AI Killer Robots

7/27/2019 AI Killer Robots

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/ai-killer-robots 1/8

14 New Hampshire Bar Journal Spring/Summer 2013

b vm:he Status of rticial Intelligence andI rones nder International aw*

By John F. Weaver

INTRoDuCTIoN OnApril23,2013,inresponsetotherapiddevelopmentofautono‑mousweapons,HumanRightsWatch(HRW)announcedthelaunchoftheCampaigntoStopKillerRobots. 1Thegroup,aninternationalcoalitionofnon‑governmentalorganizations,isdedicatedtoconvinc‑inggovernmentstobansuchweapons.2Thesegoalsareconsistent withHRW’sreportfromDecember2012, Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots,whichoutlinesthegroup’s“numerouslegal,ethical,policy,andotherconcernswithfullyautonomousweapons.”3Inparticular,HRWpointstointernationalhumanitarianlaw,whichappliestosituationsofarmedconictandgovernstheconductofhostilitiesandtheprotectionofpersonsduringconict, 4asprohibiting“killerrobots.”5

HRWdescribeskillerrobotsasweaponsthatare“abletoselectandengagetargetswithouthumanintervention.” 6Notsurprisingly,“killerrobots”isnotaphraseembracedbyeveryoneinterestedinthistechnology.Neutralobserversaremorelikelytouse“autonomousdrones.”Iprefertheterm"AIdrones,"becausewhatwearetalkingaboutistechnologythatmakesdecisions,replicatinganaspectofhu‑manintelligence–forbetterorworse–whichisexactlywhatarticialintelligence(AI)does. HRW’spubliccampaignagainst AI drones coincideswiththe Americangovernment’spublicre‑examinationofitsdronepractices.

OnMay23,2013,PresidentObamadeliveredaspeechattheNationalDefenseUniversitythatdiscussedAmericandronepolicy.Althoughnot‑ingthe“precisionofdronestrikes,”hewarnedthatdronestrikesarenota“cure‑allforterrorism”andthatadrone‑based“perpetualwar… willprove self‑defeating,and alterour countryintroublingways.”7Similarly,inNovemberof2012,theUSDepartmentofDefenseissuedDirective3000.09,whichrequiresthatautonomousweaponsystems“shallbedesignedtoallowcommanderstoexerciseappropriatehumanjudgmentovertheuseofforce”andshall“[co]mpleteengagements

inatimeframeconsistentwithcommanderandoperatorintentionsand,ifunabletodoso,terminateengagementsorseekadditionalhumanoperatorinputbeforecontinuingtheengagement.” 8

NotethattheDepartmentofDefenseandHumanRightsWatchhavereachedtwoverydifferentconclusionsaboutAIdronesunderinternationallaw.HRWarguesin Losing HumanitythatAIdrone violateinternationallaw.TheDepartmentofDefense,throughDirective3000.09,reliesontheassumptionthatinternationallawpermits AIdronesifthey’reoverseen,regulated,andtestedappropriately.Thidiscrepancyispossiblebecauseinternationallawdoesnotactuallydirectlyaddressarticialintelligence,eitherwithregardtodronesoranyothertypeofmachine,vehicle,technology,etc.Internationallaw,likealmostallformsoflaw,assumesthathumanbeingsmakedecisions.Itdoesnotaddresssituationsinwhichdecisionsaremadebymachineswithouthumaninput.

ThisarticleusesAIdronestobrieyexplorethatemptyspaceTheverystructureofinternationallaw–howitiscreated,howitienforced,itshistoricaldevelopment–meansweareunlikelytohaveclear internationallaw governingarticial intelligenceanytimesoon.ThisrepresentsaseriousabsenceasnumerousproductsandmachinesaresettorelyonAI,includingrecentnewsworthyexamplelikeautonomouscars.

I. BRIEf HISToRy of INTERNATIoNALLAw AND wEAPoNS

Earl Internatinal La tTda’s Treaties and Cstms

Internationallawhasadeephistory.Almostassoonascivilizationsdeveloped,theybecameinterestedinrelationswiththeoutside world.9Earlyreligiousandsecularwritingsreferencepeacetreatiesandalliancesbetweendifferentsovereignpeoples:Jews,Romans,SyriansSpartans,Carthaginians,Germantribes,Arabtribes,etc. 10TheRomanEmpireconductedextensivetreatieswithitsneighbors,althoughtheRomansfrequentlydidthisasarststeptowardabsorbingtheother




partyintotheEmpire,orasformalrecognitionoftheotherpartyasavassaltotheEmpire.11

Treaties recoveredfromearlycivilizationsin Asia,Africa,andEuropeshowthatthesocietiesonthosecontinentswereconcerned

withmanyofthesametopicssimultaneously,butwithoutinteractionamongmanyofthepeoples.Ambassadors,extraditionofcriminals, protectionofforeigners,andinternationalcontractswereallissuesthatearlysocietiesaddressedthroughtreaties.Theprinciplesthatcametogovernthesemattersareremarkablysimilar,regardlessofwhetherthecivilizationswereintheMediterraneanregionoron thePacicOcean.12

TheRomansdevelopedaconceptthatattemptedtoencapsu‑latetheseuniversalprinciples: jus gentium,thebodyoflawthatiscommontoallpeople.LongaftertheEmpiredisintegratedandtheconceptofnationsandstatesdeveloped, jus gentiumbecameoneoftheprimaryprinciplesofinternationallaw,referringtouniversallawsandcustomsthathavebeenconsentedtobyallpeoplesandstatesthroughouttheworld.13Thecombinationof jus gentiumandthe patchworkoftreatiesbetweenempires,tribes,andpeoplesconstitutedthegeneralextentofinternationallawuntilthemid‑17 thcentury.14

Today,theapplicationofcustomsandtreatiesisstilltheprimary forcegoverninginternationallaw,althoughgeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedby nationsandopinionsof respectedscholarsare alsorelevant.15However,thissystemoflaw,byitsnature,lacksagovern‑

mentthathastheabsoluterighttopassandenforcelawsaffectingnations.Rather,internationallawdependsonthenationsthemselvestoenterintotheprocessofmakinginternationallawswillinglyandthenactingingoodfaithtoenforcethoselawswithintheirborder

andamongthemselves.Inotherwords,eachnationhastoconsenttobeinggovernedbyinternationallaw,evenwhenthepotentialoutcomeisn’twhatthatnationwants. Despitetheapparentlimitations,theinternationalcommunityhausedthemainelementsofinternationallaw–treatiesandcustoms–togoverncontroversialweapons.ThosemeasuresareusefulwhenconsideringhowinternationallawmightbeusedtogovernAIdrones

Treaties gvernin weapns

TheUnitedNationsusesavarietyoftoolstoencourageaction fromitsmemberstates,including“norm‑creating”treatiesandreso

lutionsfromtheSecurityCouncil.TheseformsofUNactionpermiittorespondquicklytotechnologicaldevelopments.16ForexampleResolution1oftheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyin1946respondetoconcernsrelatedtoatomicweapons,whichwererstusedtheyeabefore.TheresolutioncreatedtheUnitedNationsAtomicEnergyCom‑missiontoaddressproblemsconnectedtoatomicenergyandpermititsuseonlyforpeacefulpurposes. 17Subsequently,manynationssignedmultilateraltreatiesregulatingandbanningnuclearweapons,includ‑ingtheTreatyontheNon‑ProliferationofNuclearWeaponsin19701

A Predator drone at a US Air Force base in the summer of 2011. Photo by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)




andtheTreatyBanningNuclearWeaponTestsintheAtmosphere,inOuterSpaceandUnderWaterin1963.19

Morerecently,theConventionontheProhibitionoftheUse,Stock‑ piling,ProductionandTransferofAnti‑PersonnelMinesandontheirDestruction(theLandmineConvention)becameeffectivein1999, 20inresponsetothenumberofinjuriesanddeathscausedbylandmines, particularlyin unstableareasoftheworld.21Theconvention,byitsterms,reliesontheUNforassistanceinworldwideacceptanceandcompliance.22

Thetreatiesandconventionsaddressingnuclearweaponsandlandminesaresignicantbecausetheyrepresentdeliberateactionsbytheinternationalcommunitytobothestablishlawgoverningnew weapons(nucleararms)andchangetheexistingcustomaryinterna‑tionaluseofweapontechnologies.Similartreatiesmaybenecessary forAIdrones(landmines).

Internatinal Cstms gvernin weapns

Historically,customgovernedmuchofinternationallaw,includ‑ingconductontheocean,useofairspaceandouterspace,diplomaticimmunity,andtherulesofwar.23Althoughtherearenowtensof

thousandsoftreatiesandinternationalagreements,thereisstillroom forcustomtodictateinternationallaw. First,customguidestreatyinterpretation.Second,treatiesneverbindallnations.24TaketheLandmineConvention,forexample.TheUnitedStatesisstillnotapartytotheLandmineConvention.25AlthoughtheUShasnotusedlandminessince1991,26itisfreetodiscontinuethatpolicyandresumefollowingcustomaryuseoflandmines.Thisincludesusinglandminestoreducethemobilityofenemypersonnel,channelingthemintospecicareasorscatteringthemoverabroadarea.Nationsuselandminestodisrupttheformationsanddelaythemovementsofhostileforces.Additionally,mineeldshavebeenusedtoprotectbordersasacost‑effectivesolutiontoshortagesofsoldiers.27

However,thewaycustomaryinternationallawpermitstheUStouselandminesistheveryreasonmanypeopleandnationsbelievedtheLandmineConventionbanninglandmineswasnecessary. 28Duringthelast20yearsofthe20thcentury,landminesclaimed1millionvictims.29Somewherebetween75and85percentofthevictimswerecivilians.30Manyofthosewerechildren.Insomemine‑infestedareas,peoplearesodesensitizedtothedangerthatkidsusetheminesaswheelsfortoytrucks.Additionally,thecountriesmostlikelytobenegativelyaffectedaredevelopingnationsthatdependonagricultureforsurvival,whereminescandestroyhugetractsofproductivesoil.31

Conversely,questionsaboutthecustomaryuseofatomicweaponsledtoUNGeneralAssemblyResolution1afterWorldWarII.FollowingthebombingofHiroshimaandNagasaki,therewasdisagreementintheinternationalcommunityabouttheUnitedStates’useofatomicbombs.Manyfeltthattheusewasconsistentwithcustomaryinter‑nationallawgoverningweaponsandwar;othersfeltthattheatomic weaponsrenderedexistinglawsofwarobsolete.32UNGeneralResolu‑tion1andsubsequenttreatiesgoverningnuclearweaponsrepresentedeffortstoclearlyestablishinternationallawgoverningthoseweapons whencustomarylawwasnon‑existentortoouncleartoprovideguid‑

ance.33

II. AI DRoNES IN THE ABSENCE of LAw

Develpment AI Drnes

AsthepositionsoftheDepartmentofDefenseandHRWillustrate wewillsoonreachthepointwithAIdroneswherenationsrelyonthem frequently,but theircustomaryuseisnotwell‑denedanda treatymaybenecessarytoestablishrulesfornationsthatwanttodeploy

them.Partofwhatisspurringthisissueistheincreasedemphasisonunmanned,buthuman‑controlled,drones.In2000,theUSCongres passedabillrequiring1/3ofalldeepstrikeaircrafttobeunmannedby2010and1/3ofallmilitarygroundvehiclestobeunmannedby2015.34Inconjunctionwiththatcongressionaldirective,theterrorisattacksofSept.11,2001,pushedtheworld’slonesuperpowertobeginafar‑reachingcampaignofattacksandsurveillanceusingunmannedmilitarydrones. AlthoughtheCIAhadbeenoperatingunarmeddronesoverAfghanistansince2000forsurveillance,followingtheSeptember11 thattacks,theCIAbegantoarmthedronesandassistinmilitaryoperationsOnFeb.4,2002,anunmannedPredatordronecommittedatargetedkillingforthersttime.35ThesuccessofthePredatortoproviderealtimeinformationtohumansoldiers,whilealsoconductingtargetedattacksitself,promptedtheUnitedStatesmilitarytogreatlyexpandthenumberofunmannedaerialdronesitmaintains.Priorto2001,theUSDepartmentofDefensedeployedfewerthan50unmannedaerialdrones.By2006,thenumberwasover3,000.36In2012,thePentagonusedapproximately7,000unmannedaerialdrones.37Now,theUSAirForcetrainsmoredronepilotsthanconventionalpilots.38Similarlythenumberofunmannedgroundvehiclesincreasedfromlessthan100in2001tonearly4,400in2007and8,000in2011. 39

Thesedronesretaina“manintheloop,”meaningthatahuman

beinghasvetopowerovercriticaldecisionslikeringweaponsorfollowingasuspectoffroutinepatrolpaths.40Manymodelsarecapableofsomeautonomousactivity.Afterapersonprovidesthedronewithdirections(e.g.,ytothesecoordinatesbythistimeandrecordactivitythere),thedroneisabletomakedecisionsonitsownwithinthepa‑rametersofthosedirections(speed,altitude,route,etc.).Still,humanbeingswiththemilitarymonitorthesesemi‑autonomousdrones.41

Thetrend,though,istowardgreateruseofautonomoustechnologyinmilitarydrones.Althoughnumerousstatesclaimthathuman willremain“inthe loop”ondecisions touse lethalforce, therearesignsthatthisresolveiscrumbling.AUNreportnotesthat“theadventofautonomouslethalroboticsystemsiswellunderwayandthatitisa

simplematteroftimebeforeautonomousengagementsoftargetsar presentonthebattleeld.”42Israelisplanninga“closedloop”bordedefensesystem,inwhichAIguntowersmonitortheborder,identifytargets,andkillthemwithoutanyhumanintervention.TheRepublicofKoreaisdevelopinganunmannedguntowerthatcanperformsentrdutyalongitsborderwiththeDemocraticPeople’sRepublicofKorea Althoughmediareportsindicate thathumanbeingswill determine whenthetowermayuselethalforce,thetowerwillbeequippedwiththecapacitytoreonitsown.43




TheUnitedStatesmilitaryhaspubliclystatedthatorasignifcant periodintotheuture,thedecisiontouselethalactionwillremainahumandecision,butstatementsromhigh-rankingpersonnelsuggestotherwise.44Forexample,Lt.GeneralRickLynchstatedinAugust2011thathewas“anadvocateoautonomoustechnology…wehavetocontinuetoadvocateorpursuitoautonomoustechnology.” 45TestsoautonomousattackdroneshavetakenplaceatmilitarybaseslikeFortBenninginGeorgia.46Additionally,DepartmentoDeenseDirective3000.09prohibitsautonomousweaponsystemsthatselecthumanbe-ingsastargetsinthefeld,butprovidesaprocesstoapproveAIdronesthatviolatethispolicy.47

AIDronesandInternationalHumanitarianLaw

There is legitimatedisagreement amongscholars andpolicy-makersoverwhetherhuman-controlleddronesviolateinternationalhumanitarianlaw.Atitsoundation,internationalhumanitarianlawisbasedonourprinciples:

1. Allpartiestoaconictmustdistinguishbetweenindividualswhoarefghtingandthosewhoarenot,directingattacksonlyatthose

whoare.2. Allpartiestoaconictmustseektominimizeincidentalcasualties

duringwar,meaningthatthemeansandmethodsoattackinganenemyarenotunlimited.

3. Amilitaryhastherighttouseanymeasuresnotorbiddenbythelawsowarthatareindispensableorsecuringthecompletesub-missionotheenemyassoonaspossible.

4. Allpartiesmustseektominimizesueringinanarmedconict.4

Twokindsoweaponsareprohibitedinarmedconicts:indiscriminateweapons49andweaponsthatcauseunnecessarysuering.5

Withregardtoindiscriminateweapons,underArticle51(4)othe Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions o 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection o Victims o International ArmedConficts (Additional Protocol I),indiscriminateweaponsareonethatproduceattacksthatare:1)notdirectedataspecifcmilitaryobjective;2)employamethodormeansocombatthatcannotbedirectedatamilitaryobjective;or3)employamethodormeansocombatthatproduceseectsthatcannotbelimitedasrequiredby

A BQM-74E drone launches rom the fight deck o the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Lassen (DDG 82) during a missile exercise to provide deense training or U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 pilots. Lassen is assigned to Destroyer Squadron(DESRON) 15 and is orward-deployed to Yokosuka, Japan. (U.S. Navy photo).




Additional Protocol I .As the InternationalCourtof Justiceput it,indiscriminateweaponsareillegalbecause“Statesmustnevermakecivilianstheobjectofattack.”51

With regardtoweapons that causeunnecessary suffering,theInternationalCourtofJusticehasstatedthat“itisprohibitedtocauseunnecessarysufferingtocombatants:itisaccordinglyprohibitedtouseweaponscausingthemsuchharmoruselesslyaggravatingtheirsuffering…Statesdonothaveunlimitedfreedomofchoiceofmeansintheweaponstheyuse.”52Themainideabehindthisinternationallawisthatweaponswhichincreasesufferingwithoutincreasingmilitaryadvantagesinanywayareunlawful.53

Somescholarsandmilitaryleadersworrythatthesedronessepa‑ratethekillerfromthevictim,makingatrocitiesmorelikely.54Inthislight,dronespermitmoredestructionthananyotherweaponssystemandbecometoolsforindiscriminateattacksandunnecessarysufferingbecausethepeopleoperatingthedronesareremovedfromtheresultsofthosedecisions.55However,othersarguethatcurrentdronesusethesameweaponscarriedbypilotedghteraircraft,whicharenotbannedbyanyinternationalagreement.Somewriterspressthepoint,notingthatbecausedronescanconductsurveillancebeforemakinganattack,

theyactuallyreduceindiscriminateattacksasdenedby Additional Protocol I andhelptoeliminateunnecessarysufferingbecausetheycantrackatargetforhoursandstrikewhenciviliansarenotinthearea,permittingthehumanoperatorstomakebetterjudgmentsaboutattackingtargets.56

Butinternationallaw,byitsterms,doesnoteffectivelyaddress AIandmachine‑made decisions.ConsiderArticle48of Additional Protocol I :

Inordertoensurerespectforandprotectionofthecivilianpopula‑tionandcivilianobjects,thePartiestotheconictshallatalltimesdistinguishbetweenthecivilianpopulationandcombatantsand

betweencivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectivesandaccordinglyshalldirecttheiroperationsonlyagainstmilitaryobjectives.

Instating“thePartiestotheconict,” Additional Protocol I onlydirectshumanbeingsunambiguously.57Thepartiesarenotpeople,ofcourse,buttheyarenationsthatarerunbypeople,withpeoplecar‑ryingoutnationaldecisionsineldsofcombat.Thatistheassump‑tionininternationalhumanitarianlaw,asembodiedinArticle91of

Additional Protocol I :“APartytotheconict…shallberesponsible forallactscommittedby persons forming part of its armed forces”(emphasisadded).Decisionsmadebyhumansoldiersareaccounted forininternationalhumanitarianlaw. ButwhenanationsendsanAIdroneintoaconict,thereisnolegalaccountability,asinternationallawdoesnotspeakdirectlytoAIdrones.IfanAIdroneactsdisproportionatelytothemilitaryobjectiveorkillscivilians,thecountryresponsibleis not responsible.Itsleaderscanplausiblysay:“WhileweacknowledgethattheAIdroneisours, wedonotcondoneitsactions.Althoughourmilitarypersonnelwereoverseeingitsoperations,byitsdesignitmakesindependentdecisionsaboutitsassignedobjectives.Usuallythosedecisionsareverygood.

Todaythedecisionswerebad.However,weacknowledgenoresponsibilityforthosedecisions,asthepersonsofourarmedforcesdidnomakethem.” HRWpointstothispotentiallylethalerrorasproofthatinternationalhumanitarianlawprohibitsAIdrones,notingthatarmedforcesmustdistinguishbetweencombatantsandnoncombatants.58Butactsanddecisionsofarmedforcesunderinternationallaw,asnotedin Article91of Additional Protocol I ,seemstoincludeonlythoseact performedanddecisionsmade bypeople,notmachines. Evenifwe were tocontort Additional Protocol I toincludeAIdrones,it’snotclearwhatisrequiredofnations.IsitthatAIdronescan neverfailtodistinguishbetweencombatantsornoncombatants?Thatstandardseemsunlikely,ashumansoldierswouldfailthatstricttest.TheUSDepartmentofDefenseinDirective3000.09seemstoassumethatithereisaburden,itisonlytocreateprocedurestotestandoverseetheoperationofAIdronestoensurethatthetechnologyiscapableofdistinguishingamongtargetssuccessfully,notthatitdoessoallthetime.InitssilenceonAI,internationallawpermitsalmostalllegainterpretationsofitsapplicationtoAI. ThatistheissueregardingtheliabilityofpartieswhouseAIdrone

thatviolateinternationallaw.Tobesure,Article91doesnotexplicitlystatethatapartytoaconictis not responsibleforactscommittedb AIdrones,butinternationalhumanitarianlawsaysnothingasexpliciaboutAIasitsaysabouthumans.Atbest,internationalhumanitar‑ianlawinadvertentlyaddressesAI.Forexample,nationsarerequiredtotake“constantcare”andprecautionarymeasurestoensurethaciviliansarenotinjuredduringattacks.59Themeasureofprecautionarymeasuresis“whetherareasonablywell‑informedpersoninthecircumstancesoftheactual perpetrator,makingreasonableuseoftheinformationavailabletohimorher,couldhaveexpectedexcessiveciviliancasualtiestoresultfromtheattack”(emphasisadded).60TheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia,which

issuedthatstatementoflaw,clearlyintendedthisstandardtobefora humanperpetrator,butitcouldarguablybecontortedtoapplytoan AIdroneaswell. Butthenthequestionbecomes,whatinformationwasavailabletotheAI?ItmaybehardertoappreciatetheinformationthatwasavailabletoAIthantheinformationthatwasavailabletohumanbeingsinthesamecircumstance.Ahumanbeinglikelyhadpeoplearoundhimorher–otherpeopleinacrowd,subordinates,friends,superiors,etc.Ahumanbeinghadaperspectivethatotherhumanbeingscanrelatetoandusetoanalyzehisorherdecision.ButanAIdronelikelyactedalone.AnAIdronemayhavemonitoredthesiteofthekillingfrom10,000feetintheair.AnAIdrone’serrormaybedue

totheAIorahumancommander.61TheresultofthoseerrorsmaybthatboththeAIandhumantookappropriateprecautionarymeasurestoprotectcivilians.Thereisamazeofcomplexityinthesefactorsthamaymakeitimpossibletoproperlyassignliabilityandguiltundecurrentinternationalhumanitarianlaw.62Theinherentproblemisthainternationalhumanitarianlawwasonlyintended–throughcustomsandtreaties–togoverndecisionsmadebyhumanbeings.ThereisnoareaofinternationalhumanitarianlawthatappliesspecicallytoA




orAIdrones.III. THE CHALLENgE of ADAPTINg

INTERNATIoNAL LAw To ADDRESS AI

AlthoughI’vefocusedoninternationalhumanitarianlaw,theabsenceoflawgoverningAIisnotuniquetothateld.AreviewofalmosteveryareaofinternationallawthatwillbeimpactedbyAI–nationalsovereignty,lawoftheseas,targetedkillings,etc.–reveals

thatnoneofthemaddressAIdirectly.AnyopinionsaboutAIunderinternationallawarebasedonexpectedcustomaryusesbynationsandinterpretationsofexistinginternationallawthattwisttheoriginalintendedmeaning. Thebest way toresolvedisagreements, potentialissues,andconictsbetweennationsoverAIistoaddresstheminamulti‑lateraltreaty,possiblyorganizedbytheUN.AIpresentstremendousbenetsanddangers,similartoatomicenergy.FollowingWorldWarII,splittingtheatomhadthepotentialforgreatenergy,butalsogreatdestruction. AIholdssimilarpromise.AIcansavehumanbeingsfromhardlaborandimprovethequalityoftheirlives.ButAIalsopermitswartobe foughtthoughtlesslyonautopilot,disconnectinghumanbeingsfrom

violenceandpreventing themfrom realizingthetruth ofRobertE.Lee’sobservationthat,“Itiswellthatwarissoterrible,otherwiseweshouldgrowtoofondofit.” ButthebenetsareendangeredandthethreatsaregreaterwhenthereisinternationalconfusionaboutwhatuseofAIisacceptableand whatuseis not.Eventhoughthere isno executiveofcetoenforceinternational law, itprovidesa usefulroadmap fornations:“Wedenitelycandothis,butthatweshouldthinkcarefullyaboutdoingthatotherthing.”It’slikethelineatanATM.Althoughthereisnoenforceablelawtellingthesecondpersoninlinehowfarbacktheyhavetostandfromtherstpersoninline,thereisgeneralagreementthatyoushouldstandbackafewfeet.Everyoneismorecomfortable whenthatruleisobeyed,helpingmaintainorderintheATMvestibule.Similarly,whenthereisgeneralagreementaboutinternationallaws,allnationsaremorecomfortableandthereislessconict. Thegreatestobstacletoa “UNConventiononArticialIntel‑ligence”isthecooperationandacceptanceofthenationsthatwillhave startedusingandrelyingonAI.Nations thatalreadyrelyonhuman‑controlleddrones(particularlytheUnitedStates)willsoonbeearlyadoptersofAIdrones.Thosenations–post‑industrialcountries with the economic incentive to research and develop labor‑savingtechnologies–arealsothemostlikelytoadoptAIinotherformsthatimpactinternationallaws:self‑pilotingplanes,self‑sailingships,etc.

ThetemptationinaconventiononAIistodraftexplicitguidelines foreverything:AIcannotopenreonanyhumanbeings,AIcannotenteranothercountrywithoutexpresspermissionfromthatcountry,nationsareliablefortheactsoftheirAI,etc.HRWandtheCampaigntoStopKillerRobotswouldlikelyendorsethatapproach. Butsomeofthosebright‑linetestswillbeunacceptabletotheUnitedStates,Israel,andothercountriesthatwillhavealreadystartedusingAI.Iftheiruseofhuman‑controlleddronesisanyindication,theywilluseAIdronesinsimilarwaysandwillbeopposedtoatreaty

thatbansthatuse.Thosenationswillnotsignthetreatyanditwilbemuchlessuseful. Rather,IsuggestmultipleconventionsthatwilladdressdifferenareasofAIusewithdifferentdegreesofspecicity,permittingtheUnitedStatesandsimilarnationstosignandratifysomebutnotallofthemThisisnotideal,butitwouldprovidesomeinternationallyacceptednormsaboutAIandcreatedenedaspirationalgoalsforAIuseundeinternationallaw.Inmanyways,theLandmineConventionservesthisaspirationalfunctiontoday,assomeofthemostrelevantcountries(liketheUnitedStates)havenotsigned,butithascreatedanidealstatus forantipersonnellandminesunderinternationallaw:Nonationwiluse,produce,orstockpileantipersonnellandmines. 63Thisidealhaeffectivelystigmatizedtheuseofantipersonnellandmines.By2010, productionofantipersonnelmineshadceasedin39nations,veof whicharenotpartiestotheLandmineConvention,andlegaltradeintheweaponisvirtuallynon‑existent.64

Multi‑lateraltreaties addressingAIdrones could bedividedtoseparatelyaddress:

1. TestingandOperationalStandards:Thistreatywould

establishguidelinesforthetestingandoperationofAIdronesbeforethey canbe deployed: Howmanytestsarenecessary?What data processing capabilitiesmust a drone have? Is there a standard fohumanrecognitionbytheAIdrone?Whatfailsafemechanismsarerequired?Thistreatywouldessentiallycreatetheproceduralframe work throughwhich nations develop internationally acceptable Adronesinordertoensuresuperiorandsaferperformance.Directive

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3000.09triestodosomeofthis,althoughonlyinbroadterms,suchasstipulatinganti‑tamperingmechanismsandcertainhumaninter‑ faces.NationsthataredevelopingAIdronesarelikelytosignatreatythatestablishesguidelinesforthetestingandoperationofAIdrones.

2. Liabiltiy:ThistreatywouldafrmthatnationsareliablefortheactionsoftheirAIdronesinthesamewaytheyareliablefortheactionsoftheirmilitarypersonnel.ThearticlesshouldaddressprecautionarymeasuresrequiredofnationswhileoperatingAIdrones.Theintentofthatwouldbetoprovideclearguidelinesforstatestofollowwhenauthorizingandusingsuchdrones.Themainpointofthisconven‑tionwouldbetogiveAIdronesastatusequivalenttohumansunderinternationallawintermsofcreatingliabilityfortheirnations,whilealsorecognizingthatsomeoftheprecautionarymeasuresthatna‑tionsneedtomaintainwhenoperatingthedronesaredifferentthantheprecautionarymeasurestheymaintainwiththeirhumanforces.Forexample,trainingrequirementsforAIdronesandthehumans whooversee themwillbe different than the training requirements for soldierswhoworkwith traditional conventional weapons. ThistreatycouldrelyontheTestingandOperationalStandardsTreaty

discussedaboveforsomefotherequiredprecautionarymeasures.

3. BattlefeldConduct :CountriesliketheUnitedStatesarenotlikelytosignanaspirationaltreatythatstrictlylimitswhatAIdronescandoincombatsituations,butsuchatreatyhasvalue,muchliketheLandmineConvention.ThistreatywouldpushthegoalsofHRW, prohibitinglethalforceandlimitingengagementwithnoncombatants whenthereisnohumanintheloop.

CoNCLuSIoN

EvenifalloftherelevantcountriesarenotwillingtorenouncetheuseofAIdrones,creatingstandardsforthemininternationallaw

isuseful.Itprovidesamodelthatthenon‑complyingnationscanlooktoforguidancewhenmakingdecisionsaboutAIdrones.Forexample,

eventhoughtheUnitedStatesisnotapartytotheLandmineTreaty,themilitaryisawareofitsgoalsandthataffectsitsapproachtoan‑tipersonnellandmines.AlthoughIessentiallylimitedthisdiscussiontoAIdronesthatengageinattacks,conventionsgoverningotheruse forAI, likesurveillanceandtransportation, canwork thesameway Additionally, treatiesaddressing lesscontroversial aspectsofAIwil provideasolidframeworkfortheuseofallAIininternationalrelations AIispoisedtoradicallychangemanyfundamentalelementsoourlivesandeconomies,whetherinternationallawaddressesitornot. Workforceswillbedisplaced.Transportationwillbeeasier.Production will be cheaper.It is important that the international communityapproachAIwithsomefundamentalconceptsincommon.Thisiscurrentlyimpossible,giventheblankslateofAI‑specictreatiesininternationallaw.Ideally,auniedapproachtoAIwillmitigatesomeofthemoreharmfulelementsofAI,likethelossofmanyjobs,and promotesomeofthebenetsofAI,likegreaterfreedomforpeopletobecomebettereducatedandcreatenewjobs,businessesandtechnolo‑gies.ThiswillfacilitatetheexpansionofthebenetsofAItomore peopleinmorecountries.

ENDNoTES1 *Thisarticleisbasedonachapterfromtheauthor’sforthcomingbook,Robots ArPeople Too: How Siri, Google Car, and Articial Intelligence Will Force Us to Change OuLaws ,whichPraegerPublishingwillreleaseinNovember2013.

“Arms:NewCampaigntoStopKillerRobots,”HumanRightsWatch,pressrelease,April23,2013,http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/23/arms-new-campaign-stop-killer-robots.

2 Id.;“AboutUs,”CampaigntoStopKillerRobots,http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/aboutus/.

3 “Arms:NewCampaigntoStopKillerRobots,”supranote1.

4 LaurieR.Blank,“After‘TopGun’:HowDroneStrikesImpacttheLawofWar,”Universityof Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 33:3(Spring2012):681.

5 HumanRightsWatch,Losing Humanity :The Case Against Killer Robots (HumanRightsWatch,2012):30-35.

6 “KillerRobots,”HumanRightsWatch,https://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/killer-robots.

7 BarackObama,“DronePolicySpeech,”NationalDefenseUniversity,May23,2012transcriptavailableatwww.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-policy.html?pagewanted=all.

8 DepartmentofDefenseDirective3000.09,Nov.212012,availableathttp://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/correpdf/300009p.pdf.

9 BaronS.A.Korff,“AnIntroductiontotheHistoryoInternationalLaw,”American Journal of International Law18:2(1924):246-247.

10 1Maccabees8:1-29(GoodNewsBible);MarkW.Janis“AnIntroductiontoInternationalLaw,”inMarkW.JanisandJohnE.Noyes,eds.,International Law Cases and Commentary ,3rded.,(St.Paul,MN:Thomson/West,2006),1;ArthuNussbaum,“TheSignicanceofRomanLawintheHistoryoInternationalLaw,”University of Pennsylvania Law Review100:5(March1952):679-680;“HistoryoftheInternationaCourtofJustice,”InternationalCourtofJustice,http://wwwicj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=1.

11 Nussbaum,supranote10,680-681.

12 Korff,supranote9,247.

13 EdwardD.Re,“InternationalLawandtheUnitedNationsSt. John’s Law Review 21:1(November1946):147-148.

14 See Nussbaum,supranote10,680-683.

15 Statute of the International Court of Justice ,June26

Edward (Terry) Shumaker

Manchester, [email protected] 623-8700

n Business, Employment,Commercial, Civil Litigation

n Panel Mediator and Arbitrator, NH State and Federal Courts,American ArbitrationAssociation, Human RightsCommission, NH PELRB

n Three decades of ADR Experience; Listed in BestLawyers in America

Thank you or your insights and eforts to bring the parties to resolution.—Counsel in a recent mediation

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http://www.bernsteinshur.com/































1945,59Stat.1055,www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0,Art.38.

16 OscarSchacter,“UnitedNationsLaw,”American Journal of International Law 88:1(January1994):2-4.

17 “NuclearWeapons,”UnitedNationsOfceforDisarmamentAffairs,www.un.org/ disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/.

18 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ,March5,1970,729U.N.T.S.161,http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt/text.

19 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere ,in Outer Space and Under Water ,October10,1963,14UST1313,www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/Par-tial_Ban_Treaty.pdf.

20 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on their Destruction ,March1,1999,2056UNTS241,www.icbl.org/ index.php/icbl/Treaty/MBT/Treaty-Text-in-Many-Languages/English( Landmine Convention ).

21 “FinalReport,”MeetingoftheStatePartiestotheConventionontheProhibitionoftheUse,Stockpiling,ProductionandTransferofAnti-PersonnelMinesandtotheirDestruction,APLC/MSP.1/1999/1,Maputo,Mozambique(May20,1999),www.apminebanconvention.org/leadmin/pdf/mbc/MSP/1MSP/1msp_nal_report_en.pdf.

22 Landmine Convention, supranote20,Art.6.

23 AnthonyA.D’Amato,“TheConceptofSpecialCustominInternationalLaw,”American Journal of International Law 63:2(April1969):212.

24 MarkW.JanisandJohnE.Noyes,International Law Cases and Commentary ,3rded.(St.Paul,MN:Thomson/West,2006),92.

25 “StatesPartiestotheConvention,”Landmine Convention ,http://www.apminebancon-vention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/.

26 MarkLandler,“WhiteHouseisBeingPressedtoReverseCourseandJoinLandMineBan,”New York Times ,May7,2010,www.nytimes.com/2010/05/08/world/americas/08mine.html?_r=0.

27 AndrewC.S.Efaw,“TheUnitedStatesRefusaltoBanLandmines:TheIntersectionBetweenTactics,Strategy,PolicyandInternationalLaw,”Military Law Review 159(1999):100-101.

28 Havingsaidthat,itshouldbenotedthattheUnitedStatesisapartytotheConventiononCertainConventionalWeapons,whichaddresseslandmines,butpermitstheiruse.

29 Efaw,supranote27,94.

30 “ArgumentsforaBan,”International Campaign to Ban Landmines ,www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Problem/Landmines/Arguments-for-a-Ban.

31 Efaw,supranote27,94.

32 JillM.Sheldon,“NuclearWeaponsandtheLawsofWar:DoesCustomaryInternationalLawProhibittheUseofNuclearWeaponsinAllCircumstances?”Fordham International Law

Journal 20:1(November1996):182.33 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion .1996I.C.J.226,266,paras.105(2)(A)&105(2)(B)(hereinafterNuclearWeapons);IvanKrmpotic,“TheEdgeandBack:TheI.C.J.AdvisoryOpinionontheLegalityoftheThreatorUseofNuclearWeapons,”Michigan State University-DCL Journal of International Law 9:2(Summer2000):316-318.

34 PaulJosephSpringer,Military Robots and Drones (SantaBarbara:ABC-Clio,2013),22.

35 JohnSifton,“ABriefHistoryofDrones,”The Nation ,February27,2012,www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-drones#.

36 UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOfce,“UnmannedAircraftSystems:ImprovedPlanningandAcquisitionStrategiesCanHelpAddressOperationalChallenges,”testimonybeforetheU.S.House,SubcommitteeonTacticalAirandLandForces,April6,2006(Wash-ington.,DC:GovernmentAccountabilityOfce,2006),5.

37 CharlesLevinson,“IsraeliRobotsRemakeBattleeld;NationForgesAheadinDeploy-ingUnmannedMilitaryVehiclesbyAir,Sea,andLand,”Wall Street Journal ,Jan.13,2010;

“PredatorDronesandUnmannedAerialVehicles(UAVs),”New York Times ,http://topicsnytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html.

38 BrendanGogartyandIsabelRobinson,“UnmannedVehicles:A(Rebooted)HistoryBackgroundandCurrentStateoftheArt,” Journal of Law, Information and Science 21:2(2011/2012):11-12.

39 PhilipAlston,“LethalRoboticTechnologies:TheImplicationsforHumanRightsandInternationalHumanitarianLaw,” Journal of Law, Information and Scienc e21:2(2011/2012)41.

40 GogartyandRobinson,supranote38,2.

41 PhilipAlston,Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Councon Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions ,U.N.DocumentA/65/321,August232010,http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/563504.472374916.html,13.

42 Id.,14.

43 Id.,15.

44 Alston,“LethalRoboticTechnologies,”supranote39,44.

45 CherylPellerin,“RobotsCouldSaveSoldiers’Lives,ArmyGeneralSays,”AmericaForces Press Service ,August17,2011,www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65064

46 PeterFinn,“AFutureforDrones:AutomatedKilling,”Washington Post,Sept.19,2011http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-19/national/35273383_1_drones-human-targetmilitary-base.

47 DepartmentofDefenseDirective3000.09,supranote8,compare§4.c(2)with§4.d

48 Blank,supranote4,681-683.

49 InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Arme

Conicts ,June8,1977,1125U.N.T.S.3,Art.51(4),www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36b4html(hereinafterreferredtoasAdditionalProtocolI).

50 InternationalConferences(TheHague),Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Lawand Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customof War on Land ,Oct.18,1907,www.refworld.org/docid/4374cae64.html,Art.23.

51 Nuclear Weapons ,supranote33,257,para.78.

52 Id.

53 Blank,supranote4,686.

54 P.W.Singer,“MilitaryRobotsandtheLawsofWar,”The New Atlantis 23(Winte2009),www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/military-robots-and-the-laws-of-war.

55 SeeChrisJenks,“LawfromAbove:UnmannedAerialSystems,UseofForce,andtheLawofArmedConict,”Notre Dame Law Review 85:3(2009):650-651.

56 Blank,supranote4,686-687.

57 Similarproblemsexistinalmostalltreaties,UNresolutions,andinternationalcouandtribunalopinionswhentheyreferto“Parties,”“States,”oranyvariationonpersonorpeople–theydonotconsiderordirectlyaddressAI.

58 Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots ,supranote5,30-32.

59 Additional Protocol I, supranote49,Art.57(1).

60 Prosecutor v. Galić .CaseNo.IT-98-29-T.JudgmentandOpinion.InternationalCriminaTribunalfortheFormerYugoslavia(Dec.5,2003),Para.58.

61 BrendanGogartyandMeredithHagger,“TheLawsofManOverVehiclesUnmannedTheLegalResponsetoRoboticRevolutiononSea,LandandAir,”Journal of Law, Informationand Science 19:1(2008),123.

62 Alston,“LethalRoboticTechnologies,”supranote39,51.

63 Landmine Convention ,supranote20,Art1.

64 InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,The Mine Ban Convention: Progress andChallenges in the Second Decade (Geneva:InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,2011

www.icrc.org/eng/assets/les/other/icrc-002-0846.pdf,2-5.

author

John Weaver practices with the rm of McLane, Graf, Raulerson and Middleton in Manchester and Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Praeger Publishing will release his book, Robots Are People Too: How Siri,Google Car, and Articial Intelligence Will Force Us to Change Our

Laws , in November 2013. It is available for pre-order on Amazon.

http://www.amazon.com/Robots-Are-People-Too-Intelligence/dp/1440829454






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