afganistan 1979 2012

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/afganistan-1979-2012 1/84

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Case Study Series

THIRTY YEARS OF

CONFLICT: DRIVERS

OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT

MOBILISATION IN

AFGHANISTAN, 1978-

2011

Antonio Giustozzi with Niamatullah Ibrahimi

January 2012


Research for a Better Afghanistan

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012


This page has been left blank to facilitate double-sided printing

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012


Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011

Editing: Toby Miller

Layout: Hugo Jackson

Cover Photographs: (Top to bottom): An armed man in Kunar (by Floortj Klijn); RAF

ightbetweenKunduzandMazar(AREUle);DiscardedSoviet- eraweaponry(AREUle);ANAsoldiers(byUNAMA)

AREU Publication Code: 1203E

AREU Publication Type: Issues Paper

© 2012 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. The opinions expressed in this publicationarethoseoftheauthoranddonotnecessarilyreectthoseofAREU.Somerightsarereserved.This publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted only for non-commercialpurposesandwithwrittencredittoAREUandtheauthor.Wherethispublicationisreproduced, storedor transmitted electronically, a linktoAREU’swebsite(www.areu.org.af)

should be provided. Any use of this publication falling outside of these permissions requires priorwrittenpermissionofthepublisher,theAfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnit.Permissioncanbe sought by emailing [email protected] or by calling +93 (0) 799 608 548.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



About the Author

DrAntonioGiustozziisresearchfellowattheCrisisStatesResearchCentre(LSE).Hehas authored a variety of articles, papers and books, including 2009’s Empires of Mud:War and Warlords in Afghanistan and Decoding the New Taliban,whichheedited.Dr

GiustozziiscurrentlyresearchingissuesofgovernanceinAfghanistan,includingfocusonthe military, police, intelligence and subnational systems.

About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent researchinstitutebasedinKabul.AREU’smissionistoinformandinuencepolicyandpracticethrough conducting high-quality, policy-relevant research and actively disseminating theresults, and to promote a culture of research and learning. To achieve its mission AREUengageswithpolicymakers,civilsociety,researchersandstudentstopromotetheiruse

of AREU’s research and its library, to strengthen their research capacity, and to createopportunitiesforanalysis,reectionanddebate.

AREUwasestablishedin2002bytheassistancecommunityworkinginAfghanistanandhasaboardofdirectorswithrepresentationfromdonors,theUnitedNationsandothermultilateral agencies, and non-governmental organisations. AREU currently receivescorefundsfromthegovernmentsofDenmark,Norway,SwedenandSwitzerland.Specicprojects in 2011 were funded by the European Commission (EC), the InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre(IDRC),theHumanitarianAidDepartmentoftheEuropeanCommission(ECHO),theUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID),andUNWomen.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



Table of Contents

Acronyms ....................................................................................................... iv

Glossary ........................................................................................................ iv

Key Players and Actors ........................................................................................ v

ExecutiveSummary............................................................................................1

1. Introduction ............................................................................................... 4

2. Historical Background .................................................................................... 7

2.1 Structuralfactors..................................................................................... 7

2.2 Rural-urban divide .................................................................................... 7

3. IdeologicalWar:1978-92 ................................................................................9

3.1 The revolt unleashed: 1978-79 ..................................................................... 9

3.2 TheimpactoftheSovietinvasion:1980-92.....................................................11

3.3 Mobilisation in the 1980s ...........................................................................13

3.4 Afghan interpretations of the 1978-92 period ..................................................15

3.5 Economicdriversofconict:1978-92............................................................17

4. FactionalWar:1992-2001 ..............................................................................19

4.1 Theageofthewarlords:1992-96.................................................................19

4.2 The rise and consolidation of the Taliban: 1994-2001 .........................................22

4.3 Economicdriversofconict:1992-2001.........................................................25

5. FeaturesoftheCurrentPhaseoftheConict:2002-10 ...........................................27

5.1 Weakgovernance ....................................................................................27

5.2 Poverty and remoteness ............................................................................31

5.3 Ethnic divisions ......................................................................................32

5.4 Conictamongcommunities.......................................................................35

5.5 The rural-urban divide post-2001 .................................................................38

5.6 Economic drivers ....................................................................................39

5.7 International intervention ..........................................................................40

5.8 Weighingthedifferentfactors ....................................................................41

6. OrganisationasaDriverofAnti-GovernmentMobilisation:TheTaliban .......................43 6.1 The origins of the Taliban insurgency ............................................................43

6.2 CommunitymobilisationwiththeTaliban .......................................................44

6.3 Non-militarycommunitysupportfortheTaliban ...............................................46

6.4 The role of foreign troops ..........................................................................47

6.5 MobilisationofindividualswiththeTaliban.....................................................48

6.6 Funding ................................................................................................60

6.7 TheoverallroleoftheTalibanintheconict ..................................................61

7. Conclusion ................................................................................................63

Bibliography ...................................................................................................67

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



iv

List of Images and Boxes

Boxes

Box1: HowtheTalibanaredened......................................................................5

Box 2: Timeline ............................................................................................21

Box 3: Afghanistan’s clerics ..............................................................................52

Box4: WhoareAfghanistan’selders?...................................................................56

Tables

Table 1: Proximity to health care services ...............................................................28

Table2:Lifeexpectancyatbirth:2000-2010...........................................................28

Table 3: The causes of civilian casualties in Afghanistan: 2006-2010 ................................48

Figures

Figure1.Socialandeconomicwell-beingandsecurityrankingbyprovince........................31

Figure 2. Age dependency ratio and security ranking by province ....................................33

Figure 3. Percentage of villages accessible all year round and security ranking by province.....33

Figure 4. Availability of radio and TV and security ranking by province ....................................33

Figure 5.Compositionofvillagepopulationbyrst languagespokenand securityrankingbyprovince ............................................................................................35

Figure 6. Rural literacy and security sanking by province ..............................................52

Maps

Map1:Chronologyoftheexpansionoftheinsurgency:2002-09......................................44

Acronyms

NDS NationalDirectorateofSecurity

SOF USSpecialOperationForces

ISAF InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce

PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

HDK Hizb-iDemokratik-eKhalq

UNAMA UnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan

ISI Inter-ServicesIntelligence

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



v

Glossary

arbab villagerepresentative;maybeappointedbythecommunity,wholiaisesinaquasi-ofcialcapacitybetweencommunityorgovernment;mayalsofulllanexecutiverole(seemalik,qaryadar)

arbaki tribally mobilised community police force in southeastern Afghanistan

malik villagerepresentative;maybeappointedbythecommunity,wholiaisesinaquasi-ofcialcapacitybetweencommunityorgovernment;mayalsofulllanexecutiverole(seearbab,qaryadar)

mujahiddin resistanceghtersduringtheSovietperiod

Pashtunwali Pashtun code of conduct

qaryadar villagerepresentative;maybeappointedbythecommunity,wholiaises

inaquasi-ofcialcapacitybetweencommunityorgovernment;mayalsofulllanexecutiverole(seearbab,malik)

rish-e-safed maleelder;“whitebeard”

shura community council

spin geree maleelder;“whitebeard”(Pashto)

Key Players and Actors

Amin,Hazullah Taraki’sdeputyin1978,tookpowerfromhiminOctober1979

Dostum, Abdul Rashid militia commander and then general in 1980-1992, leader of Junbesh-i-Milli in 1992-2006

Ghilzai oneofAfghanistan’stwolargetribalconfederations,theotherbeingtheDurranis. In modern times, government has been expressed mainly by theDurranis, 1978-2001 being the only major exception

Haqqaninetwork oneofthemanynetworksofwhichtheTalibanarecomposedandthepredominant one in southeastern Afghanistan; compared to most othernetworksittendstohavemorenancialautonomy

Hizb-i-Islami IslamicParty;thelargestradicalIslamistorganisationinAfghanistan.

Hizb-i-Wahdat UnityParty;aethnic-basedpartyledbyHazaraclergymen

Jami’at-i-Islami IslamicSociety;oneofthemainoppositionpartiesinvolvedinthejihad,based in Pakistan. A relatively moderate Islamist party

Junbesh-i-Milli National Islamic Movement, a secularist party based in northernAfghanistan

Khalq oneofthemainfactionsoftheHizb-iDemokratik-eKhalq(HDK)andthelargest one in southern Afghanistan

Massud,AhmadShah eldcommanderofJami’at-i-IslamiandMinisterofDefencein1992-2001

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



vi

Parcham oneofthetwomainfactionsoftheHDK,strongestinKabulandthecities

Rabbani, Burhauddin leader of Jami’at-i-Islami and President of Afghanistan in 1992-2001

Taraki,NurMohammed theleaderof thePDPAandrstpresidentof thepro-Sovietregimein1978-79

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



1

Executive Summary

Theliteratureconcerningthelast30yearsofwarinAfghanistanhasoverthelastfewyearsreachedsuchacriticalmassthatitisnowpossibletoidentifystructuralfactorsinAfghanhistorythatcontributedtothevariousconictsandhavebeenitssignalfeature

from1978onward.Thestate-buildingmodelborrowedfromtheneighbouringBritishandTsaristempiresinthelate19thcenturycontainedtheseedsoflatertrouble,chieyintheformofrural-urbanfrictionthatgainedsubstantialforcewiththespreadofmodernitytoruralAfghanistanstartinginthe1950s.FollowingtheKhalqiregime’sall-outassaulton rural conservatism in 1978-79, this friction ignited into large-scale collective actionby a variety of localised opposition groups, including political organisations, clericalnetworks, and Pakistanimilitary intelligence, aswell as the intelligence servicesofseveral other countries.

Duringthe1980s,Sovietheavy-handedness,combinedwiththelocaldynamicsofviolenceandmassiveexternal support, intensied andentrenched theexistingconict.New

socialgroupsemergedwithavestedinterestinprolongingtheconict,whileexistingsocial groups were transformed by it. Communities everywhere armed themselvesto protect against roaming bandits and rogue insurgents, eventually dismantling themonopolisation of violence that Amir Abdur Rahman had started to marshal from 1880onward.

In1992,ontheeveofcivilwar,thenationalarmyandpolice,aswellasthesecurityservices,were disbanded.Thiswasa complexprocess,featuring factional inghtingandthedesireofthenewmujahiddinelitetoeliminateanalternativeandpotentiallyrival source of power. Armed insurgent groups eventually became semi-regular orirregularmilitiaswithlittledisciplineandweakcommandandcontrolfromthepoliticalleadership. As a result, Afghanistan reverted to the pre-Abdur Rahman state of rival andsemi-autonomousstrongmen,withthecentralgovernmenthavingtonegotiatefortheirallegiance.

ExplanationsoftheTaliban’sriseusuallyrefertothedisorderandchaosthatcharacterizedthissituationasitexistedinAfghanistanduring1992-94;however,thebiggestchallengenowistounderstandhowsuchanexampleofcollectiveactioncouldtakeplaceinafragmented political and social context.

In2001,thenewinterimgovernmenttookpowerandinheritedaheavilycompromisedsituation. Rather than mobilising scarce human resources and reactivating as much of the state administration as possible, thegovernment instead emphasized patronage

distribution, in the process surrendering virtually all levers of central control to strongmenandwarlordsassociatedwiththevictoriousanti-Talibancoalition.Thiscombinedwithotherfactorstoradicallyundercutgovernance,whichunderminedthestate’slegitimacyandpushedsomecommunitiestowardrevolt.

The predominant social, cultural, and economic trends of the post-2001 period abetted thespread of the Taliban’s recruitment base by deepening the rural-urban divide mentionedabove.Theconcentrationofeconomicgrowth inthecities,thearrivalofmassmediatypically rather disrespectful of the villages’ predominantly conservative social mores,andtheafrmationofcapitalistattitudesattheexpenseofestablishedredistributionistattitudes amongthewealthy classes,all contributedtothe population’s polarisation.

MassivelevelsofexpenditureinAfghanistanalsotriggeredaninationaryprocess,whichbadlyharmedallthosewhowerenotdirectnancialbeneciariesoftheintervention.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



2

Theclergy,havingmuchtoloseinthenewpoliticalset-up,graduallyremobilisedasanoppositionforce.Itsgeneralexpansionandpriormilitaryexperience,alongwiththefactthat many of its members had been part of a single political organisation (Harakat-i-Enqelab) during the 1980s, had all contributed to the re-emergence of a militant clericalmovementin1994,asdidthejihadistindoctrinationofnewgenerationsofclerics.By

steadilyco-optingmoreandmorelocalclericalnetworks,theTalibannotonlyexpanded,albeittemporarily,butalsosocialisednewcomersintothemovement,therebycreatingarelatively strong sense of identity. The idea of clerical rule seems only gradually to havegainedgroundwithintheTaliban,butby2001itwasentrenchedwithintheirranks.

The Taliban are often depicted as relying on poverty and social marginality as spurs to therecruitmentofvillageyouth,althoughthereislittleactualevidenceofthat.Whateverthe cause of many young Afghans joining the insurgency, mercenary motivations seemtodissipate once the Taliban havea chance tosocialise and indoctrinate theirnewmembers.ThebehaviouroftheTalibaninthebattleeldsuggeststhatmercenaryaimsare not a major, long-term motivating factor.

The Taliban have also been seen as a Pashtun revanchist movement, aiming to redresstheimbalancethatemergedin2001whenmostlynon-Pashtunsseizedcontrolofthestateapparatus.Infact,thereisgrowingevidenceof theTalibanrecruitingfromtheethnicminoritiesasmuchaspossible.WhileitispossiblethatsomeTalibansupportersmightafter2001haveseenthemasasourceofPashtunempowerment,thereislittleor no evidence that such considerations have played an important role in recruitment.

By contrast, there is substantial evidence that the Taliban have exploited conictsamongcommunitiestoestablishtheirinuence,ifnotnecessarilytorecruitindividualsto their cause. In a number of occasions, the Taliban have also succeeded in mobilisingdisgruntledcommunitieson theirside,encouragingthemtoghtagainstgovernment

andforeigntroops.Suchcommunitymobilisationwasmostlyrelativelyshort-lived,asthecommunitieswereextremelyvulnerabletothereactionoftheAfghanstateandtheWesternarmiesandsufferedheavilyintheghting;by2011,suchmobilisationappearedto have declined.

Muchhasbeensaidontheroleofopiuminfuellingtheconictsovertheyears.Whileitisevident that insurgents tax the drugs trade, their involvement in it is likely to have beenoverstated. In reality, the Taliban do not appear to attribute much importance to thedrugtaxesraisedinsouthernAfghanistanandwereinearly2011shiftingtheirmilitaryefforttootherareasofthecountry.Whilenarcoticsrevenuelikelyrepresentsa solidmajorityoftheTaliban’sowntaxrevenue,externalsupportfromPakistaniandIranian

sourcesisreportedlyasignicantlylargerportionoftheiroverallrevenue.Similarly,since the Taliban tax any economic activity, including aid contracts and private securitycompanies,developmentaidtheoreticallyfuelstheconictasmuchasthenarcoticstrade does.

Theintensicationoftheinternationalmilitarypresencefrom2006onward,meanttocontaintheinsurgency,hashadtheoppositeeffect,withgreaternumbersoftroopseventuallypresidingoveranaccelerationoftheinsurgency’sexpansion.InpartthiswasduetoregionalpowersincreasingtheirsupportasaparticularreactiontothegrowingAmericanpresence.Theaccelerationoftheinsurgency’sspreadwasalsotheresultoflocal reactions to the presence of foreign troops.

In order to fully explain the post-2001 insurgency, a unifying factor is needed, a “driverofdrivers.”TheTalibanhavebeenabletolinktogetherandintegratevariouscauses

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



3

andgroups,capturingtheirenergyandrageanddirectingittowardthestrategicaimofexpellingforeignersfromthecountryandimposinganewpoliticalsettlement.Intheiruse of xenophobic and occasionally nationalistic recruitment arguments, the Taliban,awareofthedifcultyoffullyintegratingcommunitiesundertheirownleadershipintothe movement, have privileged the role of individuals.

Therearemanyweaknessesandgapsinourknowledgethatshouldbeaddressedinordertoconrmorrejectsomeofthehypothesesformulatedhere.Inparticular,theTaliban’sorganisationalsystemisstillpoorlyunderstood,asistheirsystemofsocialisation.Socialandpoliticaldynamicssuchastheurban-ruraldivideandtheimpactofcashinowsafter2001arealsopoorlyunderstood.Howmuchofthepre-warsocialorganisationisleftintactoratleastfunctionalisalsofarfromclear.Futureresearchwouldcertainlybenetfromacomprehensivemappingexercise.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



4

1. Introduction

SeveralalternativeinterpretationsofwhatdrivesconictinAfghanistan—inparticularanti-governmentmobilisation—have been advancedby different actors in thepolicyarena.Thedebateis,infact,asoldastheconictitself.TheTalibanhave,ofcourse,

presented the conict as a “jihad” against a foreign occupation and the puppetgovernment supporting it. The most popular International SecurityAssistance Force(ISAF)explanationoftheconictrevolvesaroundpovertyandmercenaryaims,thoughsomeISAFanalystsnowpartiallyaccepttheTaliban’sversionofevents.Theviewsfromwithin theAfghan educatedclassare themselves stilldifferent, pointing at allegedconspiraciesofforeignpowers.

Noneofthisshouldsurprise.Whatisperhapsalittlemoresurprisingisthefactthat32yearsintothewarand9years intoits latestphase,ananalysisof thesocialandpoliticalfactorsunderlyingtheconicthasbeenmissingfromthepolicyliterature. 1 As a result, the purpose of this paper should be self-evident: bringing together the

existingliterature,reviewingit,andstartingamorerigorousdiscussionofwhathasbeen driving anti-government mobilisation in Afghanistan for over 30 years. The paperhas therefore been designed to highlight existing gaps in the literature, map futureresearch opportunities and needs, and provide an initial, although not conclusive, brief onwhatexistingevidencesuggestsarethemaindriversofmobilisationinthecurrentsituation.

The current, post-2001 armed confrontation can be seen as the third phase of aconagration that started in1978.Froma political analysisperspective,minimisingthedifferencesbetweenthedifferentphasesof theconictmight seemdebatable.However,whentheunderlying social,cultural, andpolitical factorsareanalyzed, itbecomesclearthat the ongoingphaseofthe conictcannot beunderstoodwithout

lookingatthepreviousphasesaswell(whichisnottosaythattheviolent,recentpastisasufcientcauseofthecurrentconict).Prolongedconictreshapessociety,oftenchangingthereasonswhyaconictisfought.Theoriginaldestabilisationofthecountryinthe1970screatedanenvironmentinwhichvarioussectorsofthepopulationweremobilised by different political movements, each carrying out a revolution (or trying to)against its predecessors and subject to external interference. It also changed Afghansocietytoafairextentandevencreatedtwonewsocialclasseswithaheightenedself-consciousness of their political role: the clergy and a class of military professionals (the“commanders”astheyareknowninAfghanistan).2

Thesignicanceofpre-1978historyandsocioeconomicdevelopmentsisdiscussedinthe

Historical background , before proceedingwith the discussion of theCurrent conict.Drivers of conict are reviewed individually to assess the literature against availableempiricalevidence.Thisseparationis,ofcourse,articial;inreality,thedifferentdriversinterplayandcannotbeeasilyisolated.Theanalysisoftheactorsintheconictislargelyfocused on the Taliban, though many observations of the Taliban’s organisational dimensioncould equally apply to the mujahiddin of the 1980s or to secondary actors in the post-2001insurgencylikeHizb-i-Islami.Inthissense,thesectiondedicatedtotheTalibanfunctionsasanexampleoftheroleofpoliticalorganisationsinenablinganddrivingconict.3

1 See,forexample,“AfghanistanStudyGroupReport”(Washington:CenterfortheStudyofthePresidency,2008).

2 Arguably,it isalsoessentialtoimprovetheexternalunderstandingofAfghansocietyandhowit functions,butadiscussionoftherelevantliteraturewouldhavetakenthispapertoofarfromitsoriginalaimandhadtobeleftout.Itis

important,however,tokeepinmindthatexternalunderstandingofAfghansocialdynamicsisstillshakyinmanyregardswhichcancurtailunderstandingthedynamicsoftheconictaswell.

3 ThisraisestheissueofhowexactlytodenetheTaliban(seeBox1).TheinternationalpoliticsoftheAfghanconict

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



5

Part2 isdedicatedtotherstphaseofconict(1978-92).Though therewashardlyany mobilisation in the country before April 1978, except to some extent in Kabul, the

picturehad completelychanged two yearslater.Giventhe actionsofthenew 1978governmentandtheentryofSoviettroopsattheendof1979,thatmobilisationoccurredishardlysurprising.Whathastobeexplainedistheparticularshapesittookandhowandwhytheseshapeschangedoverthecourseofthevariousconicts.

Part3covers the secondphaseofconict(1992-2001),usuallydescribedasthe“civilwars,”evenifamajorcomponentofcivilwaralsoexistedfrom1978to1992.Thisphaseischaracterizedbytheradicaldiminutioninimportanceofideologicalconfrontations.UntiltheemergenceoftheTalibanasamajorforce,theconictwaslittlemorethanjockeyingforpoweramongpreviouslylooselyalliedfactionsthatcouldnotagreeonthedivisionofthe spoils. Gradually, an element of ethnic identity emerged, particularly after the Taliban

startedgaininggroundinterritoriesmainlypopulatedbyTajiks,Hazaras,andUzbeks.

Part4isdedicatedtothepost-2001phaseoftheconict,whichisreviewedingreaterdetailasitispresumedtobeofgreaterinteresttothemajorityofreaders.Weakandbadgovernance, both popular discussion topics among Afghanistan-focused policymakers, beginthereviewofthedifferentfactorsofanti-governmentmobilisation.Povertyandremoteness,alsowidelydiscussed,follows.Ethnicdivisionsasadriverofconicthasbeentoacertainextentmarginalizedinwesterndiscussionsofthetopic,butispopularamongAfghansandregionalanalystsandobservers;ananalysisfollows.Conictamongcommunitieshasbeenincreasingly discussed in recent times and the proliferation of evidence that has drivenawarenessofitscurrentimportanceisdiscussed.Therural-urbandividehasnotbeenpaid

much attention, but an attempt is made to highlight its current importance in 5.5. 5.6 and5.7 discuss some aspects of the impact of international intervention.

InordertoaddressthescantattentionpaidintheliteraturetotheTaliban’sorganizationaldimension, the paper includes a separate section that surveys the Taliban’s ability tointercept grievances of various kinds and subsume them under their banner. The sparse,indirectevidenceofitsimportanceisgatheredinpart6.Itrevealslittleawarenessofits implications, hence the reason for the section.

Though readers should not expect a comprehensive theory of the drivers of anti-governmentmobilisationinAfghanistan,thedebatecanstillbeclariedbyweighingthe existing evidence for each of the arguments currently in circulation. The paper

fallsbeyondthescopeofthisstudyinfavourofadiscussionoftheroleplayedbytheISAF’sandOperationEnduringFreedom’sactionsinmobilisingopposition,alongwiththeroleplayedbyregionalpowers.

Box 1: How the Taliban are dened.

Throughout,theTalibanaredenedasallthosewhoacknowledgetheleadershipofMullahOmarandoftheLeadershipShuraandwhointurnareacknowledgedbytheleadershipasmembersofthemovement.ThismeansthattheHaqqaninetwork(one

ofthemanynetworksofwhichtheTalibanarecomposedandthepredominantoneinsoutheasternAfghanistan),despitehavinganunusualdegreeofnancialautonomy,isdenitelypartoftheTalibanandthatHekmatyar’sHizb-i-Islamiisdenitelynot.Hekmatyar at timeshas maintained relations with the Taliban and his men havecooperatedonthebattleeld,buttheyhaveremainedaseparateorganisation.ThisdenitionoftheTalibaniscompatiblebothwiththeimageofitasanorganisationthat developed a degree of coherence in 2005-09 and the image of it as little morethan a franchise, bringing together disparate and variously motivated groups under alabel of convenience.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



6

concludesbyassemblingtheelementsofthesituationintoacomprehensiveoverviewand discussing the intersections among the various drivers of mobilisation.

Thispaperisbasedontheliteratureandontheauthors’owneldresearch.Theliteraturehas been selected on the basis of its grounding in actual research or experience: thebettergrounded, themore ithasbeen taken intoconsideration. Sometimes,policy-orientedtextsandcommentarieswillbementionedinordertoillustrateaposition,but,ingeneral,thistypeofliteraturehasbeenmostlyleftaside.Consideredtextsrangeacross several languages, including English predominantly, but also French, German,Russian,Italian,DariandPashto.Theresearch-orexperience-basedtextswereusedtoidentifythedifferentinterpretationsaboutwhatisdrivingmobilisation,butalsoasasourceofrawinformation,whichwasthenfusedwithmaterialgathereddirectlybytheauthors to assess the different interpretations themselves.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



7

2. Historical Background

2.1 Structural factors

The history of Afghanistan in the 19th and 20th centuries contains many features that

havemadethecountryvulnerabletointernalconict.BeforeAbdurRahman,Afghanistanhad been ruled by a rather loose coalition of tribes, a system of government that provedunreliable in the long term, particularly after the arrival of the British and Russianempires. Rahman imposed his rule over the country by skilfully deploying a strategy of divide-and-rule, and introduced a different, more authoritarian system of governmentthat,thoughdependentonBritishsubsidies,forthersttimeachievedsomethingthatcouldbecalledauniedgovernment.

After Rahman, the political system did not change substantially; his successors mostlyconsolidatedhisworkandmovedmorecarefullytowardfurthercentralisationattheexpenseofcommunityautonomy.Suchasystem,however,wasvulnerable,mainlybecause

thecentralgovernmentcouldnotaffordtoallowevenitsownrepresentativestogaintoomuchpowerinthecommunities.Divide-and-rulemeantthatthegovernmentalwayscultivatedalternativenotablesaspossiblereplacementsforthosewhowereworkingfor the government in case the latter objected to taxation, conscription, and othergovernmentdemandsresentedasexcessive.ThisuiditywasnotamajorconcernwhileAfghanistanwasfreeofexternalinuence,aswasthecaseduringthereignsofRahmanandHabibullahKhan,Rahman’ssuccessor.DuringtimesoffrictionwithAfghanistan’spowerfulneighbours,however, rivalryamongcommunitynotablesofferedimmediateopportunities for a foreign-based opposition force to mobilise support. This may or maynothavehappenedin1928-29(theinvolvementoftheBritishagainstAmanullahwasnever proven), but certainly happened on a massive scale starting in 1978 and from 2002

onward.4

2.2 Rural-urban divide

Onestructuralfactorthatmeritsadedicatedsectionistherural-urbandividethathasplayed such a large part in the country’s history. The system of domination developedbythemonarchyinthelate19thcenturyallowedadegreeofurbancontroloverruralcommunities that contained a built-in tension between the administration and thelocals. Throughout the 20th century, urban authorities ruled the agricultural hinterlandsautocratically though a state administration that maintained a very clear separationfromthelocalpopulationanddidnotshyawayfromhighlightingitsurbanorigins.The

inuenceofurbanlifestylesledruralnotablesandanybodywhoaspiredtostatustobuyimported products like china, kerosene, sugar, and tea from urban traders at very highprices,whiletheruraleconomystagnated.Thearrivalandspreadofmonetisationinthe 19th century also extracted surplus from the rural population through unfavourabletermsof trade,drawing increasingnumbersof landowners towardproducing forthemarket and, most importantly, adopting capitalist methods of production that abandonedthereciprocitywhichhadcharacterised patron-client relations, particularlyinareassurrounding the main urban centres.

Theresultoftheseprocesseswasacumulativeweakeningofthepowerandinuenceoftheoldkhans,whowerestillthestate’smaintoolofvillagesocialcontrol,whileatthe

4 AntonioGiustozzi,“IfOnlythereWereLeaders:TheProblemof‘Fixing’thePashtunTribes,”inRethinking the SwatPathan,ed.M.MarsdenandP.Hopkins(London:C.Hurst,forthcoming).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



8

sametimeantagonisingtheruralpopulation.Suchantagonismwasonlystrengthenedby direct state extraction. Although direct state taxation declined throughout the 20thcentury,corruptionwasoften institutionalisedandmoreor less accepted,even if ithappened to be sometimes rapacious and out of control.5

Urban-ruralantagonismwasfurtherenhancedasaresultofselectedstatepolicies.Fromthe1930s,moderneducationandsocialreformswereintroduced,butonlyinthecities;education and reforms only started spreading to the countryside in the 1960s and 1970s.6 Whilechangesinthevillageswerehappeninganyway,particularlyaroundthemajorurbancentres,thegovernment’slaissez-faireattitudeensuredthatsuchchangeswouldstill lag far behind developments in the cities.

Atthesametime,itisworthnotingthattherulingelite’shostilitytowardlarge-scalemerchants prevented their reaching a truly “domineering” status.This undercut thestrength of economic and urban development in Afghanistan and ensured that ruralsocietywasantagonisedanddominated,butnotdissolved.Theemergenceinthelate1960sand1970sofanewgenerationofruralintellectualswasanexplosivedevelopment,

astheysoonstartedchallengingtheinuenceandroleofboththeclergyandtheruralnotables. As has been frequently remarked upon, it was from this frustrated ruralintelligentsiathattherevolutionariesofKhalq,oneofthetwowingsofthepro-SovietPeople’sDemocraticParty(PDPA),andothergroupswouldemerge,soontoturntheirimplicit challenge into outright aggression. As the Khalqis established a party-stateregimeandidentiedthemselveswiththestate,thereactionbyboththeruralelitesandthevillagerswasventedagainstnotonlyKhalq,butalsothestate.Thefrustrationthathadaccumulatedinthecountrysideovertheyearswasnowabletobeexpressed.7

5 AntonioGiustozzi,“TheEyeoftheStorm:CitiesintheVortexofAfghanistan’sCivilWar”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009).

6 AntonioGiustozzi,“Nation-buildingisNotforAll:ThePoliticsofEducationinAfghanistan”(Berlin/Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,May2010).

7 Giustozzi,“TheEyeoftheStorm”;HassanKakar,Government and Society in Afghanistan (Austin: University of TexasPress,1979);ThomasBareld,“WeakLinksinaRustyChain,”inRevolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan: AnthropologicalPerspectives,editedbyM.NazifMohibShahraniandRobertL.Caneld(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



9

3. Ideological War: 1978-92

3.1 The revolt unleashed: 1978-79

Theeventsof1978-79thatinitiatedtheAfghanconictareknownintheirgenerallines,even if a complete consensus on the crisis’s causes has yet not emerged. The Khalqimilitaryrevolutionof27April1978wasclearlythedirectprecipitatingfactor.Differentauthors,however,emphasisedifferentfactorstoexplainwhyresistancetothenewregimestarted.Somearguethattheresistancewasinevitablesincethenewregimewasatheistand extremist;8 others contend that Khalqi reforms (land reform, bride price reform,educationalcampaigns)enactedinthefaceofamostlyindifferentpopulationwerethemostsignicantfactor.9Viewsonreforms,particularlylandredistribution,arealsodivided:did the Khalqis deliberately conceive destablising reforms in order to subvert the socialframeworkofruralsocietyandpreparethegroundforcollectivisation? 10Thereformswerecertainlypoorlyconceived,butweretheytooradical? 11 Probably the impact of the reformsvariedfromareatoarea;sourcestendtoagreethatinsomeareaswheremuchoftherural

populationwaslandless,thereformsinitiallyattractedinterest.12

Therewasanethnicdimensiontotheconictalreadyinthisearlystage,astheKhalqileadershipwasmostly Pashtun.13 This does not, however, implya consciouslyethnicdimension to the rebellions, ofwhich therewas hardly traceat that time.14 Worthnoting,withaneyetolaterdebatesaboutendemicconservatismandanti-statism,istheslownesswithwhichthePashtunsmobilisedonthesideoftheinsurgency:intheSouth,onlyinthesecondhalfof1979andonlyfullyaftertheSovietarrival;intheEast,slowlyin the second half of 1979 and, in Paktia, mostly limited to the Jaji tribe.15

Among the causes of the greater or lesser inclination of each community to dissent

include varying Khalqi presence in different regions, geography and the greater or lesserremoteness of communities relative to the centre, and the varying exposure of differentcommunities to social transformation.16 Areas characterised by a greater erosion of community structures and institutions tended to be more sympathetic to the policiesofthenewregime,asthelocaleliteshadbeenweakened. 17Thesameoccurredwherepeasants and landlords belonged to different communities, lacking, therefore, anyreciprocal link.18

Arguablywhatreallyundidthenewregimewasitsadministrativeweakness.NotonlydidtheKhalqisinherittheweakadministrationofthepreviousrepublicanandmonarchist

8 WilliamMaley,The Afghanistan Wars(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2002),60.9 OlivierRoy,Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990);GillesDorronsonro,Revolution Unending(London:C.Hurst,2005).

10 Roy, Islam and Resistance, 86-7.

11 Roy, Islam and Resistance;AminSaikal,Modern Afghanistan(London:Tauris,2006),188-9.

12 TheKhalqiideologywasnotthereforewithoutsomeconstituency,butthiswastoosmalltoconstituteamassbase.SeeRoy,Islam and Resistance, 86-87; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 93.

13 Saikal,Modern Afghanistan, 188-189; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 96; Giorgio Vercellin, Afghanistan 1973-78:dalla Repubblica Presidenziale alla Repubblica Democratrica (Venice:UniversitádegliStudi,1979).

14 RoyattributestheNuristanis’earlyresistancetotheseveringoftheirprivilegedrelationshipwiththeoldregime,but also argued that the insurgency’s early spread among ethnic minorities cooled the largely Pashtun establishment’senthusiasmforopposition.SeeRoy,Islam and Resistance, 104-5.

15 Roy, Islam and Resistance, 101-2; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 97.

16 Roy, Islam and Resistance, 106.17 Roy, Islam and Resistance, 103.

18 Roy, Islam and Resistance, 86-7.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



10

regimes,buttheyalsocompoundedthesituationbyreplacingmostoftheofcialswithloyal, but inexperienced ones.19Animageofweaknesswasalsoconveyedbytherivalriesamong thepro-Soviet leftists; internaldivisionmightwell haveprompted thelatentopposition to activelymobilise againstwhich the PDPA’sweak leadership under theailingTarakiwasnotabletoreacteffectively. 20 Internal divisions might also have had a

demoralisingeffectonpartofthemembership;oneexampleofthiswastheconspiracyagainstTarakiandhisdeputyAminbythemoremoderatewingoftheparty(Parcham)

and other leftist groups targeted by the Khalqis.21

These facts lead to a further discussion of the actual mechanisms of social mobilisationandcollectiveactionthatallowedanti-governmenthostilitytotranslateintomassviolentaction.NotmuchisknownaboutwhatactuallyhappenedintheAfghancountrysideatthe time, except for the activities of political parties and organisations. More or lessdetailedstudiesexistnowforHazarajat, 22 Pech,23andNuristan;24 in the Afghan language,some memoirs cover events in a number of provinces. These are mostly studies by formerparticipants, linked to a particular group of organisations and assuming its point of viewandhavenotyetbeenusedinasystematicstudyoftheperiod.InterviewswithformermujahiddincommanderscarriedoutbytheauthorseemtoconrmDorronsoro’sviewthatthecrudeandruthlessrepressionunleashedaftertherstsignsofoppositionemergedwerecompletelyindiscriminateandunderminedanyguaranteeofsafetyforthe elites and the general population alike.25 Furthermore, the lack of consultationregarding reforms alienated the population and rendered the reforms unacceptable andunworkable.26 Although there is no evidence of a determined policy of repression aimedatsocialgroupssuchaskhansormullahs,thewell-publicisedmassexecutionseffectivelyfunctionedthesameway.27Finally,alltheauthorsonthesubjectagreethatthenewregime’scommunicationpolicywasnotonlyineffective,butcounterproductivevis-à-visthe rural communities: the leftist symbolism (red banners) and rhetoric scared the eliteswithoutnecessarilymeaninganythingtothebulkofthepopulation.Thewidespread

viewoftheSovietUnionasanatheistpowermightalsohaveplayedarolewithincertainstrata of the population (particularly the clergy).

It is clear that most villages in Afghanistan did not participate in the original revolt, if fornootherreasonthanthepresenceofthenewregimewasquitethinandthemajority

19 ThoughthispartiallyrecallsRahman’smethods,Rahmanwasmoreselectiveinhisappointments,takingexperienceintoconsideration.SeeLouisDupree,Contributions to American Universities Field Staff Reports,SoutheastAsiaSeries,various years; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 94; Michael Pohly, Krieg und Widerstand in Afghanistan: Ursachen,Verlauf und Folgen seit 1978 (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1992), 78-9.

20 Beverley Male, Revolutionary Afghanistan(London:CroomHelm,1982),196.

21 BasedoninterviewswithParchamcadres,KabulandLondon,2008-09.

22 Niamatullah Ibrahimi, “The Failureof a ClericalProto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984” (London: LSECrisis StatesResearchCentre,2006);NiamatullahIbrahimi,“AttheSourcesofFactionalismandCivilWarinHazarajat”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009);NiamatullahIbrahimi,“DivideandRule:StatePenetrationinHazarajat(Afghanistan)fromtheMonarchytotheTaleban”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009).

23 DavidB.Edwards,Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2002),132-133.

24 RichardStrand,“Nuristan,”http://nuristan.info/index.html(accessed16January2012).

25 Afurtherfactorunderrepresented intheliterature ishowthestructuralcharacteristicoftheAfghanstatebothas it emerged under monarchy (1880-1973) and Daud’s Republic (1973-78) might have facilitated or at least shapedtheonsetofcivilwar.IthasbeenpointedoutthatthePDPA,astheproductoftheAfghanstatefromwhoseofcialsitrecruitedmostofitsmembers,subsequentlyderivedfromthatstatea“proclivitytowardregimentation,”asifthiswasitsunderstandingofwhatacceleratingmodernityinAfghanistanwas.SeeDorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 94-7.

26 NeamatollahNojumi,The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of theRegion (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 44-50.

27 StathisKalyvas,The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006).InKalyvas’terms,this indiscriminate violence, rather than discouraging opposition, instead offered the discontented an incentive to gatherunder armed groups’ banners and prompted the communities to revolt and sever links to the government.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



11

ofvillageswereneverreachedbyeducationorlandreformteams.Somevillagesweremobilisedtoattackdistrictcentres,but,onthewhole,ofanestimated44,000Afghanvillages, a large majority must have been passive spectators, or even ignored eventsaltogetherasthepresenceofthenewgovernmentwasneverestablishedthere.28

The 1978-79 period is important in terms of understanding later developments. Incontrasttothemonarchy’sstrategyofcontrol,theinexperiencedleftistsinpowerinfactdidexactlytheoppositeofRahman’sdivide-and-rulegovernance:theyuniedaseparate and fragmented opposition by unleashing repression against everybody at thesame time.29Moreover,infocusingontheIslamicthreat,TarakiandAminhelpeddenethe forthcoming resistance in religious terms.30Fromthenonward,thearmedoppositionwoulddescribeitselfasajihadanditsghtersasmujahiddin.Theroleoftheclergyinfanningtheoriginalresistanceispoorlyunderstood;itwasmainlythePDPAregimethataccusedthemullahsofhostility,butwhetherthePDPAwasrightorthepre-emptiverepressionturnedintoaself-fulllingprophecy,itisclearthattheclergywassoontobecome one of the drivers of the resistance.31Therejectionofthe“aggressiveatheism”ofthePDPAshowedthat,“religiouslegitimacycontinuedtobeadeterminingcondition

fortheacceptanceofthestate.”TheattempttooffsetthelossofreligiouslegitimacywithrelianceonPashtunnationalismdidnotsufce,althoughitmighthaveretardedthe

mobilisation of Pashtuns to the opposition.32

3.2 The impact of the Soviet invasion: 1980-92

ThearrivalofSoviettroopson27December1979seemedatthetimeanuncontroversialturningpointintheconict,withtheSovietsmainlymotivatedbyTaraki’sassassinationatthehandsofhisdeputyAmin,whotookcontroloverthepartyandstateafterapurgeofTaraki’ssupporters.Whilethisstillappearstrue,thedistinctionbetweenthepre-Sovietinvasionandthepost-SovietinvasionperiodshasbeenblurredbythereleaseofnewdocumentsfromtheSovietarmyandtheKGBthathaveundercuttheconventionalwisdomonhowcompromisedthesituationactuallywasunderAmin.33 This blurring isreectedaswellinthewesternliterature.Kakar,forexample,whoused,amongothers,his Khalqi prison-mates as a source of information, tends to support the thesis of Aminbeingnearlyin fullcontrolbeforehisoverthrow.34Mostauthors,however,accepttheviewthatAmin’sregimewasundersiegeas27Decemberapproached,withthearmygradually disintegrating and opposition expanding.35

WesternandregionalobserversatthetimeweredividedovertheimpactoftheSovietarrival:would it spur further resistance, orwould it intimidate the existing oppositioninto submission?While the Khalqis had generated opposition because of the challenge

theypresentedtotheestablishedorder,Sovietinterventionwasmeanttobringgreatermoderationandstabilisethecountry.However,theywereperceivedasfacilitatingforthe

28 ThisisthecurrentestimateofthenumberofvillagesinAfghanistan;thenumberhasbeenregularlyrevisedupwardsfrom1978onward.

29 Giustozzi,“Afghanistan:TransitionWithoutEnd.AnAnalyticalNarrative”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2008).

30 Edwards,Before Taliban, 85.

31 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 105-6.

32 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 96.

33 AleksandrLyakhovskii,Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana(Moscow:Iskona,1995);M.F.Slinkin,Narodno-demokraticheskaya partiya Afganistana y vlasti; vremya Taraki-Amina (1978-1979 gg) (Simferopol:KulturaNarod,1999).

34 Hassan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress,1995),32-3.

35 Kakar, Afghanistan, 194.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



12

ruling party an even harsher repression, thereby stimulating further resistance.36 The tasksandaimsoftheSoviet40thArmyinAfghanistanwerepoorlyunderstoodintheWest,butwhatisrelevanthereisthatthearrivaloftheSovietsupendedwhateverpartsofAfghanistanwerestillunaffectedbytheinsurgency.Ittookseveralmonthsfortheinsurgencyandtherebellionstospread,butby1981virtuallyeverycornerofthecountrywasaffected.37

Whywasthis?TheinitialinterpretationthatanationalistreactiontoSovietpresencewasresponsiblehaslostsupport.Totheextentthattherewassuchareaction,itwasmainly in the cities and among the ranks of the elites and the middle class. This reactiondidhaveanindirectimpactthroughoutthecountryasitweakenedwhatwasleftofthestateapparatus;italso“sprinkled”theruralresistancewithnationalistsentiment,broughtoverbymembersoftheeliteandthemiddleclasseeingfromrepressioninthecities.38Mostofthelatter,however,chosethesafetyofPakistanovertheriskimplicitinjoiningthearmedght.

TheactualimpactoftheSovietinvasionis,aswithothertopics,hardlydiscussedintheliterature.Thismightbeduetothelackofinformationabouttheperiod:neithertheSoviets

norwesternjournalistsandtravellershadmuchaccessin1980,aratherchaoticperiodwhenoppositionpartieswerenotyetwellorganisedandthemajorgureheadsoftheresistancewerenotyetknown.ClearlythenewSoviet-installedpresidentKarmalwasperceivedasapuppetbymosturbanAfghans;hisinitialmovestoeasetheclimateofrepressionwerewelcomed,butastheactualextentoftheSovietpresencebecameclear,oppositiongrewrapidly.AswiththeperiodoftheKhalqiregimementionedabove,whatreallyhappenedinthecountrysideinthisperiod,i.e.,whatdynamicsallowedoppositionpartiestospreadrapidly,isnotyetknown,thoughsomecasestudiesdoexist.39 These studies suggest the roleofreligiousnetworksinpropagatingtherebellionandtheco-optingofcommunalrevoltsbythe parties based in Pakistan, on the basis of the distribution of patronage.

That the various parties and organisations of the armed opposition steadily gainedgroundfromthe1980sonward,however,isbeyonddoubt. 40Thelongwartransformedthecommunitiesandthewaytheyconfrontedtheconict,allowingradicalorganisationsliketheIslamistpartiestograduallytakeoverandchangethewar’snature.Counter-interventionbyPakistan,SaudiArabiaandtheUnitedStatesenabledthesegroupstodramaticallyexpandtheiroperations.The“traditional”wayofwarfareinAfghanistan,usedintheearlystagesofthewar,gavewaytosomethingmorelikeaguerrillawar. 41

Insum,whileeffortstostudytheorganisationoftheinsurgentmovementsexist,featuringleadership headquarters-level studies,42 statistics on the opposition movements43 and a

36 Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences (Boulder:WestviewPress,1984);JosephJ.Collins,The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force inSoviet Foreign Policy (Lexington:LexingtonBooks,1986);HenryS.Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1999).

37 Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995); Dorronsoro,RevolutionUnending.

38 Kakar, Afghanistan; Roy, Islam and Resistance, 118-9.

39 ForthecaseofLogar,seeKakar, Afghanistan,138-9;forthecaseofPech,seeEdwards, Before Taliban, 132-3.

40 Thereisstillsomecontroversyonhowweakthevariouspartiesandorganisationsofthearmedoppositionwerebeforethatandabouttherespectivestrengthofeachorganisationinvolvedfrom1980onward.Similarlyindistinctishowthepartiesestablishedtheirbasesamongthepopulation,howtheyrecruited,andhowtheyoperated.

41 Roy, Islam and Resistance;OlivierRoy,“NaturedelaguerreenAfghanistan,”Les Temps Modernes,June1988;OlivierRoy,“Afghanistan:Laguerrecommefacteurdupassageaupolitique,”Revue Française des Sciences Politiques, December1989.SeealsoAntonioGiustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords of Afghanistan (LondonandNewYork:C.Hurstand

ColumbiaUniversityPress,2009),43-4.42 ViktorSpolnikov, Afganistan: Islamskaya kontrrevolutsiya (Moscow:AkademiyaNaukSSSR,1987).

43 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1995).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



13

casestudyofHizb-i-Islami,44onthewhole,ourunderstandingofthedynamicsoftheinsurgencyinthe1980sisstilllimitedandoftensupercial,particularlyasfarastheinteraction of party leaderships and the grassroots goes.

3.3 Mobilisation in the 1980s

Mobilisation was widespread in the 1980s. Religious elites (ulema) and politicalcounter-elites (the Islamist parties, the Maoists, and others) decided to activelyopposearegimewhichtheydidnotjustdislike,butalso,becauseofitsmovestowardpre-emptive repression, perceived as a deadly threat. Grassroots readiness emergedgradually;managingthismobilisationoftenproveddifcultforthecommunityeldersandthemullahs.Oppositiongroupswereorganisationallyweakintheearlydaysoftheresistance and most Afghan communities maintained at least some degree of capacity tomobilise internally. In addition, in areas more affected by social and economic change,orwherevercommunitystructureshadbeenweakened,mobilisationwassloworeven,as mentioned, favoured the leftist regime, suggesting that in those days little individual

mobilisation against the government (rural or urban) occurred outside the middle class.45

Local“commanders”(kumandanan)wereoftenboundbytheconsensusofthecommunityandwerenotfreetoghtastheypleased.

It seems clear that the control exercised by the communities over the kumandananwasstrongestwhere community structureswerestrongestandthatthelongerandmoreviolent the conict,themoredestabilisingthe impact onthe community and onitsabilitytorestrainanemergingprofessionalisationofviolence.Eveninareasnotknownfor the strength of community links, mobilisation by elders played an important role.Wherecommunityauthoritywasweak,commandershadthestrongestpowerevenintheabsence of a reciprocal relationship.46

The emergence of warlordism

Thecharacteristicsofthearmedgroupsinvolvedintheconictchangedbetween1979and1992,whenthepro-Sovietregimenallycollapsed.Thedegenerationofgrassrootsmobilisationinto“warlordism”andamilitaryclassseparatefromsocietymainlyaffectedspecicareasofthecountry,liketheSouth, 47butwasapresenceinvariousmeasuresthroughout the country.48

Therehasbeena lotofconfusion concerningthewarlords; theexpressionhasbeenused indiscriminately as a term of abuse. In the literature, the term is mainly used todescribemilitaryleaderswhobreakoffthepoliticalchainofcommand.Amajorboneof

contentionamongscholars,observers,andformerparticipantsisthegureofPanjshiriresistancecommanderAhmadShahMassoud:warlordornationalhero?Towhatextentare these judgements the result of Massoud’s effective public relations campaign ratherthanoftheactualrealityontheground?BecauseMassoudmaintainednationalpoliticalaims,describinghimasawarlordisinappropriate.Moreover,thenatureofMassoud’sorganisationwasatleastinpartdifferentfromthatofclear-cutwarlordssuchasGen.

44 AbdulkedrSinno,Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2008).

45 InterviewswithIslamistandMaoistcadreswhoparticipatedinthe1980sinsurgencyconrmedthis(Kabul,2007-09);Roy, Islam and Resistance, 98-9.

46 MichaelBhatiaandMarkSedra, Afghanistan, Arms and Conict(London:Routledge,2008).47 Maley, Afghanistan Wars , 194-5.

48 Giustozzi,Empires of Mud .

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



14

Dostum,49 and Ismail Khan.50Similarly,evensomemajorguresoftheinsurgencywhohave had a bad press for some time,rstamongthemGulbuddinHekmatyar,werenot warlords as they were never military leaders and had political aims, however

objectionable they might have been.

TherealquestioniswhetherwarlordismwasacausalfactorinthedecayoftheAfghanstateinthe1990s,orwasitjustaprocessofadaptationtothecollapseofthecentral

state,whichhadothercauses.

Social fragmentation as a limit to long-term mobilisation

Inthe1980s,theIslamistpartiesmixedcadreactivismwithcommunitymobilisation,particularlyinthecaseofHizb-i-Islami.Althoughthisgrouphasnotbeenstudiedindepth, it clearly had the largest number of cadres of any of the insurgent groups; it isalsoknownthatitsrelationswiththecommunitieswerenotalwaysidyllic,although

muchoftheavailableinformationwasprovidedbyitsrivals,Jamiat-i-Islami.51

Islamists aside, the only other insurgent group which had some kind of supra-communitarianstructurewasHaraqat-i-Enqelab,anorganisationbasedonacoalitionofclericalnetworks,ofthewhichtheTalibanwereoriginallyone(theyformedasacomponent of the party in 1990).52 As in the jihads of the 19th century, the clericalnetworkshadtheabilitytooperateacrosscommunities,therebyplayingaunifyingrolewithintheirsphereofinuence(whichwasneveraslargeasAfghanistanasawhole).

Whatisclearhereishowtheabilitytopulltogetherdisparateindividualsandcommunitiesmobilising for theirown reasonwas a functionof the organisationalcapacityoftheoppositionparties.Somereliedonpersonalnetworks(likeHarakat),othersonpartystructuresandtrainedcadres(likeHizb-i-Islami),othersstillonamixofthetwo(like

Jamiat-i-Islami). Each organisational model had advantages and disadvantages; perhapsJamiat-i-Islami’s eclecticapproach allowed the party to grow faster than its rivals,althoughitshouldbeconsideredthattheparty’sgrowthafter1980wasatleastinpartduetotheslowerexpansionoftheinsurgencyinthenorthernareas,whichweremoreremote from Pakistani sources of supply.

Within a larger context in this regard, an important aspect of the 1980s that thescholarlyliteraturehasnottreatedseriouslyisinter-communityconict.Theadmittedlysparseevidencederivingfromtravelmemoirsofjournalistsandtheauthor’sinterviewswithparticipants (formermujahiddin)suggeststhatthecollapseofthegovernment’sinuenceintheruralareasalloweddormantorlimitedconictsamongcommunitiesto

return.Therelianceoncommunitiesasthebasisfortheresistance,thevery“generous”policyofdistributingweaponstowhoeverpaideventhemostsupercialallegiancetotheparties(withtheexceptionofHizb-i-Islami,whichhadtighterrules)andthegeneralspread of insecurity as bandit groups preyed on villages and travellers all contributed tothefactthatbythemid-1980s,hardlyanyvillagewasleftwhichwasnotheavilyarmed.Sincewar-relateddestructionmeantresourceswerenowscarcerthanever,competitionoverwater,cattle,andland,aswellasoverthecontrolofroadsandpaths,resumedfull-blown.Partiesandcommunitieswerecaughtinaviciouscycleofofferingeachotherincentives toghttheir local andnationalrivals.Communities startedghtingeach

49 FormermilitiacommanderinnorthwesternAfghanistan,claimedafollowingmainlyamongUzbeks.

50 Giustozzi,Empires of Mud .51 For example in Roy, Islam and Resistance;Sinno,Organizations at War .

52 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 245.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



15

otheranddrewthepartiesinasasourceofsupport;partiesstartedghtinginordertoexpandcontrolandusedcommunitiesascannonfodder.Thenetresultinanycasewasthatmuchofthelossoflifewhichoccurredinthe1980swasduetointernecineconictwithintheresistance.53Particularlyinmoreremoteareas,wheretheSovietarmyandtheirAfghanallies rarelypenetrated (that is,between75-90percentofthecountry

dependingonthephaseofthewar),suchconictaccountedforamajority,oftenalargemajority,ofthecasualtiesamongghtersandcivilians.54

Theexistenceofmultiple,rivalresistancepartiesandlocalconictsamongcommunitiesmeantthatasidefromthepresenceoftheSovietarmyandtheleftistregimeinKabul,therewasenoughfuelintheconicttokeepitgoingwellbeyondtheSovietwithdrawal.TheSovietsthemselvesandobserversonthegroundlikeDorronsoroagreedthatasthewithdrawalwasunderwayin1988-89,theresistancestartedrapidlytoloseitscharacterof jihad; the local clergy in particular started demobilising.55However,thiswasnotgoingtobetheendoftheconict,butwouldjusteffectachangeinitsnature,ashasbeennoted.By1988-89,theconicthaddevelopedtothestagewhereitwasreproducingitself sincean important part of the population (typically thosewith power at thenational and local level) had a vested interest in instability and statelessness, if notoutrightwar.Therewerestillpoliticalcausesofinstability,namelythefailuretoreachacomprehensivesettlement,butanalysisshowsthatthelittlewarsinwhichthemilitaryclasswas constantly engaged along the borders of the variouswarlord politieswasmakingitdifculttobrokeranagreement.ThecaseofHazarajat,addressedbelow,isenlighteninginthisregard:itwasanIranianpoliticalinterventionwhichforcedamilitaryclassdisinclinedtostopghtingtofollowthepoliticiansandagreetoasettlementin

1988-89.56

3.4 Afghan interpretations of the 1978-92 period

Theperiodofjihad(1978-92)isverypopularamongAfghanwriterswithinterpretationsoftheconicttendingtofocusonitsinternationaldimension.Thiscollectiveview,however,cannot be reduced to conspiracy theories, even if many of its adherents tend to ignorethemostrecent“revisionist”literature.Instead,initsmorematureform,theexternalistinterpretationsstresshowPresidentDaud(1973-78)gotentangledinsuperpowerrivalries,withtheSovietsencouraginghimtopittheissueofPashtunistanagainstPakistan.57 AuthorsmorecurrentwithwhathasbeenpublishedinternationallyacceptthatSovietinterestinthewarmwaterportsoftheIndianOceanwasnotasignicantfactordrivingtheinvasionof December 1979; instead, they mention the desire to stabilise the Khalqi regime, counter

theIslamistthreat,andcompetewithChinaandtheUSasmoresignicantmotivations.58

FortheauthorsmostexposedtoWesternliterature,externalinterferencedidnotalwayshavenegativeeffects:Gorbachev’sreformsintheSovietUnionhadaquickimpactinAfghanistan,withKarmal’sreplacementbyNajibullahandthelaunchof theNationalReconciliationpolicyin1987beingtwonotableexamples.59Also,theSovietsarguably

53 Interviews with former mujahiddin commanders, Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Gardez, Faryab, Kunduz (2005-09);Giustozzi,Empires of Mud , 58-9, 221-2.

54 ForthecaseofHazarajatseeIbrahimi,“TheFailure”;“AttheSources”;“DivideandRule.”

55 AntonioGiustozzi,War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992 (LondonandGeorgetown:C. Hurst andGeorgetownUniversityPress,2000),178-80;Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 201-2.

56 Ibrahimi,“AttheSources.’’

57 M.IbrahimiWarsaji, Jihad-e Afghanistan wa Jang-e Sard-e Qodrathai Bozorg[AfghanistanJihadandGreatPower’s

ColdWar](Peshawar:SaboorIslamicPublicationsCentre,1381),vol.1,154-9,372-7,389and761-3.58 SeeWarsaji, Jihad-e Afghanistan , vol. II, 106-7.

59 Warsaji, Jihad-e Afghanistan, vol. II, 308-11.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



16

quieted down the rivalry among the leftists; with their withdrawal, the interpartycompetitionandrivalryintensied,culminatinginTanai’sattempted1990coup,andintheParchampro-Karmalfaction’s1992dethroningofNajibullahandhandingofpowerto Massoud.60

Nonetheless,amongAfghanauthors,ideologicalinterpretationsandconspiracytheoriesremainpopular,particularlythoselinkedtoJamiat-i-IslamioranywhomaintainIslamistinclinations:thefragmentationofthePDPAisoftenattributedtoSovietmachinations.61 Fromthisperspective,MoscowwantedtousedifferentgroupstoexpandtheirinuenceinAfghanistan among different social and ethnic groups.62ColdWartheories,encompassingsuchthemesastheSovietUnion’sdesiretoexpandsouthwards,thenaturalaggressivenessofcommunistregimes,thedesiretoseizecontroloverAfghanistan’snaturalresources,and the puppet character of the PDPA since the early days of its existence, are repeatedover and over, particularly by Islamist authors.63Furthermore,theSaurcoupd’étatwasnotaninitiativeofAfghancommunists,butratherwasplannedbytheSovietUniontoachievetheirlong-termgoals.Tarakiwaschosenasheadoftherevolutionarycouncilbecausehewas aweakand semi-literateperson, thebetter toallowtheSovietsto

pursuetheirowncolonialobjectives.64

In this vein, Pakistan’s role in the 1978-92 period is a source of some controversy. ThedominantviewisthatZia-ulHaqandotherPakistaniofcialsencouragedtheformationof seven rival mujahiddin parties in Pakistan. Pakistan used international assistanceto strengthen its ownarmy and gave only oldweapons to themujahiddin andalsoappropriated western andArab funds. Itdid not try toprevent internaldifferencesamong the mujahiddin, but rather fueled these differences and supported those partiesandgroupsthatitsawasservingitsfutureinterestsinAfghanistan.

AuthorssofteronPakistan,bycontrast,generallydescribeZia-ulHaq’sroleaspositive

andbelievethatthecreationofsomanypartiesandinternaldifferencesweremoreareectionofjihadiexpansion,tribalconguration,andthesocialandpoliticalgeographyofAfghanistan.IfPakistanhadbeeninapositiontoinuencethis,itwouldhaveforcedallgroupstojoinHizb-i-Islami.Evensuchauthors,however,somewhatcontradictorilycriticisewhattheycallPakistanidiscriminationamongmujahiddinpartiesinweapons

distribution.65

Similarly,theideologicaldivisionsoftheIslamistmovementexplaintheviolenceinternalto the resistance.66 The Islamists, as compared to the leftists, had the advantage of not

60 AbdulHamidMubariz,Hqayeq wa Tahlil-e Waqaye’a Siasi Afghanistan: az Soqut-e Saltanat ta Ijraat-e Taliba, 1973-

1999[FactsandAnalysisofPoliticalEventsofAfghanistan:FromtheFallofMonarchytotheRiseofTaliban,1973-1999](Kabul:MaiwandPublishers,1378),54-59.

61 SayedMuhammadBaqirMesbahZadah, Afghanistan Qurbani Rofaqa wa Bratheran [Afghanistan: victim of comradesandbrothers](MashhadIran:SanabadPublishers,1378),20-3.

62 MesbahZadah, Afghanistan Qurbani, 24-6.

63 ThesplitofthepartyintoKhalqandParcham,accordingtothisview,was instigatedtopreventtheattractionofnon-PashtunstoMaoistideology.ThentheSovietslostcontrolandthetwofactionsstartedghtingeachother.

64 Laalistani, Jang-e Qodrat: Waqaia Sey Dahe Akhir Afghanistan[PowerStruggle:EventsoftheLastThreeDecadesinAfghanisan] (Kabul: Publisher unknown, 1384), 7, 12,18-26, 127-8;Amir EatemadDanishyar, Jang-e Afghanistanwa Shoravi, Amil Fropashi Jahni Kamonism[Afghan-SovietWar,theCauseofGlobalCollapseofCommunism](Tehran:Bahinah Publishers, 1371), 44-7, 75-7, 123-5; M. Ikram Andishmand, Salhai Tajawuz wa Muqawimat[YearsofInvasionandResistance](Nashr-ePaiman,1383),2-3,5,69;NasryHaqShinas,Tahawulat-e Siasi Jihad-e Afghanistan [PoliticalDevelopmentsofJihadinAfghanistan](Kabul:NamaniPublishers,1385),vol.1,8,12,20-1,23,vol.2,5,50-2,463-7;MesbahZadah, Afghanistan Qurbani, 62-5.

65 Andishmand, Salhai Tajawuz, 19;HaqShinas,Tahawulat-e Siasi, vol. 1, 8, 12, 20-1, 23, vol. 2, 5, 50-2, 463-7;Laalistani, Jang-e Qodrat, 174-7, 187,


8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



17

beingatoddswiththecultureandreligionofthepeople,butnonethelesslackedsocialroots.67TheirweakpopularbasemadethemdependentonPakistanisupport,which,inturn,allowedtheaforementionedPakistanimanipulations.68 Afghan literature on thesubject insists on personal rivalries as an explanation for political dynamics. The Khalq-Parchamconictisexplainedinthisway,asaredivisionsamongthemujahiddin. 69 A

single leftist author takes a different approach and concurs regarding the failure of thenewKhalqiregimetopaysufcientattentiontothestrongrootsintraditionandoldcustoms of economic institutions in society, turning the natural allies of the revolutionagainstit.Moreover,themonopolisationofpowerbyasinglepartyhadtheperverseeffectofmarginalisingthe“revolutionaryvanguards”fromthemasses.70

AlthoughdetailedaccountsofthejihadphaseofthewarsareincludedintheAfghanliterature, the analysis of mobilisation is seldom very sophisticated. Most commonexplanationsofintra-mujahiddinconictinthe1980sand1990saddress:

• wealthaccumulation;

• theroleoftheKGBandKhADininstigatinginternalconictsandrivalries;

• interferences by allies: Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Islamic Parties inPakistan; and

• Arabsalsocontributingtointernalconictsbyfundingrivalfactions.71

AsomewhatmoresophisticatedanalysisisofferedbyWarsaji,whorecognisesthatthetribal character of Afghan society facilitated external interference.72 He also recognisesthat a number of other factors explain resistance movement divisions and fragmentation:personal ambitions and attitudes of leaders and political groups, deep social divisions,etc.73 He in turn explains these rivalries as the result of:

• political,economicandculturalbackwardness;

• a culture of despotism;

• adeep-rootedtribalandmilitaristicspiritinthesocietypastbackwardness;and

• authoritarian regimes leaving behind a legacy of ethnic prejudice and discriminations.74

3.5 Economic drivers of conict: 1978-92

Alreadyduringthe1980s,thewarandthehugesupportprovidedtothewarringsidesby their respective patrons greatly intensied the dependence of Afghan politicalorganisations on external aid, the more so as internal food production declined

massively during thewar.As state controlweakened, smuggling activities ofvariouskinds,includingthenarcoticstrade,expandedrapidlyandbecameasignicantsourceoffundingformilitary-politicalorganisations.Warinevitablycreatedaneconomicinterestinitsowncontinuationamongimportantconstituenciesonbothsidesoftheconict.



69 Lalistani, Jang-e Qodrat, 30-55.

70 Kabir Ranjbar, Mosaleha way a Dame Jang[PeaceorContinuationofWar](Kabul:GovernmentPrintingPress,1989),2-6.

71 HaqShinas,Tahawulat-e Siasi, vol. I, 442-58.

72 Warsaji, Jihad-e Afghanistan, vol. I, 161-3.73 Warsaji, Jihad-e Afghanistan, vol. II, 317-8.

74 Warsaji, Jihad-e Afghanistan, vol. II, 474-7.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



18

From1987onward,Sovietde-escalation,understoodasareductioninassistanceandinthelevelofforeignpresence,proveddifculttoimplementalsobecauseofAfghanreactions,withSovietclientsrstresistingtheideaofhavingtoghtthewarontheirownandthenpanickingwhenthatbecameinevitable.75Thestrengthofpro-warinterestsnotwithstanding,duringtheearly1990s,asdirectexternalaidalmostentirelydriedup,

smugglingactivitiesgainedevengreaterimportance,themoresoasthefactionswhichcontrolledportionsof thecountryoftenresorted toprintingmoneyto fundthewareffort,unleashingwildinationanddestabilisingwhatwasleftofthelocaleconomy.Thisiswhenthenarcoticstradestartedpickingup,mainlyintermsofexpandingcultivationoftheopiumpoppy.Otherformsofrevenuecollectionbecomingincreasinglyimportantweretax collection fromthepopulationand roadtolls; the sellingofweaponryand

ammunition on the black market also occurred.76

Decentralised revenue collection as described also favoured local commanders as opposedtothetopleadership.Similarly,factionswithinthepro-Sovietgovernmentlackedfaithinthepossibilityofwinningthewar,particularlyasSovietaidstartedfalteringin1991.Theleadershipsstartedconsideringwhetherasettlementwouldnothavebeenthebestmethodtoconsolidatetheirgainsuptothatpoint.Theopportunityforpeace,however,wasmissedduetothelackofanacceptableandreliableexternalbroker.77

75 Giustozzi,“CyclesofWarandPeaceinAfghanistan:UnderstandingthePoliticalEconomyofConict”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2010);JonathanGoodhand,andDavidManseld,“Drugsand(Dis)Order:AStudyoftheOpiumTrade,PoliticalSettlementsandState-MakinginAfghanistan”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2010);AlexDeWaal,“Missionwithoutend?PeacekeepingintheAfricanpoliticalMarketplace,”International Affairs 85, no. 1(2009), 99-113.

76 G.Dorronsoro,“Afghanistan:desréseauxde solidaritéauxespacesrégionaux,”inÉconomie des Guerres Civiles ed.F.JeanandJ-C.Run,147-88(Paris:Hachette,1996);BarnettR.Rubin,“ThePoliticalEconomyofWarandPeaceinAfghanistan,”World Development28,no.10(2000),1789-1803;AlainLabrousse, Afghanistan: Opium de Guerre, Opiumde Paix (Paris: Fayard,2005),97-8;JonathanGoodhand,“FromHolyWartoOpiumWar?ACaseStudyoftheOpiumEconomyinNorthEasternAfghanistan”(Manchester:IDPM,UniversityofManchester,1999);AntonioGiustozziandNoor

Ullah,“‘Tribes’andWarlordsinSouthernAfghanistan,1980-2005,”inMercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires: PrivateViolence in Historical Context, eds.AlejandroColásandBryanMabee(London:Hurst,2010).

77 SeeGiustozzi,Empires of Mud.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



19

4. Factional War: 1992-2001

4.1 The age of the warlords: 1992-96

The dynamicsofthe civilwar period are now ratherwell known, at leastasfar as

northernAfghanistanisconcerned.Therivalwarlordpolitiesweredrawnintoconictswitheachothermostlybyamilitaryclassthatwastryingtoexpanditstaxbaseanditspatronagenetworks;theconictwiththecentre(thatis,withtheRabbanigovernment,whichhadtakenoverin1992andremainedtheinternationallyrecognisedgovernmentuntiltheendof2001)wasduetotheinabilityoftherivalfactionstoreachapoliticalsettlement over the division of spoils. Because the strength of the various factions hadnotbeentestedonthebattleeldandnoimpartialandcrediblenegotiatorwasavailable(theUNonlyhadalimiteddiplomaticpresencewithnoarmedinterposingforce),anewroundofcivilwarbeginningin1992wheredifferentforcescouldtesttheirrespectivestrengthwas probably inevitable.The presence ofmultiple military-political actorsmeant that after the initial failure of either faction to gain military supremacy, the

formationofrivalallianceswouldfollowasanattempttoachievevictorywithoutaninclusive political settlement.78

The failure of political consolidation

The patterns of mobilisation in the 1990s differed from the 1980s: community mobilisation,beguninthe1980s,nallycompletelycededgroundtoeconomicmobilisation. 79 Themullahs and the elders had lost control over their communities and had lost interest inthewar;theclergyinparticulardemobilisedfromtheSovietwithdrawalonward.Thegrowingmercenarycharacterofthewarpartiallyexplainsthedecreasingeffectivenessofthearmiesinvolved.Onecouldspeakofthe“demodernisation”ofthesearmies,asa

detailedstudyofDostum’sshows.80

In this period, the limited social and economic base of the different military organisationsinvolvedexplainswhythewarseemedboundtocontinueindenitely,althoughinrealitynegotiations involving different partners took place at various stages; it is likely that the

warwouldeventuallyhaveendedoncethevariousfactionsexhaustedtheirresources.81

ThedetailedstudyofIsmailKhan’sandDostum’spoliciesinthewestandNorthshowsthatinternalconsolidationwasgoingonwithineachofthepolitiesthatemergedfrom1992onward,whichcouldperhapsbedescribedastheformationofproto-states.Inotherwords,thesituationinAfghanistaninthe1990swasslowlyevolvingtowardanew

equilibrium.Themainconundrumtoberesolvedwashowtoincorporateanovergrownmilitary class in a future political settlement.

Ismail Khan and Dostum had their own answers to the problem, but neither politysurvived the crisis of consolidation. In the presence of external threats, they couldhardly afford to confront decisively the military class in principle subordinated to them.IsmailKhanin1992-95waslessexposedtoexternalthreatsandcouldaffordtogofartherincentralisinghis“emirate,”adevelopmentwhichalsosuitedhismoreauthoritarianpersonality.Dostum,bycontrast,wasalwaysthreatenedbythepossibilityofdefection


79 BhatiaandSedra, Afghanistan.

80 AntonioGiustozzi,“TheDemodernisationofanArmy:NorthernAfghanistan1992-1998,”Small Wars and Insurgencies 1,no. 15 (2004), 1-18.

81 AntonioGiustozzi,“CyclesofWarandPeace.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



20

ofhiscommanders.Theweakideologicallegitimacyofbothpolities(butparticularlyDostum’s)madethetaskofthedominantwarlordsthatmuchtougher.Anequilibriumwasgoingtobeestablishedinonewayoranother;thefailureofthewarlordstoachieveitquicklyenoughleftthemexposedtotheemergenceofnewthreats,whichwerebound

to emerge from the ungoverned Pashtun belt.82

The emergence of regional polities

ThedifcultyofconsolidatingthevariouspolitiesthatemergedoutofthefragmentationoftheAfghanstateiswellillustratedbythewaveofself-contained,smallercivilwarsthatshookHazarajatafter1979.83WhywereeventheShiiteKhomeinistfactionsunabletoreachaninternalpoliticalsettlement?ThereweresomeideologicaldifferencesaseachfactionalignedwithadifferentAyatollahinIran,butthebitterconictcannotbe

explained in these terms.

IsthesamemodelapplicabletoAfghanistanasawhole?TheunicationofAfghanistanhas historically been the work ofa few dynamic centres,able topull togetherthesurrounding countryside. As argued by Barnett Rubin, it remains to be demonstrated thatauniedAfghanistancanbeachievedwithoutexternalsupport.Theconundrumofthe1990swasthatrivalpowersweresupportingrivalcontendersforpower:theevidenceisthat Iran and to a lesser extent Russia and Tajikistan supported the Rabbani government,whilePakistan supportedHizb-i-IslamiandUzbekistan andTurkey supportedDostum.Noexternalsupporter providedenough toallowany factiontogainanedgeonthe

adversaries.84

Duringthisperiod,atendencytowardtheethnicisationofconictstartedemerging.Different factions used ethnic arguments to keep mobilising support which wouldotherwisehavewaned;becauseAfghanistan’sregionstendtohavesolidethnicmajorities,

ethnicisation and regionalisation largely coincided. Ethnic friction in Afghanistan is a verycontentiousissue,whichmostscholarshavebeentryingtoavoidforalongtimeasitisvirtuallyimpossibletoaddresstheissueinawaywhichdoesnotoffendsomebody. 85 Inthe1990s,therstethno-nationalistviewsstartedacquiringawiderconstituency,goingbeyond small groups of intellectuals and becoming a factor of mobilisation of the factionsengagedincivilconict. Jamiat-i-Islami,Junbesh-i-Milli(thepartyofGen.Dostum),Hizb-i-Islami,Hizb-i-Wahdat (alargelyHazaraparty, initiallyof Khomeinistleanings),and the Taliban, among others, used ethnic feelings and resentment occasionally tomobiliselaggingsupport.Eachofthesefactionshadamixedconstituency,butwithapredominantethnicgroupatthecore.Insomecases,theseeffortswerequitesuccessfulin termsof creating or reinforcingethnic identities. Pashtuns,Tajiks, Hazaras, and

Uzbekswereallaffectedinvaryingmeasurebytheseprocesses.86


83 Withdefactoautonomysince1979,Hazarajatshowedalreadyinthe1980swhatthefateoftherestofAfghanistanwouldbeafterthecollapseofthepoliticalcentre.Therstwarpittedtheclergyagainstsecularelders,followedbyawarbetweenpro-Kho’iclericsandKhomeinists,thenbyawaramongKhomeinistfactions.In1988,IranianbrokeringfosteredreconciliationwhichuniedalltheKhomeinistfactionsuntiltheintra-Khomeinistcivilwarrestartedin1993duetodividedrelationswiththenewRabbanigovernment.Prof.RabbaniwastheleaderofJamiat-i-Islami.

84 SylvieGelinas, Afghanistan du Communisme au Fondamentalisme(Paris:L’Harmattan,2000);Giustozzi, Empires of Mud .

85 Onthepre-2001periodandtheliteraturesee3.1and4.1above.

86 Dorronsoro,‘‘Afghanistan’’;AntonioGiustozzi,“LosgruposétnicosylamovilizaciónpolíticaenAfganistán,”Revistade Estudios Sociales,December2010.OnHizb-i-WahdatseeIbrahimi,“TheFailure”;“AttheSources”;“DivideandRule.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



21

Afghan interpretations of the 1992-94 period

InAfghaninterpretationsofthe1992-94period,Pakistanimanipulationsarewidelyseenas the reason the different factions of the resistance failed to coalesce around a politicalsettlementaftertheSovietwithdrawal,althoughthereisalsocriticismoftheroleofIranandSaudiArabiaindamagingnationalunityandsacricingjihadandtheuprisingfortheirowninterests. 87 After the Pakistani military barred the representatives of theZahirShahgroupfromparticipatinglocallyintheedglinginterimAfghangovernmentinPakistan, the Pakistani government then attempted undermine the interim government

beforeanytransitionofpowerinKabul.88

The victorious mujahiddin also failed to form a national government in 1992 becausetheyhadnottrainedprofessionalcadrestotakeover.AftertheSovietwithdrawal,theAmericansthemselvesgotincreasinglyworriedaboutthepossibilityoftheestablishmentof an Islamist regime in Afghanistan and started cultivating the seeds of difference andconfrontation among the different mujahiddin commanders.89 Then Pakistani support forHizb-i-Islamidrovethe1990scivilwar. 90

EvencommentatorssoftestonPakistanviewitsroleafterZia-ulHaq’sdeathin1988negatively. Pakistani military ofcials and politicians initially viewed the jihad in

Afghanistanasadefenseshieldandnancialresource.Aftertheyaccumulatedenoughwealthandresources,however,Pakistanstartedthinkingof replacingtheRussiansinAfghanistanbyannexingAfghanistanasoneofitsprovinces.ControlofAfghanistanwouldbringPakistanclosertoCentralAsiaandprovidethemwithforcesforongoingconictsinIndiaandKashmir.Ininternationalconferences,PakistanstartedmakingdealswithMoscowandKabulasrepresentativesofAfghanistan.91

Fewauthorsdrawwider-rangingconclusionsfromthecivilwarsandtherstTalibanphaseofthewar(1994-2001).HazMansurarguesthatpoliticalIslamhindersnation

87 Warsaji, Jihad-e Afghanistan,vol.II,512-38,646-651;HaqShinas,Tahawulat-e Siasi, vol. II, 46-62.

88 Mubariz,Hqayeq wa Tahlil-e Waqaye’a Siasi Afghanistan, 31-40.

89 Mubariz,Hqayeq wa Tahlil-e Waqaye’a Siasi Afghanistan, 47-48.90 Mubariz,Hqayeq wa Tahlil-e Waqaye’a Siasi Afghanistan, 112-123.

91 HaqShinas,Tahawulat-e Siasi, vol. II, 101-3, 213-8.

Box 2: Timeline

8April1978 SaurRevolution

14September1979 TarakimurderedbyAmin

27December1979 Sovietinvasion

15February1989 SoviettroopscompletewithdrawalfromAfghanistan

30April1992 Najibullah’spro-Sovietregimecollapsesandthearmed opposition takes control of Kabul

27September1996 TheTalibantakeKabul

7October2001 AmericanattackontheTalibanregimestarts

June 2002 Taliban start reorganising and launch an insurgency movement

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



22

buildingandpoliticaldevelopmentbypromotingacosmopolitanworldviewthatstresses

connectionsthatgowellbeyondthenationalborders.92

4.2 The rise and consolidation of the Taliban: 1994-2001

The rise of the Taliban

There is controversy over the actual origins of the Taliban. Though some authors arguethattheTalibanwereinfactlargelyacreationofthePakistaniintelligenceagencies,thefailureofthePakistanistopropelHizb-i-Islamitovictoryin1992-94stronglysuggeststhatmerePakistanisupportwouldnothavebeensufcienttoturntheTalibanintothedominant faction in Afghanistan.93 The Taliban themselves have instead argued that theywereaspontaneousreactionofsomegroupsofclerics,disgustedbythechaosandorgyofabusewhichengulfedsouthernAfghanistanin1994.94Dorronsoro,theonlywesternscholar to have travelled extensively inside Afghanistan in the 1990s, believes thatalthough the Pakistanis played a role in the emergence of the Taliban as an autonomous

military-political force through the Pakistani Jamiyat-al Ulema, local Afghan dynamicslargely account for the success of the Taliban. Pakistani intelligence agencies onlyexploitedamovementwhichhadlocalrootsandhelpedittoanearvictory.95

WhatevertheactualoriginsoftheTaliban,itisclearthattheTalibanhadwidespreadpopular supportat leastduring the expansion toward Kabul, althoughthe source ofthissupportisvaryinglyattributed.TherewasalsoafundamentalistdimensionoftheTaliban’sappeal,whichmusthavebeenstrongamongmuchoftheclergywhichhadbeen marginalised since 1992.96

The Taliban in power 1996-2001

TheTalibanwerenotableto completelycrushopposition,withresistancecontinuinginthenortheastandinpocketselsewhereoutsidesouthernAfghanistan.MostofthisresistancewasfromrivalorganisationsthatdidnotwanttodisarminthefaceoftheTaliban’sonslaught.However,therewerealsopocketsofethnicresistance,theextentofwhichisstillamatterofdispute:clearlysomecommunitieswereopposedtotheTaliban,butwasitawidelysupportedfeeling?TheevidenceindicatesthatcollaborationexceededresistanceuntilthestartofOperationEnduringFreedominlate2001,althoughthis could be said for a period of any country under occupation.97

WiththeTaliban’srecentrecruitingamongtheethnicminorities,thedegreeofprejudicialhostility to the Taliban among them has been increasingly questioned, especially as the

TalibanhavealwaysclaimedsomebaseofsupportamongtheTajikandUzbekclergy.98 Itwillprobablyneverbepossibletodemonstratewhatthemajorityofthemembersoftheethnicminoritiesfeelanditmightbebeyondthepointanyway,asinaninternalconictvoluntarymobilisationisonlysmallpartofwhatisgoingon.Itisknownnow

92 Mansur, A’lami Naw A’dami Naw [New World New Man] (Kabul: Publication of Hizb-e Mardum-e Musalman-eAfghanistan, 1388), 91-145.

93 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (London:Tauris,2000),159.

94 AbdulSalaamZaeef,My Life With the Taliban(C.Hurst:London,2010).

95 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 243-4.

96 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending, 267; Rashid, Taliban; Michael Grifn, Reaping the Whirlwind: The TalibanMovement in Afghanistan(London:PlutoPress,2001).

97 Giustozzi,Empires of Mud ;AntonioGiustozzi,“TheTalibanBeyondthePashtuns”(Waterloo,Ontario:CIGI,2010).98 Giustozzi, “Beyond the Pashtuns”;AntonioGiustozzi, and Christoph Reuter, “The Northern Front: The AfghaninsurgencyspreadingbeyondthePashtuns”(Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



23

thatMassoudfacedserioustroubleinmobilisingthenortheasternerstoghtagainsttheTaliban;therewerealsoattemptstosupporttheTalibaninBadakhshan.ProbablywhatisclosesttothetruthisthatalargeportionofthenorthernclergysympathisedwiththeTaliban regardless of its ethnic background.99

HowdidtheTalibanevolveasamilitary-politicalorganisationduringthisperiod?MuchanalysishasbeenfocusedonitsrelationshipwithalQaedaaswellaswiththePakistanis.Findingreliableinformationinallthisisdifcult;forexample,theroleofPakistaniarmyofcersinassistingandadvisingtheTalibanhasneverbeendenitivelyproven,althoughvolunteers from theFederallyAdministeredTribalAreasandtheNorth-WestFrontierProvince have been captured on the battleeld.100 Though al Qaeda’s combatantsweredenitelythere,atleastsomeofthemghtingwiththeTaliban,theirsizeandcontributionhavenotbeenassessedwithanyprecisionandtheirmilitarycontributiontothegeneraleconomyofthewarwasinalllikelihoodmodest.Thesameappliestotheatleast14jihadistgroupsofvariousorigins(Arab,Pakistani,andCentralAsian,mostly)that established bases in Afghanistan in those years. Most of the time, they did not getinvolvedinAfghanistan’sinternalconict. 101

PerhapswithPakistanior jihadisthelp, theTaliban’smilitarymachineshowed clearsignsofimprovementandrenementaftertheytookKabulin1996.Thiswastoalargeextenttheresultoftheirconfrontationwithprogressivelymorecapablerivals:theireasyadvancestoppedoncetheycameintocontactwiththemoredevelopedmilitary-politicalforcesofMassoud,Dostum,andIsmailKhan.Subsequently,theyadaptedandcreatedsomethingmoreresemblinganarmy,howeverprimitivebywesternstandards. 102

Undoubtedly the Taliban received material support from outside, in the shape of 4x4pick-upsmainly, but they donot seem tohavebeen the beneciaries of signicantnancialsupport.AlQaedaisknowntohavecontributedsomemillionsofdollarsandthe

Pakistanismore,butstillintherangeofthelowtensofmillions.103

All the indicationsarethattheTalibanwerefarfrombeingawashinmoney.

Dynamics of Taliban expansion

BythetimeEnduringFreedomstarted,theTalibanwas stillencounteringopposition,though most observers at that time (and analysts later) believed that they eventuallywouldprevail.Nevertheless,theTalibanhadtheirownshareofproblems,mostlyderivingfromthe2000poppyban,whichreducedtheirrevenueandmadethemunpopularintheSouthinparticular;theregimemightnothavebeenabletosuccessfullyconsolidateeven in the event of a successful conclusion of the military campaign.104Whatevertheir

situation, their success in bringing 90 percent of Afghanistan under their direct or indirectcontrol is a feat that requires explanation.105

99 Giustozzi,Empires of Mud , 281-2.

100 AmericanofcialshaverecentlyconrmedininterviewstotheBBCthatinlate2011anevacuationofPakistanimilitarypersonnelassignedtosupporttheTalibantookplacefromKunduz(BBC2,“SecretPakistan,”26Octoberand2November2011).

101 Rashid, Taliban;BrynjarLia, Architect of Global Jihad (London:C.Hurst,2008).

102 AnthonyDavis,“HowtheTalibanBecameaMilitaryForce,”inFundamentalism Reborn? ,ed.WilliamMaley,(London:C.Hurst,1998).

103 SteveColl,Ghost Wars(NewYork:Penguin,2004).

104 Parry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War (Seattle,WA:UniversityofWashingtonPress,2001),123-4.

105 Theexistingliteraturedoesnotreallyprovideanexplanation;sayingthattheTalibanexploitedthewarwearinessofthemajorityofAfghansonlyexplainstheirinitialadvance,whentheypresentedthemselvesaspeacemakers;by1997theywerelookingincreasinglylikeawarfactionintenton capturingpowerforitself,butcontinuedtomakesteadyterritorial gains.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



24

Inordertomaintaincontrolovertheirnewlyacquiredterritories,theTalibanco-optedanumberofmilitiaspreviouslyafliatedwiththeirenemies.ThiswascommonintheNorthandinHazarajatinparticular.Everywhere,theyselectivelyabsorbedtherankandleoftheirformeradversaries,sometimesevencommanderswhowerenotmullahs,particularly once the need to establish a functional army asserted itself. They even

absorbedhundredsofspecialistsfromwhathadbeenthepro-Sovietarmy,althoughtheyendeduppurginganumberofthemonideologicalgrounds.ThedifferencebetweentheTaliban’s centrally controlled military force and these militias is that in the case of thelattertheymaintainedtheirleaders.Themilitiaswerepartiallydisarmedandusedasakindofpoliceforce;thissystemofindirectcontrolallowedtheTalibantoavoidmuchcontactwiththepopulation.Inareaswheretheanti-Talibanresistancewasactive,theTalibanwoulddeploymilitarily.Itisintheseareasthatlossoflifetendedtooccur,includingthemassacresofcivilians.Elsewhere,theTalibanwerehardlyeverseen.106

ThoughtheTalibanmighthavebeenclosertondingthekeyto“pacifying”Afghanistanthan any of their predecessors or successors, not enough is known about the localdynamicsofthisperiod.SomeauthorsarguethattheTalibanwerebeginningtobecome

unpopular even among Pashtuns in 2000-01, as a consequence of their poppy ban.107Whilethis is possible, the evidence to support the case is again scant.

Afghan interpretations of the 1994-2001 period

ConsideringtheimpactthattheTalibanhavehadonAfghanistan’srecenthistory,itissurprisinghowlittletheyhavebeendiscussedintheliterature.Thepredominantviewsuggests the Taliban originally had three major characteristics: an ideological link to themore traditional segment of the Islamic movement, Pashtun ethnocentrism, and totaldependenceoncontrollingforeignentities.TheywererecruitedandtrainedbyISIofPakistan.108

With regard to the Taliban’s relation to the Pakistanis, Afghan interpretationspredominantlyholdthatthewarinAfghanistanprovidedauniqueopportunityforPakistan.TheydecidedtoendwiththePashtunistanissueforeverandgraduallymovetowardannexingAfghanistanandchangingthepoliticalmapofSouthAsia;theTalibanwereaninstrument of this policy.109EvenauthorswhodonotbelieveinanyPakistaniannexationplansupporttheviewthataTaliban-ledsubordinategovernmentinKabulwouldsettlethequestionoftheDurandLinerstandsecurePakistaniinterestsinAfghanistanandCentralAsia second.However, theTaliban exacerbatedethnic frictionbecause theywere“narrow-mindedethno-centrists”,makingthepacicationofAfghanistanunderaPakistaniclientmoredifculttoultimatelyachieve.110

Furtheronfromthis,accordingtoAfghanauthors,anotherfactorprolongingthewarwastheriseoftheTalibandrawingtheIranians,UzbeksandIndiansintothewar,fuellingtheconictanddrivingitonendlesslybysupportingdifferentsides,withthePakistanis

playing a particularly negative role. 111

106 Giustozzi,“BeyondthePashtuns.”

107 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermines Counterterrorism,” The WashingtonQuarterly 28, no. 4 (2005), 55-72.

108 Andishmand, Salhai Tajawuz, 45.

109 Andishmand, Salhai Tajawuz, 83.110 Andishmand, Salhai Tajawuz, 273, 276.

111 Andishmand, Salhai Tajawuz, 189-90.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



25

Thenewgovernmentlackedlegitimacybecauseofitsinabilitytoprovideservicestothe population; in addition, ideological and cultural differences among the factionsprevented the formation of a national government.112ThelackofcorruptionwithintheTalibanevengavethemanedgeovertherivalmilitiasmilitarily,astheirsupplieswerearrivingontime,butPakistanisupportfortheTalibanwasdecisiveasIranandother

countrieswerenotquiteasdeterminedintheirsupportfortheanti-Talibanfactions.

113

ThereareveryfewattemptstoexplaintheemergenceoftheTalibanwithendogenousfactors: the anarchy predominating in the Pashtun belt in the mid-1990s and the

radicalisation of the madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan.114

4.3 Economic drivers of conict: 1992-2001

The trends highlighted for the 1978-92 period (see 2.5 above) strengthened after1992.Opiumpoppycultivationacceleratedfurtherandthecreationoftherstheroinreneriesfollowed.Thefactions’military-politicalleadershipdidnotdrivetheprocess,

eventhoughsometimestheyexploiteditfortheirownpoliticalends.Thelocalwarlordsand commanderswho were the real protagonists of the endogenouswar economy’sexpansionsawtheirpowerandinuencegrow.Intheircase,warproteeringbecameoftenapre-eminentinterest,replacingpriorpoliticalaims.ArguablythiswasthecaseoftheAkhundzadasinHelmand,whowagedwartoextendtheircontrolovertheprotabledrug trade, and of many other local actors, but it does not appear to have been the caseoftheleadershipsofJamiat-i-IslamiorofHizb-i-Islami.Individualsandgroupswithintheseorganisations,however,developedeconomicinterests,whichoverrodepoliticalaims, facilitating the partial organisational disintegration of the late 1990s.115

As the mujahiddin’s different military-political factions confronted each other, beginningin 1992 and hastening the collapse of the Afghan state, a spiral of violence and revenge

rapidlytookover.Thefactionswereactuallygraduallydisintegrating,butataboutthesame pace, so that none of them could gain a decisive advantage from the process. Theunderlyingeconomicconditionsforpeacewerethereforeinplace,butwerewaitingforanewfactortoappearandbreakthepoliticaldeadlock.TheTalibanemergedinthemid-1990sastheforcewhichcouldguaranteetheinterestsofatleastalargeportionofthegroupsofwarproteerscreatedbythesmugglingeconomy,includingthenarcoticstrade,reunitingmostofthecountryundertheircontrol.TheTalibanalsodrewsupportfromcommunitieswhoseinterestshadbeendamagedbythebreakdownoftheAfghanstateanditsfragmentation,suchasTajikslivinginthenorthernfringesofHazarajat,whohadlostlandandassetstotheHazaras,andPashtunnomads,whohadlostaccess

toHazarajatpastureswhenthisregionhadobtaineddefactoautonomyin1979-80.116

AsRubinput it,onlytheTaliban inthe1990shadthe“politicalcapital”toactasacatalyst for strong underlying social and economic trends. The main anti-Taliban factionswerewearingdownaftermanyyearsofghting;key playerswithin theirrankshadaccumulatedwealthandwerekeentoretirefromwar.Thepopulationingeneralwastiringofghtingandwaslongingforpeaceandreconstruction.Theinternationalcommunitybeingabsentfromthescene,theTalibanemergedtosteerthecountrytowardpeace.



114 Mubariz,Hqayeq wa Tahlil-e Waqaye’a Siasi Afghanistan, 225-230.

115 Dorronsoro,“Afghanistan:desréseaux”;Rubin,“ThePoliticalEconomy”;Labrousse, Afghanistan; Goodhand, “FromHolyWartoOpiumWar?”;GiustozziandUllah,“‘Tribes’andWarlordsinSouthernAfghanistan.”

116 Dorronsoro,“Afghanistan:desréseaux”;Rubin,“ThePoliticalEconomy”;Labrousse, Afghanistan, 127-6.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



26

Many“warlords”subscribedtotheplan,hopingthattheywouldbeallowedtokeepthewealthandinuenceaccumulatedduringthewar.TheTalibanalsopromisedwarlordsaroleintheneworder.117

117 Giustozzi,“CyclesofWar”;Rubin,“ThePoliticalEconomy.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



27

5. Features of the Current Phase of the Conict: 2002-10

CertainfeaturesofAfghansocietyandtheAfghangovernmentasitemergedafter2001facilitatedthere-emergenceofaconict,butdidnotigniteitthemselves.Whenthefactorsthatunderpinnedthenewconictareanalyzed,attentionisdrawntowardweak

governance (often taking the shape of bad governance altogether) and internationalintervention. Only once anti-government mobilisation took off did the variety ofotherfactorsjointhesetodrivetheconict:povertyandremoteness,conictamong

communities,thepoliticaleconomyofwar,andethnicdivisions.

5.1 Weak governance

BadorweakgovernanceisoftencitedasoneofthekeycausesofinstabilityinAfghanistan,althoughvulnerabilitiesinAfghangovernancedonotexplainwhygovernancewasnot

alwaysbadorconducivetoinstability.As previously noted, the system establishedbyAbdurRahmanwasdependent onhaving theright individualsoccupypositionsof

responsibility.118Thepre-warsystemhaddevelopedacapacitytohandlelocaldisputesandwasquitegoodatthis,ifnotatmuchelse.Re-establishingthesystemasithadbeeninthe1970swouldhaveneededamassiveandsystematiceffort,whichsimplydidnothappen.Neitherwasanythinkinggoingintothedevelopmentofanalternativesystemas a replacement. As a result, the Afghan government did not really have an effectivesystemofengagementwithitsruralpopulation.Moreoftenthannotunabletosettledisputes,aswellastoofferservices,thepost-2001governmenthasplayedasmallrole

in the life of the population.119

Service provision: Education, healthcare, and policing

Educationwas restoredquickly after2001,with the number ofchildren enrolled inschoolsgrowingveryfastuntil2005.However,thespeedoftheprocesswasoneofthecausesofitslimitedimpact:thequalityoftheeducationprovidedwasextremelypoor.As a result, after an initial enthusiasm for the return of secular education, interestamong the population started fading. At the same time, the curricula of primary andsecondary schoolswere seenascontroversial bythemore conservative elements insocietyand had alreadybecome a source oftension in2002.Later, theTaliban andother armed opposition groups capitalised on this resentment and launched a campaignagainstschoolsandteachers,whichrolledbackstateeducationfromvastareasofthecountry,mainlyintheSouth.Althoughevidenceissketchyonthispoint,itwouldappearthat communities exposed to state education in the past tended to be supportive of the

schools,whilecommunitiesnotyetreachedbythegradualroll-backofstateeducationfromthe1950sonwardwerehostileandsusceptibletoTalibanpropaganda.120

The provision of health services has similarly had limited impact in the rural areas,particularlythemoreremoteones,duetothelackofqualiedpersonnelwillingtoserveawayfromthecities;indeed,fewoftheruralclinicsbuiltafter2001hadamajorimpact

118 Selectingadministratorsonsuchascalewasclearlynota taskforeverybody.ManybelievethatPresidentKarzaiandmostofhisministersanddepartmentheads,forexample,didnotperformverywellinthisregard,oftenappointingweakgovernors.Localrepresentativesofthegovernmentwerealsoneglected,withfewofcialsexertinganyefforttorehabilitateasystembadlydamagedbylongyearsofwarandbythesuccessionofvariousgovernmentsfrom1978

onward.119 Giustozzi,Empires of Mud .

120 Giustozzi,“Nation-Building.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



28

on the surrounding population.121Table1showshowmostvillageswerestillatagreatdistancefromanyhealthcentre,whileTable2showshowestimatesoflifeexpectancy(ruralandurbancombined)showedonlyverylimitedprogressafter2000,consideringtheverylowlevelfromwhichAfghanistanstarted.Althoughabreakdownofthedataisnotavailable,giventhattheoverwhelmingmajorityofdoctorsarebasedincitiesand

towns,eventhemodestincreaseislikelytohavebenetedtheurbanpopulationmuchmore than the rural population.

Table 1: Proximity to health care services

Source:“NationalRiskandVulnerabilityAssessment2005”(Kabul:CentralStatisticsOrganization,2005).

Table 2: Life expectancy at birth: 2000-2010

Source:WorldBankestimates2000-2010.

Policingwasalsoverydecientafter2001.Althoughsomeimprovementcouldbenotedinpolicequalityafter2005(again,startingfromaverylowlevel),thiswasmostlylimitedto the cities or to the more secure provinces. Rural policing remained very limited eveninthebestcases,withpolicemenrarelyventuringtothevillages,particularlyifthesewereawayfromthemainroads.Asdiscussedingreaterdetailbelow,oftenthefactionalcapture of policing had a major negative impact on the credibility of the government

121 Seealso“Afghanistan:MaternalMortalityinNortheasternAfghanistanamongWorstinWorld,”IRIN,16 February2007; “Afghanistan:OverstretchedHealth Services inKandahar Province,”IRIN,17 September,2009; KlausMorales,“RebuildingAfghanistan’shealthserviceishamperedbyinsecurityandlackoffunds,”British Medical Journal 331 (2005),1164;SchuylerGeller,“DepartmentofDefenseBloggersRoundtable:AfghanistanNationalSecurityForcesHealthCareCapabilityDevelopment;FormationOfFormalMilitaryMedicalAndAlliedHealthCareTrainingPrograms”(Washington,DC:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,23June2010);SchuylerGeller,“DepartmentOfDefenseBloggersRoundtable:MedicalManualMentoringTraininginAfghanistan”(Washington,DC:UnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense,2010).

Distance from Nearest Health Centre, 2003-05 ِ % of villages

In village 2.6

Lessthan5km 14.4

5-10 km 14.9

More than 10 km 65.1Other 3

2000 41.8

2002 42.1

2003 42.3

2004 42.6

2005 42.9

2006 43.2

2007 43.6

2008 43.9

2009 44.6

2010 44.7

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



29

andpushedseveralcommunitiestosupporttheinsurgency.ThereasonwhythiswaspossiblewastheweaklysupervisedstructureoftheMinistryofInterior,whichallowedmuchroomforthearbitrarybehaviourofpoliceofcers.122

Strongmen and “bad” governance

AsAfghanistanemergedfromOperationEnduringFreedominlate2001,thenewcoalitioninpowerincludedelementsoftheoldelitethathadruledthecountryupto1973,organised anti-Taliban parties, and a range of independent strongmen operating mainlyintheSouth.From2002to2009,thestrongmenwerelargelysouthern-based;mostlypartofeitherKarzai’sownpatrimonialnetworkortheCIA’snetwork.BothnetworkshadbeenestablishedintheearlyphasesofEnduringFreedominordertomobiliseghtersagainsttheTalibanregime.IntheSouth,thestrongmen’snetworksalwaysremaineddividedbetweenthosedirectly linked totheKarzai family and thosehostiletoit.The rivalnetworkscoexisteduneasily,aseachtriedtomaximiseitsinuenceoverthegovernmentstructure at the expense of the other. Their rivalries negatively affected their ability tocontaintheinsurgencyatastagewhereitwasstillveryvulnerable.Thepriorityofeach

networkwasnottoghtaweakinsurgency,buttoundermineeachother. 123

Clashesbetweentheprivatemilitiasofthestrongmenandtheinsurgentsweremostlyoccasional,althoughmanyof thestrongmen’smilitiaghtershadbeen incorporatedintonationalpoliceandborderpoliceandwereghtinginthatcapacity.Indeed,thewholesecurity apparatus intheearlyyears ofthepost-2001 regimewasmannedbymilitiamen of the different strongmen, on the basis of the division of spoils brokered byPresidentKarzai.ThisappliesalsototheforcesoftheMinistryofDefence,which,untilthedeploymentoftheNationalArmy,werealsomilitiasgatheredundertheumbrellaof the ministry, but in practice under the effective control of the strongmen. Anothernegativeconsequenceofincorporatingstrongmenintothesecurityforceswasthelow

levelofdiscipline,professionalism,theweakcommandandcontrolstructure,thespreadof corruption, and the tendency to live off the population, a trait compounded by thelowsalariesandpaymentdelays.124

Wasthereanyalternativetotherelianceonthesemilitias?AfghanistandidnothaveanarmyorapoliceforceafterthedestructionoftheTaliban’sforcesin2001.However,itwouldhavebeenpossibletoconsiderrecallingformerofcersofthe1980sarmytoformthenucleusofthenewarmyandquicklystartdeployingregularunits.ManysuchofcerswereinfactalreadyonthepayrolloftheMinistryofDefence,althoughrarelyeffectivelydeployed.Theyhadlogistical,management,andspecialisttasks,butwerealmostneverfoundinthe combat units, except for armour and artillery.Avettingprocesswould

havebeenneeded,butoutoftheseveralthousandswho,inprinciple,werequaliedfor the job,asignicantportionwouldprobably havebeenfoundtobesuitable forthenewarmy.Amorefunctionalcoreofthearmycouldhaveenabledthemilitiasthatformedtherankandleanywaytobeusedinasomewhatmoreefcientway.Instead,apoliticallymotivated decisionwas takento liquidate the old regulararmyofcerswithin theprovisionalarmed forces even aheadof thedisarmament,demobilizationandreintegrationprocess,whichdisbandedthemilitiaunitsunderMinistryofDefence

122 AntonioGiustozziandMohammedIshaqzadeh,“Afghanistan’sParamilitaryPolicinginContext”(Kabul:AfghanistanAnalysts Network, forthcoming); ICG, “ReformingAfghanistan’s Police” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2007);AndrewWilder,“CopsorRobbers?”(Kabul:AfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnit,2007).

123 AntonioGiustozziandNoorUllah,“TheInvertedCycle:KabulandtheStrongmen’sCompetitionforControlover

Kandahar,2001-2006,” Central Asian Survey 2 (2007).

124 Giustozzi,Empires of Mud , and “Bureaucratic Façade and Political Realities of Disarmament and Demobilisation inAfghanistan,”Conict, Security and Development 8, no. 2 (2008), 169-92.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



30

control in 2003-05.125Theresultwasthat intheearlyyearsof theTalibaninsurgency,therewerehardlyanyavailablesecurityforcesabletosuppressitinadisciplinedand

carefullytargetedway.126

Fromabout2006,thenewNationalArmyplayedanincreasinglyimportantroleinghting

the insurgency in the South (and elsewhere). At the same time, the disarmament,demobilization and reintegration process had eliminated the open presence on theground of the largest militias, even if most strongmen retained some undergroundmilitary capability. The composition of the police force, despite efforts to incorporatemoreprofessionalelements,didnot,however,changemuch.Asmentioned,professionalpoliceofcerswereextremelyreluctanttoserveintheSouth,bothbecauseofthehighlevel of personal risk involved and because of the southern police forces’ and provincialadministration’sdominationbygureslinkedtotherulingeliteinKabul,afactlikelytohampertheabilityofthepolicetooperateefciently.Asaresult,evenifcarriedoutthrough their involvement in the police, strongmen’s militias have continued to accountfor a large share of the government’s military effort in southern Afghanistan. As thecasualtyguresshow,thepolicewerestillbearingtheburdenofthemilitaryeffort,despitethegrowingroleofthearmy.127

ItisanapparentparadoxthatasthewarexpandedtoagreaterandgreaterportionofAfghanistan, the role of strongmen’s militias increased, despite the rapid expansion of bothpoliceandarmy.OutsidesouthernAfghanistan,thecompositionofthepoliceismoremixedthanintheSouth.Thepresenceofprofessionalpoliceisusuallyhigher,althoughthisvaries from province to province; usually the largest provinces, better connected by roadandrunfromarelativelylargecity,tendtoattractmoreprofessionalpolice.Strongmen’smilitiasalsoplayanimportantroleinmanyprovincesoftheWest,Northeast,NorthandEast,althoughnotallof them.Ontopofthis,undergroundordeactivatedstrongmenmilitias have resurfaced in 2009-10 across northern and northeastern Afghanistan to face

the penetration of the Taliban. The mobilisation of these militias, often in agreementwithlocalpoliceforcesalreadystaffedbyindividualslinkedtothesamestrongmeninthepast,representedaturningpointinKunduz,whereISAF,Afghanpolice,andtheAfghanarmy had until then been unable to contain the expansion of the insurgency. 128

That the strongmen’s militias account for a large portion of the military mobilisationcarriedoutbyKabul,evennineyearsintothewar,isatthispointclear.Someoftheimplicationsofthishavealreadybeendiscussedabove,butthereareothers.Organisingalarge-scalewareffortonthebasisofarmedforcesorganisedpatrimoniallyisdifcultandinefcient.Theindividualstrongmenwilldemandrewardsfortheirparticipation,whichmayconstraintheabilityofthegovernmenttomakedecisionsandappointofcialsas

requiredbythepoliticalenvironment.IntheNorth,sourcesincontactwithseveralofthestrongmen involved in the militia movement report that most of them have negotiateddealswiththeTaliban,carvingoutspheresofinuenceandfocusingonthecontroloftheir home turfs.129 There is therefore a strong argument that, relatively unhindered byaninefcientrepression,theTalibankeptspreadingaroundAfghanistan.Noteverybodyagrees: the role played by the strongmen in much of Afghanistan has convinced some thatthatitwaseffortstoreformthecorruptandwarlord-dominatedAfghanstatethatkicked

125 Giustozzi,“Bureaucraticfaçade”;AntonioGiustozzi,“MilitaryreforminAfghanistan,”in Afghanistan: Assessing theProgress of Security Sector Reforms,ed.MarkSedra,(Bonn:InternationalCenterforConversion,2003).

126 Ontheimportanceofthis,seeAntonioGiustozzi,The Art of Coercion(London:Hurst,2011).

127 GiustozziandIshaqzadeh,“PolicingAfghanistan.”

128 GiustozziandIshaqzadeh,“PolicingAfghanistan”;GiustozziandReuter,“TheNorthernFront.”

129 GiustozziandReuter,“TheNorthernFront”;Giustozzi,Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007 (LondonandNewYork:C.HurstandColumbiaUniversityPress,2007),171.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



31

offtheinsurgencybyweakeningthosewhohadbeenholdingalidonitanddeprivingtheAfghan government of key sources of support.130

5.2 Poverty and remoteness

Undoubtedly, much of the Afghan rural population is very poor. The return of millionsofAfghanrefugeesfromPakistanandIranfrom2002onwardcompoundedtheproblem,evenifmanyofthoseofruraloriginsoptedanywaytosettleinthecities.Interestingly,however,studieshavebeencarriedoutonthelevelofincomeofAfghanprovincesandthereisnoclearmatchbetweentheinuenceoftheTalibanandtherankingintermsofrural poverty. In Figure 1, the more the dots indicating a Taliban breakthrough cluster totherightendofthegure,thegreaterthecorrelation.

Figure 1. Social and economic well-being and security ranking by province

Sources:NRVA2005(well-being index);UnitedNationsDepartmentof SafetyandSecurity(UNDSS)security map, January 2010.131

The impact ofpovertyonrecruitmentbythe insurgents isdiscussed below,but thequestion here iswhether poverty per se is a structural factor favouring conict inAfghanistan.Undoubtedly,itcreatesaconstituencyformercenaryrecruitment,whichmightbeplayingaroleintheconict,butitisdifculttoseehowitcanbeconsideredanunleashingfactor.Itisalsoimportanttodistinguishbetweenactualpovertyandotherrelated issues such as the lack of social mobility, overpopulation, and unemployment andthe associated social marginalisation.

Inthisregard,itmightbemoreappropriatetofocusourattentiononthe“youthbulge”that characterises Afghanistan’s demographics. Figure 2 uses a proxy for the youth bulge;theagedependencyratio(howmanychildrenunder15yearsper100workingageadults15-64yearsold).Ascan be noticed,thereisa somewhatclosermatchwithTalibanpenetration by province. The disproportionate amount of young men, of course, creates

130 ForKarzai’sownopinion,see“HelmandEx-GovernorJoinsKarzaiBlameGame,”IWPR,3March2008.

131 Legend:UNsecurityassessmentswereincolourcodesintheoriginalmapsandtheyhavebeentranslatedthisway:Red(extremerisk)=4;mixedRedandothers3.5;orange(highrisk)3;mixedorangeandlightorange/white=2.5;lightorange(mediumrisk)=2;mixedlightorange/white=1.5;white(lowornorisk)=1.Note:forthesakeofsimplicity,theJanuary2010UNDSSsecuritymapwasusedasabenchmarkofthesecurityconditionsofeachprovince.Thereareanumberofproblemswiththischoice:securityconditionsdonotnecessarilyreecttheinuenceoftheinsurgentsamongthepopulation,astheyarealsoinuencedbytheproximityoftheinsurgents’sanctuaries;insomeareasinsecurityisnotjusttheproductoftheinsurgency.However,theUNDSSmapprovidedanindependentassessmentofthesecuritysituation,whereasanassessmentproducedbytheauthorscouldhavebeenviewedasbiased.Thepurposeofthesegraphsisnottoprovideanaccuratecomparisonbetweensocialindicatorsandthelevelofviolenceinaparticularprovince,butmerelytoshowwhetherthereisanyobviousmatchbetweensocialindicatorsandlevelsofviolencecountrywide.The more the squares marking the level of violence in each province tend to fall on a curve matching that shaped by thetopofthecolumnsinthesocialindicatorgraph,themoreitcanbesaidthatthereisarelationshipbetweenthatsocialindicator and the level of violence.

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

J o w z j a n

K a p i s a

K a b u l

L o g a r

P a r w a n

H e l m a n d

H e r a t

T a k h a r

B a l k h

K u n d u z

B a g h l a n

N a n g a r h a r

S a m a n g a n

P a n j s h i r

K a n d a h a r

B a d a k h s h a n

L a g h m a n

B a m y a n

G h a z n i

N i m r u z

F a r a h

W a r d a k

D a y K u n d i

K u n a r

F a r y a b

G h o r

P a k t i y a

N u r i s t a n

B a g h d i s

K h o s t

S a r - i P u l

U r u z g a n

Z a b u l

P a k t i k a

Dots:UNDSSSecurity

Assessment(see footnote 131)

Bars:Comparitivesocial

and economicwell-being

(0 = least deprived)

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



32

huge pressures on society, families, communities, and the government to accommodatenewcomerstothesysteminasatisfyingway.Socialstatusisanimportantconsiderationhere.Unfortunately,littleisknownabouttheexpectationsofyoungAfghans,exceptalong very general lines. In particular, do all young villagers have the same ambitions andthesameexpectations?Ifpovertywastheproblem,massivepublicworksprogrammeswouldabsorbunemploymentandunderminethebaseofrecruitmentofthepartiesinconict.ThiswouldprobablyharmrecruitmentintothearmymorethanrecruitmentbytheTaliban,atleastoutsidesouthernAfghanistanwherearmyrecruitmentisverylow.The analysis of the impact of poverty-alleviation programmes, therefore, depends on ouranalysisofthefactorsdrivingrecruitment,whicharediscussedbelow.Apartfromthis,itisprobablyunjustiedtoexpectthatallsectionsoftheruralyouthwouldbesimilarlyenticedbyunskilledmanualjobs.AlthoughlittleisknownaboutsocialstraticationinPashtunvillages,thereputablefamilieswhichmakeupthetriballeadership(ifany)andthe clerical families are unlikely to be impressed by an offer of menial jobs.

Littleisknownaboutgenerationalconicteither.Sparseevidencesuggeststhateldersandnotableshaveinrecentyearsbeenndingitincreasinglydifculttocontrolsections

ofthe youth, particularly returneescomingback fromPakistan,who havegrownupin an elder-free environment, and young men exposed to radical religious education.Combined with the frustration with insufcient opportunities for social promotion,employment, marriage, etc., the mix could turn into quite an explosive one.132

AcommonrefrainisthatTalibaninuenceisinverselyproportionaltoaccessibility;inGen.Eikenberry’swords,“wheretheroadends,theTalibanbegins”.However,availableevidencedoesnotsupportthisidea(Figure3).Intheearlystagesofinltratinganyprovince,theinsurgentsunderstandablystayedawayfrommoreaccessibleareas,but

thatchangedafterwards.

Perhaps a more plausible hypothesis is that cultural remoteness might be a facilitatingfactor for theexpansionofthe insurgency;Figure 4,at least, showsaclosermatchbetweentheachievementofaTalibanbreakthroughinexpandingintoaprovinceand

the availability ratio of radio and TV.

5.3 Ethnic divisions

The political debate in Kabul is often ethnically driven, as is electoral mobilisation.133 Afghan authors have had some difculty reconciling the claimthatAfghanistan isanationwiththeevidencetheythemselvesprovideofhowdifferentethnicgroupsarenotwellintegrated.134Themostdevelopedanalysisof theethnic issueis fromHaz

Mansur,whoviewstheseriesofwarswhichaffectedAfghanistanfrom1978onwardasademonstration of the non-existence of an Afghan nation. The shattering of the pre-1978despotismgaveeveryethnicgroupanopportunitytoassertthemselves.Inotherwords,Mansurseesthepositivepotentialofthese30yearsofwarforeffectivenation-building. 135

132 InterviewswitheldersinPaktyaprovince,2006-07;personalcommunicationwithDavidManseld,whotravelledtoNangarharProvince,October2010.

133 AntonioGiustozzi,“ArmedPoliticsandPoliticalCompetitioninAfghanistan,”inThe Peace in Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding, eds.Astri Suhrkeand MatsBerdal(London: Routledge, forthcoming);AntonioGiustozzi,“Afghanistan:PoliticalPartiesorMilitiaFronts?”inTransforming Rebel Movements after Civil Wars,ed.J.deZeeuw,(Boulder,CO:LynneReinner,2007).

134 HaqShinas,Tahawulat-e Siasi, vol 3, 482-504, 511-19.

135 HazMansur, A’lami Naw A’dami Naw [NewWorldNewMan](Kabul:Hizb-eMardum-eMusalman-eAfghanistan,1388).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



33

Figure 3. Percentage of villages accessible all year round and security ranking by province

Figure 4. Availability of radio and TV and security ranking by province

Sources,legendandnote:seeFigure1above.


Figure 2. Age dependency ratio and security ranking by province

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

U r u z g a n

Z a b u l

H e l m a n d

K u n d u z

N i m r u z

K a n d a h a r

L o g a r

F a r a h

H e r a t

K u n a r

L a g h m a n

P a k t y a

P a k t i k a

B a m y a n

W a r d a k

G h a z n i

B a l k h

S a m a n g a n

N a n g a r h a r

B a g h l a n

B a g h d i s

B a d a k h s h a n

D a y K u n d i

K a p i s a

S a r - i P u l

K h o s t

G h o r

P a r w a n

N u r i s t a n

T a k h a r

K a b u l

F a r y a b

P a n j s h i r

J o w z j a n

Dots:

UNDSSSecurityAssessment

(see footnote 131)

Bars:Age dependency

ratio (number of 15 year olds

per100workingage adults)

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

L o g a r

K a b u l

K

a n d a h a r

N i m r u z

H e l m a n d

K u n d u z

H e r a t

L a g h m a n

K h o s t

P a k t i y a

P a r w a n

N a n g a r h a r

K a p i s a

F a r a h

U r u z g a n

B a l k h

J o w z j a n

F a r y a b

K u n a r

G h a z n i

B a g h l a n

T a k h a r

B a g h d i s

Z a b u l

W a r d a k

P a n j s h i r

S a m a n g a n

P a k t i k a

B a d

a k h s h a n

G h o r

B a m y a n

S a r - i P u l

N u r i s t a n

D

a y K u n d i

Dots:UNDSSSecurity


Bars:Villages accessible

by road allyear round (%)

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

K a b u l

J o w z j a n

H e r a t

P a r w a n

K u n d u z

K a p i s a

N a n g a r

T a k h a r

B a l k h

P a n j s h i r

F a r a h

N i m r u z

L o g a r

F a r y a b

S a m a n g

B a d a k h

G h a z n i

B a g h l a n

H e l m a n d

L a g h m a n

P a k t i k a

B a g h d i s

K u n a r

P a k t i y a

K a n d a h a r

W a r d a k

D a y

U r u z g a n

G h o r

K h o s t

S a r - i P u l

B a m y a n

Z a b u l

N u r i s t a n

Dots:UNDSSSecurity


Bars:

Availability of TV and

radio coverage(0 = complete

coverage)


8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



34

MansuralsoreportstheviewsoftheMarxists,whoarguethatnation-buildingrequiresunique historical circumstances, and of supremacist nationalists, who insist on thehomogenization of languagesandthepromotion ofPashtoas thenational language.But Mansur argues that democratic nation-building is possible on the basis of a reliablecensus and the recognition of the plurality of ethnic groups and languages.136

Perhaps the bestevidence ofhow ethnic divisions havebeenadriver ofconict inAfghanistan is the bitter debate about ethnicity itself. Hints of this abound in theliterature.Pro-JamiatauthorAndishmandopenlycriticisedHizb-i-Islami’soppositiontotheRabbanigovernmentas“Pashtunfascism.”137NorthernerLalistanicriticisedPresidentNajibullahforhis“racial”andethnictendencies.DespitethefactthatDostumwasthemain reason for Najibullah’s survivalafterSoviet withdrawal,hecouldnot tolerateDostumasapowerfulUzbekanddirectedJumaAsaktoweakenhimintheNorth.138 Apartfromtheseradicalstatements,twooppositepositionsaremaintainedamongthosewho

agreethatethnicityisakeydriverofconict:

• The Pashtuns believe that they form the majority in Afghanistan; they have created

the Afghan state and the minorities must recognise its Pashtun character to ensurestability. If federalism is meant as decentralisation at the provincial level, thePashtunsmightcountenanceit,butonlyifitdoesnotimplytheweakeningofthe

state’s Pashtun identity.139

• The process of Pashtunisation at the expense of other ethnic groups coupledwithsupporttothePashtunsandBaluchsoutsideAfghanistanisthemainsourceof instability in Afghanistan. This policy has undermined trust in the state amongAfghans on the one side and has encouraged interference by the Pakistanis onthe other.140Afghanistanwillonlybestabilisedwithapluralistethnic,linguistic,

cultural, and local identity.141

Since 2001, there has been little indication of an effort to mobilise insurgents onanethnicbasis,aswillbediscussedbelow.Figure5,however,showsthatthemoreheavily Pashtun-populated provinces had a tendency to be more heavily affected by theinsurgency. Therefore, ethnicity played a role even if not a direct one, an aspect of theinsurgency that merits investigating.

One reason for the limited recourse toethnicmobilisation isadisadvantage that itcarries: it precludes recruitment among other ethnic groups and easily causes counter-mobilisation.Amilitary-politicalmovementontheascendancewithnationalambitionsistherefore unlikely to use ethnic motives. Groups on the decline, like Jamiat-i-Islami (anIslamist group mainly based among Tajiks), Junbesh-i-Milli (the party of General Dostum)

andHizb-i-Islamiinthe1990s,aremorelikelytorelyonethnicpropaganda,strugglingas they do to keep their ranks together and unable to afford long-term thinking.142

136 Mansur, A’lami Naw A’dami Naw , 17-29.

137 Andishmand, Salhai Tajawuz, 131-5, 146.

138 Lalistani, Jang-e Qodrat, 447-49.

139 Anwar-ul-HaqAhady,‘‘Zawal-epashtunhadarAfghanistan’’ [TheDeclineofPashtunsinAfghanistan],inHal-emunasebat-e tabari dar Afghanistan [ResolutionofEthnicRelationsinAfghanistan],(Kabul:Hizb-eMardum-eMusalman-e Afghanistan, 1386), 32-34.

140 Dr.Lalzad, ‘‘Huweyat,millatwanasionalismdar asr-ehazir’’[Identity,Nation andNationalisminPresentAge],in Hal-e munasebat-e tabari dar afghanistan[ResolutionofEthnicRelationsinAfghanistan],(Kabul:Hizb-eMardum-e

Musalman-e Afghanistan, 1386), 43-44.141 Lalzad,‘‘Huweyat,millatwanasionalismdarasr-ehazir,’’51-66.

142 Giustozzi,Empires of Mud ; Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



35

5.4 Conict among communitiesA completemapping of conicts among communities has never been attempted inAfghanistan; provincial-level mappings have been carried out in some cases, but nevercirculatedinthepublicdomain.Attemptstoestablishhowwidespreadinter-communityconictismustrelyonanecdotalevidence.Episodesaresignalledineveryprovince,althoughdistinguishingconictdrivenbyastrongmanandhisindividualinterestsandgenuineconictamongcommunitiesisnotalwayseasyintheaggregate.Thepointisthatexactlyasthestateexploitedthesetensionsandconictsinthepastundertherubricof“divideandrule,”socantheybeexploitedtodaybyanemergentforceengagedinitsownformofstateformation“frombelow.”143WhilethereissparseevidenceofTalibanmanipulationofcommunalconict,nosystematicstudyhasyetbeencarriedoutofthisaspectoftheinsurgency;thereareobviousdifcultiesinmappingoutcommunalconictin the middle of an insurgency, although some provincial studies have been carried out

and never released in the public domain.144

Community mobilisation

The Afghan government has not invested much energy since 2001 in mobilisingcommunitiesonitsside,whethertoghttheinsurgencyorforanyotherpurpose.Aspreviouslymentioned,alreadyquiteearlyinthepost-2001periodtherewaswidespreaddissatisfactionamongcommunityeldersaboutthewaythegovernmentwasmanagingthe reconstructionand relations with the provinces.Communities thatwereweakly

connectedtothegovernment(havingnosympatheticfellowtribesmaninthecabinet)felt unable to attract Kabul’s attention.

Having said that, a number of communities have nonetheless been mobilised on thegovernment side. Although many communities in southern and southeastern Afghanistanhave been opposing the government since 2001 and many others have not taken sides,several more have clearly been opposing the Taliban and supporting the government,thoughwithdeclining enthusiasm over theyears. Sometimes theirmotivations have

143 Thebest-knownversionofthethesisthattheinsurgencyisdrivenbycommunalconictwasadvancedin2007byJohnsonandMason,whoclaimedthattheTalibanwerelargelyatribalrebellionoftheGhilzaitribalconfederacy.Now,eventheauthorsofthatarticlehaveabandonedthisthesis,basedonmoreaccurateinformationfromtheground.See

ThomasJohnsonandChrisMason,“UnderstandingtheTalibanandInsurgencyinAfghanistan,”Orbis(winter,2007),71-89.144 AntonioGiustozzi,“AuxiliaryIrregularForcesinAfghanistan:1978-2008,”inMaking Sense of Proxy Warfare: States,Surrogates, and the Use of Force, ed. M. Innes, (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, forthcoming), 118-9.

Figure 5. Composition of village population by rst language spoken and security ranking


0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

K h o s t

P a k t y a

K a n d a h a r

P a k t i k a

U r u z g a n

N a n g a r h a r

H e l m a n d

K u n a r

Z a b u l

W a r d a k

K a b u l

L o g a r

L a g h m a n

F a r a h

G h a z n i

K u n d u z

B a d g h i s

K a p i s a

P a r w a n

N i m r o z

B a l k h

H e r a t

B a g h l a n

J o w z j a n

D a y K u n d i

F a r y a b

S a r - i P u l

T a k h a r

S a m a n g a n

G h o r

B a m y a n

N u r i s t a n

P a n j s h i r

B a d a k h s h a n

Dots:UNDSSSecurity


Bars:Percentage of

Pashto speakersin villagepopulation (%)

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



36

mirroredthoseofthecommunitiessidingwiththeTaliban:arealorperceivedthreatorabuseatthehandsoftheTaliban.However,althoughbyallneutralaccounts,includingtheAfghanistanIndependentHumanRightsCommission(AIHRC)andtheUnitedNationsAssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA),theTalibanhaveregularlybeencausingmoreciviliancasualties than ISAFandgovernment forcescombined, thesamemechanism

of revenge driven by the Pashtunwali does not seem to have mobilised communitiesagainst the Taliban in the same measure that it allegedly mobilises on their side. Materialinterests seem to be predominant in mobilising people on the government side, even if smallgroupsofpeople,organisedinmilitiasorintothepolice,havebeenghtingveryactively against the Taliban on the basis of a personal desire for revenge.

In terms of endurance, there have been few cases of communities ghting againsttheTalibanforanylengthoftimeorwithanydegreeofdetermination;mostofwhatisknownentails a few occasional skirmishes (exceptions include someBarakzai andAchakzaicommunitiesinDandandSpinBoldak,andsomePopolzaigroupsaroundTarinKot,etc.;onthewhole,mobilisationhasbeenlimited).145

Whythisseemstobethecaseisnotimmediatelyclear.OnereasonisthattheTalibanhavebeencarefultoavoidgettingengagedinprotractedghtswithcommunities;whenfacingresistanceonalargescale,theyhaveoptedtostayawayandmaybewaitforthesituationtochange.Whenstrikingback,theyhavetargetedkeyguresamongthelocaloppositionratherthangoingforall-outghting.Themoremobilisationhasbeengenuinelycommunitarian(thatis,independentofthewillandinterestsofafewkey

individuals), the less likely the Taliban have been to challenge opposition militarily.146

When communitymobilisationoccurred withgovernment sponsorship, itwas largelythroughstrongmenconnectedtoKabulandwithinuenceorcontroloverthestructuresofsubnationaladministration.Severalwell-knownexamplescanbementionedforthe

South.InUruzgan,duringhistenureasgovernor,JanMohammadmanagedtomobilisePopolzaiandselectedBarakzaiorAchakzaicommunitiesagainstrivalcommunities.Insome cases, this mobilisation proved durable, if for no other reason than once an intra-communityconictisstarted,stoppingitisdifcult.ThePopolzaisofTarinKot,forexample,weretrappedonthegovernmentsidebytheirearliercloseidenticationwithJan Mohammad.147SomecommunitiesalsomobilisedinoppositiontobothgovernmentandTaliban;thereareknownexamplesinseveralprovinces. 148

From2006onward,therehavebeentalksofinvolvingcommunitiesmoresystematicallyin the counterinsurgency through the formation of militias.149 The idea is to offer

145 MathieuLefèbvre,“LocalDefenceinAfghanistan:AReviewofGovernment-backedInitiatives”(Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010);Giustozzi,Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.

146 Althoughnodenitiveevidenceexists,thismighthavebeenthecaseofsometribesinsoutheasternAfghanistan.They denied their territory to the Taliban and do not seem to have been seriously challenged in this regard; it is hardtobelievethattheTaliban,willingtoghtunderthethreatofB-52sandAH-64s,wouldhavebeenintimidatedbyafewtribalsecurityguards.SeeMohammadTariqOsman,“TheTribalSecuritySystem( Arbaki)inSoutheastAfghanistan”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2008);AntonioGiustozzi,ed.,Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field (LondonandNewYork:C.HurstandColumbiaUniversityPress,2009),294.TheTalibaninotherwordshavebeen relying on at least a passive acceptance of their presence and activities by local communities.

147 Demobilisationor“defection”wasoftentheresultofmilitarydefeat,orofpatronagelinksbeingsevered.Inthiscase,inghtingamongpro-governmentfactionswasoftentoblame,forexampleinnorthernAfghanistan.

148 PersonalcommunicationwithUNofcials,membersofparliamentandofcialsofinternationalorganisationsinHeratandKabul,2008-10;MartinevanBijlert,“UnrulyCommandersandViolentPowerStruggles:TalibanNetworksinUruzgan,”inDecoding the New Taliban,ed.AntonioGiustozzi(London:Hurst,2009);MartinevanBijlert,“TheBattleforAfghanistan:ZabulandUruzgan”(Washington:NewAmericaFoundation,2010);GiustozziandReuter,“TheNorthern

Front.”

149 Theterm‘militia’isavoidedbybothISAFandtheAfghangovernmentbecauseitevokesunpleasantmemoriesinAfghanistanandbecausethetermhasbecomeabywordforabuseandundisciplinedbehaviour.Termslike“self-defence

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



37

incentivestothecommunitiestomobilisebehindthegovernmentandactivelyghttheinsurgentswhentheyentertheirterritory.Thisideaisinspiredbothbypreviouscasesofcounterinsurgencies elsewherewheremilitiasplayedan important ifnotdecisiverole and by the example of the arbakitribalpolicementionedabove.Sincetheareasofarbaki activity in southeastern Afghanistan seem to have contained insurgent activity,

ISAFbeliefisthatasimilarsystemcouldhelpelsewhere.

150

The main problem faced by the counterinsurgents is that this idea is only reallyappreciatedinISAFsectorsandnotverymuchbymostAfghanofcials,whohavedoubtsovertheviabilityofthemilitiasandseeinitanattemptbyISAFtoreduceitsdirectcommitmenttotheght(Afghanisation).Inaddition,whilesometribesofthesoutheastmaintained an arbaki tradition for millennia, such a tradition either did not exist or hasgonelostintherestofthecountry.EvenintheSoutheast,thearbaki system is seenby some observers as in decline, a process accelerated by American efforts to sponsorit. Offeringpayment to the arbaki has eroded the tribal legitimacy of these forcesand turned them into a kind of mercenary force. Their effectiveness has consequentlydeclined, not least because, as already discussed, they are not a military match for the

insurgents.151

Militias

SincetheAmericanshavestruggledtokeepthearbakialiveintheSoutheast,itisonlyfairtodoubttheviabilityofextendingthesystemelsewhere.Infact,regardlessofhowthemilitias being created around Afghanistan are called, they are in all likelihood not goingto be arbaki.Anumberofexperimentswithmilitiashavebeencarriedoutsince2006,eachofthemwithsomewhatdifferentcharacteristicsbutalsowithcommonaspectsandissues.Twooftheseexperiments,theso-calledAfghanPublicProtectionProgram(AP3)andtheLocalDefenceInitiative(LDI),aimedatmobilisingcommunities.TheAP3started

inWardakprovinceinearly2009;afteraslowstart,itmetitsrecruitmenttargetsofover1,000 men, but as a tool of community mobilisation it failed completely. A mechanism tobringtogetherelders,createdundertheAfghanistanSocialOutreachProgramme,wasplanned to select the members of the AP3 and to some extent manage them in a kind of watered-downversionoftheroleplayedbycommunityshuras in the establishment andmanagement of the arbaki.Inpractice,themechanismwasbypassedandrecruitmentwasheavilyinuencedbytheprovincialgovernor,theheadoftheNationalDirectorateofSecurity(NDS),andotherpowerfulindividuals,alltryingtoplacetheirownprotégésin the force and turn it into a source of patronage and private military support.

TheAP3recruitedlittleinareasheavilyinuencedbytheTalibanduringitsrstyear

ofexistence.InordertoturntheAP3intoausefulforce,itwasnecessarytoappointastrongman at its head, Ghulam Mohammad Hotak. A former Talib released from prison,hesucceededinwideningtherecruitmentareaoftheAP3.Atthispoint,anyintendedcommunitycharacteroftheAP3wascompletelylost.152

TheLDI,implementedfromearly2010,alsoforesawadegreeofcommunityinvolvementthrough the village shuras and Community Development Councils established underthe National Development Programme by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and

force,”“communitydefence,”“auxiliarypolice,”etc.areinsteadused,buttheconnotationisthesame.

150 Giustozzi,“AuxiliaryIrregularForces”;Lefebvre,“LocalDefence.”

151 Osman,“Tribalsecurity”;SuzanneSchmeidlandMassudKarokhail,“TheRoleofNon-StateActorsin‘Community-

Based Policing’ - An Exploration of the Arbakai(TribalPolice)inSoutheasternAfghanistan,”Contemporary Security Policy 30,no.2(2009),318-342;Lefebvre,“LocalDefence.”

152 Lefebvre,“LocalDefence.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



38

Development. Given the recent launch of the programme, any assessment of it isdifcult.Therstindicationsarethatatleastinsomelocalities,thecommunityelderswere involvedinthe selectionofparticipants (Arghandab),whileinother areastheprogram ran into serious trouble with the communities (Achin). Intertribal rivalriesamongsubtribesseemtohavebeenacomplicatingfactor,whichwasnotinitiallytaken

into account.

153

Laterin2010,theAfghanLocalPolicewasalsolaunched,effectivelyreplacingtheLDIandplacingitinprincipleunderthecontrolofpolicestationsaroundAfghanistan.TheUSSpecialOperationForces(SOF)werenotjustinvolvedintrainingthenewmilitias,butalsoinsupervisingthemafterdeployment.However,thelimitednumber ofSOFunitscommitted tothe taskand the fast-expandingnumber oflocalpoliceraisesdoubtsoverhoweffectivesuchsupervisionmightbe.

Tosumup,theeffortsofthegovernmentandISAFtomobilisecommunitiesinthewarupto 2009 have been disjointed and ad hoc, being essentially conducted on a patrimonialbasisbythepresidentandsomecloseassociates.Fromthatdateonward,therehasbeena determination to make the effort more systematic, but the ability to implement thedecision has been marred by divisions over the details, a lack of capability, and limited

understanding of community dynamics.

5.5 The rural-urban divide post-2001

The post-2001 rural-urban divide has surprisingly been rarely mentioned in the existingliterature,despitethepresenceofhugeschismsbetweenAfghanistan’s citiesandthevillages. It is tempting to see the emergence of the Taliban in the context of this rural-urbanconict.UndoubtedlytheDeobandiandSalainclinationspresentamongtheTalibanwereactuallynewtomostAfghanvillagers. 154However,therealconcerninresearchtermsshouldbetounderstandhowtheTalibanmanagedtoinsertthemselvesinanexistingandwideningsplitbetweenruralandurbanAfghanistan,ashighlightedin2.3above.

According to the Afghan Ministry of Finance, of the US$36 billion spent by theinternationalcommunitybetween2001and2009,15percentwasforagricultureandrural development.155Althoughmodest,thiswassignicant.Measuringtheimpactoftheresourcesallocated,however,isdifcult;whiletheimpressionisthat,inareasaffectedbytheinsurgency,spendingeffectivelywashardtodo,whateverprojectassessments

have been made in these areas have not been released in the public domain.

Evenmore difcult to assess is the impact of overall economic and social change.Anecdotalevidencesuggeststhatthebehaviourofeldershasoftenbeenmodiedbytheneweconomicenvironmentandhasbecomemoreprot-orientedandlessredistribution-

oriented; research evidence of this process is also beginning to emerge.156Socially,theremightbeaconnectionwith—againpurelyanecdotal—reportsthattheinuenceoftheeldersiswaninginmanycases.ThefactthatmanyyoungAfghansgrewupintherefugeecamps,andthereforemostlyawayfrompre-warsocialstructures,mightbeanotherfactorunderminingtheinuenceoftheelders.

At the same time it is clear that access to the mass media, once very rare in thecountryside, is becoming increasingly common and that the type of media available

153 Lefebvre,“LocalDefence.”

154 Edwards,Before Taliban.

155 Ministry of Finance, Donor Financial Review (Kabul: GIRoA, 2009).

156 AdamPain, “Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Kandahar” (Kabul:Afghanistan ResearchAndEvaluation Unit, 2010).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



39

haschangeddrastically.Radioprogrammesareaccessedinalmosteveryvillagenow;asubstantialminorityofvillagesalsohavesomeaccesstotelevision.Inotherwords,the cities have been exporting their mores and economic patterns to the countryside.ListeningpatternsandaccesstomediabytheAfghanpopulationaremonitoredbyISAF,but data is not released.157

5.6 Economic drivers

InternationalinterventioninAfghanistanin2001waswelltimedtodeprivetheTalibanofthe role of peacemakers and appropriate it for the American-led expeditionary force and theinterimadministrationofHamidKarzai,althoughthiswasnotsomucharesultofwisdomasofotherconsiderations.Thecountrywasexhaustedandeasyaccumulationseemedstillpossibleunderthenewconditionsofpeacewithlittlecentralgovernance.TheinitialeffortsoftheTalibanandtheirPakistanialliestoigniteanewconictyieldedfewresultsinitially,even if they signalled the failure of international intervention to forge a settlement thatguaranteedtheinterestsofthekeyplayers.Thedeceptivepeaceof2001rapidlygavewayto

an unmanaged clash of antagonistic interests, sometimes taking the shape of the formationofrivalnetworks,somefavouredbyKabul-Washingtonandothersnot.

As of early 2011, the prospect of further gains (in terms of accumulation) still looked verygoodtomanyofthepartiesinvolvedintheconict,withthepromiseofmoreresourcesthaneverbeingpumpedintothecountryinthenearfuture.Allsidesintheconictthussharean interestintheconict’spersistence,evenwheneachtriestostrengthenitsownposition.Thegovernmentanditsalliesaredirectrecipientsofexternalassistanceand, moreover, opportunities for siphoning off resources represent a further incentive.TheTaliban,too,benetbecausetheytaxanyaidprojectorbusinessactivityintheirareasofinuence,aswellasanyothereconomicactivity.

The opium economy

Theroleoftheopiumeconomyisnotaseasytodeneasmightbeassumed.Someauthors have argued that there is plenty of evidence of Taliban involvement in thenarcotics trade dating back to the 1990s, subsequently resumed after 2001 to fundtheinsurgency.WhiletheevidenceoftheTaliban’sconnectionwithnarco-trafckingis indeed solid, some authors go so far as to argue that this is the movement’s primarysource of funding and that the Taliban may have turned into a narco-terrorist movement,thatis,onewherepoliticalandcommercialaimshavemerged.158Othersarguethattheevidence of the Taliban’s involvement as a movement (as opposed as to the involvementofindividuals)isimsyandthataccusationsagainsttheTalibanareoftenpolitically

motivated.159 Arguably, the involvement of many government-aligned strongmen in thenarcoticstrade,aswellasgovernmentofcials,hasalsodestabilisedthecountryandprovidedajusticationforplayingfoulwithAfghanistan’sinternationalobligations.160

Theinformationavailableissimplyinsufcient,particularlyinqualitativeterms,forestablishinghowmuchrevenuetheTalibanderivefromthenarcoticstrade.Vis-à-vistheTaliban’s comprehensive tax operations, narcotics offer a better tax opportunity thanmost other crops in southern Afghanistan. The illegal character of the trade also appears

157 Aggregatednationaldataishoweveravailablein“AfghanMediain2010:SynthesisReport”(Kabul:Altai,2010).

158 Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror (NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,2009).

159 Pierre-ArnaudChouvy,Opium (London: Tauris, 2009), 120-3; David Macdonald, Drugs in Afghanistan (London:PlutoPress,2007),80-1;JustinMankin,“GamingtheSystem:HowAfghanOpiumUnderpinsLocalPower,” Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009).

160 Labrousse, Afghanistan, 187-8; Macdonald, Drugs, 110-1.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



40

tohaveplayedaroleadriverofpro-Talibanmobilisationofcommunitieswhofeared

being affected by the counternarcotics operations (see 6.2).

The role of aid contracts

Aid projects in Afghanistan have been criticised for different reasons, including theirineffectivenessinresolvingorpreventingconict.Canaidprojects,however,themselvesbedriversofanti-governmentmobilisation?Onewayaidprojectsdestabiliseistheirresistance to completely fair distribution; often, moreover, they are even less fairlydistributedthanitwouldbepossibletodoonaccountofincompleteinformationaboutneeds, themanipulation ofdonors and implementing agenciesby localofcialsandelders,andthedonors/implementingagencies’ownprejudices.161

As previously noted, aid projects also contribute to anti-government mobilisation viatheir taxation by insurgents. Although no in-depth, scholarly study has been producedonthisaspectyet,mediareportssuggestthatwherevertheinsurgentsreach,theytaxaid projects and deliveries of supplies at rates of 20-40 percent.162In2009,aUSAID

internalreportconrmedreportsofcontractorspayingprotectionmoneytoinsurgents,withanestimatedUS$5.2millionofUSAIDmoneysuspectedofhavingfounditswayto

the Taliban.163

5.7 International intervention

The most obvious claim concerning international intervention as a driver of anti-government mobilisation in Afghanistan concerns the hypothesis of a “clash of civilisations,” that is, an outright rejection by the Afghan population of foreign,“Christian”armiesonMuslimsoil.Anotherversionpostulatesanautomaticnationalistor xenophobic reaction by the host population against any foreign army moving into itsterritory.ItisclearthattherewasnosuchrejectionintheearlyyearsoftheinterventionwhichstartedinOctober2001.Althoughincidentsinvolvingforeigntroopsandthelocalpopulationdid occurfrom2001onward, topresentthatasa“clashofcivilisations”wouldbefar-fetched;foryearstheydidnotigniteviolentresistance.Itisinsteadmoreappropriatetospeakofa“frictionofcivilisations,”mostofthetimeinvolvingonlylow-scale incidents and feeding a mix of nationalist, religious, and xenophobic rejectionin sectors of the population.164Thisfrictionalwaysoccursinthepresenceofforeignarmies,but,withoutothercombiningfactors,doesnotperseleadtooutrightrejectionor violent opposition revolt.165

Themostserious formoffrictionbetweena foreign interveningarmyandacivilian

population are violent incidents involving the collateral killing of civilians, typically in

161 Geert Gompelmann, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security inAfghanistan’sFaryab Province” (Boston:Tufts,2011), 30-1;PaulFishtein,“WinningHeartsand Minds?ExaminingtheRelationshipbetweenAidandSecurityinAfghanistan’sBalkhProvince”(Boston:Tufts,2010),28-9;“Winning‘HeartsandMinds’inAfghanistan:AssessingtheEffectivenessofDevelopmentAidinCOINOperations”(WiltonPark:March2010).

162 JeanMacKenzie,“WhoisfundingtheAfghanTaliban?Youdon’twanttoknow,”GlobalPost, 13 August 2009.

163 In2010,ISAFhadtolaunchaninvestigationintothediversionofprojectfundsbycontractorstopayprotectionmoneytotheTalibaninsouthernAfghanistan.SeeC.M.Sennott,“TaxpayermoneyfunneledtoTaliban,” GlobalPost, 30September2010;USAIDOfceofInspectorGeneral,“ReviewofSecurityCostsChargedtoUSAIDProjectsinAfghanistan(ReviewReportNo.5-306-10-002-S),”29September2009;JonathanOwen,“Armylaunchesinvestigation:CorruptAfghansstealingmillionsfromaidfunds,” The Independent, 7 March 2010.

164 AntonioGiustozzi,“Afghanistan:‘friction’betweencivilizations,”inThe Borders of Islam: Exploring Huntington”sFaultlines, from Al-Andalus to the Virtual Ummah,eds.StigJarleHansen,AtleMesøy,andTuncayKardas(London:Hurst,2009).

165 See3.2foracomparisonwiththedynamicsfollowingtheentryofsoviettroops.SeealsothecasesoftheUSArmyinOkinawa,SouthKoreaandinGermany.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



41

acontextwhereaninsurgencyhasalreadybegun.Section5.2discussesindetailtheissueofciviliancasualtiesandtowhatextentitmayplayaroleindrivingcommunitiestowardtheradicalminoritywhichhasalreadyoptedforviolentresistance.Here,itsufcestopointoutthatOperationEnduringFreedom,initshuntfortheremnantsofalQaedaandtheirAfghanallies,wasalreadycausingciviliancasualtiesin2002-

05beforetheISAF’sroll-outtotheprovinces;thequestionwhicharisesisagainwhyittooksolongforresistancetoemerge.Clearlytherecannotbeanautomaticlinkbetweenciviliancasualtiesandrevenge.

Particularlywheninterventionishighproleandinvolvesspendinglargeamountsofmoney, it can itself become a major driver of anti-government mobilisation. Threeadditional factors are critical to understanding the spread to violent resistanceagainstforeigntroopsfrom2002onward.Therstisdiscussedingreaterdetailin6.5:Strongmen,andistheconceptof“criticalmass”:grievances,desireforrevenge,xenophobic/nationalist feelings and religion-based opposition accumulate untila vehicle for their open expression appears, typically in the shape of an insurgentmovementwhichhasgrownsufcientlytoclaimafairchanceofsuccess.

Thetwootherfactorsareevenmorecloselyrelatedtointernationalintervention.Theperceptionthattheforeignforcesaregoingtointerferewiththestatusquoandinfavourofrivalcommunitiesorofacentralpowerwhoseinterestsareatoddswiththelocalsmighthavebeenapowerfulfactorinstimulatingthereactionofanumberofcommunities,asdiscussedin6.2.Finally,acrucialenablingfactorwhichcan greatly facilitate a radical minority is external counterintervention. This is thewillingnessofforeignpowersnotalreadyinterveninginthecountryandforwhateverreason hostile to the on-going intervention to support an insurgency. The role of Pakistanisdiscussedin6.1and6.5:Economicfactors.ItisworthaddingthatPakistanhasnotbeentheonlyneighbouringcountrypromptedintopro-insurgencybywestern

intervention in Afghanistan. Evidence has been mounting in particular that Iran hasbecomeincreasinglyinvolvedwiththeTalibanfrom2005onward.166

5.8 Weighing the different factors

Theweightofevidenceasdiscussedinthissectionshowsthatanumberoffactorswhichareextensivelydiscussedelsewhereintheliteraturearenotcommensuratelysupported. International intervention alienated a portion of Afghan society, initiallythemostconservativeone.Weak governancereinforcedthe sensein anumber ofcommunitiesthattheywerelosingoutintheneworder,dominatedbygroupsofthepopulationwellconnectedwiththeinterveningpowers.Itwasnotethnicortribal

grievanceswhichunleashedtheconict,norpovertyorremoteness,andnoteventhe rural-urban divide, though some of these factors played an important role inmaintaininganti-governmentmobilisation.Theevidencepointsparticularlytowardtheroleoftherural-urbandivideindrivingthepolarisationofAfghansocietybetweensupportersofinternationalinterventionandrejectionists.Thewareconomyresultingoutofthenewconictthengeneratedasetofinterestsandsocialgroupswhichsupportedwarforwar’ssake:mercenaries,proteers,contractors,etc.Thecycleofwarisreallyabouthowallthesefactorsinteractandmutuallyreinforceeachother:weak governancemakesconict amongcommunitiesworsen and explode, in turnfurther complicating the task of governance institutions. The same is true of ethnicdivisions.Internationalinterventionandthewareconomyarecloselyintertwined;

166 Diplomatic sources inKabul, 2009-10;Greg Bruno, andLionelBeehner, “Iran and theFutureofAfghanistan”(Washington,DC:CouncilonForeignRelations,2009).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



42

thewayforeignmoneyisspenttendstoreinforcetherural-urbandivide,fuellingtheinsurgency and reinforcing in turn international intervention,with stillmoremoneybeing spent.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



43

6. Organisation as a Driver of Anti-Government

Mobilisation: The Taliban

A special section has been dedicated to the Taliban as an organisation as it is the strengthof their particular organisational characteristics that have functioned as a driver of anti-

governmentmobilisation.Onlyapeculiarlyadaptedorganisationsuch as theTalibancouldhavecarriedtheconictonagainstalloddsinthemannertheydid.

By contrast, the government’s organisational characteristics drove the conict onlyinasmuchas itwasweakandinefcient.Similarly, theforeignmilitariesengaged inAfghanistanhave prolonged the conict byvirtue of their inability to adapt to theenvironment; only in2010did itbecome apparent that the NATOmilitaries and, inparticular,theAmericanmilitarywereabletoadaptsuccessfullytothechallenge.

6.1 The origins of the Taliban insurgency

TherehasbeenmuchdebateabouthowAfghanistanreturnedtowarafter2001.AlltheindicationsarethatafterOperationEnduringFreedom,theTalibanwereseriouslydemoralised and in a state of complete disorganization.167 Why and how did theyremobilisesuccessfullyfrom2002onward?IthasbecomeincreasinglycommontoarguethatthefailuretoincorporatetheTalibanintheBonnpoliticalsettlementwasthemaincause.168Whilethismightbetrueinabstract,the“politicalsettlement”reachedinBonnwas,asisnowknown,alreadyshakyonitsownevenwithouttheinclusionoftheTaliban.Hadtheybeenincluded,itwouldonlyhavebeenmorefragile.Asitwas,therewasnopoliticalwill inWashingtonorinKabul(exceptpotentiallyfortheUN)toincorporatetheTalibaninthesettlement.Theywereseenashavingbeenutterlydefeatedandfewactuallyfeltthatincorporatingthemwouldhavebeenofmuchbenetanyway.169Later

effortssponsoredbythePakistanistoallowa“moderateTaliban”partytoenterthepoliticalarenainAfghanistanwereostracisedinKabulandcametonothing.170

Because of the Taliban’s marginalisation and ideological resilience, the situation thatemergedinearly2002meantthattheTalibanleadershipwasverylikelyprimedtotrytohitbackandstartaninsurgencyinsideAfghanistan.Onthispointthereisstillaratherercedebatevis-à-vistherolethePakistaniintelligenceservicesplayedinpushingtheTalibanbacktowar.SomearguethattheISIwasthekeyfactorinstartingthenewwarandthattheTalibanweremerelyapuppetofthePakistanis,whousedtheminordertoclaimbackadegreeofinuenceinAfghanaffairsthatithadlost.Now,whilethereisgrowingevidenceofastrongPakistaniroleinsupportingtheTalibaninsurgency,the

viewthattheTalibanarenothingmorethanaPakistanipuppetwouldbefar-fetched. 171

Thebestdemonstrationofthisisthat,aswasseenregardingthe1980s,awillingnessbyaneliteorcounter-elitetostartawardoesnotmeanthatitcansuccessfullydoso. By implication, therefore, even amalign foreign inuence cannot set re to a

167 Giustozzi,Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.

168 TalatbekMasadykov,AntonioGiustozzi,andJamesMichaelPage,“NegotiatingwiththeTaliban”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009);JamesFergusson, Taliban(London:BantamPress,2010);MichaelHughes,“InterviewwithFormerAsst.SecretaryofStateDobbins:Afghanistan’sDiplomaticDilemmas,” Hufngton Post, 17 December 2009; MarySack,“AnInterviewwithLakhdarBrahimi,” Journal of International Affairs, August 2005.

169 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos(London:Penguin,2008);JamesDobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-building in Afghanistan(Washington,DC:PotomacBooks,2008).

170 ThomasRuttig,“LoyaPaktya’sinsurgency,”inDecoding the New Taliban,ed,AntonioGiustozzi(London:C.Hurst,2009).

171 Rashid, Descent,219-20;MattWaldman,“TheSunintheSky”(London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2010).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



44

countrycompletelyarbitrarily.Someconditionshavetobeinplace,allowingforthemobilisationofcommunitiesand/orindividualsbehindtheinsurgentelite.Thisisnotthespaceforreproducingadetailedchronologyoftheinsurgency(whichis,however,summarisedinMap1).Itisobvious,however,thattheinsurgencystartedprettyslowlyin2002.AnecdotalaccountssuggestthattheTalibanwerefacingseriousdifcultiesin

remobilisingtheirassociates,or,forthatmatter,inrecruitingnewmembersintherstfewyearsoftheinsurgency.172Inotherwords,itmaybearguedthattheresurgenceoftheTalibanasaseriousmilitaryforcewasnota foregoneconclusionevenaftertheirleadership had taken the decision to remobilise.173TheTaliban,however,seemtohave

managedtollthegapquitesuccessfully.

Map 1: chronology of the expansion of the insurgency: 2002-09

Source:Giustozzi[2010g].

6.2 Community mobilisation with the Taliban

For a number of reasons, community mobilisation in Afghanistan has attracted more policyand scholarly interest than any other form of mobilisation connected to the insurgency.Someofthesereasonsarequiteobvious:theevidenceofcommunitymobilisationonthesideoftheTaliban(particularlystrongfrom2006onward)wasquiteembarrassingforbothISAFandtheAfghangovernment.IthadthepotentialofdenyingtheBonnnarrativeof the legitimate government which had popular support. While there was denialinitially,astheevidencebecameoverwhelming,someeffortshadtobemadetoanalysethematter.Butwhatis reallyknownaboutcommunitymobilisationwiththeTaliban?AstudysuggeststhatincidentsofISAFandcoalitionforcescausingciviliancasualtiesmight have been an important factor in driving communities to support the Taliban.174

172 Theirmainrecruitmentgrounds(byfar)werePakistanimadrassas.173 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.

174 LukeN.Condra,JosephH.Felter, RadhaK. Iyengar, and JacobShapiro, The Effect of Civilian Casualties in

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



45

This invokes badal, thePashtunwalimechanismof revenge, theexact assessmentofwhichisextremelydifcult.OthershavesuggestedthatTalibanexpansionisdrivenbytheirexploitationoflocalconicts,aninterpretationsupportedbyabundantanecdotalevidence.Inreality,however,themechanismsleadingtocommunitymobilisationontheTaliban side seem to be more complex, involving community elders making decisions

aboutcollaborationwiththeTalibanoftenonpragmaticgrounds.

175

Mostofwhatisavailableisanecdotalevidence,suchastalesrecountedbydisplacedpeople and travellers, in addition to the newspaper reports, military reports, anddiplomaticinternalreportingthathavefoundtheirwaytothepublicdomaininavarietyofways.Mostofthisevidenceinevitablyconcernstheareaswheremostofthemilitaryandreconstructioneffortswerefocused,andthatarealsothemostdenselypopulatedareaswherepeoplearemorelikelytotravel. 176 For community involvement, the intendedmeaninghereisactiveparticipationintheghting,asopposedtomeresupportfortheTaliban discussed in section 6.3.

The evidence of the dynamics driving communities into the hands of the Taliban seems

toindicateanumberoffactors,whoserespectiveweight,however,isverydifculttomeasure.Arstfactoris,asmentionedinsection5.4:Communitymobilisation,realorperceivedthreatstotheinterestsofspeciccommunitiescomingeitherfromtheAfghangovernment or from ISAF troops.This seems to have been the case of severalAlizaicommunitiesincentral-northernHelmand,amongwhichthebeliefwaswidespreadthatiftheBritishtroopsdeployedin2006weretoconsolidatetheirhold,eradicationofthepoppyeldswouldhave followed.Thesecommunitieshad not shownmuch sympathyfortheTalibancausebefore,butstartedghtingalongsidethematthispoint.AnotherexampleisthatoftheNoorzaisofZhariandPanjwai,whofeltthreatenedbyaborderpolicethatwascontrolledbytheirAchakzairivals,orthePashai-speakingcommunityofKorengalandsomeothervalleysinKunar,whosetimber-smugglingactivitieswerebelieved

to be threatened by American deployment.177 In general, it seems safe to assume that forthelocalleadershipofacommunitytotakesidewiththeinsurgency,astrongmotivationmust be there.

Itisworthpointingoutthat,aspreviouslystated,communitymobilisationdidnotjustoccurontheTalibanside.OneoftheproblemsofdiscussingcommunitymobilisationinAfghanistanisthatitisnotalwaysclearwhatacommunityisandwhereacommunitybeginsandends.Stateintervention,30yearsofwar,andsocialandeconomicchangehaveerodedtheroleandpowersofmanycommunities.Evenasidefromthat,inthemore hierarchically structured communities of the northern plains and of some otherparts of Afghanistan, elders or old militia commanders often mobilised to take part in the

conict,mostlyonthegovernmentside,butsometimesalsoontheTalibanside.Insuchcases,itisdifculttotellwhethertheseareallstrongmenwiththeirretinues,actingon the basis of personal interest, or charismatic local leaders mobilising a community

around themselves. The former seems to be much more often the case.178

Afghanistan and Iraq(Cambridge,MA:NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,2010);RajaG.BadalHussain, A Cultureof Revenge: The Impact of Collateral Damage on Taliban Insurgency (Monterey,CA:NavalPostgraduateSchool,2008).

175 Giustozzi,Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop,50-1;ThomasRuttig,“HowTribalAretheTaleban?”(Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010).

176 Referenceismadeto areassuchascentralHelmand,thedistrictssurroundingKandaharCity,andsomeareasofUruzgan.AmoremodestamountofevidencealsopointstoTalibancommunityinvolvementinZabul,remoterpartsofKandahar,partsofPaktika,Khost,andPaktia,andpartsofKunarandKunduz.SeeGiustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and

Laptop;Giustozzi,Decoding the New Taliban.177 Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.

178 GiustozziandReuter,“TheNorthernFront.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



46

6.3 Non-military community support for the Taliban

It is also necessary to discuss the role of those communities that have not directlyparticipatedintheconictbyghtingoneitherside,buthave,inavarietyofways,supported the insurgents. This refers to allowing freedom of movement; providing

shelter, food, and water; providing hideouts; allowing recruitment; and providinginformationandintelligence.Inmanyways,theroleofthesecommunitieshasbeenevenmore important than thosewho haveactively foughtwith the Taliban, exceptthat,aspreviously said,having wholecommunitiesmobilising ontheirside allowedtheTalibantopresenttheircauseasaneweditionofthejihadofthe1980sandtogainlegitimacy.Part-timecommunityghtershadsomesuccessagainstthegovernmentforcesinitially,butregularlyfalteredonceISAFintervenedtobackupthepoliceandarmy.Theirmilitaryimpactinthelongtermwasquitemodest.

Communitynon-militarysupport,bycontrast,notonlywasmorewidespread,butalsoessential inenablingmore “professional” guerrilla units toestablish themselves andoperatewithadegreeofeffectiveness.Becauseofthenatureofthiskindofsupport,littleisknownaboutit,withitsexistenceinferredfrominsurgentsbeingabletooperateeveninareaswhereISAFandAfghansecurityforceshaveathickpresenceontheground.WhentheAmericansmovedintotheMarjahregionofHelmandinearly2010,theyfoundanundergroundTalibanorganisationwaitingforthemandabletooperatethankstothecollaboration of a large portion of the local villagers. Villagers’ continuing collaborationwiththeTalibanwasalsoreportedbytheBritisharmyinotherpartsofHelmand.179

Discussingevenbrieytheseformsofcovertsupportisnecessaryinordertoformulatesomehypothesesonhowcommunitiesmightgraduallyslideintosupportingtheinsurgency.Itisofcourseparticularlydifculttoestablishhowanumberofcommunitieshavegottothe pointofengaginginthe conict,despitetheobvious senseofwar-weariness

whichwasverypalpableinAfghanistanafter2001.Insomecases,theengagementmighthavestartedabruptly,butthereisnoreasontothinkthatthiswastypicallythecase.Thereissomesparseevidencethatsomecommunityleadersmighthavewantedtousethe Taliban as an opportunity to send messages to Kabul, having failed to attract thegovernment’s attention through the dispatch of delegations and through the lobbyingoflocalofcials;allowingtheTalibantostartoperationsintheterritoryofaparticularcommunityseemstohavebeenconsideredbymanyeldersasthelastchancetodrawgovernment attention.180Seekingprotectionagainstlocalrivals(particularlywhenthosehadseizedcontroloverlocalauthorities)appearstohavebeenanotherfactorpushingelderstosignaltoKabulthatalternativeswereavailableforthemtoresortto. 181 Finally,theprovisionofjusticebytheTalibanshadowgovernmentseemstobeanotherfactor

drawingcommunitiestowardtheinsurgency. 182

That ishow the cycleofgetting involvedin the insurgencymust have started.TheTaliban, in all likelihood, must have done their best to play to the elders’ ambitions andfears,luringthemintoafalsesenseofcondencethattheycouldinanycasecontroltheinsurgentsoncehavingallowedthemin.ThearrivaloftheTaliban,however,meantthebeginningofrepression,which,particularlyinitsearlydayswhenknowledgeoflocal

179 PersonalcommunicationwithUSDepartmentofDefenseofcial,2010;personalcommunicationwithBritishArmyofcers,2010.

180 InformationaboutlargeamountsofaidmoneybeingpumpedintoKabulandlittleevidencethatanyofitwasreaching the provinces (or at least a particular province) is likely to have added to the irritation of the leaders and have

pushedthemtowardadesperateattempttointerceptatleastsomemeagremeasureofthewealth.181 PersonalcommunicationwithUNofcials,2003-4;personalcommunicationwitheldersinPaktia,2006.

182 SarahLadbury,“HelmandJusticeMappingStudy”(London:DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment,2010).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



47

realitieswasnon-existentamongtheranksoftheNATOarmies,wasbadlytargeted.Asin 1978, although not to the same extent, ineffective repression of the insurgency, theblunders of the security forces, and abuses of suspects by foreign and Afghan armed forces

all contributed to increase the opportunities for local recruitment by the insurgents.183

6.4 The role of foreign troops

Onanhistoricalscale,ISAFhascertainlybeenoneofthebestbehavedmilitaryforcesoperating in foreign territory on record. Although its troops have committed abuses andmade mistakes that have led to the deaths of hundreds of civilians each year, comparedto the scale of operations, these side effects of military presence have been modest.LookingathistoricalprecedentsinAfghanistanandelsewhere,theAfghansecurityforces,takenasawhole,havenotbeenparticularlybadlybehavedeither,althoughthearmyhas been much better behaved than the police.184Still,eveniftheratioofindividualsassociatedwithbadbehaviourwasverylowinISAF,giventhesizeoftheforcesinvolved,the fast rotation of personnel (often on a 6-9 months’ basis for the foreign troops), their

overwhelmingrepower,andthefactthatciviliancasualtiesareonlytheleadingedgeof behaviours perceived as challenging by the Afghan population, a number of incidentsoccurredsufcienttopoliticisetheissue(akindof“occupationsyndrome”)andalienateagrowingnumberofcommunities.Inparticular,anecdotalevidencesuggeststhathousesearches, a sometimes disrespectful attitude toward elders and other civilians, thedestruction of Afghan property during operations, and the perceived endorsement of progressiveculturalpractices(suchaswomen’sempowerment),haveallcontributedto

create friction.185

ThequestionofwhyincidentsinvolvingciviliancasualtiescausedbyISAFhaveinnitelygreater resonance among the Afghan public than the more frequent incidents causedbythe Taliban has not been convincingly answered. Onemightspeculate, basedonrandominteractionwithmembersoftheAfghanpublic,thatbecauseoftheperceptionofimmensepoweravailabletoNATOcountriesandparticularlytheUS,theyshouldbeexpected to adhere to much more demanding standards than the poorly equipped andtechnologically primitive insurgents. Another anecdote-driven speculation is that theAfghan public seems to perceive the insurgency as a response to the presence of foreignarmies on Afghan ground and therefore considers the foreigners as responsible to someextentforinsurgentviolenceaswell.ISAFhasbeenincreasinglysuccessfulincontainingthe number of civilian casualties, despite an ever-rising level of overall violence (Table

3).Thepoliticalpayoffofthiseffort,however,hasremainedextremelyuncertain.

The Taliban’s post-2002 organisational improvements might well be another factor,

explainingwhytheirviewsresonatedmoreamongAfghansthantheKabulgovernment’sortheforeignmilitarycontingents’.ItisknownthatsmallteamsofTaliban(typically4-5)movefromvillagetovillage,relayingtheirmessageandtheirviews;alsoknownis

that the Taliban deploy preachers and try to co-opt mullahs to deliver their propaganda.186

183 PersonalcommunicationwithUNofcials,Khost,2008.

184 ThebadbehaviourwidelyattributedtotheAfghanpolicestilllooksmodestcomparedtothemasskillingsof1978-79, for example.

185 Episodeswereoftenreportedinthepress;interviewswitheldersandAfghanciviliansovertheyearshavealsotendedtoconrmthis.

186 Interviews with Taliban commanders and village elders in southern Afghanistan, summer 2011. The Afghangovernment, by contrast, hardly has any active presence at the village level and relies on propaganda relayed throughthemassmedia;statetelevisionandradio,however,havefewlisteners,whilecommercialmediadonotusuallydelivera pro-government message.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



48

Table 3: The causes of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, 2006-2010

Source:UNAMA

6.5 Mobilisation of individuals with the Taliban

Every insurgent movement that has an organisational dimension as such (that is, beyondthat of each of its component parts) needs to recruit individuals to some extent, regardless

ofwhetherthebaseismadeupofcommunitiesornot.Indeed,theTalibanhavebeenconsistentlyrecruitingindividualssince2002.Theleadershipdoesnotidentifyitselfwithanycommunity,ethnicortribal,andmaintainsamodestbutgrowing“bureaucracy”initssanctuariesinPakistan.Thefactthattheyoperateeveninmanyareaswheretheyhavelittleornodirectcommunitysupportissufcientevidenceofthat—muchofnorthernandwesternAfghanistan,forexample.In2002-05,eveninmostoftheSouth,theTalibanwereoperatinginareaswherecommunitysupportwasnotyetforthcoming.MostcommunitiesmightnothaveactivelyopposedtheTaliban,butthereisnoevidence thattheyweresupporting them either.

ThereisalotofdebateovertheactualsizeoftheTalibaninsurgencyandhowithasbeen

changing over time, but this is not the focus here. More interesting is the assessment of the factors driving the Taliban’s recruitment of individuals, typically young men (and boys)intheirteensorearlytwenties.ISAFsourcessuggestthatfewmenintheirlatetwentiesandevenfewerintheirthirtiesjointheTalibanwithouthavingpreviouslybeeninvolvedwiththemovement.187Opinionsaredividedonwhatfactorsaremoreimportant;littlesystematicstudyhasbeencarriedout,oratleastitisnotinthepublicdomain.Whatthereisisplentyofanecdotalevidence,which,ofcourse,canbeinterpretedindifferentwaysparticularlywhenviewedselectively.

Old Taliban

Muchofthe originaleffort tostartaninsurgencywas focusedonreactivatingTaliban

networksand,ingeneral,individualswhohadcollaboratedwiththeTalibanregime.TheTalibanclaimedtohavehad300,000suchTaliban/collaboratorsinthe1990s,probablywithsomeexaggeration.Clearly,manycollaboratorswerepragmaticallymotivatedanditis not surprising that they might have opted not to get involved in the post-2001 insurgency.Although the Taliban put up a considerable effort over the years to contact many formermembersandinvitethemtorejoin,theevidencesuggeststhatevenmanywhohadjoinedtheTalibanandservedinrelativelyhighpositionsingovernmentshowedlittleenthusiasmfor joining.188 This is true for periods other than in the early days: for example, as of 2010,

themajorityofTalibannotablesinKunduzhadnotrejoinedthemovementyet.189

187 PersonalcommunicationswithISAFofcials,2009-10.

188 SamiYousafzai,“TheTalibaninTheirOwnWords,”The Daily Beast,25September2009;AlexStrickvanLinschotenand Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created (London:C.Hurst,2012),chapter7.3.


2006 2007 2008 2009January-

June 2010

ISAFandAfghan

government forces230 629 828 596 223

Insurgents 699 700 1160 1630 920

Unknowncausesandcrossre

Unknown 194 130 180 128

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



49

DeterminingthereasonswhymanyoldTalibandidnotjointheinsurgencyis,ofcourse,difcult;eveninterviewingthemwouldprobablynotyieldgenuineanswers. 190However,it is pretty obvious that supporting an emerging government or even a faction in a civilwarissomethingqualitativelydifferentfromsupportinganinsurgency.Guerrillawaris much more demanding than either of the other options; the personal risk is much

greaterandsoisthelevelofpersonaldiscomfort.ManyoftheoldTalibanwhooptedtostayathomeoreventocollaboratewiththegovernmentwerenotyoungmenwithoutfamily responsibility; their previous allegiance might not have been very deep giventhat their collaborations started in the 1990s at the time of Taliban ascendancy. Indeed,theghtersintheTalibanranksafter2001havebeen,asmentioned,overwhelminglyyoungmenintheirteensorearlytwenties.Asforjuniorcommanders,mostwereintheirtwentiesorthirtiesintheearlyyearsoftheconict,butthehighcasualtyratehasbeendrivingtheiraverageagedownwards.Accordingto ISAF,by2010,thejunior

commanders’ age averaged 19-20 or 25, depending on the source.191

Bycontrast,thetopleadershipwas,by2010,dominatedbythesurvivingoldTaliban.From2002onward,however,asignicantnumberofthemoreseasonedoldTalibanturnedintopoliticalcadres,aswellasseniorcommandersandmid-levelleaders.Asitis,thevalue of these political cadres should not be underestimated: they have been in chargeof proselytising, negotiating with communities and administering “liberated” areas.Initially,theTaliban’spoliticalcadresweremorereligiouspreachersthananythingelse,but, to the Taliban, religion and politics, of course, overlap; over time, the movementhasgrowninsophisticationandpoliticalpositionshaveproliferated,staffedbythesecadres.192

Economic factors

Moneymatters,atleastasanenabler:littlehappensanywherewithoutfundingofsome

sort.That,however,doesnotmeanthatthemotivationsofsocialandpoliticalactorsaresolelynancial.Asdiscussedin3.5and4.3,economicfactorshavetobecombinedwithpoliticalandsocialdrivers.Themostpopularinterpretationoftheabilityof theTalibantorecruitthousandsofyoungmenhastodowitheconomicfactors.AnunderlyingaspectofalltheoriesstressingtheeconomicmotivationsofTalibanghtersisthattheinsurgencycanfundamentallybeexplainedwithaconspiracybyeitherthePakistaniarmed forcesor transnationalextremist groups.Theweight attributed toeither thePakistanis or to the transnational jihadists varies among commentators and across time.Ifmercenaryaimscouldexplaineverything,however,anycountrycouldalwaysstartaninsurgencyinaneighbourwhereunemploymentisrifeandpeoplearepoor.Thisclearly

isnotasufcientexplanation.

There is actually some evidence to back up this hypothesis: some interviews byjournalistsand,mostimportantly,someinformalsurveyscarriedoutin2009-10byUNagenciesandothersamongreconcilingghters,mostofwhomexplaintheirparticipationintheinsurgencywitheconomicdifculties,lackofopportunities,etc.Thisevidenceissufcienttoargueatleastthattheeconomicfactorplaysarolewiththeobviousrejoinderthatthe“sample”ofintervieweesisobviouslybiased:thecadresoftheTalibaninsurgency very rarely reconcile and most reconciled individuals come from areas thataremarginaltotheinsurgencyandwhereastrongTalibanorganisationisnotpresent

190 Afewofthemhavebeencontactedbythisauthorsovertheyearsandothershavebeen interviewedbyother

researchers,buttherehasbeennosystematicefforttogaugetheirfeelingsandviews.191 PersonalcommunicationwithISAFofcer,2010;“TalibanDyingYoung,”New York Post,14November2010.

192 AntonioGiustozzi,Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects(NewYork:TheCenturyFoundation,2010).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



50

(likeHeratinthewestandBaghlaninthenortheast).193Similarly,itmighthavebeeneasier for journalists to approach mercenary and opportunistic elements than politicallycommitted and indoctrinated cadres, particularly before the Taliban leadership startedtheir recent pattern of encouraging their commanders to interactwith the media.Indeed,Taliban interview output over the last couple ofyears (excludingtheirown

media) shows little evidence of a strong mercenary component; those interviewingTaliban commanders tend to get a sense of a group of people strongly committed to thejihad.194Moreover,ISAFsourcesprivatelyadmitthattheirowninterrogationofTalibanprisoners yields rather different results: the prisoners claim to be committed to thejihad and to be motivated by religious feelings.195Directinterviewingwithinsurgents

also seems to indicate that economic motivations are secondary.196

Therearesomemoregeneralreasonsforbeingscepticalaboutanyinterpretationwhichexplains the insurgency mainly in terms of economic grievance. The behaviour of theTalibaninbattledoesnotsuggestarankandlemotivatedbyeconomicconsiderations;whateveronemightthinkoftheideologyoftheTaliban,mostISAFofcerswhoservedintheSouthemergedwithsomerespectforthebraveryandspiritofsacriceoftheenemy.Thisis,ofcourse,nothowmercenariesbehave.ThecasualtiesoftheTaliban,whichISAFsourcesclaim(perhapswithsomeoverestimation)tohavebeenaround5,000-7,000eachyearfrom2007onwardandwhichTalibansourcesthemselvesstatehavebeen“heavy,”conrmsthattheghtersmustinthemainbewellmotivated.ISAFstatisticsreleasedtothepressusuallyreportamuchgreaternumberofTalibankilledandwoundedinactionsthan Taliban captured, particularly once it is considered that many of those rounded uparereleasedforlackofevidence.ConsideringthatthosearrestedaremorelikelytobeofmoredubiousTalibanallegiancethanthosewhofoughttodeath,thisfactconrms

that the Taliban are largely not a mercenary force.197

WhileeconomicmobilisationmightnothaveoccurredonalargescaleontheTalibanside,

thereisevidencethatthepoorestelementsoftheAfghanpopulationwereafter2001availableformobilisationonwhateversideoftheconict,essentiallyformercenaryreasons. Whatdrivestheseyoungmentojointhepolice?Theexpectationofmanypolicerecruits is probably that serving in the police opens the door to additional sources of income.Illegaltaxingofroadtravellers,involvementinillicittrafcs,protectionrackets,etc.,canallcomplementthemodestpolicesalaryandtheevidenceisoverwhelmingthatmany provincial police forces are indeed involved in such activities.198 From this pointofview,thepictureconcerningtheAfghanNationalArmyissimilar.Althoughstatisticsabout army recruitment are hard to come by, available data unequivocally suggests aninowofyoungrecruitsfromthemoredepriveddistricts.Economicmotivationseemsprominent as a reason for joining; often, it is communities and households pushing young

menwithoutotherprospectstojoininordertosecureasourceofrevenue.Anarmysalaryrepresentsasignicantsourceofincomeforfamilieslivinginruralareas.199

193 PersonalcommunicationwithUNofcial,Kabul,April2010.EvidencesuggeststhatintheseareastheTalibanrelyonopportunisticelementstoamuchgreaterdegreethanintheareaswheretheinsurgencyismoredeveloped:disgruntledJamiatisinHeratandBaghlan,criminalelementsinKandaharbefore2006,etc.Asithappens,untilthetimeofwritingthisreport,verylittlereconciliationhadtakenplaceinthecoreareasoftheinsurgency(theSouthinparticular).

194 Fergusson, Taliban;MattWaldman,“GoldenSurrender”(Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010);Giustozzi,Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop;GiustozziandReuter,“TheNorthernFront.”

195 PersonalcommunicationwithISAFofcial,October2010.

196 Sarah Ladbury, “Testing Hypotheses on Radicalisation In Afghanistan” (London: Department for InternationalDevelopment,2009);Waldman,“GoldenSurrender.”

197 “Afghanistanexpectsbloody2009,” Agence France-Presse ,5January2009;JasonStraziuso,“Record151U.S.troops

dieinAfghanistanin2008,” Associated Press,December31,2008;Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop.198 GiustozziandIshaqzadeh,“PolicingAfghanistan”;ICG,“ReformingAfghanistan’sPolice”;Wilder,“CopsorRobbers?”

199 AntonioGiustozzi,“AuxiliaryForceorNationalArmy?Afghanistan’s‘ANA’andtheCounter-insurgencyEffort,2002-

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



51

TheimprecisestatisticsdonotallowforanymeaningfulcomparisonbetweentherecruitsofthegovernmentforcesandoftheTaliban,but,aswasseen,itwouldbetomisconstruereality to argue that in sociological terms the government forces are the expression of “modern,”“progressive”AfghanistanandthattheTalibaninsteadembodyaretrogradepastwhichrefusestodie.TheavailabledataalsodoesnotsupporttheassertionthattheTalibanareamercenaryforcecontrastingwithapatrioticarmyandpoliceforcedefending the nation from aggression. By all appearances, the mercenary character of the Afghan security forces is more pronounced than that of the Taliban.

As already hinted several times, in any internal conict opposing an establishedgovernment and an insurgent force, particularly in the early stages opting for supportingthe government is much easier than the contrary. As a result, insurgent movements tendtobequiteisolatedintheearlystagesoftheirdevelopment;therearealwaysmoreopportunists and mercenaries on the government side than vice-versa.200 The governmentcan also count on its ability to bring some development and reconstruction to most partsof Afghanistan as a source of support; even Taliban sympathisers recognise the inability

todosoasthemainweaknessofthemovement.201

Mullahs

There is of course a lot of anecdotal evidence that mullahs (see box 4) have played akeyrolewithintheTaliban;in2002-03,almostalltheireldcommanders,nottospeakoftheirpoliticalleaders,hadareligiouseducationbackground.Figure6showsruralilliteracyrates ineachAfghanprovince,matchedwithTalibanbreakthroughsineachprovince;thereisatleastapartialmatch.Acorrespondingdistrict-levelmapwould,inalllikelihood,show,forexample,inKandaharprovincethattheTalibanrstestablishedthemselvesinthedistrictswithlowerliteracylevels.Alinkisassumedbetweenweaklevelsofruralliteracyandhighlevelsofclericalinuence,onthebasisthat,inthe

absence of rural schools and teachers, the inuence of themullahs as a source ofinformationmustcertainlybegreatlyenhanced.WhatisbeingarguedhereisnotthattheTalibanarenecessarilyilliterate,butratherthatthereisamatchbetweenclerical

inuenceandTalibanexpansion.

Figure 6 is not enough to demonstrate a strong involvement of the clergy on the Talibanside,buttherearealsoreportsandcommentariesbyAfghangovernmentofcialsaswellasUNofcials,acknowledgingthatmuchoftheclergysupportstheTaliban. 202 It should bestressed that this is, of course, not to say that all Afghan mullahs support the insurgency.Governmentagencies,suchasthePresidencyandtheNDS,haveinvariousways,triedtomaintain a level of support for the government among mullahs and ulama, for example,

byco-optingthemintogovernmentstructuresliketheCouncilofUlama,orbyregularlypaying them. The Taliban implicitly recognised a degree of support for the governmentamongtheclergywhenearlyintheirinsurgencycampaigntheyunleashedawaveofassassinations directed at clerics. By January of 2009, 24 of the 150 members of the pro-governmentUlemaShurainKandaharhadalreadybeenassassinated.203Quantifyingthe

2006,”Small Wars and Insurgencies18,no.1(2007),45-67;AntonioGiustozzi,“TheAfghanNationalArmy:UnwarrantedHope?”RUSI Journal154,no.6(2009),34-40;“AForceinFragments:ReconstitutingtheAfghanNationalArmy”(Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup,2010).

200 Discussionsof this issueare inJeremyM.Weinstein, Inside Rebellion (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007); and David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009).

201 Ladbury, “TestingHypothesesonRadicalisation.”

202 ThisisparticularlythecaseinthePashtunbelt;signicantlevelsofsupportarealsorecognisedtoexistinpocketsofnorthernAfghanistan.SeeGiustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, section 2.4.

203 JeffreyDresslerandCarlForsberg,“TheQuettaShura”(Washington:InstitutefortheStudyofWar,2009).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



52

Figure 6: Rural literacy and security ranking by province


Box 3: Afghanistan’s clerics

Thecategory“mullah”includesavarietyofgures,rangingfromthemosteducatedulema(doctorsofthelaw)atthetop,tothepart-timevillageimam(preacher)atthe bottom. Many young, trained, or semi-trained mullahs had never preached ortaught before theybecome involvedin oneofAfghanistan’swars;this isalsothecaseofmanyTalibanghters.ThisisanewdevelopmentinAfghanistan.Althoughnostatisticsexist,around1980,Sovietsourceswereestimatingthenumberofclericsataround300,000,or2percentofthepopulation.The1980sand1990swereaperiodofclericalisationinAfghanistan,withIslamistandclericalpoliticalpartiesandMuslimcharities all sponsoring religious education for political purposes, so it is likely that

theweightofthemullahsinAfghansocietyin2002wasevengreaterthan2percent.It is not uncommon to see mosques for every group of 20-30 families in the villages.Althoughbynomeansuniedpolitically,theAfghanclergyisthereforeapowerfulsocialconstituency,themoresogiventheroleofvillagepreachersinspreadingnewsandofferinginterpretationsofeventswithinandwithoutthevillage.Historically,theAfghanmullahshavehadareputationforconservatismandlowreligiouseducationalstandards,areectionofthepovertyofthecountry.Fromthe1980sonward,becauseoftrainingtakingplacemostlyinPakistan,thenewgenerationofAfghanmullahshasbeenupliftedto regionalstandardsintermsofeducation(atatime,however,whenfundamentalistinterpretationsofIslamwerebecomingpredominantamongthePakistani clerics). As a result, folk Islam has declined in Afghanistan, but liberal orprogressive mullahs remain very rare. Government efforts to train mullahs in statemadrassashavenotbeenverysuccessful,whetherbeforethewar,inthe1980s,orafter 2001.

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

P a r w a n

K a p i s a

P a k t i y a

P a n j s h i r

B a l k h

K a b u l

G h a z n i

H e r a t

K u n d u z

K u n a r

B a d a k h s h a n

K h o s t

L o g a r

W a r d a k

B a m y a n

D a y K u n d i

F a r y a b

N u r i s t a n

N a n g a r h a r

N i m r u z

F a r a h

J o w z j a n

B a g h l a n

G h o r

S a m a n g a n

t a k h a r

L a g h m a n

K a n d a h a r

S a r - i P u l

B a g h d i s

U r u z g a n

H e l m a n d

P a k t i k a

Z a b u l

Dots:UNDSSSecurity


Bars:Rural literacy

rate (%)

level of support for either government or Taliban among the clerics is impossible, butitisclearthatnopro-governmentmullahwouldbeabletoopenlypreachanddeliverpoliticalmessagesintheruralareaswherethepresenceoftheTalibanisstrong.IndeedtheTalibanseemtohaveaclearpriorityofweedingoutanypro-governmentmullahwhomtheymightndinthevillages.Contrarytovillageelders,though,whohavebeenowingoutofruralareasoftheSouthinthethousands,fewmullahshavecomeout,

suggesting that not many village mullahs felt much sympathy for the government.204

204 Giustozzi,Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, 43-4.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



53

Explainingwhythemullahsmightnotfeelmuchenthusiasmforthepost-2001regimeinKabuldoesnotpresentmuchdifculty.AlthoughtheTalibanregimewasnotabletoredistributemucheventothemullahswhorepresenteditsmainconstituency,itcertainlyempoweredthem.Mullahsandulamanotonlyaccountedforalltheministersandmostdeputyministers,aswellasallthegovernorsandprobablyallthedeputygovernors,but

alotofthemwerealsoappointedasheadofdepartments.Thejudiciarywas,ofcourse,entirelyclericalised.Inshort,allthemostinuentialpositionsingovernmentwereheldbymullahs.Moreover,eventhatlargemajorityofmullahswhoreceivednoappointmentsawtheirinuencegreatlyenhancedastheprivilegedcounterpartsofthegovernmentat the local level, to a great extent replacing the elders (see box 5). Even the localcouncilscreatedbytheTalibanasawaytoconnectgovernmentandcommunitieswereoften dominated by mullahs.205 Finally, the role of the clergy in the educational systemwasenhancedgreatly.Therefore,mullahsandulamaingenerallookbackattheTaliban

regimewithnostalgia.

Bycontrast,underthepost-2001regime,theclergyhassteadilybeenlosinginuence,dueto a series of developments such as the overhaul and expansion of state education,206 the

arrival of the modern mass media and in particular television, and the re-establishmentofanon-clericalbranchofthejudiciary.Oneoftheresultsofthesedevelopmentswastoshrinktheinuenceofthemullahsinsociety,atatimewhenmanyAfghanshadalreadybecomeresentfuloftheclericalisationofpoliticalpower,atleastjudgingbyanecdotalevidenceandthememoriesofvillageeldersandurbandwellers.Althoughwesternmediahas lovedportraying the attempts ofthe clerics toexerciseresidualinuenceongovernmentpoliciesasanindicatorofthelimitedreachofthepost-2001changes, from the perspective of the clergy, such changes had in reality been huge anddevastating.Anythingthatthemullahscouldsee,atleastuntil2008,pointedtowardagradualsecularisationofAfghanstateandsociety,hardlyanobjectivethatwouldearnthe sympathy of the clergy. Apart from these issues related to clerical self-interest,

themullahshavealsobeenantagonisedbya series ofdevelopmentswhichare alsocontroversialwithinAfghansocietyasawhole.AlthoughtheroleofwomeninAfghansocietyhasremainedverymodestafter2001,notonlybywesternstandards,butalsobythe standards of some of the countries of the region (for example Iran), the appearanceofasmallminorityofwomeninpublicandplayingamoreprominentroleinsociety,includingforexampleinthemedia,hasbeenenoughtogreatlyirritatetheclergy,withinwhichmanybelievethatworseistocomeinthisregard,too.

The current weight of themullahs in Afghan society is hard to gauge; however, itshouldbeconsideredthatifcloserrelativesareincluded(children,wives,parents,andsiblings),thesheerdemographicweightofthecategorymustbenolessthan15percent

of the population. As mentioned above, in areas little affected by the roll-out of stateeducation over the years,mullahs tend tobemore inuential because they remaintheonlyeducatedindividualinthevillageandareasourceofopinionandadvice.Onecould conclude that probably there has been a process of polarisation among the public,betweenasecularisingpartofthepopulationandamoreconservativeportion,gatheringaroundthemullahs.Suchpolarisationinteractedwithothernewandolddevelopments,includingtheurban/ruraldivide,thereturnofrefugeeswhohadgrownupawayfromAfghanruralsociety,inter-communalconictandexternalintervention.

Surveyingtheclergyisadifcultandcomplicatedtask;someeffortstocapturethefeelingsofthemullahshavebeencarriedout,however,from2007onward.Thefeelings

205 Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending.

206 Giustozzi,“Nation-building.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



54

expressedbythemullahswere(unsurprisingly)notofopensupportfortheTaliban,butcertainlyofhostilitytowardwesternpresenceinAfghanistan.207

Madrassa students

WhenthesupportoftheclergyfortheTalibanisdiscussed,referenceismadetoestablishedmullahsandulamawho haveadegreeofinuenceoverthe communitieswheretheyoperate.AlthoughanumberofmullahsalsoghtwithintheTalibanranks,mostgenuinemullahs(asopposedtoself-appointedmullahswhowereneverhiredbyacommunitytopreachandteach,seebox4)didnotjointheghting,butcontentedthemselveswithamore political role. The Taliban themselves appear to have had little interest in takinginuentialmullahsawayfromtheirroleofrecruitersandfacilitatorsandturningthemintoghters.ThisisparticularlythecasebecausetheTalibandonotseemtohaveanyshortageofcommittedrecruitsjoiningtheranks.Wherearetheserecruitscomingfrom?

There is a solid consensus among observers and analysts that religious madrassas havesincethebeginningoftheinsurgencyin2002beenprovidingasteadyowoffull-time

Talibanghters.Themostcommittedandcapableofthesethencanrapidlyturnintothecadresoftheinsurgency:teamcommandersandabove,ofwhichtherewerereckonedtobe roughly 2,000 in early 2010. Most of the madrassa recruitment occurs in Pakistan, fortheobviousreasonthattherenotmanyfunctioningmadrassasinAfghanistan.Ofcoursenot all Pakistani madrassas are a recruitment ground for insurgents; certainly not allcontribute to the same extent. In some cases, the teachers might actively encourage andeven indoctrinate the students to join the jihad; in others, they might simply toleratetheoccasionalpresenceofrecruitersonthemadrassa’sground.Overall,however,itisclearthatthemadrassashavebeenprovidingasteadyowofcomparativelyhighqualityrecruits,withoutwhichtheinsurgencywouldinalllikelihoodneverhavegoneveryfar.208

WhyhasTalibanrecruitmentinthemadrassasbeensosuccessful?TheanswerhasmainlytodowiththecloseidenticationbetweentheTalibanfromtheirveryoriginsasanorganisedforcein1990andthePakistaniJamiyat-i-Ulema,whichcontrolsalargeportionofthesemadrassas.This,ofcourse,explainswhytheTalibanhaveeasyaccesstothegroundsofthemadrassas;italsoexplainswhytheeducationorindoctrinationthatthestudentsreceiveisquitecompatiblewithrecruitmentintothejihad.209

Afghan clerics educated in Pakistan have in recent years been moving into Afghanistantoestablish radicalmadrassas there.Radicalmadrassas seemwell fundedcomparedto others, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, hence the likelihood of foreign funding,presumably from the Arab Gulf countries. In some cases, the collaboration of some

of these madrassa teachers and the insurgency has been proven; in most cases, it isassumedorallegedbytheAfghansecurityagencies.Suchmadrassashaveturnedupasfar north as near the central Asian border, although they are still relatively rare in mostoftheNorth.Inthenorthwest,itwouldappearthatTalibanrecruitmentmostlyfocusesonmadrassas,whetherradicalornot.Whatmakesamadrassaradical,i.e.,sympathetic

207 MirwaisWardak, Idrees Zaman, and Kanishka Nawabi, “The RoleAnd Functions of Religious Civil Society inAfghanistan” (Kabul:CooperationforPeaceandUnity,2007);KajaBorchgrevink,“ReligiousActorsandCivilSocietyinPost-2001Afghanistan”(Oslo:PRIO,2008).

208 SeeNicoleM.Warren,“MadrassaEducation inPakistan:AssistingtheTaliban’sResurgence”(Newport,RI:SalveRegina University, 2009) for a survey of literature on the subject; also “Pakistan: Karachi’s madrassas And ViolentExtremism”(Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup,2007).

209 WhytherearesomanymadrassasandwhytheyaresowellfundedhastodowiththeowofArabmoneyinthe1980s,meanttoassistthejihadagainsttheSovietarmy,andthecontinuinglinkswiththeGulfCountries;ithasalsotodowithrecentPakistanihistory,whichcannotbediscussedindetailhere.SeeWarren,“MadrassaEducation”;“Pakistan:Karachi’sMadrassas.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



55

totheinsurgents?Itisthepersonalleaningofthemullahswhichhasthegreatestimpactonthestudents,whojoinatayoungagewithoutmuchofapoliticalinclination.Littleisknownoftheinclinationsofthefamilieswhosendtheirchildrentoradicalmadrassas,except that anecdotally many families are not politically motivated in their choice.210

Refugee campsIn the early years of the insurgency, an important source of recruits appears to havebeen the Afghan refugee camps inside Pakistan.211WhytheTalibantargetedtheseforrecruitmentisclear:theywereoutsidethereachoftheAmericansandthePakistaniauthorities could probably be relied upon to mostly or even completely turn a blind eyetotherecruitmentactivities.ItisverydifculttomeasurethedegreeofsuccessoftheTalibanintherefugeecamps;whatisknownisthatthesecond-mostimportantcomponentoftheinsurgencyin2009,Hizb-i-Islami,wasmostlyrecruitingitscadresoperatinginNangarharfromthecamps,asopposedtoNangarharitself.212Thiswouldseemtosuggesta greater susceptibility to recruitment among those living in the camps rather than inthevillages.Thisisnotsodifculttoexplain:thecampswereunderthecontrolofthe

jihadistgroupsinthe1980sandtheindoctrinationoftherefugeeswaswidelypractised.The fact that these refugees, contrary to the majority of those living in Pakistan in 2001,have not gone back yet suggests an economic link to Pakistan, but perhaps also a higherthanordinarydissatisfactionwiththenewstatusquoinAfghanistan. 213 In a sense, therefugeesin2002-07votedwiththeirfeet:theystayedorwentalso(but,ofcourse,notonly)inaccordancewiththeirpoliticalinclination.

Whatever thecase, theweight ofthe refugee camps inthe recruitmentow oftheinsurgencyhasclearlybeendecliningovertime,notnecessarilybecauseoffewerrecruitsfromthecamps,butiffornootherreasonbecauseofthegrowthinrecruitmentinsideAfghanistan.However,thefragmentaryinformationwhichltersfromtheTalibanside

suggests that the refugee camps remain close to the heart of the leadership: consultationswithmullahsandeldersthereareheldonimportantissueswheretheleadershipwantsto take the pulse of the base of the movement.214 Taliban sources also suggest that thecampsaretheonlylocationwheretheycarryoutsomekindofforcedrecruitment:eachfamilyis requestedtocontributeamaleofghtingage.Again,conscriptionimpliesaconsiderable organisational capacity and a high degree of control over the refugee camps.215

The youth

As mentioned above, in the early years of the insurgency, the Taliban struggled to recruitinsideAfghanistan.From2006onward,evidencehasbeenemergingthattheTalibanhavestartedhavingatleastsomesuccessinmobilisingyoungpeopleinthevillages,whodo not have a religious educational background. Information on this matter is slight,but a number of young men educated sometimes even to university level are beingattracted to the insurgency.216 A survey of the obituaries in the Taliban press, carriedoutinformallybyoneoftheauthors,conrmsthetrendtowardhighschoolgraduates

210 Ladbury, “TestingHypothesesonRadicalisation,”30.

211 See,forexample,“Soviet-erarefugeecampsbecomingbreedinggroundsforTaleban,”ANI,13October2009.

212 AntonioGiustozzi,“BetweenPatronageandRebellion:StudentPoliticsinAfghanistan”(Kabul:AfghanistanResearchand Evaluation Unit, 2010).

213 Fazal-ur-RahimMarwat,From Muhajir to Mujahid (Peshawar:PakistanStudyCenter,2005).

214 Giustozzi,Negotiating with the Taliban.215 InterviewswithTalibancadres,summer2011.

216 Giustozzi,“BetweenPatronageandRebellion.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



56

sometimes making it to the rank of commander.217 Judging from this, it must be assumedthatagrowingproportionoftheTaliban’scoreforce(excluding,therefore,mercenariesand opportunistic allies) is composed of young men brought to the cause of the Taliban.PerhapstheTaliban,intheircampaigntowagejihadagainsttheforeignoccupationofAfghanistan, have started attracting a constituency more interested in the nationalistic,

or proto-nationalistic, or even xenophobic content implicit in the idea of jihad. In reality,littleisknownofthemotivationsofthisgroupofrecruits.

OneimportantfactorinmotivatingyoungmentojointheTalibanisthesearchforahigher social status; this type of attraction remains valid once the recruits are socialised.If other motivations play a role initially, the Taliban are successful in merging theirrecruits into a committed whole.218 At least in recent times, the Taliban have beeninvesting an organisational effort in bringing into their movement more young men andboys educated outside the madrassas. Active proselytising, for example, is reported inhigh schools in a number of provinces.219

Strongmen old and new

The attitude of strongmen was brieydiscussed earlier when reviewing the issue ofcommunity mobilisation. As argued, probably only in a small number of cases can theinvolvement of the strongmen in the conictbe seen asan indicator ofcommunitymobilisation.Usually it is the strongmanalonewhomakes the decision toenter theconictanddecidesonwhichside.Afewofthesestrongmenhaveinrecentyearsdecidedtosidewith theTaliban, at least temporarily.Their typicalprole is that ofa localcommander ofoneoftheanti-Talibanfactions,disappointedwith thetreatmentandthe career advancement experienced after 2001 and at the same time, unable to secureextra-statesources ofrevenue andpatronage,suchas,forexample,smuggling.HowdoesthistypeofTalibanrecruit(typicallyjoiningwithasmallretinueofmen)differ

fromthemercenaryandopportunisticrecruitsdiscussedatthebeginningofthissection?Someofthestrongmenwerenotmerelymotivatedbytheseeminglybetterprospectsforadvancement and gain offered by the Taliban, but also by a strong sense of grievance thatemerged after 2001; the feeling that the values of the 1980s jihad had been betrayed, thatthemujahiddinhadbeensidelinedbytheoldelitereturningtopower,ofteninallianceswithelementsoftheleftistpartyagainstwhichthemujahiddinhadbeenghting. 220

Intheearlyyearsofthewar,themarginalisation(realoralleged)oftheoldmujahiddinwasfarfromappearingastheobviousoutcomeoftheBonnagreement.By2006,however,thepicturehadchangedsignicantly;thecabinethadbeenpurgedofsomeofthegures

217 For example, Al Somood carries obituaries in every issue.

218 Ladbury,“TestingHypothesesonRadicalisation.”

219 CommunicationswithteachersandAfghanjournalist,spring2011.

220 GiustozziandReuter,“TheNorthernFront”;AntonioGiustozzi,“Herat:quandoiTalibanreclutanoiTagiki,”Limes 2, (2010).

Box 4: Who are Afghanistan’s elders?

Theterm“elder”iswidelyusedintheliteratureaboutAfghanistan;themostdirectreferencetothisgureinAfghancultureisthe“whitebeards”(spin geree or rish-i-safed ).Thetermis,however,usedinthispublicationasashorthandforarangeof“menofinuence”inthevillages.Thisincludesgureslikekhans (tribal leaders), maliks/qaryadars, arbabs, and mirabs. Maliks and qaryadars in particular have historicallybeenappointedbytheAfghanstateasintermediarieswiththecommunities.Clericsare not included in this category.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



57

mostcloselyassociatedwiththeanti-Talibanmilitias,althoughothersservedon.Evenifthe marginalisation of the mujahiddin had in reality been still limited, the direction of thetrendwasenoughtoconvincethoseamongthemujahiddinwhohadnotgotwhattheyconsideredtheirfairshareofthespoilsthattheywerenotlikelytogetitinthefutureeither.FewhadanytrustleftinPresidentKarzai,whosepromisesappearednowempty

afternothavingbeenmetseveraltimesbefore.Karzai’sdivide-and-ruletacticsvis-à-vistheanti-Talibanforceshadbeenquiteeffectiveuptothatpoint,butwerebeginningtoshowtheirlimitationsashisalliesbecamemoreawareofthem.

At the same time, non-state armed groups began to proliferate, consisting not just of reactivatedoldgroupsofarmedmenafliatedwiththe2001anti-Talibancoalition,butalsoentirelynewgroups.ThelatestsetofdatareleasedbytheUN’sDisbandmentofIllegalArmed Groups report mentioned 5,557 illegal armed groups, including 1,334 disbanded.221 Eventhisnumberwasverylikelyanunderestimate.During2009and2010,manynewarmed groups have been formed or reactivated in the areas affected by the insurgency asaresultofthecollapseoflawandorderandthespreadingsenseofinsecurity.AlthoughsomeofthesearmedgroupsweretheninvolvedintheschemesoftheAfghangovernment

andISAFtocreatelocalsecurityforces,theyaccountedforjustaverysmallportionofallarmedgroups(see5.1: Serviceprovision).AlthoughnobodyknowsexactlyhowmanygangsandarmedgroupsmightbeactiveinAfghanistanasofautumn2010,NDSsourcesmentionedmorethanonepervillageinaprovincesuchasWardak. Inaway,this process resembleswhat happenedinthe1980s,even if,at that time,agreaterportionofthearmed groupshad some formal link toapoliticalorganisation: Sovietsourcesestimatedin1988thatone-thirdofthemujahiddingroupswerenotlinkedtoa political party.222 Inaplace likeWardak, less than10percentoftheactivearmedgroupsareTalibanorHizb-i-Islami,withafewmorecollaboratingwiththeinsurgentsas mercenaries or opportunistically; the rest have no discernible political agenda andhaveprobablybeenformedwiththeprimaryaiminmindtoprotectcommunitiesand

individuals.223 Inevitably, once armed groups start appearing, they further contribute tothedeteriorationofsecuritybecausetheywillstartoccasionallypreyingonneighbouringvillages, resort to violence more easily during disputes, and, in the presence of a suitablecharacter, turn into strongmen’s gangs and start exercising control over the population.

Theproliferationofarmedgroupsaroundthecountryalreadycreatedamassivelawandorderproblem,susceptibletoignitingamilitary-politicalconictevenifaninsurgencyhadnotalreadybeengoingon.Intheactualcontextofacountrywithaninsurgencyalreadyactive,theoptiontocollaboratewasinevitablygoingtolookattractivetosomeofthedisgruntledstrongmen;indeed,thepotentialconstituencyofstrongmeninclinedtocollaboratewiththeinsurgencyhasalsobeengrowing.Themixtureofideologicalmotivationsandpragmatic

considerationswhichwasdiscussedinthissubsectioncould,ofcourse,representanexplosivemix;inordertoexplainwhatcouldtriggeralarge-scaleshifttowardsupportingtheTalibanorthejihad,itisnecessarytointroducetheconceptof“criticalmass.”

In the social sciences, this term refers to the process of social movements becomingmore attractive beyond a hard core of ideological supporters if they can convey thefeeling that their chances of success are high; in such cases, even elements that do notshare the ideology of the movement join in because they start seeing it as a vehicle fortheirownaspirationsasagrouporasanindividual.Inthecontextofcivilconict,thecriticalmassisnotsimplyachievedbyamovementdemonstratingabilityandpower,

221 Giustozzi,“BureaucraticFaçade,”169-92.222 Giustozzi,War, Politics and Society , 151.

223 PersonalcommunicationwithUNofcial,April2010.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



58

butistheresultoftheinteractionbetweenconictingparties:theirrelativestrengthiswhatmatters.Vis-à-vistheTaliban,theirattractivenessdoesnotdependsimplyontheirperceived strength, butalsoontheperceived strength (orweakness)oftheiropponents.Inthe1980s,thecriticalmasswasachievedbytheinsurgencyin1980,becausetheSovietarmywasinitiallynotable(nor,forthatmatter,willing)toproject

powerdeepintothecountry.Themujahiddinwerethentheonlyviableentitypresent.TheSovietsandtheirAfghanallieshadtocampaignaggressivelytounderminethesensethattheruralareaswereoutoftheirreach;theynevercompletelysucceededinthis.

Inthiscase,theTaliban’sorganisationalpowerisafunctionofitsindirectimpact:itisnot used directly to mobilise strongmen on the Taliban’s side, but its mere existenceattracts them to operate under such a relatively solid umbrella. The experience of northern Afghanistan suggests that once the Taliban came under pressure in the secondhalf of 2010, the strongmenwhohadallied tothemstarteddefectingback tothegovernment.224

The ethnic dimension

Ethnicityasadriverofanti-governmentmobilisationwasdiscussedin4.3.Whatremainsopentodiscussioniswhetherethnicgrievancesplayaroleinthemobilisationtotheinsurgency of Pashtuns in particular. For this, evidence is very slim; all that can be saidis that ethnically motivated attacks against non-Pashtuns by Taliban insurgents seem tobenon-existentorveryrare.TheTalibanhavealwaysinsistedthattheyarenotboundtoanyparticularethnicgroup.However,thereisnoquestionthatPashtunsaccountfortheoverwhelmingmajorityoftheTaliban’sranks.Thislendsatleastsomeplausibilitytothishypothesis,whichiswidelyheldinPakistanbyanalystsandpublicalikeandhassomepopularityinAfghanistanitself.ItisworthpointingoutthattheinsurgencyhasitssanctuaryinPakistanandoperatesacrosstheborderinareasofAfghanistanwhich

areoverwhelminglyPashtun;similarly,themajorityofstudentsinPakistanimadrassasandAfghanrefugeesarePashtuns.Inevitably,therefore,theinsurgencywasgoingtobeoverwhelminglyPashtun,atleastuntilitconsolidateditsbasesinsideAfghanistanandmovedontoinltratetheregionsontheothersideoftheHindukush.Atthesametime,however,itisclearthattheTalibanhaveatleastsince2006carriedoutintenseeffortstomobilisesupportamongnon-Pashtuns,withatleastsomesuccessfrom2008onward.225

Adifferentmatter,ofcourse,iswhetherPashtunresentmentisdrivingasignicantnumber of young villagers to join the Taliban. There is also evidence of high levelsofTalibanrecruitmentamongPashtunrefugeesfromnorthernAfghanistan,whowere

forcedtoleaveinthewakeofawaveofrevengeattacksthatfollowedthecollapseoftheTalibanregimebyTajik,UzbekandHazaramilitias. 226 The case of the refugeesfromtheNorthis,however,notsufcienttocasttheTalibanasawholeasavehicleofPashtunresurgence.Thesparseepisodesofcommunicationwithinsurgentsdonotseemtoconveyethnicrivalryasamajorsourceofmotivationfortheghters,asitishardlyever mentioned.227

224 AntonioGiustozziandChristophReuter,“TheInsurgentsoftheAfghanNorth,”(Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2011).

225 Giustozzi,“BeyondthePashtun”;GiustozziandReuter,“TheNorthernFront.”

226 Oftentheserefugeeshavelostpropertyandwouldliketogoback;thefamilieshavesufferedinjuryandsometimeslossoflife,whereastheconditionsintherefugeecamps(mostlyaroundKandaharCity)havebeenprettybad.

227 Giustozzi,Negotiating with the Taliban.Fromtimetotime,itwasallegedthattheTalibanofferedsupporttogroupsofKuchientangledinconictsoverlandwithnon-Pashtuns,particularlyHazaras(inWardak),andthattheKuchiacceptedsuchsupport.Suchallegations,however,havenotbeenconrmedbyindependentandneutralsources.SeeTomCoghlan,“Villagersforcedoutby‘Taliban’nomads,’’ The Telegraph,2April2008;JoshuaFoust,“They’reProbablyNotTaliban,”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



59

Throughout the Pashtun belt, ethnic grievances seem to play a subsidiary role only. ForexampleLadburydescribestheimpactofthepicturesofTajikcultgureCommanderMassoud being displayed on the NationalArmy’s vehicles among young Pashtuns inWardak.228TheexceptionisnorthernAfghanistan,whereethnicrivalriesseemtohavedrivencommunitymobilisationontheTalibansideinthePashtunpocketsofKunduzand

Baghlanandcounter-mobilisationofTajiksandUzbeksinanti-Talibanmilitias.

229

Here,too (as inthecaseofthestrongmen,see6.5:Strongmen),theroleoftheTaliban’sorganisationalpower is indirect: thePashtuncommunities rosewhentheyperceived

thattheTalibanwerestrongenoughtoenabletheirmobilisationagainstlocalrivals.

Xenophobia

Another popular view of the origins of the conict inAfghanistan is the contentionthat the Afghans’ natural xenophobia inevitably ends up mobilising them against anyforeign military force present in the country, particularly if that is perceived as anoccupyingforce.Theproblemwithsuchaviewisthatitisdifculttoanchorittoanyfactualevidence;theonlywaytodetermineifitactuallyplaysaroleinrecruitment

wouldbetosurveytheghtersandaskabouttheirmotivations.230Itistrue,however,thattheanecdotalevidenceshowshostilitytoforeignpresenceasarecurrenttheme;canitbeseparatedfromconservativereligiousconvictions?Isitadeterminingfactorofmobilisation?Asmentionedabove,thereissomeevidenceofciviliancasualtiesasa mobilisation factor in the jihad. This could be linked to the activation of dormantxenophobic sentiment. But in order to achieve some clarity on the role of xenophobia asadriverofanti-governmentmobilisation,whatxenophobiaisshouldbeclaried.

Xenophobia in Afghanistan has been much discussed, but rarely studied with anyseriousness.Theremightbetwosourcesofit:therejectionofexternalelementscommonto communities used to living in relative isolation, and religious sentiment. The former

couldwellbeactivatedbythepresenceofaforeignarmyandtheconsequentfrictionwithlocalcommunitiesoverincidentsbigandsmall:aroadaccident,acollateralkilling,culturally insensitive behaviour, etc. As for the latter, religious sentiment is referredtohere assomething separatefrom theideologisation of Islam,which characterisesIslamist movements and, in a sense, fundamentalist movements such as the Taliban.231

Thedistinctionbetweenxenophobiaandnationalistsentimentisthin:muchdependsontheperceptionofISAFandEnduringFreedomasanoccupyingforce(henceanationalistreactionisjustied)orasabenignforceinAfghanistanoninvitationofthelegitimategovernmentofthecountry(henceanyreactioncouldonlybexenophobic).Inotherwords,xenophobia is an indiscriminate reaction against any foreign presence, independently of

itsraisond’être;nationalismhastobejustiedbytheexistenceofanobjectivethreat.Inpractice,thedistinctionisdifculttomakebecausewhoeverobjectstoaforeignpresencedoes that on the basis of the perception of a threat. Perhaps a useful distinction here couldbebetweenthreatstoAfghanistanasawholeandthreatstoasinglecommunityorportionofthecountry.Again,however,localperceptionsmightbeblurredinthisregard.

Registan.net,21July2008.OnallegationsofTalibanusingethnicmotivesafter2001seealsoAlecMetz,“InsurrectionandResurrection:TheTalibanResurgenceinAfghanistan”(Monterey,CA:NavalPostgraduateSchool,2006),whohoweverdoes not provide empirical evidence.

228 Ladbury,“TestingHypothesesonRadicalisation,”19.

229 GiustozziandReuter,“TheInsurgentsoftheAfghanNorth.”

230 Thiscouldbedoneatleastamongprisonersandreconciledghters;however,surveyingreconciledorcaptured

ghtersisgoingtoproducebiasedresults.

231 See5.7onthefrictionbetweenaconservativeMuslimpopulationanda non-Muslimoccupyingarmy.Giustozzi,“Afghanistan:‘Friction’betweenCivilizations”;Ladbury,“TestingHypothesesonRadicalisation.”

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



60

Whetherdescribedasxenophobicornationalistsentiment,thepointisthatthereasonwhyitcatalysesaroundtheTaliban,whichisnotprimarilyanationalistmovement,isthattheTalibanaretheonlyorganisationstrongenoughtoconveythesegrievances.WithouttheTaliban,thissentimentwouldremainlatent.

Protection from bad governanceEvidenceismountingthattheprovisionofjusticebytheTalibanshadowgovernmentmightfavour Taliban recruitment, not just of communities (see 6.2), but also of individuals. Thewaythisworksisrathersimple:oncetheTalibanhaveresolvedadisputeoracriminalcase in somebody’s favour, that person has a vested interest in seeing the Taliban stayincontrolofhisarea.Areturntogovernmentcontrolwouldundothedisputeresolutionof the Taliban.232However,ithastobeconsideredthatresponsestoTalibanjusticevary,alsodependingonthetypeofjusticeadministered.WhenTalibancommandersimposeafundamentalistversionoftheSharia,thelocalsmightnotseethisasverylegitimate.Generallyspeaking,however,thereisnodoubtthatTalibanjusticeismuchmorepopularthan government justice; customary justice seems in abstract to be more popular than the

Taliban’s,butsuffersfromweakimplementationinareaswherecommunitystructuresarenot strong.233

As in the case of nationalism and xenophobia, described above, grievances caused by “badgovernance”wouldremainlatentintheabsenceofanorganisationallyviableforceliketheTaliban;thefactthattheTalibanhaveinvestedasignicantamountofresourcesintheir judiciary helps them gain an image of a movement that aims to redress injustices.

6.6 Funding

Basic, individually geared economic motivations as a driver of anti-government mobilisation

havebeendiscussedabove.Thewiderfundingofinsurgencyhas,however,beenamatterof constant debate for other reasons too, mostly concerning the actual sources of funding,but also the ability to mobilise support. Although, as argued above, the mercenarycomponentoftheinsurgencyisnotveryimportant,itwouldbedifcultforthemajorityofTalibancommandersandghterstoghtwithoutcompensation,becausemostofthemhave dependents and families and there is strong cultural pressure to take care of them.Taliban sources admit that the number of men they can mobilise is determined by theirnancialresources;thishasbeenthecaseparticularlyfrom2006onward,whentheowofrecruitsacceleratedgreatly.ThehighrateofinationinducedinAfghanistanbyforeignintervention and massive external spending has had an effect on Taliban indemnities, too,whichvariedfromplacetoplace,butwerearoundUS$140in2006andhadrisento$200-

300 in 2010. This trend, plus the expansion of the ranks and the development of politicalandwelfareoperationsbytheTalibansuggestnotonlyasteepriseinfunding,butalsothattheTalibanmighthavebecomevulnerabletorevenuedownturn.234

As previously hinted, the sources of revenue for the Taliban are not a merely academicconcern,butalsoaverypoliticalone.TheTalibanarewidelybelievedtohavebeenreceivingcashfromjihadistnetworksintheArabGulfandelsewherein2002andatleastforsometimeafterwards.OneclearindicationoftheexistenceofArabfundingwasthepresence in Afghanistan of Arab volunteers entering the country in groups in order to


233 Ladbury,“HelmandJusticeMappingStudy.”

234 SpencerAckerman,“TalibanPaysItsTroopsBetterThanKarzaiPaysHis,”Wired , July 26 2010; Glenn Kessler, “PayincreaseforAfghantroopsboostsinterest,”Washington Post,December102009;DeirdreTynan,“Afghanistan:IfYouCan’tBeattheTaliban,TrytoBuyMilitantsOff,”Eurasia Insight, January 14 2010.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



61

practicelive-conditionghtingskillsintheearlyyearsofthepost-2001insurgency.TheirpresenceinrelativelylargegroupswasnotpopularamongAfghanvillagersandevenamong the Taliban, so the fact that they continued to visit the country for some time isprobablyagoodindicatorofhowimportantArabfundingwasatthattime.Itappearsthatthefundingwasconditionalonallowingthesegroupsofinsurgenttraineescoming

to Afghanistan and operating in relative freedom for some time.

235

Thefactthatsuchgroupsof“jihadisttourists”becamerarerandrarerafter2006isprobably an indicator of the declining importance of this funding, at least in relativeterms.Correspondingly,TalibantaxationofAfghanbusinesses,farmers,andtravellershasexpandedwithgeographicexpansionoftheiractivities,particularlysince2009.InareaswheretheTalibanarewellestablished,theTalibanhavebeenquitepervasivein their efforts to tax everybody, except the families contributing young men to thecauseofthejihad.Taxation,typicallycontainedataround10percentofincome,allowstheTalibantobanpredatorybehaviouramongtheirghters.Expropriationofcivilianproperty is sometimes reported, but the Taliban are also reputed to punish these abusesand to insist on the return of misappropriated property.236

AnalallegedsourceofTalibanrevenueisthePakistaniISI.Thisislikelytohaveemergedonly recently, as the Taliban expanded operations and as Pakistani covert support andfacilitation for theTaliban failed to elicit strong condemnation in thewest.TalibansourcesallegethatISIfundingwasby2010wasthesinglelargestsourceoffunding.237

6.7 The overall role of the Taliban in the conict

The importance of the Taliban as a movement and as an organisation in the post-2001conictisclear:withoutthem,theinsurgencyeitherwouldnothavetakenplace,orwouldhavebeenverydifferent.ItwasTalibandissatisfactionwiththepost-2001settlement

whichwasinalllikelihoodthemainfactorinunleashingthenewconict.TheTalibanasanorganisation,withaninitiallylimited,butcommittedcorecadreof“believers”,wasable to tap into the grievances of the clergy, of disenfranchised communities, of sectionsof the youth, and even co-opt some of the strongmen once so bitterly opposed by theTalibanthemselves.TheTalibanwerealsoabletomobilisexenophobicsentimentaroundthecountry;theimportanceofspecicallyethnicresentmentamongPashtunsisnotconrmedasbeingverysignicantbytheavailableevidence.Withexternalhelpor,atleast,tolerance,theTalibanwerealsoorganisationallycompetentenoughtomaintaina hold on some refugee camps inside Pakistani territory and also to mobilise madrassastudents on a large scale. In all of this, economic considerations played a marginalrole, although the increasingly large Taliban armed force needed funding to keep going;

theTalibanwererathergoodatseekinganyopportunityforfundraising.Despitetheseconsiderations,littleresearchconcerningtheTaliban’sorganisationandhowitworkshas been published so far; an effort to demonstrate the importance of organisation intheanalysisofinsurgencieswasmadewithregardtoHizb-i-Islamiforthe1980sand1990s,buthasnotbeenfollowedupyetforthepost-2001period.238

235 ANAsource,April2010;BillRoggio,“Analysis:AlQaedamaintainsanextensivenetworkinAfghanistan,”Long War Journal,29July2010;JamesGordonMeek,“AlQaedainAfghanistan:Smallinnumbers,hugeinimpactonTaliban,”New York Daily News, 23 August 2010.

236 Itisobviousthatalarge-scaletaxationeffortimpliesasignicantorganisationalcapability;theinsurgentshavetobeawareofwherethemoneyisandcollectitfromdispersedlocations.BeingwellfundedinturnallowstheTalibantopresentthemselvesasaforceoforderinacontextofchaos,wheregovernmentagencies,neververyeffective,become

evenlessabletooperatebecauseofthreatandintimidationandoftheincreasingdifcultyofsupervisingstaffmembers.237 Giustozzi,Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop;Giustozzi,Decoding the New Taliban;Waldman,“TheSunintheSky.”

238 SeeA.Sinno,Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,2008).

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



62

7. Conclusion

Whileit isclearthatexistingfeaturesofAfghansociety,inparticulartherural-urbandivide,contributedtofacilitatetheemergenceofaconictthat,oncestarted,beganto be fuelled by other factors, one key argument of this paper is that Afghanistan is

afictedbytheweightof itsownhistorymorethananythingelse.Structuralfactors,therefore,arenotalwaysgivenonceandforall,buthavetheirowndynamics.RecentAfghan history produced mass migration and return, the process of urbanisation, theweakeningofcommunitystructures,andnewsocialclasses,allofwhichcreatedanenvironmentwherenewconictscouldeasilybeignited.Thisalsoexplainswhythewaytheconictwasunleashedin1978-79differedquitemarkedlyfromthewayitstartedoff in 2002-03.

Thetransformativeimpactofthepre-2001conictsisitselfareasonwhyknowingthepre-historyofthe2001-10conictisimportanttounderstandpost-2001developments.The emergence of the Taliban as a countrywide movement from 1994 onward was

addressed as perhaps the most important development, if seen from the perspective of 2011.TheTaliban,organisationallyandintermsofidentity,uniedmuchoftheAfghanclergy, changing the Afghan political landscape. Another important consequence of the1980sand1990swastheemergenceofafragmentedandlocalisedmilitaryclass,whichprovedveryresilientandremainedanimportantplayerintheconictafter2001(thestrongmen discussed in 5.1).

Otherconsequencesofthe1980sand1990sworthmentioningare:

• thecollapseofthestate in1992,whichhadadevastating impactonanalreadyrelativelyweakstatestructureandthereforeaccountedatleastinpartforthe“weakgovernance”discussedin5.1;

• theemergenceofatendencytowardsethnicpolarisation,whichaffectedconictpatterns after 2001 despite not being a major driver;

• the establishment of external relationships by Afghan military-political actors,whichmostlycontinuedafter2001.

Elements of a comprehensive interpretation of the post-2001 phase of the conictcanalreadybeformulated.OnecanthinkofAfghanistanasasocietyrivenbyconict(amongcommunities,amongsocialgroupsandamongpoliticalfactions),whoseenergycan then be captured and redirected by an insurgent movement, as long as the latterreachesthe“criticalmass”required.Achievingthisconvincespotentialconstituencies

that the insurgency has a chance of success or at least to leave a mark on the politicalorder.Itisimportanttokeepinmindthatforthe“fellowtravellers”whooffernon-militarysupportfortheinsurgencyorevenghtalongsideit,theultimatesuccessoftheinsurgentmovementtakingpowerisnotessential:whatmattersisthattheinsurgencyreaches a level of strength that forces the central government to make adjustmentstothepoliticalsettlement,withconcessionstothedisenfranchisedandmarginalisedcommunities or social groups. In light of this, perhaps offering one-off payments to theelders of these communities might not be enough to genuinely appease them; in fact,quitethecontrary,theywilltendtoidentifytheconictasthesourceoftheirrewardsandwillhaveanincentiveinkeepingthatgoing.Long-termchangestothepolitical

settlement may be required.

In2002-03,theinitialunleashingoftheconictwasaresultofweakandevenoutrightbad governance (the role of the strongmen) and international intervention, which

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



63

alienatedaportionofAfghansociety.TheweaknessoftheAfghanstateandits“badgovernance”isapopularexplanationforwhythepost-2001phasestarted.Someseebadgovernanceasadirectcauseofresistance;othersviewstateweaknessanddysfunctionaswhatreallyturnsvariousgrievances(whichpersewouldnotbeverythreatening)intoa major challenge to the Afghan government. The mishandling of modest local disputes

canthereforehaveadisproportionateimpact.Onthewhole,thereisanearconsensusamongobserversthatweakgovernanceisakeyfactor,althoughdevelopmentagenciestendtorelyonthisexplanationmoreexclusivelythan“counterinsurgents,”whotendtomixitwithotherinterpretations.TheTalibanthemselvesseemtoagreewiththisview,consideringtheextentoftheirinvestmentintheirownsystemofshadowgovernanceandjudiciary.Badgovernance,however,explainswhy theTalibanhavebeengaininginuence,butlesssowhytheyrecruitgrowingnumbersofyoungAfghansandwhytheTalibancadresghtintherstplace.

It is undoubtedly remarkable that foreign intervention in both cases contributed tosparkingtheconict,despitethedifferencesinthewaystheSovietandwesternarmiesentered the country oroperated. The better behaviour ofwestern armies caused a

counter-mobilisationnonetheless,evenifaslowerone.However,arguingthatexternalinterventionisalwaysdoomedtounleashresistanceinAfghanistanmeanslittle:itisimportanttounderstandthemechanismsthatpresideoversuchmobilisation.Ofthese,perhapstheperceptionthattheforeignersweresettochangethestatusquowasoneof the main causes of hostile reaction; more generally, the entry of large numbers of foreigntroopsandthepumpinginofresources,nancialandotherwise,couldonlyalterthelocalbalanceofstrength,pushingthecommunitiesthatbenetedtheleastovertoopposition.

The particular impact of intervention becomes clearer upon consideration of the roleofthewareconomy,whichgeneratesasetofinterestsandsocialgroupsthatsupport

warforwar’ssake:mercenaries,proteers,contractors,violencespecialists,smugglers,etc. The interaction and mutual reinforcement of all these factors can be describedasacycleofwar.Weakgovernanceallowsfrictionamongcommunitiestoworsenandreachboilingpoint,whencommunitiescanbemobilisedintoawiderconictsothattheycanghttheirneighbours.This,inturn,furthercomplicatesgovernance.Similarly,internationalinterventionandthewareconomyembraceeachotherinaspiralthatispotentiallyverydisruptiveofsocialandpoliticalpatterns:theinowofforeignmoneytends to reinforce the rural-urban divide, fuelling the insurgency and inviting a furtherdeepeningofinternationalintervention,withstillmoremoneycomingin.

Some believe that the drug economy in particular plays a pivotal role among the

drivers of anti-government mobilisation. In reality, resource mobilisation by the partiesinconict isquitediversied:siphoning off aid assistance, taxing projects and anyeconomic activity, direct support from abroad, involvement in smuggling, etc. It is alsosimplistictotracetherootsoftheconicttoruralpovertyandthelackofprospectsforruralyouthinparticular.Forquitesometime,theinsurgencywaslargelyexplainedbywesterndiplomatsandmilitariesintermsof“brigandage”andthemercenaryactivityof marginal sectors of the population on the pay-book of Pakistan (more recently Iranhas also been mentioned). External efforts to destabilise the country are still invokedbyAfghangovernmentofcialsasthemainsourceofinstability,anexplanationalsopopularamongtheAfghanintelligentsia,whilethereremainsareluctancetodiscussbad

governance as a main source of the insurgency.

Aformulationmoreinlinewithavailableevidencewouldhavetoshowhow,byreachingits critical mass, an insurgent movement mounts such a challenge to the existing

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



64

governmentthattheself-condenceofstateservantsisshaken,disruptingtheabilityofstateinstitutionstomaintaincontrol.Thisisthestartofacycleofwar,whichcanreproduce itself many times as rival military-political forces compete to accumulate themeanstoformanewstate(orre-establishtheoldorder).InthecaseofAfghanistan,external intervention complicates the picture, but does not ultimately alter the

fact thatwar cycles lead tocompetitiveaccumulation ofpowerand resources untilthe conditions are in place for a peace cycle to start. In the minds of internationalpolicymakers, escalating intervention is supposed to deliver victory to their Afghanallies,givingthemanenormousedgeoverthechallengers.Clearlythishasnotbeenworkingverysuccessfully,castingdoubtsonhowbenecialexternalinterventionreallyistolocalalliesandprotégés.Itclearlyseemstoremoveanyincentiveamongthelocalalliestoshapeupfortheghtandtakeresponsibility.Thedilemmaisthatoncetheprotégéshavegrowndependentonexternalsupport,weedingthisdependencyoutisdifcult.Anexternaldisengagementmightstartapeacecycle,butaretheprotégésatallinapositiontobenetfromthat?Theobviousriskisthatthechallengerstothepost-2001ordercouldemergeasthettestcompetitorinapost-interventionscenario.Thechallengetogettheprotégésbackinshapeisathereforeaveryseriousone.Thedynamics of dependency deserve a dedicated, in-depth study.

A driver of anti-government mobilisation that has been highlighted is the organisationaldimension of the Taliban, which allowed them tomobilise growing sections of thepopulationdespitetheirownhugeresourceandtechnologyinferiorityandthemilitaryodds all heavily staked against them. In the context of a fragmented Afghanistan, theTaliban’sgrowingmostlymadrassa-recruitedcadresturnedouttobeauniqueasset.Onthebasisofthatstrength,theywereabletotapintothegrievancesofseveralsectorsof the population, and even co-opt some of the strongmen once so bitterly opposed bythe Taliban themselves.

Unfortunately, in this regard, study of the Taliban is not very advanced. The otheressentialdimensioninstudyinginsurgentmovementsishowideologyactsasamobilisingandunifyingfactor.InthecaseofAfghanistan,the“ideology”ofthemovementisprettywellknown,butthewaysitenablesmobilisationremainobscure.Mostimportantly,thedynamicswithinwhichtheAfghanreligiousestablishmenthaveledtotheemergenceandconsolidationoftheTalibanarestillonlysuperciallyknown.KnowingmoreaboutthatisessentialtounderstandtheTaliban’sownviewsandtheirpotentialinterestinpeacemaking.

ThepeculiarabilitiesoftheTalibanhavecombinedwithaseriesofsocialcircumstancesto ignite and fuel the insurgency, as discussed above. The political environment also

contributed.TheBonnAgreementin2001wasnotalastingpoliticalsettlementandthishad important implications, both in terms of internal and international politics. It mightwellhavemadeanewphaseoftheconictinevitable,orinanycasehavefacilitatedits emergence.

Apart from our limited knowledge of the Taliban, there are other big gaps inthe evidence available asmany of the issues reviewed inthis paperhavenot beenthoroughlyinvestigated.Whatisavailablehasallowedustorejectsomehypothesesand interpretations or at least circumscribe their relevance: mercenary aims, ethnicity,and poverty may all play some role, but are not the main driving factors. By contrast,investigating the rural-urbansplitand the erosionofthe old patternsofpowerandinuenceinthevillagesseemsaparticularlypromisinginvestmentintermsofimprovingourunderstandingoftheunderlyingdriversofanti-governmentmobilisation.StudyingtheAfghanclergyanditsinternaldynamicsisstillinitsinfancyandmightbedifcult

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



65

toimplementinthecurrentpoliticalclimate,butwouldcertainlybehighlyrewarding.Ourknowledgeofexistingmechanismsofinformalgovernanceisonlyspottyandoftensupercial.Theimpactofinternationalinterventionisincreasinglydebatedinthepress,butrarelystudiedindepth;thisparticularstreamofstudywouldcertainlyyieldusefullessons in future interventions.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



66

Bibliography

“AForceinFragments:ReconstitutingtheAfghanNationalArmy.”Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup,2010.

Ackerman,Spencer.“TalibanPaysItsTroopsBetterThanKarzaiPaysHis.”Wired , 26 July2010.

“AfghanMediain2010:SynthesisReport.”Kabul:Altai,2010.

“AfghanistanExpectsBloody2009.” Agence France-Presse, 5 January 2009.

“Afghanistan:MaternalMortalityinNortheasternAfghanistanamongWorstinWorld.”IRIN,16February2007.

“Afghanistan:OverstretchedHealthServicesinKandaharProvince.”IRIN,17September,

2009.

“Afghanistan Study Group Report.” Washington, DC: Center for the Study of thePresidency, 2008.

Ahady,Anwar-ul-Haq.Zawal-e pashtunha dar Afghanistan [The Decline of Pashtuns inAfghanistan].InHal-e munasebat-e tabari dar Afghanistan [Resolution of Ethnic RelationsinAfghanistan],1-37.Kabul:PublicationofHizb-eMardum-eMusalman-eAfghanistan,1386.

Andishmand, M. Ikram. Salhai tajawuz wa muqawimat [YearsofInvasionandResistance].Nashr-ePaiman,1383.

Bareld, Thomas. “Weak Links in a Rusty Chain.” In Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan: Anthropological Perspectives ,editedbyM.NazifMohibShahraniandRobertL.Caneld,170-183.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984.

Bhatia,Michael,andMarkSedra. Afghanistan, Arms and Conict.London:Routledge,2008.

Bijlert,Martinevan.“UnrulyCommandersandViolentPowerStruggles:TalibanNetworksinUruzgan.”InDecoding the New Taliban,editedbyAntonioGiustozzi.London:C.Hurst,2009.

Bijlert,Martinevan.“TheBattleforAfghanistan:ZabulandUruzgan.”Washington,DC:NewAmericaFoundation,2010.

Borchgrevink,Kaja.“ReligiousActorsandCivilSocietyinPost-2001Afghanistan.”Oslo:PeaceResearchInstituteOslo,2008.

Bradsher, Henry S. Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999.

Bruno,Greg,andLionelBeehner.“IranandtheFutureofAfghanistan.”Washington,DC:CouncilonForeignRelations,2009.

Centlivres,Pierre,andMichelineCentlivres-Demont.Et si on Parlait de l’Afghanistan?

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



67

Paris:EditionsdelaMaisondesSciencesdel’Homme,1988.

Chouvy,Pierre-Arnaud.Opium.London:Tauris,2009.

Christensen,Aasger. Aiding Afghanistan: The Background and Prospects for Reconstructionin a Fragmented Society .Copenhagen:NordicInstituteofAsianStudies,1995.

Coghlan,Tom.‘‘VillagersForcedoutBy‘Taliban’Nomads.” Daily Telegraph, 2 April 2008.

Collins,JosephJ.The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study in the Use of Force inSoviet Foreign Policy .Lexington:LexingtonBooks,1986.

Condra,LukeN.,JosephH.Felter,RadhaK.IyengarandJacobShapiro. The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq.Cambridge,MA:NationalBureauofEconomicResearch, 2010.

Crews,RobertD.“Introduction.”InThe Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, edited by

RobertD.CrewsandAminTarzi,1-58.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2008.

Danishyar, Amir Eatemad. Jang-e Afghanistan wa shoravi, amil fropashi jahni kamonism[Afghanistan and Soviet War, the CauseofGlobal CollapseofCommunism].Tehran:Bahinah Publishers, 1371.

Davis,Anthony.“HowtheTalibanBecameaMilitaryForce.”InFundamentalism Reborn? ,editedbyWilliamMaley,43-71.London:C.Hurst,1998.

DeWaal,Alex.“MissionWithoutEnd?PeacekeepingintheAfricanPoliticalMarketplace.”International Affairs 85, no.1 (2009): 99-113.

Dobbins, James. After the Taliban: Nation-building in Afghanistan. Washington,DC:Potomac Books, 2008.

Dorronsoro,Gilles.“Afghanistan:desréseauxdesolidaritéauxespacesrégionaux.”InÉconomie des Guerres Civiles,editedbyF.JeanandJ.C.Run,147-188.Paris:Hachette,1996.

Dorronsoro, Gilles. Revolution Unending.London:C.Hurst,2005.

Dressler,Jeffrey,andCarlForsberg.“TheQuettaShura.”Washington:InstitutefortheStudyofWar,2009.

Dupree,Louis.Contributionsto American Universities Field Staff Reports,SoutheastAsiaSeries,variousyears.

Edwards, David B. Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad . Berkeley, CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2002.

Felbab-Brown,Vanda.“Afghanistan:WhenCounternarcoticsUnderminesCounterterrorism.”The Washington Quarterly 28,No.4(2005):55-72.

Fergusson, James. Taliban.London:BantamPress,2010.

Fishtein,Paul.“WinningHeartsandMinds?ExaminingtheRelationshipbetweenAidandSecurityinAfghanistan’sBalkhProvince.” Boston: Tufts, 2010.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



68

Foust, Joshua. “They’reProbablyNotTaliban.”Registan.net, 21 July 2008.

Gelinas,Sylvie. Afghanistan du Communisme au Fondamentalisme.Paris:L’Harmattan,2000.

Geller, Schuyler. “Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable: Afghanistan NationalSecurityForcesHealthCareCapabilityDevelopment;FormationofFormalMilitaryMedicalandAlliedHealthCareTrainingPrograms.”Washington,DC:USDepartmentofDefense,2010.

Geller,Schuyler.“DepartmentofDefenseBloggersRoundtable:MedicalManualMentoringTraininginAfghanistan.”Washington,DC:USDepartmentofDefense,September22010.

Giustozzi,Antonio.War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992. London andGeorgetown:C.HurstandGeorgetownUniversityPress,2000.

Giustozzi, Antonio. “Military Reform in Afghanistan.” In Afghanistan: Assessing

the Progress of Security Sector Reforms, edited by Mark Sedra, 23-31. Bonn: BonnInternationalCenterforConversion,2003.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“TheDemodernisationofanArmy:NorthernAfghanistan1992-1998.”Small Wars and Insurgencies 15, no. 1 (2004): 1-18.

Giustozzi, Antonio. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007 .LondonandNewYork:C.HurstandColumbiaUniversityPress,2007.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“Afghanistan:PoliticalPartiesorMilitiaFronts?”In Transforming RebelMovements after Civil Wars,editedbyJ.deZeeuw.Boulder,CO:LynneReinner,2007.

Giustozzi, Antonio. “Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan’s ‘ANA’ and theCounter-insurgencyEffort,2002-2006.”Small Wars and Insurgencies 18, no. 1 (2007):45-67.

Giustozzi, Antonio. “Afghanistan: Transition Without End. An Analytical Narrative.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2008.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“Bureaucratic FaçadeandPoliticalRealities ofDisarmament andDemobilisationinAfghanistan.”Conict, Security and Development 8, vol. 2 (2008):169-92.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“Afghanistan:‘Friction’betweenCivilizations.” InThe Borders of Islam: Exploring Huntington’s Faultlines, from Al-Andalus to the Virtual Ummah, editedbyStigJarleHansen,AtleMesøy,TuncayKardas.London:C.Hurst,2009.

Giustozzi,Antonio (ed.).Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field .LondonandNewYork:C.HurstandColumbiaUniversityPress,2009.

Giustozzi,Antonio.Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords of Afghanistan. LondonandNewYork: C.HurstandColumbiaUniversityPress,2009.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“TheAfghanNationalArmy:UnwarrantedHope?”RUSI Journal 154,no. 6 (2009): 34-40.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



69

Giustozzi,Antonio.“TheEyeoftheStorm:CitiesintheVortexofAfghanistan’sCivilWar.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“BetweenPatronageandRebellion:StudentPoliticsinAfghanistan.”Kabul: Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2010.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“CyclesofWarandPeaceinAfghanistan:UnderstandingthePoliticalEconomyofConict.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2010.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“DilemmasofGovernanceinAfghanistan:BetweenPatrimonialismandBureaucratisation.”In Afghanistan: Beyond the Wild Tribes,editedbyA.SchlenkhoffandC.Oeppen.London:C.Hurst,2010.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“Herat:quandoiTalibanreclutanoiTagiki.”Limes 2 (2010): 179-86.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“LosgruposétnicosylamovilizaciónpolíticaenAfganistán.” Revistade Estudios Sociales, December 2010.

Giustozzi, Antonio. “Nation-building is Not for All: The Politics of Education inAfghanistan.”Berlin/Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“NegotiatingwiththeTaliban:IssuesandProspects.”NewYork:TheCenturyFoundation,2010.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“TheTalibanBeyondthePashtuns.”Waterloo,Ontario:CentreforInternational Governance Innovation, 2010.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“Auxiliary Irregular Forces inAfghanistan:1978-2008.” InMaking

Sense of Proxy Warfare: States, Surrogates, and the Use of Force, edited by M. Innes.Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, forthcoming.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“IfOnlythereWereLeaders:TheProblemof ‘Fixing’thePashtunTribes.”InRethinking the Swat Pathan,editedbyM.MarsdenandP.Hopkins.London:C.Hurst,forthcoming.

Giustozzi,Antonio.“ArmedPoliticsandPoliticalCompetition inAfghanistan.” InThePeace in Between: Post-War Violence and Peacebuilding,editedbyAstriSuhrkeandMatsBerdal.London:Routledge,2011forthcoming.

Giustozzi,Antonio.The Double-Edged Sword .London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2011.

Giustozzi,Antonio.The Art of Coercion.London:C.Hurst,2011.

Giustozzi,Antonio,andChristophReuter.“TheNorthernFront:TheAfghanInsurgencySpreadingBeyondthePashtuns.”Kabul/Berlin:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010.

Giustozzi,Antonio,andChristophReuter.“TheInsurgentsoftheAfghanNorth.”Kabul/Berlin:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2011.

Giustozzi,Antonio,andMohammedIshaqzadeh. Afghanistan’s Paramilitary Policing in

Context.Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,forthcoming.

Giustozzi, Antonio, and Noor Ullah. “The Inverted Cycle: Kabul and the Strongmen’s

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



70

CompetitionforControloverKandahar,2001-2006.”Central Asian Survey 2 (2007): 167-84.

Giustozzi,Antonio, andNoor Ullah. “‘Tribes’ andWarlords in SouthernAfghanistan,1980–2005.”InMercenaries, Pirates, Bandits and Empires: Private Violence in HistoricalContext, edited by AlejandroColásandBryanMabee,133-57.London:C.Hurst,2010.

Gompelmann,Geert.“WinningHeartsandMinds?ExaminingtheRelationshipbetweenAidandSecurityinAfghanistan’sFaryabProvince.”Boston:Tufts,2011.

Goodhand,Jonathan,andDavidManseld.Drugs and (Dis)Order: A Study of the OpiumTrade, Political Settlements and State-Making in Afghanistan.London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2010.

Goodson, Parry P. Afghanistan’s Endless War . Seattle,WA:University ofWashingtonPress, 2001.

Grevemeyer, JanHeeren. “Afghanistan:das ‘Neue Modell einer Revolution’ undder

döricheWiderstand.”In Revolution in Iran und Afghanistan, edited by Kurt GreussingandJan-HeerenGrevemeyer.Frankfurt:SyndikatAutorenundVerlagsgesellschaft,1980.

Grifn,Michael.Reaping the Whirlwind: The Taliban Movement in Afghanistan.London:Pluto Press, 2001.

Hammond, Thomas T. Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the SovietInvasion, and the Consequences.Boulder,CO:WestviewPress,1984.

Haq Shinas, Nasry. Tahawulat-e siasi jihad-e Afghanistan [Political Developments of JihadinAfghanistan].Kabul:NamaniPublishers,1385.

Hughes,Michael.“InterviewwithFormerAsst.SecretaryofStateDobbins:Afghanistan’sDiplomaticDilemmas.”Hufngton Post, 17 December 2009.

Hussain, Raja G. Badal: A Culture of Revenge: The Impact of Collateral Damage on theTaliban Insurgency .Monterey,CA:NavalPostgraduateSchool,2008.

Ibrahimi,Niamatullah.“TheFailureof aClericalProto-State:Hazarajat,1979-1984.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2006.

Ibrahimi, Niamatullah. “At the Sources ofFactionalism and CivilWar inHazarajat.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009.

Ibrahimi,Niamatullah.“DivideandRule:StatePenetrationinHazarajat(Afghanistan)fromtheMonarchytotheTaliban.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009.

Johnson, Thomas, and Chris Mason. “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency inAfghanistan.”Orbis(winter,2007):71-89.

Kakar, Hassan. Government and Society in Afghanistan. Austin, TX: University of TexasPress, 1979.

Kakar, Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982.Berkeley,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1995.

Kalyvas,Stathis.The Logic of Violence in Civil War .Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 2006.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



71

Kessler,Glenn.“PayIncreaseforAfghanTroopsBoostsInterest.” Washington Post, 10December 2009.

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009.

Labrousse,Alain. Afghanistan: Opium de Guerre, Opium de Paix . Paris: Fayard, 2005.

Ladbury, Sarah. “Testing Hypotheses on Radicalisation in Afghanistan.” London:Department for International Development, 2009.

Ladbury,Sarah.“HelmandJusticeMappingStudy.”London:DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment, 2010.

Laalistani. Jang-e qodrat: Waqaia sey Dahe Akhir Afghanistan [PowerStruggle:EventsoftheLastThreeDecadesinAfghanisan].Kabul,Unknownpublisher:1384.

Lalzad, Dr. Huweyat, Millat wa Nasionalism dar Asr-e Hazir [Identity, Nation and

NationalisminPresentAge]InHal-e Munasebat-e Tabari dar Afghanistan [Resolution of EthnicRelationsinAfghanistan],38-66.Kabul:Hizb-eMardum-eMusalman-eAfghanistan,1386.

Lefèbvre Mathieu. “Local Defence inAfghanistan: A Review of Government-backedInitiatives.”Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010.

Lia,Brynjar. Architect of Global Jihad .London:C.Hurst,2008.

Linschoten,AlexStrickvanandFelixKuehn. An Enemy We Created .London:C.Hurst,2012.

Lyakhovskii,Aleksandr.Tragediya i doblest Afgana.Moscow:Iskona,1995.

Macdonald, David. Drugs in Afghanistan.London:PlutoPress,2007.

MacKenzie,Jean.“WhoIsFundingtheAfghanTaliban?YouDon’tWanttoKnow.”GlobalPost, 13 August 2009.

Male, Beverley. Revolutionary Afghanistan.London:CroomHelm,1982.

Maley,William.The Afghanistan Wars.NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2002.

Mankin,Justin.“GamingtheSystem:HowAfghanOpiumUnderpinsLocalPower.” Journalof International Affairs 63, no. 1 (2009): 195-209.

Mansur, Haz. A’lami Naw A’dami Naw [NewWorldNewMan].Kabul: PublicationofHizb-eMardum-eMusalman-eAfghanistan,1388.

Marwat,Fazal-ur-Rahim.From Muhajir to Mujahid .Peshawar:PakistanStudyCenter,2005.

Masadykov,Talatbek,AntonioGiustozziandJamesMichaelPage.“NegotiatingwiththeTaliban.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2009.

Meek,JamesGordon.“AlQaedainAfghanistan:SmallinNumbers,HugeinImpactonTaliban.”New York Daily News, 23 August 2010.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



72

Mehdi, Muyeddin. Nazaria Haye Tamin Sobat wa Halle Munasebat-e Tabari [TheoriesofStabilizationandResolutionofEthnicRelations].In Hal-e Munasebat-e Tabari dar Afghanistan [Resolution of Ethnic Relations in Afghanistan], 67-168. Kabul: Hizb-eMardum-e Musalman-e Afghanistan, 1386.

Mesbah,Zadah,andSayedMuhammadBaqir. Afghanistan: Qurbani Rofaqa wa Bratheran [Afghanistan:VictimofComradesandBrothers].Mashhad, Iran: SanabadPublishers,1378.

Metz,Alec. “InsurrectionandResurrection:TheTaliban Resurgence inAfghanistan.”Monterey,CA:NavalPostgraduateSchool,2006.

Ministry of Finance. Donor Financial Review . Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republicof Afghanistan, 2009.

Morales,Klaus.“RebuildingAfghanistan’sHealthServiceisHamperedbyInsecurityandLackofFunds.”British Medical Journal 331 (2005): 1164.

Mubariz, Abdul Hamid. Hqayeq wa Tahlil-e Waqaye’a Siasi Afghanistan: az Soqut-eSaltanat ta Ijraat-e Taliba [Facts and Analysis of Political Events of Afghanistan: FromtheFallofMonarchytotheRiseofTaliban,1973-1999].Kabul:MaiwandPublishers,1378.

Nojumi,Neamatollah.The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, CivilWar, and the Future of the Region. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.

USAIDOfceofInspectorGeneral.“ReviewofSecurityCostsChargedtoUSAIDProjectsinAfghanistan.”ReviewReportNo.5-306-10-002-S.Manila:USAID,2009.

Olesen,Asta.“TheSaurRevolutionandtheLocalResponsetoIt.”In Forschungen inand über Afghanistan,editedbyS.W.BreckleandC.M.Naumann.Liestal:BibliothecaAfghanica, 1983.

Olesen,Asta.Islam and Politics in Afghanistan.London:Curzon,1995.

Osman,MohammadTariq.“TheTribalSecuritySystem( Arbakai)inSoutheastAfghanistan.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2008.

Owen,Jonathan.“ArmyLaunchesInvestigation:CorruptAfghansStealingMillionsfromAidFunds.”The Independent, 7 March 2010.

Pain,Adam. “Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Kandahar.” Kabul:Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2010.

“Pakistan:Karachi’sMadrassas andViolentExtremism.”Brussels: InternationalCrisisGroup, 2007.

Pennes, Sébastien. “L’Insurrection talibane: guerre économique ou idéologique?”Politique Étrangère 2 (2008): 345-358.

Peters, Gretchen. Seeds of Terror .NewYork:St.Martin’sPress,2009.

Pohly, Michael. Krieg und Widerstand in Afghanistan: Ursachen, Verlauf und Folgen seit1978. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1992.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



73

Ranjbar, Kabir. Mosaleha way a Idame Jang [Peace orContinuation ofWar]. Kabul:Government Printing Press, 1989.

Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban.London:Tauris,2000.

Rashid, Ahmed. Descent into Chaos.London:Penguin,2008.

“ReformingAfghanistan’sPolice.”Brussels:InternationalCrisisGroup,2007.

Roggio,Bill“Analysis:AlQaedaMaintainsanExtensiveNetworkinAfghanistan.”LongWar Journal, 29 July 2010.

Roy, Olivier. Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990.

Roy,Olivier. Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War .Princeton:DarwinPress,1995.

Roy,Olivier.“NaturedelaGuerreenAfghanistan.”Les Temps Modernes (1988): 1-37.

Roy,Olivier.“Afghanistan:LaGuerrecommeFacteurduPassageauPolitique.” RevueFrançaise des Sciences Politiques, December (1989): 887-902.

Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. NewHaven,CT:YaleUniversityPress, 1995.

Rubin, Barnett R.“The Political Economy ofWarand Peace inAfghanistan.”World Development 28, no. 10 (2000): 1789-1803.

Ruttig,Thomas.“Loya Paktya’s Insurgency.” InDecoding the New Taliban, edited by

AntonioGiustozzi.London:C.Hurst,2009.

Ruttig, Thomas. How Tribal Are the Taleban? Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010.

Sack, Mary. “An Interview with Lakhdar Brahimi.” Journal of International Affairs, August (2005): 239-47.

Saikal,Amin.Modern Afghanistan.London:Tauris,2006.

Schmeidl,Suzanne,andKarokhailMassud.“TheRoleofNon-StateActorsin‘Community-BasedPolicing’-AnExplorationoftheArbakai(TribalPolice)inSoutheasternAfghanistan.”Contemporary Security Policy 30, no. 2 (2009): 318-342.

Sennott,C.M.“TaxpayerMoneyFunnelledtoTaliban.”Global Post,30September2010.

Sinno, Abdulkedr. Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond . Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press, 2008.

Slinkin,M.F.Narodno-Demokraticheskaya Partiya Afganistana y Vlasti; Vremya Taraki- Amina (1978-1979 gg).Simferopol:KulturaNarod,1999.

“Soviet-era Refugee Camps Becoming Breeding Grounds for Taleban.” Asian NewsInternational,13October2009.

Spolnikov, Viktor. Afganistan: Islamskaya Kontrrevolutsiya. Moscow:Akademiya NaukSSSR,1987.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



74

Strand,Richard.“Nuristan:HiddenLandoftheHindukush.”http://nuristan.info/index.html (accessed 16 January 2012).

Straziuso,Jason.“Record151U.S.TroopsDieinAfghanistanin2008.” Associated Press,31 December 2008.

“TalibanDyingYoung.”New York Post,14November2010.

Tynan,Deirdre.“Afghanistan:IfYouCan’tBeattheTaliban,TrytoBuyMilitantsOff.”Eurasia Insight, 14 January 2010.

Vercellin, Giorgio. Afghanistan 1973-78: dalla Repubblica Presidenziale alla RepubblicaDemocratrica.Venice:UniversitádegliStudi,1979.

Waldman,Matt.“GoldenSurrender.”Kabul:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,2010.

Waldman,Matt.“TheSunintheSky.”London:LSECrisisStatesResearchCentre,2010.

Wardak, Mirwais, Idrees Zaman, and Kanishka Nawabi. The Role and Functions of Religious Civil Society in Afghanistan.Kabul:CooperationforPeaceandUnity,2007.

Warren,NicoleM.“MadrassaEducationinPakistan:AssistingtheTaliban’sResurgence.”Newport,RI:SalveReginaUniversity,2009.

Warsaji,M.Ibrahimi. Jihad-e Afghanistan wa Jang-e Sard-e Qodrathai Bozorg [AfghanistanJihadandGreatPower’sColdWar].Peshawar:SaboorIslamicPublicationsCentre,1381.

Weinstein,JeremyM. Inside Rebellion.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007.

Wilder,Andrew.“CopsorRobbers?”Kabul:AfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnit,2007.

“Winning‘HeartsandMinds’inAfghanistan:AssessingtheEffectivenessofDevelopmentAidinCoinOperations.”ReportonWiltonParkConference.WiltonPark,UK:March2010.

“WorkingPaper4forAfghanistanPublicExpenditureReview2010:SecondGenerationofPublicExpenditureReforms,SecuritySector.”London:UKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment, 2010.

Woodward,Bob.Obama’s Wars.NewYork:Simon&Schuster,2010.

Yousafzai,Sami.“TheTalibaninTheirOwnWords.”The Daily Beast,25September2009.

Zaeef,AbdulSalaam.My Life With the Taliban.London:C.Hurst,2010.

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012



75

Request for Feedback

AREU isvery interested tohear from its researchusers.Whether you are a regularreaderofourpublications,haveattendedanAREUlectureorworkshop,usethelibrary,orhaveonlyjustbecomefamiliarwiththeorganisation,youropinionsandfeedback

arevaluable.Theycanhelpusdeliveronourmandateasbestwecanbyinformingourapproachtoresearchandthewaywecommunicateresults.Theeasiestwaytoprovidefeedback is to email [email protected]. Alternatively, you can call +93 (0)799 608 548.Youarefreetotelluswhatyoulike,butsomepotentiallyusefulinformationis:

• HowyouengagewithAREU(i.e.,throughpublications,meetings,etc.)

• WhatyouuseAREUresearchfor

• HowyoureceiveAREUpublications

• Whetheryouusehardorsoftcopyversions

• Howpublicationscouldbetterpresentinformationtoyou

• Yourthoughtsonourresearchprocessesorresults

• Suggestedareasofresearch

• YourfavouriteAREUpublicationsorevents

• Whatyoubelievewecoulddobetter

• Youreldofinterest,employmentorstudy,aswellaslocation

8/2/2019 afganistan 1979 2012


Recent Publications from AREU

Allpublicationsareavailablefordownloadatwww.areu.org.af,andmanyinhardcopyforfreefromtheAREUofceinKabul.

Jan2012 HealingtheLegaciesofConictinAfghanistan:CommunityVoicesonJustice,PeaceandReconciliation,byEmilyWinterbotham

Dec2011 AfghanistanLookingAhead:ChallengesforGovernanceandCommunityWelfare

Nov2011 PainfulSteps:Justice,ForgivenessandCompromiseinAfghanistan’sPeaceProcess,byJayLamey,withEmilyWinterbotham

Oct2011 BetweenaRockandaHardPlace:Counter-narcoticsEffortsandtheirEffectsinNangarharandHelmandinthe2010-11GrowingSeason,byDavidManseld

Oct2011 RethinkingRuralPovertyinAfghanistan,byPaulaKantorandAdamPain

Oct2011 LegaciesofConict:HealingComplexesandMovingForwardinGhazniProvince,byEmilyWinterbotham

Oct2011 LegaciesofConict:HealingComplexesandMovingForwardinBamiyanProvince,byEmilyWinterbothamwithFauziaRahimi

Oct2011 LegaciesofConict:HealingComplexesandMovingForwardinKabulProvince,byEmilyWinterbotham

Oct2011 WartimeSuffering:PatternsofViolationinAfghanistan,byEmilyWinterbotham,withAkbarLudin,AminSheikhzadeh,FarkhloqaAmini,FauziaRahimi,JamilaWafa,ShukriaAzadmaneshandZamanSultani

Aug2011 ManagingConcurrentandRepeatedRisks:ExplainingtheReductionsinOpiumProductioninCentralHelmandBetween2008and2011,byDavidManseld

Aug 2011 Governance and Representation in the Afghan Urban Transition, byTommaso Giovacchini

July2011 TheImpactofMicronanceProgrammesonWomen’sLives:ACaseStudyinKabulProvince,bySogolZand

July 2011 # AfghanistanResearchNewsletterNo.30

July2011 DistrictCouncils:TheMissingMiddleofLocalGovernance

July2011 LocalGovernanceforLocalNeeds:KeyFindingsandPolicyOptionsforAfghanistan,byDouglasSaltmarsheandAbhilashMedhi

June 2011 Local Government is Failing to Meet Local Needs (podcast)

Documents

afganistan 1979 2012