The Institutional Identity of Regional Organizations, OrMercosur’s Identity Crisis1

Andrea Oelsner

University of Aberdeen

In the last 15 years, the link between identity and regional institutions has received considerable academic attention,especially from EU scholars. Mostly, their focus has been on the ways in which European institutions affect, constrain, orconstitute (or otherwise) state’s and individual actor’s behavior and identities. By contrast, international relations hasbeen strikingly silent on the question of the identity of regional institutions. However, studying an institution’s identitycan highlight important aspects of its ‘‘quality of life’’; not least its ability to interact with other international actors andwith its own constituent parts. This article argues that a clear identity is necessary for the organization to project itselfinternally, internationally, and temporally. The question of institutional identity—and the risks of failing to constructone—is explored by looking at the case of Mercosur, an association which, the article argues, suffers from identity crisesin its three main identity dimension: political, economic and external.

In the last 15 years, much international relations (IR)research on international institutions has focused on thelink between identity and institutions. In particular, workon European integration from a social constructivist per-spective has investigated how European institutions affect,constrain, or constitute (or otherwise) states’ and individ-ual actors’ behavior and identities. By contrast, IR hasbeen strikingly silent on the question of the identity ofregional and international institutions. However, institu-tions develop around clear ideas, goals, and interests thatwork as a centripetal force making membership and par-ticipation appealing to members and potential members,and on which these base their support for the institution.In time, these ideas, goals, and interests may become acentral part of the institution’s ‘‘character’’; they maycome to define it. Thus, studying an institution’s identitycan highlight important aspects of its ‘‘quality of life’’,not least its ability to interact with other internationalactors and with its own constituent parts. The question ofan institution’s quality of life is appropriate given thatwith remarkably few exceptions, once regional organiza-tions are created, they rarely disappear. Indeed, ratherthan being dissolved, most often unsuccessful organiza-tions become irrelevant and fall ‘‘into dormancy’’, to useHettne’s (2005:547) words.

In this context, this article has two main purposes. Thefirst is to develop the notion of ‘‘institutional identity’’;

the second is to assess Mercosur’s success in construct-ing one.2 The article argues that a clear identity is neces-sary for an organization to project itself not onlyinternally and internationally, but also temporally,increasing its visibility and relevance. Internally, it pro-jects its image onto member states and their public opin-ion, which are the source of its political legitimacy.Internationally, the projection onto regional and interna-tional actors of a defined image constructed (partly)upon its institutional identity (and partly upon the con-gruence between that identity on the one hand and theinstitution’s actions and behavior on the other)3 contrib-utes toward the organization’s credibility, recognition,and reputation. Finally, temporally, a solidly structuredinstitutional identity helps to convey internally and exter-nally the idea of the organization’s continuing relevanceinto the future; that its continuity will transcend mereinertial permanence.

The question of institutional identity is explored in thisarticle by looking at Mercosur. This is a challenging casegiven that despite a promising start, Mercosur has so farfallen short of the goal that its very name proclaims:becoming the Common Market of the South. Since thebeginning of the twenty-first century, intra-Mercosur politi-cal convergence and economic and trade achievementshave dwindled. The dynamism of Mercosur’s externalagenda has somewhat compensated for the lack of progresson its internal front. Thus, while the association’s internalsense of purpose was diluting, members found a source ofcohesion around Mercosur’s external negotiations. How-

1 Fieldwork for this paper was carried out in August–September 2006 inArgentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. I am grateful to the British Academy and theCarnegie Trust for their financial support, as well as to the government offi-cials and academics in all three countries who shared their views with me inconfidential interviews and conversations over this time. For helpful commentsand encouragement, I would like to thank the editor of ISQ, the anonymousreviewers, Gian Luca Gardini, Miriam Gomes Saraiva, Andres Malamud, SergioCaballero Santos, Marysia Zalewski, Mustapha K. Pasha, Michael E. Smith, andNeil Mitchell. I would also like to thank the audiences at ECPR-Potsdam 2009,the Research Seminar at the University of Aberdeen in 2010, the LatinAmerican Series at the University of Glasgow in 2010, and the Research Semi-nar at the University of Lancaster in 2010 for thought-provoking questionsand comments.

2 Mercour (Mercosul, in Portuguese) was created on March 26, 1991, byArgentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,Peru, and Venezuela have become associated members, and Mexico has obser-ver status. In 2006, Venezuela started the process to become Mercosur’s fifthfull member, eventually completing it in 2012.

3 In this sense, Berenskoetter (2010:3601) contends that ‘‘[i]dentityclaims are enhanced or undermined by certain practices, that is, what one ‘is’(or wants to be) is sustained by what one ‘does’ […].’’

Oelsner, Andrea. (2012) The Institutional Identity of Regional Organizations, Or Mercosur’s Identity Crisis. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111 ⁄ isqu.12033� 2012 International Studies Association

International Studies Quarterly (2013) 57, 115–127

ever, in the course of the first decade of 2000, Mercosur’sidentity crisis has involved the external dimension too.

A note of caution is appropriate here. Other, moreconventional IR studies based on neorealist, neoliberal,and institutionalist approaches have explained Mercosur’sexistence and survival as well as inadequacies (Hurrell2001; Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002; Malamud 2003;Gomez Mera 2005; Oelsner 2005; Malamud and Schmit-ter 2006). The present analysis is not a critique of thesestudies; rather, it aims to shed light on a contributing fac-tor to Mercosur’s success, or lack thereof—namely, its(in)capacity to construct a coherent institutional identity.

In what follows, the argument proceeds in three mainparts. The first two are primarily theoretical, focusing ondiscussions about institutional identity, with only generalreferences to its empirical manifestation in differentregional institutions. Borrowing heavily from Organiza-tional Studies, it is argued that international institu-tions—and among them regional organizations—need topossess a distinct identity in order to obtain the necessarysupport and legitimacy from their members, and to inter-act effectively and gain relevance in the regional andinternational arena. The third section is largely empirical,tracing Mercosur’s construction of an institutional iden-tity and analyzing its current identity crisis. This partfocuses on three dimensions of Mercosur’s iden-tity—political, economic, and external.

International Relations and the Identity of Institutions

The term ‘‘identity’’, understood as the identity of regio-nal organizations—what is called here institutional iden-tity—differs from the notion of ‘‘regional identity’’ as hasbeen more widely studied in IR. In particular, the disci-pline’s understanding of regional identity arose mainlyfrom the field of European ⁄ EU Studies to refer to theemergence of shared feelings of loyalty, solidarity, andcommon belonging among citizens of the EU statestoward one another, or of EU citizens toward Europeaninstitutions. Questions at the heart of this concept ofregional identity have typically focused on whether or notcitizens of the European Union (or EU officials) havedeveloped a European identity, what this identity is, whatits relationship is to national identities, what the role ofEuropean institutions is in the construction of this Euro-pean identity, and how all of this has changed individualand state actors’ behavior, interests, and beliefs.4

Such an understanding of regional identity is partlyexplained by the fact that, in the context of the structure-agent divide, international institutions in general, andEU and European institutions in particular are seen aspertaining to the structure. Take, for instance, Checkel’s(1999:546–548) three institutionalisms—rational-choice,historical, and sociological. Even his preferred, thicksociological institutionalism treats institutions as stronglyindependent variables that constitute identity and behav-ior of actors, rather than as agents themselves capable ofpossessing an identity. As a consequence, research hasbeen concerned with how the structure ⁄ institution ⁄ Euro-pean Union constrains the interests and identity of theagent ⁄ state ⁄ citizen, or, according to social constructivism,how they mutually constitute one another. A similar treat-ment of regional identity has been the focus of a number

of studies on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,ASEAN (Acharya 1997; Busse 1999; Nabers 2003; Jones2004).

This article, instead, treats regional institutions asagents in their own right, and as such capable of develop-ing their own institutional identity. This approach hasfound limited space within IR theory, where the existenceand importance of institutional identity has at best beenimplicitly assumed rather than discussed, and often noteven that. In an exception, Fierke and Wiener (1999)devote an entire article to discussing the identity of theEuropean Union and NATO as institutions. However, whilethey raise the important theoretical question of ‘‘how insti-tutional identities and interests are transformed’’ (Fierkeand Wiener 1999:723), they leave untouched the ontologi-cally prior questions of whether and why it is appropriateto talk about institutional identity as different from theidentity, or shared identity, of the institutions’ memberstates, what this institutional identity is, why it is importantfor institutions to have an identity, and so on.

More implicitly, the idea of institutional identity in thesense proposed here has been taken up in some of theliterature about ASEAN and ASEM (Asia–Europe Meet-ing) (see Gilson 2002; Reiterer 2004). For instance, the‘‘ASEAN way’’, guaranteeing the principle of consultationand consensus, informality, flexibility, and non-interfer-ence in domestic affairs, appears to be central to theinstitutional identity of ASEAN (although a critical view isshown below). Member states can see themselvesreflected in the ASEAN way, which thus promotesengagement with and cohesion within the regional orga-nization. In addition, the ASEAN way is a feature thatexternal actors recognize as distinctive to ASEAN andthat contributes to the association’s predictability in theirdealings with it, thus serving both the external andtemporal institutional projection as well.

In most other IR studies, the issue of institutionalidentity is touched upon even more indirectly via notionssuch as regionness and actorness. According to Hettne(2005: 548 and 556), these are closely related and com-plementary phenomena. While ‘‘regionness defines theposition of a particular region in terms of regional cohe-sion […]’’, ‘‘actorness defines the capability to influencethe external environment’’, a capability which resultsfrom both ‘‘the strengthened ‘presence’ of the regionalunit in different contexts’’—a stronger level region-ness—as well as its interaction with other actors. In thissense, some have talked about ‘‘East Asianness’’ and‘‘Europeanness’’ (Hettne 2001; Gilson 2002).

From this perspective, interregionalism—or dialogueand negotiation processes between regions—contributesto promoting and strengthening both regionness and ac-torness (Gilson 2002; Hanggi 2003; Hanggi, Roloff, andRuland 2006). For Reiterer (2004:6), ‘‘analogue to statesin the international system, interaction between regionsleads to constructing identities through mutual recogni-tion, reference and assertion.’’ This case can be made forthe Mercosur–EU dialogue. Yet, while negotiating as abloc may have proved a positive exercise for Mercosur interms of identity construction, the protracted and diffi-cult course of these biregional negotiations has also high-lighted inherent weaknesses within the organization.

This brief, by no means exhaustive review shows thatIR has failed to fully engage in a discussion of regionalinstitutional identity. Generally, rather than studying theidentity of institutions (institutional identity), research hasfocused on identity within institutions (collective identity),

4 This has become a prolific field in the past 20 years. Among many oth-ers, see Wendt (1994); Risse–Kappen (1996); Checkel (1999); Cederman(2001a); Herrmann, Risse, and Brewer (2004); Checkel (2007).

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taking institutions for social aggregates—collectivities orgroups of individuals. As a consequence, identity isunderstood as common perceptions and feelings amongmembers. An institutional identity approach, instead, seesorganizations as ontological social actors in their ownright. As such, they interact socially as if the collectivitywere a single individual, its institutionalized identityclaims being available to members (Whetten and Mackey2002:395; see also Whetten 2006). The next section turnsto Organizational Studies to flesh out a notion of institu-tional identity and highlight how it can be useful to IR.

Institutional Identity, Organizational Identity, andOrganizational Studies

Defining Institutional Identity

The question of the identity of organizations has beenaddressed explicitly in the field of Organizational Stud-ies (OS) (see Albert and Whetten 1985; Dutton andDukerich 1991; Albert, Ashforth, and Dutton 2000; Gioia,Schultz, and Corley 2000, 2002; Pruzan 2001; Whettenand Mackey 2002; Whetten 2006).5 Many of the insightsderived from this scholarship can enrich an IR under-standing of the functioning of international organiza-tions. They can help explain why organizations becomerelevant or irrelevant to their own members and in theirsocial international realm beyond objective measurementsof trade, economic compatibility, power capabilities, andso on. Paraphrasing Whetten and Mackey (2002), this sec-tion examines the main propositions of ‘‘a social actorconception of institutional identity’’, which informs thesubsequent analysis of the identity of Mercosur.

OS scholars generally agree that organizations possessidentities and identity requirements.6 Whetten and Mac-key (2002; see also Whetten 2006) apply the principle offunctional equivalence to suggest that collective actorsneed identity in the same way as individual actors do.Starting off from this assumption, they develop a concep-tion of identity of collective social actors by drawing uponthe requirements and functions of identity of individualsocial actors.

Like individuals, collective social actors need a self-definition or self-concept in order to act and interacteffectively within their social environment. It is throughthis self-concept that they—whether organizations orhumans—can fulfill the need for both belonging to a lar-ger category and uniqueness: by perceiving themselves atthe same time as similar to, and different from otheractors of their kind. In addition, a self-concept gives thema sense of permanence, of being the same despite thepassage of time. Finally, it helps other actors in the sys-tem to perceive the collectivity as one, facilitating effec-tive social interaction. As Albert et al. (2000:13)summarize, identity and identification ‘‘simultaneouslyconvey distinctiveness and oneness (for example, of anorganization, group, or individual), while allowing forblurring, multiplicity, and dynamism in identity contentand process.’’

This is significant given that identities are not immuta-ble. While certain stability in the core contents of aninstitution’s identity contributes to its temporal projec-tion, identities do change in response to contextual trans-formations (see Gioia et al. 2000). The capacity of aninstitution to adapt its identity, and often also its organi-zational structure, to a new environment proves crucial tothe way it relates to the world. This is reflected, forinstance, in the call of ASEAN’s former Secretary Gen-eral, Rodolfo Severino (quoted in Reiterer 2004:3), forthe association to revise the ASEAN way if it ‘‘is tocontinue to be relevant and effective in the twenty-firstcentury.’’

There are, however, limitations to the individual ⁄ collec-tive identity analogy. One of them relates to individualshaving inherent characteristics that precede the identityarticulation process, such as a sex, or certain physical orethnic characteristics. In other words, their identity issocially constructed, but some of their features areinnate. By contrast, collective social actors, beingthemselves social artifacts created by other (individual orcollective) actors to fulfill specific purposes, lack them.Not only is their identity socially constructed, but theyare social constructions themselves (Whetten and Mackey2002:397).

Combining the functional equivalence principle withinstitutional theory’s claim that organizations are createdfrom a number of available organizational forms, Whet-ten and Mackey (2002) argue that founding members’early organizational choices are to collective identity whatindividuals’ inherent characteristics are to individualidentity. Functionally, they play a similar role, eventhough their structure is different. Thus, when a groupof international actors decides to establish a defense alli-ance, a UN specialized agency, or a free trade agreement,they choose from different organizational forms andmake an initial ‘‘placement’’ of the organization into anidentity category. As is further discussed below, the initialdecision that Mercosur should become a common marketrepresents one such constituting choice, currently at thecenter of its identity crisis.

It is the constructed nature of institutions that makestheir having a clear identity especially important. WhilePruzan (2001:276) argues that having an institutionalidentity can play an important role in determining orga-nizational viability and success, Whetten (2006:223) fur-ther contends that whereas ‘‘a chronic mistaken identityis troublesome for individuals, it is a fatal flaw for organi-zations.’’ Despite the earlier observation that interna-tional institutions rarely disappear, on occasions they candisappear. Indeed, there have been a few cases in whichorganizations became too irrelevant and ceased having areason to exist, and eventually did dissolve.7

International relations scholars tend to implicitlyagree with the claim that not having a clear and forcefulidentity undermines a regional institution’s relevanceand efficiency. For instance, in opposition to the claimmade above about the identity of ASEAN, for Jones andSmith (2007:175), far from being a feature of the asso-ciation’s identity, the ASEAN way is a rhetorical claim oflittle substance that has ultimately weakened the associa-

5 In OS, organizational identity studies a wide range of organizations, frombusinesses and transnational companies to public and local organizations suchas hospitals, schools, and football clubs. This article, instead, uses the terminstitutional identity to highlight the main difference between the organizationsstudied in OS and those studied in IR—namely, the nature of their member-ship. Whereas in the former the members are individuals, in the latter mem-bership is made up of collective actors (states).

6 For a critical view, though, see Cornelissen 2002.

7 The League of Nations and the Latin American Free Trade Associationdisappeared, although it could be argued that the United Nations and theLatin American Integration Association, respectively, replaced them. Also theWarsaw Pact and Comecon were disbanded in 1991.

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tion’s capacity to deal collectively with the economiccrisis:

Between 1990 and 1997 ASEAN’s assertion of regional har-mony, concord, consensus and stability served only to obscurethe reality of a loose collection of insecure post-colonial states,briefly united for a few decades by their self-denying ordinanceof non-interference in their internal affairs and a shared oppo-sition to communism, leaving them ill-prepared for the condi-tions of durable international disorder that would confrontthem after 1997.

In sum, it has been argued that organizations arecollective social actors that can, in time, become morethan the sum of their members. As social actors, theyhave similar needs for similar attributes to those of indi-viduals if they are to interact effectively in their socialenvironment. Having an identity is one such attribute:both individual and collective social actors need identityfor comparable purposes. In the particular case of aregional organization, the importance of developing asense of actorness and identity is that a sharper ‘‘self-view’’ facilitates the identification of its own (institu-tional) interests, definition of its own (institutional) goalsand strategies, and formulation and implementation ofagreed regional policy. Yet, as Wendt (1999:231) con-tends, the relationship between identities and interests isintertwined to the point that ultimately the two work intandem:

Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot knowwhat it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities havevarying degrees of cultural content so will interests. Identitiesmay themselves be chosen in light of interests, as some ratio-nalists have argued, but those interests themselves presupposestill deeper identities […]. Without interests identities have nomotivational force, without identities interests have no direc-tion.

Finally, a clear identity makes the organization morevisible in the regional and international arena, buildingand stabilizing the organization’s image.

Some Ontological and Methodological Notes

The study of the institutional identity of regional organi-zations brings to the fore at least two difficulties. The firstis ontological, and the second methodological. Ontologi-cally, questions about how institutional identities are con-stituted and what the role of leadership is in the identityconfiguration process need to be resolved.8 The method-ological difficulty refers to the very challenging (for theresearcher) nature of identities. How do we know aninstitutional identity when we see one, or rather how dowe see one? After all, ‘‘‘[i]dentity’ is neither an objectnor a causal force. Rather, it is a concept: it is a discursivetool that is used by actors ⁄ agents to accomplish socialtasks in a given context’’ (Slocum and van Langenhove2004:230).

The study of Mercosur’s institutional identity adds athird difficulty, and that is the attempt to explain notonly Mercosur’s institutional identity, but also its institu-tional identity crisis. After some ontological and method-ological clarifications next, the following section tracesthe construction of Mercosur’s early institutional identity

and exposes the organization’s more recent problems interms of a loss of clarity concerning its identity.

Given the structural differences between internationalorganizations and their institutional identity on the onehand and individual actors and their identity on theother, the process of their identity constitution will differsubstantially too. At least three main analytical elementscan be distinguished as feeding into the process of iden-tity formation of an international organization: inspiredindividual leadership, a leading state (or states), and theprocess of social interaction.

Firstly, inspired leadership by one or more individualsworking toward establishing the institution can influenceits identity articulation. Robert Schuman and especiallyJean Monnet and Herni Spaak are generally credited forleaving a durable imprint on the early construction ofthe European Communities’ identity. According toDosman (2006), Raul Prebisch played a similar role dur-ing the first wave of Latin American integration (see alsoMalamud 2010), contributing to shaping the character ofLatin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). In theSouthern Cone, a region where presidential systems withstrong Executives predominate, the inspired leadershipleaving a mark on Mercosur’s incipient identity is associ-ated with the figures of Presidents Raul Alfonsın (Argen-tina) and Jose Sarney (Brazil).

The second element in institutional identity formationis the leadership of one member state or axis of states.The notion of a state playing a prominent role in theidentity configuration of a regional organization resem-bles Walter Mattli’s (1999) concept of institutional leaderor paymaster, although in Mattli’s conception the leaderperforms a different function. In the European Union,for instance, Germany has usually been identified as thepaymaster given its willingness ‘‘to ease distributionaltensions through generous side-payments’’ (Mattli1999:100).

Closer to the concept of ‘‘leading state ⁄ s’’ used hereis Adler and Barnett’s (1998:39) ‘‘core state’’ in securitycommunities. Core states have the power ⁄ authority to‘‘determine shared meaning that constitutes the ‘we-feel-ing’ and practices of states and the conditions whichconfer, defer, or deny access to the community and thebenefits it bestows on its members.’’ However, Adlerand Barnett’s core states appear to contribute towardwhat was called above collective identity. Instead, therole of leading states in an organization’s identity forma-tion relates to their capacity to influence the institu-tion’s form, content, and other main characteristics. Forinstance, Laursen (2007:12) suggests that in the earlystages of European integration, Dutch insistence on thecreation of a common market shaped the identity of theEconomic Community. In addition, Germany’s ownexpression of Europeanness is often said to have fedinto the European Union’s institutional identity. InMercosur, where paymasters have been difficult to find,the Argentine–Brazilian axis—or ‘‘strategic alliance’’, aslocal political leaders have frequently termedit—has been most substantial in Mercosur’s cognitiveconfiguration.

Finally, the third element contributing to shaping insti-tutional identity is the process of interaction between theinstitution and its social environment. Three types of inter-action are discerned here. The first two are intra-institu-tional and refer to the interaction of the institution’smember states among themselves, and between the institu-tion as an actor and its membership. Intra-institutional

8 I would like to thank one anonymous reviewer for pointing this out andsuggesting helpful examples.

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interaction allows members to negotiate—beyond andin addition to the influence of the leading state ⁄ s—whatkind organization they want to create or have createdand what they would like their organization to looklike and do. It also allows them to develop a senseof shared ownership of and shared belonging to theorganization.

The third type of interaction is between the institutionand other international state and nonstate actors. Thisextra-institutional instance echoes the relationshipbetween Self and Other and the impact of that relation-ship on Self’s identity constitution, as discussed in socialpsychology. As Berenskoetter (2010:3602) observes,‘‘[t]he widely accepted view among IR scholars […] isthat a sense of Self is socially constructed with or againstcertain ‘Others’.’’ Similarly, Jepperson, Wendt, andKatzenstein (1996) argue that there is a form of identitywhich is relationally defined within a social structurethrough interaction with other actors. The claim that theEuropean Union has spurred collective identity buildingand acted as an ‘‘external federator’’ in its relations withEast Asia, Mercosur and the Southern African Develop-ment Community (Hanggi et al. 2006:9–12; see alsoGilson 2002; Hanggi 2003; Ruland 2006:308–310) can beadjusted for the study of institutional (rather than collec-tive) identity building.

Regarding the methodology used to see identity, auseful start is to adapt the classic OS definition of organi-zational identity to the case of international institutions.In a seminal article, Albert and Whetten (1985; furtherelaborated in Whetten 2006) defined organizational iden-tity as the central, enduring, and distinctive features ofan organization’s character. For international institutions,a further qualification is required. In addition to identitybeing about the central and enduring features that distin-guish an institution from others, identity must also referto those features that represent the source of internalinstitutional cohesion. They are, in a sense, those centraland enduring attributes that make states want to be andstay members of that institution rather than another one,however similar it may be.

While the capacity of external projection serves thefunction of presenting the institution’s distinctiveness tothe outside—thus enhancing effective extra-institutionalinteraction—providing cohesion relates to its internalidentity projection, working as one mechanism holdingmembers together. This is all the more important forregional or subsystemic organizations with a smallermembership. In these cases, the departure of one or twomembers may represent a major threat to its existence,one to which international organizations with a largermembership are less exposed. For instance, the UN orthe Commonwealth of Nations can afford seeing a few(non-central) members leave without it causing an institu-tional crisis in a way that Mercosur, with only four fullmembers, cannot.9

While both identity and its central, enduring, distin-guishing and cohesive attributes are unobservable, theireffects can be seen in an institution’s unique pattern ofbinding commitments, organizational choices, and iden-tity-revealing discourse. In a regional association made upof collective actors (states), the motivations, interests, andidentities of the founding members constrain theirchoice of organizational forms, which feeds into the con-

struction of the organization’s profile and identity. Theinstitutional identity gradually crystallizes in a series ofboth normative and discursive statements that definewhat the institution is; what its purpose, goals, and limitsare; how it plans to achieve them, and so on. This is donethrough treaties, agreements, protocols, and other officialdocuments as well as through declarations, speeches, andpublic gestures.

Mercosur’s Institutional Identity

The remainder of this article analyzes Mercosur’s identityconstruction by tracing references to it in constitutivedocuments and other identity-revealing discourse. It isargued that in the past decade Mercosur has sufferedfrom identity crises, and that these have not been effec-tively resolved. Although not the only factor, this situa-tion contributes to explaining the organization’s currentslowdown. As shown below, Mercosur’s early identity artic-ulation developed along three central dimensions, eachwith its own central, enduring, distinguishing, and cohe-sive features. First, a political dimension evolved aroundthe principle of democracy, and was defined in opposi-tion to both the members’ authoritarian past and thenondemocratic regimes in the rest of Latin America. Sec-ondly, an economic dimension, expressed in the nameMercosur ⁄ Common Market of the South chosen for theassociation, reflected the normative ideal of preventingunderdevelopment. Finally, an external dimension builtaround the self-perception and projected image of beinga bloc was articulated against the prospect of becominginsignificant in the international realm. The first twoidentity dimensions require focusing on Mercosur’s inter-nal dynamics. The third dimension shifts the focus toMercosur’s external agenda and international action. Foreach dimension, key institutional decisions (choices, com-mitments), decision failures, official documents, and pub-lic speeches—both of Mercosur as an organization and oftheir member states—as well as material gathered frominterviews with regional officials are examined and ana-lyzed within the broader political context in which theyemerged.

The Political Identity of Mercosur

The project of Mercosur was born out of political asmuch as—if not more than—economic motivations. Theweight of its political dimension explains at least in partwhy its initial design was based on gradualism (sectoralagreements), and why cooperation included most sensi-tive areas, such as nuclear technology and biotechnology(see Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002).

The single most important political issue that stoodout since Mercosur’s inception and soon became a cen-tral, enduring, distinguishing, and cohesive attribute ofthe organization was the principle of democracy. Theneed to consolidate the democratic transitions in theSouthern Cone and throughout South America was thekey motivation for creating Mercosur, just as avoiding arenewed Franco–German confrontation underlay thefounding of the European Coal and Steel Community.Precisely because it was so central, it also functioned as acohesive feature. Argentina and Brazil first, and Uruguayand Paraguay along them later, planned, created, andstayed in Mercosur because Mercosur’s democratic profilehelped them consolidate their own democratic institu-tions.

9 This was correct at the time of writing. In 2012, though, Mercosuraccepted Venezuela as a full member, taking the number of members to five.

119Andrea Oelsner

The place given to democracy by the leading axisformed by Brazil and Argentina can be traced throughthe three bilateral documents that comprise the run-upto Mercosur: the 1985 Iguazu Declaration, the 1986Integration Act establishing the Program for EconomicIntegration and Cooperation (PICE), and the 1988Argentine–Brazilian Treaty of Integration, Cooperationand Development. The text of these agreements, andtheir negotiation and implementation mechanisms reflectthe centrality of politics and democracy to the integrationproject.

Regarding the text of the documents, the 1985 declara-tion’s final paragraph (Declaracao do Iguacu 1985) readsthat the presidents

emphatically reaffirmed that the democratization process thatthe continent experiences ought to lead to greater rapproche-ment and integration between the peoples of the region. […][D]emocracy must necessarily mean peace, freedom and socialjustice; [and the presidents] committed themselves to spare noeffort for societies that privilege the principles of human dignity,cooperation, solidarity, peace and welfare to live together in thiscontinent. They concluded by pointing out that Brazilian–Argentine bilateral relations will be an example of this ideal.10

A similar tone is present in the Integration Act (Actapara la Integracion Argentino–Brasilena 1986):

[T]his program [PICE] constitutes a renewed thrust towardLatin American integration and the consolidation of peace,democracy, security, and development in the region.

The 1988 Treaty (Tratado de Integracion 1988) is thefirst of these documents to make no mention of demo-cratic consolidation, its content concentrating overwhelm-ingly on economic issues. Nonetheless, its negotiationand implementation followed the same pattern as the twoprevious agreements, revealing the continuing predomi-nance of political motivations. Firstly, the treaty explicitlystipulates that the foreign affairs ministries were to coor-dinate the integration process (Tratado de Integracion1988, article 6), just as in the Iguazu Declaration (Declar-acao do Iguacu 1985, paragraph 19) and the IntegrationAct (Acta para la Integracion Argentino–Brasilena 1986,paragraphs 3–6). Secondly, despite recognizing thatinvolving business representatives was desirable, they wereleft outside the negotiations (Declaracao do Iguacu 1985,paragraphs 18 and 22; Acta para la Integracion Argenti-no–Brasilena 1986, paragraph 2). This exposes the pri-marily political objectives of the treaty—consolidation ofdemocracy and bilateral rapprochement—rather thaneconomic ones (Gardini 2006). The secondary roleplayed by trade becomes even clearer when one observesthe hitherto low levels of bilateral and regional exchange.Indeed, integration could never have responded to theneed to manage interdependence as there was hardly anyat the beginning of the process. With these choices, theArgentine–Brazilian leading axis marked the inception ofMercosur with a political imprint.

Cederman (2001b:7) finds that ‘‘in order to under-stand the interactive logic of identity formation […] theattention of the analyst should not be confined to thesymbolic sources of internal unity but must be extendedto the ‘ritual of inclusion and exclusion’.’’ The weight ofthe democratic norm in the Southern Cone acted,accordingly, as this symbol that would provide partici-

pants with internal (intraproject) cohesion as well asestablishing who was and who was not invited to the dia-logue.

By erecting the democratic norm as the condition forparticipation, the leading states of this process respondedto two different challenges. The first related to theirinternal need to strengthen (fragile) democratic institu-tions and weaken the leverage of their military corpora-tion in domestic politics. To this end, playing downbilateral disputes and pooling efforts to build not just abilateral ‘‘democratic alliance’’ but rather a ‘‘democraticregion’’ around them—that is, promoting the rule of lawacross Latin America—appeared as an effective strategyconsistent with their principles.

The second challenge involved avoiding making themistakes of previous integration attempts. Lessons drawnfrom LAFTA and LAIA (Latin American IntegrationAssociation) taught them not to design overambitiousprograms. Including states with political regimes incom-patible with their own was perceived as overambitious.Historian Botana (1991:25) summarizes this moral: ‘‘thenotable expansion of democratic legitimacy in our regionis, thus, the inescapable basis of integration processes.[…] We have already seen that economic integrationprocesses without political content are inconducive.’’

The initial exclusion of Paraguay from the Mercosurnegotiations symbolizes the threshold marked bydemocracy. While Uruguay had participated in theArgentine–Brazilian summits leading up to integration,Paraguay was not invited to join in until after thedictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner had fallen in 1989.Moreover, Asuncion’s main incentive for seeking inclu-sion in Mercosur was the conviction that belonging to acommunity of democratic states would help it againstpolitical instability (Kaltenthaler and Mora 2002). Ineffect, during the 1996 attempted coup d’etat, Paraguay’spartners in Mercosur played an important role in itsconstitutional resolution (Valenzuela 1997). This showsthat while democracy has been an identity attributeoriginally promoted by the leading states, it has also beenone reproduced in the process of interaction amongmembers and between Mercosur and its constituent parts(intra-institutional interaction).

It could be argued that by 1991, when Mercosur wasofficially established, the principle of democracy hadgiven way to issues more closely related to the actual eco-nomic aspects of integration; that democracy had beendisplaced from the core of the institution’s identity. Bythen Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay had successfully heldpresidential elections for a second time since the fall oftheir dictatorships, leaving the transition period behind.Also, the text of the Treaty of Asuncion itself revolvesaround the goals, instruments, and structure of the eco-nomic integration program, omitting any mention ofdemocracy or rule of law.

In the years that followed, however, nearly every post-summit presidential declaration made references to eco-nomic integration as being a tool of democratic consoli-dation.11 Furthermore, following the 1996 coup attemptin Paraguay, Mercosur states signed the ‘‘democratic com-mitment’’, stipulating that democracy was an essentialcondition for participation in the organization, and thatthe breakdown of the rule of law in a member state could

10 All translations from Spanish or Portuguese originals are mine.

11 For the text of all joint presidential declarations, see http: ⁄ ⁄ www.mercosur.int ⁄ t_ligaenmarco.jsp?title=off&contentid=90&version=1&channel=secretaria&seccion=4. (Accessed August 28, 2009).

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result in its expulsion from Mercosur (see DeclaracionPresidencial 1996). In 1998, this declaration of principlebecame part of the Treaty of Asuncion through theadoption of the Protocol of Ushuaia (see Protocolo deUshuaia 1998).

Democratic consolidation was thus a central element inintra-institutional interaction dynamics, feeding intoMercosur’s political identity articulation. Democracyacted, to a large extent, as that ‘‘idea’’ around which theefforts of the Southern Cone states converged; as thecohesive force that moved the integration process for-ward. Several types of discursive references reveal the cen-tral, enduring, distinguishing, and cohesive quality of thedemocratic principle to the association’s institutionalidentity. Not only did regional documents and declara-tions make recurrent and consistent reference to it, butalso political leaders oriented their regional actions inaccordance with values associated with democracy, suchas promoting peaceful relations, transparency, dialogue,and trust and confidence building (Oelsner 2009). Theseveral mutual visits to hitherto unacknowledged nucleartechnology plants that the Brazilian and Argentine presi-dents carried out in the late 1980s symbolized their com-mitment to overcoming old suspicions and constructing aregional democratic and peaceful alliance. In addition,democratic rule became a condition for participation inMercosur—implicit during its first few years, and explicitsince 1998. Finally, this institutional ideational core hasbeen consistent with domestic practice despite grave chal-lenges—as well as Paraguay, also Argentina and Brazilunderwent major constitutional crises, but all have suc-ceeded in maintaining institutional continuity.12

Although still central, enduring, and distinguishing,with its consolidation, democracy as a political identityattribute has gradually lost in cohesion capacity. Yes, it isstill important, and no, it would not be Mercosur ifdemocracy were not present in every state—after all, it isa normative requirement for membership. But sincedemocracy can now to some extent be taken for granted,the weakness and contradictions of other potential cen-tral, enduring, distinguishing, and cohesive political attri-butes have surfaced.13 This erosion of Mercosur’spolitical identity has been a gradual process, somewhatintensified by the relegation of politics during the 1990s.The adoption of neoliberalism, technocracy and unilat-eral economic opening in the Southern Cone meant theabandonment of the gradualist, flexible, and sectoralapproach to integration, resulting in the sharp commer-cial turn of Mercosur. Increasingly, the notion of ‘‘openregionalism’’ began to be associated with Mercosur, as itsmention in most joint presidential declarations afterAugust 1996 shows.

In the late 1990s with recession in Argentina andUruguay, the Brazilian devaluation, and the Argentineeconomic collapse, neoliberalism and the Washingtonconsensus became discredited. After 2003, following theelectoral victories of Luiz Inacio ‘‘Lula’’ da Silva in Brazil,

Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, and Tabare Vazquez inUruguay, and in 2008 Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, itseemed that the Mercosur states had begun to convergearound a new progressive, center-left model. It seemed,indeed, that these common views could feed into theorganization a new set of values—social justice, egalitari-anism, solidarity, social participation—which would, intime, become central, enduring, distinguishing, and cohe-sive attributes of Mercosur. Initiatives in this directionhave promoted the formation and participation of civilsociety organizations, a tendency that marks the incipientemergence of a Mercosur ‘‘from below’’ (Dabene 2004).However, slow progress, little influence, and nearlyabsence of institutional channels for social participationrender their emergence as new institutional identity refer-ents unlikely.

More striking is the fact that this period of allegedideological harmony brought about 6 years of intra-Mercosur political fragmentation. After 2005, the disputebetween Argentina and Uruguay over the construction ofpulp mills on a shared river escalated legally and diplo-matically to the point of resorting to a lawsuit before theInternational Court of Justice and the presidents refusingto meet. Despite Spanish mediation, the conflict took along time to resolve. In turn, Brazil, in line with its ambi-tion to assert itself as a global player, has shifted its atten-tion away from its immediate neighborhood toward theglobal stage. Claiming a permanent seat on the UN Secu-rity Council is part of this strategy—an initiative longopposed by Argentina—as is Brazil’s active engagementin the WTO and other international forums. Moreover,Brazil has placed itself at the center of South–Southcooperation promotion by launching the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) and theBrazil–Russia–India–China summits (BRIC), and seekingfurther engagement with Africa. According to Quijano(2005:57–58), ‘‘Mercosur is but only one of [Brazil’s]interlocutors.’’ Yet it is probably former President daSilva’s initiative to create the South American Communityof Nations in 2004, later renamed Union of South Ameri-can Nations (UNASUR) that more directly threatens torelegate Mercosur to the backstage and dilute its politicalidentity, as well as its external identity, as it is arguedbelow.14

The Economic Identity of Mercosur

Besides the political dimension, Mercosur’s identity hasdeveloped along an economic dimension centered uponthe idea of being (or aiming to be) a common market.The 1988 bilateral Treaty of Integration, Cooperationand Development and the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion mayhave been silent on political issues, yet they were explicitabout the organizational choices—the functional equiva-lent to inherent characteristics—made by the new part-ners regarding economic integration. Of course, it couldbe argued that also the treaties creating LAIA and LAFTAwere explicit about organizational choices and economicarrangements and filled with identity-referencing dis-course, yet they fell into dormancy anyway.

The difference between them and Mercosur is that thelatter effectively changed the involved states’ regionaltrade policy. According to Hurrell (1995:44–45), the rele-vance of a regional organization can be signaled by

12 In addition to the 1996 attempted coup, the assassination of Para-guayan Vice-President Argana in 1999 led to increasing political instability anda further failed coup in 2000. In Argentina, there were military uprisings in1987, 1988, and 1990. In 2001, in the midst of the country’s financial break-down, four presidents were appointed in a period of 12 days following the res-ignation of Fernando De La Rua. In Brazil, President Collor de Melo cameclose to impeachment in 1992 accused of direct involvement in corruption.

13 Since the writing of this article, however, President Lugo of Paraguaywas removed from office through a constitutional yet rushed and questionableprocess in 2012, putting again the issue of democratic stability at the center ofthe debate.

14 Regarding the ideas spurring Brazil’s shifting focus away from Mercosurtoward South America, see Spektor 2010.

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whether or not it influences domestic policies across arange of issues, and whether or not relations betweenstates in the region and the rest of the world are influ-enced by the regional institution. Unlike LAIA and LAF-TA, Mercosur soon became important for its members, afact revealed by how it affected their commercial policiesand patterns.15 Consensus on the need to integratebecame an efficient drive to increase intraregional trade.After starting from low levels of regional interdepen-dence, within a few years Mercosur had stimulated anunprecedented growth in exchange. Between 1990 and1998, intraregional exports grew more than five times,from US$4bn to US$21bn, the increase in intra-Mercosurdirect investment also being extraordinary. For instance,if in 1993 Brazil invested US$80m in Argentina, in 1998it invested US$425m (Baumann 2001:39–43). Similarly,while in 1990 Mercosur accounted for 4.2% of Brazil’stotal exports and 11.2% of its imports, by 1996 thefigures had risen to 15.5% and 15.6%, respectively (Veiga1999:30).

In effect, rather than being the result of interdepen-dence, Mercosur sought to create interdependence. Thus,it was only at a second, though still early, stage that someof its economic goals began to be fulfilled, reinforcingthe economic dimension of Mercosur’s identity. The ideathat regional cooperation should advance toward a com-mon market, however, was present from the beginning ofthe leading Argentine–Brazilian axis’ negotiations (Bau-mann 2001:26). Furthermore, economic integration,development, and democracy were perceived (and talked,as the early treaties demonstrate) as intertwined values atthe heart of the Southern Cone, as Dabene (2004) dem-onstrates. Since the initial planning of the association,the idea of economic integration in the form of a com-mon market has been a central, enduring, distinguishing,and cohesive attribute of the type of Mercosur that theleading partners set out to build.

Between 1986 and 1990, integration progressedthrough 24 sectoral protocols establishing mechanismsfor tariff reductions and elimination of non-tariff barriers.In 1988, the Treaty of Integration, Cooperation andDevelopment (Tratado de Integracion 1988, articles 3and 5) explicitly proclaimed its aim to constitute a com-mon market, stipulating the complete liberalization oftrade in goods and services within the following 10 years.In turn, the Buenos Aires Act (Acta de Buenos Aires1990) accelerated the process by establishing ‘‘general-ized, linear and automatic tariff reductions’’ with the aimof reaching a tariff of zero by the end of 1994—a dead-line that the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion corroborated—andincluded Annex 1 on the ‘‘Methodology for the Forma-tion of the Common Market.’’ Thus, just as democracywas at the heart of Mercosur’s political identity, the com-mon market was at the heart of its economic identity.The very name of the association, the actual wording ofthe constituting agreements, the agenda set in intra-insti-tutional negotiations, and the remarkable advancesachieved during the first half of the 1990s are evidenceof this.

Since an auspicious outset, however, several issues putthe association to test. Divergent macroeconomic policiesin Argentina and Brazil during the first half of the 1990s,Mexico’s currency devaluation of 1994, bitter Argentine–Brazilian discrepancies over the automobile sector in

1995, the Asian and Russian financial crises, Brazil’s Realdevaluation in 1999, and Argentina’s financial meltdownin 2001 all contributed to the persistence and recurrenceof exceptions to intrabloc trade liberalization, a ‘‘perfo-rated’’ common external tariff, intra-Mercosur trade wars,and poor policy coordination. In addition, Burges(2005:440) points to the ‘‘mercantilist approach to inte-gration that sees countries engage in tit-for-tat trade spatsto protect domestic firms [and] actively retards the crea-tion of transnationalised economic space.’’ Moreover, therelative homogeneity of the partners’ exports makesextra-continental trade much weightier, thus reducingany political incentive to pursue deeper integration—tothe point of ‘‘active Brazilian government disinterest’’(Burges 2005:443–444).

Mercosur’s repeated shortcomings to achieve its eco-nomic objectives have led to several seemingly deadly cri-ses. In a not-so-long life it has already undergone various‘‘relaunchings’’, ‘‘refoundations’’, and ‘‘reconstructions’’,none of which has yet proved a turning point in the inte-gration process.16 This pessimism has been reflected inthe academic literature, often characterizing the associa-tion as a ‘‘failing development project’’ (Mecham 2003),questioning whether ‘‘Mercosur still [has] a project’’(Dabene 2004), explaining its existence in terms of ‘‘sur-vival’’ (Carranza 2003; Gomez Mera 2005) and highlight-ing its ‘‘declining achievement’’ (Malamud 2005).17 Butnot only in the literature has this pessimism been pres-ent; Mercosur’s tenth anniversary passed with only a smallceremony with no president attending, and its 15th anni-versary celebrations, coming in the middle of the Argen-tine–Uruguayan pulp mills dispute, were canceled.

With so many questioning Mercosur’s results and evenreason to exist, what in its early stage was a central,enduring, distinguishing, and cohesive attribute of itsidentity—namely, being the Common Market of theSouth—seemed to be in crisis too. In an attempt to retainthis central character, Mercosur’s highest organ, theCommon Market Council (CMC),18 decided at the Janu-ary 1994 meeting to postpone—yet not renounce—theformation of the common market, settling for the morerealistic goal of a customs union. This shift allowed thatdiscussions on difficult issues, such as services, free move-ment of capital and labor, and macro-economic coordina-tion, be left for a later stage (Baumann 2001:26–27). Thepost-summit presidents’ declaration (Comunicado deColonia 1994, paragraph 4) still states that Mercosur aimsto ‘‘advance the establishment of a Customs Union andlay the groundwork for the formation of the CommonMarket.’’

In this context, calls to downgrade Mercosur to a freetrade area without further ambitions abounded, most

15 This trend was arguably facilitated by Brazil’s and Argentina’s unilateraleconomic liberalization programs.

16 For Mercosur’s ‘‘relaunching’’, see Comunicado de los PresidentesJune 30, 2000; Comunicado de los Presidentes December 15, 2000; and CMCResolutions 22 ⁄ 00 to 32 ⁄ 00 (available at http: ⁄ ⁄ www.mercosur.int ⁄ msweb ⁄Normas ⁄ deca00.html). The position of High Representative also was allegedlycreated to ‘‘relaunch the process’’ of Mercosur, according to Samuel PinheiroGuimaraes, first to be appointed to the post (Barros 2011). Regarding its‘‘refoundation’’, see Nofal 1999; Rial 2000; Pasquini Duran 2006. For its‘‘reconstruction’’, see O Estado de Sao Paulo 2002; Garcıa 2003; GazetaMercantil 2003.

17 These quotes are taken from actual titles of journal articles or bookchapters.

18 The CMC, which is responsible for the political conduct of the integra-tion process, has a 6-monthly rotating presidency. Mercosur’s other organs arethe Common Market Group (executive organ in charge of implementing thedecisions of the CMC), the Trade Commission, the Secretariat, the Economicand Social Consultative Forum (consulting body to the GMC), the MercosurParliament, the Commission of Permanent Representatives, and the Perma-nent Review Tribunal.

122 Mercosur’s Identity Crisis

notoriously by the then Argentine minister of the econ-omy Domingo Cavallo in the year of the tenth anniver-sary of the Treaty of Asuncion (Burgueno 2001). On theother hand, the document that the presidents signed tocommemorate Mercosur’s first decade (Comunicado delos Presidentes June 22, 2001) insists that ‘‘the commit-ment to both the Customs Union and the Common Mar-ket is indispensable for maintaining Mercosur’s identity andits own interests in the international context.’’19 Onemajor problem for the assertion of Mercosur’s identityhas been that the effective and full implementation ofthe customs union, let alone the common market, waspostponed in 2001 and again in 2006.

Controversy over the status of Mercosur, internal tradewars over cars, chicken and sugar, and Mercosur’s ulti-mate failure to deliver, more than 20 years after its crea-tion, loudly promised results all contributed to its identitycrisis, overshadowing the (modest) progress achieved,such as the definition of a Production Integration Pro-gram, the institutionalization of the Mercosur StructuralConvergence Fund, and the implementation of projectsfunded by it, as well as the creation of the Mercosur Fundfor Guarantees to Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises(see Institute for the Integration of Latin America2009:65–102, 2010:41–71).

After 1997, intra-Mercosur negotiations slowed downand references to its deepening became vague andscarce. According to Renato Baumann, Brasilia Directorof the Economic Commission for Latin America and theCaribbean (ECLAC), this is partly explained by the emer-gence of a larger challenge: the beginning of Free TradeArea of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations and the needto reach common positions, which in turn highlighted aseries of unclear, pending issues within the association.20

The question of finding a unified voice is, thus, at theheart of the last of Mercosur’s identity dimensions dis-cussed here; the construction of the external image ofbeing a bloc.

The External Identity of Mercosur

The need to form a bloc to achieve greater internationalleverage also appears early. In the Iguazu Declaration(Declaracao do Iguacu 1985, paragraph 8), the presi-dents:

Agreed on the urgent necessity of Latin America to strengthenits bargaining power with the rest of the world, increasing itsdecision-making autonomy and avoiding that countries in theregion continue to be vulnerable to the effects of policies thathave been adopted without their participation. Thus, theyresolved to conjugate and coordinate their respective govern-ments’ efforts for the revitalization of cooperation and integra-tion policies among Latin American nations.

The Argentine–Brazilian Friendship Act (Acta deAmistad Argentino–Brasilena 1986, paragraph VIII)similarly declares that the presidents,

[c]onscious of the grave problems facing Latin America, andidentified with their peoples’ common yearnings, reaffirm thepurpose of opening new horizons for regional cooperationand integration […] with the aim of fostering a Latin Ameri-can presence in the international context in accordance withthe region’s noblest and most legitimate ideals.

The goal of coordinated action in the internationalcontext reappeared thereafter frequently in speeches byPresidents Alfonsın and Sarney, the leaders who mostclearly influenced the construction of Mercosur’s originalidentity. At the signing of the 1988 Treaty, Alfonsın(1988) referred to the need for ‘‘joint [Argentine–Brazil-ian] action in order to project ourselves with greaterstrength into the world and defend there, jointly, ourcommon interests.’’ Sarney (1988), in his turn, assertedthat ‘‘Brazil and Argentina want to be united and strongin a strong and united Latin America.’’

By the time of Mercosur’s foundation, the ambition toform a bloc remained strong and had been infused intothe institution as one of its central, enduring, distinguish-ing, and cohesive attributes. For instance, Enrique Igle-sias, president of the Inter-American Development Bank(Destaco Enrique Iglesias la creacion del Mercosur1991:88), welcomed the Asuncion Treaty not just becauseit would expand markets, but also because it would‘‘[increase] the negotiating potential [of the Mercosurstates] vis-a-vis other countries and groups of countries.’’

As these quotes reveal, during this early period theleaders had in mind a defensive type of bloc. In contrastto the economic and foreign policies implemented dur-ing the 1990s, in the late 1980s both Brazil and Argentinastill followed heterodox economic recipes and sought tokeep aside the strategic and ideological components ofthe East–West confrontation. However, rather quickly theactual content of the bloc identity adapted to post-ColdWar and Washington consensus circumstances, replacingthe defensive and protectionist model of integration withthe concept of open regionalism.

In the years following the Treaty of Asuncion, Merco-sur’s external agenda became increasingly complex anddynamic. It evolved around three key areas: foreign directinvestment (FDI), enlargement, and cooperation withthird regions and countries. Regarding FDI, the notionof being a bloc based upon the premises of open region-alism attracted significant amounts of foreign capital. Thesize and growth prospects of the region’s economies, thepossibility of free access to the enlarged market, andexpectations of expansion to other South American statesall contributed to making Mercosur an important FDIdestination (Rios 2004). Nonetheless, arguably the mostdecisive factor for the Southern Cone being appealingfor FDIs was the domestic economic stabilization, deregu-lation, and privatization programs under way in the1990s, carried out independently from integration.

Concerning enlargement, Mercosur succeeded in con-veying the image of a united and auspicious organization,becoming a magnet in the region. This image worked asa centripetal force in Latin America, where most otherstates gradually sought incorporation in Mercosur as asso-ciate members or observers, with Venezuela even applyingfor full membership.21 As in Europe, questions of broad-ening versus deepening, and about the potential dilutingeffect of enlargement on identity, have also emerged.(see Pena 1999). In particular, while the strategic impor-tance of Venezuelan energy seems to be the prime moti-vation behind adhesion negotiations, it transpired inmost interviews with Southern Cone officials and academ-ics that the presence of Hugo Chavez would weakenMercosur’s external credibility—one of the main func-tions of the identity’s external projection. The ambiguity

19 Emphasis added.20 Interview with Renato Baumann, Brasilia, August 28, 2006.

21 Since the writing of this article Venezuela has become a full member ofMercosur, yet the issues raised in this paragraph are still relevant.

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concerning enlargement to Venezuela reflects the tensionbetween the concrete and pragmatic long-term benefitsof its incorporation, and the risk of (further) increasingpolitical heterogeneity within Mercosur as well as poten-tially having Chavez ‘‘hijack’’ the association for his ownpolitical purposes.22 This ambiguity is especially apparentin Brazil, where the issue of energy has become central,yet the goal of establishing itself as the developingworld’s regional and global leader is equally strong (seeBurges 2005). And this is a goal for which Brazil nolonger needs Mercosur.

With regard to cooperation with third parties, the con-struction of a convincing image has been strategic in theparallel negotiation processes with the European Unionand the United States ⁄ FTAA, as well as in the signing ofover 20 preferential trade agreements with third coun-tries and organizations, including the Andean Commu-nity, India, the South African Customs Union, and Israel.Within the context of the FTAA process, the SouthernCone’s position—led by Brazil—of allowing states tonegotiate as members of already existing subregionalblocs prevailed over the US preferred option of only indi-vidual country negotiation. Mercosur states thus engagedin an exercise of identifying common interests, internallyestablishing priorities, and externally defending agreedpositions. The interregional talks with the EuropeanUnion, too, have contributed to strengthening Mercosur’sbloc identity, arguably constituting these two the associa-tion’s most important external processes in terms ofidentity shaping.

In the troubled years of the late 1990s and early 2000s,a dynamic external agenda helped to provide Mercosurwith cohesion and a sense of direction, with Phillips(2001:577) even suggesting that external negotiationshad become Mercosur’s new ‘‘glue’’. By reinforcingthrough discourse and practice the idea of being a bloc,Mercosur was able to both consolidate this identitydimension and effectively project it externally. Thesedevelopments—bloc-identity consolidation and its exter-nal projection—proved instrumental in the association’sresilience in the late 1990s when its political andeconomic identity started to erode.

However, as the parallel EU ⁄ FTAA negotiationsdragged on, major internal fissures and technical andnormative lacunae within Mercosur came to the surface,and ‘‘speaking with one voice’’—the frequent call of theregion’s leaders—began to prove increasingly difficult, inan example of how extra-institutional interaction can leadnot to identity creation but to intra-institutional tensions.According to Alcides Costa Vaz, while the association’sactive external agenda gave it the opportunity to‘‘develop an image of progress, since 1996–1997 theinternal and external agendas have grown apart. One nolonger reflects the other, and that has limited Mercosur’scapacity for joint action.’’23 In a similar vein, Carranza(2006; see also Rios 2004) points out that the lack of

progress in Mercosur’s internal agenda has turned intoan obstacle when it comes to its external negotiations.

The existing disparities in production structures andtrade flows between the Mercosur countries hinder theirfinding of common positions in the negotiations withmore developed parties and in the WTO, as was the casein mid-2008 when the Mercosur vote was split. Whenpolitical divergences and dissatisfaction with the absenceof effective mechanisms to deal with controversies—suchas the paper mills one—are added, Uruguay’s preferencefor bilateral agreements with the United States, whichwould not be allowed under Mercosur regulations, comesto symbolize the crisis existing in Mercosur’s bloc iden-tity. Finally, Brazil’s sponsoring of a number of alternativeinitiatives, ranging from UNASUR to BRIC and IBSA, arealso eloquent symbols of the weakening capacity ofMercosur to effectively project an identity externally.

Conclusion

This article has discussed the concept of institutionalidentity as different from collective and regional identity.The latter, which have been the subject of much IRresearch, refer to the shared identity of individual or col-lective actors within regions or international or regionalorganizations, and sees organizations as social aggregates.The former, instead, concerns the identity of regional orinternational institutions as ontological collective socialactors of their own, and has received virtually no disci-plinary attention. While regional or collective identity isan attribute of an institution’s members, institutionalidentity is an attribute of the organization itself.

As with the identity of individuals, institutional identityis also subject to change and adaptation. Changing inter-nal, regional, and global conditions will affect identityand may bring about identity crises in international orga-nizations. Just think of NATO and the end of the ColdWar, the European Union and enlargement or the EUconstitution, the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of theSoviet Union, and so on. Crises may trigger identity shiftsand adjustment, or lead down to dissolution. Short ofdissolution, though, is irrelevance: when an organizationrisks owing its existence to inertia. This may happenwhen partners have few incentives to further invest in theinstitution, yet given the political capital that has alreadygone into it the costs of leaving may be comparativelyhigher.

At times, the different fates regional organizations mayrun relate to how well developed and consolidated theirinstitutional identity is. The clearer it is, the less trau-matic adaptation and change result. The more fragile itis, the more confusing it is for institutions to re-find andredefine their central, enduring, distinguishing, andcohesive attributes and use them as the basis for structur-ing their institutional interests and behavior.

In reviewing Mercosur’s institutional identity, it wasshown that its original identity construction along politi-cal, economic, and external dimensions served as an idea-tional structure on which to base its internal, external,and temporal projection. However, this early identity con-figuration failed to consolidate itself as the force guidingthe organization’s internal and external behavior anddevelopment. As concrete obstacles and difficul-ties—which more traditional, rationalist theories can helpexplain—appeared to hinder the process of identity con-solidation, Mercosur proved to have limited ability toadapt to a changing environment. Moreover, failure to

22 This risk is indeed very real, and only adds to Mercosur’s external iden-tity dimension being further muddled. Even before having completed the pro-cess of incorporation into Mercosur, President Chavez made a number ofcontroversial declarations, calling for Mercosur to take distance from the‘‘elites’ old integration schemes centered upon the economy’’ (El Universal2005), threatening that either Mercosur is ‘‘reformatted’’ or ‘‘it will be fin-ished’’ (El Universal 2006), claiming that ‘‘the twenty-first century socialismwill not harm Mercosur but on the contrary, it will strengthen it’’ (El Univer-sal 2007a), and accusing it of being ‘‘marked by capitalism and fierce competi-tion’’ (El Universal 2007b).

23 Author’s interview, Brasilia, August 31, 2006.

124 Mercosur’s Identity Crisis

fulfill expectations that had become the backbone of itsidentity articulation left Mercosur disoriented as an insti-tution. Thus, the institutional identity crisis found theassociation with a weaker internal notion of Self.

Arguably, the construction of stronger organs and possi-bly even supranational structures would strengthen Merco-sur’s institutional identity. It has been debated, however,whether more institutionalization necessarily works as apole around which a cohesive identity is built. What is thecase, though, is that ‘‘in the absence of an externalizedbureaucratic structure, it becomes more important to havean internalized cognitive structure of what the organiza-tion stands for and where it intends to go—in short, aclear sense of the organization’s identity’’ (Albert et al.2000:13). In Mercosur, the absence of supranationalinstances combined with a record of flexibility when itcomes to norm implementation has tended to benefit thelarger partners, which have had more leverage to negoti-ate deviations. Therefore, it is not surprising that Argen-tina’s and especially Brazil’s reticence to progress towardmore autonomous Mercosur organs provokes frustrationand detachment in the smaller partners Uruguay and Par-aguay, further diluting internal cohesion.

Despite this rather pessimistic picture, since the globalfinancial crisis of 2008 Mercosur has experiencedrenewed dynamism (Institute for the Integration of LatinAmerica 2011). Mercosur states have weathered the glo-bal crisis better than other economies, and their recoveryhas taken a faster pace. Intraregional trade has picked upmore rapidly than extraregional exports and imports,which means that although the organization’s externalagenda has slowed down, its internal agenda has beenable to either show signs of progress, or at least of suffer-ing less of stagnation.

In the context of a more dynamic regional trade cli-mate, in 2009 and 2010 some important sources of inter-nal political tension were resolved. First, Brazil andParaguay agreed on a fairer distribution of the benefitsresulting from the Itaipu hydroelectric dam, and second,the Argentine–Uruguayan dispute over the pulp mills ona shared river was brought to an end by the ruling of theInternational Court of Justice. These two issues had nega-tively affected political dialogue within Mercosur, andhence, their satisfactory removal offers new prospects tothe association (Institute for the Integration of LatinAmerica 2011:73–74).

As Mercosur finds itself in a comparatively better politi-cal and economic juncture, it should use this opportunityto work on the redefinition and strengthening of theinternal dimension of its institutional identity. Achievinggreater intraregional consensus on the various mattersand re-establishing the organization’s internal and exter-nal priorities for the post-global crisis era will prove cru-cial for invigorating an adapted political, economic, andexternal institutional identity. In other words, a clearersense of Self will come, first of all, from a clearer sense ofdirection given by the internal agenda.

The more positive evolution since 2009 could serveMercosur to capitalize on previous achievements anddevelopments. While the establishment of the MercosurParliament and the Permanent Review Tribunal haveworked toward Mercosur’s institutional strengthening,the (re)introduction of a more independent High Repre-sentative in December 2010 has the potential of promot-ing political efficiency and visibility both to the insideand to the outside of the organization without necessarilyimplying transference of sovereignty. If successfully imple-

mented, the figure of the fully dedicated High Represen-tative—enjoying the support from the members andholding a longer tenure of 3 years (rather than the 6-monthly rotating ‘‘pro-tempore’’ presidency)—could lendcontinuity and stability, improve the institutional qualityof the organization, and effectively contribute toward theconsolidation of Mercosur’s institutional identity.

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