82. Navarosa v. COMELEC

7/24/2019 82. Navarosa v. COMELEC

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 157957. September 18, 2003.]

CHARITO NAVAROSA , petitioner , vs . COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, HONORABLE DEAN R. TELAN, as Presiding Judge,Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan and ROGER M.

ESTO, respondents .

Francisco B. Sibayan for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Reynaldo M. Quimpo for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

In the election protest filed in the RTC by mayoralty candidate Esto against his rivacandidate Navarosa, judgment was rendered in favor of Esto, declaring him winnerin the May 14, 2001 elections and ordering Navarosa to pay him damages. WhileNavarosa appealed the ruling to the COMELEC, Esto filed a motion for execution of

judgment pending appeal. The same was granted subject to the filing of P300,000bond or stayed, as prayed by Navarosa, upon filing of P600,000 supersedes bondEsto then filed a petition for certiorari with the Comelec. Navarosa, in hermemorandum, raised for the first time the issue of RTC's failure to acquire

jurisdiction over the election protest for Esto's failure to pay the Comelec filing fee

The Comelec held that the filing fee was duly paid and the execution of judgmentpending appeal is proper. CAcDTI

After active participation in all the proceedings of the case, petitioner is nowestopped from claiming absence of jurisdiction for non-payment of filing fees. Inexecution of judgment pending appeal, the Comelec affirmed the good reasons to

justify issuance of order namely, that it will give substance and meaning to thepeople's mandate, and more than 10 months of the 3-year term of office hadalready lapsed. A supersedeas bond finds no application in election protest caseswhere judgments invariably include orders which are not capable of pecuniary

estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; FILING FEE; JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE OFNON-PAYMENT THEREOF, THOUGH PROCEDURALLY NOT PROPER IN A PETITION

THAT INVOLVES ONLY AN ANCILLARY ISSUE, RESOLVED HERE. — PetitionerNavarosa contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the electionprotest because of respondent Esto's failure to pay the COMELEC filing fee underRule 35, Section 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Procedurally, petitioner



Navarosa should not have raised this jurisdictional issue in this petition whichinvolves only the ancillary issue of whether to allow execution of the trial court'sdecision pending appeal. Nevertheless, as the question of the trial court's

jurisdiction also affects its authority to issue ancillary orders, we resolved to passupon this issue.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — Section 9 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure provides: FilingFee. — No protest, counter-protest, or protest-in intervention shall be given due

course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of three hundred pesos(P300.00) for each interest. Each interest shall further pay the legal research fee asrequired by law. Respondent Esto must pay this filing fee before the trial court canexercise its jurisdiction over the election protest. The COMELEC filing fee, todistinguish from the other mandatory fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, asamended, is credited to the Court's General Fund.

3. ID.; ID.; ELECTION PROTEST CASES; JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE RAISED BYPARTY FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, ESTOPPED. THEREFROM. — At no time didpetitioner Navarosa ever raise the issue of respondent Esto's incomplete payment of

the COMELEC filing fee during the full-blown trial of the election protest. PetitionerNavarosa actively participated in the proceedings below and raised the issue ofincomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee only in her memorandum torespondent Esto's petition before the COMELEC Second Division. PetitionerNavarosa's conduct estops her from claiming, at such late stage, that the trial courtdid not after all acquire jurisdiction over the election protest. Although a partycannot waive jurisdictional issues and may raise them at any stage of theproceedings, estoppel may bar a party from raising such issues. The law vests in thetrial court jurisdiction over election protests although the exercise of such

jurisdiction requires the payment of docket and filing fees by the party invoking the

trial court's jurisdiction. Estoppel now prevents petitioner Navarosa fromquestioning the trial court's exercise of such jurisdiction, which the law and not anyact of the parties has conferred on the trial court. At this stage, the remedy forrespondent Esto's incomplete payment is for him to pay the P200 deficiency in theCOMELEC filing fee. It is highly unjust to the electorate of Libacao, Aklan, after thetrial court has completed revision of the contested ballots, to dismiss the electionprotest and forever foreclose the determination of the true winner of the electionfor a mere P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL; REQUISITES. — To grant

execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites mustconcur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to theadverse party; (2) there must be "good reasons" for the execution pending appeal;and (3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the "good reasons."

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GOOD REASONS; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — InRamas v. Commission on Elections, the Court, after reviewing pertinent

jurisprudence, summarized the circumstances qualifying as "good reasons" justifyingexecution pending appeal, thus: In a nutshell, the following constitute "goodreasons," and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution



pending appeal: (1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) theshortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3) thelength of time that the election contest has been pending. The trial court in thepresent case, relying on cases reviewed in Ramas, invoked two "good reasons" to

justify its order allowing execution pending appeal. First, the order will "givesubstance and meaning to the people's mandate." Second, "more than 10 monthsor nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term" of the office in question had already lapsed. TheCOMELEC found these "good reasons" sufficient.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 2, RULE 139 OF THE RULES OF COURT APPLIES INSUPPLETORY CHARACTER. — Unlike the Election Code of 1971, which expresslyprovided for execution pending appeal of trial courts' rulings in election protests, thepresent election laws are silent on such remedy. Nevertheless, Section 2, Rule 39("Section 2") of the Rules of Court (now 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) applies insuppletory character to election cases, thus allowing execution pending appeal inthe discretion of the court. A primordial public interest - to obviate a hollow victoryfor the duly elected candidate as determined by the trial court - lies behind thepresent rule giving suppletory application to Section 2. Only a more compelling

contrary policy consideration can prevent the suppletory application of Section 2.

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERSEDEAS BOND CANNOT STAY AN ORDER NOTCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION SUCH AS RIGHT TO HOLD OFFICE ANDPERFORM ITS FUNCTION. — In insisting that the simple expedient of posting asupersedeas bond can stay execution pending appeal, petitioner Navarosa neitherclaims nor offers a more compelling contrary policy consideration. A supersedeasbond under Section 3, Rule 39 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailingparty in election protest cases. Section 3, provides: Stay of discretionary execution.Discretionary execution issued under the preceding section may be stayed upon

approval by the proper court of a sufficient bond, filed by the party against whom itis directed, conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or order allowed tobe executed in case it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thusgiven may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. A supersedeasbond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case of itsaffirmation. Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest ofthe prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, ofprotection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimatesentence of Section 3 states: "[T]he bond thus given may be proceeded against onmotion with notice to the surety." Consequently, it finds no application in election

protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are not capable ofpecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions. Asapplied to the present case, the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed can onlyanswer for that portion of the trial court's ruling ordering her to pay to respondentEsto actual damages, attorney's fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot secureexecution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor ofLibacao, Aklan by popular will of the electorate and authorizing him to assume theoffice. This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the filing of thesupersedeas bond in the first place.



8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION; NOT PRESENT. — The Court holds that the COMELEC did not commitgrave abuse of discretion in ordering execution pending appeal of the trial court'sdecision. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise ofpower because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion mustbe so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a dutyenjoined by law. This does not obtain in the present case.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J p:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") En Banc

Resolution dated 15 April 2003 denying petitioner Charito Navarosa's motion forreconsideration of the COMELEC Second Division Resolution 1 dated 28 November2002. The COMELEC Second Division Resolution ordered the execution pendingappeal of the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan,proclaiming respondent Roger M. Esto winner in the mayoralty race in the 14 May2001 elections.

The Facts

Petitioner Charito Navarosa ("petitioner Navarosa") and respondent Roger M. Esto("respondent Esto") were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14 May2001 elections. On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers ofLibacao proclaimed petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winningmargin of three (3) votes over respondent Esto. 3

Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precinctsrespondent Esto filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. 129("election protest") in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan ("trialcourt"). Petitioner Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities

prejudiced her, filed a counter-protest in the same case.

On 4 March 2002, after revision of the contested ballots, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Esto. The trial court found that respondent Estoobtained 4,595 votes over petitioner Navarosa's 4,553 votes. Thus, the trial courtdeclared respondent Esto the elected mayor of Libacao by a margin of 42 votes andannulled the earlier proclamation of petitioner Navarosa. The trial court also orderedpetitioner Navarosa to pay respondent Esto actual damages and attorney's fees. Thedispositive portion of the decision provides:



WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Declaring the Proclamation of . . . protestee [Navarosa] as theduly elected Mayor of Libacao, Aklan and the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and the Proclamation of the WinningCandidates for Municipal Offices, dated May 17, 2001, as null andvoid;

b) Declaring the protestant, Roger M. Esto, as the duly electedMunicipal Mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the May 14, 2001 election;

c) Ordering the protestee [Navarosa] to pay the sum of P14,215.00as actual and compensatory damages, and the amount of P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, plus the cost of suit. 4

Petitioner Navarosa appealed the trial court's ruling to the COMELEC (EAC Case NoA-9-2002). Respondent Esto, on the other hand, filed with the trial court a motionfor execution of the judgment pending petitioner Navarosa's appeal. Petitioner

Navarosa opposed respondent Esto's motion. In the alternative, petitioner Navarosaoffered to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the triacourt grant respondent Esto's motion.

In its Order of 22 March 2002 ("Order"), the trial court granted respondent Esto'smotion subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond. However, in the same order, thetrial court also granted petitioner Navarosa's prayer to stay the execution pendingappeal, upon filing a P600,000 supersedeas bond. The Order reads:

The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized and given approval toexecution of judgments pending appeal in election cases, filed under existing

election laws. In these cases, the immediate execution was made inaccordance with Sec. 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court ( Ramas et al. vs.COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 130831, 2/10/98). There is, therefore, no questionnow that execution pending appeal may be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he grant of execution would give substance and meaning to the people'smandate specially since the court has established protestant's right to theoffice (Lindo vs. COMELEC cited in the Ramas case); more than 10 monthsor nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term for Mayor had already lapsed (Gutierrez vs.COMELEC , G.R. 126298, 3-25-97; Tobon Uy vs. COMELEC also cited in theRamas case). These are two "good reasons" to justify execution of thedecision pending appeal.

[P]rotestee [Navarosa] however, prays in the alternative, that shouldexecution pending appeal be granted, the same be stayed upon his [sic]filing of supersedeas bond to be fixed by the court under Sec. 3, Rule 39,1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Unlike Sec. 2, Rule 39 where the grant of execution pending appeal is



conditioned upon the presence of the "good and valid reason" for its grant,Sec. 3, Rule 39 does not provide for any condition precedent before thediscretionary execution of Rule 2 may be stayed. All that it requires is that asufficient supersedeas bond must be approved by the court conditionedupon the performance of the judgment allowed to be executed in case itshall be finally sustained in whole or in part. Under this section, therefore,the filing of a supersedeas bond sufficient in amount is enough to stay theexecution granted under Sec. 2.

Moreover, the margin of 42 votes in the instant case is not so big,overwhelming or insurmountable as to be practically beyond or improbableof being overturned by the higher courts. . . .

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing[,] the court finds that the protestant,Roger M. Esto is entitled to the execution of the decision dated March 4,2002, pending appeal, upon the filing of a bond which covers the salary andemoluments of the office of the Municipal Mayor of Libacao, Aklan and or thepayment of all damages in the amount of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency,in cash, surety bond or real property with assessed value in said amount to

be filed on or before April 3, 2002, furnishing copy thereof to the protesteeor his duly authorized representative.

The protestee, Charito Navarosa, considering that the margin is not soinsurmountable as to be beyond reversal by the higher court[,] is herebyallowed to stay the execution of the decision of March 4, 2002 pendingappeal, by filing a supersedeas bond in double the amount posted by theprotestant, on or before April 3, 2002, furnishing copy thereof theprotestant or his duly authorized representative. 5

Both petitioner Navarosa and respondent Esto sought reconsideration of the Orderbut the trial court denied their motions on 5 April 2002.

Respondent Esto filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the Order.In her memorandum to the petition, petitioner Navarosa raised for the first time theissue of the trial court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over the election protestbecause of respondent Esto's failure to pay the COMELEC filing fee.

The Ruling of the COMELEC

In its Resolution dated 28 November 2002 ("Resolution"), the COMELEC Second

Division affirmed the trial court's Order granting execution pending appeal andnullified the stay of the execution. The Second Division also found that respondentEsto duly paid the COMELEC filing fee. The Resolution reads:

Going now to the main issue at hand, did respondent judge gravely abusehis discretion and/or exceed his jurisdiction when he stayed the immediateexecution of his decision on a finding of "good reasons" he made in hisquestioned Order of March 22, 2002 by allowing in the same Order the filingof a supersedeas bond double the amount posted by petitioner?

The answer is yes.



It is [for] the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition,mandamus and injunction over all contests involving elective municipalofficials decided by the trial courts of general jurisdiction elevated on appeal,and not the trial court, that may order the stay or restrain the immediateexecution of the decision pending appeal granted by the trial court of general jurisdiction in an election contest. Except when the trial courtreversed itself in a motion for reconsideration of its order granting

immediate execution, it cannot later on stay or restrain the executionthereof in the guise of allowing the losing party to file a supersedeas bond.

The issue before the trial court where a motion for execution pending appealis filed is to determine whether or not there are "good reasons" to justify theimmediate execution pending appeal. The issue is not whether . . . there aregood reasons to stay the immediate execution of the decision pendingappeal.

The trial court, by granting the immediate execution of the March 4, 2002decision, recognized that the "good reasons" cited in the questioned Orderconstitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh theinjuries or damages to the adverse party if the decision is reversed. Bydeclaring that petitioner Esto is the duly elected Mayor of Libacao, Aklan, thetrial court gave substance and meaning to the people's mandate asexpressed in the ballot, especially since it has established petitioner Esto'sright to the office. The trial court cannot indirectly reverse its substantialfinding of "good reasons" by a rule of procedure which does not strictlyapply in election protest cases when it allowed the filing of a supersedeasbond under Section 3, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To allowthe application of the said procedural relief would defeat the right of thewinning candidate in an election protest to hold the public office by virtue of

the people's mandate expressed through the ballot and to perform thefunctions of the said public office.

xxx xxx xxx

It is interesting to note that instead of expounding on the propriety of thesupersedeas bond to stay the execution of a judgment in an election protestcase, private respondent raised for the first time in his [sic] memorandumthe issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the instant electionprotest for the alleged failure of petitioner Esto to pay the filing fee of P300.00 required under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure. However, the records of Election Case No. 129 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9 showed otherwise. The Official Receipts issued bythe RTC of Kalibo, Aklan shows [sic] that petitioners paid a total of P515.00filing fees in Election Case No. 129 by specifically stating therein "[F]iling Feein Election Case No. 129". At the time of filing the election protest, petitionerspecified that the payment made was to cover the COMELEC filing fee forthe election protest. Upon assessment, petitioner paid not only the amountof P300.00 required under Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, but a total sum of P515.00 as filing fees. While it is true that theissue of jurisdiction may be raised anytime, even on appeal, the same is of



no moment now. 6

Petitioner Navarosa sought reconsideration of this ruling but the COMELEC En Bancdenied her motion on 15 April 2003.

Hence, this petition.

On 10 June 2003, the Court required the parties to maintain the status quo pendingresolution of this petition.

The Issues

Petitioner Navarosa raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC ACTEDWITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OREXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE 28

NOVEMBER 2002 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECONDDIVISION FOR FAILURE TO RULE ON THE BASIC ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO OVER RESPONDENTESTO'S ELECTION PROTEST FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THEMANDATORY COMELEC FILING FEE OF P300.00.

2. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC ACTEDWITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OREXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE 28NOVEMBER 2002 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECOND

DIVISION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WERE NO " GOOD REASONS " TO EXECUTE THE 4 MARCH 2002 DECISION OF THE

TRIAL COURT.

3. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC EN BANC ACTEDWITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OREXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE 28NOVEMBER 2002 RESOLUTION OF THE COMELEC SECONDDIVISION WHEN THE LATTER RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURTHAD NO POWER TO ORDER THE STAY OF EXECUTION OF ITS 4

MARCH 2002 DECISION PENDING APPEAL IN AN ELECTIONCONTEST, BECAUSE SECTION 3, RULE 39 OF THE REVISEDRULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY TO ELECTION CASES. 7

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over Election Case No. 129

Petitioner Navarosa contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the



election protest because of respondent Esto's failure to pay the COMELEC filing feeunder Rule 35, Section 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure ("Section 9").Procedurally, petitioner Navarosa should not have raised this jurisdictional issue inthis petition which involves only the ancillary issue of whether to allow execution ofthe trial court's decision pending appeal. Nevertheless, as the question of the triacourt's jurisdiction also affects its authority to issue ancillary orders such as its Ordeof 22 March 2002 subject of this petition, we have resolved to pass upon this issue.

Section 9 provides:

Filing Fee . — No protest, counter-protest, or protest-in-intervention shall begiven due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of threehundred pesos (P300.00) for each interest.

Each interest shall further pay the legal research fee as required by law.

Respondent Esto must pay this filing fee before the trial court can exercise its jurisdiction over the election protest. 8 The COMELEC filing fee, to distinguishfrom the other mandatory fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, asamended, is credited to the Court's General Fund. 9

Petitioner Navarosa claims that although the receipts issued by the trial court showthat respondent Esto paid P515 as "filing" and other fees, only P100 was credited tothe General Fund. The rest of what respondent Esto paid accrued to the JudiciaryDevelopment Fund (P400), the Legal Research Fund (P10) and the Victim'sCompensation Fund (P5). 10 Consequently, respondent Esto paid only P100 of theP300 COMELEC filing fee, for which reason the trial court did not acquire jurisdictionover the election protest. Petitioner Navarosa also claimed that the Second Divisiondid not rule on this issue.

Contrary to petitioner Navarosa's claim, the COMELEC Second Division did rule onthe issue of respondent Esto's non-payment of the full amount of the COMELECfiling fee. The Second Division held that the P515 fees respondent Esto paid alreadycovered the P300 COMELEC filing fee.

However, based on the trial court's Election Fees Form for Election Case No. 129, 11

of the total amount of P515 respondent Esto paid, only P100 was indeed credited tothe General Fund. Consequently, respondent Esto only paid P100 of the requiredP300 COMELEC filing fee.

In an earlier ruling, 12 the Court held that an election protest is not dismissible if theprotestant, relying on the trial court's assessment, pays only a portion 13 of theCOMELEC filing fee. However, in Miranda v. Castillo , 14 the Court, reiterating Loyolav. Commission on Elections , 15 held that it would no longer tolerate "any mistake inthe payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after thepromulgation of the Loyola decision on March 25, 1997." Nevertheless, our rulingsin Miranda and Loyola are inapplicable to the present case.

At no time did petitioner Navarosa ever raise the issue of respondent Esto's



incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee during the full-blown trial of theelection protest. Petitioner Navarosa actively participated in the proceedings belowby filing her Answer, presenting her evidence, and later, seeking a stay of executionby filing a supersedeas bond. Not only this, she even invoked the trial court's

jurisdiction by filing a counter-protest against respondent Esto in which she musthave prayed for affirmative reliefs. 16

Petitioner Navarosa raised the issue of incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing

fee only in her memorandum to respondent Esto's petition before the COMELECSecond Division. Petitioner Navarosa's conduct estops her from claiming, at suchlate stage, that the trial court did not after all acquire jurisdiction over the electionprotest. Although a party cannot waive jurisdictional issues and may raise them atany stage of the proceedings, estoppel may bar a party from raising such issues. 17

In Pantranco North Express v. Court of Appeals , 18 this Court applied the doctrine ofestoppel against a party who also belatedly raised the issue of insufficient paymentof filing fees to question the court's exercise of jurisdiction over the case. We held:

The petitioner raised the issue regarding jurisdiction for the first time in its

Brief filed with public respondent [Court of Appeals] . . . After vigorouslyparticipating in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invokingthe trial court's authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, the petitioner iseffectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction.

Indeed, in Miranda and Loyola , as in every other case 19 where we sustained thedismissal of the election protest for lack or incomplete payment of the COMELECfiling fee, the protestee timely raised the non-payment in a motion to dismissBefore any revision of the contested ballots, the protestee filed a petition forcertiorari questioning the trial court's jurisdiction before the COMELEC and

eventually before this Court. In contrast, in the instant case, petitioner Navarosa didnot raise the incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee in a motion to dismissConsequently, the trial court proceeded with the revision of the contested ballotsand subsequently rendered judgment on the election protest. Petitioner Navarosaraised for the first time the incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee in hermemorandum before the COMELEC Second Division.

Thus, estoppel has set in precluding petitioner Navarosa from questioning theincomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee, and in effect assailing the exerciseof jurisdiction by the trial court over the election protest. The law vests in the trial

court jurisdiction over election protests although the exercise of such jurisdictionrequires the payment of docket and filing fees by the party invoking the trial court's jurisdiction. 20 Estoppel now prevents petitioner Navarosa from questioning the triacourt's exercise of such jurisdiction, which the law and not any act of the parties hasconferred on the trial court. At this stage, the remedy for respondent Esto'sincomplete payment is for him to pay the P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filingfee. 21 It is highly unjust to the electorate of Libacao, Aklan, after the trial court hascompleted revision of the contested ballots, to dismiss the election protest andforever foreclose the determination of the true winner of the election for a mereP200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee. We repeat that:



[E]lection contests involve public interest, and technicalities and proceduralbarriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to thedetermination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their electiveofficials. And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contestsmust be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choiceof public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In anelection case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all meanswithin its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. 22

Good Reasons Exist to Grant Execution Pending Appeal in this Case

To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisitesmust concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to theadverse party; (2) there must be "good reasons" for the execution pending appeal;and (3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the "good reasons."23 Petitioner Navarosa concedes respondent Esto's compliance with the first andthird requisites. What she contests is the trial court's finding that there are "goodreasons" to order discretionary execution of its decision.

I n Ramas v. Commission on Elections , 24 the Court, after reviewing pertinent jurisprudence, summarized the circumstances qualifying as "good reasons" justifyingexecution pending appeal, thus:

In a nutshell, the following constitute "good reasons," and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) thepublic interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of theremaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.

The trial court in the present case, relying on cases 25 reviewed in Ramas , invokedtwo "good reasons" to justify its order allowing execution pending appeal. First, theorder will "give substance and meaning to the people's mandate." Second, "morethan 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term" of the office in question hadalready lapsed. The COMELEC found these "good reasons" sufficient. Beingconsistent with Ramas , we find no grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the triacourt or of the COMELEC.

Petitioner Navarosa's invocation of Camlian v. Commission on Elections 26 isunavailing. In Camlian , the COMELEC ruled that circumstances such as "publicinterest in the true outcome of the elections[;] that the protestee illegallymanufactured votes[;] and that the appeal was interposed for delay" do not sufficeto justify execution pending appeal. On appeal, we sustained the COMELEC, notingthat "not every invocation of public interest with . . . reference to the will of theelectorate can be appreciated as a good reason especially so if the same appears tobe self-serving and has not been clearly established." The Court further pointed outthat the protestant failed to substantiate his claim that the appeal is dilatory as it infact assails the trial court's ruling. These circumstances are absent in the present



case, precluding Camlian's application.

Section 3 of Rule 39 Not Applicable To Election Protest Cases

Unlike the Election Code of 1971, 27 which expressly provided for execution pendingappeal of trial courts' rulings in election protests, the present election laws are silenton such remedy. Nevertheless, Section 2, Rule 39 ("Section 2") of the Rules of Court(now 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) applies in suppletory character to election

cases, thus allowing execution pending appeal in the discretion of the court. Asexplained in Ramas :

The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) and the otherelection laws do not specifically provide for execution pending appeal of

judgment in election cases, unlike the Election Code of 1971 whose Section218 made express reference to the Rules of Court on execution pendingappeal; . . .

The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of theElection Code of 1971 does not mean that execution of judgment pending

appeal is no longer available in election cases. In election contests involvingelective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of general

jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which arecognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pendingappeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissiblepursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This Section 4 provides:

SEC 4. In what cases not applicable . — These Rules shall not applyto election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and

insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,except by analogy or in a suppletory character and wheneverpracticable and convenient.

As to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials, which fallwithin the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of ArticleIX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority topromulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of electioncases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Additionally, Section 52(c),Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code empowers the COMELEC topromulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Code or

other laws which it is required to enforce and administer. Accordingly, theCOMELEC promulgated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 1 of Rule41 thereof expressly provides that "[i]n the absence of any applicableprovision in [said] Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in thePhilippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character andeffect." 28

In the earlier case of Gahol v. Riodique , 29 the Court explained the legislative intentbehind the enactment of Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971. In Gahol , theCourt gave an additional justification for allowing execution pending appeal of



decisions of trial courts, thus:

. . . [T]his innovative provision is the product of the bad experience of thepeople under the previous election laws. Public policy underlies it. . . .[S]omething had to be done to strike the death blow at the "pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the-protest" technique often, if not invariably,resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory thepeople's verdict against them and persist in continuing in an office they very

well know they have no legitimate right to hold. . . . [T]o uphold the theory of Protestee that the very nature of the matter in dispute in election contests,the holding of a public office and the performance of its functions, makesgravely doubtful the propriety of an execution pending appeal, what with thepossible placing of the corresponding powers of government in the hands of one who might ultimately turn out not to be really entitled to the position, isto negate the unquestionable and patent intent of the legislature to give asmuch recognition to the worth of a trial judge's decision as that which isinitially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers is composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots,apart from their being more apt to yield extraneous considerations, that the board must act summarily, practically [racing] against time, while, on the other hand, the judge has the benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the

protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the court, good reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, a primordial public interest — to obviate a hollow victory for the duly electedcandidate as determined by the trial court — lies behind the present rule givingsuppletory application to Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary policyconsideration can prevent the suppletory application of Section 2. In insisting thatthe simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay execution pendingappeal, petitioner Navarosa neither claims nor offers a more compelling contrary

policy consideration. Instead, she merely contends that Section 3 of Rule 39("Section 3") applies also in a suppletory character because its "Siamese twin" 30

provision, Section 2, is already being so applied. Such simplistic reasoning bothignores and negates the public interest underlying Section 2's application. Wecannot countenance such argument.

Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interestsof the prevailing party in election protest cases. Section 3 provides:

Stay of discretionary execution. — Discretionary execution issued under thepreceding section may be stayed upon approval by the proper court of a



sufficient bond, filed by the party against whom it is directed, conditionedupon the performance of the judgment or order allowed to be executed incase it shall be finally sustained in whole or in part. The bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety . (Emphasissupplied)

A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealedfrom in case of its affirmation. 31 Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions

where the interest of the prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, andconsequently, of protection, through the filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, thepenultimate sentence of Section 3 states: "[T]he bond thus given may be proceededagainst on motion with notice to the surety." Consequently, it finds no applicationin election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are notcapable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform itsfunctions. As well observed by the COMELEC Second Division in its Resolution in theinstant case:

The supersedeas bond, as used under Section 3, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure, refers to a bond, either in cash or a surety bond, filed bythe losing party in an ordinary civil action to secure the performance or tosatisfy the judgment appealed from in case it is affirmed on appeal in favorof the prevailing party. A supersedeas bond is filed purposely for theperformance of the judgment appealed from in case it is affirmed by theappellate court. On the assumption that the filing of the supersedeas bondapplies in an election protest case, the practical considerations of the matterdictate that it cannot secure the performance of or satisfy the judgmentrendered in an election protest which basically involves the right to hold apublic office and the performance of its functions in accordance with themandate of the law, except insofar as the monetary award provided in the

special order. By allowing the filing of a supersedeas bond to stay theexecution of a judgment in an election protest declaring the protestant, as inthe case of petitioner herein, as the winning candidate who is entitled to theright to hold and perform the functions of the contested public office, wouldrender the judgment in an election protest illusory. . . . While thesupersedeas bond ensures that the appealed decision if affirmed is satisfied,in an election protest case, such bond, in the event the appealed case is affirmed and the execution pending appeal is proven to be meritorious,cannot adequately answer for the deprivation of a duly elected candidate of his post, and his constituents of their leader of choice, such deprivation

being unquantifiable . 32 (Emphasis added)

As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed canonly answer for that portion of the trial court's ruling ordering her to pay torespondent Esto actual damages, attorney's fees and the cost of the suit. It cannotsecure execution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor ofLibacao, Aklan by popular will of the electorate and authorizing him to assume theoffice. This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the filing of thesupersedeas bond in the first place.



In sum, the Court holds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretionin ordering execution pending appeal of the trial court's decision. Grave abuse ofdiscretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lackof jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion orpersonal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as toamount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 33 This does notobtain in the present case.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition. The Resolution dated 28 November2002 of the COMELEC Second Division, and the Resolution dated 15 April 2003 ofthe COMELEC En Banc , are AFFIRMED. The status quo order dated 10 June 2003 isLIFTED and the COMELEC is directed to cause the implementation of the Decision ofthe Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, in Election Case No. 129,without prejudice to any judgment the COMELEC may render in EAC Case No. A-9-2002. Moreover, respondent Roger M. Esto shall pay immediately the P200deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee. cCTIaS

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcunaand Tinga, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain with Commissioners Ralph C. Lantionand Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., concurring.

2. Penned by Judge Dean R. Telan.

3. Petitioner Navarosa received 4,876 votes while respondent Esto obtained 4,873votes.

4. Rollo , pp. 84–85.

5. Rollo , pp. 155–157.

6. Rollo , pp. 44–48.

7. Ibid., pp. 16–17.

8. Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals , 315 Phil. 134 (1995).

9. Soller v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 139853, 5 September 2000, 339 SCRA685; Miranda v. Castillo , G.R. No. 126301, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 503; Loyola vCOMELEC , 337 Phil. 134 (1997); Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals , 315 Phil. 134(1995); Pahilan v. Tabalba , G.R. No. 110170, 21 February 1994, 230 SCRA 205.

10. Rollo , pp. 19–20.

11. Ibid., p. 74.



12. Pahilan v. Tabalba, supra , note 9.

13. In case of non-payment of filing fees, the election protest will be dismissed (seeGatchalian v. Court of Appeals , 315 Phil. 134 [1995]).

14. G.R. No. 126301, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 503.

15. 337 Phil. 134 (1997).

16. The records do not contain a copy of petitioner Navarosa's Answer.

17. La Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 88246, 4 June1993, 223 SCRA 151; Martinez v. De la Merced , G.R. No. 82039, 20 June 1989174 SCRA 182; Tajonera v. Lamaroza , G.R. Nos. 48907 & 49035, 19 December1981, 110 SCRA 438; Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals L-51539, 14 December 1981, 110 SCRA 241; People v. Munar , G.R. No. L-3764222 October 1973, 53 SCRA 278.

18. G.R. No. 105180, 5 July 1993, 224 SCRA 491, reiterated in National Stee

Corporation v. Court of Appeals , 362 Phil. 150 (1999).

19. Soller v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 139853, 5 September 2000, 339SCRA 685; Melendres, Jr. v. Commission on Elections , 377 Phil. 275 (1999)Gatchalian v. Court of Appeals , 315 Phil. 134 (1995).

20. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7166 vests Regional Trial Courts ("RTCs") withexclusive original jurisdiction over election protests involving municipal officials. Thepayment of the COMELEC filing fee merely allows the RTCs to exercise such

jurisdiction. (For a distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction, see Lim v. Pacquing, G.R. No. 115044, 1 September 1994, 236 SCRA

211).

21. For a grant of similar remedy, see National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals 362 Phil. 150 (1999).

22. Juliano v. Court of Appeals , 127 Phil. 207 (1967).

23. Alvarez v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 142527, 1 March 2001, 353 SCRA434.

24. G.R. No. 130831, 10 February 1998, 286 SCRA 188, reiterated in Santos v

Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 155618, 26 March 2003.

25. Gutierrez v. Commission on Elections , 337 Phil. 143 (1997), and Tobon Uy v.Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 88158, 4 March 1992, 206 SCRA 779.

26. 338 Phil. 474 (1997).

27. Section 218 provides: "Assumption of office notwithstanding an election contest— Every candidate for provincial, city, municipal or municipal district office dulyproclaimed elected by the corresponding board of canvassers shall assume officenotwithstanding the pendency in the courts of any contest against his election



without prejudice to the final decision thereon and applicable provisions of theRules of Court regarding execution of judgment pending appeal."

28. Ramas v. Commission on Elections, supra , note 24. For prior but identical rulingssee Lindo v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 127311, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA511; Garcia v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 88158, 4 March 1992, 206 SCRA779.

29. G.R. No. L-404115, 27 June 1975, 64 SCRA 494.

30. Rollo , pp. 27–30.

31. De Leon v. De los Santos , 78 Phil. 461 (1947).

32. Rollo , pp. 46–48.

33. Alafriz vs. Nable , 72 Phil. 278 (1941).

Documents

82. Navarosa v. COMELEC