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Pakistan Advantage Extensions...................................................................................................................... ...17Pakistan Advantage Extensions...................................................................................................................... ...18Pakistan Advantage Extensions...................................................................................................................... ...19Solvency Extensions............................................................................................................................................20Russian Relations DA 2AC Aff Answers .........................................................................................................21Russian Relations DA 2AC Aff Answers .........................................................................................................22Russian Relations DA Aff Answers Ext. Defense............................................................................................23Russian Relations DA Aff Answers: Defense ..................................................................................................24Russian Relations DA Aff Answers: Link Turns....................................................................................... ......252AC AFF Answers: Counterplan......................................................................................................................262AC AFF Answers: Counterplan......................................................................................................................27

AFF Answers: Counterplan Extensions...........................................................................................................281NC Afghanistan Advantage.............................................................................................................................291NC Afghanistan Advantage.............................................................................................................................301NC Afghanistan Advantage.............................................................................................................................312NC Afghanistan Advantage: Extensions........................................................................................................322NC: AT Economy Add On...............................................................................................................................331NC Pakistan Advantage...................................................................................................................................341NC Pakistan Advantage...................................................................................................................................352NC Pakistan Advantage Extensions................................................................................................................361NC Solvency......................................................................................................................................................371NC Solvency......................................................................................................................................................381NC Russian Relations DA................................................................................................................................391NC Russian Relations DA................................................................................................................................40Russian Relations DA NEG: Uniqueness Extensions......................................................................................41Russian Relations DA Neg: Link Extensions...................................................................................................42Russian Relations DA Neg: Link Extensions...................................................................................................43Russian Relations DA NEG: Internal Link Extensions..................................................................................44Russian Relations DA NEG: Impact Extensions Key to START...................................................................45Russian Relations DA NEG IMPACT Extensions ........................................................................................ ..46

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INHERENCY :T HE CURRENT DEBATE OVER AFGHANISTAN HAS CONFLATED C OUNTERTERRORISM AND C OUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES . T HE DUALMISSIONS HAVE CREATED AN INTRACTABLE STALEMATE THAT ENSURES ENDLESS INTERVENTIONIST WARFARE .

M ICHAEL J. B OYLE 2010 ( L ECTURER IN I NTERNATIONAL R ELATIONS AND A R ESEARCH F ELLOW AT THE C ENTRE FOR THE STUDY OFT ERRORISM AND P OLITICAL V IOLENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS , I NTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 86: 2 (2010) 333353 D OCOUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER ?)

This episode indicates the extent of the confusion over counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN)that marks thcontemporary debate over Afghan- istan. Both CT and COIN would envisage military action in A but to very different ends. A CT mission would focus exclusively on Al-Qaeda while offering littsupport to the Karzai government; a COIN mission envis- ages a comprehensive commitment to deTaleban and rebuilding the Afghan state while destroying Al-Qaeda operatives there. Yet it has now becomcommonplace for politicians and military officials alike to mention CT and COIN in the same breaththem as if they were functionally equivalent.The official US government definition now frames counterterrorism in classic hearts and minds counterinsurgenactions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.12 Terrorist threats are now regularly descand vice versa. The influential US Army and Marine Corps Counter- insurgency Field Manual states that todays operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency, one which seeks tochange world- wide. Al-Qaeda is a well known example of such an insurgency.13 An official from US Central Command (CENTCOM), for instance, has gone so far to define counterterrorism as a COIN approach.14 Meanwhile, insurgent threats in places such as Chechnya, Indonesia and Thailand are now regularly redescribed as terrorist threats, as analysts speculate on whether local conflictsfor Al-Qaeda or otherwise spill out into acts of horrific violence on the international stage.

This confusion over the differences between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not new, but it has become more serious over the last eight years.15 Since the events of September 11,these concephave regularly been conflated as policy-makers have struggled to come to grips with the threat poQaeda. To some extent, this is natural: Al-Qaeda is a global terrorist organization which intervenes directly in local (often insurgencies, defined here as organized violent attempts to overthrow an existing governmentUS and its allies into exhausting wars of attrition.In other words, it is a terrorist organization which dabbles (sometimes successfully, sometimes less so) in iBut the fact that the threats of terrorism and insurgency are so often intertwined in contemporardoes not make them fundamentally equivalent or susceptible to the same remedies. Nor does extending counterinsurgency operations on a global level, as some prominent authors have suggeste16 The fusionthe threats from terrorism and insurgency, so often described as symptomatic of the complexity of the modern security challenges, can be misread to imply that the responses to them should be similar

while intermixed in practice, these threats remain distinct, and require a policy response which disand prioritizes threats and separates those actors who have a negotiable political programme fromremain incorrigible.Similarly, the fact that terrorists and insurgents operate in the same theatre, and in some cases function in tandem, is not an argument for a response that seamleelements of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.Indeed, there is no reason to assume that counterterrorism and counterins

strategies are fully compatible or mutually reinforcing. The record of the war in Afghanistan suggthat both models of warfare involve tradeoffs or costs that may offset the gains made by the other.Unless thesetradeoffs are properly managed, the simultaneous deployment of counterterrorism andcounterinsurgency operations may operate at cross-purposes and make long-term strategic successmore elusive . The fact that US and UK leaders have been so willing to split the differ- ence counterterrorism and counterinsurgencyand to ignore the offsetting costs of eachmay help to the current painful stalemate in Afghanistan. This article will argue thatcounterterrorism and counterinsurgency aredistinct models of war which can operate at cross-purposes when jointly applied to low-intensity coas that in Afghanistan.The conflation of these two different models of warfare stems from an intellectual error, which assumes that a fused threat (for example, between a nationalislike the Taleban and a transnational terrorist group like Al-Qaeda) must necessarily be met by a joint or blended counterterrorism and counterinsurgency approach.In fact, these two modelswarfare involve divergent assumptions about the roles of force, the importance of winning support

local population, and the necessity of building a strong and representative government. Such approacneces- sarily mutually reinforcing or even compatible.At the tactical and strategic level, there are at least four possible offsetting costspopularcountermobili- zation of enemy networks, a legitimacy gap and diminished leveragethat may be incurred when counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are deployed simulta- neously.At the politiclevel, the conflation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency risks producingan overly interventionistforeign policy which distracts and exhausts the US and UK as they treat an ever-increasing nulocalized insurgencies as the incubators of future terrorist threats.

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1ACP LAN : T HE UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REMOVE ALL FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN THAT ARE UNNECESSARY FORCOUNTER -TERRORISM OPERATIONS .

ADV 1: A FGHAN STABILITYT HE CURRENT COUNTER -INSURGENCY STRATEGY HAS MADE THE UNITED STATES BEHOLDEN TO THE CORRUPT K ARZAI G OVERNMENTUNDERMINING DEMANDS FOR REFORM AND GOOD GOVERNANCE .M ICHAEL J. B OYLE 2010 ( L ECTURER IN I NTERNATIONAL R ELATIONS AND A R ESEARCH F ELLOW AT THE C ENTRE FOR THE STUDY OFT ERRORISM AND P OLITICAL V IOLENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS , I NTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 86: 2 (2010) 333353 D OCOUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER ?)Finally, a counterinsurgency mission can have offsetting effects on counterterrorism goals if it sends commitment that inadvertently reduces the leverage the foreign backer has over its partner governm. Just athe US learned to its peril with South Vietnam, each decision to send additional troops and resourhow much the US needs to win, thereby reducing its leverage over its local partner.87 This is problemat because counterterrorism cooperation depends on leverage, especially when the foreign backer askgovernment to undertake or authorize costly operations to capture or kill suspected terrorists. Thereevidence that this dynamic is in play in respect of Pakistan, which has received $15 billion in aid fr

much of it earmarked for counterterrorism support, only to find that the funds are diverted into weaused against India.88 Pakistan has refused to end its tacit support for the Afghan Taleban, who operate freely in Quetta, and there are unconfirmed reports that the Taleban still receiintelligence service.89Similarly, President Obamas declaration of Afghanistan as a necessary war and hisdecision to send 30,000 additional US troops appear to have made the Karzai regime less willing toaccede to American demands over corruption reform and improved governance . Rory Stewart has poinout that the more we give, the less influence we have over the Afghan government, which believes we need it more than it needs us. incentive do Afghan leaders have to reform if their country is allowed to produce 92 percent of the worlds heroin and still receive $20 billion of international aid?90 It remains to be seen whether th

will spill over into responses to counterterrorism demands, butit is worth asking whether this renewed commitment to COIN strategiAfPak region will leave the US punching beneath its weight with both governments. The US is so heavilyinvested in stopping the spread of violence in the regionto the point that it will tolerate bothAfghanistan and Pakistan exploiting their crises for profitthat it may find it lacks the leverage neededto achieve its essential counterterrorism goals.

G OOD GOVERNANCE KEY TO AFGHAN STABILITY

SHANTHIE M ARIET D'S OUZA 2009 ( ASSOCIATE F ELLOW AT INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES , T ALKING TO THE T ALIBANW ILL IT E NSURE 'P EACE ' IN AFGHANISTAN ? S TRATEGIC ANALYSIS , V OLUME 33, I SSUE 2 M ARCH 2009)More than three decades of incessant fighting has led to a situation of 'reconciliation deficit' in Afwhich is reflected in the ongoing inter-ethnic distrust and ongoing power struggle between the Pa Northern Alliance groups. Serious challenges to governance have plaguedthe COIN effort andthe credibility of tAfghan Government. Lack of access to basic amenities such as roads, electricity, and drinking water are key concerns of the rural population.The 'governance deficitfurther exacerbated by rampant corruption, a system of patronage, and the absence of public institutioof mediating in local, national, and regional conflicts. The failure to establish rule of law has unconfidence in the Afghan Government.The international development effort in Afghanistan is, moreover, under-resourced and even the limited resources are being squandeThe new Afghan institutions that have emerged out of the 2001-2002 Bonn Process are still regardeas unrepresentative, the subsequent elections notwithstanding. A number of individuals with directcountry's warlords, and those closely associated with the drug trade were elected to Afghanis parliament, promoting a 'culture of impunity'.19 Presently, some of the tribes and communities that do noincluded in the current political process or do not benefit adequately from the reconstruction and dehave reasons to support anti-government activities, even in a passive way. Thus, to achieve a stable security environment and a government thtrust and legitimacy, the COIN effort will have to include 'political outreach to disaffected groups'.20 In other words, the 'disaffected communities' within Afghanistan will have to be engaged through a sreconciliation process to make maximum use of the rapidly shrinking political space.

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E NDING THE C OUNTER -INSURGENCY STRATEGY WOULD SPUR A POLITICAL TRANSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS , ENDING CONFLICT INAFGHANISTAN

SHANTHIE M ARIET D'S OUZA 2009 (A SSOCIATE F ELLOW AT INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES AND ANALYSES , T ALKINGTO THE T ALIBAN : W ILL IT E NSURE 'P EACE ' IN AFGHANISTAN ? S TRATEGIC ANALYSIS , V OLUME 33, I SSUE 2 M ARCH 2009, PAGES 254 272)Defying the initial expectations of total and swift annihilation in the aftermath of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),the Taliban continue to mount lethal attacks wAfghanistan from their sanctuary in the Pakistani tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan. Wand East Afghanistan have traditionally been happy hunting grounds for the Taliban, other areas, erelatively stable North, have witnessed increased insecurity and instability. The net impact of these waves of violence and propaganda war la by the Taliban-led insurgency1 has been significant on the Afghan populace, most of whom are not supporters of the Taliban. This regime of intimidation and violecombined with the ineffectiveness of the international community's Counter-insurgency (COIN) cam provide security and the sluggish progress in rebuilding the country, has had an adverse impact on Government's legitimacy among its populace. Its reach, as a result, has been curtailed and its authoriwaned.Optimism among the Afghans, which was generated in the aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban regime, is gradually giving way to despondency.

In light of the deteriorating security situation, there is a growing recognition among Afghan and NAthat peace in Afghanistan will not be won by the military effort alone. Mere reorienting of military mrisks prolonging and intensifying the armed conflict, without initiating processes of negotiareconciliation, to rebuild a broad political consensus in support of the Afghan Government. Reconciliation and negotiationsviewed as mechanisms to weave-in disaffected elements inside the 'tent' which in turn could erode the support base for the Taliban.The politically disaffected groups - only sof whom are with the Taliban, or others who now have common ground with the Taliban - need to over. It would be timely to explore such policy alternatives in effectively tackling the present insurge.The need for such reconciliation, talks, and negotiations used interchangeably in this article is characterized by the common parlance, of 'negotiating with the Taliban'. For obvious reasons, it contin

reactions from many quarters. It is important to note at the outset that this article does not promote acquiescence to Taliban demands nor extol Taliban's virtues. The article looks primarilyan alternative policy option that many international and Afghan analysts are increasingly proposinggaining currency - to move towards a national reconciliation which includes negotiating with the The Afghan Government has indicated its willingness to negotiate with the 'Afghan Taliban'. The focus of the article, therefore, be on prospects for negotiations and reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban and their affiliates, and not the 'moderate Taliban'.3 Of late, both the Afghan Government and the international community hdifferent levels of communications and dealings with the Taliban. Many concerns and doubts abound as far as the desirabilit y and feasibility of such a process is concerned. This article is a stock-taking eand implications of such policy postures that could aid or impede peace-building processes in the conflict-ridden country.The role of talks and reconciliation in addressing the Afghan insurgencyThe issue of reconciliation and negotiations is an essential component of any COIN strategy, especially in a country whose social fabric has been severely damaged through decades of conflict. This ha

various recent studies. According to a recent study by RAND Corporation,'Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups and nearly half of the terror groups analysed ended as a result of a transition into thepolitical process .'4 Another study that reviewed 80 conflicts in the period from 1990 to 2007, conclonly 7.5 per cent of them ended in a military victory and not always for government forces.5 Thus, run,a number of insurgencies have ended through a negotiated settlement.

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1ACA FOCUS ON TERRORISM ONLY WILL GIVE THE UNITED STATES THE DISTANCE FROM THE K ARZAI GOVERNMENT NECESSARY TO SUPPORTGOOD GOVERNANCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL .

M ICHAEL J. B OYLE 2010 (L ECTURER IN I NTERNATIONAL R ELATIONS AND A R ESEARCH F ELLOW AT THE C ENTRE FOR THE STUDY OFT ERRORISM AND P OLITICAL V IOLENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS , I NTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 86: 2 (2010) 333353 D OCOUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER ?)

Accordingly, it is now essential for the US to think about ways to manage these tradeoffs effectively, so that the CT and COIN missions reinforce each others effects. Three important steps can be id, thUS needs to restrict the number of potential targets of commando raids and drone strikes, and to rules of engagement to prevent civilian casualties and reduce the risk of public backlash. Force shosparingly, especially in Pakistan, and directed only at networks directly operating with Al-QaedAfghan Taleban. These strikes should not be extended to other Islamist networks whose support fwith Al-Qaeda and the Taleban might be incidental. The US must be mindful that the long-term polof employing these strikes against militant networks in Pakistan may outweigh the tactical benefiso.91 Second, as President Obama has recognized, the US needs to preserve its leverage over the gof Afghanistan and Pakistan by explicitly making aid, and the contribution of troops, dependent on end of corruption and improvements in self-policing capacity. Third, the US needs to limit itsAfghanistan to the problem of violencethat is, destroying Al-Qaeda and reversing the momenTalebanand to put some distance between itself and the Karzai government. Rather than trying the legitimacy of the Karzai government, it should focus its energies on supporting good governalocal and tribal level and on ensuring that the local delivery of security, justice and public services from corruption.92 Such a bottom-up approach would see the Afghan state remaining a patchwork orun by local warlords and strongmen with indirect links to the central government in Kabul. This hardly inspiring, but it is far more realistic than assuming that it is possible to defeat an ever-expanof enemies while remaking Afghani- stan into a centralized modern state.At the political level, however, the effects of the conflation of counterterrorism and counterinsu perhaps more serious. One of the unfortunate by-products of the experience of the last eight yearsseen two major national insurgencies conducted concurrently with a global struggle against Al-Qa policy-makers have begun to conclude (as Miliband did) that counterterrorism is counterinsurdangers of such a position are manifest. To treat every terrorist threat through the lens of counterinsto commit the US to undertaking countless state-building missions abroad, often with limited prsuccess. To treat every insurgency as the potential incubator of a future terrorist threat is a overextension, distraction and exhaustion. The struggle with Al-Qaeda can be won only if the US kof its priorities and avoids entangling itself in an ever-increasing number of distant conflicts. Bcertainly be lost if the US exhausts itselffinancially, militarily, even morallyby forever scahorizon for new monsters to destroy.93

INSTABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN SPILLS OVER THROUGH C ENTRAL ASIA .

L AL , 06 (R OLLIE , R AND C ORPORATION , "C ENTRAL ASIA AND ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS . S ECURITY AND C OMMERCE AT THEC ROSSROADS ," WWW . RAND .ORG / PUBS / MONOGRAPHS /2006/RAND_MG440. PDF )

The Asian states neighboring Central Asia have historic links and strong interests in the region. CAfghanistan, India, and Pakistan are critical players in the security and economic issues that will defuture of Central Asia and affect U.S. interests in the region. All of these states are of importance toStates, whether due to the war on terrorism, economic ties, arms control, nonproliferation, or other . ChinIran, and India have all aggressively sought to build trade ties to and through Central Asia, and China and India have also invigorated security cooperation.But regional states are concerabout the situation in Afghanistan, which they fear might lead to a spillover of conflict onto their so, and they also fthe possibility of Pakistani activity and influence, which has led them to keep that state at arms length.

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AND AFGHANISTAN STABILITY IS KEY TO M IDDLE E AST STABILITY BECAUSE IT IS THE LYNCHPIN IN THE W AR ON T ERROR .

ANATOL L IEVEN , 2007 (S ENIOR R ESEARCH F ELLOW WITH THE NEW AMERICA F OUNDATION , M IDDLE E AST P OLICYSPRING , HTTP :// WWW .MEPC .ORG /FORUMS _ CHCS /47. HTML )So looking at the inevitable consequences of American withdrawal, the situation after America does withdraw, what should we be concerned with most critically? Well, the first is something which is

about in the context of the Middle East, and that is of course Afghanistan.De facto defeat in Iraq will be bad enough. De facto defeat in Afghwould be a catastrophic humiliation for the United States, and would in effect mark defeat in the waas a whole. Now by defeat in Afghanistan I don't mean that the Taliban can actually chase us out likei'75. But that we also get into a situation where America,and Britain for that matter, and whoever remains there, which won't be very many allies, I thinaresuffering a continual stream of heavy casualties with no prospect of actually creating a successfusuccessful and stable Afghan state. Now this fits into the Middle East not just because American stratewhole in the war on terror, but also because Iran is absolutely critical to the stabilization, the develAfghanistan. And not just that, but if in the future we ever face the situation in which we are going tfrom Afghanistan as well, well then, we go back to the situation before 9/11 in which Iran and Rucritical to keeping the Northern Alliance going against the prospect of the Taliban conquering country.

ANOTHER WAR IN THE M IDDLE E AST WILL GO NUCLEAR .

J OHN STEINBACH 2002 (DC I RAQ C OALITION ,HTTP :// WWW .WAGINGPEACE .ORG /ARTICLES /2002/03/00_ STEINBACH _ ISRAELI -WMD .HTM )

Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort,now be a strong probability."(41)and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gmomentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukesIt iswidely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellof Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian hseriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral pof nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for thuse, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refinweapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon - for whatever reason - the deMiddle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

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1ACADV 2: P AKISTANT HE CURRENT COUNTER -INSURGENCY STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSIVE INCREASE IN DRONE ATTACKS INP AKISTAN , WHICH IS STRENGTHENING RADICAL ELEMENTS IN THE P AKISTAN MILITARY .

M ICHAEL J. B OYLE 2010 (L ECTURER IN I NTERNATIONAL R ELATIONS AND A R ESEARCH F ELLOW AT THE C ENTRE FOR THE STUDY OFT ERRORISM AND P OLITICAL V IOLENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS , I NTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 86: 2 (2010) 333353 D O

COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY GO TOGETHER ?)A second, and related, problem is that the target set for the application of lethal force tends to expanfrom counterterrorism targets to ones associated with the counterinsurgency effort. Such an expans justified on the grounds that militant networks in the insurgency operate in tandem with, or otherwa terrorist organization and vice versa. However, the expansion of the target set produces a range oindirect offsetting costs to the counterinsurgency mission byincreasing the ranks of ones enemies and byrealigning existing militant networks against the foreign power.The effects of this mission creep can be seen with commando raids and the use of Predator

Pakistan. These were originally used sparingly and only against Al-Qaeda operatives; then the US broadened its target set to include senior Taleban officials in Afghanistan.63 By 2009, aware that high-rankTaleban were operating freely across the border in Pakistan, the US expanded commando raids in

regions.64 At least four raids were conducted, two of which were directed against so-called high-vanear the border. Similarly, in 2008 the US expanded the target list for Predator drone strikes to incluofficials and related hostile Islamist networks (such as the Haqqani network) operating across the Pakistani border. In summer 2009, concerned over growing tstability of Pakistan, the US began to direct strikes against factions of the Tehrik-i-Taleban in Pakistan (TTP) and eventually killed its leader, Baitullah Mehsud.65 From 2007 to 2009, the change in the

the target set has been dramatic. According to an analysis by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedmann,in 2007 the US launched only five drone strikes, against Taleban targets and two against Al-Qaeda. By contrast, in the first ten months of 2009 it lastrikes against a variety of targets, including 18 against the Taleban, 16 against Baitullah Mehsagainst Al-Qaeda and four against the Haqqani network .66 Under the Obama administration, the number of Predator strikes and the diversification of theactually increased.67There is considerable evidence that these raids and drone strikes have been successful in Al-Qaedas capabilities.68 Obama administration officials believe that they have eliminated more tthe top Al-Qaeda targets over the last year.69 There are numerous anecdotal reports that Al-Qaeda has been demoralized by the strikes, which they see as causing diranks.70 But the blowback effects have been significant. The immediate reaction to the drone strikes andcommando raids in Pakistan has been public outrage . A recent Pew study revealed that 58 per cent of Pakistanis did not believe that missile strikes wereand 93 per cent believed that they killed too many civilians.71 Even though the Pakistani government approves some drone strikes, approximately 58 per cent of Pakistanis now believe that the US cond

autho- rization of the government in Islamabad.72 What influence the US has is now seen as negative: 64 per cent of Pakist believe the US is their countrys enemy.73 The commando and Predator drone operations have reinfo percep- tion that the government is weak and cannot say no to the US even when the latter unsanctioned air strikes and ground incursions on Pakistani territory.74 The growing sense that thgovernment is paralysed in the face of US interventionhas contributed to the countermobilization of militant networks .75 This was precisely the fear of the Pakistani military, who warned after the first major US commando raid that such action[s] are completely counterproductive huge losses because it gives the civilians a cause to rise against the Pakistani military.76At present, there is only anecdotal evidence to suggesrecruitment into militant networks has increased out of a desire for revenge for commando raidsstrikes.77 Since no reliable data on the supply of militant recruits to Pakistani Islamist networks ex

knows whether the use of commando raids and drones creates more enemies than it kills.78

But it is clear ththe expansion of these strikes has accelerated the radicalization of existing militant groups andencouraged them to make common cause with jihadi groups.The result has been a political realignment among existing militant groups in oppositionand its alleged puppet government in Pakistan. The TTP, formed out of a coalition of disparate militant networks in December 2007, now comprises more than 40 militant groups, and has developed olong standing Kashmiri and Punjabi groups, which themselves are showing increasing susceptibility to jihadi ideologies. The use of commando raids and Predator drone strikes has pushed the TTP c

Haqqani network and its counterpart in the Afghan Taleban. Together, these groups now form an inchoate insurgency against the Zadari government.These strikes have also transformthe priorities of the Pakistani networks and turned some that were exclusively focused on challengin

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1ACoverthrowing the incumbent regime in Islamabad towards actively countering the US and Afghanistan.Worse still, Al-Qaeda appears to gain from this dynamic: Hakimullah Mehsud, the former leader of the TTP, stated unequivocally in October 2009 that we have respect for jihadist organizationswe are with them.79 He also declared his allegiance to Afghan Taleban leader Mullah Omar as the amir of his movement. The use of commando raids and drone strikes agains

Pakistan has furthered the radicalization of existing groups and expanded the international horizons of militant groups whose focus was previ- ously the Pakistani government or Kashmir.Ironically, thresult of the expansion of strikes into Pakistan may be to encourage the process of fusion thatdescribed and to pull these groups even closer to Al-Qaeda.The expansion of raids and strikes in Pakistan has added to the ranks of the enemies that the Ufighting. In doing so, it has turned the US into a party to the counterinsurgency effort in Pakist bureaucratic designa- tion AfPak recognizes. But such involvement has direct and indirect costs counterterrorism effort. The direct cost becomes apparent when Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militantarget US counterterrorism assets,as occurred on 30 December 2009 when the Jordanian Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi blew himself up at a meeting with CIA agents in Afghseven American and one Jordanian intelligence officials. This attack was facilitated by Hakimullah Mehsud, who declared that the attack was revenge for the killing of Baitullah Mehsud in a Predatoattack was particularly costly for the CIA, which lost senior operatives with the highly specialist skills needed to pursue high-ranking Al-Qaeda members.81

The indirect costs are numerous. It is hard to measure what the US loses from the strikes, but it is oit gains no intelligence from dead (as opposed to captured) operatives. It also loses the moral high gstrikes acciden- tally kill high numbers of civilians. But perhaps the greatest indirect cost is its coninstability in Pakistan. The pressure placed on Al-Qaeda and its affiliates has accelerated the crisis faPakistani government and encour- aged local militant networks(including ethnic separatist and tribal groups)to form tactical aideological alliances with Al-Qaeda, thus magnifying the threat they pose. As a result, the US is nowinto a war across South Asia with a growing number of militant Islamist networks, many of whom have strong familial and tribal tiethe local population and stronger regenerative capabilities than Al-Qaeda.The creeping expansion of the target set has transformed a set of tactics originally reserved for counterterrorism operations into a tool for fighting an ever-widening circleof insurgents in Pakistan. The dilemma is that, while the counterterrorism benefits of these operatclear, in adding to the ranks of its enemies the US now faces a more durable network of militants ththe Talebans insurgency against the United States, Pakistan and the Karzai government.

AND THE INCREASE OF TROOPS ON THE GROUND UNDERMINES P AKISTAN S OWN CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE P AKISTAN T ALIBAN .

SYED M ANZAR ABBAS Z AIDI 2010 (L ECTURER , P OLICING AND C RIMINAL I NVESTIGATION , U NIVERSITY OF C ENTRALL ANCASHIRE , A SIAN P OLITICS & P OLICY VOLUME 2, I SSUE 2, P AGES 257-277 N EGOTIATIONS AND THE ANTI -T ALIBANC OUNTERINSURGENCY IN P AKISTAN )

The situation in Pakistan is volatile enough without being "nudged" by a U.S. territorial intrusion inthis would only lead to an Afghanistan- and Iraq-style state implosion, allowing the Islamists ev predominance in Pakistani politics. The fallacy inherent on relying upon a purely military strategy hunmitigated disaster in neighboring Afghanistan. Besides causing a huge number of civilian casuaalso contributed to the political strengthening of the Taliban by making them appear like freedotaking on a colonial force. A purely military solution will again backfire; Islamist propaganda would then carry the power for an even greatestimulus of militants from all over the world, exacerbating an already grave situation.It has to be acknowledged that Pakistan is set to see a campaign that will extend over a few years at least to pay tangible dividends.Any efforts to "fast-track" thiscampaign by putting foreign boots on the ground will only aggravate the militancy. For better or worse,

the Pakistani army is the only viable option to spearhead the COIN campaigns, and continuous efforts bythe international polity have to be directed to retrain, equip, and back up this entity for a protractedantiguerilla campaign. Pakistan's Taliban imperative has been marked by a laissez-faire attitude towaindecisiveness and inaction on the part of the state to tackle a festering insurgency allowed it to bloswidespread movement. The widely prevalent belief in policy circles that the Taliban would continue concentrating on foreign troops in Afghanistan and encircling the Kabul regime inccomplacency, which now has to be shaken off. It must also be remembered that as army operations escalate in intensity, the Talibanal-Qaeda nexus will be hard at work to chalk out a course of further tePakistan; this has the potential of opening multiple fronts for the state forces, for which a COIN regime should have adequate "buffer" logistical backup.

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1ACT HE DESTABILIZATION OF P AKISTAN BY RADICALS RESULTS IN NUCLEAR WAR .

STEPHEN J. M ORGAN , 07 ( FORMER MEMBER OF THE BRITISH L ABOUR P ARTY E XECUTIVE C OMMITTEE , BETTER ANOTHER T ALIBAN AFGHANISTAN , HTTP :// EZINEARTICLES .COM /?B ETTER -A NOTHER -T ALIBAN -A FGHANISTAN ,-THAN -A-T ALIBAN -NUCLEAR-P AKISTAN ?& ID =475808 )

Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following

9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "

(not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood.Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, cowould be ripe for a coup d'tat by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the rmasses to take power . Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, th place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populatThe nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast.

Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community andBorder clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, annuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out.Atomic Al Qaeda

Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influen possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistarsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisitionand other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda.Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again bestrategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.What is at stake in "the half-forgotten war" in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America's capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are aPresident Musharraf's unspoken slogan of "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!"

AND A STRENGTHENED T ALIBAN IN P AKISTAN WILL BE THE SOURCE OF THE NEXT MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS , THIS TIME WITH ACCESSTO NUCLEAR WEAPONS .

SYED M ANZAR ABBAS Z AIDI 2010 (L ECTURER , P OLICING AND C RIMINAL I NVESTIGATION , U NIVERSITY OF C ENTRALL ANCASHIRE , A SIAN P OLITICS & P OLICY VOLUME 2, I SSUE 2, P AGES 257-277 N EGOTIATIONS AND THE ANTI -T ALIBANC OUNTERINSURGENCY IN P AKISTAN )

The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan has caused escalating concerns among U.S. policy echelPakistan's tribal areas are now being considered a likely source of the next 9/11; the fact that Panuclear weapons largely complicates the scenario. American concern for the militants' actions in thesescalated exponentially, with repeated demands being made from the Pakistani establishment foconclusive action against them."I'm not convinced we are winning in Afghanistan. I am convinced we can," Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Navy Admiral Mike Mullen said before the U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Mullen said he was already "looking at a new, more comprehensive strategy for the region" that would cover both sides of the

border."We can hunt down and kill extremists as they cross over the border from Pakistan, but until we wclosely with the Pakistani government to eliminate the safe havens from where they operate, the eonly keep coming,"he said (Daily Times, September 11, 2008).Apparently, the United States has been thinking about and preparing for direct intervention in Pakistan's tribal areas for some time, notwithstanding that the unmanned drone attacks currently being cond

link in this chain. Ostensibly, the Iraqi engagement has held these plans in abeyance ("Secret U.S.," 2008).There has also been an ongoing tussle betwee proponents of use of direct force and the school of thought that endorses unmanned attacks but decrtroops in a sovereign state, with the potential to turn a populace already disgruntled by U.S. poliregion further against it("Secret U.S.," 2008).It is also a fact that the United States is not adequately preparePakistani engagement, since the administrative level of expertise, particularly within the ranks oregarding this region is inadequate("Secret U.S.," 2008). However, this has not stopped American territorial incursions utilizing unmanned Predator drones, which have beento target al-Qaeda and Taliban in the Pakistani tribal theater.

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T HIS RESULTS IN E XTINCTION .YONAH ALEXANDER 2003 ( PROF AND DIR . OF INTER -U NIVERSITY FOR T ERRORISM STUDIES , W ASHINGTON T IMES , A UGUST28)

Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramaticainternational community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of tthreats to the very survival of civilization itself . Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rcritical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by th began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misumanifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment o

exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terroristintroduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and iminternationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have enteredSuper Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious imconcerning national, regional and global security concerns.

R EDUCING FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN AND FOCUSING ON COUNTER -TERRORISM EFFORTS STOPS INCREASING RADICALISM IN P AKISTAN .

M ALOU INNOCENT 2009 (F OREIGN P OLICY ANALYST AT THE C ATO I NSTITUTE HTTP :// WWW .CATO .ORG /PUB _ DISPLAY .PHP ?PUB _ ID =10479 T HE US M UST R EASSESS I TS DRONE P OLICY )

Drone strikes also contribute to the widening trust deficit between Pakistanis and the US. A recent poconducted by Gallup Pakistan for Al-Jazeera found that 59 percent believed the US was the greatePakistan. Most Pakistanis oppose extremism; they simply disagree with American tactics.America's interests lie in ensuring the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of Yet Washington's attempts to stabilize Afghanistan help destabilize Pakistan, because its actionsserve as arecruiting tool for Pakistani Taliban militants . Just as one would not kill a fly with a sledgehammer,using overwhelming firepowekill a single insurgent creates collateral damage that can recruit 50 more. Military force against insur

be applied precisely and discriminately. On the ground, Pakistani security forces lack training, equipmecommunication gear to carry out a low-intensity counterinsurgency. But drones provide a poor substgoal is to engage rather than alienate the other side.A better strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan is for the United States to focus on limiting cromovement by supporting local Pakistani security forces with asmall number of US Special Forces personnel To improve fighting capabilities and enhance cooperation, Washington and Islamabad must increase tof military-to-military training programs to helphone Pakistan's counterterrorism capabilities and serve asconfidence-building measure to lessen the Pakistan Army's tilt toward radicalism.Ending drone strikes is no panacea for Pakistan's array of problems. But continuing those strikes wideepen the multiple challenges the country faces. Most Pakistanis do not passively accept Americand officials in Islamabad cannot afford to be perceived as putting Washington's interests above tho

own people. Long-term success in both Afghanistan and Pakistan depends on the people's repuextremism. Continued US actions add more fuel to violent religious radicalism; it is time to reassestactics and objectives in the region.

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SOLVENCY :ABANDONING THE C OUNTER -INSURGENCY MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ALLOW WITHDRAW OF MAJOR AMERICAN UNITSSUCCESSFULLY ISOLATE THE K ARZAI REGIME , AND ALLOW FOR BUILDING A MORE STABLE -DECENTRALIZED AFGHANSTAN .

BING WEST A PRIL 7, 2010 ( AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IN THE R EAGAN ADMINISTRATION , HAS REPORTED ONTHE AFGHAN WAR SINCE 2001. H OW TO SAVE AFGHANISTAN F ROM K ARZAI NEW YORK T IMES . )The United States ambassador to Afghanistan, KarlEikenberry, was guilty of understatement last fall when he told Washing''Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner .'' Still,getting rid of Mr. Karzai at this point wouldn't be easy, anmajor upheaval would clearly imperil President Obama's plan to start withdrawing American tsummer.The Marja offensive, however, may have shown us an alternative approach to the war. For on

demonstrated that our Karzai problem is part of a broader failure to see that our plans for Afghoverambitious.The coalition is pursuing a political-military strategy based on three tasks. First, ''clear'' the guerrillas from populated areas. Second, ''hold'' the areas with Afghan forcresponsible governance and development to gain the loyalty of the population for the government in Kabul. To accomplish this, the coalition military has deployed reconstruction teams to 25 provincWe maycall this a counterinsurgency program, but it's really nation-building.

The problem with building a new and better Afghanistan is that, above the local level, President long held the levers of political power by controlling provincial finances and leadership appointmentsthose of police chiefs. Regardless of the coalition's success at the district level, an obdurate and Karzai is an obstacle to progress.The success in Marja, however, changed the dynamics of the conflict. It now seems that the planned surge of 30,000 additional troops will progress in ''clearing and holding'' Kandahar and other Taliban-controlled areas by mid-2011. At that time, the force ratio will be one coalition soldier for every t hree Afghan soldiers and policemen, and

still rely upon us for firepower and moral support.Ideally, we could then begin to withdraw major American units and leave behitask forces that combine advisory and combat duties, leading to a new ratio of about one AmerAfghans. Not only would this bring our troops home, but it would shift the responsibility for nation-Afghan forces. At the same time, we would have to pivot our policy in two ways. First, Mr. Karzatreated as a symbolic president and given the organizational ''mushroom treatment'' -- that is, we shouthe flows of information and resources directly to the national government.President Ronald Reagan did something similar with another erratic ally, President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines. In February 1986, Reagan warned Marcos that if government troops attacked o

up on the outskirts of Manila, it would cause ''untold damage'' to his relations with the United States -- meaning the aid spigot would be turned off. When his countrymen saw that he was stripped of presforced Marcos into exile.

Second, the coalition must insist that the Afghan military play a primary role in the governance of tand provinces, including in the allocation of aid and the supervision of the police. We should work dithose local and provincial leaders who will act responsibly, and cut off those who are puppets of Kab

This is happening, to some extent, in Helmand Province, site of the Marja battle, where the coindependent control over $500 million in reconstruction aid and salaries. We have been fortunat provincial governor, Gulab Mangal, while a Karzai appointee, has proved an innovative partner. case, we know that coalition aid need not flow through Kabul.Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the head of Central Command, already seems to be considering this approach as the battle for Kandahar gains intensity. ''One of the things we'll be doing in the shaping is w

leaders to try to get an outcome that makes sense'' including ''partnering inside the city with the Afghan National Police,'' he told reporters last month.Although isolating Mr. Karzai strike many as a giant step backward, the truth is that we don't have a duty to impose demoAfghanistan . The advancement of liberty doesn't necessitate a ''one person, one vote'' system, as the fraudulent votes cast for Mr. Karzai in last summer's sham election showed. We cannot provide dewe desire it more than the Afghans.

The Philippines -- and South Korea as well -- evolved into thriving democracies at their own pace, well after American aid helped to beat back the military threats facing them. It was enough to prtakeovers and leave behind governments controlled in the background by a strong military. We didn't spend tens of billions of dollars on material projects to inculcate democratic principles.Similarly, a diminished Hamid Karzai can be left t o run a sloppy government, with a powerful, American-financed Afghan military insuring that t he Taliban do not take over.Admittedly, this risks the emergence of the Pakistan model in Afghanistan -- an army that has a country rather than a country that has an army. But we are not obliged to build a democratic nation und

We need to defend our interests, and leave the nation-building to the Afghans themselves.

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M IDDLE E AST W AR GOES NUCLEAR : I SRAEL STRIKE .G AFFNEY 03 (M ARK , A RESEARCHER , WRITER , POET , ENVIRONMENTALIST , ANTI -NUCLEAR ACTIVIST W ILL IRAN BE NEXT ? A LTERNATIVEST URKISH J OURNAL O FIN TERNATIONAL AFFAIRS , S UMMER VOL 2, WWW .ALTERNATIVESJOURNAL .NET /VOLUME 2/NUMBER 2/GAFFNEY .PDF )

It is very possible --some would say probable--that the U.S., possibly in conjunction withIsrael, will launch a preventiveraid and destroy the Bushehr reactor before it goes on line.Such a raid would be fateful for the region and the world.It would trigger another Mideast war, and possibly a confrontation with Russia , with effects thatare difficult to predict. A war with Iran mig ht bring about thecollapse of the NPT, lead to a new arms race, and plunge the world intonuclear chaos. Such a crisis holds the potential to bring the world to the nuclear brin k. This article will review the background, and provide an analysiswill discuss the reactor at Bushehr first, then the other suspect site

AFGHAN INSTABILITY SPILL OVER INTO IRANR HINEFIELD 6 [ J EFFREY D., L IEUTENANT , U NITED STATES NAVY B.S., J ACKSONVILLE UNIVERSITY ; IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIETALFRAGMENTATION FOR STATE FORMATION: CAN DEMOCRACY SUCCEED IN AFGHANISTAN?; MASTER OFARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL; HTTP :// STINET .DTIC .MIL /CGIBIN /G ET TRD OC ?AD=A445561&L OCATION =U2& DOC =G ET TRD OC .PDF ]In addition, Irans key interest in Afghanistan is to exert its own influence over the western part of that nation and to protect the Shia minority groups that live within the central region of Afghanista

Peimani, the possibility of instability, chaos, and criminal activitiesin Afghanistan could spill over into Iran which, unsurprisingcaused the Iranian government to watch their Afghan neighbors closely and has caused concern abo

of events within Afghanistan with the potential of inducing instability into Iran.242

NUCLEAR WAR E ISENSTADT 4 [M ICHAEL , S ENIOR F ELLOW @ W ASHINGTON I NSTITUTE FOR NEAR E AST P OLICY , I RAN W ATCH # 899, THE IAEA ANDIRAN: THE PERILS OF INACTION, 9-16, HTTP :// WWW .IRANWATCH .ORG /PRIVATEVIEWS /WINEP/ PERSPEX -WINEP -EISENSTADTNUCLEARIRAN -091604. HTM ]

Implications of Instability in Iran?Instability and unrest in a nuclear Iran could have dire consequences. Were antiregimviolence to escalate to the point that it threatened the survival of the Islamic Republic(unlikely in the near term, but a possibility in thfuture should popular demands for politi cal change continue to be ignored by conservative hardliners),diehard supporters of the old order might lash out at perceived external enemies of the doomed regime with all means at their disposal, including nuclear w

The apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by an Islamic Republic in its death throes, though unlikely in the near term,cannot be dismissed as a source of concern.

M IDDLE E AST INSTABILITY CREATES SANCTUARIES FOR T ERRORIST AND DESTROY THE GLOBAL ECONOMY .L IEUTENANT C OLONEL R OBERT M. M ONARCH 2009 ( DENYING SANCTUARY , DTIC .MIL /CGI -BIN /G ET TRD OC ?L OCATION =U2& DOC =G ET TRD OC .PDF &AD=ADA494801)

Sanctuaries are not only a threatto the newly formed governmentsof Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the governments hostirebels (Pakistan, Syria and Iran) and stability in the region. Eliminating these sanctuaries is vital tocounter- insurgencies, thus providing the fledgling states security to develop their governmental systems. The host countries also need these areas eradicated to purge foreign-armed gtheir lands and restore sovereign control of their territory. Both of these factors contribute to stability within the countries and, ultimately, within their region.The United States seeks MidEastern and Southwest Asian regions noted for their stability and prosperity. Free trade of vitresources and goods from these regions is critical to a growing globalized economy. The solution to this goainsurgent-free statesallowed to flourish in the international system wi thout fear of armed conflict or overthrow. As noted, at stake in both Iraq and Afghanistan is the fate of both natioInsurgencies are draining their national treasures and sapping the will of the populace to resist. ForStates and our coalition partners, the stakes are equally high. A stable Middle East and unhinderenecessary for vital economies within the United States, its allies, and the Middle Eastern countries. Also, the world canafford for terrorists to once again establish bases in Southwest Asian nations with sympathetic regimes. Finally, defeating these insurgencies will slow the drain of our national treasures, both blood

providing a growth of prestige amongst friends and foes alike around the world.To defeat the insurgencies, the sanctuaries must be eliminated.

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E XTINCTIONP HIL K ERPEN , N ATIONAL R EVIEW O NLINE , O CTOBER 29, 2008, D ON ' T T URN P ANIC INTO DEPRESSIONHTTP :// WWW .CBSNEWS .COM /STORIES /2008/10/29/ OPINION /MAIN 4555821. SHTMLIts important that we avoid all these policy errors - not justfor the sake of our prosperity, but for our survival . The Great Depression, after all, didnt end untilthe advent of World War II, the most destructive war in the history of the planet.

In a world of nuclear and biological weapons and non-state terroristorganizations that breed on poverty and despair,another global economic breakdown of such extended durationwould risk armed conflictson an even greater scale .

E MPIRICALLY DENIED : R USSIAN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE DECREASES THE R USSIAN THREAT .STEPHEN SESTANOVICH 2008 ( SENIOR F ELLOW FOR R USSIAN AND E URASIAN STUDIES R USSIA AND THE G LOBAL E CONOMIC C RISIS CFR BRIEF WWW .CFR .ORG /PUBLICATION /17844/ RUSSIA _ AND _ THE _ GLOBAL _ ECONOMIC _ CRISIS .HTML )

Any international economic crisis afflicts different countries in different ways, but an unfortunate few experience every painful dimension of it.In the current crisis, Russiaconfronting virtually all the negatives at once--sharply declining export earnings from energy and mleveraged corporate balance sheets and a chorus of bailout appeals, a credit crunch and banking bursting real-estate bubble and mortgage defaults, accelerating capital flight, and unavoidable prdevaluation. The Russian stock market is down 70 percent from late spring. The government has burnemore than 20 percent of its foreign-exchange reserves since August. The outflow of capital in Octwas $50 billion. Next year's budget is based on a projected average price for oil of $95 per barrel; n planners have to work with forecasts of $50 or lower. Since Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has said that Russian government spending goes into deficit at $70 pressures for spending cuts are starting to mount. Severe reductions have already been announced in housing and education programs.Russians, it seems, at last have an answthe question they have been asking since the economic collapse of 1998: Can anything approachinghappen again? The vast hard-currency reserves they accumulated during years of high oil and gas prices (and thanks to conservative fiscal policies) make it hard to imagine that Moscow mightanytime soon.Yet the very fact that this crisis has engulfed the country at a moment of high confidence in has made it in some respects even more shocking. Debate about how it is being handled, how far it will go, and what changes it will bring with it is becomingmuch more open. Russians remember, after all, that 1998 was not only an economic calamity but a polit ical crisis--perhaps the low moment of the entire presidency of Boris Yeltsin. It t oppled the go political careers of key liberal policymakers, and actually brought Communists back into the cabinet. It offered a hearing to protectionist demands for Russia to insulate itself against the fluctuationeconomy. It revived talk of the need to hew to Russia's collectivist traditions, rather than to alien Western ideas about markets and the primacy of the individual. The very fact that this crisis has engumoment of high confidence in the future has made it in some respects even more shocking. In Russia's response to the crisis of 2008 there have been a few echoes of 1998, including a generous share of

President Dmitry Medvedev and others have repeatedly criticized the United States and called for a reduction in its global influence. There have also been hints of a further tightening of authoritariacommentators have interpreted Medvedev's proposal to lengthen the president's term of office as a sign that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin plans an early return to the Kremlin--perhaps to rule with

Yet, for all this, the most distinctive feature of the Russian leadership's overall response to the crisis hemphasis on the importance of further reform and on cooperation with other countries. There harepudiation of liberal policymakers, and few suggestions that Russia should pursue a "Third Way,"wall itself off from the world economy. If there is one theme that unites Medvedev's many policy statemis that the restoration of state control of the economy must be avoided at all cost. "The governme" says ArkaDvorkovich, the president's chief economic adviser, "cannot replace the private sector, the market, and business, nor is it going to do so." For Medvedev, the state bureaucracy is already far too powe

Soviet-era mistrust of "free people and free enterprise."The only way to stabilize the economy and sustain growth, he has repeat publicly argued, is through transparency, competition, accountability, and protection of property WheMedvedev and others call for changes in international financial regulation, their message is that Russia should try to increase its influence in global processes, not withdraw from them, and abide by int

talk idly of creating alternatives.Many Russian commentators have said that if the goal is to keep a hard-hit Russian in the international mainstream, adjustments in Russian foreign policy are likely to follow as well. T predict a complete change of direction, but a less confrontational, less ideological, more prudresource-constrained approach to relations with the West. The need for such adjustments is particularly obvious where resources are concerned. Witheducation, and infrastructure budgets under acute pressure, it is hard to imagine that military spending could be completely unaffected.Military officials who were told by PutSeptember that they would get a 50 percent funding increase over the next three years may wsuggestions by President Medvedev that their budget is now on hold. Yet arguments about the urgemilitary modernization can hardly have the same force that they did earlier in the fall.Already the armed forces have had to accept to cut the size of the office corps by almost 60 percent in the next three years. The Russian government's desire to delay large increases in military spending surely also contributes to its apparent interearms-control agreements with the incoming U.S. administration.

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P AKISTAN ADVANTAGE E XTENSIONSC OUNTERINSURGENCY FAILING NOW : M ARJAH .J ONATHAN W ALLACE M AY 25 2010, ( ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AT THE NEW AMERICA F OUNDATION , AND AN INCOMING MASTERSSTUDENT IN SECURITY STUDIES AT G EORGETOWN UNIVERSITY F OREIGN P OLICY SHOWTIME IN K ANDAHAR HTTP :// AFPAK .FOREIGNPOLICY .COM /POSTS /2010/05/25/ SHOWTIME _ IN _ KANDAHAR )

Kandahar will be the most important test thus far of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's strategy of increasedand a thorough counterinsurgency campaignin Afghanistan. Though it will be a "process" rather than one pitched battle,success or failure in tsouthern Afghan province -- a historical Taliban stronghold -- will determine operational momentum2011, when the first of the U.S. troops are scheduled to begin withdrawing.The Taliban are treating it like a major battle, attacking the boardKandahar air base during a sophisticated operation over the weekend.

If Kandahar is show time, then Marjah has been the dress rehearsal.It is not going well. The Marjah operatihas not been successful in rooting out Taliban elements, which continue to terrorize the populundermine the Afghan government that was supposed to take root in the ineptly named "governmenexperiment.It is clear that coalition forces, while seemingly able to clear out fighters during the initial battle, cannot fully eradicate the deep roots of the insurgency. As Carlotta Gall, one oreporters in Afghanistan, noted last week,the Taliban "are village men who never left the area although they quit fighting soon after the military operation. Gradually theyfound a stealthiway of operating, moving around in small groups, often by motorbike or on foot." Rather than meruntil the time is ripe to resurge, then, local fighters must be convinced to throw in their lots with t

government. However, lack of security, poor performance of the Afghan armed forces, and the slogovernment projects have undermined the credibility of the McChrystal strategy (and its partners in government) and acted as force multipliers for the Taliban's intimidation tactics. Though still in prMarjah offensive -- a "bleeding ulcer" -- leaves much to be desired.NO UNIQUENESS TO THE TURNS : C OUNTER -INSURGENCY IS DOOMED TO FAILURE AND IS ULTIMATELY UNNECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL COUNTER -TERRORISM .STEVEN S IMON ; J ONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (A DJUNCT SENIOR F ELLOW AT THE C OUNCIL ON F OREIGN R ELATIONS , IS AP ROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE US N AVAL W AR C OLLEGE AFGHANISTAN : H OW M UCH IS E NOUGH ?',SURVIVAL , 51: 5, 47 67)

Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan also would probably fail. Counterinsurgency generally works only w

the domestic government resisting the insurgents enjoys the respect and support of most of the population. Rising perceptions of Hamid Karzai's government as ineffectual and corrupt, and suspicions that it rigged the 20 August national election, indicate that it does not have that kind of among Afghans. On the operational level, provisional and qualified counter-insurgency success in Ira persuasive precedentfor a comparable result in Afghanistan. One indirect indication is the difficulty the Obama administration is having in figuring out how to measure such success! Winsurgency challenges were essentially compartmentalised in the confined space and among the relatively small populati ons of Anbar, Diyala and Ninewah provinces and in Baghdad, Afghanistan's hazar

sized national territory. Thus,applying the surge formula to Afghanistan, however it is adjusted, is likely to empower increase factionalism and ultimately make Afghanistan harder to sustain as a functioning unitary would make Afghanistan more susceptible to being used as a strategic pawn by a number of regioincluding Iran as well as India and Pakistan.Comprehensively successful counter-insurgency inAfghanistan, however, is not necessarily required to fulfil the US counter-terrorism mission . It remainunclear whether a US-led counter-insurgency effort would aim to induce the Taliban factions to rejecor some other constellation of tribes to join forces against the Taliban.But none of the factions share the kind of overarching nationalist self-inteunified Iraqi Sunnis across tribal lines.They are more like Somali clans, and no visible daylight has emerged between tTaliban and 'bad' militants. Those advocating an extended counter-insurgency campaign note that 'the Tnot a unified or monolithic movement', that many Taliban militants 'fight for reasons having nothingIslamic zealotry', and that each Taliban grouping has 'specific needs' and 'particular characteristics'.' By the same tokhowever, these home truths indicate such a high degree of motivational fragmentation within the Taliban that no single faction is likely to gain complete dominance. Thus, power is likely to remain defactions, like Somali ones, will tend to worry about, and focus on, immediate rivals rather than external adversaries.9 To the extent that there is unity among Afghan factions, as with Somalis, it will be a

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P AKISTAN ADVANTAGE E XTENSIONSC OUNTER -INSURGENCY FAILING NOW : K ARZAIDEXTER FILKINS J UNE 11, 2010 ( STAFF WRITER , T HE NEW YORK T IMES K ARZAI IS SAID TO DOUBT W EST C ANDEFEAT T ALIBAN )

But their motivations appear to differ starkly. The Americans and their NATO partners are pouring tens

of thousands of additional troops into the country to weaken hard-core Taliban and force the group tothe bargaining table. Mr. Karzai appears to believe that the American-led offensive cannot work. At a newconference at the Presidential Palace this week, Mr. Karzai was asked about the Talibans role in the June 4 attack on the loya jirga and his faith in NATO. He declined to address either one. Who did it?the attack. Its a question that our security organization can bring and prepare the answer. Asked if he had confidence in NATO, Mr. Karzai said he was grateful for the help and said the partnership was well. But he did not answer the question. We are continuing to work on improvements all around, Mr. Karzai said, speaking in English and appearing next to David Cameron, the British prime minisofficial said the resignations of Mr. Atmar and Mr. Saleh, who had strong support from the NATO allies, were extremely disruptive. The official said of Mr. Karzai, My concern is, is he capable oleader? The NATO official said that American commanders had given Mr. Karzai a dossier showing overwhelming evidence that the attack on the peace conference had been carried out by fighters

Haqqani, one of the main leaders fighting under the Talibans umbrella. There was no doubt, the official said.The resignations of Mr. Saleh and Mr. Atmar reveadeep fissure among Afghan leaders as to the best way to deal with the Taliban and with their pPakistan. NO LINK : C AN SIGNAL DEDICATION TO P AKISTAN WITHOUT TROOPS .DANIEL M ARKEY 2007 (A F ALSE C HOICE IN P AKISTAN . B Y: M ARKEY , D ANIEL , F OREIGN AFFAIRS , 00157120,

J UL /AUG 2007, V OL . 86, I SSUE 4)Third, if and when greater coercion is deemed necessary, it should be applied through demandsengagement. Rather than threatening to cut off assistance, the White House should insist on greaterPakistani intelligence operatives, to army and other security forces, to information. Washington should put anend to any lingering doubts about its plans to stay actively involved in Pakistan and the region . Islamabad is deeaverse to having U.S. armed forces operate autonomously within Pakistan, so these demands should not be raised publicly, and an effort should be made to find less conspicuous ways to integrate Am

operations.Today's communications, reconnaissance, and long-range strike technologies can bring U.S. fofight without ever placing boots on the ground . Beyond possible tactical benefits, greater U.S. involvwould send the signal that Washington plans to invest in long-standing, working-level ties and that igoal is deeper, closer cooperation.

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P AKISTAN ADVANTAGE E XTENSIONSINCREASED TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN INCREASES P AKISTAN INSTABILITY .STEVEN S IMON ; J ONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 ( ADJUNCT SENIOR F ELLOW , C OUNCIL ON F OREIGN R ELATIONS , P ROFESSOR OF STRATEGICSTUDIES , US N AVAL W AR C OLLEGE AFGHANISTAN : H OW M UCH IS E NOUGH ?', S URVIVAL , 51: 5)Al-Qaeda remains the biggest threat to the United States in Central and South Asia, andcounter-terrorism is thus still Washington's most pressingThere is little dispute on this point. The question is whether counter-insurgency and state-bAfghanistan are the best means of executing it. The mere fact that the core threat to US interests nowPakistan rather than Afghanistan casts considerable doubt on the proposition. Unlike the Taliban, tPakistani government is not a viable target for the US military.Its relationship to al-Qaeda is far more subtle and complicated than was the Taliban's.the Taliban embraced alQaeda as an economic benefactor in the absence of international legitimacy, and thus amounted to a full strategic ally of an enemy, Islamabad perceives al-Qaeda as a kind of v

inimical to the Pakistani leadership, butthe wrong kind of coercion could cause it to mutate into something more dangewit, a catalysing movement that fuels Islamic radicalisation in Pakistan and imperils the secular regione reason that Pakistan's counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency cooperation has been so erratic. Another reason is thelping to keep the Taliban a viable political player in Afghanistan serves Pakistan's regional strategic interests in providing Pakistan with strategic depth vis--vis India and in denying India a fully stregime there. President Obama has cast Afghanistan as a neglected war of necessity in contrast to the putative war of choice with Iraq. Yet for the United States, any analytic distinction betweenone of necessity at this point is arguably untenable: if necessity is a function of an existential threat - that is, one that imperils the American state - the United States faces none from any quarter, so no wanecessary in that sense. The Soviet Union, with abundant nuclear weapons and a vast, well equipped military, was an existential threat. Al-Qaeda, though extremely dangerous and disruptive, is not.' War balance a desirable or advisable way of advancing American interests. In the case of Afghanistan, the implicit assumption of US policymakers is that pacifying the country through coercive and expansivoperations and a concerted effort to bring order to its politics will make it easier, or at least will not make it harder, to contain regional militancy and ensure stability in Pakistan. The United States plans ttroop presence in Afghanistan to 78,000 by mid 2010, which would represent an increase of nearly a third over the mid 2009 number. Fiscal-year 2010 funding for Operation Enduring Freedom will incincluding a $7.5 billion bump for the Afghan security forces and an additional $700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, a flexible spending programme that allows for swiftraining and equipment for Pakistani counter-insurgency forces. Indeed, in August 2009 US commanders began pressing for more troops to be deployed at a faster pace.4 Whatever US officia

privately,the White House,State Department and Pentagonhave thus far not acknowledged publicly the possibility that American intrusiveness in Afghanistan might mean less Pakistani cooperation. That, however, appeacase. To be sure, Pakistan has pragmatically responded to US pressure to thwart the Taliban in its tribal areas. Butit is more significant in the broader strategiccontext that Pakistan has objected to expanded US military operations in Afghanistan on two grounds.Firstly, they would cause a cross-border spillover of militants into Pakistan and increase the counter-insurgency burden on the Pakistani military. Secondly, they would foment political instability in Pakisintensifying popular perceptions of American militaryoccupation of the region and the Pakistani government's complicity with the Americans in suppressing was not even considered an enemy of Pakistan. Indeed, in a July strategic priority 2009 briefing, Pakistani officials made it clear that, however concerned the United States was about the Taliban, t

as their top strategic priority and the Taliban militants as little more than a containable nuisance and, in the long term, potential allies.5 In this light,the realistic American objectshouldnot be to ensure Afghanistan's political integrity by neutralising the Taliban and containing Pakistani radicalism, which is probably unachievable. Rather, its aim shouldbe merely to ensuthat al-Qaeda is denied both Afghanistan and Pakistan as operating bases for transnational attacks onStates and its allies and partners.

C OUNTER -INSURGENCY WILL INCREASE ANTI -A MERICANISM AND THE RISK OF TERRORISM .STEVEN S IMON ; J ONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 ( ADJUNCT SENIOR F ELLOW , C OUNCIL ON F OREIGN R ELATIONS , P ROFESSOR OF STRATEGICSTUDIES , US N AVAL W AR C OLLEGE AFGHANISTAN : H OW M UCH IS E NOUGH ?', S URVIVAL , 51: 5)

The Obama administration's instincts favouring robust counter-insurgency and state-building in Areflect the 199os-era US and European predilection for peacekeeping, reconstruction and stabilisatimultilateral use of force for humanitarian intervention,deployed to positive effect in the Balkans and withheld tragically in Rwanda. To the extent that this m premised on an expansion of the rule of law to hitherto poorly and unjustly governed areas, such as Somalia and Bosnia, it reflects the broader conception of counter-terrorism adopted after ii September.Insofar as it favours collective action by major powers with the unambiguous endorsement of the UN Security Council, it is also consistent with the Obama administration's rejection of Bush-era un

aggressive internationalist approach to spreading democracy and the rule of law, notwithstanding the shortsightedness and inefficacy of the Bush doctrine, is admirable and in some instances appropIn thiscase, however, it is more likely to hurt than help. While a larger US military footprint might help sta

Afghanistan in the short term, the effects of collateral damage and the aura of US domination it wouldgenerate would also intensify anti-Americanism in Pakistan . This outcome, in turn, would frustrate core American objectives by rendering it politically far more difficult for the Pakistani government towith Washington(and easier for the quasi-independent Inter-Services Intelligence to collude with the Taliban and al-Qaeda), thus making it harder for the United States to defeat alQaeda.It woulalso increase radicalisation in Pakistan, imperil the regime and raise proliferation risks, increasing decreasing pressure on India to act in the breach of American ineffectuality.

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SOLVENCY E XTENSIONSC OUNTER -INSURGENCY WILL COLLAPSE HEGEMONY : INEVITABLE WITHDRAW OF FAILED WAR .STEVEN S IMON ; J ONATHAN STEVENSON 2009 (A DJUNCT SENIOR F ELLOW AT THE C OUNCIL ON F OREIGN R ELATIONS , IS AP ROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES AT THE US N AVAL W AR C OLLEGE AFGHANISTAN : H OW M UCH IS E NOUGH ?',SURVIVAL , 51: 5, 47 67)The upshot isthat only if the United States establishes a well-calibrated limited policy now will it have thepolitical flexibility to sustain it over the longer-term and thereby to effectively contain the jihadist threatin Central Asia . If, on the other hand, the Obama administration promises more than it can deAfghanistan, a reprise of Vietnam may occur: once failure becomes clear, domestic support will evaadministration will be compelled to withdraw precipitously, and the United States will lose contraction in the region.NO RISK OF NATO COLLAPSE : 3 REASONS .JAMES SPERLING AND MARK WEBBER 2009 ( PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE , U OF AKRON , PROFESSOOF I NTERNATIONALPOLITICS, LOUGHBOROUGHU NIVERSITY, NATO: FROM K OSOVO TO K ABUL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 85:3 (2009) 491511)This view of a NATO apparently perched permanently at the edge of

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