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7/30/2019 Bahan Scaner Pak Purbo

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n re Beaufre e prncpes o strategyLiddell Hart puts forward six positive and twonegative rules, the substance of which can bereduced to the following four :

1. Force the enemy to disperse by an indirectapproach.2. Achieve surprise by selecting unforseen

courses of aciion.3. Action is strength against the enemy's weak

points.4. Achievement of a decision by action in

secondary theatres if necessary.Liddell Hart has brilliantly developed a theory of

the indi,rect appfoaqh" whipll he holds to be the,best strategy. The essential difference betweenhe indirect approach and indirect stratesy is notmerely that the former has a geographicalonnotation. The object of the indirect approg.llhs the attainment of military victory; it is only the

prepatory manoeuvring for this victory which isndirect. I therefore place the indirect approachn the category of direct str ateqy. l=he es$entialeature

of indirect strategv is that it seeks toobtain a result by methods other than militaryvictory


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requirements for particular combat capabilities, such as longerendurance surface combatants, platforms able to launch anti-ship missiles, and longer range aircraft. (Malaysia, for exampte,has included in the performance specifications required of itsnew fighters the ability to conduct operations with certainpayloads and for certain times on station over the area of theSouth China Sea and the particular Spratly lslands which itclaims).

I

. The Requirements for EEZ Surveitlance and Protection.The promqlgation of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZs) under the Third United Natlons Conference on the Lawof the Sea (UNCLOS

lll) hasgenerated

requirements forsurveillance and power projection capabilities over resource-rich areas which, for many states in the region, are greater thantheir land areas.ln Malaysia, 'the protection of the economic interest of thecountry in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)'was introducedas 'a new element' in the 1986-1990 five-year defence plan;the defence vote was significantly increased ln the 1991-1995plan, and the principal reason givpn for the increase was theneed to '(improve) the capability and efficiency of the country tocontrol and safeguard the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)'.

u.mber : Dr. Desmond Ball"Trends in Milit4ry Acquisitions in The Asia PacificRegion: lmplications for Security and Prospects forConstraints and Controls".SDSC Canberra 4993


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LAPORANSTRATEGI KEAMANAN NASIONAL

PRESIDEN BUSH DI GEDUNG PUTIH, 13 AGUSTUS 1991Kutipan bagian terpenting laporan itu meriputi :a. Pengakuan bahwa strategi pencegahan (containment

strategy) AS yang sudah dilaksanakan setama 40 tahunkini harus diubah guna mencerminkan kenyataan geo-strategis.

b. Dorongan evolusi yang membangun dari uni soviet.c. Kesadaran bahwa para sekutu AS secara mendasar akan

terkena dampak urusan daram negeri Uni soviet.d. Pengakuan bahwa dunia semakin saling bergantung

secara politis, ekonomis, teknologis, militer tetapikepemimpinan AS pada umumnya te[ap esensial.

e. Suatu penekanan pada kekuatan yang lebih kecil dan iebihtangkas untuk menanggapi kepentingan di kawasan dankeperluan

di masa damai, tetapi yang dapat dijadikandasar untuk menyusun kembali kekuatan yang lebih besarbila diperlukan.

f. D.ukungan Amerika yang berkelanjutan pada sistemekonomi internasional iang seteibuka dan seluasmungkin, dan pada pakta pertahanan Aflantik Utara(NATO) sebagai landasan yang sangat diperlukan oaiamkerja sama lintas-Atlantik dengbn suitu Eiopa yang barubersatu dan bebas.

g segiat-giatnya mengusahakan kebijakan AS mengenaiTimur Tengah, dengan mengaliui tantangan dankesempatan baru ya.ng dimungkinkan oleh keilenangankita dalam Perans Teluk.


7/77

. Pengakuan bahwa Asia Timur dan pas tetap pentingdan bahwa peranan yang dijalankan oleh ikatan keamanankami di sana juga vital

. Dukungan yang semakin kuat kepada perserikatanBangsa-Bangsa yang sudah didayagunakan untukmembangun memelihara perdamaian, memperbaikikeadaan kehidupan manusia, dan mengurangi penderitaanmanusia.

Pernyataan melalui perjanjian-perjanjian Angkatanlersenjata Konvensiol{ di Eropa (cFE) d-an penguiangansenjata strategis (srART) untuk benar-benar dmmiileopada pengendalian persenjataan sebagai sarana untukmemperkokoh stabilitas internasional.Memperbarui perjuangan prinsip-prinsip kebebasan politikdan ekonomi sebagai penjarnin yang paling pasti bagikemajuan umat manusia dan perdamaian dunil.

'

Suatu agenda dunia yang baru untuk menanggulangi aruspengungsi, penyalahgunaan obat bius dan Gmerosotanmutu lingkungan.

aporan ini menekankan ketangguhan kepentingan danjuan kita yang mendasar datam tihun 1ggO-an.Ketahanan Amerika Serikat sebagai negara yang bebasmerdeka, dengan nilai-nilai fundamentilnya yang utuhserta kelembagaan dan masyarakatnya yang manta[.Suatu ekonomi AS yang sehat dan terus tumbuh untukmemastikan . adanya kesempatan bagi kemakmuranperorangan dan sumber daya untuk upayi-upaya nasionaldi dalam dan luar negeri.Hubungan yang sehat dan kooperatif dan yang secarapolitis bersemangat dengan para sekutu oan negara-ne ara sahabat.


8/77

d. Suatu dunia yang stabil dan aman, tempat kebebasanpolitik dan ekonomi serta hak-hak asasi manusia danlembaga demokrasi tumbuh dengan subur.

Laporan ini menerangkan bahwa perubahan findamental kitaadalah mengaitkan sarana politik, ekonomi dan militer yangtersedia dengan tujuan yang teguh di suatu dunia' yangditandai oleh perubahan yang luar biasa positifnya namunmasih penuh dengan tantangan dan ancaman terhadapkeamanan kita dan juga terhadap para sekutu sertasahabat kita. Amerika Serikat akan sepenuhnya tetap terlibatdalam dunia yang lebih luas dan akan terus mengejartujuannya bersama-sama mereka yang memiliki kesamaannilai dan perhatian. Pendekatan kita kepada keamanan akanterus dibentuk oleh kenyataan bahwa kita merupakan suatubangsa yang dipisahkan oleh samudera-samudera luas daribanyak di antara sahabat dan kepentingan kita yang palingpenting. Untuk membela mereka masih akan memerlukankehadiran pasukan Amerika di luar negeri, yang didukungoleh kemampuan memproyeksikan kekuatan dari AmerikaSerikat. Laporan strategi ini diakhiri dengan seruan untukterus bqrdialog, mengadakan kerjasama yang erat dankonsultasi dengan Kongres guna membantu membentuksuatu struktur kemanan yang cocok bagi peluang-peluangmasa kini dan tantangan-tantangan esok hari.

UMBER :USIS EP 209 - 091391


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d. Suatu dunia yang stabil dan aman, tempat kebebasanpolitik dan ekonomi serta hak-hak asasi manusia danlembaga demokrasi tumbuh dengan subur.

Laporan ini menerangkan bahwa perubahan findamental kitaadalah mengaitkan sarana politik, ekonomi dan militer yangtersedia dengan tujuan yang teguh di suatu dunia' yangditandai oleh perubahan yang luar biasa positifnya namunmasih penuh dengan tantangan dan ancaman terhadapkeamanan kita dan juga terhadap para sekutu sertasahabat kita. Amerika Serikat akan sepenuhnya tetap terlibatdalam dunia yang lebih luas dan akan terus mengejartujuannya bersama-sama mereka yang memiliki kesamaannilai dan perhatian. Pendekatan kita kepada keamanan akanterus dibentuk oleh kenyataan bahwa kita merupakan suatubangsa yang dipisahkan oleh samudera-samudera luas daribanyak di antara sahabat dan kepentingan kita yang palingpenting. Untuk membela mereka masih akan memerlukankehadiran pasukan Amerika di luar negeri, yang didukungoleh kemampuan memproyeksikan kekuatan dari AmerikaSerikat. Laporan strategi ini diakhiri dengan seruan untukterus bqrdialog, mengadakan kerjasama yang erat dankonsultasi dengan Kongres guna membantu membentuksuatu struktur kemanan yang cocok bagi peluang-peluangmasa kini dan tantangan-tantangan esok hari.

UMBER :USIS EP 209 - 081391


10/77

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PatNctPLES OF WAR

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PsYchological warfare - - the planned use in

time of war or declared emer$ency ofpropaganda, and exploitation of other actions,with the primary purpose of influencing theopinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior ofenemy, neutral or friendly. Foreign groups inouch a way as to support the aceomplishmentof national aims and objectives.Psychological warfare consolidation- -

psycholog ical warfare directed towardpopulations in friendly rear areas or interritory occupied by friendly militay forceswith the objective of facilitating militaryoperations and promoting maximumcooperation among the civil populace.

Psychological warfare objective - - Imilitary, political, economic, or other

objective, the attainment of which is to beachieved or facilitated by the employmentof psychological warfare.

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Psychological warfare task - - a particularproject whose accomplishment willcontribute to the achievement of thepsychological

warfare objective.Psychological warfare theme - - ? subjector topic used as a means ofaccomplishing a psychological warfare

- task.Psychological activities - - those activitiesconducted in peacetime or in areas

outside of active military theaters of war,which are planned and conducted toinfluenoe the emotions, attitudes, orbehavior of foreign groups in waysfavorable to the accomprishmenf of u.Spolicies and objectives.

Psychological operations - - this termincludes psychological activities andpsychological warfare, and encompassesthose political, military, economic, andideological actions planned andconducted to create in enemy, hostile,neutral, or friendly foreign groups the


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emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorableto the accomplishment of U.S policies andobjectives.

Propagand a -- any information, ideas,doctrines, or special appealsdisseminated to influence the opinions,emotions, attitudes, or behavior of anyspecified group in order to benefit the

sponsor; either directly or indirectly.Black - - propaganda which purports to

emanate from a source other than the trueone.

Grey - - propaganda which does not

specially identify any source.-Yhite - - propaganda disseminated and

acknowledged by the sponsor or by anaccredited agency thereof.

Dictionary of US Military Terms,Washington DC. 1963.


17/77

Teori Strategi B.H. LIDDELL HART

7. Pendapat L. Haft tentang Ctausewi?."The art of the employment of batfles as a meansto gain the object of war. strategy forms the planof the war, maps out the proposed course of theditferent campaigns which compose the war, andregulates the battles to be fought in each,,Defects :a. lt intrudes on the sphere of policy, or the higher

conduct of the war, which must necessarily bethe responsibility of the government and not ofthe military leaders it emproys as its agents inthe executive control of operations.

b. lt narrows the meaning of 'strategy' to the pureutilization of batfle,

thus conveying the idea thatbattle is the only means to the strategical end.(Easy to confuse the means with the end and toreach the conclusion that in war every otherconsideration should be subordinated to the aim offighting a decisive batfle).

2. Relation to policy.a. Hubungan panglima perang dan pimpinan

nasio na l/pemeri nta h fl !8,b. Moltke tentang strategy : The practical

adaptation of the means placed at a generalsdisposal to the attainment of the objeciin view.c. L. Hart tentang strategy : The art of distributingand applying military means to fulfillthe endsof policy. (strategy is eoncerned not merely


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BUTIR.BUTIR POLITIK DAN STRATEGIAMERIKA SERIKAT

1..Its first

President, George Washington, in his farewell address to theoeople of the United States in 1796, had some good advice forcountries in our position. For, in some respects, the United States wasthen in the same position. \Mastrington argued for an independent andhonest course in foreign affairc, and explained: 'nothing is moreessential than that permanenL inveterate antipathies against particularnations and passionate attachments for others should be cultivated.The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or anhabitupl fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to itsanimosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead itastray from its duty and its interest.'

2. Although Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has advisedCongress that the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review willdiffer from that of the Clinton administration in important respects,there has in fact been a remarkable consistency in US strategicpoticy-and its formulation-through the Reagan, Bush and Clintonadministrations. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, forinsnce, begins its chapter on defence strategy with the followingsentiments.

Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has ernbracedseVeral fundamental and enduring goals as a nation : to maintain thesovereignty, political freedorn, and independence of the United States,with its values, institutions, and territory intact ; to protect the lives and

personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad; and to providefor the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people.Achieving these basic goals in an increasingly interdependent worldrequires fostering an international environment in which critical regionsare stable, at peace, and free from domination by hostile powers; theglobal economy and free trade are growing; democratic norms andrespect for human rights are widely accepted...The United States seeksto pay a leadership role in the international comrnunity, working closely


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1.

ONPOLITICS,

DIP

The distinction betweenrelative ofl'e. These two t,single art of politics-thtstates so as to further thstrategy, the conduct ofdiplomatic method. Cguarantees and threats bpanoply with regard trenemies , that is, to the aIThe relation of strategyformula : "'W'ar is to harand policy, to accommcS7ar."

Let us start from the2


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the continuation of policrby its opposite : policymeans. But these two forboth cxpress the contin,altem.ately riolent and n

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Geostrateqi. Geopolitik dan Geoekonomi

eopolitics :ls the science of the earth's relationships of politicalprocesses. lt is based on the broad foundations of politicalgeography, which is fhe science of the political organism inspace and their strueture. Moreover, geopolitics sets out tofurnish the tools for political action and the directives forpolitical life as a whole.iOorpalen , 1942. The World of General Hatlshofer. NewYork).

. A study of the influence of such physical factors asgeography, economics, and demography upon the politicsand esp. the foreign policy of a state. (Webster).

eostrategy:A branch of geopolitics that deals With strategy.

. The combination of geopolitical and strategic factorscharacterizing a particular geographic region.The use by a government of strategy based upon

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geopolitics. (Webster;. I

Geostrategic regionhe geostrategic region must be large enough to possessertain globe influencing characteristics and functions ...tifl...

the expression of the inter-relatiqnships of a large part of theworld in terms of location, movement, trade Orientation, and

ulture or ideological bonds. While it is a single-feature region,

n the sense that its purpose is to efnbrace areas over whichower can be applied, it is a multi-feature region in itsompositlon. Control of strategic passageways on fqnd andea is fre uentl crucial to the unit of geostrategic regions.


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4. Geopolitical region.The geopolitical region is a subdivision of the above. ltexpresses the uniff of geographic features. Because it isderived directly from geographic regions, this unit can provide

a framework for common political and economic actions.Contiguity of location, and complementarity of resources areparticularly distinguishing marks of the geopolitical region ..:the geo-strategic region has a strategic role to play and thegeopolitical region has a tactical one. (Cohen S.B. 1964.Geography and Politics in a Divided World. New York).

5. Geo-ecopolitics : Consists of geopolitics revised toinclude the neglected economic factorsand a greater awareness of thesignificance of rapid technologicalchange.(Mouzon O,T. 1959.lnternational Re$ources and Foreign

Policy. New York).6. Geo-economic:

a. Of, relating to, or characterized by economic conditions orpolicies that are influenced by geographic factors and existor are carried out on the internationai level. (Websteds 3tdNew lnternational Dictionary 1966).

b."We

are enteringthe age of geo-economics, with flows of

trade, finance, and teqhnology shaping the poyVer realitiesand the politics of a new era. Military power remains asignificAnt component of national strength. But in today'sworld, technological and commercial capabilities as muchas military strength are the defining element of nationalpower and influence.

(R.H. Solomon: America and Asian Security in an era ofgeo-economics U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch. , May 25,1 ee2)


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STRATEGIC VIEWS OF THE GLOBE

The classic schools of suategic thoqght, maritime, continental,

and aerospace (see chapter 3), appraise geographic settings in shalplydifferent ways. Three early spokesmap-ffi2har, Mackinder, and deSeversky- advanced concepts that still illustrate the basicdivergences displayed by their philosophical descendents, eventhough details outlined by that trio have since been altered to reflectcurrent clrcumstances.

MARITIME

Alfred Thayer Mahan, an unabashed champion of militarymight, focused his attention on the hydrosphere, the aqueousenvelope that covers three-fourths of our earth's epidermis. Beforethe turn of the trnrentieth century, h. contended that any country orcoalition strong enough to command the hlgh seas could control thewodd's wealth and thereby dominate the earth. As the princrpalprerequisites, he saw a powerful navy with operating bases at homeand overseas, complemented by ^ massive merchant marine. Formaximum effectiveness, Mahan's theory depends ofl severalessentials identified in his tteatise Tbe Influence of Sea Power UponHistorl. A centrally situated strategic position, which combinessecure land boundaries

with access to one or more bodies of openwater, tops his list. Those basic geographic attributes must becoupled with a coastline that features deep-draft harbors anddefensible shores. Next, flo nation c n caffy out seafaring strategiesofl a grand scale unless its people have an affinity for salt water andan aptitude for commerce. Finally, governmental policies mustactively exploit all environmental advantages to promote powerafloat.


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CONTINENTAL

Halford J. Mackinder, who folloured Mahan by just a few years,emphasbed the strategic importance of land masses as opposed to

the seas. His study, "The Geographical Pivot of History," publishedin 1904, recognrzed central Eurasia as the hub of the universe (saeaccompan)nng map).

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The original Pivot Area, whose confines corresponded closely withthose of Asiatic Russia, reputedly afforded great mobility for groundforces, but not a base of power in terms of teeming population orintrinsic treasures. Consequendy, Mackinder eventually added

^good deal of Eastetn Europe to the Pivot Area, which heredesignated the Heardand. His ultimate outline therefore embracedlands that fiford a happier m^rraa,ge of mobrlity and power. Theremainder of Europe and Asia constituted an Inner, or Marginal,Crescent, sometimes known as the Rimland. The Americas, Africasouth of the Sahara, Australia, and large islands like Britatn; Japan,and Indonesia, comprised an Outer, or fnsular, Crescent. As theconcept evolved, Eurasia and Africa in combination came to becalled the \il7odd-Island. From that total theorem Mackinder derivedhis primary postulation :

\7"ho rules East Europe cornmands the Heartland.$7ho rules

the Heartland cornmands the sTodd-Island.$7ho rules the STodd-Island commands the Sfodd.


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AEROSPACE

The advent of au power threw tn a third dimension. AlexanderP. de Seversky proposed a competing theory, based on the premise

that complete ^1r supremacf; not just local or temporary arrsuperiority, is possible. His book Air Power : Key to Sunrival,written in 1950, before the existence of ICBMs, discounted overseasbases as "ufltenable," downgraded the importance of naval and landcombat, and stated unequivocally that "the manifest destiny of theUnited States is in the skies." His vieur of the globe, based on

^polar

projection, visuali-ed the East-$7est confrontation across the ArcticOcean, not across the Atlantic and Pacific. He drew a blue circlearound the United States, demarking the 5,000-mile strike radius ofcontemporaty bombers.

A yellow ellipse, demarked by similar bounds, was centeredon theSoviet Union. The Two ovedapped at the Area of Decision;

Where the struggle for mastery of the whole ^tr ocean will beunfolded... Ary investment we make today in the yellow zore with theintention of assuring a flow of strategic supplies in wartime is shearwaste. It is as unrealistic as would be investment for the same purposesby the Soviet Union in our blue zorle. Common sense demands that wechannel economic preparedness only into the zofle

wecan

successfullydefend.

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THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED YIEWS

The truth of the matter is, none of the media justaddressed offers a panacea, although some influentialstrategists still persist in pushing one approach to theexclusion of others. Maritime strateges, for example, areideal for extending national influence over wide areas) asthe Soviets are demonstrating today, but th.y are notlikely to cripple resourceful countries like the UnitedStates and Red China. Whosoever rules the Heartland(u.y heartland, not necessarily the one described byMackinder) would be constrained from commanding therest of the wodd if he lacked the ability to project apotent punch beyond his particular land mass. Aerospaceoperations depend heavily on territorial fulcrums. LikeArchimedes, airmen need

aplace

to stand before they caneven try to move the wodd. Candidates for modern great-power status need the effectively in all threeenvironments.

Source "Grand Strategy : Principles and Practices"John M. Collins, Naval Inst Press, Annapolis1,97 4


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The Maritime Strategy

Both ashore and afloat, we . . . . . ... imperativelyneed first of all a conception of war. Once this iscreated we will be able to proceed, with oureyes open and our course well market, towatda coherent comprehensive scheme of navallife. Doctrine, methods and nrles may be madeto flow consistendy and logically therefrom.Strategy, tactics, logistics, gunnery, shipdesign...........every ramification ._of theprofession-may be developed ' withconfidence and wisdom. . . . . .'

Soutce "Military Doctrine : Blueprint for ForcePIanning"Col. Flarry G. Summers, Jt., USA B.t)

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