade da Guatemala violou o Artigo 6.2, ao prorrogar o período da investigação diante de pedido do seu produtor, sem que fosse concedida ao produtor mexicano qualquer possibilidade de defesa. Entretanto, o Painel também entendeu que não houve infração ao mesmo dispositivo, na conduta da autoridade da Guatemala de mudar a determinação do dano durante a investigação, sem informar ao produtor mexicano e lhe conceder oportunidade de defesa, tendo em vista que a primeira sentença do Artigo 6.2 é muito ampla se interpretada isoladamente. Para. 8.179. “Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.2 because Cruz Azul was not given any opportunity to comment on Cementos Progreso's request for extension of the POI. There is no evidence before us to suggest that Cruz Azul even knew that Cementos Progreso had requested an extension of the POI. We interpret the first sentence of Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement as a fundamental due process provision. In our view, when a request for an extension of the POI comes from one interested party, due process requires that the investigating authority seeks the views of other

interested parties before acting on that request. Failure to respect the requirements of due process would conflict with the requirement to provide interested parties with “a full opportunity for the defence of their interests”, consistent with Article 6.2. Clearly, an interested party is not able to defend its interests if it is prevented from commenting on requests made by other interested parties in pursuit of their interests. In the present case, Cementos Progreso's request for extension of the POI was made on 1 October 1996. The Ministry's decision to extend the POI was made on 4 October 1996, only three days after Cementos Progreso's request. There is no evidence to suggest that the Ministry sought the views of Cruz Azul, or other interested parties, before deciding to extend the POI. Accordingly, we find that by extending the POI pursuant to a request from Cementos Progreso without seeking the views of other interested parties in respect of that request, the Ministry failed to provide Cruz Azul with “a full opportunity for the defence of [its] interests”, contrary to Guatemala's obligations under Article 6.2 of the AD Agreement.” Para. 8.238. “As for Article 6.2, we note that the first sentence of that provision is very general in nature. We are unable to interpret such a general sentence in a way that would impose a specific obligation on investigating authorities to inform interested parties of the legal basis for its final determination on injury during the course of an investigation, when the express wording of Article 12.2 only imposes such a specific obligation on investigating authorities at the end of the investigation.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/AB/R, para. 507 Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou o entendimento do Painel de que a União Europeia havia violado os Artigos 6.4 e 6.2, ao fornecer informações sobre a determinação do valor normal apenas em estágio muito avançado da investigação, impossibilitando às partes o exame em tempo hábil (Artigo 6.4) e o exercício de sua ampla possibilidade de defesa (Artigo 6.2). Neste caso, o DSB julgou interessante analisar o Artigo 6.2, mesmo que fosse mais genérico do que o Artigo 6.4. Para. 507. “The European Union further submits that the first sentence of Article 6.2, which provides that all interested parties “shall have a full opportunity for the defence of their interests”, cannot “be read as a catch-all due process provision” because doing so “would effectively render redundant all of the other provisions of Article 6 which impose specific obligations on investigating authorities”. We recall that, in the fasteners investigation, the Chinese producers could not make relevant requests for adjustment in order to ensure a fair comparison within the meaning of Article 2.4 of the Antidumping Agreement, because they were not informed, in a timely manner, of the basis on which the export price and normal value was compared. Consequently, they did not have a full opportunity to defend their interests in relation to the Commission's dumping determination. Thus, contrary to the European Union's assertion, the Panel did not simply treat Article 6.2 as a “catch-all due process provision”. Rather, the Panel's finding is consistent with the Appellate Body's interpretation, in EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, that the “presentations” referred to in Article 6.4 “logically are the principal mechanisms through which an exporter subject to an Antidumping investigation can defend its interests” within the meaning of Article 6.2. On this basis, we consider that the Panel properly found that “the Chinese exporters could not defend their interests in this investigation because the Commission only provided information concerning the product types used in the determination of the normal value at a very late stage of the proceedings” and that, therefore, “the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 6.2” of the Antidumping Agreement”.” 3. Artigo 6.4 Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/AB/R, paras. 145 e 149

Ao determinar que tipo de informação deve ser revelada pelas autoridades, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que esta avaliação deve ser realizada sob o ponto de vista das “partes interessadas” e não das autoridades investigadoras. Portanto, foi revertida a decisão do Painel segundo a qual a autoridade investigadora não seria obrigada a revelar certas informações que considerasse irrelevante para a sua conclusão, pois os documentos eram importantes para as partes. Como o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que a União Europeia violou o Artigo 6.4, também houve nova análise sobre o Artigo 6.2, considerado violado, uma vez que a não exibição dos documentos no caso em questão constituiu um impedimento à ampla defesa pelos exportadores brasileiros. Para. 145. “We turn first to the requirement that the information be “relevant”. From the Panel's reasoning, it is apparent that it read this requirement to mean “relevant” from the perspective of the investigating authority. We disagree. Article 6.4 refers to “provid[ing] timely opportunities for all interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases”. (emphasis added) The possessive pronoun “their” clearly refers to the earlier reference in that sentence to “interested parties”. The investigating authorities are not mentioned in Article 6.4 until later in the sentence, when the provision refers to the additional requirement that the information be “used by the authorities”. Thus, whether or not the investigating authorities regarded the information in Exhibit EC-12 to be relevant does not determine whether the information would in fact have been “relevant” for the purposes of Article 6.4.” Para. 149. “The European Communities recognized during the oral hearing that a finding of violation in this case under Article 6.4 would necessarily entail a violation of Article 6.2. (…) Thus, by failing to disclose Exhibit EC-12 and thereby depriving the Brazilian exporter of an opportunity to present its defence, the European Communities did not act consistently with Article 6.2.” Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R, paras. 7.479-7.480 Neste caso, o Painel resume o dispositivo do Artigo 6.4, segundo o qual as partes possuem o direito de examinar, em tempo hábil, todas as informações relevantes para a apresentação de seus casos, desde que tais informações: sejam usadas pelas autoridades; sejam relevantes para a apresentação dos casos às partes interessadas; não sejam confidenciais; e, sejam disponibilizadas pelas autoridades investigadoras, sempre que possível, em tempo hábil. O Painel também entendeu que o Artigo 6.4 não obriga a autoridade investigadora a revelar de forma ativa as informações, rejeitando, portanto o argumento da China de que a União Europeia teria agido em desconformidade com este dispositivo ao não fornecer informações aos produtores chineses. Para. 7.479. “We note that Article 6.4 generally stipulates that the authorities shall give interested parties “opportunities” to see all information used by the investigating authorities in an Antidumping investigation. This right, however, is not unlimited. First, it applies to information which is used by the authorities. Second, the information must be relevant to the presentation of the interested parties' cases. Third, this right does not apply to confidential information. Fourth, the investigating authorities have to provide these opportunities “whenever practicable”, and on a “timely” basis.” (62)  The panel in EC - Salmon (Norway) explained these obligations as follows:

It seems clear to us that the timeliness of the opportunities must be assessed by reference to the right of the interested parties to prepare presentations on the basis of the information seen. It is similarly clear to us that whether particular information is relevant is not determined from the investigating authorities' perspective, but with reference to the issues to be considered by the investigating authority under the AD Agreement. Thus, information which relates to issues which the investigating authority is required to consider under the AD Agreement, or which it does, in fact, consider, in the exercise of its discretion, during the course of an Antidumping

investigation, presumptively falls within the scope of Article 6.4. Clearly, an investigating authority may not allow interested parties to see information which is properly treated as confidential under the AD Agreement. Finally, the question of whether information is “used” by the investigating authority cannot, in our view, be assessed from the perspective of whether the information is specifically referred to or relied upon by the investigating authority in its determination. If the investigating authority evaluates a question of fact or an issue of law in the course of an Antidumping investigation, then, in our view, all information relevant to that question or issue that is before the investigating authority must necessarily be considered by the investigating authority, in order to make an objective and unbiased decision. Consequently, it seems clear to us that whether information is “used” by the investigating authority must be assessed by reference to whether it forms part of the information relevant to a particular issue that is before the investigating authority at the time it makes its determination.

Para. 7.480. “In addition, we agree with the European Union that Article 6.4 does not obligate the investigating authorities to actively disclose information to interested parties. China generally recognizes that Article 6.4 requires the authorities to allow interested parties to see all information which is relevant to the presentation of their cases, and bases its claims under Article 6.4 on the assertion that the Commission refused to “provide” certain information to the Chinese producers despite numerous requests. We note, however, that, in its response to question 101 from the Panel, China argues that “the investigating authorities were under the obligation to provide such normal value information even in the absence of a request for disclosure”. To the extent this may suggest that China considers the Commission to have been required to actively disclose information under Article 6.4, we reject that view. In our view, a violation of Article 6.4 would normally require a showing that the investigating authorities denied an interested party's request to see information used by the authorities, which was relevant to the presentation of that interested party's case and which was not confidential.” 4. Artigo 6.5 Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.219, 8.220, 8.213 e 8.209 Neste caso, o Painel enfatizou que o Artigo 5 contempla dois tipos de informações confidenciais: aquelas confidenciais por sua própria natureza, e as que são tratadas como confidenciais no caso específico uma vez que possuem bons fundamentos para isso. No caso concreto, o Painel decidiu que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala violou o Artigo 6.5, ao conferir tratamento confidencial ao requerimento do produtor doméstico por iniciativa própria, sem que o fundamento para a concessão da confidencialidade tenha sido demonstrado pelo produtor. O Painel também entendeu que a autoridade da Guatemala violou o Artigo 6.5.1 ao não requerer ao produtor doméstico o fornecimento da declaração esclarecendo o motivo pelo qual os resumos acerca da informação confidencial não foram entregues. Entretanto, entendeu o Painel que o Artigo 6.5.2 não se aplica ao caso, pois não houve manifestação da autoridade no sentido de que a informação fornecida sob confidencialidade não estaria justificada. Para. 8.219. “The text of Article 6.5 distinguishes between two types of confidential information: (1) “information which is by nature confidential”, and (2) information “which is provided on a confidential basis”. Article 6.5 then provides that the provision of confidential treatment is conditional on “good cause” being shown. Logically, one might expect that “good cause” for confidential treatment of information which is “by nature confidential” could be presumed, and that “good cause” need only be shown for information which is not “by nature confidential” (but for which confidential treatment is nonetheless sought). It is presumably for this reason that, in rejecting Mexico's claim,

Guatemala argues that the relevant information was “clearly of a confidential nature”. While we have some sympathy for Guatemala's argument, given the logical appeal of such an interpretation of Article 6.5, we note that Article 6.5 is not drafted in a way which suggests this approach. Instead, the requirement to show “good cause” appears to apply for both types of confidential information, such that even information “which is by nature confidential” cannot be afforded confidential treatment unless “good cause” has been shown.” Para. 8220. “In our view, the requisite “good cause” must be shown by the interested party submitting the confidential information at issue. We do not consider that Article 6.5 envisages “good cause” being shown by the investigating authority itself, since - with respect to information that is not “by nature confidential” in particular - the investigating authority may not even know whether or why there is cause to provide confidential treatment.” Para. 8.213. “(...) Although Article 6.5.1 does not explicitly provide that “the authorities shall require” interested parties to provide a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible, any meaningful interpretation of Article 6.5.1 must impose such an obligation on the investigating authorities. It is certainly not possible to conclude that the obligation concerning the need to provide a statement of reasons is an obligation imposed exclusively on the interested party submitting the information, and not the investigating authority, since the AD Agreement is not addressed at interested parties. The AD Agreement imposes obligations on WTO Members and their investigating authorities. Accordingly, in our view Article 6.5.1 imposes an obligation on investigating authorities to require parties that indicate that information is not susceptible of summary to provide a statement of the reasons why summarization is not possible. Guatemala has failed to adduce any evidence that the requisite statement of reasons was provided by Cementos Progreso, or that the Ministry even required Cementos Progreso to provide such a statement of reasons. We therefore find that the Ministry violated Article 6.5.1 of the AD Agreement by failing to require Cementos Progreso to provide a statement of the reasons why summarization of the relevant information was not possible. In making this finding, we attach no importance whatsoever to Guatemala's assertions concerning the alleged treatment of similar information by other WTO Members. Whether or not other WTO Members act in conformity with Article 6.5.1 is of no relevance to the present dispute, which concerns the issue of whether or not the Ministry acted in conformity with that provision.” Para. 8.209. “First, Mexico claims that the Ministry violated Article 6.5.2 by accepting to provide confidential treatment for certain information submitted during the verification visit at Cementos Progreso, despite Cementos Progreso failing to justify its request for confidential treatment. However, Article 6.5.2 does not require any justification to be provided by the interested party requesting confidential treatment. If any such obligation exists, it derives from Article 6.5, not 6.5.2. Mexico has not based this claim on Article 6.5. Article 6.5.2 speaks only to events when “the authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted”. Since there is nothing to suggest that the Ministry found that Cementos Progreso's request for confidentiality of the relevant information was not warranted, Article 6.5.2 would appear not to apply in the factual circumstances of this case. We therefore reject Mexico's Article 6.5.2 claim.” Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners) (China), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R, paras. 7.451 e 7.560 Neste caso, o Painel exalta o entendimento de que a boa fundamentação (good cause) é necessária para a concessão da confidencialidade às duas espécies de informações citadas no Artigo 6, quais sejam: as informações confidenciais por sua própria natureza, e aquelas fornecidas em uma base confidencial pelas partes de uma investigação. O Painel decidiu que a União Europeia violou o Artigo 6.5, ao revelar as informações fornecidas em base confidencial por nove produtores chineses (via documento “MET/IT Claim Forms”), às autoridades chinesas e demais partes interessadas, sem autorização específica das partes que forneceram as informações. O Painel também entendeu, e o

Órgão de Apelação confirmou, que houve a violação do Artigo 6.5.1, uma vez que faltaram os resumos relativos às informações não confidenciais fornecidas por dois produtores domésticos. Para. 7.451. “We note that Article 6.5 addresses the treatment of information submitted to the investigating authorities in an Antidumping investigation by interested parties for which confidential treatment is sought. It states that information which is by nature confidential or which is submitted on a confidential basis must be treated as confidential by the investigating authorities provided good cause is shown. It also provides that such information cannot be disclosed without specific permission from the party submitting the information. We note that it is now well established that the good cause requirement for confidential treatment applies both to information that is by nature confidential and to information submitted on a confidential basis. Thus, whether the identity of the complainants and the supporters was by nature confidential or was submitted on a confidential basis is not relevant to our analysis. Article 6.5 does not, however, explain what “good cause” means. In our view, this is something that has to be assessed by the investigating authorities in light of the circumstances of each investigation and each request for confidential treatment. We also consider that what constitutes “good cause” will depend on the nature of the information at issue for which confidential treatment is sought. The “good cause” alleged to exist, in turn, will determine the kind of supporting evidence that may be needed in order to demonstrate the existence of such “good cause”.” Para. 7.560. “Finally, we note that, in the circumstances of this case, we do not consider it necessary for us to determine whether or not the information in the MET/IT Claim Forms, or in the MET Disclosure Document, was properly treated as confidential under Article 6.5 of the AD Agreement. We agree with the European Union that merely because a document is labelled as such does not demonstrate that the information it contains is confidential within the meaning of Article 6.5. It is clear that an investigating authority may conclude that information submitted as confidential does not merit such treatment. However, in such a case, Article 6.5.2 of the AD Agreement establishes certain requirements, not least of which is to give the supplier of the information an opportunity to make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form. Moreover, even if the investigating authority concludes that a request for confidentiality is not warranted, Article 6.5.2 provides that if the supplier is unwilling to make the information public or to authorize its disclosure in generalized or summary form, the authorities may disregard the information. Article 6.5.2 does not, however, authorize the authorities to provide the information to other interested parties in the investigation. In any event, even assuming, as the European Union asserts, that the MET Disclosure Document does not contain any data on the volume, value, or unit price of sales, actual costs of the companies concerned, percentage or value of profits, value of any subsidy received, or the value of the assets of the companies examined, this does not, in our view, demonstrate that the document contains only non-confidential information. Information which may properly be treated as confidential under Article 6.5 is not necessarily limited to data of the types referred to by the European Union, but may include any type of information submitted on a confidential basis.” Relatório do Painel no litígio China - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States (China - GOES), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS414/R, paras. 7.192, 7.193 e 7.224 Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que a autoridade investigadora da China violou o Artigo 6.5.1 do Acordo Antidumping (e o Artigo 12.4.1 do Acordo sobre Subsídios e Medidas Compensatórias), ao não requisitar às partes o fornecimento de resumos pormenorizados das informações confidenciais que fossem suficientes para a compreensão razoável da substância da informação fornecida sob confidencialidade. O Painel também não aceitou que o fato de existirem apenas dois produtores nacionais poderia constituir uma “circunstância excepcional” apta a justificar a não apresentação do resumo, nos termos do Artigo 6.5.1. Para. 7.192. “Finally, with respect to whether the “exceptional circumstances” exemption is at issue, in response to a Panel question, China clarifies that, in the event the Panel finds the non-confidential summaries inadequate, it does not invoke the exceptional circumstances exemption. Indeed, the text of

the provisions at issue, and the Appellate Body and panel reports, clearly state that if information is not susceptible of summarization, the party must identify the exceptional circumstances and provide a statement explaining why summarization is not possible. The investigating authority is required to scrutinize such statements to determine whether they establish “exceptional circumstances”. It is clear that this did not occur in the context of this case. However, although it does not rely on the exemption, China contends that the adequacy of the non-confidential summaries should be assessed in the light of the “exceptional circumstance” that there were only two Chinese producers of GOES, making it difficult for summaries of aggregate data adequately to protect the confidentiality of the information.” Para. 7.193. “In considering China's argument in this regard, we note that Articles 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement and 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement explicitly establish the standard by which the sufficiency of non-confidential summaries is to be assessed, namely by reference to whether the summaries “permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information submitted in confidence”. If the information is not susceptible of summary, for example because it would not be possible to summarize the information while still preserving its confidentiality, the provisions allow for an exemption to the requirement to furnish a non-confidential summary. However, if this “exceptional circumstance” exemption is not invoked, as in this case, there is no basis to conclude that purported “exceptional circumstances” alter the standard that applies under Articles 12.4.1 and 6.5.1. Therefore, the Panel will assess the adequacy of the non-confidential summaries by reference to whether they “permit a reasonable understanding of the information submitted in confidence”. If they do not, the fact that there were only two Chinese producers of GOES will not alter the conclusion that China acted inconsistently with Articles 12.4.1 and 6.5.1.” Para. 7.224. “As highlighted in the preceding reasons, the Panel has analysed the information on the basis of China's argument that the non-confidential summaries can be found in Part I of the application. The Panel has concluded that, for at least some of the categories of confidential information, there are deficiencies in the purported summaries relied upon by China, such that they do not provide a reasonable understanding of the substance of the confidential information. In addition, we are not convinced by that aspect of China's defence which suggests that a non-confidential summary exists where an interested party is able to derive, or infer from the context, the possible nature of the confidential information. Rather, there is an explicit obligation under Articles 6.5.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 12.4.1 of the SCM Agreement for an interested party submitting confidential information to furnish a summary of it. It is not for other interested parties to derive their own summary based on the context from which the information is redacted.” 5. Artigo 6.6 Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Ramdom Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of one Megabit or above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: Coreia do Sul, WT/DS99/R, para. 6.78 Neste caso, o Painel esclareceu que a certificação das autoridades acerca da veracidade das informações fornecidas no curso das investigações, conforme dispõe o Artigo 6.6, pode ser exercida de várias maneiras, sem a necessidade de um processo formal de verificação da informação. Assim, o Painel rejeitou o argumento da Coreia de que os EUA teriam supostamente violado este dispositivo ao determinar a existência de dumping com base em dados fornecidos unicamente pelo peticionário, sem conferir as fontes utilizadas. Para. 6.78. “In essence, we understand Korea to argue that Members cannot discharge their Article 6.6 obligation to “satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties upon which their findings are based” unless they verify the accuracy of that information. However, the text of Article 6.6 does not explicitly require verification of all information to be relied on. Indeed, the term “verify” only arises in Article 6.7 of the AD Agreement. Article 6.6 simply requires Members to “satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information”. In our view, Members could “satisfy themselves as to the accuracy of the information” in a number of ways without

proceeding to some type of formal verification, including for example reliance on the reputation of the original source of the information. Indeed, we consider that Antidumping investigations would become totally unmanageable if investigating authorities were required to actually verify the accuracy of all information relied on.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy (Argentina - Ceramic Tiles), Demandante: Itália, WT/DS189/R, paras. 6.57

Nesta controvérsia, o Painel afirmou que o ônus de certificação das informações é da autoridade investigadora.

Para. 6.57. “Article 6.6 of the AD Agreement thus places the burden of satisfying oneself of the accuracy of the information on the investigating authority. As a general rule, the exporters are therefore entitled to assume that unless otherwise indicated they are not required to also automatically and in all cases submit evidence to demonstrate the accuracy of the information they are supplying. We note that in this case, all four exporters stated that they were willing to accept any kind of verification visits. The DCD decided however not to conduct such an on-the spot-verification. We believe that if no on-the-spot verification is going to take place but certain documents are required for verification purposes, the authorities should in a similar manner inform the exporters of the nature of the information for which they require such evidence and of any further documents they require.” 6. Artigo 6.7 e Anexo I Relatório do Painel no litígio Egypt - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, para. 7.325

O Artigo 6.7 faz explícita referência à possibilidade de verificar as informações fornecidas pelas partes, por meio da realização de procedimentos de investigação in loco, com base no que disciplina o Anexo I do Acordo Antidumping. O Artigo 6.8 dispõe acerca da possibilidade de formulação do juízo, com base na melhor informação disponível, observado o Anexo II. Por este motivo, supostas violações aos Artigos 6.7 e 6.8 incluem referências aos Anexos, motivo pelo qual a análise dos casos que incluem estes dispositivos será feita concomitantemente.

Para. 7.325. “Concerning the relationship of Annex I to Article 6.7, we come to the same conclusion as in respect of Annex II and Article 6.8. In particular, we note Article 6.7’s explicit cross-reference to Annex I: “[T]he procedures described in Annex I shall apply to investigations carried out in the territory of other Members”. This language thus establishes that the specific parameters that must be respected in carrying out foreign verifications in compliance with Article 6.7 are found in Annex I.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy (Argentina - Ceramic Tiles), Demandante: Itália, WT/DS189/R, footnote 65

Nesta controvérsia, o Painel entendeu que, embora seja uma prática comum, não é uma exigência a realização da investigação in loco em todos os casos. Assim, o Acordo Antidumping permite a realização da investigação in loco, mas não a considera a única, e nem a principal forma, de a autoridade cumprir com a obrigação constante do Artigo 6.6, de certificar-se acerca da veracidade das informações fornecidas pelas partes.

Footnote 65. “There does not exist a requirement in the Agreement to carry out investigations in the territory of other Members for verification purposes. Article 6.7 of the AD Agreement merely provides for this possibility. While such on-site verification visits are common practice, the Agreement does not say that this is the only way or even the preferred way for an investigating authority to fulfill its obligation under Article 6.6 to satisfy itself as to the accuracy of the information supplied by interested parties on which its findings are based.”

Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8203-8205, 8.189 e 8.196-8.198

Nesta controvérsia, o México alegou que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala teria supostamente violado o Artigo 6.7 e o parágrafo 7 do Anexo I, ao verificar informações que não foram apresentadas pelo produtor mexicano alvo da investigação, uma vez que se relacionavam a um período novo da investigação, acrescido ao curso do procedimento investigatório. O Painel rejeitou o argumento, pois embora o principal objetivo da investigação seja de fato investigar as informações já recebidas, o próprio texto do parágrafo 7 do Anexo I admite que podem ser necessárias informações adicionais. Além disso, o último parágrafo do mesmo dispositivo afirma que durante a visita podem ser formulados pedidos suplementares decorrentes da informação obtida, o que confirma o entendimento de que novas informações podem ser obtidas durante a investigação in loco. O México também alegou que uma visita de verificação da autoridade da Guatemala ao produtor mexicano teria violado o Artigo 6.7 e os parágrafos 2, 3, 7 e 8 do Anexo I, pois a autoridade incluiu três peritos não governamentais, dois dos quais o México considerou que estariam em conflito de interesse por representarem uma indústria de cimentos americana em uma investigação de antidumping de cimentos, iniciada pelo México. Embora o Painel tenha entendido que uma autoridade imparcial não teria incluído peritos com conflitos de interesse em sua equipe de investigação, não constatou, no caso concreto, qualquer prova do México sobre este conflito. Em relação à suposta violação ao parágrafo 2 do Anexo I, o Painel aceitou o argumento do México de que a autoridade investigadora da Guatemala não agiu nos termos deste dispositivo, tendo em vista que a autoridade mexicana não foi devidamente informada da intenção de inclusão de peritos não-governamentais na equipe de investigação. Entretanto, a não comunicação das “circunstâncias excepcionais”, que levaram à inclusão de tais peritos, não foi aceita pelo Painel como possível violação ao referido Artigo.

Para. 8.203. “Although Annex I(7) provides that the “main purpose” of the verification visit is to verify information already provided, or to obtain further details in respect of that information, it also provides that an investigating authority may “prior to the visit … advise the firms concerned … of any further information which needs to be provided”. Since there would be little point in advising a firm of “further information … to be provided” in advance of the verification visit if the investigating authority were precluded from examining that “further information” during the visit, we consider that the phrase “further information … to be provided” refers to information to be provided during the course of the verification. Mexico's view that an investigating authority may only verify information submitted prior to the verification visit is not consistent with this interpretation of Annex I(7).” Para. 8.204. “In response to a question from the Panel, Mexico argues that the phrase “any further information … to be provided” refers to accounting information to be provided by the verified company during verification in order to substantiate the information previously supplied to the investigating authority. We note, however, that the phrase does not read “any further accounting information … to be provided”. The term “information” is not qualified in any way by the express wording of Annex I(7), and there are no elements in the context which plead for such qualification.” Para. 8.205. “Furthermore, we note that the last phrase of Annex I(7) refers to on-the-spot requests for further details to be provided in light of “information obtained”. Thus, although it should be “standard practice” to advise firms of additional information to be provided in advance of the verification visit, this does not preclude an investigating authority from requesting “further details” during the course of the investigation, “in light of the information obtained”. In our view, the reference to “information obtained” cannot mean the information obtained from the exporter in advance of the verification visit, since (consistent with “standard practice”) requests regarding that information should be made prior to the visit, and not during the course of the investigation. Accordingly, the “information obtained” must refer to information obtained during the course of the verification visit, since it is only information obtained during the course of a verification visit which may prompt a request for further details during the course of the verification visit. The last phrase of

Annex I(7) therefore confirms our understanding that an investigating authority may seek new information during the course of the verification visit.” Para. 8.189. “We find at para. below that it was entirely reasonable for Cruz Azul to object to the inclusion in the Ministry's verification team of two non-governmental experts who had a conflict of interest. Although we are of the view that an impartial and objective investigating authority would not include non-governmental experts with a conflict of interest in its verification team, none of the provisions cited by Mexico explicitly prohibit such conduct. Accordingly, we are unable to find that the Ministry violated Article 6.7 and Annex I (2), (3), (7) and (8) of the AD Agreement by including non-governmental experts with a conflict of interest in its verification team.” Para. 8.196. “In principle, Mexico bears the burden to prove that the Ministry failed to inform it of the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the Ministry's verification team. As a practical matter, this burden is impossible for Mexico to meet: one simply cannot prove that one was not informed of something. Although Mexico cannot establish definitively that it was not informed by the Ministry of the Ministry's intention to include non-governmental experts in its verification team, there is sufficient evidence before us to suggest strongly that it was not so informed. Although an investigating authority should normally be able to demonstrate that it complied with a formal requirement to inform the authorities of another Member, Guatemala has failed to rebut the strong suggestion that it failed to do so. In fact, Guatemala has simply referred to the very letter which suggests strongly that Mexico was not notified by Guatemala. In these circumstances, we do not consider that the evidence and arguments of the parties “remain in equipoise”. Accordingly, we find that the Ministry violated paragraph 2 of Annex I of the AD Agreement by failing to inform the Government of Mexico of the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the Ministry's verification team.” Para. 8.197. “Mexico also claims that the Ministry violated Annex I(2) by failing to inform Mexico of the exceptional circumstances which justified the inclusion of non-governmental experts in the Ministry's verification team. Guatemala asserts that Annex I(2) did not require the Ministry to inform Mexico of the exceptional circumstances at issue.” Para. 8.198. “We agree with Guatemala. Whereas paragraph 2 of Annex I requires the exporting Member to be “so informed”, the logical conclusion from the structure of that provision is that the exporting Member need only be informed of the intention to include non-governmental experts in the investigating team. If the intention of the drafters had been to impose an obligation on authorities to inform exporting Members of the “exceptional circumstances” at issue, presumably the first sentence of Annex I(2) would have been drafted in a manner that clearly provided for that obligation. We therefore reject Mexico's claim that Guatemala violated Annex I(2) by the Ministry's failure to inform Mexico of the exceptional circumstances justifying the need to include non-governmental experts in the Ministry's verification team.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Korea - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia (Korea - Certain Paper), Demandante: Indonésia, WT/DS312/R, paras. 7.184, 7.188 e 7.192

Nesta controvérsia, o Painel entendeu que não é necessário que os resultados das investigações realizadas pelas autoridades, nos termos do Artigo 6.7, sejam revelados aos exportadores necessariamente na forma escrita. O objetivo de revelar os resultados é possibilitar aos exportadores e demais partes interessadas o acesso às informações, para que possam estruturar suas defesas ao longo do processo de investigação, sendo importante a descrição de todas as informações verificadas e a citação das que não foram passíveis de verificação. No caso concreto, decidiu o Painel que houve violação ao Artigo 6.7, pois a autoridade investigadora da Coreia não forneceu as informações verificadas, possibilitando às partes a estruturação de suas defesas até o fim do processo de investigação.

Para. 7.184. “We note that Article 6.7 requires the IA to inform the investigated exporters of the verification results. The text provides that such disclosure can be made either by making the results available so that the exporters can see them if they so wish or through the final disclosure under Article 6.9 before a final decision is taken in the investigation.” Para. 7.188. “Next, we shall address Korea's allegation that certain documents sent by the KTC also informed the Sinar Mas Group of the verification results. In this context, we shall first address the issue of whether or not Article 6.7 requires that the disclosure regarding the verification results be made in a written format. Since Indonesia submits that an oral disclosure would not satisfy Article 6.7, we understand Indonesia to argue that a written disclosure is necessary. Korea disagrees with Indonesia in this regard. According to Korea, Article 6.7 does not require written disclosure. We agree with Korea that Article 6.7 does not require written disclosure. It requires that the verification results be disclosed to the investigated exporters without specifying the format in which such disclosure is to be made. We note that when they intended that written format be used with respect to certain communications in the course of an Antidumping investigation, drafters stated it clearly in the Agreement. For instance, Article 5.1 of the Agreement provides that the application for the initiation of an investigation has to be made in writing. Similarly, Article 6.3 provides that oral information submitted to the IA by an interested party may only be taken into account if it is subsequently reproduced in writing. These examples support our interpretation that Article 6.7 does not require that disclosure be a written disclosure. As long as it can be proved that the substantive requirements of that provision have been fulfilled, the format of the disclosure would not matter.” Para. 7.192. “On the basis of the above explanations, it becomes factually clear that the contents of the disclosure regarding verification made through the oral briefing during the April 4 meeting and the KTC's reports issued following the verification were limited to the fact that the Sinar Mas Group failed to submit CMI's financial statements during verification and that the KTC decided to use facts available with respect to Indah Kiat and Pindo Deli. The issue is whether or not this limited disclosure was enough to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.7. In our view, the purpose of the disclosure requirement under Article 6.7 is to make sure that exporters, and to a certain extent other interested parties, are informed of the verification results and can therefore structure their cases for the rest of the investigation in light of those results. It is therefore important that such disclosure contain adequate information regarding all aspects of the verification, including a description of the information which was not verified as well as of information which was verified successfully. This is because, in our view, information which was verified successfully, just as information which was not verified, could well be relevant to the presentation of the interested parties' cases.” 7. Artigo 6.8 e Anexo II Relatório do Painel no litígio Egypt - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey (Egypt - Steel Rebar), Demandante: Turquia, WT/DS211/R, paras. 7.146-7.147 e 7.153-7.155 Em primeiro lugar, este Painel esclarece a relação entre o Artigo 6.8 e o Anexo II, o qual define a melhor informação disponível no sentido do parágrafo 6.8. Este entendimento também foi citado nos casos United States - Hot-Rolled Steel, Argentina - Ceramic Tiles e US - Steel Plate, portanto, da mesma maneira que no Artigo 6.7 e Anexo I. Também neste caso, o Anexo II será analisado em conjunto com o o Artigo 6.8. Neste caso, o Painel esclarece que, embora o Artigo 6.8 admita a formulação de juízo com base em fatos disponíveis, as informações de fontes não confiáveis devem ser evitadas. Segundo o Painel, os dispositivos do Anexo II que determinam que informações podem ser utilizadas como fatos disponíveis “relacionam-se com a confiabilidade da informação usada pela autoridade investigadora” e referem-se ao histórico de negociação do Anexo, cuja origem remonta a Rodada Tóquio, e continha um preâmbulo que estabelecia que informações não confiáveis seriam evitadas, além de ter como fundamento a Convenção de Viena. O Painel também analisou o conceito de “informação necessária”, no sentido atribuído pelo Artigo 6.8, e considerou que este Artigo refere-se à “informação necessária” e não à “informação requisitada”. Como o Artigo 6.8 não define o que

seria informação necessária, e o Painel não encontrou outro dispositivo ao longo do acordo que trouxesse este significado, o Painel concluiu, por analogia ao poder das autoridades no Parágrafo 1 do Anexo II, que cabe à própria autoridade a discricionariedade de especificar quais seriam as informações necessárias em cada caso.

Para. 7.146. “Article 6.8 therefore addresses the dilemma in which investigating authorities might find themselves - they must base their calculations of normal value and export price on some data, but the necessary information may not have been submitted. Article 6.8 identifies the circumstances in which an IA may overcome this lack of necessary information by relying on facts which are otherwise available to the investigating authority.” Para. 7.147. “It is clear to us that according to the wording of Article 6.8, an investigating authority may disregard the primary source of information and resort to the facts available only under the specific conditions of Article 6.8. An IA may therefore resort to “facts available” only where a party: (i) refuses access to necessary information; (ii) otherwise does not provide necessary information within a reasonable period; or (iii) significantly impedes the investigation.” Para. 7.153. “Our view of the relationship of Annex II to Article 6.8 is consistent with that of the Appellate Body in United States - Hot-Rolled Steel. In that case, the Appellate Body stated that Annex II is “incorporated by reference” into Article 6.8, i.e., that it forms part of Article 6.8. In similar vein, the Appellate Body also referred to the “collective requirements” of Article 6.8 and certain provisions of Annex II. The panel in Argentina - Ceramic Tiles came to a similar conclusion.” Para. 7.154. “It is clear that the provisions of Annex II that address what information can be used as facts available (which, along with the other provisions of Annex II, “shall be observed”) have to do with ensuring the reliability of the information used by the investigating authority. This view may further be confirmed, as foreseen in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, by the negotiating history of Annex II. In particular, this Annex was originally developed by the Tokyo Round Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, which adopted it on 8 May 1984 as a “Recommendation Concerning Best Information Available in Terms of Article 6:8”. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the substantive provisions of the original recommendation were incorporated with almost no changes as Annex II to the AD Agreement. A preambular paragraph to the original recommendation, which was not retained when Annex II was created, in our view, provides some insight into the intentions of the drafters concerning its application. This paragraph reads as follows:

The authorities of the importing country have a right and an obligation to make decisions on the basis of the best information available during the investigation from whatever source, even where evidence has been supplied by the interested party. The Anti-Dumping Code recognizes the right of the importing country to base findings on the facts available when any interested party refuses access to or does not provide the necessary information within a reasonable period, or significantly impedes the investigation (Article 6.8). However, all reasonable steps should be taken by the authorities of the importing countries to avoid the use of information from unreliable sources.

To us, this preambular language conveys that the full package of provisions in the recommendation, applicable in implementing Article 6:8 of the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code, was intended, inter alia, to ensure that in using facts available (i.e, in applying Article 6:8), information from unreliable sources would be avoided.” Para. 7.155. “On the question of the “necessary” information, reading Article 6.8 in conjunction with Annex II, paragraph 1, it is apparent that it is left to the discretion of an investigating authority, in the first instance, to determine what information it deems necessary for the conduct of its investigation (for calculations, analysis, etc.), as the authority is charged by paragraph 1 to “specify … the information required from any interested party”. This paragraph also sets forth rules to be followed by

the authority, in particular that it must specify the required information “in detail”, “as soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation”, and that it also must specify “the manner in which that information should be structured by the interested party in its response”. Thus, there is a clear burden on the authority to be both prompt and precise in identifying the information that it needs from a given interested party (...).” Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC – Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.455 e 7.462 Neste caso, a autoridade investigadora da União Europeia notificou todas as empresas que conseguiu ter conhecimento e não apenas àquelas informadas na petição inicial (caso Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice). Entretanto, a obrigação do Parágrafo I do Anexo II de informar às partes interessada e fornecer-lhe oportunidade razoável, antes que a autoridade julgue com base nos dados disponíveis, permanece igual. Como não foram todas as empresas que receberam o questionário, o Painel considerou que houve violação ao Parágrafo I do Anexo II e ao Artigo 6.8 do Acordo Antidumping. Para. 7.455. “We agree with the EC that there are important differences between the actions of the investigating authority in Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice and those of the investigating authority in the investigation at issue in the present dispute. However, these differences cannot change the nature of the obligation set out in paragraph 1 of Annex II. In this regard, we observe, as the Appellate Body did in Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, that pursuant to paragraph 1 of Annex II an interested party must not only be informed of the information required by an investigating authority for the purpose of its investigation, but it must also be given an opportunity to provide it before the investigating authority may resort to “facts available” within the meaning of Article 6.8. Thus, we must assess whether the investigating authority complied with these requirements, in the light of the particular facts and circumstances of the investigation at issue.”

Para. 7.462. “However, to the extent that 33 of the 67 companies that did not receive the “sampling questionnaire” were not members of any of the associations represented by the FHL, we find that the EC did not provide these companies with the relevant notices required under paragraph 1 of Annex II. Because these companies were unknown to the investigating authority (and not members of the FHL or NSL), they could not have received the relevant notices under paragraph 1 of Annex II. We see nothing in the facts that have been presented before us to suggest that the FHL had indicated that it would act as a channel of communication between the investigating authority and companies that were not part of the membership of the relevant industry Associations at the time that the “sampling questionnaire” was being distributed. Thus, to the extent that the investigating authority applied “facts available” for the purpose of establishing the margin of dumping of the 33 companies that did not receive a “sampling questionnaire” and which were not members of the FHL or the NSL, we find that it acted inconsistently with paragraph 1 of Annex II and therefore also Article 6.8 of the AD Agreement.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.177 Neste caso, o México argumentou que as autoridades investigadoras não podem prorrogar o período de investigação, uma vez que o Parágrafo 1 do Anexo II exige que as informações sejam requeridas das partes envolvidas tão logo seja iniciada a investigação. Entretanto, o Painel rejeitou este argumento, uma vez que existem outros fatores que podem fazer com que sejam necessárias a atualização de informações ao longo da investigação. Para. 8.177. “We are not persuaded that paragraph 1 of Annex II, or any other provision of the AD Agreement, prevents an investigating authority from extending the POI during the course of an investigation. We agree with Guatemala that there may be a number of circumstances in which the

investigating authority will need updated information during the course of its investigation. In this regard, we would also note that the extension of a POI may in certain cases lead to negative findings of dumping and/or injury, to the benefit of exporters. The fact that the POI may be extended after the imposition of provisional measures is not necessarily problematic, since even without any extension of the POI there is no guarantee that the factual basis for the preliminary determination will be the same as that of the final determination. The factual basis may change, for example, if a preliminary affirmative determination of injury is made on the basis of data provided by the complainant, and if some (or all) of that data are shown to be erroneous during verification of the domestic industry. Indeed, in such cases differences in the factual bases of the preliminary and final determinations would normally be necessary in order to preserve the integrity of the investigation. Although Annex II(1) provides that interested parties should be informed of the information required by the investigating authority “as soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation”, this does not mean that information concerning a particular period of time may only be required if the request for that information is made immediately after initiation. We interpret the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Annex II to mean that any request for specific information should be communicated to interested parties “as soon as possible”. Since Mexico has not advanced any argument that it was possible for the Ministry to have requested information concerning the extended POI before it actually did so, we reject Mexico's claim that the Ministry's extension of the POI violated Guatemala's obligations under paragraph 1 of Annex II of the AD Agreement.”

Relatório do Painel no litígio Argentina - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Ceramic Floor Tiles from Italy (Argentina - Ceramic Tiles), Demandante: Itália, WT/DS189/R, para. 6.20 Neste caso, o Painel enfatizou que a autoridade apenas poderá julgar com base na “melhor informação disponível”, conforme o Artigo 6.8, nas hipóteses previstas neste dispositivo e melhor reguladas pelo Anexo II, ou seja, quando a parte negar acesso à informação necessária, não fornecer esta informação dentro de um período razoável, ou interpor obstáculos significativos à investigação. Para. 6.20. “It is clear to us, and both parties agree, that an investigating authority may disregard the primary source information and resort to the facts available only under the specific conditions of Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement. Thus, an investigating authority may resort to the facts available only where a party: (i) refuses access to necessary information; (ii) otherwise fails to provide necessary information within a reasonable period; or (iii) significantly impedes the investigation.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.252- 8.253 Neste caso, o Painel indicou que o recurso à “melhor informação disponível” não deve ser utilizado quando a informação é verificável e quando ela pode ser usada na investigação sem dificuldades excessivas. Por isso, o Painel considerou que a autoridade da Guatemala violou o Artigo 6.8, em linha com o entendimento do Parágrafo 3 do Anexo II, ao determinar o dumping com base na melhor informação disponível, uma vez que as informações fornecidas pelo produtor mexicano são “verificáveis” e podem ser utilizados sem dificuldades excessivas. Para. 8.252. “Furthermore, Annex II(3) provides that all information which is “verifiable”, and “appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the investigation without undue difficulties”, should be taken into account by the investigating authority when determinations are made. In other words, “best information available” should not be used when information is “verifiable”, and when “it can be used in the investigation without undue difficulties”. In our view, the information submitted by Cruz Azul was “verifiable”. The fact that it was not actually verified as a result of the Ministry's response to reasonable concerns raised by Cruz Azul does not change this. In addition, there is nothing in the Ministry's final determination to suggest that the information submitted by Cruz Azul could not be

used in the investigation “without undue difficulties”. Since the information was “verifiable”, and since the Ministry did not demonstrate that it could not be used “without undue difficulties”, Annex II(3) provides strong contextual support for the above conclusion that the Ministry violated Article 6.8 in using the “best information available” as a result of the cancelled verification visit.”

Para. 8.253. “Accordingly, we find that the Ministry violated Article 6.8, read in light of paragraph 3 of Annex II of the AD Agreement, in having recourse to the “best information available” for the purpose of making its final dumping determination.”

Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, paras. 7.72-7.74 Neste caso, o Painel considerou que se certa informação fornecida por uma Parte não for aceita pela autoridade e puder ser utilizada “sem dificuldade excessiva”, requer-se explicação nos termos do Parágrafo 6 do Anexo II para a conclusão de que a informação verificável e apresentada no prazo correto não poderá ser utilizada de modo apropriado. Para. 7.72. “The second criterion of paragraph 3 requires that the information be “appropriately submitted so that it can be used in the investigation without undue difficulties.” In our view, “appropriately” in this context has the sense of “suitable for, proper, fitting”. That is, the information is suitable for the use of the investigating authority in terms of its form, is submitted to the correct authorities, etc. More difficult is the requirement that the information can be “used without undue difficulties”. “Undue” is defined as “going beyond what is warranted or natural, excessive, disproportionate”. Thus, “undue difficulties” are difficulties beyond what is otherwise the norm in an anti-dumping investigation. This recognizes that difficulties in using the information submitted in an anti-dumping investigation are not, in fact, unusual. This conclusion is hardly surprising, given that enterprises that become interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation and are asked to provide information are not likely to maintain their internal books and records in exactly the format and with precisely the items of information that are eventually requested in the course of an anti-dumping investigation. Thus, it is frequently necessary for parties submitting information to collect and organize raw data in a form that responds to the information request of the investigating authorities. Similarly, it is frequently necessary for the investigating authority to make adjustments of its own in order to be able to take into account information that does not fully comply with its request. This is part of the obligation on both sides to cooperate, recognized by the Appellate Body in the US - Hot-Rolled Steel case.” Para. 7.73. “In discussing the obligation on interested parties to cooperate in the information gathering aspect of the investigation, the Appellate Body in US - Hot-Rolled Steel, noted that cooperation is a process, commenting that paragraphs 2 and 5 of Annex II of the AD Agreement reflect “a careful balance between the interest of investigating authorities and exporters. In order to complete their investigations, investigating authorities are entitled to expect a very significant degree of effort – to the “best of their abilities” – from investigated exporters” However, the Appellate Body further commented that “cooperation is indeed a two-way process involving joint effort.” Thus, it seems clear to us that investigating authorities must undertake a degree of effort - some degree of “difficulty” – if needed to be able to use information submitted by an interested party. However, the investigating authorities are not required to undertake extreme measures – that is “undue” difficulties - in order to use information submitted, any more than the interested parties are required to undertake extreme measures to provide requested information.” Para. 7.74. “In our view, it is not possible to determine in the abstract what “undue difficulties” might attach to an effort to use information submitted. We consider the question of whether information submitted can be used in the investigation “without undue difficulties” is a highly fact-specific issue. Thus, we consider that it is imperative that the investigating authority explain, as required by paragraph 6 of Annex II, the basis of a conclusion that information which is verifiable and timely submitted cannot be used in the investigation without undue difficulties.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 99-103 e 104 Neste caso, as autoridades americanas recorreram a fatos adversos disponíveis para o cálculo da margem de dumping de um exportador que não cooperou, por não fornecer as informações requisitadas. O Órgão de Apelação confirmou a conclusão do Painel, de que o exportador não cooperou com a investigação e fez constar em seu relatório que, nos termos do Parágrafo 7 do Anexo II, a falta de cooperação poderia levar a resultado menos favorável à Parte. Ao analisar o conceito de cooperação, nos termos do Parágrafo 7 do Anexo II, o Órgão de Apelação notou que este dispositivo não indicou o nível de cooperação que é esperado das partes interessadas para evitar a possibilidade de as autoridades investigadoras recorrerem a um resultado menos favorável. Assim, entendeu o Órgão de Apelação que, de acordo com o Parágrafo 5, o nível de cooperação tem que o ser “o melhor que seus recursos tenham permitido”. Também ressaltou, que o Parágrafo 2 deste Anexo atribuía destaque ao princípio da boa fé, no requerimento de informações, e o fato de que as autoridades devem evitar sobrecarga adicional desproporcional à parte interessada. O Órgão de Apelação considerou que os Parágrafos 2 e 5 do Anexo II e o Artigo 6.13 do Acordo Antidumping, de certa forma equilibram os interesses das autoridades investigadoras e dos exportadores, pois ao mesmo tempo que exigem “o melhor de seus recursos” por parte dos exportadores, também não permitem que as autoridades imponham medidas desproporcionais ou não razoáveis. O Artigo 6.13 considera a cooperação um processo de duas vias. Para. 99. “Paragraph 7 of Annex II indicates that a lack of “cooperation” by an interested party may, by virtue of the use made of facts available, lead to a result that is “less favourable” to the interested party than would have been the case had that interested party cooperated. We note that the Panel referred to the following dictionary meaning of “cooperate”: to “work together for the same purpose or in the same task.” This meaning suggests that cooperation is a process, involving joint effort, whereby parties work together towards a common goal. In that respect, we note that parties may very well “cooperate” to a high degree, even though the requested information is, ultimately, not obtained. This is because the fact of “cooperating” is in itself not determinative of the end result of the cooperation. Thus, investigating authorities should not arrive at a “less favourable” outcome simply because an interested party fails to furnish requested information if, in fact, the interested party has “cooperated” with the investigating authorities, within the meaning of paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.” Para. 100. “Paragraph 7 of Annex II does not indicate what degree of “cooperation” investigating authorities are entitled to expect from an interested party in order to preclude the possibility of such a “less favourable” outcome. To resolve this question we scrutinize the context found in Annex II. In this regard, we consider it relevant that paragraph 5 of Annex II prohibits investigating authorities from discarding information that is “not ideal in all respects” if the interested party that supplied the information has, nevertheless, acted “to the best of its ability”. (emphasis added) This provision suggests to us that the level of cooperation required of interested parties is a high one – interested parties must act to the “best” of their abilities.” Para. 101. “We note, however, that paragraph 2 of Annex II authorizes investigating authorities to request responses to questionnaires in a particular medium (for example, computer tape) but, at the same time, states that such a request should not be “maintained” if complying with that request would impose an “unreasonable extra burden” on the interested party, that is, would “entail unreasonable additional cost and trouble ”. (emphasis added) This provision requires investigating authorities to strike a balance between the effort that they can expect interested parties to make in responding to questionnaires, and the practical ability of those interested parties to comply fully with all demands made of them by the investigating authorities. We see this provision as another detailed expression of the principle of good faith, which is, at once, a general principle of law and a principle of general international law, that informs the provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as the other covered agreements. This organic principle of good faith, in this particular context, restrains

investigating authorities from imposing on exporters burdens which, in the circumstances, are not reasonable.” Para. 102. “We, therefore, see paragraphs 2 and 5 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as reflecting a careful balance between the interests of investigating authorities and exporters. In order to complete their investigations, investigating authorities are entitled to expect a very significant degree of effort – to the “best of their abilities” – from investigated exporters. At the same time, however, the investigating authorities are not entitled to insist upon absolute standards or impose unreasonable burdens upon those exporters.” Para. 104. “Article 6.13 thus underscores that “cooperation” is, indeed, a two-way process involving joint effort. This provision requires investigating authorities to make certain allowances for, or take action to assist, interested parties in supplying information. If the investigating authorities fail to “take due account” of genuine “difficulties” experienced by interested parties, and made known to the investigating authorities, they cannot, in our view, fault the interested parties concerned for a lack of cooperation.” Relatório do Painel no litígio China - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States (China - GOES), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS414/R, paras. 7.386-7.387 e 7.393 Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que a China violou o Artigo 6.8 e o Parágrafo 1 do Anexo II, ao utilizar os fatos disponíveis para o cálculo da margem de dumping para exportadores americanos não conhecidos, sob o argumento de que as pré condições para a utilização dos “fatos disponíveis” não foram preenchidas. Para. 7.386. “In the view of the Panel, paragraph 1 of Annex II and Article 6.1 place the notification obligation on investigating authorities and it is difficult to find in the terms of the Anti-Dumping Agreement any obligation on unknown exporters to come forward after a general public notice of initiation is published. Consequently, in the Panel's view, China's argument that the notice of initiation met the notification requirements embodied in paragraph 1 of Annex II and Article 6.1 cannot be sustained.” Para. 7.387. “In relation to the other preconditions for the application of facts available found in Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, given that the unknown exporters were not notified of the “necessary information” required of them, the Panel cannot conclude that they refused access to or failed to provide the information.” Para. 7.393. “In sum, in the view of the Panel, MOFCOM did not notify the “all other” exporters of the necessary information required of them and so did not meet one of the preconditions for the application of facts available, as found in paragraph 1 of Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Further, exporters that were unknown to MOFCOM, and indeed that were non-existent, cannot reasonably be held to have refused to provide necessary information or to have impeded an investigation within the meaning of Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.” 8. Artigo 6.9 Relatório do Painel no litígio United States - Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews) (Article 21.5, Argentina), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/RW, para. 7.150

Nesta controvérsia, a Argentina alegou que a autoridade investigatória americana violou o Artigo 6.9, por não informar fatos essenciais que formariam a base para a decisão. O Painel rejeitou este argumento, pois a Argentina não provou que os fatos eram essenciais nos termos do Artigo 6.9.

Para. 7.150. “We agree with the United States' observation that Argentina's claim under Article 6.9 is limited to the two memoranda, dated 16 December 2005, i.e. the same date as the Section 129 Determination at issue. These memoranda include the inconsistencies found by the USDOC in Siderca's and Acindar's cost data, submitted to the Panel as Exhibits 21 and 23, respectively. We recall our findings (supra, paras. 7.124 and 7.126) that these memoranda contained the USDOC's reasoning, and not facts. Furthermore, we note that this reasoning concerns the cost information submitted by the two Argentine companies themselves. Given that the obligation under Article 6.9 applies to essential facts and that the two memoranda cited by Argentina contain the USDOC's reasoning regarding the data submitted by the Argentine exporters, we reject Argentina's claim under Article 6.9.” Relatório do Painel no litígio Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.230 O Painel explica que um dos objetivos do Artigo 6.9 é possibilitar aos terceiros interessados o conhecimento sobre se determinado fato foi considerado essencial pela autoridade investigadora. Por isso, embora os fatos essenciais possam estar disponíveis nos autos, partes interessadas com acesso aos autos não saberão se, e quais informações, constituíram a base para a determinação da autoridade. Assim, o Painel rejeitou o argumento da Guatemala de que para cumprir os termos do Artigo 6.9 bastaria, simplesmente, disponibilizar o acesso aos autos, mesmo porque, neste caso, não haveria muita diferença prática entre o dispositivo deste Artigo e o Artigo 6.4.

Para. 8.230. “Furthermore, if the disclosure of “essential facts” under Article 6.9 could be undertaken simply by providing access to all information in the file, there would be little, if any, practical difference between Article 6.9 and Article 6.4. Guatemala is effectively arguing that it complied with Article 6.9 by complying with Article 6.4, i.e., by providing “timely opportunities for interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases … and that is used by the authorities …”. We do not accept an interpretation of Article 6.9 that would effectively reduce its substantive requirements to those of Article 6.4. In our view, an investigating authority must do more than simply provide “timely opportunities for interested parties to see all information that is relevant to the presentation of their cases … and that is used by the authorities …” in order to “inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures”. In light of these considerations, we do not consider that the Ministry could comply with the requirement to “inform all interested parties of the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures” simply by offering to provide interested parties with copies of all information in the file.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no litígio China - Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical Steel from the United States (China - GOES), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS414/AB/R, paras. 240-241

Neste caso, os EUA alegaram que a autoridade investigadora chinesa não teria revelado os “fatos essenciais”. Merece destaque a discussão acerca do conceito de “fatos essenciais” a serem informados às partes antes da determinação final, nos termos do Artigo 6.9. O Órgão de Apelação entende que são considerados “fatos essenciais” aqueles realmente significativos no processo de tomada de decisão, quanto à aplicação ou não da medida definitiva. Por fim, o Órgão de Apelação confirmou a decisão do Painel de que a China violou o Artigo 6.9. Para. 240. “At the heart of Articles 6.9 and 12.8 is the requirement to disclose, before a final determination is made, the essential facts under consideration which form the basis for the decision whether or not to apply definitive measures. As to the type of information that must be disclosed, these provisions cover “facts under consideration”, that is, those facts on the record that may be taken into account by an authority in reaching a decision as to whether or not to apply definitive anti-dumping and/or countervailing duties. We highlight that, unlike Articles 12.2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and 22.5 of the SCM Agreement, which govern the disclosure of matters of fact and law

and reasons at the conclusion of anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations, Articles 6.9 and 12.8 concern the disclosure of “facts” in the course of such investigations “before a final determination is made”. Moreover, we note that Articles 6.9 and 12.8 do not require the disclosure of all the facts that are before an authority but, instead, those that are “essential”; a word that carries a connotation of significant, important, or salient. In considering which facts are “essential”, the following question arises: essential for what purpose? The context provided by the latter part of Articles 6.9 and 12.8 clarifies that such facts are, first, those that “form the basis for the decision whether to apply definitive measures” and, second, those that ensure the ability of interested parties to defend their interests. Thus, we understand the “essential facts” to refer to those facts that are ignificant in the process of reaching a decision as to whether or not to apply definitive measures. Such facts are those that are salient for a decision to apply definitive measures, as well as those that are salient for a contrary outcome. An authority must disclose such facts, in a coherent way, so as to permit an interested party to understand the basis for the decision whether or not to apply definitive measures. In our view, disclosing the essential facts under consideration pursuant to Articles 6.9 and 12.8 is paramount for ensuring the ability of the parties concerned to defend their interests.” Para 241. “We agree with the Panel that, “[i]n order to apply definitive measures at the conclusion of countervailing and anti-dumping investigations, an investigating authority must find dumping or subsidization, injury and a causal link” between the dumping or subsidization and the injury to the domestic industry. What constitutes an “essential fact” must therefore be understood in the light of the content of the findings needed to satisfy the substantive obligations with respect to the application of definitive measures under the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement, as well as the factual circumstances of each case. These findings each rest on an analysis of various elements that an authority is required to examine, which, in the context of an injury analysis, are set out in, inter alia, Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, and 3.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Articles 15.1, 15.2, 15.4, and 15.5 of the SCM Agreement. Articles 3.2 and 15.2 require investigating authorities to consider the effect of subject imports on prices. In particular, under the second sentence of these provisions, authorities must consider whether there has been a significant price undercutting by the dumped or subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like domestic product, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.” 9. Artigo 6.10

Relatório do Painel no litígio European Communities - Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon - Norway), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.166-7.168 Neste caso, o Painel ressaltou que o significado literal do texto do Artigo 6.10 sugere que os Membros poderiam escolher em focar a investigação em todos os exportadores conhecidos ou todos os exportadores e produtores. O Painel rejeitou o argumento da Noruega e concluiu que as CE não violaram o Artigo 6.10 ao limitar o número de partes interessadas investigadas a dez, excluindo todos os “exportadores não produtores”. Para. 7.166. “In our view, neither of these two grammatical functions of the word “or” supports Norway's interpretation of Article 6.10. In this regard, we find it particularly telling that the drafters of the AD Agreement chose to use the word “or” and not the word “and” in agreeing on the text of this provision. This choice of language suggests the drafters intended that Members be left with discretion to choose the focus of their investigations. Indeed, though it is clear that the AD Agreement envisages that the pricing behaviour of both exporters and producers may be examined for the purpose of determining the existence of dumping, there is no preference to investigate one or the other. The provisions of the AD Agreement relating to the calculation of normal value and export price apply equally to investigations in respect of both types of interested parties.”

Para. 7.167. “Thus, the ordinary meaning of the text in Article 6.10 suggests that Members may choose to focus their investigations on either all known exporters, all known producers, or all known exporters and producers. We see that there may well be important reasons for making such a choice. For instance, in certain circumstances, a focus on both known exporters and known producers may result in the calculation of two margins of dumping in respect of the same export transactions. This may arise whenever a producer makes indirect export sales through a non-related exporter (or trader) that sells part of the products purchased from the producer on the domestic market. By including both the exporter and the producer in the investigation, Article 6.10 would dictate that an individual margin of dumping would have to be calculated for each entity. Thus, two determinations of the existence of dumping would have to be made for the same export transactions.” Para. 7.168. “We do not believe that the first sentence of Article 6.10 was intended to be interpreted in a manner that would require two, potentially very different, determinations of the existence of dumping in respect of the same export transactions. Thus, in our view, the ordinary meaning of the first sentence of Article 6.10 suggests that the “known exporter[s] or producer[s]” that serve as the starting point for the selection of the interested parties investigated under either of the two limited investigation techniques described in the second sentence of Article 6.10, do not always have to be all known exporters and all known producers. We see no provision in the AD Agreement that would explicitly prohibit such interpretation of Article 6.10.” III. Comentários O Artigo 6 contém obrigações processuais importantes, ao longo da investigação antidumping, as quais devem ser respeitadas pela autoridade investigadora e pelas partes interessadas. Merece destaque o direito ao devido processo, a garantia da ampla defesa às partes, o dever da confidencialidade de informações, a obrigação de notificação e publicidade dos atos. De modo geral, notou-se que o DSB optou por uma interpretação mais literal e restritiva de seus dispositivos, como por exemplo na definição de “questionário” e de “partes interessadas”, para os fins da investigação. Entre os casos citados, percebe-se que o litígio Guatemala - Cement contém muitas alegações de questões processuais, tendo sido avaliados vários dispositivos pelo DSB. Ainda, conforme mencionado ao longo das interpretações, os dois anexos ao Acordo Antidumping estão estritamente relacionados a este Artigo, estabelecendo os procedimentos para a investigação in loco (Anexo I) e limitações ao uso da melhor informação disponível (Anexo II). Ambos os dispositivos foram objeto de análise pelo DSB. Estes deveres e garantias processuais constam na legislação antidumping brasileira, que disciplina de forma pormenorizada os prazos e procedimentos, sempre respeitando os princípios do Acordo Antidumping. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 60: New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, 1993. Footnote 61: Oxford English Dictionary, on-line edition, consulted 27 March 2011. Footnote 62: Appellate Body Report, EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 142; Panel Report, Korea - Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Certain Paper from Indonesia - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Indonesia (Korea - Certain Paper) (Article 21.5, Indonesia), WT/DS312/RW, adopted 22 October 2007, DSR 2007:VIII, 3369, para. 6.82.

Ø Artigo 7

Lucas Spadano IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 7 Provisional Measures

7.1 Provisional measures may be applied only if:

a) an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, a public notice has been given to that effect and interested parties have been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments;

b) a preliminary affirmative determination has been made of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry; and

c) the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused during the investigation.

7.2 Provisional measures may take the form of a provisional duty or, preferably, a security - by cash deposit or bond - equal to the amount of the antidumping duty provisionally estimated, being not greater than the provisionally estimated margin of dumping. Withholding of appraisement is an appropriate provisional measure, provided that the normal duty and the estimated amount of the antidumping duty be indicated and as long as the withholding of appraisement is subject to the same conditions as other provisional measures. 7.3 Provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the investigation. 7.4 The application of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a period as possible, not exceeding four months or, on decision of the authorities concerned, upon request by exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade involved, to a period not exceeding six months. When authorities, in the course of an investigation, examine whether a duty lower than the margin of dumping would be sufficient to remove injury, these periods may be six and nine months, respectively. 7.5 The relevant provisions of Article 9 shall be followed in the application of provisional measures. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 7 Medidas Provisórias

7.1 Medidas provisórias só poderão ser aplicadas se:

a) uma investigação tiver sido iniciada de acordo com o disposto no Artigo 5, um aviso tiver sido publicado nesse sentido e às partes interessadas tiver sido oferecida oportunidade adequada de apresentar suas informações e fazer comentários;

b) uma determinação preliminar afirmativa de dumping e respectivo dano à indústria

nacional tiver sido alcançada; e

c) as autoridades competentes julgarem que tais medidas são necessárias para impedir que ocorra dano durante as investigações.

7.2 As medidas provisórias poderão assumir a forma de direitos provisórios ou preferivelmente a de garantia - por meio de depósito em dinheiro ou certificado - igual ao montante do direito antidumping provisoriamente estimado, desde que não seja superior à margem de dumping provisoriamente calculada. Considera-se medida provisória adequada a suspensão de valoração aduaneira, desde que os direitos normais e o montante de direitos antidumping sejam indicados e que a suspensão de valoração aduaneira esteja sujeita às mesmas condições das demais medidas provisórias.

7.3 Não serão aplicadas medidas provisórias antes de decorridos 60 dias da data de início das

investigações. 7.4 A aplicação de medidas provisórias será limitada ao mais curto período possível, não

excedendo este a 4 meses, ou, por decisão das autoridades competentes e a pedido de exportadores que representem percentual significativo do comércio em questão, ao período de 6 meses. Na hipótese de as autoridades no curso de uma investigação examinarem se um direito inferior à margem de dumping seria suficiente para extinguir o dano, tais períodos passam a 6 e 9 meses respectivamente.

7.5 Na aplicação de medidas provisórias, serão observadas as disposições pertinentes do Artigo 9. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução A expressão “produção doméstica” é coerente com o texto to Acordo Antidumping em inglês e com o Decreto brasileiro na matéria, o Decreto nº 1602/95, o qual regulamenta o Acordo Antidumping no Brasil. Assim, em lugar de “indústria nacional”, no Artigo 7.1(b), sugere-se a leitura de “indústria doméstica”. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 7 1. Questões Gerais

a) “Economia processual”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: CE, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.298 Neste caso, embora o México tenha alegado que a Guatemala violou o Artigo 7.1 porque não fora dada oportunidade adequada para que uma empresa mexicana apresentasse comentários sobre informações fornecidas à autoridade investigadora, o Painel considerou desnecessário examinar tal pleito, uma vez que já havia concluído que a medida definitiva e uma decisão sobre a medida provisória resultariam, no máximo, em uma decisão a respeito de parte da medida definitiva já examinada. Para. 8.298. “At most, Mexico’s claims concerning the provisional measure could only result in a ruling with respect to part of the definitive measure insofar as it relates to retrospective collection of the provisional measure (i.e., where it is mandated that the ‘provisional antidumping duties collected would remain in favor of the treasury’). Since we have already made findings that give rise to a recommendation concerning the totality of the definitive measure, we do not consider it necessary to further address claims (i.e. concerning the provisional measure) that could only result in a ruling concerning only part of the definitive measure.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

b) “Desnecessidade de identificar medida de aplicação de direito provisório separadamente no requerimento de instauração de Painel, para que seja possível apresentar argumentos de violação do Artigo 7”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 7.52-7.53 Nesta controvérsia, o Painel esclareceu que não é necessário identificar uma medida de aplicação de direitos antidumping provisórios no requerimento de instauração do Painel para que seja possível alegar que houve violação ao Artigo 7.4, se esta alegação tiver relação com a medida definitiva de aplicação de direitos antidumping identificada. No caso, o demandante identificou somente a medida definitiva, mas apresentou argumentos baeados no Artigo 7.4. A discussão foi considerada pelo Painel como parte do escopo de seus Termos de Referência. Para. 7.52. “The Appellate Body Report in Guatemala - Cement indicates that a complainant may, having identified a specific antidumping duty in its request for establishment, bring any claims under the AD Agreement relating to that specific measure. That there should be a relationship between the measure challenged in a dispute and the claims asserted in that dispute would appear necessary, given that Article 19.1 of the DSU requires that, “where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with the agreement” (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, we must consider whether the United States' claim under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement relates to Mexico's definitive antidumping duty or whether the United States, having failed to identify the provisional measure as a specific measure being challenged in its request for the establishment of a panel, is now precluded from pursuing this claim.” Para. 7.53. “A claim regarding the period for which a provisional measure was applied does not, at first glance, constitute a challenge to the definitive antidumping duty in this dispute. However, we consider that the United States' claim under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement is nevertheless related to Mexico's definitive antidumping duty. In this regard, we recall that, under Article 10 of the AD Agreement, a provisional measure represents a basis under which a Member may, if the requisite conditions are met, levy antidumping duties retroactively. At the same time, a Member may not, except in the circumstances provided for in Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement, retroactively levy a definitive antidumping duty for a period during which provisional measures were not applied. Consequently, because the period of time for which a provisional measure is applied is generally determinative of the period for which a definitive antidumping duty may be levied retroactively, we consider that a claim regarding the duration of a provisional measure relates to the definitive antidumping duty.” 2. Limite dos prazos para aplicação de medidas provisórias

a) “Impossibilidade de extensão da aplicação de medidas provisórias para além dos períodos definidos no Artigo 7.4”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United Staes (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 7.182-7.183 Nesta controvérsia, o Painel recusou a tentativa do México de justificar uma extensão de 28 dias no período de aplicação de medida provisória (para além de 6 meses), com base em “boas intenções” e no fato de que este teria sido o “período mais curto possível”, em conformidade com o espírito do Acordo. Conforme denota o Relatório do Painel, os prazos-limite definidos no Artigo 7.4 são vinculantes e não comportam interpretação flexível. Para. 7.182. “The language of Article 7.4 is clear and explicit on the question of the allowable duration of a provisional measure. Unless exporters representing a significant percentage of the trade involved request an extension of the period of application, a situation which undisputedly did not arise

in this case, Article 7.4 limits the period of application of a provisional measure to a period no longer than six months, and provides no basis for extension of that period. Indeed, Mexico has made no legal argument to the contrary, relying instead on general assertions of its good intentions and that the additional period of application of the provisional measure was for the shortest time possible.” Para. 7.183. “The AD Agreement contains specific rules for the implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 with respect, inter alia, to the period of application of provisional measures. Those rules are binding on all Members, and arguments based on references to the “spirit” of the GATT 1994 are unavailing to justify a failure to comply with those rules. We conclude that, in light of the specific limitation on the period of application of provisional measures contained in Article 7.4, the application of the provisional measure beyond the six month period is inconsistent with Mexico's obligations under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement.” (nota de rodapé omitida) III. Comentários Proporcionalmente à quantidade de disputas na OMC, envolvendo a aplicação de direitos antidumping, é reduzido o número de casos relacionados à medidas provisórias. Como se trata de medidas aplicadas em um período relativamente curto de tempo, a realidade é que dificilmente haverá tempo hábil para que uma disputa sobre direitos antidumping provisórios chegue à fase do Painel, sem que eles tenham sido revogados ou convertidos em direitos definitivos. Nesse sentido, como os remédios do sistema de solução de controvérsias são prospectivos (não retroativos), os aspectos em disputa costumam girar em torno da aplicação de direitos definitivos, o que tende a tornar desnecessário o exame de argumentos sobre as medidas provisórias anteriormente aplicadas. Isso não retira, porém, a importância que as normas contidas no Artigo 7 possam ter para a manutenção do cumprimento das regras em investigações antidumping, ou para a solução de eventuais violações na fase de consultas. De todo modo, a pouca jurisprudência construída a respeito do tema evidencia ao menos um ponto importante: o compromisso da OMC em exigir a aplicação rigorosa dos prazos máximos para adoção de medidas provisórias dispostas no Artigo 7.4, sem que haja espaço para prorrogações baseadas em argumentos de razoabilidade ou outros fundamentos. Assegura-se, assim, maior previsibilidade às investigações e eventuais aplicações provisórias de direitos antidumping.

Ø Artigo 8

IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 8 Price Undertakings

8.1 Proceedings may (63) be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional measures or antidumping duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings from any exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in question at dumped prices so that the authorities are satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is eliminated. Price increases under such undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the margin of dumping. It is desirable that the price increases be less than the margin of dumping if such increases would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.

8.2 Price undertakings shall not be sought or accepted from exporters unless the authorities of the importing Member have made a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and injury caused by such dumping. 8.3 Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities consider their acceptance impractical, for example, if the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including reasons of general policy. Should the case arise and where practicable, the authorities shall provide to the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider acceptance of an undertaking as inappropriate, and shall, to the extent possible, give the exporter an opportunity to make comments thereon. 8.4 If an undertaking is accepted, the investigation of dumping and injury shall nevertheless be

completed if the exporter so desires or the authorities so decide. In such a case, if a negative determination of dumping or injury is made, the undertaking shall automatically lapse, except in cases where such a determination is due in large part to the existence of a price undertaking. In such cases, the authorities may require that an undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. In the event that an affirmative determination of dumping and injury is made, the undertaking shall continue consistent with its terms and the provisions of this Agreement.

8.5 Price undertakings may be suggested by the authorities of the importing Member, but no exporter shall be forced to enter into such undertakings. The fact that exporters do not offer such undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so, shall in no way prejudice the likely to be realized if the dumped imports continue. 8.6 Authorities of an importing Member may require any exporter from whom an undertaking has been accepted to provide periodically information relevant to the fulfilment of such an undertaking and to permit verification of pertinent data. In case of violation of an undertaking, the authorities of the importing Member may take, under this Agreement in conformity with its provisions, expeditious actions which may constitute immediate application of provisional measures using the best information available. In such cases, definitive duties may be levied in accordance with this Agreement on products entered for consumption not more than 90 days before the application of such provisional measures, except that any such retroactive assessment shall not apply to imports entered before the violation of the undertaking. Footnote 63: The word “may” shall not be interpreted to allow the simultaneous continuation of proceedings with the implementation of price undertakings except as provided in paragraph 4.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 8 Compromissos sobre Preços

8.1 Poderão19 suspender-se ou dar-se por encerrados os procedimentos sem imposição de medidas provisórias ou direitos antidumping se qualquer exportador comunica sua disposição de assumir voluntariamente compromisso satisfatório no sentido de rever seus preços ou de cessar as exportações a preços de dumping destinadas à região em apreço, de forma a que as autoridades fiquem convencidas de que o efeito danoso do dumping será eliminado. Os aumentos de preço que se realizem sob tais compromissos não deverão ser mais altos do que o necessário para eliminar a margem de dumping. Seria desejável que o aumento de preço fosse menor do que a margem de dumping, caso esse aumento seja suficiente para cessar o dano causado à indústria doméstica. 8.2 Os exportadores não deverão buscar ou aceitar compromissos sobre preços a menos que as autoridades do Membro importador tenham chegado a uma determinação preliminar afirmativa de dumping e dano por ele causado. 8.3 As autoridades não precisam aceitar ofertas de compromissos sobre preços se consideram que sua aceitação seria ineficaz como, por exemplo, no caso de o número de exportadores efetivos ou potenciais ser excessivamente elevado ou, por outras razões, entre as quais a existência de princípios de política geral. Na ocorrência de semelhante situação, e caso seja possível, as autoridades deverão fornecer ao exportador as razões pelas quais julgam inadequada a aceitação do compromisso e deverão, na medida do possível, oferecer ao exportador oportunidade para tecer comentários sobre o assunto. 8.4 Se um compromisso sobre preços é aceito, poder-se-á, não obstante, completar a investigação sobre dumping e dano caso o exportador assim o deseje ou as autoridades assim o decidam. Nessa hipótese, se se chega a uma determinação negativa de dumping ou dano, o compromisso será automaticamente extinto, exceto quando aquela determinação negativa resulte em grande parte da existência mesma do compromisso sobre preços. Em tais casos, as autoridades poderão requerer que o compromisso seja mantido por período de tempo razoável e conforme as disposições deste Acordo. Na hipótese contrária, de que se chegue a uma determinação positiva de dumping e dano, o compromisso será mantido conforme os termos em que tiver sido estabelecido e as disposições deste Acordo. 8.5 As autoridades do Membro importador poderão sugerir compromissos sobre preços, mas nenhum exportador poderá ser forçado a aceitá-los. O fato de que os exportadores não ofereçam compromissos sobre preços ou não os aceitem, quando oferecidos pelas autoridades, não poderá prejudicá-los na consideração do caso. As autoridades terão liberdade, porém, para concluir que uma ameaça de dano será mais provável se continuarem a ocorrer as importações a preços de dumping. 8.6 As autoridades de um Membro importador poderão requerer a qualquer tempo do exportador com o qual se estabeleceu um compromisso sobre preços que o mesmo forneça periodicamente informação relativa ao cumprimento do compromisso e que permita verificação dos dados pertinentes. No caso de violação de compromisso, as autoridades do Membro importador poderão, por força do presente Acordo e em conformidade com o disposto nele, tomar prontas providências que poderão consistir na imediata aplicação de medidas provisórias apoiadas na melhor informação disponível. Nesses casos, direitos definitivos poderão ser percebidos, ao abrigo deste Acordo, sobre produtos que tenham entrado para consumo até 90 dias antes da aplicação das referidas medidas provisórias, não

                                                                                                                         19 Não se deverá interpretar a palavra “poderão” no sentido de ser permitida a continuação dos procedimentos simultaneamente à implementação do compromisso sobre o preço, com exceção do disposto no parágrafo 4.

podendo essa cobrança retroativa, porém, atingir importações que tenham entrado antes da violação do compromisso. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução 8.1 A primeira sentença do item 8.1 seria mais bem vertida ao português com o seguinte texto:

“Procedimentos podem ser suspensos ou encerrados sem a imposição de medidas provisórias ou direitos antidumping mediante o recebimento de compromissos voluntários satisfatórios de qualquer exportador (...).” (g.n.)

Ao invés do texto oficial:

“Poderão suspender-se ou dar-se por encerrados os procedimentos sem imposição de medidas provisórias ou direitos antidumping se qualquer exportador comunica sua disposição de assumir voluntariamente compromisso satisfatório (...)”.

Porque não é a comunicação da disposição de assumir um compromisso voluntário que suspende ou encerra uma investigação, mas sim o recebimento do próprio compromisso em termos satisfatórios sob a ótica das autoridades no sentido de eliminar os efeitos danosos. Os termos do Acordo Antidumping são mais estritos que os da versão do governo brasileiro. A última frase do item 8.1 seria igualmente melhor vertida se recebesse a seguinte redação, mais fiel aos termos do texto original:

“É desejável que os aumentos de preços sejam inferiores à margem de dumping se tais aumentos são adequados para eliminar o dano à indústria doméstica.”

Ao invés de:

“Seria desejável que o aumento de preço fosse menor do que a margem de dumping, caso esse aumento seja suficiente para cessar o dano causado à indústria doméstica.”

8.2 A despeito da inversão do sujeito e predicado da frase na versão do texto em português deste Artigo, não há comprometimento no sentido do dispositivo original. 8.3 A versão deste Artigo mostra-se bastante problemática, desvirtuando o texto original com repercussões práticas relevantes. Destacam-se abaixo a versão fiel ao dispositivo do Acordo, e transcreve-se o texto oficial internalizado pelo Decreto 1.355:

“As autoridades não precisam aceitar ofertas de compromissos sobre preços se consideram impraticável a sua aceitação como, por exemplo, no caso de o número de exportadores efetivos ou potenciais ser excessivamente elevado ou, por outras razões, incluindo de política geral. Se a situação surgir, e caso seja possível, as autoridades deverão fornecer ao exportador as razões pelas quais julgam inadequada a aceitação do compromisso e deverão, na medida do possível, oferecer ao exportador oportunidade para tecer comentários sobre o assunto.”

Ao invés de:

“As autoridades não precisam aceitar ofertas de compromissos sobre preços se consideram que sua aceitação seria ineficaz como, por exemplo, no caso de o número de exportadores efetivos ou potenciais ser excessivamente elevado ou, por outras razões, entre as quais a existência de princípios de política geral. Na ocorrência de semelhante situação, e caso seja possível, as autoridades deverão fornecer ao exportador as razões pelas quais julgam

inadequada a aceitação do compromisso e deverão, na medida do possível, oferecer ao exportador oportunidade para tecer comentários sobre o assunto.”

O termo “impractical” da primeira frase deste Artigo, por exemplo, foi traduzido como “ineficaz” em português, alterando o motivo pelo qual as autoridades investigadoras poderiam não aceitar uma oferta de compromisso de preços. “Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities consider their acceptance impractical, for example, if the number of actual or potential exporters is too great, or for other reasons, including reasons of general policy”. O termo “ineficaz” indica que o compromisso sobre preços não estaria cumprindo a sua função, enquanto o termo “impraticável” indica que mesmo que um compromisso seja eficiente, seria impraticável, por condições que não permitiriam que ele fosse aplicado, monitorado, entre outros. Concretamente, no caso de haver diversos modelos de um produto objeto de dumping, o acompanhamento periódico previsto por um compromisso de preços exigiria um extenso trabalho, o qual tornaria a oferta impraticável, porém, não necessariamente ineficaz. Além disso, não há nada no texto original em inglês sobre “princípios de política geral”, como indicado na versão em português em vigor do Acordo Antidumping. 8.4 A versão do texto oferecida novamente causa imprecisões sobre o texto original do Acordo. Não há nada no dispositivo do Acordo Antidumping que sugira que as autoridades irão oferecer compromissos, mas sim que convidarão, sugerirão que os exportadores assim o façam. Assim, a tradução correta seria:

“O fato de que os exportadores não ofereçam tais compromissos ou não aceitem a sugestão para oferecê-los não poderá prejudicá-los na consideração do caso.”

Ao invés de:

“O fato de que os exportadores não ofereçam compromissos sobre preços ou não os aceitem, quando oferecidos pelas autoridades, não poderá prejudicá-los na consideração do caso.”

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 8

1. Artigo 8.3

a) “Da aceitação de ofertas de compromissos sobre preços”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act)(Byrd Amendment), WT/DS217/R - Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, Coreia do Sul e Tailândia e WT/DS234/R, Demandantes: Canadá e México, paras. 7.80-7.81 O Painel em US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) concluiu que, embora a indústria doméstica recomende que as autoridades aceitem ou recusem algo, a indústria doméstica não desempenha papel decisivo nesse processo. Para. 7.80. “The decision to accept an undertaking or not under the Agreements is one the investigating authority is to take, and it may reject an undertaking for various reasons, including reasons of general policy. The fact that domestic producers may or may not be influenced by the CDSOA to suggest to the authority not to accept the undertaking, does not affect the possibility for interested parties concerned to offer an undertaking or for that undertaking to be accepted, in light of the non-decisive role of the domestic industry in this process.”

Para. 7.81. “In addition we note that the text of AD Article 8.3 (…) does not require the authority to examine objectively any undertaking offered. Rather, it stresses that undertakings offered need not be accepted and that the reasons for rejecting an undertaking may be manifold and include reasons of general policy. In our view, the CDSOA cannot be found to impede the objective examination of the appropriateness of accepting an undertaking, in the absence of any such obligation under AD Article 8 and SCM 18.” III. Comentários Não há comentários.

Ø Artigo 9 Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins Bruno Herwig Rocha Augustin Lucas Spadano IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 9 Imposition and Collection of Antidumping Duties

9.1 The decision whether or not to impose an antidumping duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled, and the decision whether the amount of the antidumping duty to be imposed shall be the full margin of dumping or less, are decisions to be made by the authorities of the importing Member. It is desirable that the imposition be permissive in the territory of all Members, and that the duty be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.

9.2 When an antidumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such antidumping duty shall

be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such product from all sources found to be dumped and causing injury, except as to imports from those sources from which price undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted. The authorities shall name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned. If, however, several suppliers from the same country are involved, and it is impracticable to name all these suppliers, the authorities may name the supplying country concerned. If several suppliers from more than one country are involved, the authorities may name either all the suppliers involved, or, if this is impracticable, all the supplying countries involved.

9.3 The amount of the antidumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established

under Article 2.

9.3.1 When the amount of the antidumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, the determination of the final liability for payment of antidumping duties shall take place as soon as possible, normally within 12 months, and in no case more than 18 months, after the date on which a request for a final assessment of the amount of the antidumping duty has been made. (64) Any refund shall be made promptly and normally in not more than 90 days following the determination of final liability made pursuant to this sub-paragraph. In any case, where a refund is not made within 90 days, the authorities shall provide an explanation if so requested.

9.3.2 When the amount of the antidumping duty is assessed on a prospective basis,

provision shall be made for a prompt refund, upon request, of any duty paid in excess of the margin of dumping. A refund of any such duty paid in excess of the actual margin of dumping shall normally take place within 12 months, and in no case more than 18 months, after the date on which a request for a refund, duly supported by evidence, has been made by an importer of the product subject to the antidumping duty. The refund authorized should normally be made within 90 days of the above-noted decision.

9.3.3 In determining whether and to what extent a reimbursement should be made when

the export price is constructed in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 2, authorities should take account of any change in normal value, any change in costs incurred between importation and resale, and any movement in the resale price which is duly reflected in subsequent selling prices, and should calculate the export price

with no deduction for the amount of antidumping duties paid when conclusive evidence of the above is provided.

9.4 When the authorities have limited their examination in accordance with the second sentence

of paragraph 10 of Article 6, any antidumping duty applied to imports from exporters or producers not included in the examination shall not exceed:

(i) the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the

selected exporters or producers or, (ii) where the liability for payment of antidumping duties is calculated on the

basis of a prospective normal value, the difference between the weighted average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and the export prices of exporters or producers not individually examined,

provided that the authorities shall disregard for the purpose of this paragraph any zero and de minimis margins and margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6. The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values to imports from any exporter or producer not included in the examination who has provided the necessary information during the course of the investigation, as provided for in subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6. 9.5 If a product is subject to antidumping duties in an importing Member, the authorities shall

promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping for any exporters or producers in the exporting country in question who have not exported the product to the importing Member during the period of investigation, provided that these exporters or producers can show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the exporting country who are subject to the antidumping duties on the product. Such a review shall be initiated and carried out on an accelerated basis, compared to normal duty assessment and review proceedings in the importing Member. No antidumping duties shall be levied on imports from such exporters or producers while the review is being carried out. The authorities may, however, withhold appraisement and/or request guarantees to ensure that, should such a review result in a determination of dumping in respect of such producers or exporters, antidumping duties can be levied retroactively to the date of the initiation of the review.

Footnote 64: It its understood that the observance of the time-limits mentioned in this subparagraph and in subparagraph 3.2 may not be possible where the product in question is subject to judicial review proceedings. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 9 Imposição e Cobrança de Direitos Antidumping

9.1 São da competência das autoridades do Membro importador a decisão sobre a imposição ou não de direito antidumping, quando estiverem preenchidos os requisitos necessários, e a decisão sobre se o montante do direito antidumping a ser imposto será a totalidade da margem de dumping ou menos do que esse valor. É desejável que o direito seja facultativo no território de todos os Membros e que seu montante seja menor do que a margem de dumping, caso tal valor inferior seja suficiente para eliminar o dano à indústria nacional.

9.2 Quando direito antidumping é imposto sobre um produto, será o mesmo cobrado nos valores

adequados a cada caso, sem discriminação, sobre todas as importações do produto julgadas serem praticadas a preço de dumping e danosas à indústria nacional, qualquer que seja sua procedência, com exceção daquelas origens com as quais foram acordados compromissos de preços sob a égide deste Acordo. As autoridades indicarão o nome do fornecedor ou fornecedores do referido produto. Se, no entanto, se tratar de diversos fornecedores do mesmo país e se for impraticável designá-los a todos pelo nome, as autoridades poderão

limitar-se a indicar o nome do país fornecedor respectivo. Se se trata de diversos fornecedores de mais de um país de origem, as autoridades poderão, alternativamente, indicar o nome de todos os fornecedores envolvidos ou, se tal for impraticável, indicar todos os países fornecedores envolvidos.

9.3 O valor do direito antidumping não deverá exceder a margem de dumping, tal como

estabelecida no Artigo 2:

(a) Quando o valor do direito antidumping for estabelecido de forma retrospectiva, o montante devido para seu pagamento deverá estabelecido o mais rapidamente possível, normalmente dentro de 12 meses, mas nunca em mais de 18 meses, após a data na qual se tenha formulado petição para a fixação definitiva do montante daqueles direitos antidumping.8 Qualquer reembolso deverá ser efetuado prontamente e, de maneira geral, em prazo não superior a 90 dias após a determinação do valor definitivo devido de acordo com este subparágrafo. Em qualquer caso, sempre que o reembolso não for efetuado no prazo de 90 dias, as autoridades deverão fornecer esclarecimentos, caso lhes sejam solicitados;

(b) Quando o valor do direito antidumping for estabelecido de forma prospectiva, tomar-

se-ão as devidas medidas preventivas para o caso de ser devido pronto reembolso, caso solicitado, de qualquer direito antidumping cobrado em excesso, além da margem de dumping. O reembolso desse direito excedente sobre a margem de dumping deverá normalmente ocorrer dentro de 12 meses, e nunca além de 18 meses, após a data em que solicitação de reembolso, devidamente fundamentada, tenha sido formulada pelo importador do produto objeto do direito antidumping. O reembolso autorizado deverá efetuar-se dentro de 90 dias a contar da decisão a que se faz referência acima;

(c) Quando o preço de exportação for construído de acordo com o parágrafo 4 do Artigo

2, as autoridades, na determinação da aplicabilidade e do alcance de um reembolso, levarão em conta toda alteração no valor normal, alteração nos custos incorridos entre a importação e a revenda e qualquer alteração no preço de revenda que se tenha refletido devidamente nos subseqüentes preços de venda, e calcularão o preço de exportação sem dedução dos direitos antidumping pagos, se demonstração conclusiva do que precede for apresentada.

9.4 Quando as autoridades tiverem limitado seu exame conforme o disposto no segundo período

do parágrafo 12 do Artigo 6, os direitos antidumping aplicados às importações dos exportadores ou produtores não incluídos no exame não poderão exceder:

(a) a média ponderada da margem de dumping estabelecida para o grupo selecionado de

exportadores ou produtores; ou

(b) a diferença entre a média ponderada do valor normal praticado pelos exportadores ou produtores selecionados e os preços de exportação dos exportadores ou produtores que não tenham sido individualmente examinados, sempre que o montante devido para o pagamento dos direitos antidumping for calculado de forma prospectiva sobre o valor normal;

entendido que as autoridades não levarão em conta, para o propósito deste parágrafo, margens zero ou de minimis ou, ainda, as margens estabelecidas nas circunstâncias a que faz referência o parágrafo

                                                                                                                         8 Fica entendido que, caso o produto em questão esteja submetido a procedimento de revisão judicial, poderá não ser possível a observância dos prazos mencionados neste subparágrafo e no subparágrafo 3(b).

10 do Artigo 6. As autoridades aplicarão direitos individuais ou valores normais às importações de qualquer exportador ou produtor incluído na investigação que tenha fornecido as necessárias informações durante seu curso, tal como disposto no subparágrafo 13(b) do Artigo 6. 9.5 Se um produto está sujeito a direitos antidumping aplicados por um Membro importador, as

autoridades deverão prontamente proceder a exame com vistas a determinar margens individuais de dumping para quaisquer exportadores ou produtores do país exportador em questão que não tenham exportado o produto para o Membro importador durante o período da investigação, desde que esses exportadores ou produtores possam demonstrar não ter qualquer relação com qualquer dos exportadores ou produtores no país de exportação que estejam sujeitos aos direitos antidumping estabelecidos sobre seu produto. Tal exame será iniciado e realizado de forma mais acelerada do aquela prevista para o cálculo dos direitos normais e procedimentos de revisão no Membro importador. Não poderão ser cobrados direitos antidumping sobre as importações provenientes de tais exportadores ou produtores enquanto se está realizando o exame. As autoridades poderão, entretanto, suspender a valoração aduaneira e/ou requerer garantias para assegurar que, no caso de as investigações concluírem pela determinação de dumping com relação a tais produtores ou exportadores, seja possível perceber direitos antidumping retroativos à data em que se iniciou o exame.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução No original em inglês, o número dos incisos vem acompanhado do número 9, relativo ao Artigo, o que não ocorre na versão em português. Além disso, a versão em português passou a usar letras nas subdivisões dos incisos, que a versão original utiliza-se de números. Isso pode gerar, para o leitor da versão traduzida, alguma dificuldade na identificação de referências normativas feitas, por exemplo, pelos Painéis e Órgão de Apelação da OMC. No Artigo 9.2, a frase “except as to imports from those sources from which price undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted” foi traduzida por “com exceção daquelas origens com as quais foram acordados compromissos de preços sob a égide deste Acordo”. Especificamente em relação à palavra origem, usualmente entendida no comércio internacional como referente a um determinado país, há risco de que a tradução provoque interpretação distinta da pretendida no texto original. O sujeito de um compromisso de preços no contexto de investigações antidumping, como se sabe, é o exportador. A tradução poderia ter mantido o sentido originalmente tencionado, por exemplo, da seguinte forma: “com exceção daquelas originárias de exportadores com os quais foram acordados compromissos de preços sob a égide deste Acordo”. As referências cruzadas contidas nos Artigos 9.3.3 e 9.4 da versão original não coincidem literalmente com aquelas encontradas no texto traduzido. Isso se dá, não por erro de referência, mas sim em função da metodologia distinta de numeração adotada no texto promulgado no Brasil, conforme comentado acima. Há uma diferença substancial de redação entre a versão original e a tradução, no que diz respeito à última frase do Artigo 9.4. Na versão original, lê-se:

“The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values to imports from any exporter or producer not included in the examination who has provided the necessary information during the course of the investigation”. [destaque nosso]

Na tradução para o português, foi indevidamente suprimida a palavra “not”, lendo-se:

“As autoridades aplicarão direitos individuais ou valores normais às importações de qualquer exportador ou produtor incluído na investigação que tenha fornecido as necessárias informações durante seu curso”.

Além da ausência do termo “exportador ou produtor não incluído”, nota-se que o mais adequado seria fazer referência àquele não incluído no exame ou na seleção (e não na investigação), tanto para manter coerência com o tema do Artigo 6.10.2 (na tradução, subparágrafo 13.b), quanto para evitar que se entenda que a investigação só se aplica a alguns produtores. Não se trata disso. A investigação ocorre em relação a todos os fabricantes do produto investigado de determinado país, mas pode haver a necessidade de selecionar apenas alguns deles, de modo que seja factível examinar os dados necessários para a determinação de dumping e dano. Na segunda sentença, faltou a palavra “que” antes da expressão “aquela prevista”. Assim, a sentença completa ficaria como segue: “tal exame será iniciado e realizado de forma mais acelerada do que aquela prevista para o cálculo dos direitos normais e procedimentos de revisão no Membro importador”. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 9 1. Artigo 9.1: Direito antidumping inferior à margem de dumping Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Antidumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.924 Este caso trata da aplicação de direitos antidumping pela UE às importações de calçados de couro oriundos da China. O Painel analisa, em seu relatório, a imposição e coleta de direitos antidumping abaixo da margem de dumping estabelecida. Para. 7.924. “While the term “lesser duty” is not defined in the AD Agreement, it is clear that this term refers to the concept of an antidumping duty less than the full amount of the margin of dumping, as described in Article 9.1. It is also clear from the text of Article 9.1, and China does not dispute, that the imposition of a lesser duty is “desirable”, but is not an obligation for WTO Members. Beyond stating that a lesser duty is desirable, if such lesser duty would be “adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry”, Article 9.1 says nothing about how the amount of a lesser duty should be established. Moreover, Article 9.1 also establishes that a Member may choose not to impose any antidumping duty at all, even where all the requirements for imposition have been fulfilled, suggesting that there is no lower limit on the amount of duty that a Member may impose if all the requirements for imposition have been fulfilled. Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement, on the other hand, establishes a clear upper limit on the amount of antidumping duty that may be imposed. It requires Member to ensure that the “amount of the antidumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2”. This is consistent with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994, which provides that “[i]n order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an antidumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such product.” There is no equivalent to Article 9.1 in the GATT 1994, which does not even mention the possibility of levying an antidumping duty in any lesser amount. In our view it is clear, and indeed, China does not contend otherwise, that Article 9.1 does not prescribe any methodology or criteria for the determination of the amount of a lesser duty, should a Member choose to apply one.” [nota de rodapé omitida] 2. Artigo 9.2: Significado da expressão “montante apropriado”

a) “Montante apropriado e valor normal” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.704-7.705 Neste caso, a Noruega argumentou que a imposição e coleta de direitos antidumping era inconsistente por diversos motivos, dentre os quais devido ao cálculo de montante não ser

apropriado, nos termos do Artigo 9.2. O Painel, em seu relatório, discutiu a relação entre a expressão “montante apropriado” e valor normal. Para. 7.704. “Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement is one of several provisions in Article 9 addressing the “Imposition and Collection of Antidumping Duties”. One of its requirements is that any antidumping duties imposed must be collected “in the appropriate amounts”. However, Article 9.2 does not explain how to determine the “appropriate” amounts of any antidumping duty to be collected. The dictionary definitions of the word “appropriate” include “specially suitable (for, to); proper, fitting”. This suggests that the “appropriate” amount of antidumping duty is the amount of duty that is “proper” or “fitting” in the context of an antidumping investigation.” Para. 7.705. “Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 reveals that the purpose of imposing and collecting antidumping duties is to “offset or prevent dumping”. This principle is reflected in Article 9.1 of the AD Agreement, which provides that an antidumping duty may only be imposed when “all requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled”. It follows that the “appropriate” amount of antidumping duty must be an amount that results in offsetting or preventing dumping, when all other requirements for the imposition of antidumping duties have been fulfilled. Dumping is defined in both Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement, in essentially the same terms, as the introduction of a product into the commerce of another country at a price which is “less than its normal value”. Thus, to the extent that an antidumping duty may be imposed to offset or prevent dumping, it follows that it may only be collected when the price of the imported product is less than its normal value. No antidumping duty may be imposed (and therefore collected) when the price of an imported product is above its normal value. To this extent, normal value constitutes a point of reference for determining when antidumping duties may or may not be imposed and collected.”

b) “Montante apropriado” e obrigatoriedade de nomeação de fornecedores Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/AB/R, paras. 336, 338-340 e 354 Nesse caso, a UE impôs direitos antidumping contra importações de ferro e aço oriundas da China. A China considerou que a regulamentação da União Europeia, relativa ao cálculo da margem de dumping para países com economias não predominantemente de mercado, viola determinadas regras da OMC. Conforme os Artigos 9.1 e 9.2 do Acordo Antidumping, o cálculo deve ser feito em relação ao país como um todo, e não em relação a cada exportador, com a exceção daqueles que demonstrarem preencher os critérios da regulamentação destinados a esse fim, e no caso do uso de amostragem. O Órgão de Apelação analisa em sua decisão, entre outros, o sentido do termo “montante apropriado”, e sua relação com a obrigação de nomear os exportadores. Para. 336. “Article 9.2 states that antidumping duties “shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each case” and that “authorities shall name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned”. It is thus clear from the wording of this provision, which uses the auxiliary verb “shall”, that the collection in appropriate amounts of antidumping duties and the naming of the supplier are of a mandatory nature. The mandatory nature of the first and second sentences of Article 9.2 can be contrasted with the preference expressed in the second sentence of Article 9.1 for duties lesser than the margin of dumping, if lesser duties are adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry. To express such a preference, Article 9.1 uses the expression “it is desirable”.” [nota de rodapé omitida] Para. 338. “We note that Article 9.2 of the Antidumping Agreement requires that antidumping duties be collected on a non-discriminatory basis from “all sources” found to be dumped and causing injury, except from “those sources” from which price undertakings have been accepted. We agree with the Panel that the term “sources”, which appears twice in the first sentence of Article 9.2, has the same meaning and refers to individual exporters or producers and not to the country as a whole. This is

indicated by the fact that price undertakings mentioned in the first sentence of Article 9.2 are accepted, according to Article 8 of the Antidumping Agreement, from individual exporters and not from countries. Therefore, the requirement under Article 9.2 that antidumping duties be collected in appropriate amounts in each case and from all sources relates to the individual exporters or producers subject to the investigation.” [notas de rodapé omitidas] Para. 339. “We have concluded above that Article 6.10 of the Antidumping Agreement contains an obligation to determine individual dumping margins for each exporter or producer, except when sampling is used or if a derogation is otherwise provided for in the covered agreements. We observe that, where an individual margin of dumping has been determined, it flows from the obligation contained in the first sentence of Article 9.2 that the appropriate amount of antidumping duty that can be imposed also has to be an individual one. We do not see how an importing Member could comply with the obligation in the first sentence of Article 9.2 to collect duties in the appropriate amounts in each case if, having determined individual dumping margins, it lists suppliers by name, but imposes country-wide duties. In other words, unless sampling is used, the appropriate amount of an antidumping duty in each case is one that is specified by supplier, as further clarified and confirmed by the obligation to name suppliers in the second sentence of Article 9.2.” [nota de rodapé omitida] Para. 340. “The second sentence of Article 9.2 contains a requirement that authorities name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned. It is not clear from the terms of the second sentence alone what the purpose of naming suppliers would be, considering that the term “name” can be defined simply as “mention or specify by name”. However, in our view, the content of the obligation “to name” is clarified by the requirements in the first sentence that antidumping duties be collected in the appropriate amounts on a non-discriminatory basis from all sources.” [nota de rodapé omitida] Para. 354. “We thus conclude that Article 9.2 of the Antidumping Agreement requires investigating authorities to specify an individual duty for each supplier, except where this is impracticable, when several suppliers are involved. We reach this conclusion by reading the first sentence of Article 9.2 in conjunction with the second sentence of Article 9.2. The first sentence requires investigating authorities to collect antidumping duties in the appropriate amounts in each case and on a non-discriminatory basis on imports from all sources – that is, suppliers – while the second sentence requires investigating authorities to name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned. We also consider that the exception in the third sentence of Article 9.2 does not allow the imposition of a single country-wide antidumping duty in investigations involving NMEs where the imposition of individual duties is alleged to be “ineffective”, but is not “impracticable”.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Antidumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.91 Este caso aborda a aplicação de direitos antidumping pela União Europeia em relação às importações de calçados de couro oriundos da China. O Painel analisa em seu relatório o tratamento individual conferido aos exportadores e fornecedores, e a relação entre o termo “impraticável” e a eficácia das medidas antidumping a serem impostas. Para. 7.91. “Article 9.2, which has remained unchanged since it was negotiated in the Kennedy Round, is a predecessor to the more detailed rules set out in Article 6.10, which was added to the AD Agreement following the Uruguay Round, and further elaborates on the basic principle of individual treatment established in the earlier provision. While the language is somewhat different, in our view, the similar structure of the two provisions supports the conclusion that they concern the same basic principle, that individual exporters and producers in antidumping investigations should be treated individually in the determination and imposition of antidumping duties. Moreover, we see nothing in the text of Article 9.2 of the AD Agreement, or in its context, that would suggest that the notion of “impracticable” in that provision may relate to the effectiveness of antidumping measures imposed.”

3. Relação entre os Artigos 9.2 e 9.3 Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.365 Neste caso, ao discutir o argumento do Brasil de que a margem de dumping a ser calculada para os propósitos do Artigo 9.3 deveria ser a margem obtida durante o período de investigação, o Painel concordou com a tese defendida pelo Brasil de que uma violação ao Artigo 9.3 implica, necessariamente, em uma violação ao Artigo 9.2, este mais geral do que aquele. Porém, não tendo identificado uma violação ao Artigo 9.3, o Painel concluiu que o Artigo 9.2 também não havia sido violado. Para. 7.365. “We note that Article 9.3 contains a specific obligation regarding the amount of antidumping duty to be imposed, whereas Article 9.2 employs far more general language in referring to the collection of duties in ‘appropriate’ amounts. In particular, Article 9.2 provides no guidance on what an ‘appropriate’ amount of duty may be in a given case. In the absence of any other guidance regarding the appropriateness of the amount of antidumping duties, it would appear reasonable to conclude that an antidumping duty meeting the requirements of Article 9.3 (i.e., not exceeding the margin of dumping) would be ‘appropriate’ within the meaning of Article 9.2 agreed with the argument made by one of the parties that a violation of Article 9.2 is entirely dependent on a violation of Article 9.3.” 4. Artigo 9.3

a) Sentido do termo “margem de dumping”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel Mexico), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 96 O caso trata da aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA contra importações mexicanas. O Painel analisou, na parte relevante, a relação entre os termos “margem de dumping” e dumping, concluindo que eles possuem somente uma definição, para todos os efeitos, em todo o Acordo Antidumping. Para. 96. “We also disagree with the proposition that the term “margin of dumping” has a different or special meaning in the context of Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement. As we stated earlier, a margin of dumping measures only the degree or magnitude of dumping. Article 9.3 refers to the margin of dumping as established in Article 2 of the Antidumping Agreement. Article 2.1 of the Antidumping Agreement defines “dumping”, and the opening phrase of that Article makes it clear that the definition applies “[f]or the purpose of this Agreement”. Therefore, “dumping” and “margin of dumping” have the same meaning throughout the Antidumping Agreement. Article 9.3 does not indicate, either expressly or by implication, that “margin of dumping” has a different meaning in the context of duty assessment proceedings than it does under Article 2. Nor does any other provision of the Antidumping Agreement suggest a special or particular meaning for this term for any stated purpose. Although transaction-based multiple comparisons may be necessary in periodic reviews to calculate an importer's liability for payment of antidumping duties, this cannot impart a different or special meaning to the term “margin of dumping” in Article 9.3.”

b) “Natureza do termo margem de dumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS350/R, para. 286

Nesse caso, a UE contestou a continuidade de uso pelos EUA da metodologia de aplicação de direitos antidumping, conhecida como zeroing, aplicada em ao menos 18 casos, inclusive em revisões administrativas. Para. 286. “Article 9.3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement is subject to the overarching requirement in Article 9.3 that the amount of antidumping duty “shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2” of that Agreement. Based on an examination of the context of Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, the Appellate Body has found that the term “margin of dumping”, as used in those provisions, relates to the “exporter” of the “product” under consideration. Furthermore, the Appellate Body has clarified that the definitions of “dumping” and “margin of dumping” apply in the same manner throughout the Antidumping Agreement and do not vary under the various provisions of the Agreement. Thus, under Article VI:2 and Article 9.3, the margin of dumping established for an exporter in accordance with Article 2 operates as a ceiling for the total amount of antidumping duties that can be levied on the entries of the subject merchandise from that exporter. The Appellate Body has seen no basis in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 or in Articles 2 and 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement for disregarding the results of comparisons where the export price exceeds the normal value. As the Appellate Body has said, “other provisions of the Antidumping Agreement are explicit regarding the permissibility of disregarding certain matters”.” [notas de rodapé omitidas] Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 102 O caso trata da aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que o termo “margem de dumping” relaciona-se com o exportador e o produto que este exporta, assim como, os conceitos de dumping e margem de dumping são aplicados de maneira uniforme em todo o Acordo Antidumping. Para. 102. “Article 9.3.1 of the Antidumping Agreement is subject to the overarching requirement in Article 9.3 that the amount of antidumping duty “shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2” of that Agreement. We recall that our examination of the context of Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 and Article 9.3 of the Anti Dumping Agreement confirmed that the term “margin of dumping”, as used in those provisions, relates to the “exporter” of the “product” under consideration and not to individual “importers” or “import transactions”, and, furthermore, that the concepts of “dumping” and “dumping margin” apply in the same manner throughout the Antidumping Agreement and do not vary under the various provisions of the Agreement. Thus, under Article VI:2 and Article 9.3, the margin of dumping established for an exporter in accordance with Article 2 operates as a ceiling for the total amount of antidumping duties that can be levied on the entries of the subject merchandise from that exporter.”

c) “Proibição de zeroing em revisões periódicas” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam (US - Shrimp), Demandante: Vietnam, WT/DS404/R, paras. 7.137-7.138 O caso, diz respeito à aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações oriundas do Vietnam. O Órgão de Apelação concluiu que a aplicação da metodologia de “zeroing” simples em revisões administrativas é, como tal, inconsistente com o Artigo 9.3 do Acordo Antidumping e o Artigo VI:2 do GATT 1994. Para. 7.137. “On this basis, the Appellate Body has found that “simple zeroing” in periodic reviews – as it is applied by the USDOC – is inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement and with Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body has held that zeroing results in the levy of

an amount of antidumping duty that exceeds an exporter's margin of dumping. This, the Appellate Body has explained, is because when the USDOC applies simple zeroing in periodic reviews, the USDOC compares the prices of individual export transactions against monthly weighted average normal values, and disregards the amounts by which the export prices exceed the monthly weighted average normal values when aggregating the results of the comparisons to calculate the cash deposit rate for the exporter and the duty assessment rate for the importer concerned. We note, however, that the Appellate Body has made it clear that its rulings with respect to zeroing in periodic reviews concern the amount of antidumping duty that can be levied in accordance with Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, and not the issue of how this amount is to be collected from the importers. Specifically, the Appellate Body has clarified that the prohibition of simple zeroing in periodic reviews does not preclude Members from carrying out an importer-specific inquiry to determine the duty liability, as long as the duty collected does not exceed the exporter-specific margin of dumping established for the product under consideration as a whole.” [notas de rodapé omitidas] Para. 7.138. “In the present dispute, the United States asserts that the Antidumping Agreement and the GATT 1994 do not prohibit zeroing in the context of periodic reviews. In particular, the United States argues that it is possible to interpret the terms or concepts of “dumping” and “margin of dumping” as referring not only to the product as a whole, but also to specific export transactions. The United States also rejects the notion that dumping is necessarily an exporter-specific concept, and argues that dumping may also be determined for individual importers. While we have carefully reviewed and considered these arguments of the United States, we note that the Appellate Body has considered, and rejected, these very same arguments in prior dispute settlement proceedings. Indeed, in two such prior cases US - Zeroing (Japan) and US - Stainless Steel (Mexico) the Appellate Body found that zeroing in the context of administrative reviews is, as such, inconsistent with Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994.” [nota de rodapé omitida] Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 109 Este caso refere-se à aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que a prática de “zeroing”, além de não ser permitida, por si só, em relação ao estabelecimento da margem de dumping, também não é admitida nas decisões relativas à revisões periódicas. Para. 109. “In addition, as we see it, a reading of Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement that permits simple zeroing in periodic reviews would allow WTO Members to circumvent the prohibition of zeroing in original investigations that applies under the first sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. This is because, in the first periodic review after an original investigation, the duty assessment rate for each importer will take effect from the date of the original imposition of antidumping duties. Consequently, zeroing would be introduced although it is not permissible in original investigations. We further note that, if no periodic review is requested, the final antidumping duty liability for all importers will be assessed at the cash deposit rate applicable to the relevant exporter. When the initial cash deposit rate is calculated in the original investigation without using zeroing, this means that the mere act of conducting a periodic review would introduce zeroing following imposition of the antidumping duty order.”

d) “Inexistência de permissão para a prática de zeroing no Artigo 9.3” Relatório do Painel no caso  United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 103 O caso trata da aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que não há, no Acordo

Antidumping, permissibilidade para a prática de “zeroing” e que, caso os negociadores do tratado quisessem permitir tal prática, o teriam feito de maneira expressa. Para. 103. “We see no basis in Article VI:2 of the GATT 1994 or in Articles 2 and 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement for disregarding the results of comparisons where the export price exceeds the normal value when calculating the margin of dumping for an exporter. The Appellate Body has previously noted that other provisions of the Antidumping Agreement are explicit regarding the permissibility of disregarding certain matters. For example, Article 9.4 of the Antidumping Agreement expressly directs investigating authorities to disregard “any zero and de minimis margins” under certain circumstances, when calculating the weighted average margin of dumping to be applied to exporters that have not been individually investigated. Similarly, Article 2.2.1, which deals with the calculation of normal value, sets forth the only circumstances under which sales of the like product in the exporting country can be disregarded. Thus, when the negotiators sought to permit investigating authorities to disregard certain matters, they did so explicitly.”

e) “Relação com o Artigo 5.8 – Teste de minimis” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, paras. 6.89-6.90 Neste caso, exportações coreanas para os EUA foram alvo de medidas antidumping. O Painel não aceitou o argumento da República da Coreia de que a margem para a aplicação da regra de minimis de 2%, listada no Artigo 5.8, deveria ser aplicada também às situações que se encaixassem no Artigo 9.3. Para. 6.89. “Article 5.8, second sentence, does not apply in the context of Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures. As Article 5.8, second sentence, does not require Members to apply a de minimis test in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, it certainly cannot require Members to apply a particular de minimis standard in such procedures.” Para. 6.90. “(...) A de minimis test in the context of an Article 9.3 duty assessment will not remove an exporter from the scope of the order. Thus, the implication of the de minimis test required by Article 5.8, and any de minimis test that Members choose to apply in Article 9.3 duty assessment procedures, differ significantly.”

f) “Aplicação de diversos direitos antidumping” Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, paras. 7.355 e 7.361 Neste caso, o Brasil posicionou-se contrariamente à imposição de direitos antidumping variáveis, argumentando que a margem de dumping a ser calculada no contexto do Artigo 9.3 deve ser a margem obtida durante o período de investigação, já que o Artigo 9.3 remete ao Atigo 2, o qual, no item 2.4.2, trata da margem de dumping como sendo aquela obtida durante o período de investigação. O Painel, contudo, afirmou que não há nada no Artigo 9.3 que proíba a imposição de direitos antidumping variáveis. Conforme o entendimento do Painel, o foco do Artigo é outro, qual seja, o de evitar que haja cobrança em excesso de direitos antidumping, bem como a restituição de um eventual pagamento excessivo, o qual é regulado nos subparágrafos 1 a 3. Dessa maneira, nem o significado ordinário, nem o contexto do Artigo levam à conclusão de que a imposição de direitos antidumping variáveis é proibida. Ademais, o Painel observa que há outras situações previstas no Artigo 9, especificamente aquelas relativas aos itens 9.3.1 e 9.3.2, que permitem a imposição de direitos antidumping com margem baseada em momentos que não o da investigação.

Para. 7.355. “In addressing this claim, we note that nothing in the AD Agreement explicitly identifies the form that antidumping duties must take. In particular, nothing in the AD Agreement explicitly prohibits the use of variable antidumping duties. Brazil’s Claim 29 is based on Article 9.3 of the AD Agreement. As the title of Article 9 of the AD Agreement suggests, Article 9.3 is a provision concerning the imposition and collection of antidumping duties. Article 9.3 provides that a duty may not be collected in excess of the margin of dumping as established under Article 2. The modalities for ensuring compliance with this obligation are set forth in sub-paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 9.3, each of which addresses duty assessment and the reimbursement of excess duties. The primary focus of Article 9.3, read together with sub-paragraphs 1–3, is to ensure that final antidumping duties shall not be assessed in excess of the relevant margin of dumping, and to provide for duty refund in cases where excessive antidumping duties would otherwise be collected. Our understanding that Article 9.3 is concerned primarily with duty assessment is confirmed by the fact that the broadly equivalent provision in the SCM Agreement (i.e., Article 19.4) refers to the ‘lev[ying]’ of duties, and footnote 51 to that provision states that ‘“levy” shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment or collection of a duty or tax’ (emphasis added). When viewed in this light, it is not obvious that - as Brazil effectively argues - Article 9.3 prohibits variable antidumping duties by ensuring that antidumping duties do not exceed the margin of dumping established during ‘the investigation phase’ pursuant to Article 2.4.2. Neither the ordinary meaning of Article 9.3, nor its context (i.e., sub-paragraphs 1–3), supports that view. If Article 9.3 were designed to prohibit the use of variable customs duties, presumably that prohibition would have been clearly spelled out.” Para. 7.361. “This therefore further undermines Brazil’s argument that the only margin of dumping relevant until such time that there is an Article 11.2 review is the margin established during the investigation. If the basis for duty refund is the margin of dumping prevailing at the time of duty collection, we see no reason why a Member should not use the same basis for duty collection. Brazil has noted that refunds do not imply modification of the duty, and are only available if requested by the importer. While these points may be correct, they do not change the fact that the refund mechanism operates by reference to the margin of dumping prevailing at the time of duty collection. It is this aspect of the refund mechanism that renders it contextually relevant to the issue before us. Accordingly, we see no reason why it is not permissible for a Member to levy antidumping duties on the basis of the actual margin of dumping prevailing at the time of duty collection.”

g) “Diversas margens de dumping para cada transação individual” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, paras. 99 e 112 O caso aborda a aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações mexicanas. O Órgão de Apelação reverteu a decisão do Painel, de que o Artigo 9.3 permitiria o estabelecimento de margens de dumping para cada transação de cada um dos importadores, o que resultaria em diversas margens de dumping no nível de transações individuais. Para. 99. “Secondly, if it were permissible to determine a separate margin of dumping for each individual transaction, several margins of dumping would exist for each exporter and for the product under consideration. However, the existence of “dumping” and several “margins of dumping” at the transaction-specific level cannot be reconciled with a proper interpretation and application of several provisions of the Antidumping Agreement. We do not see how, for example: the determination of injury under Article 3; the establishment of an individual margin of dumping for each exporter under Articles 5.8, 6.10, 6.10.2, 9.4, and 9.5; the acceptance of voluntary undertakings from an exporter under Article 8; and a review under Article 11.2 or 11.3 for continuation or revocation of an antidumping duty order, can be done at the transaction- or importer-specific level. The Panel's interpretation appears to us to be premised on the notion that the concept of transaction- and importer-specific dumping and margin of dumping could be confined to the stage of duty assessment

and collection under Article 9.3. However, we find no textual or contextual basis for such an interpretation.” Para. 112. “It appears to us that the United States and the Panel have not correctly understood the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 9.3 in previous disputes. First, the Appellate Body has not recognized the notion of “an importer's dumping margin” and has not held that “an importer's dumping margin must be averaged out”. Rather, the Appellate Body has consistently held that “margin of dumping” is an exporter-specific concept, and that, whatever methodology is followed for assessment and collection of antidumping duties, the total amount of antidumping duties assessed and collected from all importers must not exceed the total amount of dumping found in all the sales made by the exporter concerned, calculated according to the margin of dumping established for that exporter without zeroing. Secondly, the Appellate Body has also consistently held that “dumping” and “margin of dumping” do not exist at the level of individual transactions, and that, therefore, the terms “dumping” and “margin of dumping” cannot be interpreted as applying at an individual transaction level, as the United States suggests. Thirdly, with respect to assessment of antidumping duty, however, the Appellate Body has recognized that, under Article 9.3, antidumping duty liability can be assessed in relation to a specific importer on the basis of its transactions from the relevant exporter.”

h) “Cálculo da margem de dumping” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, paras. 113-114 O caso trata da aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA, contra importações mexicanas. Em passagem relevante, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu que o cálculo da margem de dumping de um determinado produto, tem que levar em conta todas as transações relativas àquele produto, inclusive aquelas em que o valor de exportação é superior ao valor normal. Para. 113. “We do not agree that the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article 9.3 would favour “importers with high margins of dumping (…) at the expense of importers who do not dump or who dump at a lower margin”, as the Panel suggests. In our view, it is not correct to say that, under the Appellate Body's interpretation, an “offset” is provided for the so-called “non-dumped” transactions. A margin of dumping is properly calculated under the Antidumping Agreement only if all transactions are taken into account, including those where the export prices exceed the normal value. Moreover, our interpretation does not preclude a WTO Member applying a retrospective system from assessing an importer's final antidumping duty liability on the basis of its own transactions, subject, however, to the legal requirement that the prescribed overall margin of dumping for the exporter is respected.” Para. 114. “In sum, the Appellate Body has ruled on the amount of antidumping duty that can be levied in accordance with Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, and not on how this amount is to be collected from the importers. In addition, the Appellate Body has recognized that WTO Members have flexibility in choosing their duty assessment and collection system within the parameters highlighted above.” 5. Artigo 9.3.2. Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso  United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS350/R, para. 294

Neste caso, a UE contestou a continuidade de uso pelos EUA da metodologia de aplicação de direitos antidumping, conhecida como zeroing, aplicada em ao menos 18 casos, inclusive em revisões administrativas. Para. 294. “In addressing similar arguments by the United States in previous appeals, the Appellate Body has emphasized that the antidumping duty collected at the time of importation, “under a prospective normal value system, does not represent the 'margin of dumping' under Article 9.3, which, as the Appellate Body has found, is the margin of dumping for an exporter for all of its sales of the subject merchandise into the country concerned.” This is not changed by the fact that, in such a system, the liability for payment of antidumping duties may be final at the time of importation. Rather, Article 9.3.2 contemplates that the amount of duties collected on a prospective basis is subject to review pursuant to Article 9.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, which provides that “[t]he amount of the antidumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping as established under Article 2.” [nota de rodapé omitida] Relatório do Painel no caso  United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 120 O caso trata da aplicação de medidas antidumping por parte dos EUA contra importações mexicanas. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação esclareceu a distinção existente entre, por um lado, a coleta de direitos antidumping no momento da importação (no caso, em um sistema prospectivo de estabelecimento do valor normal), e por outro lado, a determinação final da responsabilidade pelo pagamento do direito pelo importador em vista da margem do dumping praticada pelo exportador, a qual é apurada com base em todas as suas vendas. Para. 120. “As Mexico, the European Communities, and Japan point out, the Panel has failed to distinguish between duty “collection” at the time of importation, on the one hand, and determinations of the final duty liability of an importer and the margin of dumping for an exporter, on the other hand. The antidumping duty collected from each importer at the time of importation, under a prospective normal value system, does not represent the “margin of dumping” under Article 9.3, which, as the Appellate Body has found, is the margin of dumping for an exporter for all of its sales of the subject merchandise into the country concerned. As the Panel itself observed, under Article 9.3.2, the amount of duties collected on a prospective basis also is subject to review. Under a prospective normal value system, a review can be triggered as well if the prospective normal value has been improperly determined and thereby the ceiling prescribed under Article 9.3 is breached. Article 9.4(ii) does not exempt prospective normal value systems from the requirement set out in Article 9.3.” [nota de rodapé omitida] 6. Artigo 9.4

a) “Objetivo do Artigo 9.4” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso  United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 123 Neste caso, tanto o Japão quanto os EUA apelaram do Relatório do Painel. Em parte relevante, discute-se a aplicação do Artigo 9.4 do Acordo Antidumping. O limite criado pelo Artigo 9.4 tem como objetivo proteger os produtores/exportadores, os quais involuntariamente não participam das investigações e poderiam, de alguma forma, serem prejudicados pela falta de colaboração de outros produtores/exportadores conhecidos. A estes conhecidos produtores/exportadores é possível aplicar o disposto no Artigo 6.8.

Para. 123. “Article 9.4 seeks to prevent the exporters, who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation, from being prejudiced by gaps or shortcomings in the information supplied by the investigated exporters.”

b) Limites à margem “all others” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 116 Discute-se, no trecho abaixo, a amplitude do limite estabelecido pelo Artigo 9.4 ao cálculo da margem antidumping. O Órgão de Apelação, seguindo o raciocínio desenvolvido pelo Painel, afirmou que o Artigo 9.4 estabelece um limite para a margem de dumping, calculada no contexto do Artigo 6.10, denominada “all others margin”. Não se trata de um método de cálculo da margem antidumping, mas sim um de limite para a coleta do direito. Tal limite, contudo, é qualificado por duas situações que não podem ser consideradas para seu cálculo: margens zero e margens definidas com base no Artigo 6.8, isto é, com base em fatos disponíveis quando uma parte interessada se recusar, ou simplesmente não entregar, informações necessárias. Para. 116. “Article 9.4 does not prescribe any method that WTO Members must use to establish the ‘all others’ rate that is actually applied to exporters or producers that are not investigated. Rather, Article 9.4 simply identifies a maximum limit, or ceiling, which investigating authorities ‘shall not exceed’ in establishing an ‘all others’ rate. Subparagraph (i) of Article 9.4 states the general rule that the relevant ceiling is to be established by calculating a ‘weighted average margin of dumping established’ with respect to those exporters or producers who were investigated. However, the clause beginning with ‘provided that’, which follows this sub-paragraph, qualifies this general rule. This qualifying language mandates that, ‘for the purpose of this paragraph’, investigating authorities ‘shall disregard‘, first, zero and de minimis margins and, second, ‘margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6.’ Thus, in determining the amount of the ceiling for the ‘all others’ rate, Article 9.4 establishes two prohibitions. The first prevents investigating authorities from calculating the ‘all others’ ceiling using zero or de minimis margins; while the second precludes investigating authorities from calculating that ceiling using ‘margins established under the circumstances referred to’ in Article 6.8.”

c) Artigo 9.4 (i) – “weighted average margin of dumping with respect to selected exporters or producers”

(i) margins

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 118 Para interpretar o significado do termo “margens”, no contexto do Artigo 9.4, o Órgão de Apelação fez referência à interpretação pelo Painel do mesmo termo no contexto de outro Artigo, o 2.4.2, no caso EC - Bed Linen, e concluiu que ele significa a margem de dumping, individualizada, determinada para cada um dos exportadores e produtores do produto investigado, para aquele produto específico. Para. 118. “[W]e recall that the word ‘margins’, which appears in Article 2.4.2 of that Agreement, has been interpreted in European Communities - Bed Linen. The Panel found, in that dispute, and we agreed, that ‘margins’ means the individual margin of dumping determined for each of the investigated exporters and producers of the product under investigation, for that particular product. This margin reflects a comparison that is based upon examination of all of the relevant home market

and export market transactions. We see no reason, in Article 9.4, to interpret the word ‘margins’ differently from the meaning it has in Article 2.4.2, and the parties have not suggested one.” Relatório do Painel no caso  European Communities - Antidumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.428 Neste caso, a Noruega argumentou que a medida antidumping adotada pela União Europeia era inconsistente por diversos motivos. A decisão do Painel, nesse ponto, esclareceu que a média ponderada de que trata o Artigo 9.4(i) é afetada por eventuais revisões de margens de dumping que reduzem essas margens. Ademais, o Órgão reafirmou o que já havia decidido em outras oportunidades, de que as margens estabelecidas por meio de fatos disponíveis não são levadas em conta para o cálculo do limite de que trata o Artigo 9.4(i). Para. 7.428. “In this light, to the extent that it determined the fixed duty on the basis of an assessment that relied upon a weighted average margin of dumping for investigated parties that (i) was overstated because it did not take into account downward revisions to the margins of dumping of three individually examined producers; and (ii) was calculated with reliance on a margin of dumping that was based on “facts available”, we find that the investigating authority acted inconsistently with Article 9.4(i) of the AD Agreement.”

(ii) exporters or producers Relatório do Painel no caso  European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.72 Em EC - Bed Linen, o Painel interpreta que a média ponderada da margem de exportadores/produtores (no plural), a que faz referência o inciso (i) do Artigo 9.4, necessária para o estabelecimento do limite de margem antidumping, não implica necessariamente a existência de mais de um exportador/produtor. Contudo, o Órgão de Apelação, nesse mesmo caso (paras. 74 et seq.), reverteu a interpretação do Painel em relação ao mesmo termo (média ponderada) no contexto do Artigo 2.2.2(ii). No caso, o Órgão afirmou que, no Artigo 2.2.2(ii) em particular, o termo “média ponderada” impede a interpretação do termo produtores/exportadores na forma singular. Porém, enfatizou que se trata de outro Artigo e que a linguagem do Órgão foi a de interpretar o termo no contexto específico do Artigo 2.2.2(ii). Para. 6.72. “Article 9.4(i) provides that the dumping duty applied to imports from producers/exporters not examined as part of a sample shall not exceed ‘the weighted average margin of dumping established with respect to the selected exporters or producers’. We consider that this provision does not become inoperative if there is only one selected exporter or producer - rather, the dumping margin for that exporter or producer may be applied.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, paras. 7.431-7.432 Ao impor medidas antidumping, a UE dividiu os exportadores/produtores em duas categorias distintas: partes que não foram investigadas, mas que cooperaram com as investigações, ao responder questionários elaborados pela União Europeia; e partes que não cooperaram, ao não responderem os questionários ou não se fazerem conhecidas às autoridades investigadoras. A decisão do Painel esclareceu que o Artigo 9.4 é aplicável somente àqueles exportadores/produtores que poderiam potencialmente ter sido incluídos na lista de partes investigadas. Destas, excluem-se aquelas partes que não cooperaram ou não se fizeram conhecidas, pois estas não poderiam ser potenciais partes investigadas.

Para. 7.431. “As we have already noted, Article 9.4(i) applies when an investigating authority has not determined an individual margin of dumping for each known exporter or producer, within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6.10, and instead determines individual margins of dumping for a limited number of interested parties selected from the known exporters or producers, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 6.10. The focus of Article 9.4 is therefore on the “exporters or producers not included in the examination” that could have been potentially included in the selection of parties to investigate pursuant to the second sentence of Article 6.10. In our view, this does not include exporters or producers that did not identify themselves to the investigating authority for the purpose of being selected in the limited investigation because such exporters or producers could not have been potentially included in the selection of the parties to investigate. Thus, the disciplines in Article 9.4(i) apply only in respect of non-investigated parties that cooperated with the investigating authority for the purpose of selection of the parties that would be subject to a limited investigation. It does not apply in respect of parties that did not cooperate for this purpose.” Para. 7.432. “In the present investigation, the non-cooperating companies were identified as companies which “did not cooperate or did not make themselves known”. This may be contrasted with the non-investigated cooperating companies, which were identified as “[c]ompanies which cooperated, but which were not selected in the sample, and which are not related to any of the companies included in the sample”. It follows that the non-cooperating companies included any investigated company that did not cooperate in the investigation and any non-investigated company that did not make itself known to the investigating authority for the purpose of being selected in the limited investigation. We note that none of the investigated companies were found to be non-cooperating. Thus, the margin of dumping attributed to non-cooperating companies was assigned only to companies that did not make themselves known to the investigating authority for the purpose of being selected in the limited investigation.”

d) Artigo 9.4(i): “Prohibitions in the calculation of “all others” rate: zero and de minimis margins, margins based on facts available”

(i) Margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso  United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 119 Em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Japão argumentou que os EUA violaram o Artigo 9.4 ao não observarem a proibição relativa ao cálculo do limite estabelecido no inciso (i), nos casos de margens de dumping calculadas pelo Artigo 6.8. Os EUA argumentaram que essa proibição referia-se, somente, àquelas margens calculadas inteiramente com base em fatos disponíveis. Ao contrário dos EUA, o Órgão de Apelação, seguindo o raciocínio do Painel, adotou uma interpretação ampla do termo “sob as circunstâncias do Artigo 6.8”. Assim, a proibição relativa à aplicação do limite imposto pelo Artigo 9.4 foi entendida como ampla, abarcando todos aqueles produtores/exportadores que, de alguma forma, tivessem se negado a prestar informações, ou simplesmente não tivessem prestado tais informações. Isso significa que, mesmo aquelas margens calculadas parcialmente com base em fatos disponíveis, estariam excluídas da base de cálculo do limite determinado pelo Artigo 9.4(i). Para. 119. “We proceed to examine the phrase ‘margins established under the circumstances referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6.’ This provision permits investigating authorities, in certain situations, to reach ‘preliminary or final determinations (…) on the basis of the facts available’. There is, however, no requirement in Article 6.8 that resort to facts available be limited to situations where there is no information whatsoever which can be used to calculate a margin. Thus, the application of Article 6.8, authorizing the use of facts available, is not confined to cases where the entire margin is established using only facts available. Rather, under Article 6.8, investigating authorities are entitled

to have recourse to facts available whenever an interested party does not provide some necessary information within a reasonable period, or significantly impedes the investigation. Whenever such a situation exists, investigating authorities may remedy the lack of any necessary information by drawing appropriately from the ‘facts available’ (…).”

(ii) established Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 121-123 Em  US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação procedeu à interpretação do termo “established” sob as circunstâncias do Artigo 6.8, referenciado no Artigo 9.4, e decidiu que uma margem não deixa de ser estabelecida sob tais circunstâncias, simplesmente porque uma parte dos dados utilizados para fins de seu cálculo foi baseada em informações concretas submetidas e não nas “melhores informações disponíveis”. Para. 121. “We turn to the word ‘established’ in the phrase ‘margins established under the circumstances’ referred to in Article 6.8. The essence of the United States’ argument is that this word should be read as if it were qualified by the word ‘entirely’, or ‘exclusively’, or ‘wholly’: only where a margin is established ‘entirely’ under the ‘circumstances’ of Article 6.8 must that margin be disregarded.” Para. 122. “We have noted that Article 9.4 establishes a prohibition, in calculating the ceiling for the all others rate, on using ‘margins established under the circumstances referred to’ in Article 6.8. Nothing in the text of Article 9.4 supports the United States’ argument that the scope of this prohibition should be narrowed so that it would be limited to excluding only margins established ‘entirely’ on the basis of facts available. As noted earlier, Article 6.8 applies even in situations where only limited use is made of facts available. To read Article 9.4 in the way the United States does is to overlook the many situations where Article 6.8 allows a margin to be calculated, in part, using facts available. Yet, the text of Article 9.4 simply refers, in an open-ended fashion, to ‘margins established under the circumstances’ in Article 6.8. Accordingly, we see no basis for limiting the scope of this prohibition in Article 9.4, by reading into it the word ‘entirely’ as suggested by the United States. In our view, a margin does not cease to be ‘established under the circumstances referred to’ in Article 6.8 simply because not every aspect of the calculation involved the use of ‘facts available’.” Para. 123. “Our reading of Article 9.4 is consistent with the purpose of the provision. Article 6.8 authorizes investigating authorities to make determinations by remedying gaps in the record which are created, in essence, as a result of deficiencies in, or a lack of, information supplied by the investigated exporters. Indeed, in some circumstances, as set forth in paragraph 7 of Annex II of the Antidumping Agreement, “if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate.” (emphasis added) Article 9.4 seeks to prevent the exporters, who were not asked to cooperate in the investigation, from being prejudiced by gaps or shortcomings in the information supplied by the investigated exporters. This objective would be compromised if the ceiling for the rate applied to “all others” were, as the United States suggests, calculated – due to the failure of investigated parties to supply certain information – using margins “established” even in part on the basis of the facts available.” 7. Artigo 9.4 (ii)

a) “Limites”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.707 Nesse caso, a Noruega argumentou que a medida antidumping adotada pela União Europeia era inconsistente por diversos motivos. Segundo a Noruega, pela forma como a margem antidumping foi calculada, tornou-se excessiva, não sendo, portanto, apropriada. Para. 7.707. “We find important contextual support for this conclusion in Article 9.4. Article 9.4 explicitly recognizes that a “prospective normal value” may be applied for the purpose of collecting antidumping duties from parties not included in a limited investigation undertaken pursuant to Article 6.10. To this end, Article 9.4(ii) establishes that for such non-investigated parties, an investigating authority will be entitled to apply antidumping duties in an amount not greater than the “difference between the weighted average normal value of the selected exporters or producers and the export prices” of the non-investigated parties. Article 9.4(ii) thereby sets the maximum level of the “prospective normal value” that could be applied to non-investigated parties at the weighted average of the normal values of the investigated parties. In our view, it would make sense to consider that essentially the same benchmark – normal value – should be equally relevant when applying a “prospective reference price” to investigated parties. In this regard, we find the last sentence of Article 9.4 to be particularly instructive.” This sentence reads:

The authorities shall apply individual duties or normal values to imports from any exporter or producer not included in the examination who has provided the necessary information during the course of the investigation, as provided for in subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6. (Emphasis added).

b) “Relação com o Artigo 9.3.2”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso  United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: União Europeia, WT/DS350/R, para. 295 Neste caso, a União Europeia contestou a continuidade de uso pelos EUA da metodologia de aplicação de direitos antidumping, conhecida como zeroing, aplicada em ao menos 18 casos, inclusive em revisões administrativas. Para. 295. “Thus, Article 9.4(ii) does not mean that the basic disciplines governing the calculation of margins of dumping, contained in Article VI of the GATT 1994 and Article 2 of the Antidumping Agreement, no longer apply. The collection of antidumping duties on the basis of a prospective normal value is only an intermediate stage of collection, since it is subject to final assessment and “a prompt refund, upon request”, under Article 9.3.2. There is nothing in Article 9.4 that exempts prospective normal value systems from the obligations under Article 9.3, including with respect to refund procedures in respect of duties assessed on a prospective basis.” (65) 8. Artigo 9.5

a) “Uso de zeroing em revisões para estabelecimento de margens individuais para novos

exportadores” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 165 Em US - Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação, revertendo a decisão do Painel, conclui que o uso da metodologia de zeroing no estabelecimento de margens individuais de que trata o Artigo 9.5 não é permitido.

Para. 165. “Article 9.5 of the Antidumping Agreement makes it clear that, upon request, investigating authorities “shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping” for exporters or foreign producers that did not ship the subject product during the period of investigation. As noted above, under the Anti Dumping Agreement, dumping determinations relate to the exporter, and both “dumping” and “margins of dumping” relate to the pricing behaviour of the exporter. Moreover, negative comparison results may not be disregarded when calculating a margin of dumping for an exporter. For the same reasons, we consider that zeroing, in establishing “individual margins of dumping” for new shippers, is also inconsistent with Article 9.5 of the Anti Dumping Agreement.” [notas de rodapé omitidas]

b) “Zeroing e Produtores não-atuantes”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 165 A técnica do zeroing não pode ser aplicada no cálculo das margens de dumping de novos exportadores, os quais não haviam exportado o produto em investigação no período do objeto de investigação, conforme entendimento do Órgão de Apelação no litígio US - Zeroing (Japan). Para. 165. “Article 9.5 of the Antidumping Agreement makes it clear that, upon request, investigating authorities “shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping” for exporters or foreign producers that did not ship the subject product during the period of investigation. As noted above, under the Antidumping Agreement, dumping determinations relate to the exporter, and both “dumping” and “margins of dumping” relate to the pricing behaviour of the exporter. Moreover, negative comparison results may not be disregarded when calculating a margin of dumping for an exporter. For the same reasons, we consider that zeroing, in establishing “individual margins of dumping” for new shippers, is also inconsistent with Article 9.5 of the Antidumping Agreement” (notas de rodapé omitidas).

c) “Contestação do zeroing em tese e âmbito de sua aplicação”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/AB/R, para. 7.186 No caso US - Zeroing (Japan) [art. 21.5(P)], o Painel consignou que a possibilidade de impugnação do zeroing em tese e a esfera de incidência dessa prática são situações distintas. Neste contexto, o Painel expressou que: Para. 7.186. “We are unable to accept the United States' argument, for it confuses (1) the existence of the zeroing procedures as a measure that can be challenged as such, and (2) the scope of application of that measure. In this regard, we note the Appellate Body's conclusion that “the 'zeroing procedures' under different comparison methodologies, and in different stages of antidumping proceedings, [ ] reflect different manifestations of a single rule or norm.” We understand this to be a reference to the fact that, although the zeroing procedures are a single rule or norm, that single rule or norm applies in different contexts, or “manifestations”. To the extent that the December 2006 Notice eliminates zeroing in W-to-W comparisons in original investigations, the Notice certainly addresses one “manifestation” of the single rule or norm. However, the Notice does not address the three remaining “manifestations” of that rule or norm which were the object of findings by the Appellate Body, namely T-to-T comparisons in original investigations, periodic reviews, and new shipper reviews. Thus, although the scope of application of the rule or norm has been reduced, the rule or norm per se has not been eliminated and, as noted below, zeroing continues to be applied in contexts other than W-to-W comparisons in original investigations. In order to eliminate the zeroing procedures per se, the Notice would have had to eliminate zeroing in the context of all of the “different manifestations”. The Notice fails to do this” (notas de rodapé omitidas).

d) “Procedimento de produtores não-atuantes - inadmissibilidade de imposição de condições não previstas no Acordo Antidumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Beef and Rice (Mexico - Antidumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/AB/R, paras. 323-324 Quando da posterior investigação de produtores não-atuantes no procedimento inicial, destinado à apuração da prática de dumping, a lei doméstica de um Membro da OMC não pode determinar requisitos não-previstos no Acordo Antidumping. No contencioso Mexico - Rice Antidumping Measures, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que é inadmissível, por iniciativa de leis internas, a imposição da demonstração de representatividade do volume das exportações durante o interstício da revisão prevista no Artigo 9.5 do Tratado em apreço. Nesta quadra, o Órgão de Apelação asseverou: Para. 323. “We examine now the consistency of Article 89D with the above treaty provisions. The Panel found that Article 89D permits Economía to conduct an expedited review provided that, inter alia, the respondent make a showing of a “representative” volume of exports to Mexico during the period of review. By so requiring, Article 89D, like Article 68 of the FTA, imposes a condition not provided for in the relevant provisions of the Agreements. As such, Article 89D prevents Economía from granting a review in instances where the conditions set out in the relevant WTO provisions have, in fact, been met by a respondent.” Para. 324. “For these reasons, we uphold the Panel’s findings, in paragraphs 7.269 and 8.5(d) of the Panel Report, that Article 89D of the FTA is inconsistent, as such, with Article 9.5 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement” (notas de rodapé omitidas). III. Comentários A jurisprudência do DSB da OMC esclarece diversos pontos relativos ao Artigo 9 do Acordo Antidumping. Note-se, antes de tudo, que o escopo do Artigo 9 diz respeito à imposição e coleta de direitos antidumping, não ao cálculo da margem de dumping. A linguagem do Artigo é clara, no sentido de que é preferível, portanto, conforme a jurisprudência, não obrigatório, impor direitos antidumping em montantes inferiores à margem de dumping, caso tal montante seja suficiente para afastar o prejuízo causado pelo dumping. Posto de outra maneira, a jurisprudência é pacífica no sentido de que a chamada “regra do menor direito” não é, hoje, obrigatória para os Membros da OMC. No contexto do Artigo 9.2, discute-se o que constitui o montante necessário a ser recolhido. A começar, o montante necessário não deve exceder a própria margem de dumping, ou seja, não se admite “punir” o produtor/exportador além do ponto em que economicamente se iguala o preço de exportação ao valor normal. Além disso, como regra geral, devem ser nomeados todos os fornecedores que terão montantes recolhidos a título de direitos antidumping, em contraposição à coleta de direitos relacionados a um país como um todo, a não ser que isso seja impraticável, caso em que será nomeado o país, ou países, dos fornecedores. Nesse ponto, foi esclarecido em caso recente que não se justifica a imposição de uma margem de dumping para o país como um todo, caso tal imposição seja considerada simplesmente “ineficaz” (e mesmo que se trate de economias não predominantemente de mercado). A jurisprudência determina que é necessário que tal imposição seja impraticável, como ocorre, por exemplo, quando a autoridade investigadora precisa se valer de seleção ou amostragem de produtores/exportadores – conforme autoriza, em certos casos, o Acordo – para viabilizar a condução de investigações envolvendo um grande número de produtores.

Outra regra a ser observada na imposição dos direitos antidumping é o dever de coletá-los de todos os exportadores/produtores, à exceção daqueles que tenham celebrado compromissos de preços. Verifica-se, aqui, mais uma hipótese de aplicação do princípio da não-discriminação nos Acordos da OMC. No contexto do Artigo 9.3, a jurisprudência posicionou-se firmemente no sentido de condenar a prática de “zeroing” em revisões administrativas, a exemplo do que ocorre nas determinações de dumping. Entende-se que, nas revisões administrativas, a prática de “zeroing” também é, por si só, proibida. Além disso, esclareceu-se que a prática de “zeroing” não é implicitamente permissível. Se fosse permissível, o seria de forma explícita, a exemplo de outras regras do Acordo Antidumping. Uma outra questão levantada, relacionada a este Artigo, diz respeito à possibilidade da imposição/coleta de direitos antidumping em montantes variáveis, e não estritamente naquele determinado no período de investigação. Nesse sentido, nota-se que não há nada no Artigo 9.3 que proíba a imposição de direitos antidumping variáveis, contanto que não se exceda a margem de dumping apurada. A jurisprudência entende, inclusive, que o foco do Artigo é justamente o de evitar que haja cobrança em excesso de direitos antidumping, bem como fornecer um mecanismo de restituição de um eventual pagamento excessivo. Já no contexto do Artigo 9.4 do Acordo Antidumping, estabelece-se um limite para os direitos antidumping coletados com base na margem de dumping calculada nos termos do Artigo 6.10, isto é, a chamada “all others rate”, aferida nos casos em que é inviável, devido ao grande número de produtores/exportadores, calcular margens individualizadas, procedendo-se, dessa forma, ao cálculo de uma margem geral. A jurisprudência esclarece, em particular, que o objetivo do mencionado limite é evitar prejuízo aos produtores/exportadores, os quais involuntariamente não tenham suas informações analisadas, vis-à-vis produtores/exportadores não colaborativos. A estes, pode ser eventualmente aplicada margem de dumping superior, baseada nas “melhores informações disponíveis” (Artigo 6.8). Assim, a interpretação do citado Artigo, em conjunto com os Artigos 6.8 e 6.10, resulta na seguinte divisão em três grupos, para fins didáticos, entre os exportadores que potencialmente praticam dumping em determinado caso: (i) aqueles exportadores que respondem questionários e prestam informações, sendo-lhes atribuídas margens calculadas individual e especificamente; (ii) exportadores que não são chamados a colaborar na investigação, ou que participam, mas têm sua margem calculada com base em seleção/amostragem; (iii) exportadores que não participam do exame de dados por se negarem a colaborar, ou simplesmente por deixarem de entregar as informações requeridas. O limite para o cálculo da margem de dumping, definido no Artigo 9.4, está circunscrito aos produtores/exportadores do grupo (ii), acima indicado. Para os produtores/exportadores do grupo (iii) (não colaborativos), o que determina o limite são as chamadas “informações disponíveis”. Já o limite para os exportadores do grupo (i) é a própria margem individualmente calculada. O procedimento para averiguação da ocorrência de dumping costuma ser complexo. As nuances presentes na investigação podem ter inúmeras formas. Ademais, as autoridades administrativas devem ter não só conhecimento de direito, mas igualmente de economia. Ao término do procedimento, as empresas estrangeiras que foram investigadas, se tiverem praticado preço inferior ao valor normal, podem estar sujeitas à imposição de direitos antidumping. Entretanto, pode acontecer de, posteriormente, surgirem empresas que não foram objeto da investigação inicial. Para esses produtores específicos, as autoridades nacionais devem determinar margens individuais de dumping. Enquanto essas margens não forem estabelecidas, não se deve, por medida de justiça, cobrar os direitos antidumping. Sucede, todavia, que se cuida de:

uma garantia relativa, uma vez que a determinação da margem individual de dumping pode ser estipulada em breve espaço de tempo, e ainda porque existe a possibilidade de cobrança retroativa, à data do início do exame individual do caso, de direitos antidumping. (66)

Boa parte dos casos envolvendo o Artigo 9.5 do Acordo Antidumping, dizia respeito à prática do zeroing, executada principalmente pelos EUA. Por meio desta metodologia, quando as autoridades administrativas detectavam a superioridade do preço de exportação em relação ao valor normal, passavam a desprezar a diferença entre os dois preços. Esta diferença é conhecida como margem negativa de dumping. Embora os EUA tenham sido acionados basicamente por países desenvolvidos nas contendas acerca do zeroing, esta temática também é de interesse de países em desenvolvimento, conforme assinalam Bown e Prusa:

(…) developing countries are increasingly affected by U.S. AD… The stock of measures affecting developing country exports has been increasing over time, as exports from many emerging economies have continued to expand. Looking forward, it is reasonable to think that this emerging pattern of AD measures involving developing countries will also be seen in the pattern of zeroing complaints at the WTO AB. Even though developing countries have currently only filed a few complaints challenging the practice, in all likelihood if the U.S. continues its non-compliance stance there will be more and more zeroing cases against the U.S., especially given that the AB’s position toward zeroing is well established. (67)

A evolução da jurisprudência do Órgão de Apelação no tocante ao zeroing demonstra que os julgamentos tendem a ser contextuais, ou seja, o Órgão de Apelação limita-se, em cada contencioso, conforme o caso específico, a perquirir sobre a compatibilidade do zeroing com apenas uma ou algumas das modalidades de cálculo da margem de dumping (média ponderada do valor normal com média ponderada do preço de exportação, transação-transação ou média ponderada do valor normal com preço de uma exportação específica) ou fases de investigação (inicial, de revisão ou de produtores não-atuantes), ao invés de decidir, de imediato e em uma única oportunidade, acerca da legalidade do zeroing para todas as modalidades ou fases. Tal comportamento, no estilo conta-gotas, tem gerado certa instabilidade no Sistema de Solução de Controvérsias da OMC, dispêndio de recursos financeiros por parte dos países demandantes e expediente protelatório dos praticantes do zeroing, que esperam uma condenação definitiva para somente então suprimirem ou alterarem o procedimento do zeroing adotado. No contencioso US - Zeroing (EC), o Órgão de Apelação reconheceu que uma norma interna de um Membro da OMC pode ser impugnada em tese ou “enquanto tal” (“as such”) por suposta afronta ao Acordo Antidumping. Vale frisar que o país demandante tem a opção de esperar a ocorrência de um caso concreto que implique desrespeito ao Acordo Antidumping ou a impugnação da lei em abstrato. Nem sempre, contudo, é fácil decidir qual estratégia seguir, mormente porque as consequências podem ser diferentes na fase de implementação das recomendações do DSB. Neste ponto, é importante anotar que “often, a Member challenges a measure both as such and as applied, leaving the panel to rule on the two challenges separately. This gives the Member a ‘fallback’ position in the event that the as such challenge fails for reasons such as insufficient evidence”. Na contenda mencionada no parágrafo acima, o Órgão de Apelação invocou o precedente US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, abordando de maneira pormenorizada o tema da norma em tese. Neste precedente, o Órgão de Apelação realçou a necessidade de que os Membros demandantes enunciem de forma clara as normas (leis, regulamentos e demais atos administrativos), os quais serão contestados “enquanto tal”. Assim, se o Painel ou Órgão de Apelação entenderem inviável a identificação da norma questionada em abstrato, o demandante será prejudicado. Nesse sentido, é relevante citar a seguinte passagem do aludido precedente:

The presumption that WTO Members act in good faith in the implementation of their WTO commitments is particularly apt in the context of measures challenged “as such”. We would therefore urge complaining parties to be especially diligent in setting out “as such” claims in their panel requests as clearly as possible. In particular, we would expect that “as such” claims state unambiguously the specific measures of municipal law challenged by the complaining party and the legal basis for the allegation that those measures

are not consistent with particular provisions of the covered agreements (WTO, WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 173).

FOOTNOTES: Footnote 65: “It is true that in a prospective normal value system individual export transactions at prices less than normal value can attract liability for payment of antidumping duties, regardless of whether prices of other export transactions exceed normal value. Similarly, under its retrospective system of duty collection, the United States is free to assess duty liability on a transaction-specific basis, but the total amount of antidumping duties that are levied must not exceed the exporters' or foreign producers' margins of dumping. (See Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (Japan), paras. 161 and 162).” Footnote 66: BARRAL, Welber. Dumping e comércio internacional: a regulamentação antidumping após a Rodada Uruguai, Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2000, p. 219. Footnote 67: BOWN, Chad P.; PRUSA, Thomas J. US Antidumping: much ado about zeroing. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5352, jun/2010, pp. 8-9.

Ø Artigo 10

Lucas Spadano IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 10 Retroactivity

10.1 Provisional measures and antidumping duties shall only be applied to products which enter for consumption after the time when the decision taken under paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 1 of Article 9, respectively, enters into force, subject to the exceptions set out in this Article.

10.2 Where a final determination of injury (but not of a threat thereof or of a material retardation of

the establishment of an industry) is made or, in the case of a final determination of a threat of injury, where the effect of the dumped imports would, in the absence of the provisional measures, have led to a determination of injury, antidumping duties may be levied retroactively for the period for which provisional measures, if any, have been applied.

10.3 If the definitive antidumping duty is higher than the provisional duty paid or payable, or the

amount estimated for the purpose of the security, the difference shall not be collected. If the definitive duty is lower than the provisional duty paid or payable, or the amount estimated for the purpose of the security, the difference shall be reimbursed or the duty recalculated, as the case may be.

10.4 Except as provided in paragraph 2, where a determination of threat of injury or material

retardation is made (but no injury has yet occurred) a definitive antidumping duty may be imposed only from the date of the determination of threat of injury or material retardation, and any cash deposit made during the period of the application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds released in an expeditious manner.

10.5 Where a final determination is negative, any cash deposit made during the period of the

application of provisional measures shall be refunded and any bonds released in an expeditious manner.

10.6 A definitive antidumping duty may be levied on products which were entered for consumption

not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures, when the authorities determine for the dumped product in question that:

(i) there is a history of dumping which caused injury or that the importer was, or

should have been, aware that the exporter practises dumping and that such dumping would cause injury, and

(ii) the injury is caused by massive dumped imports of a product in a relatively short time which in light of the timing and the volume of the dumped imports and other circumstances (such as a rapid build-up of inventories of the imported product) is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the definitive antidumping duty to be applied, provided that the importers concerned have been given an opportunity to comment.

10.7 The authorities may, after initiating and investigation, take such measures as the withholding

of appraisement or assessment as may be necessary to collect antidumping duties retroactively, as provided for in paragraph 6, once they have sufficient evidence that the conditions set forth in that paragraph are satisfied.

10.8 No duties shall be levied retroactively pursuant to paragraph 6 on products entered for consumption prior to the date of initiation of the investigation.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 10 Retroatividade

10.1 Só poderão ser aplicadas medidas provisórias e direitos antidumping a produtos destinados ao consumo que entrem após o momento em que entre em vigor a decisão prevista no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7 e no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 9, respectivamente, sujeita às exceções estabelecidas neste Artigo.

10.2 Poderão ser percebidos direitos antidumping retroativos pelo período durante o qual medidas

provisórias, caso tenham existido, tenham sido aplicadas sempre que uma determinação final de dano (mas não de ameaça de dano ou de retardamento sensível no estabelecimento de uma indústria) seja feita, ou sempre que se conclua pela determinação final de ameaça de dano, em que as importações a preço de dumping, na ausência de medidas provisórias, teriam por efeito determinar a existência de dano.

10.3 Se o direito antidumping definitivo é mais alto do que os direitos provisórios pagos ou

pagáveis ou do que o valor estimado para fins de garantia, a diferença a maior não será cobrada. Se o direito definitivo é inferior ao direito provisório pago ou pagável ou ao valor estimado para fins de garantia, a diferença deverá ser reembolsada ou o direito recalculado conforme o caso.

10.4 Exceto nos casos previstos no parágrafo 2, sempre que se determine a existência de ameaça de

dano ou atraso sensível no estabelecimento de uma indústria (mas não tenha ainda ocorrido nenhum dano real), só se poderá impor direito antidumping definitivo a partir da data de determinação da ameaça de dano ou de retardamento sensível, e todo depósito em espécie efetuado durante o período de aplicação de medidas provisórias será reembolsado, e todo o depósito em fiança será prontamente liberado.

10.5 No caso de se chegar a conclusões negativas, todo depósito em espécie efetuado durante o

período de aplicação de medidas provisórias será reembolsado e todo o depósito em fiança será prontamente liberado.

10.6 Poder-se-á cobrar retroativamente direito antidumping definitivo sobre produtos que tenham

entrado para consumo até 90 dias antes da data de aplicação das medidas provisórias, sempre que as autoridades determinem o seguinte acerca do produto importado a preços de dumping:

a) há antecedentes de dumping causador de dano, ou o importador estava consciente, ou

deveria ter estado consciente, de que o exportador pratica dumping e de que tal dumping causaria dano; e

e) o dano é causado por volumosas importações a preços de dumping em período de

tempo relativamente curto, o que, à luz da velocidade e do volume das importações a preço de dumping e também de outras circunstâncias (como o rápido crescimento dos estoques do produto importado), levará provavelmente a prejudicar seriamente o efeito corretivo dos direitos antidumping definitivos aplicáveis no futuro, desde que aos importadores envolvidos tenha sido dada a oportunidade de se manifestar sobre a medida.

10.7 As autoridades poderão, após iniciada uma investigação, tomar medidas que estimem necessárias, como suspender a valoração aduaneira ou a liqüidação de direitos, para perceber

direitos antidumping retroativos, tal como previsto no parágrafo 6, sempre que tenham indicação suficiente de que as condições estabelecidas naquele parágrafo estejam preenchidas.

10.8 Não se poderão perceber retroativamente direitos ao abrigo do parágrafo 6 sobre produtos que

tenham entrado para consumo antes da data de início da investigação. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução A expressão “subject to the exceptions set out in this Article”, constante na versão original em inglês do Artigo 10.1, e traduzida como “sujeita às exceções estabelecidas neste Artigo”, teria sentido mais claro em português se fosse traduzida como “observadas as exceções estabelecidas neste Artigo”. Ademais, a expressão “sufficient evidence” disposta no Artigo 10.7 foi traduzida indevidamente como “indicação suficiente”. Juridicamente, há uma diferença relevante entre provas ou evidências e indícios, razão pela qual a tradução deveria ter sido “evidências suficientes” ou “provas suficientes”. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 10 1. Artigo 10.7

a) “Natureza das medidas que podem ser tomadas pelas autoridades ao amparo do Artigo

10.7” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.155-7.156 O Painel manifestou o entendimento de que as medidas autorizadas pelo Artigo 10.7 têm natureza cautelar, no sentido de que seu propósito é preservar a possibilidade de, posteriormente, exigir-se o pagamento de direitos antidumping de forma retroativa. Para. 7.155. “Article 10.7 provides that once the authorities have sufficient evidence that the conditions of Article 10.6 are satisfied, they may take such measures as, for example, the withholding of appraisement or assessment, as may be necessary to collect antidumping duties retroactively. We read this provision as allowing the authority to take certain necessary measures of a purely conservatory or precautionary kind which serve the purpose of preserving the possibility of later deciding to collect duties retroactively under Article 10.6. Unlike provisional measures, Article 10.7 measures are not primarily intended to prevent injury being caused during the investigation. They are taken in order to make subsequent retroactive duty collection possible as a practical matter. Measures taken under Article 10.7 are not based on evaluation of the same criteria as final measures that may be imposed at the end of the investigation. They are of a different kind - they preserve the possibility of imposing antidumping duties retroactively, on the basis of a determination additional to the ultimate final determination.” Para. 7.156. “Our understanding in this regard is confirmed by the fact that, unlike provisional measures, which can only be imposed after a preliminary affirmative determination of dumping and injury, Article 10.7 measures may be taken at any time “after initiating an investigation (…).”

b) “Evidências suficientes” da existência das condições previstas no Artigo 10.6” (i) Conceito de “evidências suficientes”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.153-7.154 Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que, na ausência de uma definição no Artigo 10.7 sobre o que constituiria “evidências suficientes”, faz-se necessário que este requisito seja analisado caso a caso, à luz do contexto da situação específica, e dos efeitos da medida imposta ou da decisão tomada pelas autoridades. Para. 7.153. “Article 10.7 of the AD Agreement does not define “sufficient evidence”. However, Article 5.3 also reflects this standard, in requiring that the authorities examine the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in the application “to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation”. The Article 5.3 requirement of “sufficient evidence to initiate an investigation” has been addressed by previous GATT and WTO panels. Their approach to understanding this standard has been to examine whether the evidence before the authority at the time it made its determination was such that an unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating that evidence could properly have made the determination. These Panels have noted that what will be sufficient evidence varies depending on the determination in question. The Panel in Mexico - HFCS quoted with approval from the Panel's report in the Guatemala - Cement I case that “the type of evidence needed to justify initiation is the same as that needed to make a preliminary or final determination of threat of injury, although the quality and quantity is less”.” (notas de rodapé omitidas) Para. 7.154. “(…) We are of the view that what constitutes “sufficient evidence” must be addressed in light of the timing and effect of the measure imposed or the determination made. Evidence that is sufficient to warrant initiation of an investigation may not be sufficient to conclude that provisional measures may be imposed. In a similar vein, the possible effect of the measures an authority is entitled to take under Article 10.7 of the AD Agreement informs what constitutes sufficient evidence. Whether evidence is sufficient or not is determined by what the evidence is used for. In sum, whether evidence is sufficient to justify initiation or to justify taking certain necessary precautionary measures under Article 10.7 is not a standard that can be determined in the abstract. (…)”

(ii) Desnecessidade de determinação de dumping e dano previamente à aplicação das medidas previstas no Artigo 10.6

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, para. 7.156 O Painel entendeu não ser necessário, para fins de demonstrar as “evidências suficientes de que as condições do Artigo 10.6 foram cumpridas”, que a autoridade investigadora chegue primeiramente a uma determinação preliminar afirmativa de dumping. Para. 7.156. “In light of the timing and effect of the measures that are taken on the basis of Article 10.7, we consider that the Article 10.7 requirement of “sufficient evidence that the conditions of Article 10.6 are satisfied” does not require an authority to first make a preliminary affirmative determination within the meaning of Article 7 of the AD Agreement of dumping and consequent injury to a domestic industry. If it were necessary to wait until after such a preliminary determination, there would, in our view, be no purpose served by the Article 10.7 determination. The opportunity to preserve the possibility of applying duties to a period prior to the preliminary determination would be lost, and the provisional measure that could be applied on the basis of the preliminary affirmative determination under Article 7 would prevent further injury during the course of the investigation. Moreover, the requirement in Article 7 that provisional measures may not be applied until 60 days after initiation cannot be reconciled with the right, under Article 10.6, to apply duties retroactively to 90 days prior to the date on which a provisional measure is imposed, if a preliminary affirmative

determination is a prerequisite to the Article 10.7 measures which preserve the possibility of retroactive application of duties under Article 10.6.”

(iii) Evidências suficientes no contexto dos Artigos 10.7 e 5.3 Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, para. 7.158 Neste trecho, o Painel notou que o Japão não havia questionado, na disputa em questão, a abertura da investigação antidumping com base em “evidências suficientes” de dumping, nos termos do Artigo 5.3. Observou, diante disso, que as mesmas evidências a justificarem a abertura da investigação deveriam servir como evidências para os fins das medidas acautelatórias previstas no Artigo 10.7. Para. 7.158. “We note that Japan did not challenge the initiation of the investigation, which was, pursuant to Article 5.3, based on a determination that there was sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and a causal link. We can perceive of no reason, given the precautionary nature of the measures that may be taken under Article 10.7, why that same information might not justify a determination of sufficient evidence of dumping and consequent injury in the context of Article 10.6 as required by Article 10.7.”

c) “Condições estabelecidas” no Artigo 10.6

(i) Consciência dos importadores sobre o dumping Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, para. 7.160 Neste trecho, o Painel manifestou a opinião de que é aceitável presumir que importadores tenham ciência da prática de dumping, especificamente quando se encontram margens de dumping significativas (no caso, acima de 25%). Para. 7.160. “USDOC determined that the importers knew or should have known that exporters were dumping and that such dumping would cause injury. USDOC normally considers dumping margins of 25 per cent or more and a USITC preliminary determination of material injury to impute knowledge of dumping and the likelihood of consequent material injury. USDOC determined that the information in the petition indicated that the estimated dumping margins were over 25 per cent for the Japanese respondents. The evidence of dumping in the petition was, in our view, sufficient for an unbiased and objective investigating authority to reach this conclusion. We note, in this regard, that Japan has not alleged that an imputed knowledge of dumping is, per se, inconsistent with Article 10.7, but rather argues that USDOC did not have sufficient evidence of dumping at all, for the purposes of Article 10.7.”

(ii) Provocação de dano

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.162-7.163 Neste caso, o Painel concluiu que a ameaça de dano se enquadra no conceito de dano para o fim de satisfazer as condições do Artigo 10.6, conforme exigido pelo Artigo 10.7. Para 7.162. “(…) we note that Article 10.6 itself refers to a determination that an importer knew or should have known that there was dumping that would cause injury. The term “injury” is defined in footnote 9 to Article 3 of the Agreement to include threat of material injury or material retardation of

the establishment of an industry, unless otherwise specified. Article 10.6 does not “otherwise specify”. Consequently, in our view, sufficient evidence of threat of injury would be enough to justify a determination to apply protective measures under Article 10.7.” Para. 7.163. “The role of Article 10.7 in the overall context of the AD Agreement confirms this interpretation. This provision is clearly aimed at preserving the possibility to impose and collect antidumping duties retroactively to 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures. Thus, Article 10.7 preserves the option provided in Article 10.6 to impose definitive duties even beyond the date of provisional measures. Assume arguendo Article 10.7 were understood to require sufficient evidence of actual material injury. In a situation in which, at the time Article 10.7 measures are being considered, there is evidence only of threat of material injury, no measures under Article 10.7 could be taken. Assume further that in this same investigation, there was a final determination of actual material injury caused by dumped imports. At that point, it would be impossible to apply definitive antidumping duties retroactively, even assuming the conditions set out in Article 10.6 were satisfied, as the necessary underlying Article 10.7 measures had not been taken. Thus, in a sense, Article 10.7 measures serve the same purpose as an order at the beginning of a lawsuit to preserve the status quo - they ensure that at the end of the process, effective measures can be put in place should the circumstances warrant.”

(iii) Volumosas importações em período de tempo relativamente curto

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184//R, paras. 7.165-7.167 Nesta disputa, o Painel, embora reconhecendo a inexistência de uma determinação no Artigo 10 sobre o período a ser considerado para a determinação da ocorrência ou não de importações volumosas com dumping, em um período de tempo relativamente curto, atribuiu peso significativo ao fato de que as importações volumosas não foram feitas in tempore non suspectu, mas sim num período em que já havia conhecimento público de que uma investigação estava iminente. O Painel ressaltou que isto pode ser uma circunstância levada em conta para os fins da avaliação da legalidade de medidas ao amparo do Artigo 10.7. Enfatizou, no entanto, que não estava questionando a adequação de se levar em conta tais fatores, para fins de uma aplicação retroativa de direitos, nos termos do Artigo 10.6. Para. 7.165. “The Agreement does not determine what period should be used in order to assess whether there were massive imports over a short period of time. Japan asserts that the latter part of Article 10.6 (ii) of the AD Agreement, referring to whether the injury caused by massive imports is likely to seriously undermine the remedial effect of the duty, implies that the period for comparison is the months before and after the initiation of the investigation. Japan argues that since the duty cannot be imposed retroactively to the period before the initiation, the remedial effect of the duty cannot be undermined by massive imports before initiation.” Para. 7.166. “We disagree with this conclusion. Article 10.7 allows for certain necessary measures to be taken at any time after initiation of the investigation. In order to be able to make any determination concerning whether there are massive dumped imports, a comparison of data is obviously necessary. However, if a Member were required to wait until information concerning the volume of imports for some period after initiation were available, this right to act at any time after initiation would be vitiated. By the time the necessary information on import volumes for even a brief period after initiation were available, as a practical matter, the possibility to impose final duties retroactively to initiation would be lost, as there would be no Article 10.7 measures in place. Moreover, as with the situation if a Member were required to wait the minimum 60 days and make a preliminary determination under Article 7 before applying measures under Article 10.7, the possibility of retroactively collecting duties under Article 10.6 at the final stage would have been lost.”

Para. 7.167. “Moreover, in our view, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the remedial effect of the definitive duty could be undermined by massive imports that entered the country before the initiation of the investigation but at a time at which it had become clear that an investigation was imminent. We consider that massive imports that were not made in tempore non suspectu but at a moment in time where it had become public knowledge that an investigation was imminent may be taken into consideration in assessing whether Article 10.7 measures may be imposed. Again, we emphasize that we are not addressing the question whether this would be adequate for purposes of the final determination to apply duties retroactively under Article 10.6.” III. Comentários No principal caso envolvendo o Artigo 10, US - Hot Rolled Steel, as discussões restringiram-se ao conteúdo do parágrafo 7. A percepção de que a natureza deste é cautelar, isto é, de que funciona como uma garantia da possibilidade de recolher direitos retroativamente em certas circunstâncias, parece contribuir para que o dispositivo seja interpretado de modo relativamente flexível, em favor da autoridade investigadora. Como exemplos desta consideração, a ser confirmada em futuros casos, pode-se notar a aceitação da presunção de que importadores têm conhecimento da prática do dumping a partir de determinada margem de dumping (no caso examinado, 25%), bem como a conclusão do Painel de que as informações que fundamentam a abertura de investigações podem ser basicamente as mesmas que fundamentam as medidas de garantia de eventual recolhimento retroativo, previstas no Artigo 10.7.

Ø Artigo 11 Alexandre Marques da Silva Martins IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 11 Duration and Review of Antidumping Duties and Price Undertakings

11.1 An antidumping duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to

counteract dumping which is causing injury.

11.2 The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive antidumping duty, upon request by any interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a review. (68) Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the antidumping duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.

11.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, any definitive anti dumping duty shall

be terminated on a date not later than five years from its imposition (or from the date of the most recent review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both dumping and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated before that date on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. (69) The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review.

11.4 The provisions of Article 6 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any review

carried out under this Article. Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review.

11.5 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to price undertakings accepted

under Article 8. Footnote 68: When the amount of the antidumping duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, a finding in the most recent assessment proceeding under subparagraph 3.1 of Article 9 that no duty is to be levied shall not by itself require the authorities to terminate the definitive duty. Footnote 69: A determination of final liability for payment of antidumping duties, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article 9, does not by itself constitute a review within the meaning of this Article. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 11 Duração e Revisão dos Direitos Antidumping e dos Compromissos de Preços

11.1 Direitos antidumping só permanecerão em vigor enquanto perdurar a necessidade de

contrabalançar a prática de dumping causadora de dano. 11.2 Quando justificado, as autoridades deverão rever a necessidade de conservar os direitos

impostos, quer por sua própria iniciativa, quer, se um período razoável de tempo se tiver passado desde a imposição de direitos antidumping definitivos, por requerimento de qualquer parte interessada, que deverá apresentar informação positiva comprobatória da necessidade de

revisão9. As partes interessadas deverão ter o direito de requerer às autoridades que examinem se a manutenção do direito é necessária para evitar o dumping, se há probabilidade de que continue o dano, ou, ainda, de sua reincidência se o direito for extinto ou alterado, ou ambos. Se, como resultado da revisão prevista nesse parágrafo, as autoridades concluem que não mais se justifica a manutenção do direito antidumping, deve o mesmo ser imediatamente extinto.

11.3 Em que pese ao disposto nos parágrafos 1 e 2, todo direito antidumping definitivo será extinto

em data não posterior a 5 anos a contar de sua imposição (ou da data da mais recente revisão prevista no parágrafo 2, caso tal revisão tenha abarcado tanto o dumping quanto o dano, ou à luz do disposto neste parágrafo), a menos que as autoridades determinem, em revisão iniciada em data anterior àquela, quer por sua própria iniciativa, quer em resposta a requerimento devidamente fundamentado feito pela indústria nacional ou em seu nome que tenha sido apresentado dentro de prazo razoavelmente anterior àquela data, que a extinção dos direitos levaria muito provavelmente à continuação ou retomada do dumping e do dano10. O direito poderá manter-se em vigor enquanto se espera o resultado do exame.

11.4 O disposto no Artigo 6 relativamente às provas e aos procedimentos aplicar-se-á a toda e

qualquer revisão efetuada sob a égide deste Artigo. Tal revisão será efetuada de maneira expedita e deverá ser normalmente concluída dentro de 12 meses contados a partir de seu início.

11.5. O disposto neste Artigo deverá aplicar-se, mutatis mutandis, aos compromissos de preços

aceitos sob o disposto no Artigo 8. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução “To counteract” significa “to do something to reduce or prevent the bad or harmful effects of something”. Assim, o verbo “contrabalançar” deveria ser alterado para “neutralizar”. A expressão “an antidumping duty”, presente no Artigo 11.1, da versão original, foi traduzida no plural. No original, a ideia é de que são os direitos antidumping em geral. Logo, traduzir como “um direito antidumping” ou “direitos antidumping” pouco importa, posto que a ideia é geral em ambos os casos. Quanto às expressões “as long as” e “to the extent necessary”, é perfeitamente aceitável a tradução como foi feita. Deve-se notar que algumas expressões em inglês são repetidas como uma forma de ênfase. Entende-se que é o caso. Por fim, pelas regras gramaticais em vigor, a grafia correta da palavra “antidumping” seria “antidumping” (sem hífen e itálico). No Artigo 11.3, a expressão “would be likely to lead” foi traduzida como “levaria muito provavelmente”, quando o correto seria “levaria provavelmente”.

Na nota de rodapé 22, consta “segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(a) do Artigo 9”, sendo que a tradução deveria ser: “segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(1) do Artigo 9”. Embora os subparágrafos ou alíneas do Artigo 9 tenham sido traduzidas por letras, na versão original esses subparágrafos ou alíneas correspondem a números. Deve-se notar que enquanto o Artigo 11.4 refere-se a “compromissos de preços”, o Artigo 8, do Acordo Antidumping, o qual cuida de disciplinar os compromissos de preços, emprega a expressão “compromissos sobre preços”.                                                                                                                          9 Tomada em si mesma a determinação definitiva da quantia do direito anti-dumping a que se refere o parágrafo 3 do Artigo 9 não constitui exame no sentido do presente Artigo. 10 Quando se calcula o montante do direito anti-dumping de forma retrospectiva, a mera constatação de que não há direito a cobrar, verificada durante o mais recente procedimento de cálculo do valor devido segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(a) do Artigo 9, não será suficiente para que se requeira das autoridades a extinção dos direitos definitivos.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução “To counteract” significa “to do something to reduce or prevent the bad or harmful effects of something”. Assim, o verbo “contrabalançar” deveria ser alterado para “neutralizar”. A expressão “an Antidumping duty”, presente no Artigo 11.1 da versão original, foi traduzida no plural. No original, a ideia é de que são os direitos Antidumping em geral. Logo, traduzir como “um direito Antidumping” ou “direitos Antidumping” pouco importa, posto que a ideia é geral em ambos os casos. Quanto às expressões “as long as” e “to the extent necessary”, é perfeitamente aceitável a tradução como foi feita. Deve-se notar que algumas expressões em inglês são repetidas como uma forma de ênfase. Entende-se que é o caso. Por fim, pelas regras gramaticais em vigor, a grafia correta da palavra “Antidumping” seria “antidumping” (sem hífen e itálico). A expressão “would be likely to lead” foi traduzida como “levaria muito provavelmente”, quando o correto seria “levaria provavelmente”. Na nota de rodapé 22, consta “segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(a) do Artigo 9”, sendo que a tradução deveria ser a seguinte: “segundo o estabelecido no subparágrafo 3(1) do Artigo 9”. Embora os subparágrafos ou alíneas do Artigo 9 tenham sido traduzidos por letras, na versão original esses subparágrafos ou alíneas correspondem a números. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 11 1. O preceito do Artigo 11.1 é Cláusula Geral Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Maleable Cast Iron TUbe or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.113 Ao dispor que os direitos antidumping devem ser utilizados, na medida do necessário, para neutralizar a prática de dumping que causa dano, o Artigo 11.1 do Acordo Antidumping, constitui cláusula geral que orienta a aplicação dos Parágrafos 2 e 3 do mesmo Artigo. Com efeito, o Painel do litígio EC - Pipe Fittings asseverou que: Para. 7.113. “By virtue of Article 11.1 of the Antidumping Agreement, an Antidumping duty may only continue to be imposed if it remains “necessary” to counteract injurious dumping. Article 11.1 contains a general, unambiguous and mandatory requirement that Antidumping duties “shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary” to counteract injurious dumping. It furnishes the basis for the review procedures contained in Article 11.2 (and 11.3) by stating a general and overarching principle, the modalities of which are set forth in paragraph 2 (and 3) of that Article.” (nota de rodapé omitida) 2. Desnecessidade de determinação de margens individuais para todos os exportadores e

produtores conhecidos em todos os casos

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam (US - Shrimp), Demandante: Viet Nam, WT/DS404/R, para. 7.167 O Artigo 11.1 não impõe às autoridades administrativas a obrigação de perquirir acerca das margens individuais para todos os exportadores e produtores conhecidos em todos os casos, tendo em vista o contido na segunda sentença do Artigo 6.10, do Acordo Antidumping. Nesse contexto, o Painel do caso US - Shrimp (Viet Nam) rechaçou a pretensão vietnamita nos seguintes termos:

Para. 7.167. “Viet Nam's claims are premised on the view that Articles 9.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement require the determination of individual margins, notwithstanding the legitimate use of a limited examination. To interpret these other provisions of the Antidumping Agreement in this way would render the second sentence of Article 6.10 meaningless. Indeed, Viet Nam would effectively have us interpret the first sentence of Article 6.10, and Articles 9.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, in isolation, as if the second sentence of Article 6.10 did not exist. There is no doubt that, generally, there is a preference for individual margins to be determined for each known exporter and producer. This is the very essence of the first sentence of Article 6.10. However, the exception provided for in the second sentence of Article 6.10 makes it clear that, despite the general preference for individual margins, investigating authorities need not determine individual margins for all known exporters and producers in all cases. Since neither the first sentence of Article 6.10, nor Articles 9.3, 11.1 and 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, impose any additional restrictions on the use of limited examinations, there is no basis for us to find that the USDOC's legitimate (i.e. consistent with the second sentence of Article 6.10) use of limited examinations is inconsistent with those provisions.” (nota de rodapé omitida) 3. Artigo 11.2

a) “Desnecessidade de cálculo de margem de dumping na revisão prevista no Artigo 11.2”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US - Zeroing), WT/DS322/R, Demandante: Japão, paras. 7.234 e 7.236 Ao se realizar uma revisão com arrimo no Artigo 11.2, as autoridades não estão compelidas a calcularem margens de dumping. Todavia, se optarem por fazê-lo, devem obedecer à sistemática do Artigo 2.4 do Acordo Antidumping. Esse entendimento foi firmado pelo Painel no litígio US - Zeroing (Japan): Para. 7.234. “Articles 11.2 and 11.3 are silent on the issue of whether in reviews contemplated by these provisions authorities are required to calculate margins of dumping. In this regard, the Appellate Body's Report in US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review states the following on the relationship of Article 2 to Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement:

Article 2 sets out the agreed disciplines in the Antidumping Agreement for calculating dumping margins. As observed earlier, we see no obligation under Article 11.3 for investigating authorities to calculate or rely on dumping margins in determining the likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping. However, should investigating authorities choose to rely upon dumping margins in making their likelihood determination, the calculation of these margins must conform to the disciplines of Article 2.4. (70)

Para. 7.236. “(…) and assuming that the reasoning of the Appellate Body on reliance of margins of dumping in the context of Article 11.3 is equally applicable to Article 11.2 (…)”.

b) “Utilização de margens de dumping calculadas em investigações anteriores como base para a revisão lastreada no Artigo 11.2 – inidoneidade da prova colhida”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US - Zeroing), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/R, paras. 7.241 e 7.243 O Demandante, no caso US - Zeroing (Japan), sustentou que as autoridades norte-americanas apoiavam-se em margens de dumping estipuladas em investigações pretéritas para efetuar a revisão inserida no Parágrafo 2º, do Artigo 11, prática que não se coadunaria com o aludido dispositivo. O

Painel, contudo, não aceitou a prova coligida, qual seja, a afirmação de uma pessoa física, nos seguintes termos:

First, Japan's response to Panel Question 60 only addresses the issue of whether USDOC relies on historical dumping margins in sunset reviews. It does not address the issue of whether USDOC relies on such margins in changed circumstances reviews. With respect to changed circumstances reviews, the only information provided by Japan as factual support for its argument that USDOC relies on historical margins of dumping is the statement by Valerie Owenby in Exhibit JPN-1. In our view, a statement of that nature cannot be a sufficient basis for a finding that a rule or norm of general and prospective application exists. (…) We conclude that Japan has failed to adduce evidence necessary to establish that a rule, norm or standard of general and prospective application exists by virtue of which USDOC relies on margins of dumping calculated in prior proceedings to support its determinations in changed circumstances reviews and sunset reviews. We emphasize that we do not make a factual finding that USDOC does not rely on such margins in this context. Rather, we consider that based upon the evidence presented by Japan we cannot find that USDOC relies on such margins. We are mindful that we may not make a case for a party.

c) “Reavaliação de taxa de depósito de dinheiro em espécie”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (Zeroing), Demandante: CE, WT/DS294/AB/R, paras. 166 e 168 Na contenda US - Zeroing (EC), o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que as CE não lograram demonstrar que os Parágrafos 1º e 2º, do Artigo 11, incidem na reavaliação de taxa de depósito de dinheiro em espécie no contexto de revisões administrativas. O Órgão de Apelação consignou que:

Para. 166. “The European Communities challenges the Panel's finding on appeal. According to the European Communities, its claims under Articles 11.1 and 11.2 do not “presuppose” that zeroing, as applied by the USDOC in the administrative reviews at issue, was inconsistent with Article 2.4 and/or Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement. The European Communities submits that “[t]he re-investigation of the cash deposit rate, which is carried out in conjunction with the retrospective assessment proceeding”, must be consistent with the obligations set out in Articles 11.1 and 11.2. On these grounds, the European Communities contends that the Panel erred in concluding that, in the administrative reviews at issue, the USDOC did not act inconsistently with Articles 11.1 and 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 168. “The European Communities has not, in our view, established that Articles 11.1 and 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement apply to the reassessment of the cash-deposit rate in the context of administrative reviews. In particular, we fail to see how the reassessment of a cash-deposit rate to be applied to future entries could constitute a review of whether the continued imposition of the Antidumping duty is necessary to counteract dumping that is causing injury.”

d) “Requisito da apresentação de informação positiva comprobatória da necessidade de revisão”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice (Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/AB/R, para. 314

A satisfação do requisito em comento, que permite à parte interessada o direito à obtenção de uma revisão com fulcro no Artigo 11.2, pode ser eventualmente feita por meio de informação que não diga respeito ao volume de exportações, consoante decidido pelo Órgão de Apelação, na controvérsia Mexico - Rice AD Measures:

Para. 314. “The interested party has the right to request the authority to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset dumping, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. Article 11.2 conditions this obligation on (i) the passage of a reasonable period of time since imposition of the definitive duty; and (ii) the submission by the interested party of “positive information” substantiating the need for a review. As the Panel correctly observed, this latter condition may be satisfied in a particular case with information not related to export volumes. (71) O Parágrafo 7.259 do Relatório do Painel mencionado pelo Órgão de Apelação, acima, tem como trecho mais elucidativo o seguinte excerto: Para. 7.259. “(…) Under a changed circumstances review of Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement, the authority examines whether there is continued need for the measure and whether the duty is to be varied or removed. A situation could be envisaged where the positive information substantiating the need for a review that the interested party is to adduce in support of its request relates only to its domestic sales and the normal value side of the dumping margin. A possible example could be a case where an exporter requests a review based on an important and dramatic drop in the normal value for the product due to a change in the cost structure of the company for example. This will have an obvious effect on the dumping margin and may thus warrant a review that leads to the duty being removed or varied (…).”

e) “As exigências previstas no Artigo 11.2 para a revisão constituem um rol fechado”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice (Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/AB/R, para. 315

Não podem as autoridades exigir condições não contidas no Artigo 11.2 para a revisão dos direitos antidumping. Tal raciocínio foi esposado pelo Órgão de Apelação, no caso Mexico - Rice AD Measures:

Para. 315. “(…) In our view, these conditions are exhaustive; thus, if an agency seeks to impose additional conditions on a respondent's right to a review, this would be inconsistent with those provisions. This includes a showing of a “representative” volume of export sales, which Article 68 of the FTA imposes as an absolute requirement in every case before affording the respondent the right to a review or refund.”

f) “O Artigo 11.2 refere-se a direitos antidumping definitivos” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Mexico - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice (Mexico - Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS295/AB/R, para. 345  O Órgão de Apelação definiu, no caso Mexico - Rice AD Measures, que o Artigo 11.2 reporta-se a direitos antidumping de caráter definitivo. Com efeito, o aludido Órgão assim se pronunciou: Para. 345. “Article 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement, referring to the “imposition of the definitive [Antidumping or countervailing] duty”, suggest that a duty may be characterized as “definitive” at the time of its imposition. Article 12.2.2 of

the Antidumping Agreement and Article 22.5 of the SCM Agreement set out requirements for an “affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty”. These provisions indicate that a definitive duty is imposed subsequent to a final affirmative determination. We are of the view, therefore, that a duty becomes “definitive” - and therefore satisfies one of the conditions to a review set out in Articles 9.3 and 11.2 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 21.2 of the SCM Agreement - at the time of the investigating authority's final affirmative determination.”

g) “Necessidade de revisões específicas para empresas – assunto em aberto” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods), Demandante: México, WT/DS282/R, para. 7.159 Eventual obrigatoriedade de que as autoridades, no tocante ao Artigo 11.2, realizem revisões específicas para cada uma das empresas, constitui questão não decidida. Como exemplo, no litígio US - OCTG AD Measures, o Painel entendeu que não precisava deslindar o problema ora versado: Para. 7.159. “We need not, however, determine in this case whether or not Article 11.2 requires investigating authorities to provide for company specific reviews. As discussed further below, our understanding is that the United States system does, in fact, provide for such reviews, both under the changed circumstances provision, and in the more limited circumstances of no dumping for three years and sales in commercial quantities.”

h) “Eventual constatação de três anos consecutivos sem dumping não implica, inexoravelmente, que os direitos antidumping não são mais justificados”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods), Demandante: México, WT/DS282/R, para. 7.173 Tal entendimento foi enunciado pelo Painel no caso US - OCTG AD Measures:

Para. 7.173. “Regarding Mexico's argument that three consecutive years without dumping should be sufficient, in all cases, to demonstrate that an Antidumping duty is not warranted, we find no basis for such a conclusion in Article 11.2. While three years with no dumping might be sufficient to demonstrate that continued imposition of an Antidumping duty is not warranted in some cases, we cannot accept that it is necessarily sufficient in all cases. For instance, take an extreme example of an Antidumping order on sales of transistor radios. A sale of one radio per year at a non-dumped price for three consecutive years might well be considered a mere token sale and not sufficient to demonstrate that continued imposition of the Antidumping order is no longer warranted (…).”

i) Significado da expressão “quando justificado” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.112 Na controvérsia EC - Pipe Fittings, o Painel explicou o conteúdo da expressão “quando justificado” (“where warranted”): Para. 7.112. “Pursuant to Article 11.2, an investigating authority is therefore required, where “warranted”, to review the need for the continued imposition of the duty. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the verb “warrant” is: “To furnish good and sufficient grounds for (a course of action); to render allowable, justify. b. To justify (a person in or to a course of action).” (72) We therefore

understand the phrase “where warranted” in Article 11.2 to denote circumstances furnishing good and sufficient grounds for, or justifying, the self-initiation of a review. Where an investigating authority determines such circumstances to exist, an investigating authority must self-initiate a review…”.

j) “Imposição de direitos antidumping – desobrigatoriedade de início imediato de revisão sob o abrigo do Parágrafo 2º, do Artigo 11”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.115 As autoridades que decidiram pela incidência de direitos antidumping não são forçadas a, concomitantemente, ou logo em seguida à fixação da medida, iniciar um procedimento de revisão com base no Artigo 11.2, conforme explicitado pelo Painel, na controvérsia EC - Pipe Fittings: Para. 7.115. “(…) we find no basis in the Agreement for an obligation that the self-initiation of a review simultaneous with the imposition of the measure is necessarily warranted or that an authority must self-initiate a review immediately upon the imposition of measures on the basis of an affirmative dumping determination in respect of a recent past IP.” (73)

k) “Probabilidade de reincidência de dano”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, paras. 6.27 e 6.28 Mesmo que as autoridades entendam que não há dano atual, elas podem decidir pela manutenção da medida antidumping se vislumbrarem a probabilidade de reincidência de dano. Este raciocínio foi acolhido pelo Painel no caso US - DRAMS: Para. 6.27. “However, the second sentence of Article 11.2 requires an investigating authority to examine whether the “continued imposition” of the duty is necessary to offset dumping. The word “continued” covers a temporal relationship between past and future. In our view, the word “continued” would be redundant if the investigating authority were restricted to considering only whether the duty was necessary to offset present dumping. Thus, the inclusion of the word “continued” signifies that the investigating authority is entitled to examine whether imposition of the duty may be applied henceforth to offset dumping.” Para. 6.28. “Furthermore, with regard to injury, Article 11.2 provides for a review of “whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied” (emphasis supplied). In conducting an Article 11.2 injury review, an investigating authority may examine the causal link between injury and dumped imports. If, in the context of a review of such a causal link, the only injury under examination is injury that may recur following revocation (i.e., future rather than present injury), an investigating authority must necessarily be examining whether that future injury would be caused by dumping with a commensurately prospective timeframe. To do so, the investigating authority would first need to have established a status regarding the prospects of dumping. For these reasons, we do not agree that Article 11.2 precludes a priori the justification of continued imposition of Antidumping duties when there is no present dumping.”

l) “Not likely” test Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, paras. 6.46-6.48 e 6.51

O “not likely” test, previsto na Section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) da legislação norte-americana, foi considerado incompatível com o Artigo 11.2 pelo Painel que julgou a controvérsia US - DRAMS. É interessante notar, que o Painel em apreço fez uma abordagem de semi-ótica para chegar a esta conclusão, tendo se manifestado conforme segue: Para. 6.46. “(…) The difference between the concepts of “likely” and “not likely” is perhaps made clearer by interpreting the word “likely” in accordance with its normal meaning of “probable”. The question then becomes whether not “not probable” is equivalent to “probable”. In our view, the fact that an event is not “not probable” does not by itself render that event “probable”.” Para. 6.47. “Given this reality, it is a priori possible that situations could arise where the not “not likely” criterion is satisfied but where the likelihood criterion is not satisfied. Reliance on the not likely criterion clearly fails to provide any reliable means to avoid or preclude this flaw. Given such a fundamental flaw, it cannot constitute a demonstrable basis for consistently and reliably determining that the likelihood criterion is satisfied.” Para. 6.48. “In light of the above analysis, we conclude that the section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) “not likely” standard is not in fact equivalent to, and falls decisively short of, establishing that dumping is “likely to recur if the order is revoked” Para. 6.51. “Accordingly, we find that section 353.25(a)(2)(ii) constitutes a mandatory requirement inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement.”

m) “Requerimento de certificação para revogação da medida antidumping – desnecessidade da análise em virtude de outras opções à disposição das partes interessadas”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 6.53 Na disputa US - DRAMS, a Coreia do Sul alegou que a exigência, por parte de Washington, de um requerimento de certificação para que se procedesse à revogação de uma medida antidumping afrontaria o Artigo 11.2. Entrementes, o Painel concluiu que não precisava ingressar no mérito do pedido, porquanto a legislação norte-americana ofertava, às partes interessadas, outras formas de revogação da aludida medida. Com efeito, o Painel entendeu que: Para. 6.53. “We note section 751(b) of the 1930 Tariff Act (as amended) and section 353.25(d) of the DOC's regulations, whereby an Antidumping order may be revoked on the basis of “changed circumstances”. We note that neither of these provisions imposes a certification requirement. In other words, an Antidumping order may be revoked under these provisions absent fulfilment of the section 353.25(a)(2)(iii) certification requirement. We also note that Korea has not challenged the consistency of these provisions with the WTO Agreement. Thus, because of the existence of legislative avenues for Article 11.2-type reviews that do not impose a certification requirement, and which have not been found inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, we are precluded from finding that the section 353.25(a)(2)(iii) certification requirement in and of itself amounts to a mandatory requirement inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement.”

n) “Revisão ex officio após três anos e seis meses sem dumping”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, paras. 6.59-6.60

No litígio US - DRAMS, o Painel asseverou que, mesmo tendo sido passados três anos e seis meses sem dumping, as autoridades não estão obrigadas a promover, ex officio, uma investigação a fim de saber se o dano continuaria ou reincidiria se a medida antidumping fosse removida. De acordo com o Painel: Para. 6.59. “A review of “whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied” could include a review of whether (1) injury that is (2) caused by dumped imports would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied. With regard to injury, we believe that an absence of dumping during the preceding three years and six months is not in and of itself indicative of the likely state of the relevant domestic industry if the duty were removed or varied. With regard to causality, an absence of dumping during the preceding three years and six months is not in and of itself indicative of causal factors other than the absence of dumping. If the only causal factor under consideration is three years and six months' no dumping, the issue of causality becomes whether injury caused by dumped imports will recur. This necessarily requires a determination of whether dumping will recur. Thus, the “injury” review that Korea believes is “warranted” on the basis of three years and six months' no dumping would be entirely dependent upon a determination of whether dumping will recur. This is precisely the type of determination that the United States sought to make in the present case. The mere fact of three years and six months' findings of no dumping does not require the investigating authority to, in addition, self-initiate a review of “whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied”.” Para. 6.60. “We therefore reject Korea's claim that the United States violated Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement by failing to initiate, solely on the basis of three years and six months' no dumping, an ex officio Article 11.2 review of “whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied.”

4. Artigo 11.3

a) “País que não é economia de mercado – estabelecimento do preço normal” Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Antidumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, paras. 7.257-7.266 Nesta investigação antidumping proposta pela União Europeia em face da China, a demandante havia considerado a China um país de economia não de mercado. Assim, na fase de determinação do preço normal, adotou por analogia o Brasil, como o país que ofereceria condições típicas de uma economia de mercado. Beijing alegou que, ao assim proceder, a União Europeia havia ofendido o Acordo Antidumping, alegação que foi afastada pelo Painel: Para. 7.257. “Thus, the first question before us is whether China's premise, that Articles 2.1 and 2.4 apply to the analogue country selection procedure and establish limits on the procedures and criteria for, and the outcome of, the selection of an analogue country, is correct. If not, then China's claim is without a legal basis in the AD Agreement, or the GATT 1994, and we need not consider its contentions regarding the facts of either the expiry review or the original investigation.” Para. 7.258. “We note first that the term “analogue country” does not appear in the AD Agreement, Article VI of the GATT 1994, in China's Accession Working Party Report, or in China's Accession Protocol. Nor is there any reference in any of these concerning the procedure or criteria for the selection of an analogue country. Indeed, China does not argue otherwise. China asserts that the “fair comparison” obligation in Article 2.4 and the term “comparable price” in Article 2.1 inform the boundaries of investigating authorities' discretion in the selection of an analogue country. In China's view, the process of selecting an analogue country must aim at securing a comparable price which could permit a fair comparison, and the country selected must be capable of yielding such a price. Thus, China's claims ask us to first conclude that Articles 2.1 and 2.4 of the AD Agreement establish

requirements for a methodology for determining normal value in certain Antidumping investigations which is not even alluded to in any relevant legal instrument, and second that the European Union violated those requirements.” Para. 7.259. “(…) On its face, it is clear that Article 2.1 is a definitional provision that sets forth the general definition of “dumping” for the purposes of the AD Agreement.” Para. 7.260. “Thus, it would seem that Article 2.1 does not, in itself, impose independent obligations and therefore cannot be the basis of a stand-alone claim. The European Union argues that Article 2.1 is a purely definitional provision that cannot be used as a basis of a claim. China, however, asserts, relying on the decision of the panel in US - Hot-Rolled Steel, that although Article 2.1 does not create independent obligations, it may nevertheless form the basis of a claim if it can be shown that the obligation is also “located” or “created” elsewhere in the AD Agreement. Even assuming this were the case, we do not consider that China has demonstrated that the obligations it asserts are “located” or “created” elsewhere in the AD Agreement. Thus, we see no basis in Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement for China's claims concerning analogue country. We have, as discussed above, dismissed China's claims under Article 17.6(i). Moreover, we agree with the European Union that, under China's approach, all dumping-related claims could be brought under Article 2.1 alone, supported by the assertion that the obligations asserted are “created” elsewhere. Articles 2.2 and 2.3 establish specific rules for alternative methods that may be used in establishing normal value and export price in certain circumstances; Article 2.4 establishes specific rules and methodologies for the comparison of normal value and export price; Article 2.5 establishes specific rules for the country in which normal value is to be established in cases of transhipment; Article 2.6 defines like products, and Article 2.7 establishes the continued significance of the second Ad Note to Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994. Under China's approach, however, these provisions would simply be subsumed in the definition of dumping set out in Article 2.1, and be effectively redundant. We do not accept that Article 2.1 can be understood in such a fashion.” Para. 7.261. “The only other provision relied on by China in this regard is Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement. China contends that Article 2.4 applies to the analogue country selection procedure, and that the “fair comparison” obligation in the first sentence of Article 2.4 is an “independent” and “overarching” obligation which applies to all of Article 2, including all aspects of the establishment of normal value, in particular, in this case, the selection of an appropriate analogue country.” Para. 7.262. “The first sentence of Article 2.4, on its face, addresses the “comparison” between the export price and normal value and explicitly requires that such a comparison must be “fair”. The remainder of the provision, including its subparagraphs, establishes specific rules for ensuring a fair comparison of export price and normal value.” Para. 7.263. “Nothing in Article 2.4 suggests that the fair comparison requirement provides guidance with respect to the determination of the component elements of the comparison to be made, that is, normal value and export price. Indeed, in our view, it is clear that the requirement to make a fair comparison in Article 2.4 logically presupposes that normal value and export price, the elements to be compared, have already been established. We note in this regard the views of the panel in Egypt - Steel Rebar. Although the issue before that panel was the different question of whether Article 2.4 establishes a “generally applicable rule” as to burden of proof, the panel considered Article 2.4 in detail, and stated:

Article 2.4, on its face, refers to the comparison of export price and normal value, i.e. the calculation of the dumping margin, and in particular, requires that such a comparison shall be “fair”. A straightforward consideration of the ordinary meaning of this provision confirms that it has to do not with the basis for and basic establishment of the export price and normal value (which

are addressed in detail in other provisions), but with the nature of the comparison of export price and normal value.”

Moreover, there is nothing in the provisions of the AD Agreement that specifically address the determination of normal value, most notably Article 2.2, that refers to the “fair comparison” called for by Article 2.4.

Para. 7.264. “China argues, however, that Article 2.4 establishes a general “fairness” obligation that applies to all of Article 2, including all aspects of the establishment of normal value. As noted above, however, the “fairness” requirement in Article 2.4 refers to the “comparison” between the normal value and the export price. In our view, to require consideration of whether a “fair comparison” will result in the process of determining normal value introduces a circularity into the analysis which is untenable. Indeed, in our view, the provisions of Article 2.4 are intended precisely to deal with problems that arise in the comparison as a result of, inter alia, how normal value was established. In such a circumstance, Article 2.4 requires investigating authorities to ensure a fair comparison between the normal value and the export price, and provides explicit guidance on how this is to be done: where there are “differences” affecting price comparability between export price and normal value, “[d]ue allowance shall be made” for those differences. These allowances can only be made after the normal value and the export price have been established.” Para. 7.265. “China relies on three Appellate Body reports in support of its view that Article 2.4 establishes a general requirement of “fairness” that applies to all of Article 2. However, the three cases cited by China in this regard involved the question of whether the investigating authority had made a “fair comparison” between normal value and export price. In none of them was the establishment of the normal value addressed in connection with the “fair comparison”. It is true the Appellate Body stated, in EC - Bed Linen, that the obligation to make a fair comparison between export price and normal value in Article 2.4 “is a general obligation” that “informs all of Article 2, but applies, in particular, to Article 2.4.2 which is specifically made 'subject to the provisions governing fair comparison in [Article 2.4]'”. However, the Appellate Body was not, in that case, considering the determination of normal value, and we see nothing in its reasoning to suggest it intended this statement to have the breadth ascribed to it by China. We decline to ascribe to the Appellate Body the views proffered by China concerning the relevance of fair comparison to the determination of normal value. We recall that in US - Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body examined the determination of normal value under Article 2.1, and while noting that the use of downstream sales to determine normal value could affect price comparability, it concluded this could be taken account of by the allowance mechanism provided for in Article 2.4. The Appellate Body certainly did not conclude that the fair comparison requirement of Article 2.4 directly applied to the determination of the normal value from the outset. We therefore conclude that China has failed to demonstrate that the fair comparison requirement of Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement, either alone, or together with Article 2.1 of the AD Agreement and/or Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994, establishes a general requirement of “fairness” which applies, inter alia, to the selection of an analogue country.” Para. 7.266. “Based on the foregoing, we conclude that China has failed to demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 17.6(1) of the AD Agreement, or with Article VI:1 of the GATT 1994 in the original investigation as a result of the analogue country selection procedure and the selection of Brazil as the analogue country. We also conclude that China has failed to demonstrate that the European Union acted inconsistently with Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement in the expiry review as a result of the analogue country selection procedure and the selection of Brazil as the analogue country.”

b) “Eventual aplicação do Artigo 3 ao Artigo 11.3 do Acordo Antidumping” Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Antidumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.329-7.331 e 7.333

Neste contencioso, o Painel entendeu que nem todos os fatores importantes na determinação do dano, conforme o estabelecido no Artigo 3, também o são na averiguação de continuidade ou recorrência de dano, nos termos do Artigo 11.3. O Painel assim se manifestou: Para. 7.329. “As we have previously noted, it is clear that Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement “does not prescribe any particular methodology to be used by investigating authorities in making a likelihood determination in a sunset review.” Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement does not require an investigating authority to undertake a new injury determination in the context of an expiry review, and it is clear that original investigations and expiry reviews are distinct processes with different purposes. The nature of the determinations concerning injury to be made in each type of proceeding is different. In original Antidumping investigations, investigating authorities must determine whether the domestic industry of a Member is materially injured by dumped imports. At this stage, the focus is on the existence of “material injury” at the time of the determination. That determination is made under Article 3, based on information concerning the necessary and relevant factors for some previous period. In contrast, in an expiry review, an Antidumping measure has been in place for some time, and investigating authorities must, based on a fresh analysis, determine whether the expiry of that measure would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of injury.” Para. 7.330. “Thus, in an expiry review, the analysis is focused on what would happen if an existing Antidumping measure were removed.” Para. 7.331. “Although Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement does not require that injury be determined in accordance with Article 3 in expiry reviews, as noted above, Article 11.3 does impose certain discipline on investigating authorities in the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury.” Para. 7.333. “Therefore, we consider that in order for China to demonstrate a violation of Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement, it must show that the European Union's likelihood of injury determination does not rest on sufficient factual basis allowing the Commission to draw a reasoned and adequate conclusion. In our view, a failure to examine relevant factors set out in the substantive provisions of Article 3 in the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury could preclude an investigating authority from reaching a “reasoned conclusion”, which would result in a violation of Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement. However, we recall that a determination of injury under Article 3 is not required under Article 11.3. Thus, we do not consider that all factors relevant to an injury determination under Article 3 are necessarily relevant to a determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury under Article 11.3.” (notas de rodapé deletadas)

c) “Vício em apuração de dano realizada com base no Artigo 3 e eventual contaminação de nova apuração efetuada com base no Artigo 11.3”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Union - Antidumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China (EU - Footwear), Demandante: China, WT/DS405/R, para. 7.337 Se uma autoridade realiza uma determinação de dano com fulcro no Artigo 3 do Acordo Antidumping, e, em posterior apuração, efetuada em novo processo de revisão, determina a probabilidade de continuação ou reincidência de dano com apoio na determinação inicial, o vício presente nesta contamina aquela. Com efeito, o painel consignou que:

Para. 7.337. “We recognize that dumping and injury are distinct concepts, and that the findings of dumping and injury are different in nature. Nevertheless, we consider that, a similar result should be reached with respect to the effect of reliance on an inconsistent determination of injury in the context of an expiry review with respect to the determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury as has been reached in the dumping context. That is, in our view, if in the course of an expiry review, an investigating authority makes a determination of injury that is inconsistent with Article 3,

and relies on that injury determination in making its determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury, the inconsistency with Article 3 taints the likelihood determination, because by relying upon the inconsistent determination of injury the investigating authority fails to make a likelihood determination based on a “sufficient factual basis” allowing it to draw “reasoned and adequate conclusions” concerning the likelihood of injury. We see no basis in the text of Article 11.3 that would support the conclusion that a different conclusion should be reached in this regard in the context of determinations of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of injury than in the context of determinations of continuation or recurrence of likelihood of dumping.”

d) “Desnecessidade de determinação de margens individuais para todos os exportadores e produtores conhecidos em todos os casos”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Shrimp From Viet Nam (US - Shrimp), Demandante: Viet Nam, WT/DS404/R, para. 7.167 Por se cuidar de tópico repetido, vide análise no item “Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo. 11.1”.

e) “A utilização de margens de dumping calculadas em investigações anteriores como base para a revisão lastreada no Artigo 11.3”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews (US - Zeroing) (Japan), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS322/RW, paras. 7.228-7.229 O aproveitamento de margens de dumping, verificadas na investigação original, em novo procedimento de revisão, deve ocorrer à luz das circunstâncias deste novo procedimento, conforme asseverado pelo Painel da controvérsia US - Zeroing (Japan) (Artigo 21.5). Para. 7.228. “Having reached this conclusion, there is no need for the Panel to determine whether certain of the margins relied upon in the 1999 sunset review were WTO-consistent. We do not disagree with the United States' argument that United States - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review supports the notion that it can rely on previously calculated dumping margins that were not challenged by Japan in the original proceedings. However, the previously calculated margins can be relied upon only in the context of a new determination. United States - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review does not require the Panel to accept a simple assertion that the 1999 sunset review may be justified on the basis of previously calculated margins.” Para. 7.229. “Therefore, we conclude that the United States has failed to comply with the DSB recommendations and rulings with respect to the 1999 sunset review, and that the violation of Article 11.3 of the AD Agreement continues.”

f) “Impugnação de determinação preliminar de probabilidade de dumping – prematuridade” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”) (US - Zeroing)(EC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS294/AB/RW, paras. 373-375 No caso US - Zeroing (EC)(Artigo 21.5), o Órgão de Apelação considerou que o questionamento, por parte das CE, de uma decisão preliminar do USDOC, no sentido de probabilidade de dumping, era precipitado, dada a natureza provisória de tal decisão. Com efeito, o Órgão de Apelação deixou assentado que: Para. 373. “We observe that, in its preliminary likelihood-of-dumping determination in Case 3, the USDOC stated that it “preliminarily determines that revocation of the antidumping duty order on [stainless steel bar] from Germany is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping” at specified margins, and invited interested parties to submit comments on the preliminary results within

certain deadlines. The USDOC also explained that it would “issue a notice of final results of this sunset review, which will include the results of its analysis of issues raised in any [comments submitted by the interested parties], no later than September 29, 2007.” Para. 374. “In US - Continued Zeroing, the Appellate Body found that the European Communities' challenge of a preliminary determination of likelihood of dumping in a sunset review was premature, considering that such preliminary results could be modified by the final results. The Appellate Body reasoned that, due to the preliminary nature of the USDOC's determination, it failed to see how the European Communities could establish that “the USDOC would have relied on the margin calculated with zeroing in deciding to continue the duty.” Para. 375. “In our view, the evidence before the Panel in these compliance proceedings regarding the sunset review determination in Case 3 does not warrant a conclusion different from the one reached by the Appellate Body in US - Continued Zeroing. In view of the preliminary nature of the determination by the USDOC in Case 3, we consider that the European Communities' challenge of the USDOC's preliminary determination was premature. Therefore, we find that the Panel did not err in finding, in paragraph 8.140 of the Panel Report, that the European Communities has not demonstrated that the United States failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in respect of the sunset review in Case 3.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

g) “Sunset Review” nos EUA Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”) (US - Zeroing)(EC), Demandante: CE, WT/DS294/AB/RW, para. 377 Nos EUA, uma “sunset review” deve passar tanto pelo USDOC (United States Department of Commerce) como pela USITC (United States International Trade Commission), como observado pelo Painel no contencioso US - Zeroing (EC)(Artigo 21.5). Para. 377. “We observe that, while the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determinations should be consistent with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, a sunset review is not completed in the United States until both the USDOC and the USITC have made likelihood-of-dumping and likelihood-of-injury determinations.”

h) “Emendas à decisão em “sunset review” efetuadas após o estabelecimento de Painel - possibilidade de análise desde que ditas emendas não alterem a natureza da decisão emendada”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: CE, WT/DS294/AB/RW, paras. 382-385 O Órgão de Apelação, em US - Zeroing (EC)(Artigo 21.5), explicitou que é possível a análise de emendas à decisão em “sunset review” tomada após a criação de Painel, observada a condição de que as mesmas não mudem a essência da decisão objeto das emendas. Para. 382. “Finally, we consider the Panel's findings with respect to the third subcategory of sunset determinations, which includes Case 19. We recall that, in Case 19, both the USDOC and the USITC had made their respective final likelihood-of-dumping and likelihood-of-injury determinations by the time the Panel was established. However, the USDOC issued a continuation order on 12 October 2007, after the Panel was established on 25 September 2007.” Para. 383. “We recall that, in Chile - Price Band System, the Appellate Body found that a panel could examine amendments to a measure that post-dated its establishment, provided they did not change the

essence of the measure at issue. In the present case, we observe that, even if the continuation order post-dated the establishment of the Panel, it was issued only a few days after this date and does not change the essence of the determinations under this sunset review. We consider that the continuation order is relevant in judging compliance by the United States with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. We also observe that, at the time the Panel was established, both determinations required by Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement in a sunset review had been made and, therefore, considering that both determinations were affirmative, the sunset review would result in a continuation order by operation of law in the United States' Antidumping system.” Para. 384. “We are of the view that the Panel should have considered that this sunset review resulted in a continuation order in its evaluation of whether it affected compliance by the United States with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in this particular sunset review. Thus, we disagree with the Panel that the fact that the proceedings had not been formally concluded in Case 19 prevented it from considering the effects of the sunset review on the implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings by the United States.” Para. 385. “We therefore reverse the Panel's findings, in paragraph 8.140 the Panel Report, that any failure by the United States in the sunset review in Case 19 had not yet materialized as of the date of establishment of the Panel and thus had no effect on the United States' implementation of the DSB's recommendations and rulings and that, as a consequence, the European Communities has not demonstrated that the United States failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

i) “Margens de dumping aferidas por meio da técnica do “zeroing” em procedimentos

anteriores – inadmissibilidade de emprego destas margens em “sunset review”” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”) (US - Zeroing), Demandante: CE, WT/DS294/AB/RW, para. 396 As autoridades, em procedimentos de “sunset review”, não podem se valer de margens de dumping calculadas em investigações originais mediante “zeroing”, posto que a irregularidade, presente no procedimento inicial, macula a decisão tomada no procedimento posterior. Assim, o Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - Zeroing (EC) (Artigo 21.5), entendeu: Para. 396. “Based on the Panel's findings and on undisputed evidence in the Panel record, we have reached the conclusion that, in the likelihood-of-dumping determinations in the sunset reviews in Cases 19, 28, 29, 30, and 31, the USDOC relied on margins of dumping calculated using zeroing in previous administrative reviews and original investigations. We, therefore, conclude that, because the likelihood-of-dumping determinations in these sunset reviews relied on margins of dumping calculated inconsistently with the Antidumping Agreement, they are inconsistent with Article 11.3 of that Agreement and undermine compliance by the United States.”

j) “Provas coligidas em outro processo - admissibilidade das mesmas em processo posterior, atendida a autonomia dos novos julgadores”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: CE, WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 190 Em US - Continued Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação aceitou o argumento de que é possível a apresentação de provas produzidas em outro feito. Todavia, os novos julgadores não estão obrigados a dar a mesma apreciação concedida às referidas provas no julgamento anterior. Para. 190. “(…) Factual findings made in prior disputes do not determine facts in another dispute. Evidence adduced in one proceeding, and admissions made in respect of the same factual question

about the operation of an aspect of municipal law, may be submitted as evidence in another proceeding. The finders of fact are of course obliged to make their own determination afresh and on the basis of all the evidence before them. But if the critical evidence is the same and the factual question about the operation of domestic law is the same, it is likely that the finder of facts would reach similar findings in the two proceedings. Nonetheless, the factual findings adopted by the DSB in prior cases regarding the existence of the zeroing methodology, as a rule or norm, are not binding in another dispute. In themselves, they do not establish that zeroing was used in all the successive proceedings in each of the 18 cases listed in the European Communities' panel request.”

k) “Complementação, pelo Órgão de Apelação, de análise feita por Painel - postura cautelosa do Órgão de Apelação”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology (US - Continued Zeroing), Demandante: CE, WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 195 Em US - Continued Zeroing, o Órgão de Apelação expressamente aduziu que estava adotando uma atitude cautelosa ao proceder à análise de tema que um Painel deveria ter abordado. Para. 195. “We recognize the important limitation on our ability to complete the analysis. We have accordingly adopted, for the purpose of this dispute, a cautious approach. Thus, only where the Panel has made clear findings of fact concerning the use of the zeroing methodology, without interruption, in different types of proceedings over an extended period of time, have we considered these findings sufficient for us to complete the analysis and to make findings regarding the continued application of zeroing in these cases. By contrast, we have not completed the analysis where the factual findings are absent in respect of the use of the zeroing methodology in each of the successive proceedings whereby the duties are maintained, or where there are insufficient factual findings to indicate that zeroing has been repeatedly applied. In such circumstances, an examination of the facts, as well as a determination as to what conclusions may be drawn from the remaining evidence in the record, would be more appropriately conducted by a panel, with the assistance of the parties.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)

l) “Mudanças nas circunstâncias financeiras de uma empresa, bem como na situação

econômica global de um país exportador” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods), Demandante: México, WT/DS282/R, para. 7.79 Mudanças nas circunstâncias financeiras de uma empresa, bem como na situação econômica global de um país exportador, são detalhes que devem levados em consideração na decisão acerca de continuação ou reincidência de dano, conforme obtemperou o Painel do caso US - OCTG AD Measures: Para. 7.79. “(...) In our view, information regarding changes in the financial circumstances of a company previously found to have been dumping, and changes in the overall economic situation of the exporting country, would appear to be relevant to whether the inference relied upon by USDOC is reasonable. This is particularly true where, as here, intervening reviews had resulted in findings of zero dumping margins. Thus, in our view, consideration of such evidence is necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 11.3. USDOC did not do so in this case.” (nota de rodapé suprimida)

m) “Desnecessidade de nexo causal entre dumping provável e dano provável numa “sunset review”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods), Demandante: México, WT/DS282/AB/R, paras. 123-125 Ao contrário do que sucede numa investigação original, não é preciso haver liame de causa entre dumping provável e dano provável numa “sunset review”, segundo apurou o Painel em US - OCTG AD Measures: Para. 123. “As we stated earlier, in a sunset review determination under Article 11.3, the nexus to be demonstrated is between “the expiry of the duty” on the one hand, and the likelihood of “continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury” on the other hand. We note that Article 11.3, in fact, expressly postulates that, at the time of a sunset review, dumping and injury, or either of them, may have ceased, but that expiration of the duty may be likely to lead to “recurrence of dumping and injury”. Therefore, what is essential for an affirmative determination under Article 11.3 is proof of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury, if the duty expires. The nature and extent of the evidence required for such proof will vary with the facts and circumstances of the case under review. Furthermore, as the Appellate Body has emphasized previously, determinations under Article 11.3 must rest on a “sufficient factual basis” that allows the investigating authority to draw “reasoned and adequate conclusions”. These being the requirements for a sunset review under Article 11.3, we do not see that the requirement of establishing a causal link between likely dumping and likely injury flows into that Article from other provisions of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement. Indeed, adding such a requirement would have the effect of converting the sunset review into an original investigation, which cannot be justified.” Para. 124. “Our conclusion that the establishment of a causal link between likely dumping and likely injury is not required in a sunset review determination does not imply that the causal link between dumping and injury envisaged by Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement is severed in a sunset review. It only means that re-establishing such a link is not required, as a matter of legal obligation, in a sunset review.” Para. 125. “For these reasons, we are unable to agree with Mexico that there is a requirement to establish the existence of a causal link between likely dumping and likely injury, as a matter of legal obligation, in a sunset review determination under Article 11.3, and that, therefore, the USITC was required to demonstrate such a link in making its likelihood-of-injury determination in the sunset review at issue in this dispute.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

n) “Análise cumulativa de dano - importações no mercado e competindo entre si” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods), Demandante: México, WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 153 O Órgão de Apelação, em US - OCTG AD Measures, entendeu que as autoridades encarregadas das investigações, caso optem por efetuar uma apuração cumulativa de dano, não estão compelidas pelo Artigo11.3 a perscrutar se as importações concorrem juntas no mercado e em relação de competição umas com as outras, ainda que possa ser necessária dependendo das circunstâncias de cada caso. Para. 153. “This is not to say that it is never necessary for an investigating authority, performing a cumulative analysis of injury caused by imports from all sources, to examine whether imports are “in the market together and competing against each other”. In order to arrive at a reasoned and adequate conclusion, an examination of whether imports are in the market together and competing against each other may, in certain cases, be needed in a likelihood-of-injury determination where an investigating authority chooses to cumulate the imports from several countries. But the need for such an examination flows from the particular facts and circumstances of a given case and not from a legal requirement under Article 11.3.” (nota de rodapé omitida)

o) “Importações e correspondente dano provável - desnecessidade de especificação de prazo”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods), Demandante: México, WT/DS282/AB/R, para. 166 As autoridades encarregadas de uma investigação antidumping, fundada no Artigo 11.3, não estão obrigadas a especificar o prazo no qual a “presença simultânea” de importações e o respectivo dano provável sucederia, caso a probabilidade da recorrência do dano se baseie em provas factuais suficientes. Neste sentido, o Órgão de Apelação alegou o seguinte: Para. 166. On its face, Article 11.3 does not establish a requirement for an investigating authority to specify the time-frame within which the “simultaneous presence” of subject imports and the corresponding likely injury would occur. As the Appellate Body found in US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews, “the mere fact that the timeframe of an injury analysis is not presented in a sunset review determination is not sufficient to undermine that determination.” The Appellate Body noted in that case that a determination of likelihood-of-injury “can be properly reasoned and rest on a sufficient factual basis even though the timeframe for the [likelihood-of-injury] determination is not explicitly mentioned.” As long as a likelihood-of-injury determination rests on a sufficient factual basis, the mere fact that an investigating authority does not specify the time-frame within which the “simultaneous presence” of subject imports and the corresponding injury would be likely to occur, does not, in our view, undermine that determination. Therefore, we do not agree with Mexico that the USITC's likelihood-of-injury determination is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement because the USITC did not indicate the time period that it considered to be applicable for its likelihood-of-injury determination.” (notas de rodapé retiradas)

p) “Grande número de “sunset reviews” - análise probatória deficiente de Painel” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) from Mexico (US - Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods), Demandante: México, WT/DS282/AB/R, paras. 194, 202-203 e 210-211 Em US - OCTG AD Measures, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Painel fez uma apuração insatisfatória do elevado número de “sunset reviews” objeto do litígio, fato que prejudicou o julgamento pelo Órgão de Apelação, no tocante à matéria fática. Para. 194. “We begin our analysis with the text of the SPB in issue in this dispute. Section II.A.3 of the SPB provides:

II. Sunset Reviews in Antidumping Proceedings A. Determination of Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

(...) 3. Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

(...) [T]he Department normally will determine that revocation of an antidumping order or termination of a suspended dumping investigation is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping where (a) dumping continued at any level above de minimis after the issuance of the order or the suspension agreement, as applicable; (b) imports of the subject merchandise ceased after issuance of the order or the suspension agreement, as applicable; or (c) dumping was eliminated after the issuance of the order or the suspension agreement, as applicable, and import volumes for the subject merchandise declined significantly.

The Department recognizes that, in the context of a sunset review of a suspended investigation, the data relevant to the criteria under paragraphs (a) through (c), above, may not be conclusive with respect to likelihood. Therefore, the Department may be more likely to entertain good cause arguments under paragraph II.C in a sunset review of a suspended investigation.

Para. 202. “Keeping these considerations in mind, we turn to a review of the “qualitative assessment” of the USDOC determinations by the Panel as contained in paragraphs 7.53 to 7.63 of the Panel Report. We agree with the Panel that “[t]he fact that in each of 232 of the sunset review determinations put before us in evidence, USDOC made an affirmative determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping is not sufficient in itself to demonstrate that the scenarios set out in the SPB are determinative or conclusive.” Para. 203. “In paragraph 7.53 of the Panel Report, the Panel considered 206 sunset reviews that were “expedited” because “foreign respondent parties either did not participate at all, or did not fully participate in the proceedings”. These constituted the bulk of the 232 cases in which the USDOC made affirmative determinations. The Panel reviewed “a sampling” of these 206 cases and stated that, “in each of those we considered, USDOC's final affirmative determination (...) was based on one of the three affirmative scenarios.” The Panel Report does not reveal the size of the sample, which individual determinations it reviewed, which of the factual scenarios were involved, or whether other factors ought to have been taken into account in any of them. More importantly, the Panel merely speculated that “there may well have been other facts that might [have been] relevant or probative [in these 206 cases], but they were not before USDOC, and thus were not addressed.” Therefore, even in respect of the “sampling” of cases that the Panel reviewed, the Panel Report does not reveal whether the USDOC excluded or disregarded evidence or factors that might have outweighed the probative value of the factual scenarios of the SPB. Nor does the Panel's analysis indicate whether, in those cases, the USDOC wrongly relied on one of the scenarios in the SPB, despite the evidence before it. It is quite possible that a number of these 206 cases were cases where the dumping had continued for the entire life of the Antidumping duty order or for a substantial period after the issuance of the order. In such cases, unless the respondent interested parties had adduced evidence to show that the dumping would not continue or recur, the USDOC could well have had reason to make an affirmative determination. We simply do not know. In respect of these 206 cases, the Panel Report does not reveal that the USDOC's affirmative determinations, although based on one of the factual scenarios, were made in disregard or to the exclusion of other factors because of the SPB.” Para. 210. “For these reasons, we find that, in assessing the consistency of the SPB, as such, with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, the Panel failed to make an objective assessment of the matter, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case, as required by Article 11 of the DSU. Accordingly, we reverse the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.64 and 8.1 of the Panel Report, that Section II.A.3 of the SPB, as such, is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 211. “Having reached this conclusion, we do not address the Panel's statement, in paragraph 6.28 of the Panel Report, that Mexico had established a prima facie case that the SPB, as such, is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement. As a result of our reversal of the Panel's finding that Section II.A.3 of the SPB, as such, is inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, that statement is moot and of no legal effect.” (notas de rodapé removidas)

q) “Aplicação de certos critérios, com base em legislação doméstica, na investigação de probabilidade de dano em detrimento de demais critérios - possibilidade de ofensa ao Artigo 11.3”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, paras. 208-209

Em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, discutiu-se se, em estipulando uma legislação doméstica para a aplicação de certos critérios, em prejuízo de outros, quando da apuração de probabilidade de dano, haveria violação ao Artigo 11.3. O Órgão de Apelação sinalizou no sentido de que, para tanto, deveria ficar provado que a aplicação dos critérios previstos na lei interna é mecânica/automática, em casos concretos, desconsiderando-se, assim, outros critérios importantes na investigação de uma “sunset review”. Para. 208. “(…) The importance of the two underlying factors (import volumes and dumping margins) for a likelihood-of-dumping determination cannot be questioned; however, our concern here is with the possible mechanistic application of the three scenarios based on these factors, such that other factors that may be of equal importance are disregarded.” Para. 209. “In our view, therefore, in order to objectively assess, as required by Article 11 of the DSU, whether the three factual scenarios of Section II.A.3 of the SPB are regarded as determinative/conclusive, it is essential to examine concrete examples of cases where the likelihood determination of continuation or recurrence of dumping was based solely on one of the scenarios of Section II.A.3 of the SPB, even though the probative value of other factors might have outweighed that of the identified scenario. Such an examination requires a qualitative assessment of the likelihood determinations in individual cases.”

r) “Investigação em “sunset review” - uso de presunções – inadmissibilidade”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, paras. 224, 227-229 e 234 Em uma investigação, em “sunset review”, o Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, posicionou-se no sentido de que o emprego de presunções é intolerável, desrespeitando, assim, o Artigo 11.3. Para. 224. “Before the Panel, Argentina argued that Article 11.3 requires investigating authorities to assume an “active role in sunset reviews” and “to gather and evaluate relevant facts”. Because the waiver provisions under United States law - both affirmative and deemed waivers - prevent the USDOC from engaging in this “substantive review”, Argentina claimed, they are inconsistent, as such, with Article 11.3. In addressing this claim, the Panel found it useful to analyze separately the case of deemed waivers from that of affirmative waivers.” Para. 227. “The Panel found that, where a respondent files an incomplete submission, these two provisions of United States law, taken together - namely, Section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Section 351.218(d)(2)(iii) of the USDOC Regulations - require the USDOC to make an affirmative determination of likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping, as to that respondent, without “taking into consideration, in [that] determination (...), the facts submitted by that exporter (or any other facts before it that might be relevant to its determination), and [without] receiving, much less considering, any other facts relevant to this question”. In the case where a respondent files no submission at all, the Panel found that these United States provisions direct the USDOC to make an affirmative likelihood-of-dumping determination as to that respondent solely on the basis that the respondent filed no submission, without consideration of other evidence on record. Both of these “deemed waiver” situations, according to the Panel, are inconsistent with the obligation in Article 11.3 for an investigating authority to arrive at a likelihood determination “supported by reasoned and adequate conclusions based on the facts before an investigating authority”.” Para. 228. “As to affirmative waivers, the Panel observed that under Section 751(c)(4)(B) of the Tariff Act of 1930, the USDOC must make an affirmative likelihood determination when a respondent declares its intention not to participate in a sunset review. The Panel was of the view that an investigating authority “can not simply assume, without further inquiry, that dumping is likely to

continue or recur because the exporter chose not to participate in the review.” Accordingly, the Panel concluded, with respect to affirmative waivers, as it did with respect to deemed waivers, that Section 751(c)(4)(B) is inconsistent with Article 11.3.” Para. 229. “Finally, the Panel addressed the relevance of the fact that the USDOC's likelihood-of-dumping determinations are made on an “order-wide” rather than “company-specific” basis. The United States argued that, where respondents have waived the right to participate, the USDOC makes company-specific determinations only as a first step in its analysis, but that the ultimate likelihood-of-dumping determination, made as a second step, is on an order-wide basis. The order-wide determination is based on all the evidence in the record. As a result, the United States claimed, “the waiver provisions do not violate Article 11.3 of the Agreement because they do not determine, in and of themselves, the final outcome of a sunset review; they only determine the outcome of the first step.” The Panel disagreed, finding that, “[t]o the extent that the order-wide determination of likelihood is based in whole or in part upon a company-specific determination that was improperly established”, the order-wide determination cannot satisfy the requirements of Article 11.3 that the determination “be supported by reasoned and adequate conclusions based on the facts before the investigating authority”.” Para. 234. “We agree with the Panel's analysis of the impact of the waiver provisions on order-wide determinations. Because the waiver provisions require the USDOC to arrive at affirmative company-specific determinations without regard to any evidence on record, these determinations are merely assumptions made by the agency, rather than findings supported by evidence. The United States contends that respondents waiving the right to participate in a sunset review do so “intentionally”, with full knowledge that, as a result of their failure to submit evidence, the evidence placed on the record by the domestic industry is likely to result in an unfavourable determination on an order-wide basis. In these circumstances, we see no fault in making an unfavourable order-wide determination by taking into account evidence provided by the domestic industry in support thereof. However, the USDOC also takes into account, in such circumstances, statutorily-mandated assumptions. Thus, even assuming that the USDOC takes into account the totality of record evidence in making its order-wide determination, it is clear that, as a result of the operation of the waiver provisions, certain order-wide likelihood determinations made by the USDOC will be based, at least in part, on statutorily-mandated assumptions about a company's likelihood of dumping. In our view, this result is inconsistent with the obligation of an investigating authority under Article 11.3 to “arrive at a reasoned conclusion” on the basis of “positive evidence”.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

s) “Investigação antidumping cumulativa em “sunset review” – permissibilidade”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, paras. 297 e 300 O Órgão de Apelação entendeu, em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, que o Acordo Antidumping permite que, em investigações antidumping, diante de originais ou revisões, seja realizada a análise cumulativa das importações, para fins de determinação de dano, ou seja, podem ser realizadas na fase de “sunset reviews”. Para. 297. “Therefore, notwithstanding the differences between original investigations and sunset reviews, cumulation remains a useful tool for investigating authorities in both inquiries to ensure that all sources of injury and their cumulative impact on the domestic industry are taken into account in an investigating authority's determination as to whether to impose - or continue to impose - Antidumping duties on products from those sources. Given the rationale for cumulation - a rationale that we consider applies to original investigations as well as to sunset reviews - we are of the view that it would be anomalous for Members to have limited authorization for cumulation in the Antidumping Agreement to original investigations.”

Para. 300. “(…) Given the express intention of Members to permit cumulation in injury determinations in original investigations, and given the rationale behind cumulation in injury determinations, we do not read the Antidumping Agreement as prohibiting cumulation in sunset reviews.”

t) “Artigo 3.3 do Acordo Antidumping - incidência tão-somente em investigações originais” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, paras. 301-302 As condições do Artigo 3.3 do Acordo Antidumping, que trata de investigações antidumping simultâneas, fica adstrito a investigações originais, não sendo aplicado no caso de “sunset reviews”, consoante o que foi explicado pelo Órgão de Apelação em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (isto não significa, contudo, que investigações simultâneas sejam vedadas em “sunset reviews”, como será abordado mais adiante): Para. 301. “Turning to Argentina's argument that the prerequisites specified in Article 3.3(a) and (b) should be satisfied by investigating authorities when performing cumulative analyses in sunset reviews, we note that Argentina offers no textual support for its claim. Indeed, as we observed above, the opening text of Article 3.3 plainly limits its applicability to original investigations.” Para. 302. “(…) As the Appellate Body has observed, a sunset review determination under Article 11.3 must be based on a “rigorous examination” leading to a “reasoned conclusion”. Such a determination must be supported by “positive evidence” and a “sufficient factual basis”. These requirements govern all aspects of an investigating authority's likelihood determination, including the decision to resort to cumulation of the effects of likely dumped imports. As a result, Argentina's concerns that investigating authorities will be given “carte blanche” to resort to cumulation when making likelihood-of-injury determinations is unfounded. We, therefore, conclude that the conditions of Article 3.3 do not apply to likelihood-of-injury determinations in sunset reviews.” (notas de rodapé suprimidas)

u) “Não é função do Painel ou do Órgão de Apelação substituir a análise das autoridades

antidumping acerca dos fatos” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 322 Embora possam os demandantes questionar que as autoridades não tenham perscrutado de maneira objetiva os fatos e provas, num procedimento ao abrigo do Artigo 11.3, não deve o Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação substituir a avaliação que as autoridades fizeram acerca dos fatos. Tal raciocínio foi seguido pelo Órgão de Apelação em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews nos seguintes termos: Para. 322. “The task of the panel is to assess whether the investigating authorities properly established the facts and evaluated them in an unbiased and objective manner. We agree with the Panel that “[its] task [was] not to perform a de novo review of the information and evidence on the record of the underlying sunset review, nor to substitute [its] judgment for that of the US authorities”. If the panel is satisfied that an investigating authority's determination on continuation or recurrence of dumping or injury rests upon a sufficient factual basis to allow it to draw reasoned and adequate conclusions, it should conclude that the determination at issue is not inconsistent with Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement.” (74)

v) “Incidência da expressão “muito provavelmente” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, para. 333 A expressão “muito provavelmente”, inserida no Artigo 11.3, deve ser aplicada na investigação antidumping como um todo, segundo asseverou o Órgão de Apelação em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews: Para. 333. “(…) the “likelihood” standard set out in Article 11.3 applies to a likelihood-of-injury determination as a whole, not to each and every factor that the investigating authority considers in the course of its analysis.”

w) “As provas colhidas não precisam enunciar certeza absoluta”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/R, paras. 340-341 O Órgão de Apelação, em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, sustentou que, numa “sunset review”, as provas coligidas não têm de revestir o julgador de certeza absoluta. No fundo, tais provas contêm certa dose de especulação, já que o contexto das determinações do Artigo 11.3 é de provas prospectivas por natureza. Para. 340. “We observe that most of the arguments put forward by Argentina on appeal with respect to the application by the USITC of the standard of likelihood is centred on the premise that some of the factors presented by the USITC are speculative. In particular, Argentina seems to assume that positive evidence requires absolute certainty on what is likely to occur in the future. We have some difficulty with this line of reasoning.” Para. 341. “The requirements of “positive evidence” must, however, be seen in the context that the determinations to be made under Article 11.3 are prospective in nature and that they involve a “forward-looking analysis”. Such an analysis may inevitably entail assumptions about or projections into the future. Unavoidably, therefore, the inferences drawn from the evidence in the record will be, to a certain extent, speculative.” (nota de rodapé retirada)

x) “Conclusões específicas para empresas e peso dessas conclusões na determinação de uma medida antidumping”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, para. 268 Em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), discutiu-se se as investigações direcionadas especificamente à empresas seriam decisivas na imposição de uma medida antidumping. Na controvérsia em apreço, as autoridades norte-americanas, quando da conclusão das investigações acerca de uma empresa, deveriam se basear em uma declaração do exportador de que ele provavelmente praticaria dumping se a determinação de dumping fosse revogada ou a investigação concluída. Para. 268. “In sum, on the basis of the evidence on the Panel record, we are not persuaded that the amended waiver provisions preclude the USDOC from making a reasoned determination with a sufficient factual basis, as required by Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement. Under the amended waiver provisions, a company-specific finding is not based on an assumption but, rather, on

a statement by the waiving exporter indicating that it is likely to dump if the order were revoked or the investigation terminated. Moreover, the amended waiver provisions do not preclude the USDOC from considering other evidence on the record of the sunset review. Indeed, under Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement, the USDOC would have to consider any other evidence on the record, and assess the statement of waiver in the light of that other evidence, before making the order-wide determination. If it failed to do so, it would not exercise the degree of diligence required of investigating authorities, nor could it make a reasoned determination with a sufficient factual basis, as required by Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement.”

y) “Novas provas relativas ao período de uma “sunset review” para os fins de implementação das recomendações do DSB”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, paras. 167-168 e 175 O Órgão de Apelação, em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), afirmou que as autoridades que conduzem uma investigação antidumping podem produzir novas provas afetas ao lapso temporal de uma “sunset review” anterior, com a finalidade de levar a cabo as recomendações feitas pelo DSB. Para. 167. “Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement does not refer to the steps that an investigating authority may take to implement DSB recommendations and rulings or to the collection of evidence at that stage. Article 11.4 states that the provisions of Article 6 of the Antidumping Agreement regarding evidence and procedure are applicable to sunset reviews. Article 6 contains several provisions relating to the collection of evidence, including several time periods. However, like Articles 11.3 and 11.4, Article 6 does not specifically refer to the collection of evidence for purposes of implementing DSB recommendations and rulings. Therefore, we do not consider that Articles 11.3 and 11.4 address the specific question of whether an investigating authority can develop a new evidentiary basis when implementing DSB recommendations and rulings.” Para. 168. “Neither do Articles 11.3 and 11.4 provide a basis for drawing a distinction between allowing an investigating authority to clarify information, or provide further explanations, on the one hand, and to develop a new factual basis, on the other hand.” Para. 175. “In the light of the above, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.60 and 8.1(b) of the Panel Report, that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the Antidumping Agreement “by developing a new factual basis pertaining to the original review period for purposes of its Section 129 Determination”. Furthermore, we do not find error in the Panel's consideration of certain provisions of the DSU as appropriate context and, therefore, reject Argentina's claim that the Panel did not make an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU.” (nota de rodapé omitida)

z) “Sunset review” inconsistente com o Artigo 11.3 do Acordo Antidumping - “questões

sistêmicas” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, para. 174 Quando da fase de execução das medidas emanadas do DSB, em virtude de uma “sunset review” que afrontou o Artigo 11.3 do Acordo Antidumping, há problemas que ainda não foram deslindados, seja por um Painel, seja pelo Órgão de Apelação. Tais problemas foram denominados pelo Órgão de Apelação de “questões sistêmicas”. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu, no caso US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), que:

Para. 174. “Before concluding, we note that the implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings in cases where a sunset review was found to be inconsistent with Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the Antidumping Agreement raises systemic questions. For example, on what basis may an Antidumping duty order be maintained after a sunset determination has been found to be inconsistent with Article 11.3 or 11.4 of the Antidumping Agreement? (75) These questions do not fall within the scope of the issue appealed by Argentina that the USDOC was precluded from developing a new evidentiary basis in the Section 129 Determination. Therefore, we do not address them further in this appeal.”

a1) “Inaplicabilidade dos padrões probatórios no tocante às investigações originais iniciadas

pelas autoridades (Artigo 5.6 do Acordo Antidumping às “sunset reviews”)” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, paras. 7.27-7.38 Caso as autoridades domésticas resolvam iniciar uma revisão de investigação antidumping, os padrões em relação às provas, descritos no Artigo 5.6 do Acordo Antidumping, não incidem numa “sunset review”, consoante explanado pelo Painel na controvérsia US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review: Para. 7.27. “We also note that the text of Article 11.3 does not contain any cross-reference to the evidentiary rules relating to initiation of investigations contained in Article 5.6 of the Antidumping Agreement. Therefore, Article 11.3 itself does not explicitly provide that the evidentiary standard of Article 5.6 (or any other evidentiary standard) is applicable to sunset reviews. Although paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 11 contain several cross-references to other articles in the Antidumping Agreement, no such cross-reference has been made in the text of Article 11 to Article 5.6. These cross-references (as well as other cross-references in the Antidumping Agreement, such as, for example, in Article 12.3) indicate that, when the drafters intended to make a particular provision also applicable in a different context, they did so explicitly. Therefore, their failure to include a cross-reference in the text of Article 11.3, or, for that matter, in any other paragraph of Article 11, to Article 5.6 (or vice versa) demonstrates that they did not intend to make the evidentiary standards of Article 5.6 applicable to sunset reviews.” Para. 7.38. “If original investigations and reviews existed for the same purposes and served the same functions, it would appear to us illogical that the same obligations did not apply to both processes. However, as we have already indicated supra, para. 7.8, original investigations and reviews are different processes which serve distinct purposes. These considerations underlie, and are apparent in, the text of the Antidumping Agreement. It is therefore unsurprising to us that the textual obligations applicable to the two are not identical. The Appellate Body, in US - Carbon Steel, acknowledged the differences between original investigations and sunset reviews, recognizing that they are “distinct processes” with “different purposes”. The qualitative differences between the two processes may explain the differences in the specific WTO obligations that apply to each of them.” (76)

b1) “Não-incidência do padrão de minimis, previsto no Artigo 5.8, às “sunset reviews”” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, para. 7.71 Em US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, o Painel manifestou que o percentual de 2%, insculpido no Artigo 5.8, não precisa ser seguido em “sunset reviews”. Na hipótese, o padrão de minimis da legislação norte-americana era inferior, qual seja, de 0,5%. Para. 7.71. “Furthermore, although paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 11 contain several cross-references to other articles of the Antidumping Agreement, no such cross-reference has been made to Article 5.8.

We consider the existence of these cross-references in Article 11 to indicate that when the drafters intended to have certain provisions in a given article of the Antidumping Agreement also apply in different contexts, they did so in a clear manner. Therefore, the absence of a cross-reference that would make the de minimis standard of Article 5.8 also applicable to sunset reviews is a further indication that the drafters did not intend to make that standard applicable to sunset reviews.”

c1) “Condições para que possa ser prorrogada uma determinação de medida antidumping” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/AB/R, para. 104 Regra geral, uma medida antidumping deve ser extinta em até cinco anos após a sua aplicação. Entretanto, o Artigo 11.3 do Acordo Antidumping permite a extensão desta medida, desde que atendidas três condições mencionadas pelo Órgão de Apelação em US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review: Para. 104. “[F]irst, that a review be initiated before the expiry of five years from the date of the imposition of the duty; second, that in the review the authorities determine that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping; and third, that in the review the authorities determine that the expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of injury. If any one of these conditions is not satisfied, the duty must be terminated”. (destaque no original) (nota de rodapé omitida)

d1) “Dumping do Artigo 11.3 – mesmo significado de dumping do Artigo 2.1” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/AB/R, para. 126 Por informar todo o Acordo Antidumping, o conceito de dumping, tal como referido no Artigo 2.1, deve ser aplicado ao Artigo 11.3, conforme salientou o Órgão de Apelação em US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review: Para. 126. “However, as we have already observed, the opening words of Article 2.1 (“[f]or the purpose of this Agreement”) go beyond a cross-reference and indicate that Article 2.1 applies to the entire Antidumping Agreement. By virtue of these words, the word “dumping” as used in Article 11.3 has the meaning described in Article 2.1. We do not read the Panel Report as suggesting otherwise.” (notas de rodapé omitidas)

e1) “Sunset review” – desnecessidade de determinação específica para empresas Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/AB/R, para. 150 No procedimento de “sunset review”, as autoridades não estão obrigadas a fazer as suas determinações de probabilidade de retomada de dumping para cada empresa, segundo entendimento do Órgão de Apelação em US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review. Para. 150. “The United States argues that the meaning of the word “duty” in Article 11.3 is explained in Article 9.2 of the Antidumping Agreement, which “makes clear that the definitive duty is imposed on a product-specific (i.e., order-wide) basis, not a company-specific basis.” As the United States points out, Article 9.2 refers to the imposition of “an Antidumping duty ... in respect of any product”,

rather than the imposition of a duty in respect of individual exporters or producers. We agree that this reference in Article 9.2 informs the interpretation of Article 11.3. We also note that Article 9.2 allows investigating authorities, in imposing a duty in respect of a product, to “name the supplier or suppliers of the product concerned” or, in certain circumstances, “the supplying country concerned.” This suggests that authorities may use a single order to impose a “duty”, even though the amount of the duty imposed on each exporter or producer may vary. Therefore, Article 9.2 confirms our initial view that Article 11.3 does not require investigating authorities to make their likelihood determination on a company-specific basis.” (77) 5. Artigo 11.4

a) “Novas provas relativas ao período de uma “sunset review” para os fins de implementação das recomendações do DSB”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, paras. 167-168 e 175 O Órgão de Apelação, em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), afirmou que, para fins de implementação de recomendações emanadas do DSB, as autoridades que conduzem uma investigação antidumping podem produzir novas provas afetas ao lapso temporal de uma “sunset review” anterior. Para. 167. “Article 11.3 of the Antidumping Agreement does not refer to the steps that an investigating authority may take to implement DSB recommendations and rulings or to the collection of evidence at that stage. Article 11.4 states that the provisions of Article 6 of the Antidumping Agreement regarding evidence and procedure are applicable to sunset reviews. Article 6 contains several provisions relating to the collection of evidence, including several time periods. However, like Articles 11.3 and 11.4, Article 6 does not specifically refer to the collection of evidence for purposes of implementing DSB recommendations and rulings. Therefore, we do not consider that Articles 11.3 and 11.4 address the specific question of whether an investigating authority can develop a new evidentiary basis when implementing DSB recommendations and rulings.” Para. 168. “Neither do Articles 11.3 and 11.4 provide a basis for drawing a distinction between allowing an investigating authority to clarify information, or provide further explanations, on the one hand, and to develop a new factual basis, on the other hand.” Para. 175. “In the light of the above, we uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraphs 7.60 and 8.1(b) of the Panel Report, that the USDOC did not act inconsistently with the United States' obligations under Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the Antidumping Agreement “by developing a new factual basis pertaining to the original review period for purposes of its Section 129 Determination”. Furthermore, we do not find error in the Panel's consideration of certain provisions of the DSU as appropriate context and, therefore, reject Argentina's claim that the Panel did not make an objective assessment of the matter before it, as required by Article 11 of the DSU.” (nota de rodapé omitida)

b) “Sunset review” inconsistente com o Artigo 11.4 do Acordo Antidumping - “questões sistêmicas”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Reviews of Antidumping Measures on Oil Country Tubular Goods from Argentina (US - Oil Country Tubular Goods Sunset Reviews), Demandante: Argentina, WT/DS268/AB/RW, para. 174 Quando da fase de execução das medidas emanadas do DSB, em virtude de uma “sunset review” que afrontou o Artigo 11.4 do Acordo Antidumping, há problemas que ainda não foram deslindados nem por Painel nem pelo Órgão de Apelação. Tais problemas foram denominados pelo Órgão de Apelação de “questões sistêmicas”. Assim, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu neste caso que:

Para. 174. “Before concluding, we note that the implementation of DSB recommendations and rulings in cases where a sunset review was found to be inconsistent with Articles 11.3 and 11.4 of the Antidumping Agreement raises systemic questions. For example, on what basis may an Antidumping duty order be maintained after a sunset determination has been found to be inconsistent with Article 11.3 or 11.4 of the Antidumping Agreement? (78) These questions do not fall within the scope of the issue appealed by Argentina that the USDOC was precluded from developing a new evidentiary basis in the Section 129 Determination. Therefore, we do not address them further in this appeal.” III. Comentários Os direitos antidumping são permitidos pela legislação da OMC como forma de remediar a indústria doméstica do Membro que sofre os efeitos danosos da prática de dumping. Entretanto, para que esses direitos não passem a exercer uma função meramente protecionista, atrapalhando o livre fluxo de mercadorias, é necessário que se sujeitem a um processo de revisão e duração, que é o escopo do Artigo 11 do Acordo Antidumping. Apesar de introduzir melhorias como a “sunset clause”, o Artigo em apreço não é imune a críticas, como as abaixo reproduzidas:

The lack of procedural requirements in Article 11 of the Agreement has often caused problems of legal certainty to companies from both developed and developing countries. From the outset, a much-needed amendment is one that sets time limits upon administering authorities in which to make a formal decision of whether or not to accept a request of review. (79)

A natureza do Parágrafo 1, como cláusula geral, implica o mesmo servir como vetor para a operacionalização dos demais Parágrafos do Artigo 11, que prevêem formas específicas de revisão dos direitos antidumping. Além do caso EC - Pipe Fittings, a função do Parágrafo 1 como cláusula geral foi também reafirmada nos contenciosos US - DRAMS e US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review. Em razão dessa sua natureza, ao se investigar a jurisprudência do Parágrafo 1, nota-se que é corriqueiro um demandante invocá-lo simultaneamente com outros dispositivos do Acordo Antidumping ou os restantes Parágrafos do Artigo 11. Quando isto ocorreu, para se evitar repetição na transcrição dos julgamentos, optou-se, na maior parte das vezes, por analisar as decisões quando da pesquisa dos outros Parágrafos do Artigo. Por derradeiro, merece destaque a análise conjunta dos Artigos 6.10 e 11.1 no caso US - Shrimp (Viet Nam). Segundo consignado pelo Painel, o método preferencial acolhido pelo Acordo Antidumping foi o da análise da margem de dumping de todos os produtores ou exportadores. Somente quando inviável tal empreitada (“impracticable”), poder-se-á limitar a análise a um número razoável de produtos ou partes interessadas. Sucede que, no caso acima aventado, o Painel entendeu que a delegação vietnamita não questionava a decisão de as autoridades norte-americanas terem considerado a primeira metodologia impraticável, mas sim o fato de o uso repetido da exceção prevista na segunda parte do Artigo 6.10 ter minado os direitos dos exportadores e produtores previstos em outros dispositivos do Acordo Antidumping, os quais são influenciados pelo fato de exportadores ou produtores possuírem margens individuais de dumping (WTO, WT/DS404/R, Parágrafo 7º). Apesar de o Painel ter negado, no ponto ora focado, a interpretação que o Vietnã pretendia fazer prevalecer, o tópico que permanece aberto é o critério a ser definido para se concluir que a análise de todos os exportadores ou produtores, como enunciada na primeira parte do Artigo 6.10, revela-se inviável, permitindo, assim, a incidência da exceção contida na segunda parte do aludido Artigo 6.10.

Embora o melhor critério seja mesmo a averiguação do caso concreto, evitando-se as reduções que respostas apriorísticas possam ocasionar, deve-se entender que o Artigo 11.1 pode servir de auxiliar nessa análise, em virtude de sua natureza de cláusula geral. Aqui vale o mesmo raciocínio para os demais Parágrafos do Artigo 11. Enquanto estes Parágrafos contêm formas específicas de revisão dos direitos antidumping, o Parágrafo 1º atua como princípio/cláusula geral em relação aos mesmos. Assim, embora o melhor critério para a aplicação do Artigo 6.10 seja a análise do caso concreto, o Parágrafo 1º, do Artigo 11, pode servir como guia/princípio na aplicação deste Parágrafo, lembrando que princípios têm alto grau de generalidade. Após a imposição de uma medida antidumping, é possível que ocorra a superveniência de circunstâncias que justifiquem a alteração da medida em questão. Nesta hipótese, o procedimento de revisão é regido pelo Artigo 11.2 do Acordo Antidumping, conhecido na doutrina e na jurisprudência como “changed circumstances review”. Cada país tem autonomia para disciplinar esta revisão da maneira que lhe aprouver, desde que respeitadas as diretrizes do Artigo 11.2. Nos EUA, por exemplo, aquele que tiver interesse pode:

(...) request a “changed circumstances” review at any time. In this case, the ITI must determine within 45 days whether or not to conduct the review. If the ITA decides that there is good cause to conduct the review, the results must be issued within 270 days of initiation, or within 45 days of initiation if all interested parties agree to the outcome of the review”. (80)

Ponto importante, e ainda não esclarecido pela jurisprudência do DSB, diz respeito à possibilidade de as autoridades poderem determinar a revisão ora focada, a partir de margens de dumping calculadas em investigações passadas. Sucede que, o Painel estabelecido para dirimir esta dúvida não entrou no mérito da discussão, tendo, todavia, deixado claro que não estava afirmando que a autoridade norte-americana não se apoiava nestas margens para efetuar as revisões (“we emphasize that we do not make a factual finding that USDOC does not rely on such margins in this context”). Poder-se-ia cogitar se, com esta última assertiva, o Painel não estaria dando um indicativo no sentido da proibição desta prática, fato que, por razão de justiça, deveria concretizar-se em futura manifestação de um órgão julgador da OMC. Na verdade, margens de dumping pretéritas devem ser apenas um dos vários elementos nos quais as autoridades administrativas devem apoiar-se, para levar a cabo a revisão do Artigo 11.2. Entende-se que estas margens de dumping são, sozinhas, insuficientes para uma “changed circumstances review”. A parte interessada, a que faz alusão o Parágrafo 2º do Artigo 11, geralmente, é o exportador ou o importador, o qual deve apresentar motivos que demonstrem a imperiosidade da revisão. Tais razões não se resumem, necessariamente, a fatores adstritos ao volume das exportações. Outras justificativas que diminuem o preço do produto praticado no mercado interno do exportador podem acontecer, como a redução da carga tributária. Assim, exigir da parte interessada, como condição para a revisão, que comprove que as exportações tiveram representatividade afronta o espírito do Artigo 11.2. A jurisprudência do DSB ainda não se manifestou sobre se as autoridades devem executar “changed circumstances reviews” específicas para cada empresa. Apesar disso, vale frisar que a legislação norte-americana - extremamente complexa - permite essas revisões individualizadas (boa parte dos litígios acerca do Artigo 11.2 envolvia os EUA). O “not likely” test, previsto na legislação interna dos EUA, foi tido como incompatível com a letra do Artigo 11.2. Pode-se entender que a análise que o Painel fez do assunto foi abrangente, sinalizando que, em situações análogas, tenderá a se pronunciar da mesma maneira. Nesse sentido, é importante realçar que, na literatura acerca dos julgados de Painéis e do Órgão de Apelação, costuma-se discutir se as decisões deveriam ter uma abordagem casuística ou, ao contrário, serem mais abrangentes, de modo a viabilizar a mesma interpretação em situações parecidas.

Por fim, quando se cuidou do tópico da compatibilidade da exigência de certificação para a abolição da medida antidumping, o Painel aduziu que, por permitir a malha normativa dos EUA outras revisões, sem a referida exigência, não precisaria decidir acerca da eventual ofensa desta condição ao Artigo 11.2. Neste ponto, é útil mencionar que há julgados, no âmbito da OMC, que trilharam idêntico raciocínio na interpretação, embora em outros assuntos que lhes foram submetidos para apreciação. Pode-se, inclusive, asseverar, que se trata de uma decisão política, mas que se revela adequada e de bom senso. O lapso temporal de cinco anos para a extinção de uma medida antidumping, conhecido como “sunset review”, previsto no Artigo 11.3, tem a finalidade de não permitir que uma medida antidumping atue como uma forma indevida de proteção da indústria doméstica. Grosso modo, as autoridades responsáveis pela condução de investigação no âmbito do Acordo Antidumping são provocadas pela indústria nacional, que se vê atingida pelo dumping ao iniciar uma revisão da medida em vigor. Nesta esteira, é válido afirmar que a prorrogação de um direito antidumping, em vigor para além do período de cinco anos depende, muitas vezes, de nova incitação da indústria doméstica. Com efeito, pode-se observar que:

It seems clear (as it did not previously) that in a ‘sunset review’, the domestic industry seeking continuation of a five-year-old order has the burden of persuasion and proof. Under the European Community practice, if no substantial request is received by the Commission, the order will expire without need for any determination by the Commission. Under US practice, initiation of a five-year review by the agencies is required both as to dumping and as to injury, but if no request is received after 90 days, a final determination revoking or terminating the order will be issued. (81)

A jurisprudência ínsita ao Artigo 11.3 demonstra que a prova do sentido ou significado de uma legislação antidumping interna é questão bem complexa. Não raramente, a parte demandante alega que as autoridades que realizam as investigações são tendenciosas na aplicação da sua lei doméstica, prejudicando, assim, os interesses dos exportadores para aquele mercado. Para fins de diretrizes quanto a este tipo de prova, o Órgão de Apelação, em US - Carbon Steel, emitiu o seguinte enunciado:

The party asserting that another party's municipal law, as such, is inconsistent with relevant treaty obligations bears the burden of introducing evidence as to the scope and meaning of such law to substantiate that assertion. Such evidence will typically be produced in the form of the text of the relevant legislation or legal instruments, which may be supported, as appropriate, by evidence of the consistent application of such laws, the pronouncements of domestic courts on the meaning of such laws, the opinions of legal experts and the writings of recognized scholars. The nature and extent of the evidence required to satisfy the burden of proof will vary from case to case. (WTO, WT/DS268/AB/R, par. 157).

Mesmo diante dos vetores de exegese mencionados pelo Órgão de Apelação, em US - Carbon Steel, percebe-se que o peso que se dá a cada prova coligida pode ser, frequentemente, alvo de discórdias. Um Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação pode esposar certo entendimento com arrimo em apenas uma parte da prova apresentada pelo demandante, ignorando ou concedendo pouca credibilidade a outros aspectos do quadro probatório do processo. Nesse sentido, correto o raciocínio do Órgão de Apelação, em US - OCTG Sunset Reviews, quando obtemperou que as provas materializadas num feito não precisam demonstrar certeza absoluta, no contexto de revisões de direitos em vigor, com uma natureza prospectiva de probabilidade de retomada de dumping e dano. Logo, denota-se que as autoridades de investigação, Painéis e o Órgão de Apelação possuem certo grau de discricionariedade ao atribuir valor aos fatos comprovados no processo. Isto, por sinal, já foi reconhecido pelo Órgão de Apelação em EC - Hormones:

(…) the determination of the credibility and weight properly to be ascribed to (that is, the appreciation of) a given piece of evidence is part and parcel of the fact finding process and is, in principle, left to the discretion of a panel as the trier of facts…”. (WTO, WT/DS26/AB/R e WT/DS48/AB/R, par. 132)

Embora os julgadores tenham uma margem de liberdade na aferição das provas, o objetivo último é sempre o alcance da verdade. A reconstrução de todo o iter dos fatos necessários para permitir o deslinde da controvérsia almeja, em síntese, o convencimento. Entretanto, o conceito de verdade absoluta é algo utópico em muitas ocasiões, mesmo em outros campos do conhecimento, distintos do direito. Ademais, esta empreitada de análise do conjunto probatório é carregada de subjetivismo, na medida em que aquele que irá julgar possui a sua própria maneira de apreciar aquilo que lhe é posto na frente. Assim, em razão da relavitização do instituto da verdade, qual poderia ser o critério por meio do qual o julgador poderia se basear para sopesar os fatos objeto das provas? Neste ponto, é útil mencionar o pensamento conjetural, tal como delineado por Miguel Reale. Nessa seara, o fenômeno da reconstrução da verdade basear-se-ia em juízos de plausibilidade, o que se coadunaria com o entendimento do Órgão de Apelação de que as provas não necessitam transmitir aos julgadores um grau de certeza de cem por cento. Com efeito, Reale afirma que “a conjetura, como suposição segundo razões de verossimilhança e plausibilidade, desenvolve-se no plano das idéias, como esquema regulativo, destinado a validamente ordenar o que não se mostra ordenável segundo conceitos, nem demonstrável analitacamente”. (82) Segundo assentado pela jurisprudência do DSB, a análise do Painel ou do Órgão de Apelação não pode fazer às vezes da análise das autoridades domésticas. Isto significa que o Painel ou Órgão de Apelação devem apenas verificar se as autoridades lastrearam suas fundamentações em provas adequadas e razoáveis. Todavia, em termos práticos, isto se revela extremamente espinhoso, mormente porque os demandantes, com frequência, alegam que as referidas autoridades são tendenciosas nas suas apurações. Os EUA, por exemplo, que são, em muitas oportunidades, réus em processos no DSB da OMC, já tiveram a qualidade das suas investigações antidumping questionadas:

Instead the DOC uses a perfunctory approach – it always rules that dumping is likely to recur and (almost) always reports the original investigation’s margin as the likely dumping margin in the event of revocation. This unsophisticated approach certainly calls into question whether the margins reported by the DOC contain any useful information whatsoever for use by the ITC in its material injury decisions”. (83)

Constatação fundamental da jurisprudência acerca do Artigo 11.3 é que, corriqueiramente, o Órgão de Apelação, instado a se posicionar, conclui que está impossibilitado de fazê-lo em virtude de a análise fática realizada pelo Painel ser insuficiente para permitir ao Órgão de Apelação decidir. Saliente-se, que o Órgão de Apelação está adstrito ao que o Painel decidiu em termos fáticos, ou aos fatos incontroversos constantes dos registros do Painel. Some-se a isto, a postura cautelosa que o Órgão de Apelação costuma ter na complementação da análise feita pelos Painéis, quando se entende habilitado para tanto. Além disso, quando há vários casos de “sunset reviews” em um mesmo contencioso, pode ocorrer de o Painel não apurar com profundidade o modo pelo qual as autoridades domésticas sopesaram as circunstâncias das investigações. Todos estes fatores negativos contribuem para dificultar uma decisão final favorável aos demandantes de um contencioso levado ao DSB, minando a credibilidade do sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC.

Nota-se, ainda, que é comum tentar-se, nas controvérsias gravitando em torno do Artigo 11.3, invocar a aplicação de outros Artigos do Acordo Antidumping nas “sunset reviews”. O critério mais utilizado pelos julgadores para solucionar este tópico é o da “cross-reference”, segundo o qual, se o Artigo ou a expressão que se quer seja aplicado(a) não é invocado(a) expressamente pelo Artigo de origem, tende-se a entender que não é hipótese de incidência do dispositivo ou da expressão em “sunset review”. Por fim, o problema da China não ser considerada uma economia de mercado, por muitos países, para fins do Acordo Antidumping. O governo chinês tem trilhado o caminho da liberalização progressiva de seu mercado, sem abrir mão da autonomia política. Em razão disso, empresas internacionais têm enxergado o mercado chinês avidamente. Entretanto, questiona-se o fato de não ser do hábito do governo chinês a manutenção de regras acordadas anteriormente numa mesa de negociação. Entende-se que, considerando-se a opção pela liberalização contínua de seu mercado (e a entrada de Beijing na OMC é indício dessa tendência), a cooperação do governo chinês no fornecimento de informações corretas às autoridades do país onde as investigações antidumping são conduzidas ganha realce. Por conseguinte, pode-se aduzir que:

If a country aspires to enjoy the market economy status, it should not find any difficulty in disclosing the information. And once such participation by the government is secured, the investigating authority should act in an unbiased and objective manner in calculating the dumping margins. Only through such reconfiguring of the roles of the parties, can one anticipate a meaningful application of WTO Antidumping regime to the NME issue. (84)

O Artigo 11.4 prevê a incidência do Artigo 6, que trata da regulação das provas, às diversas espécies de revisão contidas ao longo do Artigo 11. A ideia é a de que os princípios e diretrizes básicas acerca da prova, aplicados nas investigações originais, também atuem em procedimentos onde se reavalia a necessidade da manutenção de uma medida antidumping.

Constatando o órgão julgador (Painel ou o Órgão de Apelação) que uma “sunset review”, prevista no Artigo 11.3, foi realizada de modo incompatível com algum dispositivo do Acordo Amtidumping, as autoridades nacionais não ficam impedidas de produzir novas provas, referentes ao período da “sunset review”, para dar cumprimento às recomendações do DSB. Como a ideia do sistema normativo da OMC é a liberalização progressiva das barreiras comerciais, não faria sentido impossibilitar as autoridades antidumping de se dedicarem à realização de novo conjunto probatório, ainda mais quando foi detectada irregularidade na investigação de origem.

Por fim, no contencioso US - OCTG Sunset Reviews (Artigo 21.5), o Órgão de Apelação deixou em aberto problemas que deverão em algum momento ser enfrentados, por não terem sido objeto desta reclamação, como a aparente contradição entre a determinação de que as revisões do Artigo 11 deverão ser concretizadas de maneira expedita, e de que não poderão, em geral, ultrapassar os doze meses de duração.

Deve-se notar que, enquanto o Artigo 11.4 refere-se a “compromissos de preços”, o Artigo 8 do Acordo Antidumping, cuida de disciplinar os compromissos de preços e emprega a expressão “compromissos sobre preços”.

FOOTNOTES: Footnote 70: KONSTANTINOS, Adamantopoulos; NOTARIS, Diego De. “The Future of the WTO and the Reform of the Anti-Dumping Agreement: a Legal Perspective”, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 24:30, 2000, p. 55-56. Footnote 71: Appellate Body Report, US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 127. Footnote 72: Panel Report, para. 7.259. Footnote 73: Oxford English Dictionary Online: http://dictionary.oed.com. Footnote 74: There are analogies between this description of the panel's task and what the Appellate Body stated in US - Lamb in the context of the application of safeguard measures. In that case, the Appellate Body recalled that the applicable

standard is neither de novo review, nor total deference, but rather the objective assessment of the facts. (Appellate Body Report, US - Lamb, para. 101) The Appellate Body went on to state that “[f]irst, a panel must review whether competent authorities have evaluated all relevant factors, and, second, a panel must review whether the authorities have provided a reasoned and adequate explanation of how the facts support their determination.” (Ibid., para. 103) Footnote 75: This question, in turn, raises other issues, such as: when does a sunset review reach an “outcome” for the purpose of Article 11.3, last sentence; and what is implied by the requirements in Article 11.4 that the review “be carried out expeditiously” and that it “shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation”? Footnote 76: Ibid., para. 87. While an analysis on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the words “investigation” and “review” would also lead us to the conclusion that they are different, we did not deem it necessary in this case to rely on this consideration in light of the clear Appellate Body language, which unequivocally states that investigations and reviews are two distinct proceedings. In this respect, we note that investigations and reviews deal with two different substantive determinations. Article 5.6 requires “sufficient evidence” of dumping, injury and causal link in order to self-initiate an investigation in which dumping, injury and causal link must be established in order to make an affirmative determination. As Article 11.3 sunset reviews deal with determinations of “likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping”, the substantive considerations surrounding initiation would logically also be different. Footnote 77: We have previously held that Article 9.4 is of little relevance for interpreting Articles 2 and 3 of the Antidumping Agreement because “the right to impose Antidumping duties under Article 9 is a consequence of the prior determination of the existence of dumping margins, injury, and a causal link.” (Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5, India), paras. 123-124 (original emphasis), referring to Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen, footnote 30 to para. 62) In contrast, the requirement to terminate an Antidumping duty under Article 11.3 unless investigating authorities make an affirmative likelihood determination in a sunset review is a consequence of the prior imposition of that duty under Article 9. Footnote 78: This question, in turn, raises other issues, such as: when does a sunset review reach an “outcome” for the purpose of Article 11.3, last sentence; and what is implied by the requirements in Article 11.4 that the review “be carried out expeditiously” and that it “shall normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation”? Footnote 79: The argument that Articles 11.1 and 11.2 necessarily require the withholding of imposition of measures and/or the self-initiation of an immediate review is irreconcilable with note 22 of the Antidumping Agreement. Note 22 states that, in cases where Antidumping duties are levied on a retrospective basis, “a finding in the most recent assessment proceeding … that no duty is to be levied shall not by itself require the authorities to terminate the definitive duty”. If this view of Article 11.2 were to prevail, an investigating authority would be obligated under Article 11.2 perpetually to withhold the imposition of measures and/or to continuously assess the situation by repeatedly self-initiating a review, and note 22 would be rendered meaningless as there would never be duties imposed on which to conduct a re-assessment. This confirms our view that, once an investigating authority has established the existence of dumping during a recent past IP, an absence of dumping (assuming arguendo that there is such an absence, however its existence is established) at the time of the imposition does not, in and of itself - and in the absence of a new or changed circumstance not present during the IP - preclude the imposition of a measure or necessarily render a review “warranted” so as to require the self-initiation of a review pursuant to Article 11.2. Brazil does not argue that such a new or changed circumstance arose following the IP, but only that the devaluation had lasting effects”. Footnote 80: JONES, Vivian C. Trade Remedies: A Primer, 2008. Disponível em http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/2054.pdf. Acesso em: 07 de Agosto de 2012. Footnote 81: LOWENFELD, Andreas F. International Economic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2008, pp. 313-14. Footnote 82: REALE, Miguel. Nova fase do direito moderno. São Paulo: Saraiva, segunda ed., 1998, p. 132. Footnote 83: MOORE, Michael O. “Department of Commerce Administration of Antidumping Sunset Reviews: A First Assessment”. Journal of World Trade, Genebra, vol. 36, n. 4, p. 696, 2002. Footnote 84: SOHN, Changho. “Treatment of Non-market Economy Countries under the World Trade Organization Anti-dumping Regime”. Journal of World Trade, vol. 39, n. 4, p. 786, 2005.

Ø Artigo 12 Luciano Inácio de Souza IA. Texto do Artigo em Português

Article 12 Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations

12.1 When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an antidumping investigation pursuant to Article 5, the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such investigation and other interested parties known to the investigating authorities to have an interest therein shall be notified and a public notice shall be given.

12.1.1 A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or otherwise make

available through a separate report (85), adequate information on the following:

(i) the name of the exporting country or countries and the product involved; (ii) the date of initiation of the investigation;

(iii) the basis on which dumping is alleged in the application; (iv) a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based; (v) the address to which representations by interested parties should be directed; (vi) the time-limits allowed to interested parties for making their views known. 12.2 Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative or

negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 8, of the termination of such an undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive antidumping duty. Each such notice shall set forth, or otherwise make available through a separate report, in sufficient detail the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the investigating authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the Member or Members the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and to other interested parties known to have an interest therein.

12.2.1 A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth, or otherwise

make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations for the preliminary determinations on dumping and injury and shall refer to the matters of fact and law which have led to arguments being accepted or rejected. Such a notice or report shall, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information, contain in particular: (i) the names of the suppliers, or when this is impracticable, the supplying

countries involved; (ii) a description of the product which is sufficient for customs purposes; (iii) the margins of dumping established and a full explanation of the reasons for

the methodology used in the establishment and comparison of the export price and the normal value under Article 2;

(iv) considerations relevant to the injury determination as set out in Article 3; (v) the main reasons leading to the determination.

12.2.2 A public notice of conclusion or suspension of an investigation in the case of an affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the acceptance of a price undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition of final measures or the acceptance of a price undertaking, due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information. In particular, the notice or report shall contain the

information described in subparagraph 2.1, as well as the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by the exporters and importers, and the basis for any decision made under subparagraph 10.2 of Article 6.

12.2.3 A public notice of the termination or suspension of an investigation following the

acceptance of an undertaking pursuant to Article 8 shall include, or otherwise make available through a separate report, the non-confidential part of this undertaking.

12.3 The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to the initiation and completion of

reviews pursuant to Article 11 and to decisions under Article 10 to apply duties retroactively. IB. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Artigo 12 Aviso Público e Explicação das Determinações

12.1 Sempre que as autoridades estejam seguras de que há suficientes elementos para justificar o início de uma investigação antidumping de acordo com o disposto no Artigo 5, serão notificados o Membro ou os Membros cujos produtos serão objeto de tal investigação, bem como aquelas partes cujo interesse na ação seja do conhecimento das autoridades investigadores, e será publicado um aviso correspondente.

12.2 O aviso público do início da investigação deverá conter, ou alternativamente tornar acessível

por meio de informe em separado, informação adequada sobre os seguintes pontos:

(a) o nome do país ou países exportadores e o produto em questão; (b) a data do início da investigação; (c) a base da alegação de dumping formulada na petição; (d) resumo dos fatos sobre os quais se baseia a alegação de dano; (e) o endereço a que devem ser dirigidas as representações das partes interessadas; (f) os prazos dentro dos quais as partes interessadas podem dar a conhecer suas opiniões.

12.3 Far-se-á publicar aviso de qualquer determinação, preliminar ou final, positiva ou negativa, de qualquer decisão de aceitar compromissos sobre preços ao abrigo do Artigo 8, do término de tais compromissos e da extinção de direito antidumping definitivo. Cada um de tais avisos informará, ou deles constará por meio de informe em separado, com suficiente pormenor, as determinações e conclusões estabelecidas sobre cada matéria de fato e de direito que se tenha considerado como relevante pelas autoridades investigadoras. Todos esses avisos e informes serão serão encaminhados ao Membro ou Membros cujos produtos tenham sido objeto de determinação ou compromisso e também às outras partes interessadas de cujo interesse se tenha conhecimento.

12.4 (a) Do aviso público sobre a imposição de medidas provisórias, ou do informe em

separado a ele relativo, constarão, com suficiente pormenor, explicações sobre as determinações preliminares acerca do dumping e do dano e referências às matérias de fato e de direito que levaram à aceitação ou à rejeição dos argumentos apresentados. O aviso ou informe, reservado o direito de requerimento de confidencialidade para as informações prestadas, deverá conter em particular:

(i) os nomes dos fornecedores, ou, quando isso for impossível, o dos países envolvidos; (ii) suficiente descrição do produto para fins aduaneiros; (iii) as margens de dumping encontradas e completa explicação das bases da metodologia utilizada para estabelecimento e comparação do preço de exportação com o valor normal conforme o disposto no Artigo 2; (iv) as considerações que se julguem necessárias à determinação do dano, conforme

estabelecido no Artigo 3; (iv) as principais razões em que se baseia a determinação.

(b) O aviso público que informe sobre a conclusão ou a suspensão de uma investigação,

caso se tenha chegado a determinação afirmativa que implique imposição de direitos definitivos ou aceitação de compromisso sobre preço, conterá, ou trará consigo informe em separado que contenha, todas as informações relevantes sobre as matérias de fato e de direito e sobre os motivos que levaram à imposição das medidas definitivas ou à aceitação do compromisso sobre preço, reservado o direito de requerimento de confidencialidade para as informações prestadas. Em especial, o aviso ou informe deverá conter as informações descritas no subparágrafo 4(a), assim como as razões para aceitação ou rejeição dos argumentos pertinentes ou alegações dos exportadores e importadores e a base de toda decisão adotada à luz do disposto no subparágrafo 13 (b) do Artigo 6.

(c) O aviso público que informe sobre o encerramento ou a suspensão de uma

investigação em conseqüência da aceitação de compromisso conforme estabelecido no Artigo 8 deverá conter, ou trará consigo informe em separado que contenha, transcrição da parte não confidencial do compromisso.

12.5 O disposto neste Artigo aplicar-se-á, mutatis mutandis, ao início e ao encerramento das

revisões contempladas no Artigo 11 e às decisões tomadas sob os auspícios do Artigo 10 acerca da aplicação retroativa de direitos.

II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 12 1. Artigo 12.1

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.87 e 8.89 Para. 8.87. “In our view, this provision can most reasonably be read to require notification and public notice once a Member has decided to initiate an investigation. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the public notice to be provided is a “notice of initiation of an investigation”. We can conceive of no logical reason why the AD Agreement would require a Member to publish a notice of the initiation of an investigation before the decision had been taken that such an investigation should be initiated.” Para. 8.89. “(…) Given the function and context of Article 12.1 in the AD Agreement, we interpret this provision as imposing a procedural obligation on the investigating agency to publish a notice and notify interested parties after it has taken a decision that there is sufficient evidence to proceed with an initiation. The Panel is of the view that Article 12.1 is not concerned with the substance of the decision to initiate an investigation, which is dealt with in Article 5.3.” Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 7.132 Para. 7.132. “(…) we consider that the nature of the Article 12.1 notification obligation is such that the investigating authority should make all reasonable efforts to obtain the requisite contact details. Sending a letter with only a very general request for assistance, without specifying the exporters for which contact details are required, does not satisfy the need to make all reasonable efforts.”

b) “Artigo 12.1.1”

(i) Separate report Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, paras. 8.95-8.96 Para. 8.95. “(…) Under Article 12.1.1, it is the “public notice”, and not the Member, that must “make available through a separate report”, certain information. We take this to mean that the public notice must at a minimum refer to a separate report. This conclusion is logical in that the separate report is a substitute for certain elements of the public notice and thus should perform a notice function comparable to that of the public notice itself.” Para. 8.96. “(…) It cannot be said that the separate report was “readily available” to the public, if the public is not informed about where, when and how to have access to this report, leave alone if they were not even publicly informed of its existence (…).”

(ii) Conteúdo Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.87 Para. 7.87. “We recall, however, that Article 12.1.1(iv) merely requires that the notice of initiation contain “a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based” (emphasis added). It does not require a summary of the conclusion of the investigating authority regarding the definition of the relevant domestic industry. Nor does it require a summary of the factors and analysis on which the investigating authority based that conclusion.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping measures on farmed Salmon from Norway (EC - Salmon), Demandante: Noruega, WT/DS337/R, para. 7.830 Para. 7.830. “(...) In our view, it follows from our finding that there is no violation of Article 12 in the fact that the EC did not provide an explanation of an analysis and determination it was not required to make. The Definitive Regulation sets forth the conclusions of the investigating authority as to the product under consideration. To the extent that Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 require an explanation of aspects of the determination not required by the AD Agreement, we consider that the Definitive Regulation contains an adequate explanation of this aspect of the EC's determination.” 2. Artigo 12.2

a) “Geral” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R, para. 7.544 Para. 7.544. “(…) We consider as a general matter that, where there is a substantive inconsistency with the provisions of the AD Agreement, it is not necessary to consider whether there is a violation of Article 12, as the question of whether the notice is “sufficient” under Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2 is immaterial.” (86)

b) “Comparação entre conteúdo 12.1 e 12.2”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.103 Para. 7.103. “(...) in notices of preliminary and final determinations, pursuant to Articles 12.2 and 12.2.2, the investigating authority is required to set forth findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material, as well as respond to the arguments of parties. That is, a notice of preliminary or final determination must set forth explanations for all material elements of the determination. A notice of initiation, on the other hand, pursuant to Article 12.1, must set forth specific information regarding certain factors, but need not contain explanations of or reasons for the resolution of all questions of fact underlying the determination that there is sufficient evidence to justify initiation.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from Índia (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.260 Para. 6.260. “(…) Moreover, in our view, it would be anomalous to interpret Article 12.2 as also requiring, in addition to the detailed information concerning the decisions of which notice is being given, explanations concerning the initiation of the investigation, of which notice has previously been given under Article 12.1.”

(i) Artigo 12.2.1 Relatório do Painel no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/R, para. 8.120 Para. 8.120. “(...) No such obligation is included in Article 12.2.1, concerning the contents of public notices on the imposition of provisional measures. We consider that Article 12.2.1 constitutes useful context when examining Mexico's claim under Article 6.1. In particular, the fact that there is no requirement for investigating authorities to include time-limits for the submission of evidence in the public notice of their preliminary determinations confirms the conclusion set forth in the preceding paragraph.”

(ii) Artigo 12.2.2 Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from Índia (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.260 Para. 6.260. “(...) We do not believe that Article 12.2.2 requires a Member to explain, in the notice of final determination, aspects of its decision to initiate the investigation in the first place.” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS219/R, para. 7.424 Para. 7.424. “(…) Nevertheless, the phrase “have led to”, implies those matters on which a factual or legal determination must necessarily be made in connection with the decision to impose a definitive antidumping duty. While it would certainly be desirable for an investigating authority to set out steps it has taken with a view to exploring possibilities of constructive remedies, such exploration is not a matter on which a factual or legal determination must necessarily be made since, at most, it might lead to the imposition of remedies other than antidumping duties. We believe that contextual considerations also support this interpretation since, the only matters referred to “in particular” in subparagraph 12.2.2 are, in addition to the information described in subparagraph 2.1, the reasons for acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or claims, and the basis for certain decisions.”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from China (EC - Fasteners), Demandante: China, WT/DS397/R, para. 7.547 Para. 7.547. “It is clear to us that the obligations with respect to explanation of determinations are not limited only to determinations that are unfavourable to a particular interested party or group of interested parties. On the other hand, however, it is also clear to us that the nature and content of the explanation given may well differ depending on the nature of the determination or decision in question. We do not exclude that, in a situation where a relevant provision establishes detailed requirements for factual criteria that must be satisfied in order to justify a particular decision, an explanation that the party in question satisfied the relevant criteria may be sufficient under Article 12.2.2.” III. Comentários Nada a comentar. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 110: Where authorities provide information and explanations under the provisions of this Article in a separate report, they shall ensure that such report is readily available to the public. Footnote 111: Original footnote: Panel Report, EC– Bed Linen, para. 6.259

Ø Artigo 13 IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 13 Judicial Review

Each Member whose national legislation contains provisions on antidumping measures shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews of determinations within the meaning of Article 11. Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the authorities responsible for the determination or review in question. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 13 Revisão Judicial

Todo Membro cuja legislação nacional contenha disposições sobre medidas antidumping deverá manter tribunais arbitrais, administrativos ou ligados ao judiciário, ou, ainda, prever procecimentos com vistas a, inter alia, realizar pronta revisão das medidas administrativas relativas às determinações finais e às revisões das determinações, de acordo com o dispositivo no Artigo 11. Esses tribunais ou os procedimentos mencionados deverão ser independentes das autoridades responsáveis pelas determinações ou revisões aludidas.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução Nada a comentar. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 13 O Artigo 13 não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

Ø Artigo 14 IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 14 Antidumping Action on Behalf of a Third Country

14.1 An application for antidumping action on behalf of a third country shall be made by the authorities of the third country requesting action.

14.2 Such an application shall be supported by price information to show that the imports are

being dumped and by detailed information to show that the alleged dumping is causing injury to the domestic industry concerned in the third country. The government of the third country shall afford all assistance to the authorities of the importing country to obtain any further information which the latter may require.

14.3 In considering such an application, the authorities of the importing country shall consider the

effects of the alleged dumping on the industry concerned as a whole in the third country; that is to say, the injury shall not be assessed in relation only to the effect of the alleged dumping on the industry’s exports to the importing country or even on the industry’s total exports.

14.4 The decision whether or not to proceed with a case shall rest with the importing country. If

the importing country decides that it is prepared to take action, the initiation of the approach to the Council for Trade in Goods seeking its approval for such action shall rest with the importing country.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 14 Medidas Antidumping em Nome de Terceiro País

14.1 Petição para adoção de medidas antidumping em nome de terceiro país será apresentada pelas autoridades do terceiro país que solicite a adoção de tais medidas.

14.2 Essa petição deverá ser substanciada por informações sobre preços que permitam demonstrar

que a importações estão-se realizando a preços de dumping e por informações pormenorizadas que demonstrem que o dumping alegado está causando dano à indústria nacional respectiva no terceiro país. O Governo do terceiro país deverá oferecer toda assistência às autoridades do país importador para que obtenha quaisquer informações adicionais que este último requeira.

14.3 As autoridades do país importador, ao analisar petição dessa natureza, deverão levar em

consideração os efeitos do alegado dumping sobre a indústria em apreço como um todo no território do terceiro país; isso significa que o dano não deverá ser avaliado apenas em relação ao efeito do aleado dumping sobre as exportações da produção destinadas ao país importador, nem tampouco em relação às exportações totais do produto.

14.4 A decisão sobre dar ou não andamento ao caso é de responsabilidade do país importador. Se

este decide que está disposto a tomar semelhantes medidas, competirá a ele a iniciativa de dirigir-se ao Conselho para o Comércio de Bens para obter-lhe a aprovação.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução Nada a comentar. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 14 O Artigo 14 não foi objeto de análise pelo DSB da OMC.

Ø Artigo 15 Rubens Romero IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 15 Developing Country Members

It is recognized that special regard must be given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing country Members when considering the application of antidumping measures under this Agreement. Possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before applying antidumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing country Members. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 15 Países em Desenvolvimento Membros

Fica aqui reconhecido que os países Membros desenvolvidos deverão dar especial atenção à particular situação dos países em desenvolvimento Membros no tratamento da aplicação de medidas antidumping ao abrigo deste Acordo. As possibilidades de soluções construtivas previstas neste Acordo deverão ser exploradas antes da aplicação de direitos antidumping sempre que estes afetem interesses essenciais dos países em desenvolvimento Membros. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução Nada a observar. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 15 1. Geral Sobre o entendimento geral a respeito do Artigo 15 do Acordo Antidumping, a Conferência Ministerial reconhece o seu caráter mandatório, e dispõe que as modalidades para a sua adoção conferem esclarecimento à sua aplicação.

“Paragraph 7.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001 on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns states that the Ministerial Conference “recognizes that, while Article 15 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 is a mandatory provision, the modalities for its application would benefit from clarification. Accordingly, the Committee on Antidumping Practices is instructed, through its working group on Implementation, to examine this issue and to draw up appropriate recommendations within twelve months on how to operationalize this provision.” 2. Extensão da obrigação dos Membros Relatório do Painel no caso  United States - Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.110 Em US - Steel Plate, o Painel entendeu que a letra do Artigo 15 é ampla, e não possui indicações legais específicas sobre a ação esperada para o seu efetivo cumprimento. A primeira frase do Artigo 15 não estabelece nenhuma obrigação específica ou geral aos PDs, em relação a qualquer ação específica que se refira ao status de PEDs. O Artigo apenas requer que as autoridades dos países explorem possibilidades de ações construtivas e não requer nenhum resultado particular.

Para. 7.110. “In US - Steel Plate, in a decision not reviewed by the Appellate Body, the Panel considered that there are no specific legal requirements for specific action in the first sentence of Article 15 and that, therefore, “Members cannot be expected to comply with an obligation whose parameters are entirely undefined”. According to the Panel, “the first sentence of Article 15 imposes no specific or general obligation on Members to undertake any particular action”. (112) (113) 3. Quando e para quem deveria ser concedida uma “atenção especial”

Neste caso, o Painel analisou a questão de quando e para quais Membros dever-se-ia conceder uma atenção especial. Entendeu que a atenção especial deverá ser concedida aos Membros em desenvolvimento, e não às empresas que exerçam suas atividades em PEDs. Com efeito, deverá ser analisado o caso concreto. O Painel também se pronunciou a respeito do momento de oferecimento de atenção especial. Concluiu que esta deverá ser dada quando da aplicação de medidas antidumping finais, e não durante a fase ou decisão intermediária. Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.111 Para. 7.111. “India’s arguments as to when and to whom this ‘special regard’ must be given disregard the text of Article 15 itself. Thus, the suggestion that special regard must be given throughout the course of the investigation, for instance in deciding whether to apply facts available, ignores that Article 15 only requires special regard ‘when considering the application of antidumping measures under this Agreement’. In our view, the phrase ‘when considering the application of antidumping measures under this Agreement’ refers to the final decision whether to apply a final measure, and not intermediate decisions concerning such matters as investigative procedures and choices of methodology during the course of the investigation. Finally, India’s argument focuses on the exporter, arguing that special regard must be given in considering aspects of the investigation relevant to developing country exporters involved in the case. However, Article 15 requires that special regard must be given ‘to the special situation of developing country Members’. We do not read this as referring to the situation of companies operating in developing countries. Simply because a company is operating in a developing country does not mean that it somehow shares the ‘special situation’ of the developing country Member.” 4. Segunda sentença do Artigo 15

a) “Remédios construtivos fornecidos pelo acordo”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.112

Neste caso, foi possível analisar o conceito e alcance da expressão “remédios construtivos”. O Painel entendeu serem aqueles utilizados como meio para contrabalançar os efeitos danosos da prática do dumping. Para. 7.112. “Remedy’ is defined as, inter alia, ‘a means of counteracting or removing something undesirable; redress, relief’. (114) ‘Constructive’ is defined as ‘tending to construct or build up something non-material; contributing helpfully, not destructive’. (115) The term ‘constructive remedies’ might consequently be understood as helpful means of counteracting the effect of injurious dumping. However, the term as used in Article 15 is limited to constructive remedies ‘provided for under this Agreement’. (…) In our view, Article 15 refers to ‘remedies’ in respect of injurious dumping.” (116) Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.229

Ainda em relação à interpretação da segunda sentença do Artigo 15, no caso EC - Bed Linen, o Painel entendeu que remédios construtivos podem ser aplicados como formas alternativas para a resolução de uma investigação de dumping e do dano provocado pelo dumping que resulte na aplicação de medidas definitivas. Com efeito, a imposição de um direito menor (lesser duty), ou um acordo de preços, podem ser favoráveis à resolução do dano causado pelo dumping, em lugar da aplicação do montante integral da margem de dumping. O Painel entendeu ainda, que além do direito menor e do acordo de preços, outros “remédios construtivos” podem existir, e apenas não foram considerados porque ações com esses argumentos não foram trazidas para análise. Para. 6.229. “The Agreement provides for the imposition of antidumping duties, either in the full amount of the dumping margin, or desirably, in a lesser amount, or the acceptance of price undertakings, as means of resolving an antidumping investigation resulting in a final affirmative determination of dumping, injury, and causal link. Thus, in our view, imposition of a lesser duty, or a price undertaking would constitute ‘constructive remedies’ within the meaning of Article 15. We come to no conclusions as to what other actions might in addition be considered to constitute ‘constructive remedies’ under Article 15, as none have been proposed to us.” (117)

b) “Poderá ser explorado”

Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.233 Dado o caráter vago da expressão “explorer”, o Painel não chegou a nenhuma conclusão em particular. Entendeu que, à luz do Artigo 15, devem ser exploradas possibilidades de remédios para a solução do problema, como remédios construtivos. Com efeito, as autoridades dos PDs deveriam agir de maneira construtiva, no sentido de explorar as possibilidades de remédios para o alcance de resultados positivos. Nesse contexto, o Painel entendeu que os Membros não possuem a obrigação de propor ou aceitar os remédios construtivos identificados ou propostos, mas de buscar possibilidades de adoção de um remédio construtivo antes da aplicação de medidas que afetariam os interesses essenciais de um PED. Para. 6.233. “In our view, while the exact parameters of the term are difficult to establish, the concept of ‘explore’ clearly does not imply any particular outcome. We recall that Article 15 does not require that ‘constructive remedies’ must be explored, but rather that the ‘possibilities’ of such remedies must be explored, which further suggests that the exploration may conclude that no possibilities exist, or that no constructive remedies are possible, in the particular circumstances of a given case. Taken in its context, however, and in light of the object and purpose of Article 15, we do consider that the ‘exploration’ of possibilities must be actively undertaken by the developed country authorities with a willingness to reach a positive outcome. Thus, in our view, Article 15 imposes no obligation to actually provide or accept any constructive remedy that may be identified and/or offered. (118) It does, however, impose an obligation to actively consider, with an open mind, the possibility of such a remedy prior to imposition of an antidumping measure that would affect the essential interests of a developing country.” (119) Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.238 Em EC - Bed Linen, o Painel expressou claramente que a passividade não é suficiente para comprovar que um Membro está explorando as possibilidades de remédios construtivos, especialmente quando um Membro em desenvolvimento já tenha demonstrado interesse em um acordo de preços. Meramente rejeitar a oferta de um compromisso de preços, não constitui uma ação que reflita “explorar remédios construtivos”. Para. 6.238. “[p]ure passivity is not sufficient, in our view, to satisfy the obligation to ‘explore’

possibilities of constructive remedies, particularly where the possibility of an undertaking has already been broached by the developing country concerned.” The Panel consequently regarded the failure of a Member “to respond in some fashion other than bare rejection particularly once the desire to offer undertakings had been communicated to it” as a failure to “explore constructive remedies”.” (120) Relatório do Panel no caso United States - Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, para. 7.116 Em US - Steel Plate, os preceitos do direito internacional público, como a “autodeterminação” e a “não intervenção em assuntos internos” foram respeitados. Nesse sentido, reforçou-se o compromisso de respeito e de adequação destes princípios às normas da OMC. Contudo, o Acordo Antidumping não estabelece que os remédios construtivos detêm caráter mandatório. O Painel entendeu que é extremamente desejável que os Membros apliquem a “regra do menor direito”, estabelecida no Artigo 9.1 do Acordo Antidumping, e que esta não é uma regra mandatória. Deixa claro que, na sua opinião, os remédios construtivos são desejáveis, porém não mandatórios. Nesse caso, em particular, embora a Índia tenha alegado que as medidas deveriam ser menos gravosas, a legislação dos EUA não permitiu tal flexibilização. Em consequência, a Índia arcou com o valor do direito antidumping integral. Para. 7.116. “In US - Steel Plate, India had argued that the United States authorities should have considered applying a lesser duty in this case, despite the fact that US law does not provide for application of a lesser duty in any case. The Panel, in a decision not reviewed by the Appellate Body, noted that “consideration and application of a lesser duty is deemed desirable by Article 9.1 of the [Antidumping] Agreement, but is not mandatory.” Therefore, it stated, a Member is not obligated to have the possibility of a lesser duty in its domestic legislation. The Panel concluded that “the second sentence of Article 15 [cannot] be understood to require a Member to consider an action that is not required by the WTO Agreement and is not provided for under its own municipal law.” (121)

c) “antes da aplicação do direito antidumping” Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, paras. 6.231-6.232 Em EC - Bed Linen, o Painel deixa claro que o termo “before applying Antidumping” será interpretado como uma medida aplicada na fase definitiva do processo. Assevera ainda, que todas as vezes em que o termo foi utilizado no Acordo Antidumping, referia-se à medida final do processo. Em contrapartida, a expressão utilizada para medidas antidumping, aplicadas durante o processo de investigação, é conhecida como “provisional measures”, sendo constantemente adotada durante o processo investigativo. Com efeito, medidas provisórias são determinações preliminares e direitos ntidumping são medidas definitivas, aplicadas durante e ao final da investigação. Não obstante essas classificações, o Painel considerou que não é obrigatória a oferta de, ou a adoção de compromissos de preços, ao invés da aplicação de direitos Antidumping provisórios para explorar as possibilidades de remédios construtivos. Para. 6.231. “In our view, [Article 1] implies that the phrase ‘before applying antidumping duties’ (…) means before the application of definitive antidumping measures. Looking at the whole of the AD Agreement, we consider that the term ‘provisional measures’ is consistently used where the intention is to refer to measures imposed before the end of the investigative process. Indeed, in our view, the AD Agreement clearly distinguishes between provisional measures and antidumping duties, which term consistently refers to definitive measures. We find no instance in the Agreement where the term ‘antidumping duties’ is used in a context in which it can reasonably be understood to refer to provisional measures. Thus, in our view, the ordinary meaning of the term ‘antidumping duties’ in Article 15 is clear - it refers to the imposition of definitive antidumping measures at the end of the investigative process.”

Para. 6.232. “Consideration of practical elements reinforces this conclusion. Provisional measures are based on a preliminary determination of dumping, injury, and causal link. While it is certainly permitted, and may be in a foreign producer’s or exporter’s interest to offer or enter into an undertaking at this stage of the proceeding, we do not consider that Article 15 can be understood to require developed country Members to explore the possibilities of price undertakings prior to imposition of provisional measures. In addition to the fact that such exploration may result in delay or distraction from the continuation of the investigation, in some cases, a price undertaking based on the preliminary determination of dumping could be subject to revision in light of the final determination of dumping. However, unlike a provisional duty or security, which must, under Article 10.3, be refunded or released in the event the final dumping margin is lower than the preliminarily calculated margin (as is frequently the case), a ‘provisional’ price undertaking could not be retroactively revised. We do not consider that an interpretation of Article 15 which could, in some cases, have negative effects on the very parties it is intended to benefit, producers and exporters in developing countries, is required.” (122) III. Comentários O Artigo 15 do Acordo Antidumping não contém natureza mandatória, pois versa sobre os aspectos gerais da implementação do direito Antidumping e da especial atenção que deve ser dada aos Membros em desenvolvimento. Com efeito, diante da ausência de clareza com relação às obrigações do Artigo 15, o Painel e o Órgão de Apelação têm interpretando as principais expressões reunidas no Artigo em questão dessa forma, requerendo apenas como obrigação a “exploração de remédios construtivos”. Observam que o Artigo 15 possui uma linguagem operacional, e que a “atenção especial” deve ser direcionada aos PEDs, de acordo com o caso concreto e ao final das investigações. Nesse sentido, os remédios construtivos auxiliam no combate aos efeitos danosos do dumping, na medida em que figuram como um meio voltado à neutralização do dano à imposição de medidas em menor valor, ou os acordos de preços. Embora o espírito da letra do Acordo da OMC possa ser entendido como voltado à aplicação de medidas Antidumping gravosas, como forma de remédio construtivo, o fato é que este entendimento não é mandatório, a não ser que os Membros alcancem esse novo entendimento e/ou elaborem leis internas dispondo sobre a aplicação desses remédios em sua legislação interna. Fica claro, portanto, que o Acordo sobre Implementação do Artigo VI do GATT buscou materializar e diferenciar a aplicação dos direitos antidumping, oferecendo tratamento especial e diferenciado aos PEDs. Dispõe, nesse sentido, que os PDs devem ter essa consciência e flexibilização em relação ao tratamento a ser dado aos PEDs, possibilitando a aplicação prática do Artigo 15 e disponibilizando-se para tal. De fato, o objetivo primordial deste Artigo 15 foi deixar claro a especial atenção que deve ser conferida aos PEDs, levando-se em conta o seu desenvolvimento retardatário e visando um comércio com menos barreiras para as exportações originárias desses países. Configura, portanto, uma típica política internacional de ação afirmativa. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 112: “In this regard, we note the decision of the GATT Panel that considered similar arguments in the EEC-Cotton Yarn dispute. That Panel, in considering Article 13 of the Tokyo Round Agreement, which is substantively identical to it successor, Article 15 of the AD Agreement, stated: “582. (…) The Panel was of the view that Article 13 should be interpreted as a whole. In the view of the Panel, assuming arguendo that an obligation was imposed by the first sentence of Article 13, its wording contained no operative language delineating the extent of the obligation. Such language was only to be found in the second sentence of Article 13 whereby it is stipulated that ‘possibilities of constructive remedies provided for by this Code shall be explored before applying antidumping duties where they would affect the essential interests of developing

countries’.” Panel Report, European Economic Community - Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil (“EEC - Cotton Yarn”), adopted 30 October 1995, BISD42S/17, para. 582 (emphasis added). Footnote 113. Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.110. Uma interpretação similar àquela dada no caso US - Steel Plate foi feita no caso EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, como se pode observar a seguir: Para. 7.78. “We agree with Brazil that there is no requirement for any specific outcome set out in the first sentence of Article 15. We are furthermore of the view that, even assuming that the first sentence of Article 15 imposes a general obligation on Members, it clearly contains no operational language delineating the precise extent or nature of that obligation or requiring a developed country Member to undertake any specific action. The second sentence serves to provide operational indications as to the nature of the specific action required. Fulfilment of the obligations in the second sentence of Article 15 would therefore necessarily, in our view, constitute fulfilment of any general obligation that might arguably be contained in the first sentence. We do not see this as a ‘reduction’ of the first sentence into the second sentence, as suggested to us by Brazil. Rather the second sentence articulates certain operational modalities of the first sentence.” Footnote 114: The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. Footnote 115: Id. Footnote 116: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, para. 6.228. In US - Steel Plate, the Panel agreed with the above conclusions and, applying it in the circumstances of this case, “consider[ed] that the possibility of applying different choices of methodology is not a ‘remedy’ of any sort under the AD Agreement”. Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.112. Footnote 117: A similar view was expressed by the Panel on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.71–7.72. The Panel on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings considered that Article 15 does not impose any obligation to explore undertakings other than price undertakings in the case of developing country Members. Panel Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.78. Footnote 118: “We note that our interpretation of Article 15 in this regard is consistent with that of a GATT Panel which considered the predecessor of that provision, Article 13 of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code, which provision is substantively identical to present Article 15. That Panel found: “The Panel noted that if the application of antidumping measures ‘would affect the essential interests of developing countries’, the obligation that then arose was to explore the ‘possibilities’ of ‘constructive remedies’. It was clear from the words ‘[p]ossibilities’ and ‘explored’ that the investigating authorities were not required to adopt constructive remedies merely because they were proposed.” EC - Cotton Yarn, para. 584 (emphasis added). Footnote 119: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, para. 6.233. See also Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, paras. 7.113-7.115 and Panel Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.72. With respect to the related concept of good faith in general, see Chapter on DSU, Section III.B.1 (vi). Footnote 120: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, para. 6.238. Footnote 121: Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, para. 7.116. Footnote 122: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, paras. 6.231–6.232. Also see Panel Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 7.82.

Ø Artigo 16 Rubens Romero IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 16 Committee on Antidumping Practices

16.1 There is hereby established a Committee on Antidumping Practices (referred to in this Agreement as the “Committee”) composed of representatives from each of the Members. The Committee shall elect its own Chairman and shall meet not less than twice a year and otherwise as envisaged by relevant provisions of this Agreement at the request of any Member. The Committee shall carry out responsibilities as assigned to it under this Agreement or by the Members and it shall afford Members the opportunity of consulting on any matters relating to the operation of the Agreement or the furtherance of its objectives. The WTO Secretariat shall act as the secretariat to the Committee.

16.2 The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies as appropriate. 16.3 In carrying out their functions, the Committee and any subsidiary bodies may consult with and seek information from any source they deem appropriate. However, before the Committee or a subsidiary body seeks such information from a source within the jurisdiction of a Member, it shall inform the Member involved. It shall obtain the consent of the Member and any firm to be consulted. 16.4 Members shall report without delay to the Committee all preliminary or final antidumping actions taken. Such reports shall be available in the Secretariat for inspection by other Members. Members shall also submit, on a semi-annual basis, reports of any antidumping actions taken within the preceding six months. The semi-annual reports shall be submitted on an agreed standard form. 16.5 Each Member shall notify the Committee (a) which of its authorities are competent to initiate

and conduct investigations referred to in Article 5 and (b) its domestic procedures governing the initiation and conduct of such investigations.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 16 Comitê sobre Práticas Antidumping

16.1 Fica aqui estabelecido o Comitê sobre Práticas Antidumping (a partir de agora referido como 'Comitê' neste Acordo) integrado pelos representantes de cada um dos Membros. O Comitê elegerá seu próprio Presidente e deverá reunir-se pelo menos duas vezes por ano e sempre que lhe seja solicitado por qualquer dos Membros, segundo o que está previsto nas disposições pertinentes deste Acordo. O Comitê desempenhará as funções a ele atribuídas pelo presente Acordo ou pelos Membros e deverá propiciar a estes últimos a oportunidade de consulta sobre quaisquer matérias relativas ao funcionamento do Acordo ou à consecução de seus objetivos. Os serviços de secretaria do Comitê serão prestados pelo Secretariado da OMC. 16.2 O Comitê poderá estabelecer os órgãos subsidiários que julgar apropriados. 16.3 No cumprimento de suas funções, o Comitê e qualquer de seus órgãos subsidiários poderá consultar qualquer fonte que julgar apropriada e buscar Informação junto à mesma. O Comitê deverá, porém, antes de buscar informações junto à fonte que se situe dentro da jurisdição de

um Membro, informar o Membro em questão. O Comitê deverá obter prévia autorização do Membro e de qualquer empresa que deseje consultar. 16.4 Os Membros deverão informar sem tardança o Comitê de todas as medidas antidumping preliminares ou finais que tenham tomado. Esses relatórios estarão disponíveis no Secretariado para fins de inspeção por qualquer outro Membro. Os Membros deverão, igualmente, apresentar relatórios semestrais sobre toda medida antidumping tomada nos 6 meses precedentes. Os relatórios semestrais serão apresentados em forma padronizada convencionada. 16.5 Cada Membro devera notificar o Comitê com respeito: a) à identificação de suas autoridades competentes para iniciar e conduzir as investigações a que se refere o Artigo 5; e b) aos procedimentos nacionais que dispõem sobre o início e o andamento de tais investigações. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução No Artigo 16.4, sugere-se a utilização da preposição “ao”, a fim de concordar com o verbo “informar”, adotado, neste caso, na forma indireta. A sentença seria transcrita da seguinte maneira: “Os membros deverão comunicar sem tardança ao Comitê (...).” Ademais, sugere-se que a palavra “tardança” esteja entre vírgulas. No Artigo 16.5, o verbo “devera” deve ser acentuado, pois está sendo conjugado no futuro do presente. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 16 1. Artigo 16.1

a) “Regras procedimentais” Não há casos de Painéis referentes a esse Artigo, os comentários apresentados a seguir se referem-se a documentos adotados pelo Comitê de Práticas Antidumping da OMC, os quais se constituem em Recomendações que embora não tenham a mesma força jurídica que o texto do Acordo, constituem consensos obtidos entre os Membros que tendem a ser implementados e seguidos. G/C/M/10, Seção 1 (ii) – O texto contendo as regras procedimentais adotadas pode ser encontrado em G/ADP/4 e G/L/143 O documento versa sobre as regras procedimentais estabelecidas pelo Artigo 16.1 para o funcionamento do Comitê no acompanhamento da aplicação do Acordo Antidumping. As regras são estabelecidas pelo Acordo Antidumping e discutidas na sua implementação pelo Comitê (integrado por um representante de cada um dos Membros). O item 16.1 dispõe sobre como será feita a escolha do Presidente do Comitê e sobre a agenda de encontros. Entende que as regras procedimentais dispostas no Artigo 16.1 foram estabelecidas em 1996, por ocasião do encontro do Conselho para Comércio e Bens. (123)

b) “deverão encontrar não menos que duas vezes ao ano, ou quando apropriado”

G/L/143, Capítulo I, Artigo 1 O documento estabelece que as reuniões do Comitê deverão ocorrer duas vezes ao ano, podendo, no entanto, ocorrer mais de duas vezes caso seja apropriado. Autoriza qualquer Membro a convocar uma nova reunião do Comitê, caso julgue necessário. (124)

2. Artigo 16.4

a) “informações mínimas, seja sobre medidas antidumping preliminares ou finais, a serem fornecidas sem demora por meio de Relatório”

O Comitê de Práticas Antidumping adotou, em 30 de outubro de 1995, um documento estabelecendo os procedimentos sobre as “informações mínimas” a serem oferecidas nos Relatórios, sejam eles o Relatório de medidas preliminares ou finais, conforme indicado no Artigo 16.4.

b) “Os Relatórios semestrais serão apresentados na forma padronizada convencionada”

G/ADP/M/4, Seção D – O texto sobre o formato e informações a serem adotadas, pode ser encontrado nos Relatórios Semi-anuais Em reunião ocorrida em 30 de outubro de 1995, o Comitê, em atenção às regras estabelecidas no Artigo 16.4, adotou um documento guia dispondo sobre o formato padrão a ser adotado por todos os Membros, assim como sobre as informações a serem fornecidas nos Relatórios semestrais. III. Comentários O Artigo 16 como um todo trata do Comitê sobre práticas antidumping. Estabelece as regras sobre eleição do presidente do órgão, sobre a definição da agenda dos encontros, e sobre os procedimentos formais a serem padronizados. Apesar de estarem previstas reuniões anuais e relatórios semestrais, qualquer Membro poderá pedir reunião extraordinária. Ademais, interpretou-se que o Artigo 16 estabelece que qualquer medida antidumping, adotada por um Membro, deverá ser informada ao Comitê para que este avalie. As medidas poderão ser analisadas tanto pelo Comitê, como por outro Membro, e esse Relatório seguirá a forma padronizada convencionada. Com efeito, conforme as regras procedimentais, deverão haver reuniões não menos do que duas vezes ao ano, ou quando os Membros julgarem apropriado. Os Relatórios sobre as investigações antidumping iniciadas, e sobre as medidas e os direitos antidumping aplicados por um Membro, deverão fornecer informações mínimas estabelecidas pelo Comitê. De forma geral, o Artigo 16, ao iniciar a parte II do Acordo sobre Antidumping, apresenta as características do Comitê de Práticas Antidumping, e lhe atribui a responsabilidade pela parte procedimental. Neste Artigo, estabelecem-se as regras procedimentais e os padrões relativos à forma das informações relacionadas à implementação do Acordo Antidumping. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 123: At its meeting of 22 May 1996, the Council for Trade in Goods approved rules of procedure for the meetings of the Committee on Antidumping Practices (the “Rules of Procedure”). Footnote 124: The Rules of Procedure require that the Committee “shall meet not less than twice a year in regular session, and otherwise as appropriate.”

Ø Artigo 17 Rubens Romero IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 17 Consultation and Dispute Settlement

17.1 Except as otherwise provided herein, the Dispute Settlement Understanding is applicable to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement. 17.2 Each Member shall afford sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, representations made by another Member with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. 17.3 If any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired, or that the achievement of any objective is being impeded, by another Member or Members, it may, with a view to reaching a mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter, request in writing consultations with the Member or Members in question. Each Member shall afford sympathetic consideration to any request from another Member for consultation. 17.4 If the Member that requested consultations considers that the consultations pursuant to paragraph 3 have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and if final action has been taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to levy definitive anti- dumping duties or to accept price undertakings, it may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). When a provisional measure has a significant impact and the Member that requested consultations considers that the measure was taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7, that Member may also refer such matter to the DSB. 17.5 The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to examine the matter

based upon:

(i) a written statement of the Member making the request indicating how a benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this Agreement has been nullified or impaired, or that the achieving of the objectives of the Agreement is being impeded, and

(ii) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member.

17.6 In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 5:

(i) in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a different conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned; (ii) the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.

17.7 Confidential information provided to the panel shall not be disclosed without formal authorization from the person, body or authority providing such information. Where such information is requested from the panel but release of such information by the panel is not authorized, a non-confidential summary of the information, authorized by the person, body or authority providing the information, shall be provided. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 17 Consultas e Solução de Controvérsias

17.1 Salvo disposição em contrário neste Artigo, será aplicado às consultas e à solução de controvérsias no âmbito do presente Acordo o disposto no Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias.

17.2 Todo Membro examinará com boa vontade as representações que lhe sejam dirigidas por outro Membro em relação a qualquer assunto relativo ao funcionamento deste Acordo, bem como oferecerá oportunidades adequadas para consultas sobre tais representações. 17.3 O Membro que considere estar sendo anulada ou prejudicada alguma vantagem que lhe é devida, direta ou indiretamente em virtude do presente Acordo, ou estar sendo comprometida a consecução de qualquer de seus objetivos por outro Membro ou Membros, poderá, com vistas a alcançar solução mutuamente satisfatória sobre o assunto, requerer consultas por escrito com o Membro ou Membros em apreço. Todo Membro examinará com boa vontade qualquer pedido de consultas formulado por outro Membro. 17.4 Se o Membro que requereu consultas considera que as mesmas, segundo o disposto no

parágrafo 3, não alcançaram solução mutuamente satisfatória, e se medidas definitivas tiverem sido tomadas pelas autoridades administrativas do Membro importador no sentido de cobrar direitos antidumping definitivos ou de aceitar compromissos de preços, o Membro poderá elevar o assunto ao órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC). Na hipótese de uma medida provisória ter impacto significativo e de o Membro que tiver solicitado consultas considerar ter sido a medida provisória tomada ao arrepio do disposto no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7, poderá esse Membro elevar o assunto à consideração do OSC.

17.5 O OSC, a pedido da parte reclamante, deverá estabelecer grupo especial para examinar o assunto com base:

(a) em declaração escrita do Membro reclamante, onde se indica como terá sido anulada ou prejudicada vantagem a que tem direito, direta ou indiretamente, ao abrigo do presente Acordo, ou como se está impedindo a consecução dos objetivos do Acordo; e

(b) nos fatos comunicados às autoridades do Membro importador, de conformidade com os procedimentos nacionais apropriados.

17.6 O grupo especial, ao examinar a matéria objeto do parágrafo 5:

(a) ao avaliar os elementos de fato da matéria, determinará se as autoridades terão estabelecido os fatos com propriedade e se sua avaliação dos mesmos foi imparcial e objetiva. Se tal ocorreu, mesmo que o grupo especial tenha eventualmente chegado a conclusão diversa, não se considerará inválida a avaliação;

(b) interpretará as disposições pertinentes do Acordo segundo regras consuetudinárias de

interpretação do direito internacional público. Sempre que o grupo especial conclua que uma disposição pertinente do Acordo admite mais de uma interpretação aceitável,

declarará que as medidas das autoridades estão em conformidade com o Acordo se as mesmas encontram respaldo em uma das interpretações possíveis.

17.7 Informação confidencial fornecida ao grupo especial não poderá ser revelada sem autorização formal da pessoa, órgão ou autoridade que a forneceu. Na hipótese de uma informação dessa natureza ser solicitada ao grupo especial, mas de não ter autorizada sua revelação deverá ser fornecido resumo não-confidencial da informação devidamente autorizado pela pessoa, órgão ou autoridade que a tenha trazido. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução Entendemos que um breve comentário em relação ao Artigo 17.4 deve ser feito. Em primeiro lugar, com relação à expressão “medida provisória”, referente à expressão em inglês “provisional mesure”. Como sabido, existe no Brasil uma espécie normativa chamada “Medida Provisória”, a qual trata da possibilidade de o Poder Executivo exercer sua iniciativa extraparlamentar de iniciar o processo legislativo. Tal espécie é bastante conhecida no Brasil, e pode trazer algum tipo de interpretação errônea. Com efeito, no nosso entender, uma tradução mais clara poderia ser “medidas preliminares”, no sentido de serem medidas temporárias, no sentido de serem medidas temporárias. De fato, ao longo de todo o texto do Acordo Antidumping, o termo “medidas provisórias” é usado, como entendidas no Artigo 7 do Acordo, e são entendidas como medidas preliminares, por serem temporárias. Ainda no Artigo 17.4, a expressão “tomada ao arrepio do disposto no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7”, também merece atenção. A tradução teve o intuito de dizer que as medidas provisórias “contrárias” ao disposto no parágrafo 1 do Artigo 7, poderão ser levadas ao conhecimento do DSB para que este tome conhecimento sobre a matéria. Ademais, a expressão em inglês “matter”, contida no Artigo 17.4, foi traduzida como “assunto”, e especificamente tratada em interpretação do Painel e do Órgão de Apelação. Acreditamos, que a palavra “assunto” não reflete a intensidade do fato, tendo utilizada na tradução a figura de linguagem eufêmica. Sugere-se a substituição pela palavra “problema”. Por fim, no texto em inglês do Artigo 17.6, não há a menção ao “grupo especial”, e o artigo em inglês utiliza a expressão “Panel” em vez da expressão “grupo especial” utilizada no texto em português. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 17 1. Geral

a) “aplicações concorrentes do Artigo 17 no Acordo Antidumping e as regras e procedimentos do DSB”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, para. 58 O Painel entendeu que as disposições do Artigo 17 seriam específicas aos casos antidumping e, portanto, este Artigo poderia ser invocado independente do DSU. Contudo, o Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Cement I seguiu entendimento contrário, rejeitando tal interpretação do Painel. Para. 58. “The Panel reached this conclusion on the basis of two alternative lines of reasoning. Under the first line of reasoning, it found the following:

This interpretation of the provisions of Article 17 provides for a coherent set of rules for dispute settlement specific to Antidumping cases, taking account of the peculiarities of challenges to Antidumping investigations and

determinations, that replaces the more general approach of the DSU. (…) In Antidumping cases, the matter in dispute may not be the final measure in and of itself (or the provisional measure or any price undertaking), but may rather be an action taken, or not taken, during the course of the investigation. (…) (emphasis added) (…) Thus, we read Article 17.4 as a timing provision, establishing when a panel may be requested, rather than a provision setting forth the appropriate subject of a request for establishment of a panel (…).”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, paras. 65-66 O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, entendeu que regras específicas adicionais relativas às consultas e solução de controvérsias estabelecidas em um determinado Acordo devem prevalecer sobre as regras de solução de controvérsias gerais, dispostas no Artigo 1.2 do DSU. Nesse sentido, as regras sobre implementação do Artigo VI são concebidas como regras específicas adicionais ou especiais e, portanto, devem prevalecer sobre a regra geral do DSU. Porém, o Órgão de Apelação, ao dispor que aquelas regras prevalecerão apenas na extensão em que houver diferença entre os dois diplomas, estabelece uma restrição. Com efeito, em não havendo diferenças entre as regras especiais e os procedimentos do DSU, este Acordo será aplicado em conjunto com as regras específicas ao Acordo em questão, especiais sobre consultas e solução de controvérsias. Apenas nos itens em que as disposições não forem complementares, deverá prevalecer o diploma específico, ou seja, caso haja conflito de normas ou violação da outra provisão. Assim, antes de concluir pela prevalência de um Acordo sobre outro, o intérprete deve delinear claramente a diferença, no caso concreto em questão. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, ao contrário da conclusão do Painel, em conjunto as disposições do Acordo Antidumping e do DSU, formam um corpo integrado de regras, e as do primeiro não têm primazia sobre as do segundo. Ademais, segundo o DSU, as medidas e as violações a serem questionadas devem ser identificadas em separado. Para. 65. “Article 1.2 of the DSU provides that the ‘rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding.’ (emphasis added) It states, furthermore, that these special or additional rules and procedures ‘shall prevail’ over the provisions of the DSU ‘[t]o the extent that there is a difference between’ the two sets of provisions (emphasis added) Accordingly, if there is no ‘difference’, then the rules and procedures of the DSU apply together with the special or additional provisions of the covered agreement. In our view, it is only where the provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures of a covered agreement cannot be read as complementing each other that the special or additional provisions are to prevail. A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them. An interpreter must, therefore, identify an inconsistency or a difference between a provision of the DSU and a special or additional provision of a covered agreement before concluding that the latter prevails and that the provision of the DSU does not apply.” Para. 66. “We see the special or additional rules and procedures of a particular covered agreement as fitting together with the generally applicable rules and procedures of the DSU to form a comprehensive, integrated dispute settlement system for the WTO Agreement. The special or additional provisions listed in Appendix 2 of the DSU are designed to deal with the particularities of dispute settlement relating to obligations arising under a specific covered agreement, while Article 1 of the DSU seeks to establish an integrated and comprehensive dispute settlement system for all of the covered agreements of the WTO Agreement as a whole. It is, therefore, only in the specific circumstance where a provision of the DSU and a special or additional provision of another covered agreement are mutually inconsistent that the special or additional provision may be read to prevail over the provision of the DSU.”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, para. 67 O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, entendeu que as disposições específicas constantes no Artigo 17 não irão substituir as disposições gerais do DSU, e sim complementá-las no que for necessário ao caso concreto. Entendeu, ademais, que reconhecer a suposta substituição das provisões de natureza integrada do DSU, por normas específicas, seria uma afronta negatória ao sistema de solução de controvérsias preconizado no Artigo 1.1 do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC. Com efeito, o entendimento em vários outros casos, interpretados ora pelo Painel ora pelo Órgão de Apelação, caminha no sentido de que os dois diplomas serão aplicados conjuntamente. No que forem contraditórios, seguir-se-á o disposto no Acordo de Implementação do Artigo VI. Para. 67. “The Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I then found that Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement does not replace the “more general approach of the DSU”. “Clearly, the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of a covered agreement are not meant to replace, as a coherent system of dispute settlement for that agreement, the rules and procedures of the DSU. To read Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement as replacing the DSU system as a whole is to deny the integrated nature of the WTO dispute settlement system established by Article 1.1 of the DSU. To suggest, as the Panel has, that Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement replaces the ‘more general approach of the DSU’ is also to deny the application of the often more detailed provisions of the DSU to antidumping disputes. The Panel’s conclusion is reminiscent of the fragmented dispute settlement mechanisms that characterized the previous GATT 1947 and Tokyo Round agreements; it does not reflect the integrated dispute settlement system established in the WTO.” (126)

b)“Desafios contra legislações Antidumping” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 62

Ainda no litígio US - 1916 Act, restava a dúvida se a solução de controvérsias estabelecida no Acordo Antidumping versava apenas sobre temas relativos ao Acordo Antidumping e aplicação de medidas antidumping, ou se aquele sistema seria utilizado em outros casos não relativos a dumping. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação dispôs que cada sistema versará sobre as matérias próprias do litígio. Com efeito, as controvérias relacionadas a dumping deverão fazer uso do sistema e de regras estabelecidas no Acordo Antidumping. Para. 62. “Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement addresses dispute settlement under that Agreement. Just as Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 create a legal basis for claims in disputes relating to provisions of the GATT 1994, so also Article 17 establishes the basis for dispute settlement claims relating to provisions of the Antidumping Agreement. In the same way that Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 allows a WTO Member to challenge legislation as such, Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement is properly to be regarded as allowing a challenge to legislation as such, unless this possibility is excluded. No such express exclusion is found in Article 17 or elsewhere in the Antidumping Agreement.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 64-65 e 68 No caso US - 1916 Act, surgiu a dúvida sobre se a instauração da disputa versaria sobre a aplicação das medidas antidumping, ou se a reclamação a ser apresentada poderia questionar a legislação dos Membros sobre a matéria “as such”. Entendeu-se, que o Artigo 17.1 não distingue uma possibilidade da outra. Em verdade, o Artigo 17.2 deixa claro que as consultas poderão versar sobre qualquer problema que afete as regras do Acordo sobre Antidumping, isto é, o Artigo deixa em aberto as

possibilidades de que a reclamação seja acerca da legislação interna dos Membros, ou seja, sobre as medidas antidumping aplicadas. No entendimento do Órgão de Apelação, poderão sim ser questionadas as legislações dos Membros, exceto se esta prerrogativa for de alguma forma excluída. Para. 64. “In considering whether Article 17 contains an implicit restriction on challenges to Antidumping legislation as such, the Appellate Body, in US - 1916 Act, noted the following: “Article 17.1 refers, without qualification, to ‘the settlement of disputes’ under the Antidumping Agreement. Article 17.1 does not distinguish between disputes relating to Antidumping legislation as such and disputes relating to Antidumping measures taken in the implementation of such legislation. Article 17.1 therefore implies that Members can challenge the consistency of legislation as such with the Antidumping Agreement unless this action is excluded by Article 17.” Para. 65. “Similarly, Article 17.2 of the Antidumping Agreement does not distinguish between disputes relating to antidumping legislation as such and disputes relating to Antidumping measures taken in the implementation of such legislation. On the contrary, it refers to consultations with respect to ‘any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement’.” Para. 68. “Article 17.3 does not explicitly address challenges to legislation as such. (…) Articles XXII and XXIII allow challenges to be brought under the GATT 1994 against legislation as such. Since Article 17.3 is the ‘equivalent provision’ to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, Article 17.3 provides further support for our view that challenges may be brought under the Antidumping Agreement against legislation as such unless such challenges are otherwise excluded.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 74 Com a mesma linha de entendimento, o Órgão de Apelação considera que o Artigo 17.3 pode ser invocado para se questionar as legislações dos Membros “as such”, e expressa que o Artigo 17.4 estabelece condições aos Membros que devem ser cumpridas antes que se possa questionar ações adotadas por uma autoridade de investigação no contexto de uma investigação Antidumping. Não obstante esse fato, o que se procura é a consistência das alegações para que se alcance um resultado satisfatório. Para. 74. “After finding that Article 17.3 supported its view that challenges may be brought under the Antidumping Agreement against legislation as such, unless such challenges are explicitly excluded, the Appellate Body also addressed Article 17.4: “Article 17.4 sets out certain conditions that must exist before a Member can challenge action taken by a national investigating authority in the context of an Antidumping investigation. However, Article 17.4 does not address or affect Member’s right to bring a claim of inconsistency with the Antidumping Agreement against Antidumping legislation as such.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 78-82 Neste caso, o Órgão de Apelação faz conexão entre o Artigo 17, o qual dispõe sobre solução de controvérsias, e o Artigo 18, ambos do Acordo Antidumping, demostrando a clara interligação entre as disposições e a possibilidade de um Membro interpor uma reclamação em face do DSB, para questionar a legislação antidumping dos demais Membros “as such”. Para. 78. “The Appellate Body in US - 1916 Act finally referred to Articles 18.1 and 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement as contextual support for its reading of Article 17 as allowing Members to bring claims against Antidumping legislation as such: “Nothing in Article 18.4 or elsewhere in the AntiDumping Agreement excludes the obligation set out in Article 18.4 from the scope of matters that may be submitted to dispute settlement.”

Para. 79. “If a Member could not bring a claim of inconsistency under the Antidumping Agreement against legislation as such until one of the three Antidumping measures specified in Article 17.4 had been adopted and was also challenged, then examination of the consistency with Article 18.4 of Antidumping legislation as such would be deferred, and the effectiveness of Article 18.4 would be diminished.” Para. 80. “Furthermore, we note that Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement states: No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.” Para. 81. “Article 18.1 contains a prohibition on ‘specific action against dumping’ when such action is not taken in accordance with the provisions of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Antidumping Agreement. Specific action against dumping could take a wide variety of forms. If specific action against dumping is taken in a form other than a form authorized under Article VI of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Antidumping Agreement, such action will violate Article 18.1. We find nothing, however, in Article 18.1 or elsewhere in the Antidumping Agreement, to suggest that the consistency of such action with Article 18.1 may only be challenged when one of the three measures specified in Article 17.4 has been adopted. Indeed, such an interpretation must be wrong since it implies that, if a Member’s legislation provides for a response to dumping that does not consist of one of the three measures listed in Article 17.4, then it would be impossible to test the consistency of that legislation, and of particular responses thereunder, with Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 82. “Therefore, we consider that Articles 18.1 and 18.4 support our conclusion that a Member may challenge the consistency of legislation as such with the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R, para. 7.90 Para. 7.90. “in so far as it requires the consideration of margins based in part on facts available in the calculation of the all others rate”. The Panel further found that, in maintaining this Section following the entry into force of the Antidumping Agreement, the United States had acted inconsistently with Article 18.4 of this Agreement as well as with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement.” (127)(128)

c) “legislação mandatória versus legislação discricionária” (129)

(i) Geral

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 91 O Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - 1916 Act, entendeu que a lei interna dos EUA não era mandatória, e sim discricionária, pois os EUA teriam a prerrogativa de iniciar ou não o caso, com base no Ato de 1916. Ademais, interpretou que, de acordo com o Artigo 16.6 do Acordo Antidumping da Rodada Tóquio, os Membros deveriam confirmar, em suas leis, regulações e procedimentos administrativos, o que foi acordado no Acordo Antidumping da Rodada Tóquio. Para. 91. “The EC also refers to the panel report in EC - Audio Cassettes, which was not adopted. (130) This report stated why the mere fact that the initiation of Antidumping investigations was discretionary would not make the EC legislation non-mandatory.” The panel stated that:

‘[it] did not consider in any event that its task in this case was to determine whether the EC’s Basic Regulation was non-mandatory in the sense that the initiation of investigations and impositions of duties were not mandatory functions. Should panels accept this approach, they would be precluded from

ever reviewing the content of a party’s Antidumping legislation.’ (131) Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/R, para. 6.168 O Painel, em EC - Audio Cassettes, entendeu que o Artigo 16.6 do Acordo Antidumping da Rodada Tóquio dispunha que as partes deveriam adotar as suas leis, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos, em conformidade com as disposições do Acordo Antidumping da Rodada Tóquio. (132) Indicou, que tal entendimento também é encontrado no Artigo 18.4 da OMC. Para. 6.168. “Since we found that Article VI and the WTO Antidumping Agreement are applicable to the 1916 Act, we consider that the reasoning of the panel in the EC - Audio Cassettes case should apply in the present case. Interpreting the provisions of Article 18.4 differently would undermine the obligations contained in that Article and would be contrary to the general principle of useful effect by making all the disciplines of the Antidumping Agreement non-enforceable as soon as a Member would claim that the investigating authority has discretion to initiate or not an Antidumping investigation.” (133) Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 6.53 Neste caso, a República da Coreia entrou com um pedido de revogação de medidas antidumping adotadas pelos EUA, baseado em um certo requerimento de certificado necessário, segundo lei de Antidumping dos EUA. O Painel não julgou a matéria referente à se a exigência de tal certificado seria considerada inconsistente com o Acordo da OMC. Para. 6.53. “We note section 751(b) of the 1930 Tariff Act (as amended) and section 353.25(d) of the DOC’s regulations, whereby an Antidumping order may be revoked on the basis of ‘changed circumstances’. We note that neither of these provisions imposes a certification requirement. In other words, an Antidumping order may be revoked under these provisions absent fulfilment of the section 353.25(a)(2)(iii) certification requirement. We also note that Korea has not challenged the consistency of these provisions with the WTO Agreement. Thus, because of the existence of legislative avenues for Article 11.2 type reviews that do not impose a certification requirement, and which have not been found inconsistent with the WTO Agreement, we are precluded from finding that the section 353.25(a)(2)(iii) certification requirement in and of itself amounts to a mandatory requirement inconsistent with Article 11.2 of the AD Agreement.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Section 129(c)(1) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (US - Section 129(c)(1) URAA), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS221/R, paras. 6.22-6.25 Neste caso, o Painel entendeu que a reclamação do Canadá era bastante similar à anterior dos EUA, e decidiu aguardar a decisão do caso dos EUA, e somente após, com maior propriedade, analisar o litígio proposto pelo Canadá. Para. 6.22. “As concerns Canada's principal claims, we note that Canada in this case is challenging section 129(c)(1) “as such”, that is to say independently of a particular application of section 129(c)(1). It is clear to us that a Member may challenge, and a WTO panel rule against, a statutory provision of another Member “as such” (for example, section 129(c)(1)), provided the statutory provision “mandates” the Member either to take action which is inconsistent with its WTO  obligations (134) or not take action which is required by its WTO obligations. (135) In accordance with the normal WTO rules on the allocation of the burden of proof, it is up to the complaining Member to demonstrate that a challenged measure mandates another Member to take WTO-inconsistent action or not to take action which is required by its WTO obligations.” (136)

Para. 6.23. “In the light of the foregoing, it will be clear that Canada's principal claims will be sustained only if Canada succeeds in establishing that section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to take action which is inconsistent with the WTO provisions which form the basis for those claims or mandates the United States not to take action which is required by those WTO provisions. In other words, for Canada to discharge its burden with respect to its principal claims, it must demonstrate both of two elements: first, that section 129(c)(1) mandates that the United States take or not take the action identified by Canada, and second that this mandated behaviour is inconsistent with the WTO provisions that it has invoked.” Para. 6.24. “We consider that the issue of whether section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to take certain action or not to take certain action is distinct from the issue of whether such behaviour would be inconsistent with the WTO provisions relied on by Canada. As a result, those two issues appear to us to be capable of independent examination.” Para. 6.25. “We think that we need not address both of the aforementioned issues if we find that Canada has failed to meet its burden with respect to either one of them. As for the sequence in which we will address those issues, we find it appropriate, in the circumstances of this case, to analyse first whether section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to take specified action or not to take specified action.” (137)

(ii) rejeição da distinção? Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, paras. 87-89 No caso US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, o entendimento do Painel gerou uma quebra de paradigma. No entanto, embora tenha considerado não ser da sua competência discutir sobre artigo, cuja regra não detém caráter mandatório, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que é possível sim interpor uma reclamação com base em regra não mandatória, alegando, no caso, tratar-se de norma mandatória. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Painel e o Órgão de Apelação detêm a prerrogativa de dizer se a regra é mandatória ou não. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 18.4 do Acordo de Implementação do Artigo VI do GATT estabelece que todas as medidas necessárias, gerais ou particulares, deverão ser tomadas para assegurar que as leis, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos estejam em conformidade com as obrigação dispostas no Acordo Antidumping. Assim, interpretou o Artigo 18.4, ampliando o direito dos Membros de invocar todas as regras possíveis para submeter tal matéria à solução de controvérsias, modificando, portanto, a interpretação anterior, a qual diferenciava o conceito das regras mandatórias do empregado para as regras discricionárias. Entendeu, que nenhum diploma expõe de forma clara o fundamento ou critério de definição para as regras mandatórias e regras discricionárias. Com efeito, diante da inexistência de uma base normativa, os Membros detêm o direito de reclamar sobre qualquer lei, regulamento ou procedimento administrativo que considerem em desconformidade com o GATT ou com o Acordo Antidumping. Ainda no mesmo caso, o Órgão de Apelação concebeu ser direito dos Membros recorrer ao DSB, sendo tal direito mandatório ou não, e que o único preceito a balizar tal direito dos Membros é o princípio da “boa fé”, disposto nos Artigos 3.7 e 3.10 do DSU. Para. 87. “We also believe that the provisions of Article 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement are relevant to the question of the type of measures that may, as such, be submitted to dispute settlement under that Agreement. Article 18.4 contains an explicit obligation for Members to ‘take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character’ to ensure that their ‘laws, regulations and administrative procedures’ are in conformity with the obligations set forth in the Antidumping Agreement. Taken as a whole, the phrase ‘laws, regulations and administrative procedures’ seems to us to encompass the entire body of generally applicable rules, norms and standards adopted by Members in connection with the conduct of Antidumping proceedings. (138) If some of these types of measure could not, as

such, be subject to dispute settlement under the Antidumping Agreement, it would frustrate the obligation of ‘conformity’ set forth in Article 18.4.”

Para. 88. “This analysis leads us to conclude that there is no basis, either in the practice of the GATT and the WTO generally or in the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, for finding that only certain types of measure can, as such, be challenged in dispute settlement proceedings under the Antidumping Agreement. Hence we see no reason for concluding that, in principle, non-mandatory measures cannot be challenged ‘as such’. To the extent that the Panel’s findings in paragraphs 7.145, 7.195, and 7.246 of the Panel Report suggest otherwise, we consider them to be in error.”

Para. 89. “We observe, too, that allowing measures to be the subject of dispute settlement proceedings, whether or not they are of a mandatory character, is consistent with the comprehensive nature of the right of Members to resort to dispute settlement to ‘preserve [their] rights and obligations (…) under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements’. (139) As long as a Member respects the principles set forth in Articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU, namely, to exercise their ‘judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful’ and to engage in dispute settlement in good faith, then that Member is entitled to request a panel to examine measures that the Member considers nullify or impair its benefits. We do not think that panels are obliged, as a preliminary jurisdictional matter, to examine whether the challenged measure is mandatory. This issue is relevant, if at all, only as part of the panel’s assessment of whether the measure is, as such, inconsistent with particular obligations. It is to this issue that we now turn.” (140) Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, para. 93 O Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, teve a oportunidade de mencionar o caso anterior US - 1916 Act, do qual importou a orientação de dividir as normas entre regras discricionárias e regras mandatórias. Em US - 1916 Act, tal distinção não havia sido esclarecida. Ao longo dos seus posicionamentos, o Painel sempre adotou a distinção como técnica balizadora para a interpretação dos casos concretos. O Órgão de Apelação, por sua vez, não havia se pronunciado sobre a questão em nenhum caso anterior e, em caráter inovador, no caso US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, considerou a ferramenta útil para diferenciar as regras mandatórias das regras discricionárias, a partir da análise do caso concreto e da aplicação mecânica do procedimento. Para. 93. “We explained in US - 1916 Act that this analytical tool existed prior to the establishment of the WTO, and that a number of GATT panels had used it as a technique for evaluating claims brought against legislation as such. (141) As the Panel seemed to acknowledge (142), we have not, as yet, been required to pronounce generally upon the continuing relevance or significance of the mandatory/discretionary distinction. (143) Nor do we consider that this appeal calls for us to undertake a comprehensive examination of this distinction. We do, nevertheless, wish to observe that, as with any such analytical tool, the import of the ‘mandatory/ discretionary distinction’ may vary from case to case. For this reason, we also wish to caution against the application of this distinction in a mechanistic fashion.” (144)

d)“Desafios de uma “prática” como tal” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, paras. 7.14-7.15 e 7.23 No caso US - Steel Plate, os EUA argumentaram que, sob o seu ponto de vista, uma prática, por si, não só pode ser questionada em uma reclamação, devendo existir um caso concreto para fundamentá-la. De outra sorte, a Índia defende que uma prática que se torna um costume poderia sim tornar-se por si só uma medida e, portanto, ser passível de contestação. Com efeito, no caso US - Export Restraints

o Canadá reclamou que as práticas utilizadas pelos EUA deveriam ser consideradas medidas violadoras e que poderiam ser questionadas como tal. O Canadá, por seu turno, alegou que tais práticas seguiam sempre uma mesma metodologia, como algo institucional e, nesse sentido, as práticas norte-americanas poderiam ser consideradas um sistema operacional por si só. Por fim, o Painel considerou que as limitações sobre as exportações feitas pelos EUA não podem configurar medidas ilícitas por si só, restando como um sistema operacional. Segundo o Painel, embora o Canadá possa estar correto em suas alegações sobre a prática dos EUA, o fato é que as leis norte-americanas não poderiam ser consideradas ainda parte de um sistema operacional independente, a ponto de violar o sistema da OMC. Em caso similar, US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Japão indagou sobre as práticas gerais seguidas pelas autoridades investigadoras dos EUA referentes à disponibilização de todos os fatos. Novamente, o Painel entendeu que a reclamação do Japão se encontrava fora dos termos de referência, e que tal alegação de prática ilícita não poderia ser feita de modo separado. Para. 7.14. “Second, the United States argues that India's claim regarding US “practice” in the application of total facts available is not properly before the Panel. The United States argues that the “practice” referred to is nothing more than individual instances of the application of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions. The United States notes that, under US law, an agency such as USDOC may depart from established “practice” if it gives a reasoned explanation for doing so. The United States relies on the Panel's decision in United States - Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies for the proposition that its total facts available practice does not have “independent operational status”, i.e., that it is not a “measure.” Consequently, the United States argues, US “practice” cannot be the subject of a claim. Moreover, the United States argues that even if such “practice” could be the subject of a claim, the challenged practice would still not be properly before this Panel, as India did not identify this “practice” in its consultation request. The United States notes that it raised this point in the DSB in response to India's request for the establishment of a Panel. Accordingly, the United States maintains that India's claim fails to conform to Articles 4.7 and 6.2 of the DSU and must be rejected for that reason alone.” Para. 7.15. “India argues that a “practice” becomes a “measure” through repeated similar responses to the same situation, and that therefore the US practice it challenges is properly before the Panel. India asserts that USDOC always applies total facts available in particular factual circumstances, and has done so consistently since 1995. Parties to a USDOC investigation can predict that USDOC will apply this “practice”. In India's view, where such a practice is established over a long period of time, it takes on the character of a measure, because a similar response to similar circumstances can be predicted (or threatened) in the future. India considers that the point at which a pattern of similar conduct takes on the character of a measure is to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. But in India's view, the label of “practice”, as opposed to administrative procedure, regulation or law, coupled with the assertion that it can be changed at any time, does not render the “practice” in question immune to challenge. To accept this possibility would, India asserts, open the door for potential abuse of the obligations imposed by the AD and other WTO Agreements.” Para. 7.23. “In this context, we note particularly the decision of the Panel in US - Export Restraints. In that case, the Panel faced the question whether the measures identified by Canada, including US practice, with respect to the treatment of export restraints as subsidies, required the USDOC to treat export restraints in a certain way. The Panel addressed the question whether the measures identified could give rise to a violation of WTO obligations by considering whether each measure constituted “an instrument with a functional life of its own, i.e., that it would have to do something concrete, independently of any other instruments, for it to be able to give rise independently to a violation of WTO obligations.” In answering this question, the Panel considered the status, under US law, of each measure identified, including the challenged US practice. With respect to that practice, the Panel observed that USDOC could depart from it, so long as it explained its reasons for doing so, and concluded that this fact “prevents such practice from achieving independent operational status in the sense of doing something or requiring some particular action …US “practice” therefore does not appear to have independent operational status such that it could independently give rise to a WTO violation as alleged by Canada”. The challenged practice in this case is, in our view, no different from

that considered in the US - Export Restraints case. It can be departed from so long as a reasoned explanation is given. It therefore lacks independent operational status, as it cannot require USDOC to do something, or refrain from doing something.” 2. Articles 17.1

O Órgão de Apelação, em US - 1916 Act, manifestou-se a respeito da existência ou não de restrição implícita no Acordo Antidumping para o ajuizamento de reclamações.

a) “resolução de controvérsias” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 64 Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, em US - 1916 Act, o Artigo 17.1 do Acordo Antidumping não distingue reclamações relativas à legislação Antidumping daquelas atinentes à medidas Antidumping adotadas na implementação desta lei. O Artigo, contudo, assegura que os Membros podem questionar a consistência da legislação interna com as regras do Acordo Antidumping, a não ser que a ação em questão esteja excluída do previsto no Artigo 17. Para. 64. “Article 17.1 refers, without qualification, to “the settlement of disputes” under the Antidumping Agreement. Article 17.1 does not distinguish between disputes relating to Antidumping legislation as such and disputes relating to Antidumping measures taken in the implementation of such legislation. Article 17.1 therefore implies that Members can challenge the consistency of legislation as such with the Antidumping Agreement unless this action is excluded by Article 17.” 3. Article 17.2

a) “qualquer questão que contrarie disposição deste acordo”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 65 Conforme entendimento do Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 17.2 do Acordo Antidumping não faz distinção entre as controvérsias relativas à legislação Antidumping daquelas relacionadas às medidas adotadas na implementação de tal legislação. Em qualquer um dos casos, as consultas dizem respeito a qualquer questão que afete a implementação desse Acordo. Para. 65. “Similarly, Article 17.2 of the Antidumping Agreement does not distinguish between disputes relating to Antidumping legislation as such and disputes relating to Antidumping measures taken in the implementation of such legislation. On the contrary, it refers to consultations with respect to “any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement”.” 4. Article 17.3

a) “equivalent provision”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Comunidades Europeias, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 66

De acordo com o Órgão de Apelação, em US - 1916 Act, o Artigo 17.3 corresponde à disposição equivalente aos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994. Com efeito, o Artigo 17.3 fornece apoio ao entendimento de que as reclamações sobre dumping, fundadas no Artigo 17.3, podem abarcar questionamentos da legislação, a não ser que esses questionamentos estejam expressamente excluídos.

Para. 66. “Article 17.3 does not explicitly address challenges to legislation as such. (…) Articles XXII and XXIII allow challenges to be brought under the GATT 1994 against legislation as such. Since Article 17.3 is the ‘equivalent provision’ to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, Article 17.3 provides further support for our view that challenges may be brought under the Antidumping Agreement against legislation as such unless such challenges are otherwise excluded.”

b) “Exclusão do Artigo 17.3 do Acordo Antidumping do Apendix 2 do DSB” Relatório do caso Guatemala - Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/R, paras. 64

O Painel, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, aduz que as regras do DSU aplicam-se às consultas e disputas ajuizadas com base no Artigo 17.3 do Acordo Antidumping. Da mesma forma, é considerada equivalente a disposição do Acordo Antidumping aos Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994, os quais servem como base para as consultas e resolução de controvérsias sob o GATT 1994. Para. 64. “The Antidumping Agreement is a covered agreement listed in Appendix 1 of the DSU; the rules and procedures of the DSU, therefore, apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions contained in Article 17 of that Agreement (…) [Article 17.3] is not listed [in Appendix 2 of the DSU,] precisely because it provides the legal basis for consultations to be requested by a complaining Member under the Antidumping Agreement. Indeed, it is the equivalent provision in the Antidumping Agreement to Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, which serve as the basis for consultations and dispute settlement under the GATT 1994, under most of the other agreements in Annex 1A of the (…) WTO Agreement, and under the (…) TRIPS Agreement.” 5. Article 17.4

a) “Geral”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/R, para. 5.27 Os EUA, demandados, alegaram que um reclamação não poderia ter início sob o fundamento de inconsistência da legislação interna em relação ao Acordo Antidumping, se não estivesse fundamentada no Artigo 17.4, o qual estabele 3 (três) possibilidades de medidas em relação às quais se apresentaria uma violação para a instauração de um Painel: (i) a aplicação definitiva de um direito antidumping; (ii) a realização de um compromisso de preços; ou, ainda, (c) a aplicação de uma medida provisória. Mas o Órgão de Apelação, revertendo a conclusão do Painel no caso Guatemala - Cement I, considerou que nem o Artigo 17 do Acordo Antidumping, nem o Artigo VI do GATT, impedem que se examine em uma controvérsia a confirmidade das legislações “as such”. Para. 5.27. “We therefore conclude that Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement does not prevent us from reviewing the conformity of laws as such under the Antidumping Agreement. The same applies, a fortiori, with respect to Article VI of the GATT 1994. In that respect, we consider that the findings of the panel and the Appellate Body in Brazil – Desiccated Coconut referred to by the United States are not applicable to this case, since those findings referred to the non-applicability of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures to existing measures or investigations initiated pursuant to applications made before the entry into force of that Agreement.” (145) Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 55 Os EUA apoiaram o seu argumento nas conclusões do Órgão de Apelação em Guatemala - Cement I, o qual assegurou que o questionamento de dumping apenas seria legítimo se amparado em uma das

três hipóteses de medidas Antidumping contidas no Artigo 17.4. Mas o Painel não considerou que as conclusões desse Relatório impediam a contestação de uma legislação “as such”, mas que apenas, no caso específico analisado, o México não havia identificado em seu pedido de estabelecimento do Painel as medidas que estavam sendo contestadas sob o Artigo 17.4. Para. 55. “[When a Member has] a law which [provides for the imposition of] duties to counteract dumping and, under the Antidumping Agreement, if [another Member wishes] to challenge that law, then [the other Member must] wait until one of the three measures [referred to in Article 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement] is in place.” (144) Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 73-74 Conforme a interpretação do Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 17.4 prevê determinadas condições necessárias para que um Membro inicie uma controvérsia no contexto relativo à implementação do Acordo Antidumping. Não obstante este fato, o Artigo em questão não restringe ou afeta o direito de um Membro propor uma reclamação no mecanismo de solução de controvérsias, questionando a inconsistência da legislação nacional “as such” do outro Membro em relação ao Acordo Antidumping. Assim, no caso em questão, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o US Act de 1916 poderia ser questionado “as such” sob as regras do Artigo VI do GATT e do Acordo Antidumping, mesmo que nenhuma das medidas previstas no Artigo 17.4 tivesse sido adotada. Para. 73. “In the context of dispute settlement proceedings regarding an Antidumping investigation, there is tension between, on the one hand, a complaining Member’s right to seek redress when illegal action affects its economic operators and, on the other hand, the risk that a responding Member may be harassed or its resources squandered if dispute settlement proceedings could be initiated against it in respect of each step, however small, taken in the course of an Antidumping investigation, even before any concrete measure had been adopted. (145) In our view, by limiting the availability of dispute settlement proceedings related to an Antidumping investigation to cases in which a Member’s request for establishment of a panel identifies a definitive Antidumping duty, a price undertaking or a provisional measure (146), Article 17.4 strikes a balance between these competing considerations.”

Para. 74. “Therefore, Article 17.4 sets out certain conditions that must exist before a Member can challenge action taken by a national investigating authority in the context of Antidumping investigation. However, Article 17.4 does not address or affect a Member’s right to bring a claim inconsistency with the Antidumping Agreement against Antidumping legislation as such.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, paras. 75-83 Segundo análise do Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo 17 do Acordo Antidumping possibilita aos Membros intentar reclamações questionando a incoerência entre leis internas e a implementação do Acordo Antidumping da OMC “as such”, consideradas também as obrigações estabelecidas no Artigo 18.4. Este Artigo requer aos Membros a implementação das providências necessárias para adaptar a sua legislação, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos antidumping às normas do Acordo Antidumping, a partir da entrada em vigor da OMC. Adicionalmente, conforme entendeu o Órgão de Apelação, é possível ao Membro apresentar uma reclamação para questionar a consistência da legislação interna de um Membro com as regras do Acordo Antidumping, mesmo se as medidas compatíveis com uma das três medidas antidumping especificadas no Artigo 17.4 não tiverem sido adotadas. Adicionalmente, nenhuma ação contra a prática de dumping nas exportações pode ser adotada se não estiver de acordo com as disposições do GATT 1994, sob pena de violação ao Artigo 18.1. Nesse sentido, qualquer ação contra a prática de dumping deverá ser fundada no Acordo Antidumping, ou no Artigo 18.4, e deverá obrigatoriamente estar amparada em disposições do GATT 1994. As disposições dos Artigos 18.1 e 18.2 endossam a interpretação de que os Membros podem

contestar as legislações dos países “as such” em relação à implementação das regras do Acordo Antidumping. Para. 75. “Moreover, as we have seen above, the GATT and WTO case law firmly establishes that dispute settlement proceedings may be brought based on the alleged inconsistency of a Member's legislation as such with that Member's obligations. We find nothing, and the United States has identified nothing, inherent in the nature of Antidumping legislation that would rationally distinguish such legislation from other types of legislation for purposes of dispute settlement, or that would remove Antidumping legislation from the ambit of the generally-accepted practice that a panel may examine legislation as such.” Para. 76. “Our reading of Article 17 as allowing Members to bring claims against Antidumping legislation as such is supported by Article 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 77. “Article 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement states: “Each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply for the Member in question.” Para. 78. “Article 18.4 imposes an affirmative obligation on each Member to bring its legislation into conformity with the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement not later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for that Member. Nothing in Article 18.4 or elsewhere in the Antidumping Agreement excludes the obligation set out in Article 18.4 from the scope of matters that may be submitted to dispute settlement.” Para. 79. “If a Member could not bring a claim of inconsistency under the Antidumping Agreement against legislation as such until one of the three Antidumping measures specified in Article 17.4 had been adopted and was also challenged, then examination of the consistency with Article 18.4 of Antidumping legislation as such would be deferred, and the effectiveness of Article 18.4 would be diminished.” Para. 80. “Furthermore, we note that Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement states: No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.” Para. 81. “Article 18.1 contains a prohibition on “specific action against dumping” when such action is not taken in accordance with the provisions of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Antidumping Agreement. Specific action against dumping could take a wide variety of forms. If specific action against dumping is taken in a form other than a form authorized under Article VI of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Antidumping Agreement, such action will violate Article 18.1. We find nothing, however, in Article 18.1 or elsewhere in the Antidumping Agreement, to suggest that the consistency of such action with Article 18.1 may only be challenged when one of the three measures specified in Article 17.4 has been adopted. Indeed, such an interpretation must be wrong since it implies that, if a Member's legislation provides for a response to dumping that does not consist of one of the three measures listed in Article 17.4, then it would be impossible to test the consistency of that legislation, and of particular responses thereunder, with Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 82. “Therefore, we consider that Articles 18.1 and 18.4 support our conclusion that a Member may challenge the consistency of legislation as such with the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement.” Para. 83. “For all these reasons, we conclude that, pursuant to Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 and Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement, the European Communities and Japan could bring dispute settlement claims of inconsistency with Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement against the 1916 Act as such. We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding that it had

jurisdiction to review these claims.”

b) “Termos de Referência do Painel”

(i) conceito de “assunto/ problema” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 70 No caso Guatemala - Cement I, o Órgão de Apelação teve a oportunidade de analisar o termo “matter”, constante nos Parágros 2, 3, 5 e 6 do Artigo 17, e sua interpretação no contexto do Artigo 17.4 do Acordo Antidumping. Entendeu ser um conceito central na definição do escopo da reclamação. A decisão do Órgão de Apelação reconheceu a necessidade da reclamação ser baseada em uma das três medidas previstas no Artigo 17.4. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, as regras de interpretação contidas no Artigo 31 da Convenção de Viena dispõem que o significado de um termo deve ser estabelecido a partir de seu significado ordinário, lido à luz de seu contexto e do objeto e propósito do tratado. Para. 70. “In view of the fact that we have reversed both of the Panel's findings that led it to conclude that this dispute was properly before it, we must now address this question ourselves. Article 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement allows a Member to refer a “matter” to the DSB when certain specified conditions are satisfied. The word “matter” also appears in paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 17. It is the key concept in defining the scope of a dispute that may be referred to the DSB under the Antidumping Agreement and, therefore, in identifying the parameters of a panel's terms of reference in an Antidumping dispute. According to the rules of interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the meaning of a term is to be determined by reference to its ordinary meaning, read in light of its context, and the object and purpose of the treaty.” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 71 Ao analisar a palavra “matter”, o Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, reconhece o seu significado amplo e, nesse sentido, tenta estabelecer parâmetros mais claros. Com efeito, entende que o significado mais apropriado, no sentido de significado ordinário, corresponde a “substância” ou “assunto de uma disputa”. O Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu uma conexão entre o termo “matter” e os termos de referência do Painel sob o Artigo 7 do DSU e define “mater” como: (i) medidas específicas em questão; e (ii) a base legal de uma reivindicação ou queixa. Para. 71. “The word ‘matter’ appears in Article 7 of the DSU, which provides the standard terms of reference for Panels. Under this provision, the task of a Panel is to examine ‘the matter referred to the DSB’. These words closely echo those of Article 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement and, in view of the integrated nature of the dispute settlement system, form part of the context of that provision. Article 7 of the DSU itself does not shed any further light on the meaning of the term ‘matter’. However, when that provision is read together with Article 6.2 of the DSU, the precise meaning of the term ‘matter’ becomes clear. Article 6.2 specifies the requirements under which a complaining Member may refer a ‘matter’ to the DSB: in order to establish a Panel to hear its complaint, a Member must make, in writing, a ‘request for the establishment of a Panel’ (a ‘Panel request’). In addition to being the document which enables the DSB to establish a Panel, the Panel request is also usually identified in the Panel’s terms of reference as the document setting out ‘the matter referred to the DSB’. Thus, ‘the matter referred to the DSB’ for the purposes of Article 7 of the DSU and Article 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement must be the ‘matter’ identified in the request for the establishment of a Panel under Article 6.2 of the DSU. That provision requires the complaining Member, in a Panel

request, to ‘identify the specific measures at issue and provide a brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem clearly.’ (emphasis added) The ‘matter referred to the DSB’, therefore, consists of two elements: the specific measures at issue and the legal basis of the complaint (or the claims).” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, paras. 72-73 O Órgão de Apelação, em Guatemala - Cement I, chama a atenção para o fato de que, na decisão emitida em Brazil - Coconut, houve concordância com a interpretação dos Painéis anteriores, estabelecidos durante o GATT 1947, assim como sob o Acordo Antidumping, de que o termo “matter”, sob a consideração de um Painel, consiste em uma reivindicação específica declarada pelas partes para a disputa em um documento importante. (147) Declarações em dois Relatórios do mencionado Painel esclarecem a relação entre ‘matter’, ‘medidas’ em questão e ‘reivindicações’. No caso United States - Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway (148), o Painel entendeu que “matter” consistiu em reivindicações específicas feitas pela Noruega, sobre a imposição de medidas. A distinção deve, portanto, ser feita entre ‘medida’ e ‘reclamações’. Consideradas juntas, a ‘medida’ e as ‘reclamações” feitas com relação àquela medida constituem o ‘matter relativo ao DSB’, os quais formam a base para os ‘termos de referência’ do Painel. (149)

(ii) Relação com o Artigo 6.2 do DSB: “medidas específicas em questão”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, paras. 77 e 79-80 O Painel, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, reconheceu as especificidades do Artigo 17.4, e o seu caráter sui generis. Nesse sentido, diferentemente de outros Artigos similares, o Artigo 17.4 estabelece exatamente quando poder-se-á iniciar uma disputa sobre medidas Antidumping. Ao propor um parâmetro, a partir do Artigo 6.2 do GATT, o Órgão de Apelação analisou que este Artigo diz que as questões levadas ao crivo do Painel devem ser “específicas”. Segundo o Órgão de Apelação, o Artigo diz que as medidas devem ser específicas no sentido de esclarecer a possibilidade de instauração de um Painel. Restou claro que as medidas relacionadas a reclamações relativas a investigações Antidumping são três: direito Antidumping definitivo; aceitação de um compromisso de preços; ou, medida provisória. Ao analisar a linguagem utilizada pelo Acordo Antidumping, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que, em que pese serem apenas três as possibilidades de “especificar” uma medida Antidumping, tal parâmetro não limita a possibilidade de apresentação de reclamações e a natureza das queixas, as quais poderão ser feitas em relação à prejuízos gerados em razão de violações ao Acordo Antidumping. Para. 77. “According to Article 17.4, a ‘matter’ may be referred to the DSB only if one of the relevant three Antidumping measures is in place. This provision, when read together with Article 6.2 of the DSU, requires a Panel request in a dispute brought under the Antidumping Agreement to identify, as the specific measure at issue, either a definitive antidumping duty, the acceptance of a price undertaking, or a provisional measure. This requirement to identify a specific Antidumping measure at issue in a Panel request in no way limits the nature of the claims that may be brought concerning alleged nullification or impairment of benefits or the impeding of the achievement of any objective in a dispute under the Antidumping Agreement. As we have observed earlier, there is a difference between the specific measures at issue - in the case of the Antidumping Agreement, one of the three types of Antidumping measure described in Article 17.4 - and the claims or the legal basis of the complaint referred to the DSB relating to those specific measures. In coming to this conclusion, we note that the language of Article 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement is unique to that Agreement.”

Paras. 79-80. “[I]n disputes under the Antidumping Agreement relating to the initiation and conduct of Antidumping investigations, a definitive Antidumping duty, the acceptance of a price undertaking or a provisional measure must be identified as part of the matter referred to the DSB pursuant to the provisions of Article 17.4 of the AntiDumping Agreement and Article 6.2 of the DSU.” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, paras. 7.52-7.53 No caso Mexico - Corn Syrup, o Painel manifestou-se sobre a possibilidade de apresentação de uma reclamação sobre a imposição de medidas provisórias enquanto não é aplicada a medida antidumping definitiva. Caso a medida provisória imposta cause um impacto significativo, por violar o Artigo 7.1 e prejudicar, de imediato, o outro Membro, este poderá encaminhar uma reclamação ao DSB. O Órgão de Apelção, por sua vez, entendeu, apoiado no Artigo 10 do Acordo Antidumping, que a medida provisória representa a base, por meio da qual um Membro (desde que cumpridos todos os requisitos necessários para a aplicação da medida) pode arrecadar os direitos antidumping de forma retroativa, para somente ao término da investigação estabelecer o valor da medida antidumping final e aplicar a medida definitiva. Em sendo assim, o Órgão de Apelação considerou que, devido ao fato de o período de vigência de uma medida preliminar afetar a determinação do período no qual uma medida definitiva pode ser aplicada retroativamente, uma reclamação em relação à duração de uma medida provisória se relaciona também à medida definitiva. Para. 7.52. “The Appellate Body Report in Guatemala - Cement indicates that a complainant may, having identified a specific Antidumping duty in its request for establishment, bring any claims under the AD Agreement relating to that specific measure. That there should be a relationship between the measure challenged in a dispute and the claims asserted in that dispute would appear necessary, given that Article 19.1 of the DSU requires that, ‘where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with the agreement’.”

Para. 7.53. “[W]e consider that the United States’ claim under Article 7.4 of the AD Agreement is nevertheless related to Mexico’s definitive Antidumping duty. In this regard, we recall that, under Article 10 of the AD Agreement, a provisional measure represents a basis under which a Member may, if the requisite conditions are met, levy Antidumping duties retroactively. At the same time, a Member may not, except in the circumstances provided for in Article 10.6 of the AD Agreement, retroactively levy a definitive Antidumping duty for a period during which provisional measures were not applied. Consequently, because the period of time for which a provisional measure is applied is generally determinative of the period for which a definitive Antidumping duty may be levied retroactively, we consider that a claim regarding the duration of a provisional measure relates to the definitive Antidumping duty.” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 7.54 O Painel, em Mexico - Corn Syrup, entendeu ser incorreto interpretar o Artigo 17.4 como proibitivo ao direito do Membro prejudicado apresentar uma reclamação ao DSB alegando violação ao Acordo Antidumping, e concluiu pela permissão de tal reclamação, pois seria incorreto interpretar tal Artigo de uma maneira que não deixaria aos Membros a possibilidade de iniciar um procedimento de solução de controvérsias.

Para. 7.54. “Read literally, this provision could be taken to mean that in a dispute where the specific measure being challenged is a provisional measure, the only claim that a Member may pursue is a claim under Article 7.1 of the AD Agreement (and not a claim under Article 7.4 of the AD

Agreement). If this conclusion is correct, a ruling that a claim under Article 7.4 could not be pursued in a dispute where the specific measure challenged is a definitive Antidumping duty would mean that a Member would never be able to pursue an Article 7.4 claim. In our view, it would be incorrect to interpret Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement in a manner which would leave Members without any possibility to pursue dispute settlement in respect of a claim alleging a violation of a requirement of the AD Agreement.”

(iii) Medidas não identificadas em termos de referência Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R, para. 7.22 Em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Painel enfatiza a relevância do conteúdo dos termos de referência, apresentados quando da instauração do Painel, para o restante do procedimento junto ao DSB. Enfatiza a importância dos termos de referência que solicitam a instauração do Painel serem bem específicos e precisos e conclui, neste caso específico, que o requerimento do Japão estava fora dos termos de referência, pois não havia nenhuma menção à queixa específica no conteúdo do termos de referência apresentados no momento da instauração do Painel. Para. 7.22. The Appellate Body has noted: “As a panel request is normally not subjected to detailed scrutiny by the DSB, it is incumbent upon a panel to examine the request for the establishment of the panel very carefully to ensure its compliance with both the letter and the spirit of Article 6.2 of the DSU. It is important that a panel request be sufficiently precise for two reasons: first, it often forms the basis for the terms of reference of the panel pursuant to Article 7 of the DSU; and, second, it informs the defending party and the third parties of the legal basis of the complaint.” (emphasis added)

(iv) Abandono de pedido Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Steel Plate), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS206/R, paras.  7.27-7.29 Neste caso, a Índia deixou de fazer constar em sua petição inicial todas as queixas em relação às quais tinha a intenção de buscar esclarecimento junto ao Painel. No entanto, em momento posterior, informou que desejava apresentar uma reclamação, na oportunidade da primeira reunião substantiva; o que foi negado pelo Painel. Para contestar o posicionamento do Painel, a Índia importou a interpretação do Órgão de Apelação em EC - Bananas, o qual permitiu o oferecimento de reclamação posteriormente à apresentação da petição inicial, desde que submetida por um terceiro Membro. Mas o Painel considerou que, no caso EC – Bananas, o ruling relevante foi o de que uma reclamação não pode ser apresentada pela primeira vez na petição escrita, se a mesma não foi apresentada no pedido de instauração do Painel. O fato é que, no caso em tela, a Índia perdeu a oportunidade de apresentar todas as suas queixas e, posteriormente, tal atitude foi entendida como abandono de pedido, nos termos dos Parágrafos 4 e 7 do Apêndice 3 do DSU, ao dispor que a parte deve informar todos seus argumentos e fatos na primeira submissão escrita. Para. 7.27. “This situation is not explicitly addressed in either the DSU or any previous panel or Appellate Body report. We do note, however, the ruling of the Appellate Body in Bananas to the effect that a claim may not be raised for the first time in a first written submission, if it was not in the request for establishment. (150) One element of the Appellate Body’s decision in that regard was the notice aspect of the request for establishment. The request for establishment is relied upon by Members in deciding whether to participate in the dispute as third parties. To allow a claim to be introduced in a first written submission would deprive Members who did not choose to participate as third parties from presenting their views with respect to such a new claim.”

Para. 7.28. “The situation here is, in our view, analogous. That is, to allow a party to resurrect a claim

it had explicitly stated, in its first written submission, that it would not pursue would, in the absence of significant adjustments in the Panel’s procedures, deprive other Members participating in the dispute settlement proceeding of their full opportunities to defend their interest with respect to that claim. Paragraphs 4 and 7 of Appendix 3 to the DSU provide that parties shall ‘present the facts of the case and their arguments’ in the first written submission, and that written rebuttals shall be submitted prior to the second meeting. These procedures, in our view, envision that initial arguments regarding a claim should be presented for the first time in the first written submission, and not at the meeting of the panel with the parties or in rebuttal submissions.”

Para. 7.29. “With respect to the interests of third parties, the unfairness of allowing a claim to be argued for the first time at the meeting of the panel with the parties, or in rebuttal submissions, is even more pronounced. In such a circumstance, third parties would be entirely precluded from responding to arguments with respect to such a resurrected claim, as they would not have access to those arguments under the normal panel procedures set out in paragraph 6 of Appendix 3 to the DSU. Further, India has identified no extenuating circumstances to justify the reversal of its abandonment of this claim. (151) Thus, in our view, it would be inappropriate in these circumstances to allow India to resurrect its claim in this manner. Therefore, we will not rule on India’s claim under AD Agreement Articles 6.6 and 6.8 and Annex II, paragraph 7 regarding failure to exercise special circumspection in using information supplied in the petition.” (152) 6. Artigo 17.5

a) “Artigo 17.5(i)”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), WT/DS132/R, para. 7.26 O Painel, em Mexico - Corn Syrup, entendeu, com base no Artigo 17.5 (i), não ser necessário fazer constar na petição inicial palavras como “anular” ou “prejudicar”. No entanto, segundo o Painel, deve-se deixar claro no requerimento inicial que a alegação de anulação de benefícios adquiridos ou de prejuízo está sendo feita, assim como quais os benefícios do demandante estão sendo anulados ou prejudicados. Para. 7.26. “In our view, Article 17.5(i) does not require a complaining Member to use the words ‘nullify’ or ‘impair’ in a request for establishment. However, it must be clear from the request that an allegation of nullification or impairment is being made, and the request must explicitly indicate how benefits accruing to the complaining Member are being nullified or impaired.” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), WT/DS132/R, para. 7.28 Em Mexico - Corn Syrup, o Painel interpretou que um pedido de violação ao Acordo Antidumping, fundamentado em alegação de anulação ou prejuízo de benefícios, com base no Artigo 3.8 do DSU, encontra conformidade com os termos do Artigo 17.5 (i) do Acordo Antidumping. Esclareceu ainda, sobre a necessidade de indicação, pelo demandante, na petição inicial, dos benefícios anulados ou prejudicados. Para. 7.28. “At least one GATT Panel has described the presumption of nullification or impairment arising from a violation of GATT provisions “in practice as an irrefutable presumption”. In our view, a request for establishment that alleges violations of the AD Agreement which, if demonstrated, will constitute a prima facie case of nullification or impairment under Article 3.8 of the DSU, contains a sufficient allegation of nullification or impairment for purposes of Article 17.5(i). In addition, as noted above, the request must indicate how benefits accruing to the complaining Member are being nullified or impaired.”

b) “Artigo 17.5(ii)”

(i) Documentos indisponíveis às autoridades investigadoras Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot-Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/R, paras. 7.6-7.7 Como concluído pelo Painel, em US - Hot-Rolled Steel, e em conformidade com o Artigo 17.5 (ii) do Acordo Antidumping (153), o Painel não irá apreciar novos fatos, detentores de novas evidências a respeito de determinações das autoridades questionadas, a não ser que tais evidências tenham sido apresentadas às autoridades investigadoras pertinentes do país em questão durante a investigação, em conformidade com os procedimentos domésticos estabelecidos. (154)(155) Um Painel não deve realizar uma revisão “de novo” dos fatos considerados durante uma investigação pelas autoridades de investigação. Para. 7.6. “A panel is obligated by Article 11 of the DSU to conduct “an objective assessment of the matter before it”. In this case, we must also consider the implications of Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement as the basis of evidentiary rulings. That Article provides:

The DSB shall, at the request of the complaining party, establish a panel to examine the matter based upon: … (ii) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member.

It seems clear to us that, under this provision, a panel may not, when examining a claim of violation of the AD Agreement (156) in a particular determination, consider facts or evidence presented to it by a party in an attempt to demonstrate error in the determination concerning questions that were investigated and decided by the authorities, unless they had been made available in conformity with the appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the investigating country during the investigation. Thus, for example, in examining the USITC's determination of injury under Article 3 of the AD Agreement, we would not consider any evidence concerning the price effects of imports that was not made available to the USITC under the appropriate US procedures. Japan acknowledges that Article 17.5(ii) must guide the Panel in this respect, but argues that it “complements” the provisions of the DSU which establish that it is the responsibility of the panel to determine the admissibility and relevance of evidence offered by parties to a dispute. We agree, to the extent that it is our responsibility to decide what evidence may be considered. However, that Article 17.5(ii) and the DSU provisions are complementary does not diminish the importance of Article 17.5(ii) in guiding our decisions in this regard. It is a specific provision directing a panel's decision as to what evidence it will consider in examining a claim under the AD Agreement. Moreover, it effectuates the general principle that panels reviewing the determinations of investigating authorities in Antidumping cases are not to engage in de novo review.” (157) Para. 7.7. “The conclusion that we will not consider new evidence with respect to claims under the AD Agreement flows not only from Article 17.5(ii), but also from the fact that a panel is not to perform a de novo review of the issues considered and decided by the investigating authorities. We note that several panels have applied similar principles in reviewing determinations of national authorities in the context of safeguards under the Agreement on Safeguards and special safeguards under Article 6 of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. There is no corollary to Article 17.5(ii) in those agreements. Nonetheless, these panels have concluded that a de novo review of the determinations would be inappropriate, and have undertaken an assessment of, inter alia, whether all relevant facts were considered by the authorities. (158) In that context, the Panel in United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities (“United States - Wheat Gluten”) recently observed that it was not the panel's role to collect new data or to consider evidence which could have been presented to the decision maker but was not.” (159)

(ii) fatos não revelados Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams), Demandante: Polônia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 115 O Órgão de Apelação, em Thailand - H-Beams, contrariando o que havia sido concluído pelo Painel, considerou que o exame do Painel deve levar em consideração os fatos tornados disponíveis às autoridades domésticas de investigação, independentemente de serem informações ou documentos confidenciais ou não, e apresentados ao Painel. O Painel deve examinar esses fatos, mesmo que pela sua natureza confidencial não tenham sido disponibilizados às parte interessadas até o final da investigação. Para. 115. “Article 17.5 specifies that a panel’s examination must be based upon the ‘facts made available’ to the domestic authorities. Antidumping investigations frequently involve both confidential and non-confidential information. The wording of Article 17.5 does not specifically exclude from panel examination facts made available to domestic authorities, but not disclosed or discernible to interested parties by the time of the final determination. Based on the wording of Article 17.5, we can conclude that a panel must examine the facts before it, whether in confidential documents or non-confidential documents.”

(iii) Documentos criados com propósito de uma disputa Relatório do Painel no caso European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed Linen from India (EC - Bed Linen), Demandante: Índia, WT/DS141/R, para. 6.43 Em  EC - Bed Linen, o Painel entendeu que poderá aceitar documentos probatórios que não estejam exatamente no formato em que eles foram originariamente disponibilizados à autoridade investigadora. Com relação à possibilidade de novos documentos serem trazidos ao processo, restou claro, no caso EC - Bed Linen, que isso será possível. Nesse sentido, naquela disputa o Painel entendeu que este poderá aceitar documentos probatórios que não sejam exatamente no formato em que eles foram originariamente disponibilizados à autoridade investigativa. Segundo o Painel, a finalidade das submissões de provas pelas Partes é esclarecer e levar ao conhecimento do Painel os fatos relevantes, de maneira organizada e compreensível às Partes. Portanto, o formato do documento não impede que se analise o seu conteúdo. Para. 6.43. “Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement provides that a panel shall consider a dispute under the AD Agreement “based upon: (…) the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member”. It does not require, however, that a panel consider those facts exclusively in the format in which they were originally available to the investigating authority. Indeed, the very purpose of the submissions of the parties to the Panel is to marshal the relevant facts in an organized and comprehensible fashion in support of their arguments and to elucidate the parties' positions. Based on our review of the information that was before the European Communities at the time it made its decision, in particular that presented by India in its Exhibits, the parties' extensive argument regarding this evidence, and our findings with respect to India's claim under Article 5.4, we conclude that the Exhibit in question does not contain new evidence. Thus, we conclude that the form of the document, (i.e., a new document) does not preclude us from considering its substance, which comprises facts made available to the investigating authority during the investigation. There is in our view no basis for excluding the document from consideration in this proceeding, and we therefore deny India's request.” 7. Article 17.6

a) “Relação com o padrão revisto no Artigo 11 do DSU”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 53-54 No caso US - Hot Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação comparou os padrões de análise contidos nos Artigos 17.6 do Acordo Antidumping e do Artigo 11 do DSU e, dessa forma, estabeleceu possíveis conflitos entre os dois. (160) O Órgão de Apelação explicou, que enquanto o Artigo 17.6 é utilizado apenas em controvérsias relacionadas ao Acordo Antidumping, o Artigo 11 do DSU pode ser utilizado em qualquer controvérsia, por ter caráter geral. Com efeito, o Artigo 11 impõe a obrigação de “avaliação objetiva da controvérsia”, e leva em consideração todos os aspectos legais e factuais da reclamação. Por outro lado, o Artigo 17.6 está subdividido em dois sub-parágrafos, sendo que o primeiro versa sobre a avaliação dos fatos da controvérsia, e, o segundo, sobre a interpretação das disposições relevantes. Nesse sentido, enquanto o Artigo 11 do DSU possui caráter geral, o Artigo 17.6 é bem mais específico e delimitado. Para. 53. “The second threshold aspect follows from the first and concerns the relationship between Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 11 of the DSU. Article 17.6 lays down rules relating to a panel's examination of “matters” arising under one, and only one, covered agreement, the Antidumping Agreement. In contrast, Article 11 of the DSU provides rules which apply to a panel's examination of “matters” arising under any of the covered agreements. Article 11 reads, in part:

(…) a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements (…).” (emphasis added)

Para. 54. “Article 11 of the DSU imposes upon panels a comprehensive obligation to make an “objective assessment of the matter”, an obligation which embraces all aspects of a panel's examination of the “matter”, both factual and legal. Thus, panels make an “objective assessment of the facts”, of the “applicability” of the covered agreements, and of the “conformity” of the measure at stake with those covered agreements. Article 17.6 is divided into two separate sub-paragraphs, each applying to different aspects of the panel's examination of the matter. The first sub-paragraph covers the panel's “assessment of the facts of the matter”, whereas the second covers its “interpret[ation of] the relevant provisions”. (emphasis added) The structure of Article 17.6, therefore, involves a clear distinction between a panel's assessment of the facts and its legal interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/AB/R, paras. 7.15-7.18 Em US - Softwood Lumber VI, o Painel examinou a aplicação de padrão de revisão sob o Artigo 11 do DSU, para uma determinação em paralelo à aplicação conjunta para a mesma determinação dos padrões presentes no Artigo 11 do DSU e no Artigo 17.6 (i) do Acordo Antidumping. Considerou, que o Painel não deve realizar uma revisão “de novo” e que não é necessário e nem apropriado analisar as queixas do Painel separadamente, sob os dois Acordos. Para. 7.15. “Under the Article 17.6 standard, with respect to claims involving questions of fact, Panels have concluded that whether the measures at issue are consistent with relevant provisions of the AD Agreement depends on whether the investigating authority properly established the facts, and evaluated the facts in an unbiased and objective manner. This latter has been defined as assessing whether an unbiased and objective decision maker, taking into account the facts that were before the investigating authority, and in light of the explanations given, could have reached the conclusions that were reached. A panel’s task is not to carry out a de novo review of the information and evidence on the record of the underlying investigation. Nor may a panel substitute its judgment for that of the

investigating authorities, even though the Panel might have arrived at a different determination were it considering the record evidence for itself.”

Para. 7.16. “Similarly, the Appellate Body has explained that, under Article 11 of the DSU, a panel’s role is not to substitute its analysis for that of the investigating authority. (161) The Appellate Body has stated:

We wish to emphasize that, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. (162)

Para. 7.17. “In light of Canada’s clarification of its position, and based on our understanding of the applicable standards of review under Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, we do not consider that it is either necessary or appropriate to conduct separate analyses of the USITC determination under the two Agreements.”

Para. 7.18. “We consider this result appropriate in view of the guidance in the Declaration of Ministers relating to Dispute Settlement under the AD and SCM Agreements. While the Appellate Body has clearly stated that the Ministerial Declaration does not require the application of the Article 17.6 standard of review in countervailing duty investigations, (163) it nonetheless seems to us that in a case such as this one, involving a single injury determination with respect to both subsidized and dumped imports, and where most of Canada’s claims involve identical or almost identical provisions of the AD and SCM Agreements, we should seek to avoid inconsistent conclusions.”

b) “Artigo 17.6(i)”

(i) Geral Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/AB/R, para. 8.19 Em Guatemala - Cement II, o Painel definiu o padrão de revisão aplicável em virtude do Artigo 17.6 (i). A tarefa do Painel é rever as decisões das autoridades de investigação e determinar se o padrão de estabelecimento dos fatos, por parte das autoridades, foi apropriado, e a sua avaliação objetiva e imparcial.

Para. 8.19. “We consider that it is not our role to perform a de novo review of the evidence which was before the investigating authority in this case. Rather, Article 17 makes it clear that our task is to review the determination of the investigating authorities. Specifically, we must determine whether its establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. (164) In other words, we must determine whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating the evidence before it at the time of the investigation could properly have made the determinations made by Guatemala in this case. In our review of the investigating authorities’ evaluation of the facts, we will first need to examine evidence considered by the investigating authority, and second, this examination is limited by Article 17.5(ii) to the facts before the investigating authority. That is, we are not to examine any new evidence that was not part of the record of the investigation. (165)” (166) Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em European Communities - Antidumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil (EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS219/AB/R, para. 127 O Órgão de Apelação, em EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5, India), deixa claro que o Membro que busca a

defesa em relação ao uma medida antidumping, deverá tentar persuadir o Órgão de Apelação com o máximo de argumentos plausíveis, contribuindo de modo ativo com a sua decisão, e rejeição do entendimento do Painel. (167)(168) No entanto, no caso EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou os argumentos do Brasil, por não considerá-los suficientes para esclarecer a controvérsia e para demonstrar a alegada falha do Painel na avaliação dos fatos. (169) Para. 127. “This excerpt demonstrates that the Panel took into account the European Communities' responses to its questions before reaching its finding. It also indicates that the Panel did not rely exclusively on the presumption of good faith, as Brazil suggests, given that some of the Panel's questions were directed at the validity of Exhibit EC-12. If the Panel had placed total reliance on the presumption of good faith, it would have simply accepted the European Communities' assertion that Exhibit EC-12 formed part of the record of the investigation and would not have posed questions to assess the consistency of Exhibit EC-12 with other evidence contained in the record. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Panel “took steps to assure [itself] of the validity of [Exhibit EC-12] and of the fact that it forms part of the contemporaneous written record of the EC investigation.”

(ii) Estabelecimento dos fatos que forem adequados

- Arquivos da autoridade investigadora Relatório do Painel em Guatemala- Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: China, WT/DSB/M/51, section 9(a). paras. 7.60, 89, 6.45 Neste caso, o Painel escrutinou todas as informações arquivadas ante o Ministério, para verificar se os resultados alcançados por este eram realmente imparciais e se a determinação alcançada foi obtida de maneira apropriada. O Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o procedimento não foi devidamente apresentado ao Painel, não tendo sido alcançada por este uma conclusão sobre a interpretação do Artigo 17. Em outros casos, a conclusão foi alcançada com base na revisão das decisões da autoridade de investigação. O Órgão de Apelação considerou que, de forma geral, de acordo com o Artigo 17.5 o Painel deve avaliar nas disputas baseadas no Acordo Antidumping, os fatos tornados disponíveis para as autoridades investigadoras. Para. 7.60. “In Guatemala - Cement I, in order to examine the claim that the initiation of an investigation was not consistent with Article 5, the Panel “scrutinized all the information which was on the record before the Ministry at the time of initiation in examining whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority could properly have made the determination that was reached by the Ministry.” (170) Para. 89. “The Appellate Body found that the dispute was not properly before the Panel and therefore did not reach a conclusion on the interpretation of Article 17 by the Panel. (171) Accordingly, the Panel Report on Guatemala - Cement I was adopted as reversed by the Appellate Body.” (172) Para. 6.45. “However, the panels on EC - Bed Linen, US - Stainless Steel, Guatemala - Cement II, and Thailand - H-Beams also based their factual review of decisions of the investigating authority on the evidence before the authority at the time of the determination. (173) See also paragraphs 622–624 above dealing with Article 17.5(ii) which orders Panels to consider a dispute under the Antidumping Agreement on the basis of the facts made available to the investigating authorities.” - tratamento dos fatos não revelados Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Thailand- Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams European) Demandante: Thailândia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 116

Uma análise hermenêutica foi feita pelo Órgão de Apelação, no Caso Thailand - H-Beams, para saber se o exame de dano basear-se-ia apenas em evidências não reveladas às Partes em uma investigação. Ao analisar o termo “establishment”, aquele órgão entendeu ser uma ação assertiva perante a disputa. A palavra “proper” foi interpretada como “preciso” ou “correto”. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação interpretou que o estabelecimento preciso dos fatos não teria uma ligação lógica com a situação de terem sido os fatos revelados ou discernidos pelas Partes, ao final da investigação e antes da determinação final. Para 116. “In Thailand - H-Beams, in discussing whether an injury determination must be based only upon evidence disclosed to the parties to the investigation, the Appellate Body interpreted the term “establishment of the facts was proper”, as follows:

The ordinary meaning of ‘establishment’ suggests an action to ‘place beyond dispute; ascertain, demonstrate, prove’; the ordinary meaning of ‘proper’ suggests ‘accurate’ or ‘correct’. Based on the ordinary meaning of these words, the proper establishment of the facts appears to have no logical link to whether those facts are disclosed to, or discernible by, the parties to an antidumping investigation prior to the final determination.” (174)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams European) Demandante: Tailândia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 117 O objetivo do Artigo 17.6 é exatamente prevenir “segundas suposições” em relação às decisões das autoridades investigadoras. Nesse sentido, o Órgão de Apelação estabeleceu a conexão existente entre os Artigos 17.6 e 17.5. Com efeito, enquanto aquele refere-se aos “problemas existentes”, este se refere aos “fatos disponíveis” para as autoridades de investigação, conforme o procedimento disposto pelas autoridades domésticas. Os fatos do processo poderão ser não-confidenciais, ou mesmo confidenciais, de acordo com os Artigos 6.5 e 12 (Parágrafos 2.1, 2.2 e 2.3). Com efeito, não se exclui a análise de todos os fatos disponibilizados às autoridades do país importador, mesmo ao final de todo o procedimento, tratando-se, portanto, de uma questão de cunho processual e conforme o devido processo legal a disponibilização de dados e argumentos às Partes interessadas. Para 117. “The Appellate Body elaborated on the aim of Article 17.6(i), stating that its function is to “prevent a panel from ‘second-guessing’ a determination of a national authority when the establishment of the facts is proper and the evaluation of those facts is unbiased and objective”:

There is a clear connection between Articles 17.6(i) and 17.5(ii). The facts of the matter referred to in Article 17.6(i) are ‘the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member’ under Article 17.5(ii). Such facts do not exclude confidential facts made available to the authorities of the importing Member. Rather, Article 6.5 explicitly recognizes the submission of confidential information to investigating authorities and its treatment and protection by those authorities. Article 12, in paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, also recognizes the use, treatment and protection of confidential information by investigating authorities. The ‘facts’ referred to in Articles 17.5(ii) and 17.6(i) thus embrace ‘all facts confidential and non-confidential’, made available to the authorities of the importing Member in conformity with the domestic procedures of that Member. Article 17.6(i) places a limitation on the panel in the circumstances defined by the Article. The aim of Article 17.6(i) is to prevent a panel from ‘second-guessing’ a determination of a national authority when the establishment of the facts is proper and the evaluation of those facts is unbiased and objective. Whether evidence or reasoning is disclosed or made discernible to interested parties by the final determination is a matter of procedure and due process. These matters are very important, but they are comprehensively dealt with in other provisions, notably Articles 6 and 12 of the Antidumping Agreement.” (175)

(iii) “avaliação dos fatos sejam imparciais e objetivos” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em United States - Final Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico (US - Stainless Steel) Demandante: México, WT/DS344/AB/R, para. 634 No caso US - Stainless Steel, o Painel rejeitou o pedido da Coreia de que a avaliação das vendas em dolar ou won poderia ser um fato objetivo, de acordo com o Artigo 17.6. O Painel entendeu que este Artigo não trata somente sobre o estabelecimento de fatos, mas também sobre a sua avaliação. Com efeito, o Painel não deve checar meramente se a autoridade nacional estabeleceu propriamente os fatos relevantes, mas também o peso vinculado a esses fatos, e se foram oferecidos de uma forma imparcial e objetiva. Para. 634. “In US - Stainless Steel, the Panel examined the determinations of the United States authorities on the issue of whether certain local sales were in dollars or won. The Panel rejected Korea’s argument that Article 17.6(i) did not apply to the examination of this issue because the United States decision on this point was not a factual determination. The Panel stated:

Korea’s view appears to be that Article 17.6(i) applies only in respect of the establishment of certain objectively-ascertainable underlying facts, e.g., did the invoices express the sales values in terms of dollars or won, in what currency payment was made, etc. We consider that this interpretation does not however coincide with the language of Article 17.6(i). That Article speaks not only to the establishment of the facts, but also to their evaluation. Therefore, the Panel must check not merely whether the national authorities have properly established the relevant facts but also the value or weight attached to those facts and whether this was done in an unbiased and objective manner. This concerns the according of a certain weight to the facts in their relation to each other; it is not a legal evaluation.” (176)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação em Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams European), Demandante: Tailândia, WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 635 No caso Thailand - H-Beams, o Órgão de Apelação teve a oportunidade de analisar se a determinação de dano deveria ser alcançada apenas com base nas informações postas à disposição pelo Membro às Partes interessadas. O Órgão de Apelação avaliou a expressão “unbiased” e “objective”, isto é, “imparcial” e “objetivo”, e chegou à conclusão que, quando analisadas de uma forma comum, estas duas palavras não possuem uma relação lógica com o fato de as informações serem confidenciais ou não ao tempo da determinação final. Para. 635. “In Thailand - H-Beams, in discussing whether an injury determination must be based only upon evidence disclosed to the parties to the investigation, the Appellate Body touched on the term “unbiased and objective”. The Appellate Body stated that “[t]he ordinary meaning of the words ‘unbiased’ and ‘objective’ also appears to have no logical link to whether those facts are disclosed to, or discernible by, the parties to an antidumping investigation at the time of the final determination.” (177) See also the excerpt from the Appellate Body Report on Thailand - H-Beams referenced in paragraph 633 above.”

(iv) Relevância dos diferentes papéis dos Painéis e das autoridades investigadoras

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, paras. 636-637 No caso US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação definiu a meta do Painel ressaltando a importância dos diferentes papéis exercidos pelas autoridades investigadoras e pelos Painéis. Nesse sentido, o Artigo 17.6 estabelece a obrigação do Painel e define quando as autoridades investigadoras

poderão agir de forma inconsistente. Dessa maneira, o Artigo 17.6 prevê um padrão apropriado para o Acordo Antidumping. Com efeito, o Painel deve avaliar se o estabelecimento dos fatos examinados pelas autoridades investigadoras foi feito de forma apropriada, objetiva e imparcial. Caso o Painel decida que não está inconsistente com o Acordo Antidumping, poderá negar a continuação do processo. Para 636. ”In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, when defining the task of panels under Article 17.6(i), the Appellate Body recalled the importance “to bear in mind the different roles of panels and investigating authorities”.” (178)

Although the text of Article 17.6(i) is couched in terms of an obligation on panels - panels ‘shall’ make these determinations the provision, at the same time, in effect defines when investigating authorities can be considered to have acted inconsistently with the Antidumping Agreement in the course of their ‘establishment’ and ‘evaluation’ of the relevant facts. In other words, Article 17.6(i) sets forth the appropriate standard to be applied by panels in examining the WTO-consistency of the investigating authorities’ establishment and evaluation of the facts under other provisions of the Antidumping Agreement. Thus, panels must assess if the establishment of the facts by the investigating authorities was proper and if the evaluation of those facts by those authorities was unbiased and objective. If these broad standards have not been met, a panel must hold the investigating authorities’ establishment or evaluation of the facts to be inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement. (179)

Para 637. “Com relação aos diferentes papeis das autoridades investigadoras e dos painéis no contexto do artigo 3.7 (ameaça de danos sérios), olhar parágrafo 199 acima.”

(v) ex post não poderão ser racionalizadas Relatório do Painel no caso Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Measures on Carton-Board Imports of Ceramic Tiles from Italy (Argentina - Ceramic Tiles), Demandante: CE, WT/DS189/R, para. 638 Ao analisar se a racionalização poderia ou não ser levada em conta na avaliação das autoridades, sendo essa tomada de forma imparcial e objetiva; ao rever se a avaliação foi feita ao tempo da determinação, em uma manifestação pública do Membro, ou em qualquer outro documento público ou de natureza confidencial; o entendimento do Painel foi de que, ao rever uma avaliação da autoridade investigadora, não deverá ser levado em consideração argumentos e razões que não formaram parte na avaliação do processo pela autoridade investigadora. Esses novos fatos seriam considerados ex post facto que não foram trazidos ao processo ao tempo das determinações. Para 638. “On the question of whether ex post rationalization should be taken into account in order to assess an authority’s compliance with the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, the Panel on Argentina - Ceramic Tiles stated:

Under Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement we are to determine whether the DCD established the facts properly and whether the evaluation performed by the DCD was unbiased and objective. In other words, we are asked to review the evaluation of the DCD made at the time of the determination as set forth in a public notice or in any other document of a public or confidential nature. We do not believe that, as a panel reviewing the evaluation of the investigating authority, we are to take into consideration any arguments and reasons that did not form part of the evaluation process of the investigating authority, but instead are ex post facto justifications which were not provided at the time the determination was made.” (180) (emphasis in original)

Relatório do Painel do no caso Argentina - Definitive Antidumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil (Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties), Demandante: Brasil, WT/DS241/R, para. 639

No caso Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties, confirmou-se que quando o Painel for rever uma avaliação feita pela autoridade investigadora, não deverá levar em consideração argumentos e razões que não foram demonstrados e que não fizeram parte da avaliação do processo de investigação das autoridades. Com efeito, no caso já citado o Painel entendeu que ex post facts não seriam aceitos como argumento. Para 639. “The Panel on Argentina - Poultry Antidumping Duties agreed with the view expressed by the Panel on Argentina - Ceramic Tiles, concluding that as a panel reviewing the evaluation of the investigating authority, it did not believe it was to “take into consideration any arguments and reasons that are not demonstrated to have formed part of the evaluation process of the investigating authority”.” (181)

(vi) Relação entre o Artigo 17.6 e o Artigo 11 do DSB

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 640 No caso US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação definiu os objetivos do Painel com relação ao Artigo 17.6, ao comparar este Artigo com o Artigo 11 do DSB. De acordo com o primeiro, o objetivo do Painel é simplesmente rever o estabelecimento e a avaliação dos fatos disponibilizados pelas autoridades investigadoras. De fato, é exatamente esse o mandamento do Artigo 11 do DSU, ao dispor que o Painel deverá avaliar ‘objetivamente’ os fatos. Nesse sentido, as provisões do Artigo 17.6 e 11 estão em total conformidade, não podendo se falar em conflito entre os dois textos. Para 640. “In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body defined the task of panels under Article 17.6(i) by comparing it to their task under Article 11 of the DSU:

Under Article 17.6(i), the task of panels is simply to review the investigating authorities’ ‘establishment’ and ‘evaluation’ of the facts. To that end, Article 17.6(i) requires panels to make an ‘assessment of the facts ‘. The language of this phrase reflects closely the obligation imposed on panels under Article 11 of the DSU to make an ‘objective assessment of the facts ‘. Thus the text of both provisions requires panels to ‘assess’ the facts and this, in our view, clearly necessitates an active review or examination of the pertinent facts. Article 17.6(i) of the Antidumping Agreement does not expressly state that panels are obliged to make an assessment of the facts which is ‘objective’. However, it is inconceivable that Article 17.6(i) should require anything other than that panels make an objective ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. In this respect, we see no ‘conflict’ between Article 17.6(i) of the Antidumping Agreement and Article 11 of the DSU.” (182)

Relatório do Painel no caso Unites States - Antidumping and Coutervailing Measures on Steel Plate from India (US - Stainless Steel), Demandante: República da Corea, WT/DS206/R, para. 641 Em oportunidade de uma demanda da Índia, no caso US - Steel Plate, o Painel entendeu que não existe conflito entre os Artigos 17.6 e 11. Para 641. “In US - Steel Plate, India requested the Panel to conduct an “active review” of the facts before the US investigating authorities pursuant to both Article 11 of the DSU and Article 17.6(i). India based its request in the Appellate Body’s decisions on the application of Article 11 in US - Cotton Yarn (183) and of Article 17.6(i) in US - Hot-Rolled Steel. (184) The US was opposed to such a request since it considered that India was trying to add to the obligations of investigating authorities. The Panel considered that there was no question that it had to apply Article 17.6 to the dispute and recalled the Appellate Body’s decision in US - Hot-Rolled Steel to the effect that Article 17.6(i) is not

in conflict with Article 11 of the DSU (185) and that Article 17.6(ii) supplemented Article 11 of the DSU. (186) (187) The Panel found:

[W]e do not consider that India’s reference to Article 11 of the DSU constitutes an argument that we apply some other or different standard of review in considering the factual aspects of this dispute than that set out in Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement, which India recognizes is applicable in all antidumping disputes. That standard requires us to assess the facts to determine whether the investigating authorities’ own establishment of facts was proper, and to assess the investigating authorities’ own evaluation of those facts to determine if it was unbiased and objective. What is clear from this is that we are precluded from establishing facts and evaluating them for ourselves - that is, we may not engage in de novo review. However, this does not limit our examination of the matters in dispute, but only the manner in which we conduct that examination. In this regard, we keep in mind that Article 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement establishes that we are to examine the matter based upon ‘the facts made available in conformity with appropriate domestic procedures to the authorities of the importing Member.’ (188)

c) “Artigo 17.6(ii)”

(i) Primeira sentença: regras habituais de interpretação

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 642 Com relação à primeira sentença do Artigo 17.6, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu como se as previsões desse Artigo se assemelhassem a algo muito próximo do Artigo 3.2 do DSU. Essas regras habituais seriam conformes aos Artigos 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viena sobre Direito dos Tratados. Nesse sentido, para o Órgão de Apelação, além do fato destes Artigos não estarem em conflito, eles até se confirmam no sentido de que, as regras habituais aplicáveis à interpretação do DSU também se aplicam ao Acordo Antidumping. Para 642. “In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body looked into the first sentence of Article 17.6(ii) which provides that the Panel “shall” interpret the provisions of the Antidumping Agreement “in accordance with customary rules of interpretation”, and considered that it echoed closely Article 3.2 of the DSU (See Section III.B.1 of the Chapter on the DSU). The Appellate Body stated that such customary rules are embodied in Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties. On a further note, the Appellate Body indicated that “[c]learly, this aspect of Article 17.6(ii) involves no ‘conflict’ with the DSU but, rather, confirms that the usual rules of treaty interpretation under the DSU also apply to the Antidumping Agreement”.” (189)

(ii) Segunda sentença: mais de uma interpretação permissiva Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 643 Ao analisar a segunda sentença do Artigo 17.6, o Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - Hot-Rolled Steel, concluiu que pode haver mais de uma interpretação sobre as provisões do Acordo Antidumping. Nesse contexto, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o termo “interpretações permissivas” quer dizer que qualquer interpretação considerada apropriada pode ser permissiva. Nesse contexto, os Painéis são obrigados a determinar se uma medida seria entendida como relevante, e de fato, essa obrigação é permitida de acordo com os Artigos 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viana sobre Direito dos Tratados. Para. 643. “The second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) deals with the situation where there is more than one permissible interpretation of a provision of the Antidumping Agreement. (190) In US - Hot-Rolled

Steel, the Appellate Body defined the term “permissible interpretation” as “one which is found to be appropriate after application of the pertinent rules of the Vienna Convention”. (191) The Appellate Body considered:

This second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) presupposes that application of the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention could give rise to, at least, two interpretations of some provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, which, under that Convention, would both be ‘permissible interpretations’. In that event, a measure is deemed to be in conformity with the Antidumping Agreement ‘if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.’ It follows that, under Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement, panels are obliged to determine whether a measure rests upon an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Antidumping Agreement which is permissible under the rules of treaty interpretation in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.” (192)

(iii) Relação com o padrão de análise do Artigo 11 do DSB

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 644 Ao analisar o caso US - Hot-Rolled Steel, o Órgão de Apelação concluiu que o Artigo 17.6 complementa o Artigo 11 do DSU. Assim, os Painéis deverão fazer uma avaliação objetiva do problema, sua aplicabilidade e conformidade com as medidas cobertas pelo Acordo Antidumping. Com efeito, a análise de uma controvérsia deve levar em conta os dois Artigos, pois eles se complementam.   Para 644. “In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, the Appellate Body considered the relationship between Article 17.6(ii) and the DSU, in particular Article 11. The Appellate Body stated:

[A]lthough the second sentence of Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement imposes obligations on panels which are not found in the DSU, we see Article 17.6(ii) as supplementing, rather than replacing, the DSU, and Article 11 in particular. Article 11 requires panels to make an ‘objective assessment of the matter’ as a whole. Thus, under the DSU, in examining claims, panels must make an ‘objective assessment’ of the legal provisions at issue, their ‘applicability’ to the dispute, and the ‘conformity’ of the measures at issue with the covered agreements. Nothing in Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement suggests that panels examining claims under that Agreement should not conduct an ‘objective assessment’ of the legal provisions of the Agreement, their applicability to the dispute, and the conformity of the measures at issue with the Agreement. Article 17.6(ii) simply adds that a panel shall find that a measure is in conformity with the Antidumping Agreement if it rests upon one permissible interpretation of that Agreement.” (193)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada (US - Softwood Lumber VI), Demandante: Canadá, WT/DS277/AB/RW, para. 645 No caso US - Softwood Lumber VI, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que, de acordo com as regras do Acordo Antidumping, o Painel deverá seguir as mesmas normas de interpretação dos tratados. A diferença com relação ao Acordo Antidumping, especificamente, é que o Painel encontra mais de uma interpretação permissiva. Não se sabe até que ponto a análise de uma controvérsia poderia ter resultados diferentes se baseada em diferentes Artigos de diferentes Acordos. O Órgão de Apelação ressalta que, apesar da suposição, este não seria o caso, pois em nenhuma instância tal violação foi alegada, isto é , se haveriam mais de uma interpretação permissiva nos acordos mais relevantes.

Para 645. “With respect to the question of the legal interpretation under Article 17.6 (ii), the Panel on US - Softwood Lumber VI considered that under the Antidumping Agreement, a panel is to follow the same rules of treaty interpretation as in any other dispute:

Thus, it is clear to us that under the AD Agreement, a panel is to follow the same rules of treaty interpretation as in any other dispute. The difference is that if a panel finds more than one permissible interpretation of a provision of the AD Agreement, it may uphold a measure that rests on one of those interpretations. It is not clear whether the same result could be reached under Articles 3.2 and 11 of the DSU. However, it seems to us that there might well be cases in which the application of the Vienna Convention principles together with the additional provisions of Article 17.6 of the AD Agreement could result in a different conclusion being reached in a dispute under the AD Agreement than under the SCM Agreement. In this case, it has not been necessary for us to resolve this question, as we did not find any instances where the question of violation turned on the question whether there was more than one permissible interpretation of the text of the relevant Agreements.” (194)

d) “Relação entre os sub-parágrafos (i) e (ii) do artigo 17.6”

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 646 No caso Mexico - Corn Syrup, o Painel entendeu que os requisitos para o padrão estabelecido pelo Artigo 17.6 (i) e (ii) são cumulativos. Deverá haver uma determinação das autoridades investigativas consistente com as provisões relevantes do Acordo Antidumping, assim como deverão ser estabelecidos e avaliados de forma imparcial e objetiva, a partir de uma interpretação permissiva. Para. 646. “In Mexico - Corn Syrup (Article 21.5, US), the Appellate Body ruled that “the requirements of the standard of review provided for in Article 17.6(i) and 17.6(ii) are cumulative. In other words, a panel must find a determination made by the investigating authorities to be consistent with relevant provisions of the Antidumping Agreement if it finds that those investigating authorities have properly established the facts and evaluated those facts in an unbiased and objective manner, and that the determination rests upon a ‘permissible’ interpretation of the relevant provisions.” (195) 8. Relação com outros Artigos

a) “Artigo 3” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Thailand - Antidumping Duties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland (Thailand - H-Beams European) Demandante: Tailândia , WT/DS122/AB/R, para. 647 No caso Thailand - H-Beams, o Órgão de Apelação localizou a relação entre o Artigo 3.1 e o Artigo 17.6.

b) “Artigo 5”

Relatório do Painel em Guatemala- Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: China, WT/DSB/M/51, section 9, para. 648 O Painel, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, estabeleceu a relação entre os Artigos 5.3 e 17.6 e determinou o que seriam “evidências suficientes para justificar o início de uma investigação”. Com efeito, de acordo com o Artigo 5.3, o Painel estabeleceu o padrão disposto no Artigo 17.6. Nesse mesmo caso, o Painel entendeu que os padrões do Artigo 5 são menos estritos que aqueles

estabelecidos nas investigações primárias ou finais relacionadas a dumping, dano ou causa em tela. Mesmo expondo detalhes e fazendo interpretações, o Órgão de Apelação, naquele caso, decidiu extinguir o processo por falta de conclusões sobre as interpretações do Artigo 17.6. Para 648. “The Panel on Guatemala - Cement I addressed the relationship between Articles 5.3 and 17.6. In determining what constitutes “sufficient evidence to justify the initiation of an investigation” under Article 5.3, the Panel on Guatemala - Cement I applied the standard of review set out in Article 17.6(i). (196) The Panel also considered that the standard of review for the initiation of an investigation under Article 5 is less strict than that for preliminary or final determination of dumping, injury and causation. (197) However, the Appellate Body found that the dispute was not properly before the Panel and therefore did not reach a conclusion on the interpretation of Article 17.6. See paragraph 256 above.”

c) “Artigo 7” Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 649 A relação entre os Artigos 7.1 e 17.4 foi discutida no caso Mexico - Corn Syrup. Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 650 A relação entre os Artigos 7.4 e 17.4 for objeto de discussão no caso Mexico - Corn Syrup.

d) “Artigo 18”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 651 A relação entre os Artigos 17.4, 18.1 e 18.4 foi discutida no caso US - 1916 Act. 9. Relação com outros Acordos da OMC

a) “GATT 1994”

(i) Artigos XXII e XXIII Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, paras. 652-653 O Órgão de Apelação analizou a relação entre o Artigo 17 e os Artigos XXII e XXIII do GATT 1994. Nesse sentido, entendeu que tais Artigos não estão expressamente incorporados no Acordo Antidumping, ao contrário do que ocorre em outros Acordos do Anexo 1A que contemplam os Artigos XXII e XXIII. Para. 652. “The Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I noted the following regarding the relationship between Article 17 and Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994:

Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994 are not expressly incorporated by reference into the Antidumping Agreement as they are into all of the other

Annex 1A agreements … As a result, … Article XXIII of the GATT 1994 does not apply to disputes brought under the Antidumping Agreement. On the contrary, Articles 17.3 and 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement are the ‘consultation and dispute settlement provisions’ pursuant to which disputes may be brought under that covered agreement.” (198)

Para. 653. “O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, avaliou essa questão. (...) Também, esse assunto foi avaliado no caso US - 1916 Act. (...)”

b) “DSB”

(i) Artigo 1

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 654 O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, considerou a aplicação concorrente do Artigo 17 e das regras e procedimentos do DSU.

(ii) Artigo 3.8 Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 655 No caso Mexico - Corn Syrup, o Painel comentou sobre a relação entre o Artigo 17.6 do Acordo Antidumping e o Artigo 3.8 do DSU.

(iii) Artigo 6.2 Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 656 No caso Guatemala - Cement I, o Órgão de Apelação rejeitou a conclusão do Painel que havia aceitado a prevalência do Artigo 17.5 sobre o Artigo 6.2 do DSU, sob o argumento de que, ao contrário do que o Painel havia entendido, estes dois Artigos agem conjuntamente. Ao analisar este caso, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que, mesmo que o Artigo 17.5 contenha mais informações do que o Artigo 6.2, isso não é suficiente para tornar sem efeito as questões específicas trazidas pelo Artigo 6.2 às disputas que envolvam o Acordo Antidumping, não havendo, portanto, inconsistência entre os dois Artigos. Para. 656. “The Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I rejected the Panel’s conclusion that Article 17.5 of the Antidumping Agreement prevails over Article 6.2 of the DSU and went on to state that both provisions apply cumulatively:

The fact that Article 17.5 contains these additional requirements, which are not mentioned in Article 6.2 of the DSU, does not nullify, or render inapplicable, the specific requirements of Article 6.2 of the DSU in disputes brought under the Antidumping Agreement. In our view, there is no inconsistency between Article 17.5 of the Antidumping Agreement and the provisions of Article 6.2 of the DSU. On the contrary, they are complementary and should be applied together. A Panel request made concerning a dispute brought under the Antidumping Agreement must therefore comply with the relevant dispute settlement provisions of both that Agreement and the DSU. Thus, when a ‘matter’ is referred to the DSB by a

complaining party under Article 17.4 of the AntiDumping Agreement, the Panel request must meet the requirements of Articles 17.4 and 17.5 of the AntiDumping Agreement as well as Article 6.2 of the DSU.” (199)

Relatório do Painel no caso Mexico - Antidumping Investigation of High-Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States (Mexico - Corn Syrup), Demandante: EUA, WT/DS132/R, para. 657 O Painel no caso Mexico - Corn Syrup discutiu a relação entre o Artigo 17.4 do Acordo Antidumping e o Artigo 6.2 do DSU. Essa questão também foi discutida pelo Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Cement I.

(iv) Artigo 7

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala- Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 659 A palavra “matter”, encontra-se tanto no Artigo 7 do DSU, como no Artigo 17.4 do Acordo Antidumping. No caso Guatemala - Cement I, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que os padrões dos termos de referência para Painéis deverão interpretar aquela palavra da mesma forma, assumindo, portanto, o mesmo significado em ambos os dispositivos, qual seja, que as “medidas” e “reclamações” devem ser identificadas em um Painel. Para. 659. “The Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I linked the term “matter” in Article 7 of the DSU, which provides the standard terms of reference for Panels, to the same word in Article 17.4 of the Antidumping Agreement. (200) It specifically stated:

[T]he word ‘matter’ has the same meaning in Article 17 of the Antidumping Agreement as it has in Article 7 of the DSU. It consists of two elements: the specific ‘measure’ and the ‘claims’ relating to it, both of which must be properly identified in a Panel request as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU. (201)

(v) Artigo 19.1

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 662 Em disputa, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, surgiu a dúvida se uma queixa que não se encontra em conformidade com o disposto no Acordo Antidumping poderia ser analisada pelo Painel. Com efeito, para que não haja uma conformidade é necessário que nenhum dos três pré-requisitos tenham sido satisfeitos, quais sejam: o dever provisional; o dever final; ou, a diminuição dos preços. Nesse caso, a Guatemala alegou que nenhum desses três elementos foi identificado e, portanto, não poderia ser analisado o caso. O Painel rejeitou tal alegação e entendeu que, em que pese o não preenchimento dos requisitos, isso não lhe impedirá de aplicar as medidas específicas ao caso. Para. 662. “In Guatemala - Cement I, it was disputed whether a complaint of non-compliance in an antidumping investigation should be examined even if neither a final antidumping measure, a provisional measure nor a price undertaking is identified in the request for panel establishment, as referenced in paragraph 612 above. In this regard, the Panel rejected Guatemala’s argument that a final or provisional duty or a price undertaking must be identified in a request for panel establishment in order for a panel to be able to issue a recommendation in terms of Article 19.1 of the DSU:

This [argument] is clearly in conflict with our conclusion regarding the

interpretation of the provisions of the ADP Agreement as not limited to disputes involving only specific ‘measures’. A restrictive reading of Article 19.1 would mean that, while the ADP Agreement provides for consultations and establishment of a Panel to consider a matter without limitation to a specific ‘measure’, the Panel so established is not empowered to make a recommendation with respect to that matter. This would clearly run counter to the intention of the drafters of the DSU to establish an effective dispute resolution system for the WTO. In addition, it would undermine the special or additional rules for dispute settlement in antidumping cases provided for in the ADP Agreement. A broader reading of Article 19.1, on the other hand, would give effect to the special or additional dispute settlement provisions of the ADP Agreement, by allowing Panels in antidumping disputes to consider the ‘matter’ referred to them, and issue a recommendation with respect to that matter. As discussed below, the DSU provisions relied on … do not, in our view, limit Panels to the consideration only of certain types of specified ‘measures’ in disputes.” (202)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Antidumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement I), Demandante: México, WT/DS60/AB/R, para. 663 O Órgão de Apelação, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, entendeu que o pedido não foi feito de maneira adequada, pois não houve a identificação das medidas relevantes de antidumping, conforme preceitua o Artigo 19.1 e, portanto, não emitiu nenhuma decisão. Para. 663. “The Appellate Body in Guatemala - Cement I found that the dispute was not properly before the Panel and therefore did not come to any conclusion as to the broad reading of Article 19.1 by the Panel. (203) The Appellate Body concluded that the Panel did not consider whether the complainant, Mexico, had properly identified a relevant antidumping measure in its panel request, and the Panel had therefore erred in finding the dispute properly before it.” (204) III. Comentários A importância do tratamento oferecido pelo Artigo 17 à solução de controvérsias surgidas em matéria de direitos antidumping é inconteste. Sem embargo, não apenas as controvérsias relacionadas ao dumping serão analisadas à luz deste Artigo, como entendido em Guatemala - Cement I. Nesse contexto, o Artigo 17 se mostra bastante amplo e prova disso é que houve 72 (setenta e duas) interpretações sobre o Artigo 17 e seus Parágrafos, número este acima da média dos demais Artigos do Acordo Antidumping, o que mais uma vez revela sua importância. A relevância do Artigo 17 é ainda maior quando a controvérsia versa sobre direitos antidumping. Com efeito, é sabido que existem outras normas que tratam sobre a solução de controvérsias em outros Acordos da OMC, inclusive no DSU. Nesse sentido, diante de um conflito de normas em um caso concreto de antidumping, deverá prevalecer o disposto no Artigo 17 sobre outras normas. Nas partes convergentes, os dois sistemas irão operar em conformidade. Essas regras são conhecidas como regras especiais e adicionais, e devem prevalecem sobre a norma geral. Outra questão importante em relação ao Artigo 17, diz respeito a se o Painel e o Órgão de Apelação podem ponderar sobre a legislação interna dos Membros. Com efeito, o Artigo 17.2 deixa claro que consulta poderá ser feita à medida que afete a operação do Acordo de Implementação do Artigo VI. Nesse sentido, de forma geral, os Membros comprometeram-se, na Rodada Tóquio, a adaptar as suas leis, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos às regras do Acordo Antidumping. Não obstante, ainda não é possível que o DSB exija de modo coercitivo que os Membros atuem dessa forma. Assim, as regras mandatórias e discricionárias poderão ser examinadas pelo Painel e pelo Órgão de Apelação, pois, segundo o Artigo 18.4 do Acordo Antidumping todas as medidas necessárias, gerais ou particulares, deverão ser tomadas para assegurar que as leis, regulamentos e procedimentos

administrativos, estejam em conformidade com o Acordo Antidumping e com o princípio da boa-fé. Outra questão relevante, refere-se a se uma prática no ordenamento jurídico interno poderia, por si só, justificar uma reclamação perante o o DSB, isto é, se poderia a legislação de um país ser levada ao DSB. O entendimento é de que, para legitimar uma reclamação, tais práticas deveriam se enquadrar em um sistema operacional independente e divergente do estabelecido no Acordo Antidumping. Na prática, a configuração desse sistema operacional independente dificilmente seria aceito pelo Painel e, de fato, não foi aceito no caso US - Steel Plate. O que se tem por certo, são os 3 (três) elementos constantes no rol taxativo do Artigo 17.4, quais sejam: a aplicação definitiva de um direito antidumping; uma redução nos preços; ou ainda, uma medida provisional. Assim, o Painel não poderá julgar procedimentos internos a um ordenamento jurídico sem estar vinculado a um caso concreto. E para que se inicie um caso concreto, desde o início das investigações deve estar clara a presença de uma das três previsões listadas no Artigo 17.4. Neste ponto, o Órgão de Apelação menciona que o Acordo Antidumping falha, ao não prever, além das três possibilidades elencadas para a instauração do Painel, a possibilidade de um Membro indagar sobre a legislação de outro Membro. O Órgão de Apelação menciona, inclusive, que tal possibilidade está evidenciada tanto no GATT, como no DSU, tendo sido uma falha não constar tal previsão no Acordo Antidumping. Nesse sentido, baseado em um dos três fatos referidos acima, deve ser feito um pedido formal e escrito para a instauração de um Painel. Os documentos probatórios deverão conter os termos de referência, indicando o problema submetido ao DSB. A reclamação deverá conter a identificação das medidas específicas desejadas, e um breve resumo da base legal. Em relação ao pedido formal, existe a possibilidade de o Painel entender que houve abandono de pedido, caso o Membro alegue fatos novos em momentos posteriores. Isso ocorreu no caso US - Steel Plate, em que a Índia alegou fato novo posterior ao pedido de investigação inicial; ou quando as autoridades investigativas já tenham concluído os trabalhos. A exceção ocorre, quando as informações disponíveis estão em conformidade com as regras domésticas apropriadas durante a investigação. Nesse sentido, conclui-se que o Painel não considerará novas evidências com base no DSU, quando o objeto de questionamento for o Acordo Antidumping (esse foi o entendimento do caso US - Hot-Rolled steel). Embora o Orgão de Apelação não possa aceitar uma análise “de novo”, nem substituir suas conclusões por aquelas das autoridades competentes, isso não significa que o Painel deva, simplesmente, aceitar a conclusão das autoridades competentes. Nesse contexto, o Painel deverá determinar a função e o objetivo dos órgãos julgadores, no sentido de fazer determinações baseadas nos fatos produzidos pelas autoridades competentes e, especificamente, determinar se o estabelecimento dos fatos foi feito com imparcialidade e objetividade. Em suma, nenhuma nova evidência que esteja fora do registro feito pelas investigações será examinada. Uma outra questão importante, é se o dano a ser analisado o será com base apenas nos fatos disponibilizados pelo Membro, ou se poderão ser explorados fatos não disponibilizados pelas autoridades investigadoras. O entendimento geral, é de que poderão ser analisados argumentos e razões que não estavam presentes quando da avaliação do processo pela autoridade investigadora. Esses novos fatos seriam considerados ex post facto, pois não foram trazidos ao processo ao tempo das determinações. Nesse contexto, os Painéis são obrigados a determinar se uma medida seria entendida como relevante, e essa obrigação é permitida nos termos dos Artigos 31 e 32 da Convenção de Viana sobre Direito dos Tratados. Muito embora o entendimento geral seja de que deverão ser levados em consideração vários dispositivos de diversos diplomas, o que se tem como certo é que o Painel deverá seguir as mesmas regras de interpretação dos tratados. A diferença com relação ao Acordo Antidumping, especificamente, é que o Painel encontra mais de uma interpretação permissiva. Não se sabe até que ponto a análise de uma controvérsia poderia ter resultados diferentes se baseada em diferentes Artigos

de Acordos distintos. O Órgão de Apelação ressalta que, apesar da suposição, este não seria o caso, pois, em nenhuma instância tal violação foi alegada, isto é, se haveria mais de uma interpretação permissiva nos Acordos mais relevantes. Nesse contexto, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que os requisitos para o padrão estabelecido no Artigo 17.6 (i) e (ii) são cumulativos. Deverá haver uma determinação feita pelas autoridades investigativas consistente com as provisões relevantes do Acordo Antidumping. Deverá haver ainda uma avaliação imparcial e objetiva sobre uma interpretação permissiva. Ademais, para que se instaure um procedimento nos termos do Artigo 17, alguns critérios devem existir para efeito de institucionalizar a reclamação e trazer segurança jurídica. Assim, o Painel, no caso Guatemala - Cement I, estabeleceu a relação entre os Artigos 5.3 e 17.6, determinando o que seria constituir “evidências suficientes para justificar o início de uma investigação”. De acordo com o Artigo 5.3, o Painel interpretou o padrão seguido pelo Artigo 17.6. Nesse mesmo caso, o Painel entendeu que os padrões do Artigo 5 são menos estritos do que aqueles estabelecidos nas investigações primárias ou finais relacionadas a dumping, dano ou causa em tela. Para todos os efeitos, no caso de controvérsia que envolva direito antidumping, deverá ser concedida atenção especial ao Artigo 17, por ser mais especializado na matéria objeto da controvérsia. Porém, não haverá prevalência do Artigo 17, pois este agirá em conjunto com os demais Artigos aptos a auxiliarem na resolução da controvérsia. De forma geral, como pode ser percebido, o Artigo 17 é bastante complexo e possui muitas interpretações. De forma específica, as regras para solução de controvérsias presentes no Acordo Antidumping visam oferecer segurança jurídica ao direito antidumping. Nesse contexto, quando certo produto, seja por meio de subsídios ou por outro meio qualquer, chega ao país importador de forma a causar algum dano ao mercado local deste produto, surge a possibilidade de o Membro que está sofrendo o dano iniciar um processo de investigação, com base nos critérios dispostos e interpretados do Acordo Antidumping. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 125: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 58, quoting from the Panel Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 7.16. Footnote 126: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 67. The Panels on US - 1916 Act followed the approach of the Appellate Body. Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (EC), para. 5.21; and Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.85. See also Appellate Body Report on US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 51. Footnote 127: The Appellate Body Report on US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 129, upheld these findings. Footnote 128: Para mais informações sobre desafiar legislações como tais, ver seção VI.B.3 (c)(ii) do capítulo sobre DSB. Footnote 129: This Section only refers to the analysis of this issue in Antidumping related disputes. For a detailed analysis of this issue in the WTO jurisprudence, see paras. VI.B.3(c)(ii). Footnote 130: Panel Report on EC - Audio Cassette, para. 4.1. On the legal value of unadopted panel reports, see footnote 358 above and its reference to the Appellate Body Report on Japan - Alcoholic Beverages II. Footnote 131: Panel Report on EC - Audio Cassette, para. 362. Footnote 132: Article 16.6(a) (“National Legislation”) of the Tokyo Round Antidumping Agreement provided as follows: “Each government accepting or acceding to this Agreement shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of this Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply to the Party in question.” Footnote 133: Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.168. See also Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (Japan), paras. 6.188–6.189. See also, Panel Report on US - Steel Plate, paras. 7.88–7.89 and 8.3. In this case, the Panel concluded that the “practice” of the US authorities concerning the application of “total facts available” (Article 6.8 Antidumping Agreement) is not a measure which can give rise to an independent claim of violation of the AD Agreement. See also, Panel Report on US - Section 129(c)(1) URAA, para. 6.22. Footnote 134: Appellate Body Report, United States – Antidumping Act of 1916 (US – 1916 Act), WT/DS136/AB/R, WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted 26 September 2000, paras. 88-89. We note that both parties agree that the issue of whether section 129(c)(1) is a mandatory or discretionary provision is relevant to this dispute. Footnote 135: Both parties agree that a statutory provision may be challenged “as such” not only if it mandates WTO inconsistent action, but also if it “precludes” action that is required by WTO rules. Canada's Second Oral Statement, para. 17; US Second Submission, para. 7. We understand the parties to this dispute to use the term “preclude” in the sense of “mandate not to”. Whereas we are aware that another panel spoke of statutory provisions “precluding WTO-consistency” which could,

as such, violate WTO provisions (see Panel Report, United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (US – Section 301 Trade Act ), WT/DS152/R, adopted 27 January 2000, footnote 675), we will, in the interests of clarity, use the expression “mandate not to” rather than “preclude”. Footnote 136: Appellate Body Report, US - 1916 Act, supra, paras. 96-97; Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft - Second Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU (Brazil – Aircraft (Article 21.5 – Canada II)), WT/DS46/RW/2, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 5.50. Footnote 137: We note that the Panel in United States - Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies first considered whether certain action was in conformity with WTO requirements and only then addressed whether the measure at issue mandated such action. See Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (US – Export Restraints), WT/DS194/R and Corr.2, adopted 23 August 2001, para. 8.14. In the circumstances of the case at hand, where there is a major factual dispute regarding whether section 129(c)(1) requires and/or precludes certain action, we think that a panel is of most assistance to the DSB if it examines the factual issues first. Moreover, we do not see how addressing first whether certain actions identified by Canada would contravene particular WTO provisions would facilitate our assessment of whether section 129(c)(1) mandates the United States to take certain action or not to take certain action. Finally, we have taken into account the fact that, in the present case, our ultimate conclusions with respect to Canada's claims would not differ depending on the order of analysis we decided to follow. Footnote 138: We observe that the scope of each element in the phrase “laws, regulations and administrative procedures” must be determined for purposes of WTO law and not simply by reference to the label given to various instruments under the domestic law of each WTO Member. This determination must be based on the content and substance of the instrument, and not merely on its form or nomenclature. Otherwise, the obligations set forth in Article 18.4 would vary from Member to Member depending on each Member’s domestic law and practice. Footnote 139: Article 3.2 of the DSU. Footnote 140: Appellate Body Report on US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 87–89. Footnote 141: Appellate Body Report, US - 1916 Act, paras. 61 e 88. Footnote 142: In footnote 95 to para. 7.114, the Panel quoted the following statement from para. 7.88 of the Panel Report in US - Steel Plate: “[t]he Appellate Body has recognized the distinction, but has not specifically ruled that it is determinative in consideration of whether a statute is inconsistent with relevant WTO obligations.” Footnote 143: In our Report in US - 1916 Act, we examined the challenged legislation and found that the alleged “discretionary” elements of that legislation were not of a type that, even under the mandatory/discretionary distinction, would have led to the measure being classified as “discretionary” and therefore consistent with the Antidumping Agreement. In other words, we assumed that the distinction could be applied because it did not, in any event, affect the outcome of our analysis. We specifically indicated that it was not necessary, in that appeal, for us to answer “the question of the continuing relevance of the distinction between mandatory and discretionary legislation for claims brought under the Antidumping Agreement”. (Appellate Body Report, US - 1916 Act, para. 99) We also expressly declined to answer this question in footnote 334 to paragraph 159 of our Report in US - Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products. Furthermore, the appeal in US - Section 211 Appropriations Act presented a unique set of circumstances. In that case, in defending the measure challenged by the European Communities, the United States unsuccessfully argued that discretionary regulations, issued under a separate law, cured the discriminatory aspects of the measure at issue. Footnote 144: Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (EC), para. 5.27; Panel Report on US - 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.91. Footnote 145: An unrestricted right to have recourse to dispute settlement during an Antidumping investigation would allow a multiplicity of dispute settlement proceedings arising out of the same investigation, leading to repeated disruption of that investigation. Footnote 146: Once one of the three types of measure listed in Article 17.4 is identified in the request for establishment of a panel, a Member may challenge the consistency of any preceding action taken by an investigating authority in the course of an Antidumping investigation. Footnote 147: Appellate Body Report on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, p. 22. Footnote 148: Panel Report on US - Norwegian Salmon AD, para. 342. Footnote 149: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement I, paras. 72–73. Footnote 150: Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas (“EC - Bananas III “), WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591, at para. 143. Footnote 151: This is not, for example, a case where a complainant obtained, through the dispute settlement process, information in support of a claim to which it did not otherwise have access. Footnote 152: We note that, since we do not reach India’s alternative claims in this dispute, as discussed below in para. 7.80, we also would not have reached this claim in any event. Footnote 153: We note that there is no claim under Article VI of GATT 1994 in this case, so we need not consider whether Article 17.5(ii) has implications for the evidence a panel may consider in that context. Footnote 154: Panel Report on US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.6. Footnote 155: Panel Report on US - Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.7. See also Panel Report on Egypt - Steel Rebar, paras. 7.15–7.21. Footnote 156: We note that there is no claim under Article VI of GATT 1994 in this case, so we need not consider whether Article 17.5(ii) has implications for the evidence a panel may consider in that context. Footnote 157: See, for example, Panel Report, Guatemala – Definitive Antidumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala – Cement II), WT/DS156/R, adopted 17 November 2000, para. 8.19. Footnote 158: Panel Report, United States - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities (United States - Wheat Gluten), WT/DS166/R, para. 8.6, adopted as modified (WT/DS166/AB/R) 19 January 2001; Panel Report, Korea-Dairy Safeguard, para. 7.30, Panel Report, Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (Argentina - Footwear Safeguard), WT/DS121/R, para. 8.117, adopted as modified (WT/DS121/AB/R), 12

January 2000. Footnote 159: Panel Report, United States - Wheat Gluten, para. 8.6. Footnote 160: In this analysis, the Appellate Body applied its conclusions on the relationship between the provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures of a covered agreement developed in Guatemala - Cement II, paras. 65–67. Footnote 161: Appellate Body Report, United States - Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan (“US - Cotton Yarn”), WT/DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 November 2001, para. 74; Appellate Body Report, United States - Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia (“US - Lamb”), WT/DS177/AB/R, WT/DS178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, para. 106. Footnote 162: Appellate Body Report, US - Cotton Yarn, para. 69, nº 42, citing Appellate Body Report, US - Lamb, para. 106. Footnote 163: Appellate Body Report, United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (“US - Lead and Bismuth II”), WT/DS138/AB/R, adopted 7 June 2000, DSR 2000:V, 2601 at para. 49. Footnote 164: We note that, in the context of safeguard measures, the panel in Korea - Dairy, said the following of the need for a panel to perform an objective assessment pursuant to Article 11 of the DSU: “7.30 We consider that for the Panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, we do not see our review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities. Rather, we consider that the Panel’s function is to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the KTC. For us, an objective assessment entails an examination of whether the KTC had examined all facts in its possession or which it should have obtained in accordance with Ar ticle 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards (including facts which might detract from an affirmative determination in accordance with the last sentence of Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Safeguards), whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of Korea. Finally, we consider that the Panel should examine the analysis performed by the national authorities at the time of the investigation on the basis of the various national authorities’ determinations and the evidence it had collected.” Footnote 165: We note that this standard is consistent with the approach followed by the panel in Guatemala - Cement I in para. 7.57 of its report. In that instance the panel was of the opinion that its role was: “(…) to examine whether the evidence relied on by the Ministry was sufficient, that is, whether an unbiased and objective investigating authority evaluating that evidence could properly have determined that sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causal link existed to justify initiating the investigation.” Footnote 166: Panel Report on Guatemala - Cement II, para. 8.19. See also Panel Report on US - Stainless Steel, para. 6.18, Panel Report on Argentina - Ceramic Tiles, paras.6.2–6.3 and Panel Report on Egypt - Steel Rebar, paras. 7.8–7.14. Footnote 167: Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), para. 169, quoting Appellate Body Report, US - Wheat Gluten, para. 151. Footnote 168: Appellate Body Report, EC - Bed Linen (Article 21.5 - India), para. 170. Footnote 169: Appellate Body Report on EC - Tube or Pipe Fittings, para. 127. Footnote 170: Panel Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 7.60. Footnote 171: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala - Cement I, para. 89. Footnote 172: WT/DSB/M/51, section 9(a). Footnote 173: Panel Report on EC - Bed Linen, para. 6.45; Panel Report on US - Stainless Steel, para. 6.3; Panel Report on Guatemala - Cement II, para. 8.19; and Panel Report on Thailand - H-Beams, para. 7.51; Panel Report on Argentina - Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.27. Footnote 174: Appellate Body Report on Thailand — H-Beams, para. 116. With respect to a related topic under Article 3.1, see also paras. 111–114 of this Chapter. Footnote 175: Appellate Body Report on Thailand — H-Beams, para. 117. With respect to a related topic under Article 3.1, see also paras. 111–114 of this Chapter. Footnote 176: Panel Report on US — Stainless Steel, para. 6.18. Footnote 177: Appellate Body Report on Thailand — H-Beams, para. 116. Footnote 178: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 55. Footnote 179: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 56. Footnote 180: Panel Report on Argentina — Ceramic Tiles, para. 6.27 Footnote 181: Panel Report on Argentina — Poultry Antidumping Duties, para. 7.49. The Panel thus rejected various arguments that were based on an ex post rationalization by the defendant, such as those put forward with respect to the evaluation of the magnitude of the margin of dumping as an Article 3.4 factor: “We note that Argentina has failed to indicate where such arguments are set forth in the CNCE’s Record No. 576, or to point us to any other document in which the CNCE is alleged to have considered such arguments. Such arguments therefore constitute ex post rationalization which we are precluded from taking into account. […]” Panel Report on Argentina — Poultry Antidumping Duties, para. 7.321. Footnote 182: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 55. Footnote 183: See Section XI of the Chapter on DSU. Footnote 184: See para. 640 of this Chapter. Footnote 185: See para. 640 of this Chapter. Footnote 186: See para. 644 of this Chapter. Footnote 187: Panel Report on US — Steel Plate, paras. 7.1–7.5. Footnote 188: Panel Report on US — Steel Plate, para. 7.6.

Footnote 189: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 57. See also Panel Report on US — Steel Plate, para. 7.7. Footnote 190: In EC — Bed Linen, the EC argued that the Panel had failed to apply the standard of review laid down in Article 17.6(ii) because it had not established that the interpretation of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement was “impermissible”. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding and indicated that the Panel had not viewed the interpretation given by the EC of Article 2.4.2 as a “permissible interpretation” within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii). The Appellate Body considered that “the Panel was not faced with a choice of multiple ‘permissible’ interpretations which would have required it, under Article 17.6(ii), to give deference to the interpretation relied upon by the European Communities. Rather, the Panel was faced with a situation in which the interpretation relied upon by the European Communities was, …, ‘impermissible’.” Appellate Body Report on EC — Bed Linen, paras. 63–66. Footnote 191: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 60. Footnote 192: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, paras. 59–60. Footnote 193: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot Rolled Steel, para. 62. Footnote 194: Panel Report on US — Softwood Lumber VI, para. 7.22. Footnote 195: Appellate Body Report on Mexico — Corn Syrup (Article 21.5 — US), para. 130. Footnote 196: Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 7.57. Footnote 197: Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 7.57. Footnote 198: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 64, fn 43. Footnote 199: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 75. Footnote 200: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 72. Footnote 201: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 76. Footnote 202: Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 7.21. With respect to the issue of repayment of antidumping duties under Article 19.1 of the DSU, see Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement II, paras. 9.4–9.7. Footnote 203: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 89. Footnote 204: Appellate Body Report on Guatemala — Cement I, para. 88.

Ø Artigo 18 Rubens Romero IA. Texto do Artigo em Inglês

Article 18 Final Provisions

18.1 No specific action against dumping of exports from another Member can be taken except in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement. (205)

18.2 Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement without

the consent of the other Members. 18.3 Subject to subparagraphs 3.1 and 3.2, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to

investigations, and reviews of existing measures, initiated pursuant to applications which have been made on or after the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement.

18.3.1 With respect to the calculation of margins of dumping in refund procedures under

paragraph 3 of Article 9, the rules used in the most recent determination or review of dumping shall apply.

18.3.2 For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 11, existing antidumping measures shall be

deemed to be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a Member of the WTO Agreement, except in cases in which the domestic legislation of a Member in force on that date already included a clause of the type provided for in that paragraph.

18.4 Each Member shall take all necessary steps, of a general or particular character, to ensure, not

later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for it, the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this Agreement as they may apply for the Member in question.

18.5 Each Member shall inform the Committee of any changes in its laws and regulations relevant

to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws and regulations. 18.6 The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this Agreement

taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee shall inform annually the Council for Trade in Goods of developments during the period covered by such reviews.

18.7 The Annexes to this Agreement constitute an integral part thereof. Footnote 205: This is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, as appropriate. IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Artigo 18 Disposições Finais

18.1 Não se poderá adotar nenhuma medida específica contra dumping em exportações praticado por outro Membro que não esteja em conformidade com o disposto no GATT 1994, tal como interpretado por este Acordo11.

                                                                                                                         11  A presente cláusula não tem por objetivo excluir a adoção de medidas ao amparo de outras disposições pertinentes do GATT 1994, segundo seja apropriado.  

18.2 Não poderão ser formuladas quaisquer reservas relativamente a qualquer disposição do presente Acordo sem o consentimento dos outros Membros.

18.3 Reservado o disposto no parágrafo 4, as disposições deste Acordo aplicar-se-ão a

investigações e revisões de medidas em vigor que tenham sido iniciadas segundo petições apresentadas na data ou após a data de entrada em vigor do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC para determinado Membro.

18.4 (a) No que diz respeito ao cálculo das margens de dumping nos procedimentos de

reembolso previstos no parágrafo 3 do Artigo 9, serão aplicadas as regras utilizadas na última determinação ou revisão da existência de dumping.

(b) Para os efeitos do parágrafo 3 do artigo 11, considerar-se-á que as medidas

antidumping existentes terão sido impostas em data não posterior à data de entrada em vigor da OMC para determinado Membro, exceto quando a legislação nacional do Membro em vigor naquela mesma data já inclua disposição do tipo previsto no mencionado parágrafo.

18.5 Cada Membro tomará as providências necessárias, genéricas ou específicas, para garantir até a

data de entrada em vigor para ele do Acordo Constitutivo da OMC, a conformidade de sua legislação, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos com o disposto neste Acordo, segundo sejam aplicáveis ao Membro em causa.

18.6 Cada Membro informará o Comitê sobre qualquer modificação em sua legislação e

regulamentos relacionada com este Acordo e sobre a aplicação de tais leis e regulamentos. 18.7 O Comitê reverá anualmente a aplicação e o funcionamento deste Acordo, levando em conta

seus objetivos. O Comitê informará anualmente o Conselho para o Comércio de Bens sobre os desenvolvimentos registrados durante o período coberto por tais revisões.

18.8 Os anexos ao presente Acordo formam parte integrante do mesmo. IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução No Artigo 18.1, entendemos ser apropriado, para que haja concordância nominal, a utilização da palavra “praticadas”, para concordar com a palavra anterior a ela: “exportações”. É de se notar que, na versão em inglês, subdividi-se o Artigo 18 de modo distinto à forma dividida na versão em português. Com efeito, na versão em inglês, subdivide-se em 18.3.1 e 18.3.2; já na versão em português, a tradução preferiu abrir novo tópico, nominando-os de 18.4 e trazendo um reflexo sobre a sequência de todo Artigo 18. No Parágrafo 6 do texto em português, o verbo “informar” necessita de preposição. Nesse sentido, o correto em nosso ponto de vista seria informar “ao” Comitê, e não, informar “o” Comitê. II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Artigo 18 1. Geral a) “Regras sobre à interpretação do Acordo antidumping” Relatório do Painel no caso United States-Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US-DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 655

Como regra de interpretação do Acordo Antidumping, o Painel, no caso US - DRAMS, refere-se ao costume ou direito consuetudinário. O costume, que é fonte do Direito Internacional Público, de acordo com o Artigo 38 do Estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça (CIJ), é fonte primária de Direito Internacional Público, e, aqui, novamente, deve ser utilizado como regra balizadora para a interpretação do Acordo Antidumping e, consequentemente, de todas as questões que tangenciam o Acordo.

Para 655. “Regarding the interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement, the Panel on US - DRAMS referred to Article 3.2 of the DSU:

[W]e bear in mind that Article 3.2 of the DSU requires Panels to interpret ‘covered agreements’, including the AD Agreement, ‘in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’. We recall that the rules of treaty interpretation set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention expressly defines the context of the treaty to include the text of the treaty. Thus, the entire text of the AD Agreement may be relevant to a proper interpretation of any particular provision thereof. (206)

2. Artigo 18.1

a) “ações específica contra o dumping” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 666 No caso US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação entendeu que o Artigo VI do GATT 1994 fica esclarecido, particularmente, pelo Artigo 18.1 do Acordo Antidumping. Nesse sentido, o que o Artigo 18.1 demanda é exatamente que ações específicas contra o dumping deverão, além de estar em conformidade com o Acordo Antidumping, estar de acordo com o Artigo VI do GATT. A interpretação referente à expressão “ações específicas contra dumping”, segundo o Artigo 18.1, são aquelas ações tomadas em resposta aos casos específicos de dumping, e em que existam os elementos constitutivos para tanto. Cabe ressaltar, que a interpretação da ação referente à nota de rodapé é mais geral, ao contrário das ações específicas do Artigo 18.1. Note-se, que as ações específicas contra dumping deverão estar de acordo com o GATT, isto é, com Artigo VI sobre a prática de dumping e medidas antidumping. Nesse contexto, as disposições específicas deverão ser conformes ao Artigo 18.1 e, consequentemente, estarem de acordo com todo o Acordo Antidumping.

Para 666. “The Appellate Body in US - 1916 Act considered that “the scope of application of Article VI [of the GATT 1994] is clarified, in particular, by Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement”. (207) The Appellate Body then found “that Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement requires that any ‘specific action against dumping’ be in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 concerning dumping, as those provisions are interpreted by the Antidumping Agreement”:

In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports within the meaning of Article 18.1 is action that is taken in response to situations presenting the constituent elements of ‘dumping’. ‘Specific action against dumping’ of exports must, at a minimum, encompass action that may be taken only when the constituent elements of ‘dumping’ are present. Since intent is not a constituent element of ‘dumping’, the intent with which action against dumping is taken is not relevant to the determination of whether such action is ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement. …

We note that footnote 24 refers generally to ‘action’ and not, as does Article 18.1, to ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports. ‘Action’ within the meaning of footnote 24 is to be distinguished from

‘specific action against dumping’ of exports, which is governed by Article 18.1 itself.

Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement contains a prohibition on the taking of any ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports when such specific action is not ‘in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement’. Since the only provisions of the GATT 1994 ‘interpreted’ by the Antidumping Agreement are those provisions of Article VI concerning dumping, Article 18.1 should be read as requiring that any ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports from another Member be in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994, as interpreted by the Antidumping Agreement.

We recall that footnote 24 to Article 18.1 refers to ‘other relevant provisions of GATT 1994’ (emphasis added). These terms can only refer to provisions other than the provisions of Article VI concerning dumping. Footnote 24 thus confirms that the ‘provisions of GATT 1994’ referred to in Article 18.1 are in fact the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 concerning dumping.

We have found that Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement requires that any ‘specific action against dumping’ be in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of the GATT 1994 concerning dumping, as those provisions are interpreted by the Antidumping Agreement. It follows that Article VI is applicable to any ‘specific action against dumping’ of exports, i.e., action that is taken in response to situations presenting the constituent elements of ‘dumping’. (208)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Dumpung and Subsidy Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Australia, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, República da Coreia, Tailândia, WT/DS217/AB/R e WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 667 No caso US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), o Órgão de Apelação reiterou o que foi visto no caso US - 1916 Act, de que seguir-se-á o Artigo 18.1 apenas quando houver os elementos constitutivos ou subsídios, ou seja, deverá haver correlação direta com os elementos constitutivos de dumping.

Para 667. “In US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), the Appellate Body reiterated its view that “a measure that may be taken only when the constituent elements of dumping or a subsidy are present, is a ‘specific action’ in response to dumping within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement”. (209) This implied that the measure must be inextricably linked to, or have a strong correlation with, the constituent elements of dumping. According to the Appellate Body, “such link or correlation may, as in the 1916 Act, be derived from the text of the measure itself”. (210) However, not all action taken in response to dumping is necessarily action against dumping. (211) The Panel on US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) took the position that an action operates “against” dumping or a subsidy within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement if it has an adverse bearing on dumping. (212) The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel’s interpretation of the term “against” and reached the following conclusion with respect to the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA):

All these elements lead us to conclude that the CDSOA has an adverse bearing on the foreign producers/exporters in that the imports into the United States of the dumped or subsidized products (besides being subject to antidumping or countervailing duties) result in the financing of United States competitors — producers of like products — through the transfer to the latter of the duties collected on those exports. Thus, foreign producers/exporters have an incentive not to engage in the practice of exporting dumped or subsidized products or to terminate such practices. Because the CDSOA has an adverse bearing on, and, more specifically, is designed and structured so that it dissuades the practice of dumping or the practice of subsidization, and

because it creates an incentive to terminate such practices, the CDSOA is undoubtedly an action ‘against’ dumping or a subsidy, within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement and of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement.” (213)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Continued Dumpung and Subsidy Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, República da Coreia, Tailândia, WT/DS217/AB/R e WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 668 Enfatizou-se, no caso US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), que não é necessário ou relevante que se examine as condições nem os impactos de competição no plano doméstico. Para o Órgão de Apelação, a análise deverá direcionar-se à estrutura e forma da medida, não sendo necessária uma avaliação econômica das implicações da mesma.

Para 668. “In US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), the Appellate Body also emphasized that in order to determine whether a specific action is “against” dumping or subsidization, it is neither necessary, nor relevant, to examine the conditions of competition under which domestic products and dumped/subsidized imports compete, and to assess the impact of the measure on the competitive relationship between them. An analysis of the term “against”, in the view of the Appellate Body, “is more appropriately centred on the design and structure of the measure; such an analysis does not mandate an economic assessment of the implications of the measure on the conditions of competition under which domestic product and dumped/subsidized imports compete”. (214) However, as the Appellate Body also clearly stated, “a measure cannot be against dumping or a subsidy simply because it facilitates or induces the exercise of rights that are WTO-consistent” (215), such as the filing of antidumping applications.”

b) “exceto de acordo com as provisões do GATT 1994” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/R, para. 669 Para 669. “O Painel no caso US - 1916 Act (EC) considerou que o artigo 18.1 do acordo antidumping confirma o propósito de artigo VI como “definir as condições sobre as quais neutralizar o dumping é permitido.” (216)

c) “nota de rodapé 24”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS162/R, para. 670 No caso, US - 1916 Act (Japan), houve uma interpretação sobre a nota de rodapé do Artigo 18.1. Nessa oportunidade, entendeu-se que esta nota não impede que um Membro enderece ou adote outro tipo de medida relacionada à causa ou efeito do dumping, baseando-se em outro diploma da OMC. Muito embora esse fato, a conclusão que se chega é de que se o Membro funda a sua demanda no Artigo VI, é de se esperar que se siga os requerimentos e procedimentos previstos no Artigo VI e no Acordo Antidumping.

Para 670. “The Panel on US - 1916 Act (Japan) considered that “footnote 24 does not prevent Members from addressing the causes or effects of dumping through other trade policy instruments allowed under the WTO Agreement. Nor does it prevent Members from adopting other types of measures which are compatible with the WTO Agreement. Such a possibility does not affect our conclusion that, when a law of a Member addresses the type of price discrimination covered by Article VI and makes it the cause for the imposition of antidumping measures, that Member has to abide by the requirements of Article VI and the Antidumping Agreement.” (217)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States- Continued Dumpung and Subsidy Act of 2000 (US - Offset Act) (Byrd Amendment), Demandantes: Austrália, Brasil, Chile, CE, Índia, Indonésia, Japão, República da Coreia, Tailândia, WT/DS217/AB/R e WT/DS234/AB/R, para. 671 Para 671. “The Appellate Body on US - Offset Act (Byrd Amendment) clarified that footnotes 24 and 56 are clarifications of the main provisions, and were added so as to avoid ambiguity:

[T]hey confirm what is implicit in Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement and in Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, namely, that an action that is not ‘specific’ within the meaning of Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement and of Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, but is nevertheless related to dumping or subsidization, is not prohibited by Article 18.1 of the Antidumping Agreement or Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement. (218)

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 672 No caso US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação referiu-se à nota de rodapé 24 para clarificar o escopo do Artigo VI do GATT 1994. 3. Article 18.3

a) “revisões de medidas existentes” Relatório do Painel no caso United States-Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 673 Restou esclarecido pelo Painel que o Acordo Antidumping aplicar-se-á apenas à medidas existentes durante ou após a vigência do Acordo. O Painel, no caso US – DRAMS, comparou com o caso Brazil - Desiccated Coconut, e examinou a compatibilidade de Artigos de outro Acordo em relação ao determinado no Artigo 18.1. Para. 673. “Referring to its statement that the Antidumping Agreement applies only to “reviews of existing measures” initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of entry into force of the Antidumping Agreement for the Member concerned, the Panel on US - DRAMS drew a comparison with the findings of the Panel on Brazil - Desiccated Coconut:

We note that this approach is in line with that adopted by the Panel on Desiccated Coconut in respect of Article 32.3 of the SCM Agreement, which is virtually identical to Article 18.3 of the AD Agreement. That Panel stated that ‘Article 32.3 defines comprehensively the situations in which the SCM Agreement applies to measures which were imposed pursuant to investigations not subject to that Agreement. Specifically, the SCM Agreement applies to reviews of existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. It is thus through the mechanism of reviews provided for in the SCM Agreement, and only through that mechanism, that the Agreement becomes effective with respect to measures imposed pursuant to investigations to which the SCM Agreement does not apply’ (Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/R, para. 230, upheld by the Appellate Body in WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted on 20 March 1997). (219)

b) “Aplicação do Acordo Antidumping” Relatório do Painel no caso United States-Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 674 Com relação à aplicação do Acordo Antidumping previamente e posteriormente à entrada em vigor da OMC, o Painel, do caso US – DRAMS, explicou que as medidas anteriores à OMC não serão analisadas simplesmente porque continuam sendo aplicadas após a entrada em vigor da OMC. Nesse contexto, de acordo com o Artigo 18.3, a revisão de medidas existentes será aplicável somente durante ou após a entrada em vigor da OMC. Não obstante esse fato, no caso de medidas que são parte do DSU ou de uma medidas posteriores ao Acordo Antidumping, e que estejam ligadas a uma medida prévia à OMC, poderá ser verificada a medida prévia, mas somente nesses casos. Para. 674. “Regarding the application of the Antidumping Agreement to pre-and post-WTO measures, the Panel on US - DRAMS emphasized that the Antidumping Agreement applies only to reviews and existing measures initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of entry into force of the Agreement with respect to the Member concerned:

In our view, pre-WTO measures do not become subject to the AD Agreement simply because they continue to be applied on or after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for the Member concerned. Rather, by virtue of the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 18.3, the AD Agreement applies only to ‘reviews of existing measures’ initiated pursuant to applications made on or after the date of entry into force of the AD Agreement for the Member concerned (‘post-WTO reviews’). However, we do not believe that the terms of Article 18.3 provide for the application of the AD Agreement to all aspects of a pre-WTO measure simply because parts of that measure are under post-WTO review. Instead, we believe that the wording of Article 18.3 only applies the AD Agreement to the post-WTO review. In other words, the scope of application of the AD Agreement is determined by the scope of the post-WTO review, so that pursuant to Article 18.3, the AD Agreement only applies to those parts of a pre-WTO measure that are included in the scope of a post-WTO review. Any aspects of a pre-WTO measure that are not covered by the scope of the post-WTO review do not become subject to the AD Agreement by virtue of Article 18.3 of the AD Agreement. By way of example, a pre-WTO injury determination does not become subject to the AD Agreement merely because a post-WTO review is conducted relating to the pre-WTO determination of the margin of dumping. (220)

4. Artigo 18.4

a) “permanência da legislação inconsistente após a entrada em vigor do Acordo da OMC” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan (US - Hot Rolled Steel), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS184/AB/R, para. 675 Neste caso, o Japão desafiou os métodos de cálculo utilizados para calcular os direitos, alegando que os métodos utilizados pelos EUA eram inconsistentes a vários dispositivos, inclusive o Artigo 18.4 do Acordo Antidumping. Nesse contexto, o Painel aceitou tal alegação, e afirmou que o o método dos EUA era inconsistente.

Para 675. “In US - Hot-Rolled Steel, Japan had challenged Section 735(c)(5)(A) of the United States

Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, which provided for a method for calculating the “all others” rate (see paragraphs 471–473 above) as inconsistent with Article 9.4 and, accordingly with Articles XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement and 18.4 of the Antidumping Agreement. The Panel found that Section 735(c)(5)(A), as amended, was, on its face, inconsistent with Article 9.4 “in so far as it requires the consideration of margins based in part on facts available in the calculation of the all others rate”. The Panel further found that, in maintaining this Section following the entry into force of the Antidumping Agreement, the United States had acted inconsistently with Article 18.4 of this Agreement as well as with Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. (221) The Appellate Body upheld these findings.” (222)

b) “Legislação Mandatória versus Legislação discricionária”

Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/R, para. 676 No caso US - 1916 Act (EC), o Painel referiu-se ao Artigo 18.4 estabelecendo que o mero fato de a iniciação das investigações sobre antidumping serem discricionárias não faria com que a legislação em questão fosse considerada não mandatória automaticamente.

c) “Medidas impostas ao crivo de disputa”

Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, paras. 677 Para o Órgão de Apelação, no caso US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, todas as leis, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos, mencionados no Artigo 18.4, deverão se submeter ao DSB. Nesse sentido, abranger-se-á todo o corpo de normas conexas aplicáveis para a devida condução dos procedimentos antidumping, caso contrário, o não cumprimento frustraria as disposições do Artigo 18.4. Para 677. “In the view of the Appellate Body on US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, all laws, regulations and administrative procedures mentioned in Article 18.4 may, as such, be submitted to dispute settlement. The Appellate Body considered that “the phrase ‘laws, regulations and administrative procedures’ seems to us to encompass the entire body of generally applicable rules, norms and standards adopted by Members in connection with the conduct of antidumping proceedings. (223) If some of these types of measure could not, as such, be subject to dispute settlement under the Antidumping Agreement, it would frustrate the obligation of ‘conformity’ set forth in Article 18.4.” (224) 5. Artigo 18.5 Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, paras. 679-680 De acordo com o Artigo 18.5, cada Membro deverá informar ao Comitê qualquer mudança nas suas leis ou regulamentos internos referentes ao Acordo Antidumping. Conforme decisão do Comitê, em 1995, esse foi o exato entendimento no sentido de que qualquer mudança, seja parcial ou completa, nas investigações, deverá ter o texto notificado o texto ao Comitê. Caso o Membro ainda não tenha nenhuma legislação ou regulamento, tal Membro deverá também informar ao Comitê que não possui legislação relative à matéria. Ademais, os governos que são apenas observadores deverão também seguir a obrigação de informar Ao Comitê.

Para 679. “Article 18.5 of the Agreement provides that “Each Member shall inform the Committee

of any changes in its laws and regulations relevant to this Agreement and in the administration of such laws and regulations”. Pursuant to a decision of the Committee in February 1995, all Members having new or existing legislation and/or regulations which apply in whole or in part to antidumping duty investigations or reviews covered by the Agreement are requested to notify the full and integrated text of such legislation and/or regulations to the Committee. Changes in a Member’s legislation and/or regulations are to be notified to the Committee as well. Pursuant to that same decision of the Committee, if a Member has no such legislation or regulations, the Member is to inform the Committee of this fact. The Committee also decided that Observer governments should comply with these notification obligations.” Ainda com relação ao tema da notificação sobre a mudança de legislação, ou sobre a não existência de tal legislação, em Outubro de 2004, 105 (cento e cinco) Membros haviam notificado ao Comitê sobre a sua regulamentação do Acordo Antidumping. Dos 105, 29 Membros notificaram ao Comitê a ausência de legislação em seu território sobre o tema. Para. 680. “As of 29 October 2004, 105 Members had notified the Committee regarding their domestic antidumping legislation. (225) Of these 105 Members, 29 had notified the Committee that they had no antidumping legislation. Members’ communications in this regard can be found in document series G/ADP/N/1/… . 28 Members had not, as yet, made any notification of antidumping legislation and/or regulations. Annex A sets out the status of notifications concerning legislation under Article 18.5 of the Agreement, and sets out the reference symbol of the document(s) containing each Member’s current notification in this regard.” 6. Artigo 18.6 Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Sunset Review of Antidumping Duties on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan (US - Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS244/R, paras. 681-682

a) “Revisão Anual” O Parágrafo 7.4 da Decisão Ministerial de Doha menciona que o Artigo 18.6 do Acordo de Implementação do Artigo VI do GATT 1994 exige que o Comitê reveja anualmente a implementação e operação do Acordo, tendo como meta os objetivos do mesmo. Nesse contexto, o Comitê é instruído a elaborar guias para o melhoramento da revisão anual, assim como recomendações ao Conselho Geral para decisões subsequentes dentro de 12 (doze) meses. Para. 681. “Paragraph 7.4 of the Doha Ministerial Decision of 14 November 2001 on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns states that the Ministerial Conference “[t]akes note that Article 18.6 of the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 requires the Committee on Antidumping Practices to review annually the implementation and operation of the Agreement taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee on Antidumping Practices is instructed to draw up guidelines for the improvement of annual reviews and to report its views and recommendations to the General Council for subsequent decision within 12 months.” (226) No mandato de Doha, o Comitê adotou várias recomendações no sentido de trazer maior transparência ao Acordo Antidumping. O relatório do Comitê deverá, além de incluir no resumo anual a lista dos casos iniciados pelos Membros, incluir também uma coluna comparativa listando o número de revogações apresentadas por cada um dos Membros durante o período analisado. Caso o Membro não alegue nada, esse dado aparecerá no Relatório, no qual deverá haver também uma comparação da quantidade de medidas preliminares e finais submetidas ao Secretariado por cada um dos Membros. Com efeito, os países desenvolvidos deverão incluir no relatório semi-anual como diferenciaram suas medidas em relação aos países em desenvolvimento, com respeito aos mandamentos contidos no

Artigo 15, ou seja, dando especial atenção à particular situação dos países em desenvolvimento. Para. 682. “Further to the Doha mandate, the Committee on Antidumping Practices adopted on 27 November 2002, the “Recommendation regarding Annual Reviews of the Antidumping Agreement”. (227) In its recommendation, the Committee on Antidumping Practices considers that “improvements in the reporting of antidumping activity under the Agreement and in the Committee’s annual reviews are important to promoting transparency”. Accordingly, the Recommendation includes the following improvements aimed at providing useful information to Members and the public, and enhancing transparency under the Agreement:

1. The Committee’s annual report under Article 18.6 should include in the Summary of Antidumping Actions (228), in addition to the column currently included that lists the initiations reported by each Member, a comparable column listing the number of antidumping revocations reported by each Member during the reporting period. Where a Member has not provided such information, the report should note this omission. Members are already requested to report the number of revocations in a separate table as an annex to their semi-annual reports of antidumping activity. Consequently, such information should be included in the Article 18.6 annual report. 2. The Committee’s Article 18.6 annual report should also include a chart comparing for each Member the number of preliminary and final measures reported in its semi-annual reports with the number of notices of preliminary and final measures the Member submitted to the Secretariat for the comparable period. 3. Developed country Members should include, when reporting antidumping actions in the semi-annual report that Members are required to submit under Article 16.4, the manner in which the obligations of Article 15 have been fulfilled. Without prejudice to the scope and application of Article 15, price undertakings and lesser duty rules are examples of constructive remedies that could be included in such Members’ semi-annual reports. The Committee’s annual report under Article 18.6 should include, in a separate table, a compilation of the information reported by each Member in this respect during the reporting period. Where a Member has not provided such information, the report should note this omission. 4. This recommendation does not prejudge the ability of Members to submit other proposals and to agree in the future on other recommendations aimed at improving annual reviews in the Committee on Antidumping Practices.” (229)

7. Relação com outros Artigos

a) “Geral” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso Guatemala - Definitive Antidumping Measure on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico (Guatemala - Cement II), Demandante: México, WT/DS156/AB/R, para. 683 A relação do Artigo 18.1 com outras provisões foi discutida no caso Guatemala - Cement II. Nesse caso, o Painel entendeu que a Guatemala teria agido de forma inconsistente com relação a vários Artigos. Para 683. “The relationship between Article 18.1 and other provisions in the Antidumping Agreement was discussed in Guatemala - Cement II. The Panel found that the subject antidumping duty order of Guatemala was inconsistent with Articles 3, 5, 6, 7,12, and paragraph 2 of Annex I of the Antidumping Agreement. The Panel then opined that Mexico’s claims under other articles of the Antidumping

Agreement, among them Article 18, were “dependent claims, in the sense that they depend entirely on findings that Guatemala has violated other provisions of the AD Agreement. There would be no basis to Mexico’s claims under Articles 1, 9 and 18 of the AD Agreement, and Article VI of GATT 1994, if Guatemala were not found to have violated other provisions of the AD Agreement.” (230) In light of this dependent nature of Mexico’s claim, the Panel considered it not necessary to address these claims.” Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS162/R, para. 684 Para. 684. “O Painel no caso US - 1916 Act (Japan) estabeleceu que “o significado que vem imediatamente em mente ao ler o artigo 18.4 é que, quando a lei, regulação ou procedimentos administrativos de determinado membro sejam considerados incompatíveis com as provisões do acordo antidumping, este membro incorreria em ruptura com suas obrigações Segundo o artigo 18.4”. (231) Relatório do Painel no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: Japão, WT/DS162/R, para. 685 Para. 685. “O Painel no caso US - 1916 Act (Japan) estabeleceu em nota de rodapé que “nós não exercemos economia judicial com relação ao artigo 18.4 porque, naquele contexto, uma violação ao artigo 18.4 automaticamente resulta da ruptura de outra provisão do acordo antidumping.” (232)

b) “Artigo 17” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 686 Para 686. “No caso US - 1916 Act, o Órgão de Apelação referiu-se ao artigo 18.1 e ao artigo 18.4 como artigos que servem de suporte contextual ao disposto no artigo 17.4 ao permitir que membros tragam suas demandas contra legislações antidumping como tais.” (233) 8. Relação com outros Acordos da OMC

a) “Artigo VI do GATT 1994” Relatório do Órgão de Apelação no caso United States - Antidumping Act of 1916 (US - 1916 Act), Demandante: CE, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 687 A relação entre o Artigo 18 do Acordo Antidumping e o Artigo VI do GATT 1994 foi discutida no caso US - 1916 Act.

b) “Acordo sobre Subsídios e medidas compensatórias” Relatório do Painel no caso United States-Antidumping Duty on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit or Above from Korea (US - DRAMS), Demandante: República da Coreia, WT/DS99/R, para. 688 Para. 688. “O Painel do caso US - DRAMS referiu-se a aplicabilidade do acordo sobre subsídios e medidas compensatórias a medidas iniciadas antes da entrada em vigor do acordo da OMC, decidindo de forma similar de ao disposto no acordo Antidumping.” III. Comentários

O Artigo 18 do Acordo Antidumping é um Artigo geral, que dispõe sobre as orientações a serem dadas ao Acordo Antidumping. Nesse contexto, o costume deve ser levado em conta, seja com relação ao histórico que envolve o comércio, seja nos diplomas que tratam direta ou indiretamente sobre o tema. O costume, fonte primária de Direito Internacional Público, baliza e guia as interpretações e procedimentos, tanto do Painel, quanto do Órgão de Apelação. Assim, seguindo o costume, os Membros deverão também, além de seguir as determinações do Artigo 18.1, e de todo o Acordo Antidumping, cumprir o determinado no Artigo VI do Acordo Geral do GATT 1994. Além das ações específicas contra o dumping, os Membros deverão seguir as ações gerais, dispostas na nota de rodapé de número 24. Note-se que, para que se iniciem as investigações, não será necessário ou relevante que se examine as condições, nem os impactos de competição no plano doméstico. Para o Órgão de Apelação, a análise estará mais direcionada à estrutura e à forma da medida, não sendo necessária uma avaliação econômica das implicações da medida. Com relação à aplicabilidade do disposto no Acordo, seguir-se-á as medidas a partir do momento em que o Membro adentrou ao GATT 1994. As medidas posteriors, as quais tiverem relação direta com uma medida prévia, também poderão ser analisadas. Com efeito, cálculos da investigação deverão ser feitos de acordo com o disposto no Acordo Antidumping, especificamente, em seu Artigo 18.4. Leis, regulamentos e procedimentos administrativos, deverão se adequar ao Acordo e, caso não estejam em conformidade, poderão ser submetidos ao DSB, que analisará não somente o disposto no Acordo, mas também todos os regulamentos conexos ao caso concreto. Com relação à aplicabilidade, segundo o Artigo 18, os Membros deverão informar ao Comitê caso haja uma mudança em suas legislações. Interessante notar, que o objetivo do Acordo que estabelece um comitê é exatamente regular a atividade e ter em dados a que passo anda o avanço dos Membros, no sentido de compatibilizarem a regulação interna com a regulação internacional referente ao comércio e ao dumping. Prova disso, é que mesmo os Membros que não possuem legislação deverão informar tal “status” ao comitê. Além da previsão de informar ao Comitê, disposta no Artigo 18.5, o Artigo 18.6 do Acordo Antidumping, em conjunto com o Artigo 7.4 da Decisão Ministerial de Doha, preveem que se reveja anualmente a implementação e operação do Acordo Antidumping, com o intuit de fazerem recomendações pontuais. Por fim, cabe ressaltar que o Artigo 18, ao contrário de vários outros Artigos, visa não apenas dispor sobre medidas específicas, mas enfatizar como deverá ser interpretado o Acordo Antidumping como um todo. Ademais, os Membros devem sempre ter em mente que, apesar da prerrogativa que os Membros tem de implementar direitos antidumping, uma especial atenção deve ser dada à particular situação dos países em desenvolvimento. Nesse contexto, temos que o dumping é uma medida que pode ser maléfica para o país importador, mas que também pode ser entendida como uma medida necessária para que determinado setor da economia do país exportador se mantenha vivo. Com efeito, o que se pretende no cenário internacional é promover o comércio internacional e, ao mesmo tempo, diminuir as desigualdades de forma a incentivar as especialidades dos Membros e, ao mesmo tempo, criar mecanismos para que os Membros que estejam sendo demasiadamente prejudicados possam buscar no DSB medidas para desincentivar subsídios exacerbados e concorrência desleal. FOOTNOTES: Footnote 206: Panel Report on US — DRAMS, para. 6.21. Footnote 207: Appellate Body Report on US — 1916 Act, para. 121. Footnote 208: Appellate Body Report on US — 1916 Act, paras. 122–126. See also Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (Japan), paras. 6.214–218 and 6.264; and Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (EC), paras. 6.197–6.199. Footnote 209: Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 239. Footnote 210: Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 239. As the Appellate Body underlined “Our analysis in US — 1916 Act focused on the strength of the link between the measure and the elements of dumping or a subsidy. In other words, we focused on the degree of correlation between the scope of application of the measure and the constituent elements of dumping or of a subsidy.” Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd

Amendment), para. 244. Footnote 211: See Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 247. Footnote 212: Panel Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), paras. 7.17–7.18. Footnote 213: Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 256. Footnote 214: Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 257. Footnote 215: Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 258. Footnote 216: Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (EC), para. 6.114. Footnote 217: Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.218. Footnote 218: Appellate Body Report on US — Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), para. 262. Footnote 219: Panel Report on US — DRAMS, para. 6.14, fn 477. Footnote 220: Panel Report on US — DRAMS, para. 6.14. Footnote 221: Panel Report on US — Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 7.90. Footnote 222: Appellate Body Report on US — Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 129. Footnote 223: We observe that the scope of each element in the phrase “laws, regulations and administrative procedures” must be determined for purposes of WTO law and not simply by reference to the label given to various instruments under the domestic law of each WTO Member. This determination must be based on the content and substance of the instrument, and not merely on its form or nomenclature. Otherwise, the obligations set forth in Article 18.4 would vary from Member to Member depending on each Member’s domestic law and practice. Footnote 224: Appellate Body Report on United States — Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 87. Footnote 225: The European Communities is counted as one Member. Prior to 1 May 2004, the member-States of the EC were the following: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. As of 1 May 2004, the member-States of the EC included in addition to the afore-listed, the following: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. This annual report includes a period both before and after the accession of these Members to the European Communities. Therefore, these Members’ separate notifications of legislation, submitted prior to their accession to the EC, are listed in this report. See document G/ADPN/1/ EEC/2/Suppl.6 for updated information on the current status of laws and regulations of these Members. Footnote 226: WT/MIN(01)/17. Footnote 227: G/ADP/9. Footnote 228: See Report (2001) of the Committee on Antidumping Practices, Annex C, G/L/495 (31 October 2001). Footnote 229: G/ADP/9. Footnote 230: Panel Report on Guatemala — Cement II, para. 8.296. Footnote 231: Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.286. Footnote 232: Panel Report on US — 1916 Act (Japan), para. 6.286, fn 595. Footnote 233: Appellate Body Report on US — 1916 Act, paras. 78–82. See also paras. 596 and 610 of this Chapter.

ANEXO I Fernanda Dalla Valle Martino

ENTENDIMENTOS RELATIVOS A APLICACAO DO ANEXO I – ANTIDUMPING AGREEMENT

IA. Texto do Anexo em Inglês

ANNEX I PROCEDURES FOR ON THE SPOT INVESTIGATIONS PURSUANT

TO PARAGRAPH 7 OF ARTICLE 6

1. Upon initiation of an investigation, the authorities of the exporting Member and the firms known to be concerned should be informed of the intention to carry out on the spot investigations.

2. If in exceptional circumstances it is intended to include non governmental experts in the

investigating team, the firms and the authorities of the exporting Member should be so informed. Such non governmental experts should be subject to effective sanctions for breach of confidentiality requirements.

3. It should be standard practice to obtain explicit agreement of the firms concerned in the

exporting Member before the visit is finally scheduled. 4. As soon as the agreement of the firms concerned has been obtained, the investigating

authorities should notify the authorities of the exporting Member of the names and addresses of the firms to be visited and the dates agreed.

5. Sufficient advance notice should be given to the firms in question before the visit is made. 6. Visits to explain the questionnaire should only be made at the request of an exporting firm.

Such a visit may only be made if (a) the authorities of the importing Member notify the representatives of the Member in question and (b) the latter do not object to the visit.

7. As the main purpose of the on the spot investigation is to verify information provided or to

obtain further details, it should be carried out after the response to the questionnaire has been received unless the firm agrees to the contrary and the government of the exporting Member is informed by the investigating authorities of the anticipated visit and does not object to it; further, it should be standard practice prior to the visit to advise the firms concerned of the general nature of the information to be verified and of any further information which needs to be provided, though this should not preclude requests to be made on the spot for further details to be provided in the light of information obtained.

8. Enquiries or questions put by the authorities or firms of the exporting Members and essential

to a successful on the spot investigation should, whenever possible, be answered before the visit is made.

IB. Texto do Anexo em Português

ANEXO I PROCEDIMENTOS PARA INVESTIGAÇÃO CONFORME PARÁGRAFO 7 DO ARTIGO 6

1. Após a abertura do inquérito, as autoridades do Membro Exportador e as empresas conhecidas como interessadas devem ser informadas da intenção de realizar as investigações no local.

2. Se em circunstancias excepcionais houver intenção de incluir peritos não-governamentais na equipe de investigação, as empresas e as autoridades do Membro Exportador devem ser informadas. Tais peritos não-governamentais não devem ser sujeitos a sanções por violação de requisitos de confidencialidade.

3. A obtenção do acordo explicito das empresas envolvidas do Membro Exportador, antes da

visita final ser marcada, deve ser pratica padrão. 5. Quanto mais cedo o acordo das empresas envolvidas for obtido, as autoridades investigadoras

deverão notificar as autoridades do Membro Exportador os nomes e os endereços das empresas que deverão ser visitadas.

5. A notificação das empresas em questão deve ser feita com antecedência considerada

suficiente. 6. Visitas para explicar o questionário devem ser feitas somente a pedido de uma empresa

exportadora. Essa visita somente poderá ser realizada se . (a) As autoridades do Membro Importador notificarem as autoridades do membro Exportador em questão; (b) o ultimo não se opor à visita.

7. Considerando que o objetivo principal da investigação em questão é de confirmar informações

prestadas, ou a de fornecer mais detalhes, as respostas para o questionário devem ser normalmente concedidas, a menos que a empresa não estabeleça em sentido contrario, e que o Governo do pais exportador seja informado pelas autoridades investigadoras sobre a visita antecipada e que não se oponha; além disso, deve ser pratica padrão das visitas o esclarecimento às empresas em questão sobre o caráter geral da informação a ser verificada ou qualquer outra informação que precise ser fornecida, embora isso não impeça que pedidos sejam feitos no local para obter mais detalhes sobre tais informações.

8. Pedidos ou esclarecimentos feitos pelas autoridades ou pelas firmas dos Membros

Exportadores, que sejam essenciais para o sucesso da investigação em questão deverão, sempre que possível, ser respondidas antes da realização da visita.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução Nada a observar. II. Interpretaçao e Aplicaçao do Anexo I O Anexo I dispõe acerca dos procedimentos para investigações in loco. Como essas investigações são realizadas segundo o Parágrafo 7 do Artigo 6, os dispositivos deste Anexo, que foram objeto de análise pelo DSB, foram mencionados nos mesmos casos em que o Artigo 6.7 do Acordo Antidumping, dentre os quais: (i) Egypt - Steel rebar (DS211); (ii) Argentina - Ceramic Tiles (DS189); e (iii) Guatemala – Cement II (DS189). III. Comentários Nada a comentar

ANEXO II Fernanda Dalla Valle Martino Marina Pantoja IA. Texto do Anexo em Inglês

Annex II Best Information Available in Terms of Paragraph 8 of Article 6

1 As soon as possible after the initiation of the investigation, the investigating authorities should specify in detail the information required from any interested party, and the manner in which that information should be structured by the interested party in its response. The authorities should also ensure that the party is aware that if information is not supplied within a reasonable time, the authorities will be free to make determinations on the basis of the facts available, including those contained in the application for the initiation of the investigation by the domestic industry.

2 The authorities may also request that an interested party provide its response in a particular

medium (e.g. computer tape) or computer language. Where such a request is made, the authorities should consider the reasonable ability of the interested party to respond in the preferred medium or computer language, and should not request the party to use for its response a computer system other than that used by the party. The authority should not maintain a request for a computerized response if the interested party does not maintain computerized accounts and if presenting the response as requested would result in an unreasonable extra burden on the interested party, e.g. it would entail unreasonable additional cost and trouble. The authorities should not maintain a request for a response in a particular medium or computer language if the interested party does not maintain its computerized accounts in such medium or computer language and if presenting the response as requested would result in an unreasonable extra burden on the interested party, e.g. it would entail unreasonable additional cost and trouble.

3 All information which is verifiable, which is appropriately submitted so that it can be used in

the investigation without undue difficulties, which is supplied in a timely fashion, and, where applicable, which is supplied in a medium or computer language requested by the authorities, should be taken into account when determinations are made. If a party does not respond in the preferred medium or computer language but the authorities find that the circumstances set out in paragraph 2 have been satisfied, the failure to respond in the preferred medium or computer language should not be considered to significantly impede the investigation.

4 Where the authorities do not have the ability to process information if provided in a

particular medium (e.g. computer tape), the information should be supplied in the form of written material or any other form acceptable to the authorities.

5 Even though the information provided may not be ideal in all respects, this should not justify

the authorities from disregarding it, provided the interested party has acted to the best of its ability.

6 If evidence or information is not accepted, the supplying party should be informed forthwith

of the reasons therefor, and should have an opportunity to provide further explanations within a reasonable period, due account being taken of the time limits of the investigation. If the explanations are considered by the authorities as not being satisfactory, the reasons for the rejection of such evidence or information should be given in any published determinations.

7 If the authorities have to base their findings, including those with respect to normal value, on

information from a secondary source, including the information supplied in the application

for the initiation of the investigation, they should do so with special circumspection. In such cases, the authorities should, where practicable, check the information from other independent sources at their disposal, such as published price lists, official import statistics and customs returns, and from the information obtained from other interested parties during the investigation. It is clear, however, that if an interested party does not cooperate and thus relevant information is being withheld from the authorities, this situation could lead to a result which is less favourable to the party than if the party did cooperate.

IB. Texto do Artigo em Português

Anexo II Melhor Informação Disponível em Termos do Parágrafo 10 do artigo 6

1. Tão logo iniciada a investigação, as autoridades investigadoras deverão especificar pormenorizadamente as informações requeridas das partes envolvidas e a forma pela qual tal informação deverá estar estruturada pela parte interessada em sua resposta. As autoridades deverão igualmente certificar-se de que a parte têm consciência de que o não fornecimento da informação dentro de um prazo razoável permitirá às autoridades estabelecer determinações com base nos fatos disponíveis, entre eles os contidos na petição de início de investigação formulada pela indústria nacional.

2. As autoridades poderão igualmente requerer que uma parte interessada forneça suas respostas

em meio específico (por exemplo, em fita magnética de computador) ou linguagem de computador. No caso de tal requerimento ser formulado, as autoridades terão em conta as possibilidades razoáveis da parte interessada de responder como lhes é solicitado e não deverão pedir à parte que use em sua resposta sistema de computador diferente daquele que é habitualmente usado pela parte. A autoridade não deverá insistir em seu requerimento de respostas informatizadas se a parte interessada não mantém contabilidade informatizada e se a entrega de respostas informatizadas representar sobrecarga adicional desproporcional para a parte interessada, como, por exemplo, acréscimo injustificado de custos e dificuldades. As autoridades não deverão insistir em seu requerimento de resposta sobre meio específico ou linguagem de computador específica se a parte não mantém sua contabilidade informatizada naquele meio específico ou naquela linguagem de computador específica e se a apresentação de respostas, tal como requeridas, resultar em sobrecarga adicional desproporcional para a parte interessada, como, por exemplo, acréscimo injustificado de custos e dificuldades.

3. Ao formularem-se as determinações ter-se-ão em conta todas as informações verificáveis que

tenham sido adequadamente apresentadas e que, portanto, possam ser utilizadas na investigação sem dificuldades excessivas, que tenham sido apresentadas atempadamente e que, quando proceda, tenham sido apresentadas no meio ou na linguagem de computador requerida pelas autoridades. Se uma parte interessada não responde no meio ou na linguagem de computador solicitada pelas autoridades, mas estas determinam que as circunstâncias estabelecidas no parágrafo 2 foram satisfeitas, a ausência de resposta no meio requerido ou na linguagem de computador requerida não deverá ser considerada como impedimento significativo da investigação.

4. Sempre que as autoridades não dispuserem de meios para processar a informação por a terem

recebido sobre um meio específico (por exemplo, fita magnética de computador) a informação deverá ser fornecida sob a forma de documento escrito ou sob outra forma aceitável pelas autoridades.

5. Muito embora a informação fornecida possa não ser a ideal sob muitos aspectos, as

autoridades não poderão por tanto justificar-se de ignorá-la, sempre que a parte interessada se tenha servido do melhor de seus recursos.

6. No caso de não ser aceita uma informação, à parte que a forneceu deverão ser apresentadas explicações imediatas sobre o motivo que determinou a recusa e oferecida oportunidade para que forneça explicações ulteriores dentro de período de tempo razoável, tendo-se devidamente em conta os limites de duração da investigação. Se as explicações são consideradas insatisfatórias pelas autoridades, os motivos pelos quais foram rejeitados tais esclarecimentos ou informações deverão ser apresentados em quaisquer conclusões que se publiquem.

7. As autoridades que tenham de basear suas determinações, entre elas as que digam respeito ao

valor normal sobre informações de fontes secundárias, inclusive as informações fornecidas na petição para início de investigação, deverão fazê-lo com especial prudência. Em tais casos, as autoridades deverão, sempre que praticável, comparar informações com outras fontes independentes à sua disposição, tais como listas de preços publicadas, estatísticas oficiais de importação e estatísticas aduaneiras, assim como com as informações provenientes de outras partes interessadas durante as investigações. Em quaisquer circunstâncias porém, fica claro que se uma parte interessada não coopera e as informações relevantes são subtraídas ao conhecimento das autoridades, tais circunstâncias poderão levar a resultado menos favorável à parte do que aquele que ocorreria caso ela tivesse cooperado.

IC. Comentários sobre a Tradução

Nada a comentar II. Interpretação e Aplicação do Anexo II O Anexo II contém diretrizes para a utilização da melhor informação disponível pela autoridade investigadora, nos casos em que as partes investigadas cooperam de forma insuficiente com a investigação. Esta hipótese é admitida pelo Parágrafo 8 do Artigo 6. Portanto, da mesma forma como ressaltado quanto ao Anexo I e Artigo 6.7, também nota-se estrita relação, na alegação pelas Partes, de suposta infração ao Artigo 6.8 e aos dispositivos do Anexo II. Assim, a interpretação dos dispositivos deste Anexo, pelo DSB, foram realizadas no item referente ao Artigo 6.8, tendo sido mencionados os seguintes casos: (i) Egypt - Steel Rebar (DS211); (ii) EC - Salmon - Norway (DS337); (iii) Guatemala - Cement II (DS156); (iv) Argentina - Ceramic Tiles (DS189); (v) US – Steel Plate (DS206); (vi) US - Hot-Rolled Steel (DS184); e, (vii) China – GOES (DS414). III. Comentários Nada a comentar.