Upload
others
View
4
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
〔論文〕 弘前大学経済研究第21号 November 1998
An Empirical Study of the Performance Measurement System
in Japanese Manufacturing Industries
Yuta Hoshino
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate the actual performance measurement system in
Japanese industrial firms. Surveyed were 407 industrial companies considered to be leaders and
innovators in high technology. The result of this study provides evidence that performance measure-
ment has been applied to performance evaluation. Furthermore, I have researched the uniqueness of
financial measures and nonfinancial measures. There were important di百erencesin the measurement of
results between the two methods. The work further touched on improvements in the management
accounting system. I then suggested the following three points as performance evaluation that could
activate personnel: (1) show performance evaluation which is connected with the incentives for a task,
(2) examine the use of results-oriented performance evaluation, and (3) examine the use of process-
oriented performance evaluation. In particular, I studied significant differences between results-oriented
evaluation and process-oriented evaluation.
Kり words:Empirical; Performance measurement; Rewarding results; Nonfinancial measures; Japanese
manufacturing industry
1. Introduction
This paper shows the results of an empirical study of the performance measurement system in Japa-
nese manufacturing industries. After having analyzed the results, I suggest some improvements in how
the performance evaluation system can be used to activate human resources. Japanese manufacturing
industries have many things in common in terms of performance measurement, capital investment,
budgeting, and the like, yet there seem to be a number of important differences between them.
In this paper I would like to examine the uniqueness of the performance measurement system in
Japanese firms. I will also clari命theimportant features of performance measurement and performance
evaluation in Japanese firms.
The purposes of performance measurement are not only to predict and measure financial perfor-
mance but also to grasp job related problems, to review budget planning, to improve employees' salary
and promotion opportunities, and to examine personnel training. Before we describe performance mea-
surement in detail, however, it will be useful to address some fundamental questions concerning corpo-
rate strategy. The variance from achievement goals is analyzed before doing performance evaluation.
This variance analysis is useful for motivation to production and performance enhancement. If a prob・
lem of cost non-efficiency is discovered, we can get rid of the causes and make corrections in budget
-111
compilation.
The performance measurement is merely related to出ebudget compilation of each divisional organi-
zation and is also related to promotion, reward, and employment. In Japanese companies, however, the
relation between budget performance and division manager rewards is weak, and the incentives for the
goal achievement of an employee are not very s位ong.
Therefore, the creation of a performance evaluation system that can link performance and rewards is
urgently needed to increase the validity of a manager’s bonus and promotion. It is not clear how per-
formance is related to personal assessment nor is it clear how a superior influences a subordinate
through control. In this paper, I would like to analyze actual performance measurement procedures in
Japanese industrial firms.
2. The Survey of Research
For the problem consciousness issue mentioned above, I used a questionnaire to gather information on
each fi口n’sorganizational structure, budget planning and control practices, and performance evaluation
system. Based on my analysis of the questionnaire, I investigated the status of the performance mea-
surement system in Japanese firms. Surveyed were a total of 407 industrial companies which is
considered to be on the cutting edge of high technology manufacturing listed on the Tokyo First Mar-
ket Stock Exchange. These were grouped into 8 categories: steel, non-ferrous metal, metal products,
machinery, electronics, transpo此 equipment,precision instruments, and other manufacturing. The sur-
vey questionnaire was mailed to all 407 Japanese industrial companies. The questionnaires were ad-
dressed to the Company Controller or the Manager of the Controller Department. Completed question-
naires were returned by 123 Japanese companies, a response rate of 30.2 percent. The highest of the
response rates was 38.5 percent for “metal products”; the lowest response rate was 14. 7 percent for
“other manufacturing”. Table 1 shows the number of companies in the initial survey, the number of
responses, and the response rates by the industry classification.
The survey questionnaire consisted of 20 questions (32 items) such as divisional organization, bud-
geting, capital investment, performance evaluation, and performance measurement. Before I examine
these questions, I must clarify some fundamental questions. concerning a management system in Japanese
manufacturing industries. Table 1 Composition of Surveys and Responses The performance evalua-
Industry classification Survey size (rate) Responses (rate) tion system is base on the
Steel 36 ( 8.8%) 10 ( 27.8%) budget planning and incen-
Non-ferrous metal 25 ( 6.1 ) 7 ( 28.0 ) tive systems. This section Metal products 26 ( 6.4 ) 10 ( 38.5 )
first provides a description Machinery 94 ( 23.1 ) 26 ( 27.7
of management system and Electronics 118 ( 29.0 ) 40 ( 33.9
then discusses the major Transport equipment 53 ( 13.0 ) 18 ( 34.0
questions of performance Precision instruments 21 ( 5.2 7 ( 33.3
evaluation. Other 34 ( 8.4 5 ( 14.7
Totals 407 (100.0%) 123 ( 30.2%)
-112-
An Empiri伺 lStudy of出ePerfonnance Measurement System in Japanese Manufacturing Indus位ies
3. Description of Management System
First, I will describe s位ategygoals. In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to rank the top
three s位ategygoals taken仕om16 kinds of managerial categories for firms' managers. These results of
the rankings are shown in Table 2. In Table 2 important strategic goals are ranked sequentially accord-
ing to growth of earnings, strengthening of research and development (R&D) e血ciency,improvement
of product quality, and sales growth. It has been proposed that Japanese companies stress sales volume
and market share more than profit.1 There are significant differences between Japanese companies and
American companies. But Table 2 shows that sales growth and growth in market share aren’t ranked
so highly. On the other hand, we must pay attention to the fact that growth of earnings ranked first.
This is evidence that there is beginning to be more emphasis on management e旺iciencyunder the
successful leadership of firms' managers. It is characteristic that s住engtheningof R&D efficiency
ranks around 2, and improvement of product quality is ranked around 3. In other words, this means
that Japanese manufacturing industry is proceeding to strengthen its engineering capability, and has re-
alized the importance of high product quality and low cost. The reason that the capital gains of stock-
holders aren’t considered very important the power of stockholders is weakened by cross-holdings.
Second, as to the analyses of budgeting, I examined performance evaluation method of company bud-
gets. It is reasonable to assume that production departments, as cost centers, are responsible for out-
put, whereas sales departments, as profit centers, are responsible for sales volume.2 If we look at
Table 2 Important Strategy Goals
Mean Responses Ranking
First(%) Second(%) Third(%)
Growth of earnings 1.30 68 40 (33.3) 12 00.0) 16(13.3)
Strengthening of R&D e伍ciency 1.09 62 24(20.0) 24(20.0) 14 (11.7)
Improvement of product quality 0.72 46 10 ( 8.4) 22 (18.3) 14 (11.7)
Sales growth 0.59 34 12 00.0) 15(12.5) 7 ( 5.8)
Growth in market share 0.34 25 4( 3.3) 9 ( 7.5) 12 (10.0)
Return on Investment (ROI) 0.31 17 9 ( 7.5) 3 ( 2.5) 5 ( 4.2)
Strengthening of marketing capability 0.31 19 6( 5.0) 7( 5.8) 6 ( 5.0)
Development of human resources 0.30 23 3( 2.5) 8( 6.7) 12 (10.0)
E伍ciencyof production systems 0.29 20 4( 3.3) 8 ( 6.7) 8( 6.7)
New product ratio 0.18 12 2 ( 1.7) 6( 5.0) 4 ( 3.3)
Improvement of product portfolio 0.17 11 4 ( 3.3) 2 ( 1.7) 5 ( 4.2)
E伍ciencyof physical distribution 0.08 7 1 ( 0.8) 1 ( 0.8) 5( 4.2)
Equity ratio 0.08 8 1 ( 0.8) 0( 0.0) 7 ( 5.8)
Improvement in quality of working conditions 0.08 7 0 ( 0.0) 3 ( 2.5) 4( 3.3)
Improvement in public image of the company 0.01 1 0 ( 0.0) 0( 0.0) 1 ( 0.8)
Capital gains for stockholders 0.00 。 0 ( 0.0) O( 0.0) 0 ( 0.0)
Note: The mean scores in the table were culculated as follows: 3 points for the most important goal, 2 for the
second and 1 for the third. The mean scores are aggregated and dividend by the number of responding
companies. The mean is the average value of a weighty score. The scores in Table 4, Table 5, Table 8,
Table 9, and Table 10 are equal as well.
-113-
Table 3 we see that functional per-
fonnance evaluation was 46.8 percent,
evaluation through profit centers was
42.7 percent, and evaluation through
informal profit centers was 8.9 per-
cent. It is clear that the profit center
has the function of the profit and loss
budget, but the point where functional
performance evaluation shows the
highest percentage as the performance
Table 3 Performance Evaluation Method of Budget (short-range planning)
Functional performance evaluation
Evaluation through informal profit centers
Evaluation through profit centers
Non-evaluation
Totals
Responses(%)
58 ( 46.8)
11 ( 8.9)
53 ( 42.7)
2 ( 1.6)
124(100.0)
There were some double responses from respondent companies.
evaluation budget method is an important characteristic. Table 7 shows the fact that many companies
are adopting divisional organization: overall adoption is 56.1 percent and partial adoption is 24.4 per-
cent.
Third, I surveyed the types of capital budgeting techniques. The results of these rankings are shown
in Table 4. According to my survey, it was found that the payback method has been adopted by great
many companies. There are several reasons for this. One reason is that the early collection of capital
was necessary. Another reason is that technical innovation was an important competitive factor. To
sum up, the reason why this method has often been adopted is that it was superior as a measure to
deal with the obsolescence of equipment and product. In addition to this payback method, we must
draw attention to the fact that the accounting rate of return and the internal rate of return are made
much of as an investment evaluation method.3
Table 4 Type of Capital Budgeting Techniques
Mean Responses Ranking
First(%) Second(%) Third(%)
Payback method 2.13 104 63 ( 49.6) 32 ( 31.1) 9 ( 11.3)
Accounting rate-of-return 0.94 56 20 ( 15.7) 20 ( 19.4) 16 ( 20.0)
Internal rate of return 0.70 41 13 ( 10.2) 19 ( 18.4) 9 ( 11.3)
Subjective method 0.63 48 10 ( 7.9) 9( 8.7) 29( 36.3)
Present value method 0.46 27 8 ( 6.3) 13 ( 12.6) 6( 7.5)
Profitability index method 0.36 21 9 ( 7.1) 5( 4.9) 7( 8.8)
MAPI system 0.05 3 1 ( 0.8) 1 ( 1.0) 1 ( 1.3)
Other 0.16 10 3 ( 2.4) 4( 3.9) 3 ( 3.8)
4. Performance Measurement of Divisional Organization
The next series of questions examined data concerning the performance measurement of divisional or-
ganization. My research aim was to observe the performance measures which division managers con-
sidered important. Table 5 shows sales volume, net profit after allocation of corporate overhead costs,
profit margin on sales, ranked in the order of importance. Looking at Table 5, we see that division
managers make much of sales volume, but do not make so much of return on investment. Table 5
shows that the result is relevant to the characteristics of divisional organization. This tendency was al-
-114 -
An Empiri回lStudy of the Perlonnance Measurement System in Japanese Manufacturing Industries
Table 5 Important Performance Measurement of Division Managers
Mean Responses Ranking
First(%) Second(%) Third(%)
Sales volume 1.40 75 36 ( 28.8) 26 ( 21.3) 13 ( 10.7)
Net profit after allocation
of corporate overhead 0.84 44 23 ( 18.4) 14 ( 11.5) 7( 5.8)
Profit margin on sales 0.79 48 15 ( 12.0) 19 ( 15.5) 14( 11.6)
Marginal profit 0.50 30 10( 8.0) 12 ( 9.8) 8 ( 6.6)
Contribution margin 0.44 24 13 ( 10.4) 4 ( 3.3) 7 ( 5.8)
Production cost per unit 0.41 30 3 ( 2.4) 14( 11.5) 13 ( 10.7)
Controllable profit 0.34 19 10 ( 8.0) 3 ( 2.5) 6 ( 5.0)
Growth in market share 0.28 20 1 ( 0.8) 10 ( 8.2) 11 ( 9.1)
Value added productivity 0.27 19 2 ( 1.6) 8 ( 6.5) 9 ( 7.4)
Net profit after charging
imputed corporated interest 0.24 13 6( 4.8) 4 ( 3.3) 3 ( 2.5)
Sales growth 0.20 16 3 ( 2.4) 3 ( 2.5) 10( 8.2)
Return on investment (ROI) 0.12 8 2 ( 1.6) 3( 2.5) 3 ( 2.5)
Asset turnover 0.11 12 0( 0.0) 1 ( 0.8) 11 ( 9.1)
Cost variances 0.o7 7 0( 0.0) 1 ( 0.8) 6 ( 5.0)
Other 0.02 1 ( 0.8) 0( 0.0) 0( 0.0)
so borne out in Bailes and Asada (1991).4
Another look at Tables 2 and 5 shows that the important goals (or measures) vary between top
management and division managers. I would next like to verify these using statistic techniques. I ex-
tracted common performance measures仕omTables 2 and 5 and made a contingency table (Table 6) by
these measures. As a result of the chi square test, the null hypothesis, where there are no dramatic
differences to note between top management and division managers in terms of important goals, was
rejected at 10 percent level of significance. The results show that there seems to be a considerable
difference in s仕ategygoals between top management and division managers.
measure where the divisional Table 6 Top Management・DivisionManager Comparison of Strategy Goals
organization must still empha-
size profits after allocation of
corporate overhead cost is an
example of a factor, which is
ranked highly. Above all, what
is shown in Table 5 is that net
profits after allocation of corpo・
rate overhead cost becomes the
important performance measure
of divisional organization along
with marginal profit, contribu-
tion margin, and controllable
Again, it was found that the
selected goals Top management Division manager
Growth of earnings 68
(Controllable profit) 19
Sales growth 34 16
Growth in market share 25 20
Return on investment (ROI) 17 8
Chi square value=7.294. Significant at the 10 percent level.
Degree of仕eedom=3.
Note: I made this Table仕omTables 2 and 5. Numerical value is the total
number of strategy goals ranked from first to third.
As profit index corresponding to growth in earnings of top manage-
ment, I selected controllable profit as the index most suitable for a
division manager.
Fhd
,i
,t
Table 7 Use of Divisional Organization
Responses(%) Defender ( % ) Prospector{%) Analyzer(%) Reactor(%)
Extensive use 69 ( 56.1) 8 ( 40.0) 21 ( 75.0) 38( 55.9) O( 0.0)
Moderate use 30 ( 24.4) 6( 30.0) 2 ( 7.1) 18( 26.5) 1 (lOO.O)
No use 23( 18.7) 6( 30.0) 5( 17.9) 11 ( 16.2) O( 0.0)
No-response 1 ( 0.8) 0( 0.0) 0 ( 0.0) 1 ( 1.4) 0 ( 0.0)
Totals 123 (100.0) 20(100.0) 28 (100.0) 68 (100.0) 1 (100.0)
Chi square value=8.017. Significant at the 10 percent level.
Degree of仕eedom=4.
Noh!: The meaning according to four s凶 tegytypes is as follows (see Hoshino [1992〕chap.6).
profit.
Defender: This type exploits the advantage of being a“follower ”and tried to reduce risks on the
development of new products and/or markets.
Prospector: This type is always an innovator which activity takes risks on the development of new
product and/or markets.
Analyzer: Strategy formulation in this type is based upon systematic research data and sophisticated
analytical methods.
Reactor: This type is an unstable organization because technology, structure, and process are not
linked to it in an appropriate manner, and management adheres to an outmoded strategy and
S甘ucture.
In addition, I observed the adoption of divisional organizations. These results are shown in Table 7.
The majority of Japanese firms specified that出eyhad divisional organizations as shown in Table 7. In
Table 7 we see that firms adopting a divisional organization overall are 56.1 percent, firms adopting it
partially are 24.4 percent, and firms which don’t adopt it at all are 18.7 percent. Overall, 80.5 percent-
age of all Japanese firms have adopted at least partially a divisional organization. The adoption rate of
出issystem is a rate which αn be considered quite high.
Recently, Japanese firms have reduced the head office function in the sense that organization expan-
sion has been put under review. Japanese firms which have adopted the divisional head office system
have returned to a divisional organization emphasizing a top down approach, because it is judged to
have caused organization expansion and erosion of product development capability. The divisional or-
ganization adoption trend will continue for a while in order to promote the creation of subsidiary com-
panies by scheme simplification and empowerment.
5. Financial measures and Nonfmancial measures
The questionnaire also sought data concerning financial measures and nonfinancial measures. Table 8
shows the mean values and the percentages of each firm that ranked specific financial measures first,
second, and third. According to Table 8, sales volume, profit margin on sales, contribution margin,
gross margin, and sales growth are located according to rank. In Table 8 we focus our attention on the
tendency that profits or profit margin is ranked highly. The fact that the cost of capital, which is con-
sidered an advantage by Japanese firms, is neglected was unexpected. In Japan, we assume that sales
-116-
An Empirical Study of the Perlormance M回 surementSystem in Japanese Manufacturing Industries
Importance of Financial Measures Table 8
Ranking
Second(%)
Responses Mean
Third(%)
7( 6.0)
14 (12.1)
6( 5.2)
9( 7.8)
8 ( 6.9)
7 ( 6.0)
1 ( 0.8)
15 (12.8)
2107.9)
8( 6.8)
14(12.0)
1704.5)
8 ( 6.8)
5 ( 4.3)
First(%)
42 (35.2)
15 (12.7)
16 (13.4)
9 ( 7.6)
7( 5.9)
9 ( 7.6)
7( 5.9)
a
-nυnunL内
44ιτqJ
POa
-q
d
q
d
q
d
q
L
’i
1.33
0.82
0.57
0.52
0.51
0.41
0.26
5( 4.3)
15 (13.0)
9 ( 7.8)
4( 3.4)
6( 5.2)
8( 6.9)
4 ( 3.4)
5( 4.3)
2 ( 1.7)
2 ( 1.7)
0( 0.0)
2 ( 1.7)
5 ( 4.3)
3 ( 2.6)
4 ( 3.4)
2 ( 1.7)
2 ( 1.7)
2 ( 1.7)
2 ( 1.7)
3( 2.6)
2 ( 1.7)
3 ( 2.6)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
4 ( 3.4)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
2 ( 1.7)
1 ( 0.8)
0( 0.0)
1 ( 0.8)
0( 0.0)
1 ( 0.8)
0( 0.0)
1 ( 0.8)
0 ( 0.0)
A苛
QuqdooQUOV司
iQUphdRdtAqfu
’i
’i唱
i
’i
0.22
0.17
0.14
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.09
0.09
O.Q7
0.07
0.02
0.02
1 ( 0.9)
O( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
1 ( 0.9)
0( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
1 ( 0.9)
0 ( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
4 ( 3.4)
1
0
0
0
0
6
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.12
Sales volume
Profit margin on sales (pretax)
Contribution margin
Gross margin
Sales growth
Growth in net profit
Controllable profit
Profit rate of total
liabilities and net worth
Inventory level
Cash flow
Return on Investment (ROI)
Sales per employee
Cost variances
Equity ratio
Cash flow planning
Rate of return on equity
Quality cost
Rate of return on asset
Cost per employee
Profit on economic measures
(price earnings ratio,etc.)
Rate of return on回 pitalstock
Residual income (RI)
Stock price of own company
Cost of capital
Other
volume and profit margin on sales would still be ranked highly, because performance measurement is
accounting information that reflects on the degree of achievement of firm’s overall goals. However,出e
important point to note in our research is the fact that profit margins such as profit margin on sales,
contribution margin, and gross margin are important measures for Japanese firms. The performance
measures which Japanese firms make much of are the indiαtors which show results such as sales vol-
ume, but also measures valued are profit margins showing e血ciencyof management in the future. The
results of出isresearch clearly show that firms are beginning to place an emphasis on e伍ciency.
As financial measures, I asked the respondents to rank the top three nonfinancial measures. Table 9
shows the mean values and the percentages of each firm that ranked specific nonfinancial measures
first, second, and third. In Table 9 we see that the firms make much of growth in market share and
forecasted sales growth. We must also pay attention to the fact that Japanese firms attach importance
to such differentiation strategies as product quality, effect of product development, and new product ra-
tio (for instance, measures showing product added value). A further important point to note is that
月/,i
,i
Table 9 Importance of Nonfinancial Measures
Third(%)
6( 5.3)
1200.6)
2 ( 1.8)
6 ( 5.3)
4( 3.5)
16(14.1)
7 ( 6.2)
8( 7.0)
11 ( 9.7)
Ranking
Second(%)
8( 6.8)
9 ( 7.7)
9( 7.7)
2107.9)
14 (12.0)
7( 6.0)
9( 7.7)
6 ( 5.1)
7 ( 6.0)
First(%)
33 (28.0)
16(13.6)
16(13.6)
6 ( 5.1)
7( 5.9)
5 ( 4.3)
5 ( 4.3)
6 ( 5.1)
4 ( 3.4)
Responses
司’弓’司t
q
d
p
D
Q
U
司A
O
u
--‘
A品
EqdqLqJqLqLqFuqLqL
Mean
0.98
0.63
0.55
0.54
0.43
0.37
0.33
0.31
0.30
3 ( 2.7)
3 ( 2.7)
4( 3.4)
5 ( 4.2)
5 ( 4.3)
2 ( 1.7)
12
10
0.21
0.15
10 ( 8.8)
2 ( 1.8)
3 ( 2.5)
2 ( 1.7)
0 ( 0.0)
3 ( 2.5)
13
7
0.13
0.12
0( 0.0)
4 ( 3.5)
3( 2.7)
5 ( 4.4)
2 ( 1.8)
2 ( 1.7)
0 ( 0.0)
2 ( 1.7)
1 ( 0.9)
0 ( 0.0)
3 ( 2.5)
2 ( 1.7)
1 ( 0.8)
1 ( 0.8)
1 ( 0.8)
5
6
6
7
3
0.11
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.04
1 ( 0.9)
1 ( 0.9)
3 ( 2.7)
1 ( 0.9)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
2 ( 1.8)
1 ( 0.9)
2 ( 1.7)
2 ( 1.7)
1 ( 0.9)
O( 0.0)
O( 0.0)
1 ( 0.9)
1 ( 0.9)
0 ( 0.0)
O( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
1 ( 0.8)
1 ( 0.8)
0 ( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
q
d
q
d
a唖
qL
胃
A
’i
’Aq
L
’A
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0 ( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
O( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
0 ( 0.0)
1 ( 0.9)
0 ( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
0( 0.0)
Aり
nυnU唱
i
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
Growth in market share
Effort to achieve goals
Prediction of sales grow出
Product quality
Effort to achieve production planning
Inventory turnover
Effect of product development
New product ratio
Customer satisfaction
Total factor (labor, equipment, and
raw material, etc.) productivity
Ratio of distribution cost to total sales
Production engineering capability
(e.g., process innovation)
Safety
Jidoka of production
(i.e., manufacturing automation)
Development of human resources
Ratio of R&D cost to total sales
Engineering level (defect rates)
Important technique holding degree
Register number of industrial property
(e.g., intellectual estate productivity)
R&D capability of technological experts
Human cost-benefit
Output (performance) for one day
Return on investment to R&D
Sales according to distributors
Order number (value) of R&D
Degree of global environment protection
Reduction of labor turnover
Elasticity of equipment
(e.g., technical tie-up)
Reward and promotion system
Cleanliness
Other
customer satisfaction and safety ranked high. On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that
firms usually ignore such issues of personnel evaluation as the reduction of labor turnover, reward and
promotion systems. These results appear in Table 9. The question we have to ask here is whether the
present performance evaluation system is capable of showing the results of the overall company activi-
ties. The method of the current accounting system is not an appropriate one to prepare financial state-
men ts. In other words, it should be clear that the current accounting system reform is necess訂 yto
-118
An Empirical Study of the Perfonnance Measurement System in Japanese Manufacturing Indus甘ies
make decisions that the firm is operating effectively. We need to incorporate both financial and
nonfinancial measures to appropriately evaluate production results.
In any case, it is important for the firm to establish a new performance measurement system. In-
deed, management decision-making is influenced by the character of its incentive system for division
managers and top management. In my understanding, it has not always clear that we have been mak-
ing steady progress in the study of the relationship between managerial accounting as budget control
and the performance measurement system as a reward scheme.
Consequently, as for the evaluation of the firm, it is important to evaluate invisible capabilities such
as management power and the potential of the firm, in addition to the financial measure analyses men-
tioned before. Although it is extremely important to evaluate qualitative factors which show the poten-
tial efficiency of the firm, it is my opinion that no investigation has taken place concerning the evalua-
tion of factors. To evaluate overall performance further, top management places more emphasis on
nonfinancial than on financial measures. To summarize, top management is not satisfied with the per-
formance evaluation information provided by the present accounting measurement system.
6. Improvement of the Management Accounting System
In this study I would like to examine how to improve managerial accounting systems. These results
町 eshown in Table 10. According to the Table 10, the improvement of numerous performance mea-
sures such as s位engtheningof long-term profitability, a responsibility accounting system, measurement
Table 10 Improvement of Performance Measurement System
Mean Responses Ranking Study Group
First(%) Second(%) Third(%) Responses(%)
Strengthening of long term profi也bility 1.13 59 32 (25.8) 16 (13.0) 11 ( 9.0) 40 (36.7)
Responsibility accounting system 0.93 47 26 (21.0) 15 (12.2) 6 ( 4.9) 45 (41.3)
Measurement of productivity 0.69 45 13 (10.5) 14 01.3) 18 (14.6) 29 (26.6)
Analysis of variances仕ombudget 0.63 37 12( 9.7) 17(13.8) 8 ( 6.5) 40 (36.7)
Measurement of product development cost 0.40 25 9 ( 7.3) 6 ( 4.9) 10 ( 8.1) 35 (32.1)
Strengthening of engineering e伍ciency 0.29 16 7 ( 5.7) 6( 4.9) 3 ( 2.4) ( 4.0)
Return on investment (ROI) 0.28 18 4 ( 3.2) 8 ( 6.5) 6 ( 4.9) ( 4.0)
Increase in market share 0.25 19 3 ( 2.4) 6( 4.9) 10 ( 8.1) 19 (17.4)
Application of nonfinancial measure 0.21 12 5 ( 4.0) 4( 3.3) 3 ( 2.4) 21 (19.3)
Measurement through cost variances 0.20 15 3 ( 2.4) 4( 3.3) 8 ( 6.5) ( 5.0)
Ratio of R&D cost to sales 0.20 15 1 ( 0.8) 8 ( 6.5) 6 ( 4.9) ()
Strengthening of exceptions report 0.15 10 3 ( 2.4) 3 ( 2.4) 4( 3.3) 16 (14.7)
Not necessary 0.11 5 4( 3.2) 1 ( 0.8) 0 ( 0.0) ( 5.0)
Measurement of inventory control cost 0.11 10 0 ( 0.0) 4( 3.3) 6( 4.9) 20 (18.3)
Strengthening of short term profitability 0.03 3 0 ( 0.0) 1 ( 0.8) 2 ( 1.6) ()
Other 0.07 5 1 ( 0.8) 1 ( 0.8) 3 ( 2.4) ( 3.0)
No-response 0.33 29 1 ( 0.8) 9( 7.3) 1905.5)
Note: This Table compares my survey with the results of Study Group (1989). Effective answer number of this group’s research is 109 companies. However, blanks show no・response.
-119-
Table 11 Level of Satisfaction of Performance Evaluation Systems
Responses(%)
greately
dissatisfied
1
4 ( 3.3)
2
25(20.3)
Mean=3.008 Standard deviation=0.805
moderately
satisfied
3
62 (50.4)
Note: Mean (standard deviation) according to each type is as follows.
Defender=2.700 (0.865) Prospector=3.143 (0.756)
Analyzer=3.147 (0.738) Reactor=2.000 (0.000)
4
30 (24.4)
greately
satisfied
5
2 ( 1.6)
of productivity, analysis of variances from budget, and so on, are listed in order of rank. Likewise,
studies of the Japan Accounting Association Study Group (1989) 5 have found the same tendencies and
reached the same conclusions as I have led about the improvement of the performance measurement
system. I employed new measures and studied the firm to discover the characteristics of perfo口nance
measurement in the Japanese manufacturing sector. In any case, since these measures are ranked in
accordance to improvement prioritization, I find that each company is moderately satisfied with the
present performance measurement function of their system (see Table 11). In light of this result, it is
clear that the desire for the improvement of managerial accounting systems is considerably high.
The question we have to note in Table 10 is that the improvement order of the ratio of R&D cost
to sales and the strengthening of short-term profitability is listed as low. In an environment where
firms are住yingto intensify their international competitiveness, it is difficult to survive so long if the
firm doesn’t recognize出eimportance of such measures. Wi出 achange of times, measures of perform-
ance evaluation should be changed.
So far we have analyzed and examined the significant features of the performance measurement sys-
tem in Japanese firms. The result of this research clearly shows that Japanese firms share the follow-
ing major characteristics. The key emp仕icalfindings are:
1 . When the firm executes co叩oratestrategy, top management places emphasis on management effi-
c1ency.
2. However, division and department managers place emphasis on sales volume. There seems to be
a very important difference in goal treatment between managers.
3 . There is the tendency that firms have adopted the investment evaluation methods which are re・
lated to the innovations that the firm recognizes as an important competition factor.
4 . The percentage of firms adopting a divisional organization is quite high. In the firms adopting the
divisional head office system, there is the tendency that出emanager reviews the expanded organ-
ization and returns to a divisional organization of the top down approach.
5 . Japanese firms place emphasis on such nonfinancial measures as customer satisfaction and safety.
6 . The demand to improve the managerial accounting system is very strong.
In this section I describe the findings of this research that provides the implications of the perfor-
mance measurement and incentive system actually used in Japanese firms. Based on my analysis here,
I offer the following proposals.
-120ー
An Empiri但 lStudy of the Pertormance Measurement System in Japanese Manufacturing Indus廿ies
1 . So long as the firm gets rid of its expansionist orientation and runs itself in a low-growth econo-
my, we will need to place more emphasis on management e血ciency.
2 . As to performance evaluation, it is not enough to explain that financial measures such as profit are
at work. I suggest that nonfinancial measures are to be explained in the performance of the firm.
3 . To increase the effectiveness of an organization using responsibility accounting and analysis of
variances from budget, I offer a scheme which matches rewards to performance and strengthens
management incentives.
In the future, we will also need to verify the theoretical model based on this research data and to
analyze the relevant strategies and factors of individual firms. My findings have provided some empiri-
cal evidence of how the budget performance and rewards system may contribute to managers’incen-
tive.
In the next section, I consider two contrasting examples of the results-oriented system and the
process-oriented system.
7. Results-Oriented versus Process-Oriented Performance Evaluation
7 .1 Compensation and Incentives in Results-Oriented Evaluation
In the final section of this study we consider how organizational goals are directly related to the per-
formance appraisal of professional employees. There are still many questions which must be asked
about the relationship between performance and compensation. What kind of personnel performance
evaluation can be adapted to increase the effectiveness of the organization?
Let us begin this analysis by comparing Japanese performance evaluation and American performance
evaluation. Japanese performance evaluation is done by measuring the result of the group, but it isn’t
measured in terms of personal efficiency. On the other hand, research has revealed that the perfor-
mance evaluation system in American firms functions not only to evaluate organizational e鉦ectiveness
but also to evaluate personal e血ciency.There seems to be an important difference in the treatment of
performance evaluation between these two approaches. This difference between the individualism and
“groupism”of the two countries applies to decision-making as well. Japanese firms have the tendency
to reach decisions within group and these訂 ealso evaluated within group. Consequently, in the Japa-
nese system it is hard to explain the causal relationship between personal endeavor and eventual re骨
sult. Generally, it is said that performance and remuneration aren’t always linked and an employee is
warmly rewarded by promotion and job rotation in Japan.
The characteristics of the Japanese style management is the lifetime employment system, the se-
niority wage system, and in-house unions. These systems have played an important part in maintaining
good business results. That is, they are beneficial when the company enjoys steady growth and there
is not much variety in work contents. As for the seniority wage system, performance-based incentives
訂enever high. Most Japanese firms have not used performance-based incentives as an important part
of management control systems. From the standpoint of employees, however, it reduces the percent-
age of labor turnover, so that future wages depend on current e百ortand performance. If we don’t es-
tablish an objective indicator such as one based on performance evaluation or remuneration contract for
-121 -
performance, it will be difficult to get an accurate understanding of an employee. When the economic
~owth rate drops and business profits fall, it also becomes necessary to reform the seniority system.
Therefore, in this low growth age Japanese firms will have to change the investment preference be-
havior and improve the low labor’s distributive shares and the low returns to shareholders which has
attracted criticism仕omEuropean and North American.
Let us consider now the implications of the performance evaluation system used to increase出ein-
centives for remuneration. Levinson (1970) suggests the following process regarding management by
objectives or performance appraisal:
・To measure and judge performance.
• To relate individual performance to organizational goals.
・To clarify both the job to be done and the expectations of accomplishment.
・To foster the increasing competence and growth of the subordinate.
• To enhance communications between superior and subordinate.
• To serve as a basis for judgments about salary and promotion.
・ To stimulate the subordinate’s motivation.
・ To serve as a device for organizational control and integration. 6
In recent ye訂 s,when the firms which have adopting techniques of management by objectives assess
the financial performance, evidence that the firms are taking this process under consideration can be
seen in many cases.7 Mohrman, Jr. et al (1989) suggests that Management by objectives and review
systems are examples of results-oriented method and define performance in terms of measurable out-
comes or objectives (p. 64 and p. 142).
After all, I should note that the development of effective performance evaluation methods increases
production efficiency and reinforces incentives and rewards.
7. 2 The Use of Process-Oriented Performance Evaluation
Meyer (1994) states that the design of any performance-measurement system should reflect the basic
operating assumption of the organization it supports.8 Even if it is assumed that the measurement
system is effective with control-oriented, functional organizations, it may not always be effective in
faster and flatter team-based organizations. If the organization changes and the measurement system
doesn’t, the latter will be at best ineffective. Meyer (1994)訂gued出at:
Many managers fail to realize that results measures like profits, market share, and cost, which
may help them keep score on the performance of their businesses, do not help a multifunctional
team, or any organization, monitor the activities or capabilities that enable it to perform a given
process. Nor do such measures tell team members what they must do to improve their perfor-
mance.9
We must build a performance system thatαn use process measures effectively to activate activities in
multifunctional organizations. Mohrman, Jr. et al (1989) said:
The results-oriented appraisal was focused on planning and evaluating performance results. The
-122-
An Empiri回 lStudy of the Performance Measurement System in Japanese Manufacturing Indus甘ies
system had other purposes beyond evaluating performance (p. 70).
Because the improvement of process and the creation of result are closely related, business organi-
zation can grow smoothly. The most commonly used result measures in product development are
schedule and cost (Meyer, 1994, p. 97). One goal which is realized, for example, is a substantial sav-
ings through reduction of inventory or shortening of a business cycle. The process is different by de-
pending upon the undertaking, but it is clear that the condition common to successful businesses is
having a system to evaluate such factors as quality, cost, and time.
From the viewpoint of organizational change, the balanced scorecard procedure, Which Kaplan and
Norton (1992) suggested, 10 is probably useful to better refine and understand existing strategies. In
other words, more than a measurement exercise. the balanced scorecard is a management system出at
can motivate breakthrough improvements in such critical areas as product, process, customer, and mar-
ket development. A balanced scorecard can supplement financial indicators by measuring such elements
as customer satisfaction, reengineering, and improvement.11 Therefore, the balanced scorecard is not
just a measurement system; it is a management system to motivate breakthrough competitive perform-
ance (Kaplan and Norton, 1993, p. 142).
Because Japanese firms can anticipate good business opportunities in the future, we need to rear-
range human resources in the direction of management innovation. We will need to build a perfor-
mance measurement system, in particular, that measures the long-range strategy goals of the divisional
organization仕omsuch perspectives as customer orientation, organizational change, and competitive ad-
vantage.
8. Summary and Conclusions
I attempted to analyze the characteristics of the performance measurement system used in Japanese
firms. In this paper I have proposed the introduction of a performance evaluation which could be used
to activate employees. The reform of the managerial accounting system is necessary for firms to en-
courage new personnel policies. In particular, the refinement of the performance evaluation system as
a foundation of rewards is indispensable to stimulate employee incentives to improve performance.
Traditional financial accounting measures such as return on investment and earnings-per-share can
give misleading signals for the continuous improvement and innovation which today’s competitive envi-
ronment demands. Financial performance measures merely indicate whether the company’s strategy,
implementation, and execution are contributing to bottom-line improvement. In light of today’s business
environment, however, the another factor must be added. Should senior management even look at the
business仕oma financial perspective? Shouldn’t managers want operational measures related to cus-
tomer satisfaction, organizational innovation, and internal processes?12 Traditional financial m回 suresdo
not evaluate customer satisfaction, quality, production lead time (parts issued-products completed),加d
employee motivation. Performance measures we have considered here are not only仕omthe financial
perspective but also as a management system to improve a firm’s competitive edge.
Finally, I would like to emphasize that it is necessary to build towards a perfo口nancemanagement
system that fits organizational goals for managers and that incorporate accounting measures which sup-
port various processes. Of course it should contribute to work incentives by informing individuals
-123 -
about performance results. Even if salary and promotions don’t effect performance directly, there will
be an incentive effect for the employees. Performance measurement itself will be linked to technical
contributions, customer satisfaction, and the image of the firm.
Acknowledgement: This study was partially supported by scientific research grants仕omJapanese Min-
istry of Education.
Notes
1. Kagono et al. (1985), p. 25. In particular, they examined a number of important differences
between Japanese and American co叩oratestrategies.
2 . Hoshino (1995), p. 127.
3. See Bromwich and Inoue (1994) for a detailed empirical survey of management practices in Japa-
nese-affiliated companies in the United Kingdom.
4. See Bales and Asada (1991). They argued that the most dramatic difference between Japanese and
American companies in division budget goals was found for sales volume and return on investment
(p. 137).
5 . Japan Accounting Association Study Group (1989), p. 18.
6. Le吋nson(1970), p. 126.
7 . See, for example, Mohrman, Jr. et al. (1989). According to Mohrman, Jr. et al. (1989), an appraisal
system involves the following key issues: (1) Appraisal tools and methods, (2) Degree of fit be-
tween other features of organization and the appraisal system, (3) System design, and (4) In仕0-
duction of the system and training of individuals (p. 12).
8 . Meyer (1994), p. 95.
9. Ibid., p. 97.
10. Kaplan and Norton (1992) state that managers want a balanced presentation of both financial and
operational measures. According to Kaplan and Norton (1992), the balanced scorecard allows man-
agers to look at the business from four important perspectives. It provides answers to four basic
questions: (1) How do customers see us? (customer perspective), (2) What must we excel at? (in-
ternal perspective), (3) Can we continue to improve and create value? (innovation and learning
perspective), (4) How do we look to shareholders? (financial perspective) (pp. 71-72).
11. Kaplan and Norton (1993), p. 134.
12. See Prietura and Simon (1989). They argue that innovation comes仕omthose employees with ex-
tensive job experience and knowledge, good intuition, and the ability (and desire) to see their jobs
仕omseveral perspectives (p. 124).
-124 -
An Empirical Study of the Performance Measurement System in Japanese Manufacturing Indus出回
References
Bales, Jack C. and Takayuki Asa也.1991.“Empiriαl Differences Between Japanese and American Bud-
get and Performance Evaluation Systems.”The International journal of Accounti昭, Vol.26 No. 2:
131-142.
Bromwich, Michael and Shin’ichi Inoue. 1994. Management Practices and Cost management Problet府間
Japanese -Affiliated白mpaniesin the United Ki勾ぬm,CIMA Publishing.
Hoshino, Yuta. 1992.αゅorateStrategy and the Accounting Information System: Theoretical and Empiri-
cal Research on Environment and α-ganization, Taga-Shuppan [in Japanese].
. 1995.“The Performance Measurement and Evaluation System in Japanese Firms: An Empiri-
cal Study.”白ゆorateAccozmti昭, Vol.47 No. 2: 127-133. [in Japanese].
Japan Accounting Association Study Group. 1989.“The Empirical Study Concerning International Com-
parison of Performance Control Accounting.”September : 1-83 [in Japanese].
Kagono, Tadao et al. 1985. Strategic vs. Evolutionary Management: A U. S. -japan Comparison of Strat-
切, and Organization, Translated from Nichi-Bei Kigyo No Keiei Hikaku [in Japanese]. New York:
Elsevier North-Holland.
Kaplan, Robert S. and David P. Norton. 1992.
mance.”Hαrvαrd Business Review, January-February: 71-79.
. 1993.“Putting the Balanced Scorecard to Work.”Harvard Business Review, September-Octo-
her: 134-147.
Levinson, Harry. 1970.“Management by Whose Objectives?”Harvard Business Review, July-August: 125
-134.
Meyer, Christopher. 1994.“How the Right Measures Help Teams Excel.”Harvard Business Review,
May-June: 95-103.
Mohrman, Jr., Allen M., Susan M. Resnick-West, and Edward E. Lawler Ill. 1989. Designing
Performanse Appraisal Systems, Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Prietura, Michael J. and Herbert A. Simon. 1989.“The Experts in Your Midst.”Harvard Business
Review, January-February: 120-124.
-125 -