Bhartrhari Ontology

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http://hin.osaka-gaidai.ac.jp/~ramseier

Bhartharis Ontology

bySudhakar Jatavallabhula


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Bhartharis Ontologyby

Sudhakar Jatavallabhula

Summary:

Editors Preface ii

Introduction 1

I. COMPLEXITY 2

Ontological synthesis 8

Potentiality, Complexity and Processuality 12Retrospect and Prospect 18

II. OBJECTS 19

Introduction 19

The referent of this and that 22

Activity: an interlude 28

Language connections 29

Number 31

Naming the substance 37

III. SPECIES 41

Species as quality 41

Retrospect and Prospect 43

The Status of Substance and Species in the Logic of Being 44

Ontological synthesis revisited: an interlude 47

The Reality of Species 49

IV. CAPACITIES 58

Species is the Capacities 58

The Object of Intentionality or Restoring Ontology 68

Retrospect and Prospect 74

A glance at the theoretical aspects of relation 75

Bibliography 77

Index ofkriks 80


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ii

Editors preface

The following essay is almost unknown to the public. I sent a copy to very fewscholars some years ago. I let my editors note on page one as it was in 2001. Nowthat I can benefit of this website at Osaka Gai Dai, Im glad to present it to thescholarly community, to the philosophers and students of philosophy, as Sudhakarsaid. For he was a true philosopher: this essay is not on Indian philosophy, it is Indianphilosophy, by anIndian author.

Besides its great style, I hold Sudhakars contribution as a major one. Strange, it isenough. Dense and deep too. But it could also be very helpful for microscopic studieson the Vkyapadya, providing a layout of the whole architecture of the Vkyapadya, atleast on the ontological level, which, according to Sudhakar, comes first.

Nonetheless, it ends up quite abruptly. And the annonced heading difference andnon-difference (p.58) is not there, though the topic is largely dealt with troughout the

text. The author also wrote I shall close this paper with a re-presentation of theconcept of relation (p.74), which suggests that the unwritten part is quite a small one.It was of course out of question for me to fill the gap: although we had lots of talks onthe Vkyapadya (and on other topics as well!), we never worked as a team: the style(and which style!) is his, as well as the genuine approach. He used to laugh atphilology and philologists. As I was during that period (1992-1999), among otheractivities, preparing a critical edition of the Kikvtti on Pini, I have been laughedat more than once. Still, our discussions were not limited to that, hopefully. We used tosubmit eachother drafts of our studies I was also at the same time involved in adissertation on theJtisamuddea. But unfortunately, the whole essay has been knownto me only after he left. And I have to confess that I was not aware of an insight of thatcaliber. We were often on the same tone about what Bhartharis philosophy is not.Now, were have a glimpse on what it is: somehow actual, through Sudhakarshermeneutics. He refers to postmodernism (fn 85) where I would have rather referredto Hans-Georg Gadamer, but this does not generate any conflict whatsoever.

As I wrote in my 2001 editors note, the text is as it was. I just made a newpresentation, a krik index, the summary, corrected some misspellings, added somebibliographical references, and very few comments in footnotes.

Special thanks are due to prof. Ashok Aklujkar (UBC, Vancouver), who encouragedme to make it public, and also to prof. Nagasaki Hiroko, Dr. Kobayashi Masato andprof. George Cardona, without whom this site would not have existed.

February 13th, 2004Yves [email protected]


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Bhartharis Ontology*by

Sudhakar Jatavallabhula

Introduction

Bhartharis Vkyapadyam consists of at least three intrinsically interwoven systems.These are, ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language. The present paper is anattempt to extract the ontological system from the text. I assume that the authors onto-logical commitments determine and govern to a significant extent his world-view ingeneral and hence his epistemological and language-related pronouncements. Having

precisely this in mind, I do not hesitate to say that the following is a first step towardsan understanding of Bhartharis metaphysics.

The numbers in braces preceding the quotations are for the internal division of my text and all thereferences within this paper are to those numbers. The references following the verses are toBhartharis Vkyapadyam in Wilhelm RAUs edition. Read ||Jti 21 || as Jtisamuddea, krik 21.For the description of Bhartharis ontology, I shall base myself on and derive the links only from thekrik text of the Vkyapadyam. Although all the ontological issues are entirely derived from andexplained on this basis, needless to add that I do take aids from the commentators: Vttikra, Vabha-deva, Puyarja, Helrja and Phullarja. As for the systems of epistemology and the philosophy ofabda, I shall merely summarize the issues without always giving the textual evidence. These issuesare mostly presented as being enveloped within the ontological problematic. In this paper my attempt

is not to represent these systems. It is simply an attempt at a philosophical re-construction ofontology on the topical basis. My intended readers are philosophers and students of philosophy.Perhaps I should add that I shall usually quote and discuss only those writers from whom I learntsomething. (An updated and exhaustive bibliography of studies of the Vkyapadyam is available.) Icould learn something only from those Sanskritists who ingeniously blended the original Sanskrittexts with their understanding of Western philosophy and the philological method. To make myselfclearer, while understanding Bharthari, I do learn a lot from LARSON (whose writings betray aprofound understanding that will be a guide-line for future researches), MOHANTY (more as aphenomenologist, for it is impossible to understand any branch of Indian Philosophy without Husserl

* [Editors note: The present paper is to be taken with caution; Dr J. Sudhakar did not allow meto put it into circulation, for he died in 2000, and I came to know the present version of the

text only recently. But it happens that we were good friends, and that we had had a lot ofdiscussions on Bharthari for many years in Poona as well as in Lausanne, and many aspects ofhis dissertation reflect our talks. It appears to me that his treatment of what he calls theontological synthesis is the most accurate one I have come across on what for instance Prof.AKLUJKAR calls inflated ontology in his 1970 unpublished (but well known to Bhartarianscholars) dissertation (p.109, 6.2), or Radhika HERZBERGER realm of Possible Being(upacrasatt) (Bharthari and the Buddhists, Dordrecht: Reidel 1986, p. 13). I believe thatthe interest of his contribution goes far further this particular point, and I am glad to present itto scholars judgement. There is no evidence that this investigation was considered by J.Sudhakar as achieved, there rather would be one that it is not. Except some rearrangements andcorrections of obvious mistakes, I let the text as it was.

Yves Ramseier ([email protected]), February 13th, 2001].


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and his disciples), HALBFASS (whose scholarship is evidenced by his way of posing the questions),CARDONA (more as a Pinian, for Bharthari was a Pinian), and MATILAL (who associated himselfwith analytical philosophy and brought along with him Indian philosophy a reconstructivedestruction). These thinkers have nothing in common, excepting that they are thinkers.

I. COMPLEXITY

[1] naikatva na ca nntva na sattva na ca nstit |tmatattveu bhvnm asaseu vidyate || Jti 21 ||

There is neither oneness nor manyness, neither existence nor non-existencewithin the true or real natures of the entities when they are not together.1

The main reason for beginning over the question What there is2 with an apparentnegative statement, is that once we pose the question what is there? and start with ananswer in the fashion of there is this or that we assume that there is / are thing(s), andthus that either there is one and only one thing, or there is more than one thing and sotheir existence. But according to Bharthari, the above question can be raised and dealtwith only if the reference is to an entity which is already a part of sasi = anassemblage or a complex of various entities and not to any entity in and by itself. Thesame logic applies to the hypothetical answers: there isnt this or that, there areentities, and there are no entities (one may also add: there are these entities andthere arent these entities). Thus an analysis of [1] could be as follows: 1) Theentities have a real self or rather the truth of their self. More precisely, each entity has anature of its own. 2) These natures come together and are commingled. 3) The realnature of the entities and any entity as such cannot be either identically or differently

ascertained, say, through enumeration. 4) We cannot attribute existence or non-existence to them3 as they exist or do not exist. This verse is one among many suchverses on the basis of which a re-construction and re-presentation of Bhartharis onto-logy is possible. I consider this particular verse as a most convenient starting-pointbecause it contains almost all important tenets of Bhartharis ontology. Needless to

1. For the dichotomous thinking with pairs of opposites that constitutes this verse, see GONDA(1991:120-36). In a characteristic way, he exhausts the most important occurrences fromUpaniads and Brhmaas. See also ORGAN 1976. ORGANs distinction between non-polar and

polar dualisms is illuminating. In a way, the following is precisely what we have in [1]: ... inpolar dualism the two fundamental realities are both joined and disjoined. Polar entities areharmonious discords or contrasting concords. They are the extremities of a single whole.(ORGAN 1976: 34).

2. See MORA (1963-64) for the earliest original Latin definitions of Ontology.

3. Or, nor can any entity be a subject of either positive or negative existential predication considering that existence is a predicate. We consider that in [1] the topical subject is anyone ofthe entities listed below. [1] concerns possible answers to questions such as: 1) Are there manysubstances or is there only one substance? 2) Does substance exist or not? Apparently there isno grammatical substance in Sanskrit language. Here, taking a clue from J.L. Shaw (1976: esp.160-61) on the topical substance, we can say that to be one or many, and to exist or not toexist, are predicates.


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add that there are indeed many other verses in the Vkyapadyam which are of a similarnature and perhaps serve similar purposes.

In the present paper, I shall proceed to explicate Bhartharis conception of Being,Entities and their interrelationship, etc., ignoring as much as possible the often inter-

vening discourse of epistemology and that of abda. I take [1] for a guide-line, in thatthe elements of the above verse are expected to enable us to pose textually relevantquestions in search of whose answers we encounter the entire problematic ofBhartharis ontology. At present, I shall take up the first two points of the analysis of[1]. Namely, the reality of the entities and their togetherness, and then dedicate a sequelfor the other two points together: the problems of difference and non-difference andexistence and non-existence. Let us first of all see what are the entities and whatconstitutes their real nature.

There is no explicit enumeration of the padrthas = Categories in the Vkya-

padyam. To begin with, we shall say along with Bharthari that they are nothing butsubstance etc. They are dravyam = substance and sabandha = relation and thechapter-headings beginning from bhyo dravyasamuddhea = once again [a chapter]concerning substance4 of the third ka of the Vkypadyam. These arepadrthas inthe sense of ontological categories and as such they are to be distinguished from thepadrthas in the sense of the basic objectivities that figure in the list of topics of theVkyapadyam.5 Thepadrthas in the latter sense include the categories. Thus the textVkypadyam is not only a padrthastram = ontology in that sense. These entitiesare padrthas in another literal and important sense which does not immediatelyconcern us here, that is, pada + artha = word-meaning.

4. To tackle the question of the list of categories I chose this way to identify them as whatBharthari understands by padrthas. It is not necessarily the case that Bhyodravya-samuddea = once again a chapter concerning substance, which is a chapter-heading, orvtti, another chapter-heading are alsopadrthas on the same level as substance, quality, etc.The former, as the title itself indicates, is an avatar of substance and the latter is a grammaticalconcept standing for complex formations. But in order not to have to resort to other systems ofphilosophy, and since there does not exist a list of ontological categories in the text, which

deals exhaustively with the topics I listed under padrthas, to identify the referent of theexpression substance, etc. of Bharthari, I tentatively identify them with the chapter-headings.However, what matters is not so much what are the padrthas (we can know nothing bymerely listing them), nor how one identifies them (in this exercise one necessarily gets lost inpseudo-scienticism, by creating meaningless phrases like Bharthari knows, Bharthari isaware of, Bharthari is familiar with, Bharthari borrowed from, and so on. What thepadrthas signify, how they are defined, and how they are related to each other is my subjectmatter. Yet, the most important criterion here is evidenced by the very treatment they receive inthe Vkyapadyam, which I shall try to re-present here and in the sequel.

5. The topics of Vkyapadyam are listed by Bharthari himself in the Brahmaka. Arepresentation of the Vkyapadyam in the lines of these topics could be highly fruitful. Anoutline of such an approach can be found in Peri Sarveswara SHARMA (1987).


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Let us note that within the framework of the Vkyapadyam, these concepts have asystem-specific signification.6 While dealing with the various concepts employed in theVkyapadyam and attempting to clarify their mutual relationship, I shall keep therelevant literature on the Vkyapadyam constantly in view. I shall, however, refrain

from accounting for the origins and various avatars of concepts and their economicalaspect such as lending and borrowing of concepts and phrases, or exchange ofconcepts and phrases. This information is perhaps valuable for different purposes, butmore initiated scholars have been supplying us with it. My task is different and verylimited. It consists in explicating and elucidating the problematic of Bhartharis meta-physics. I shall try to clarify the nature of the grid of concepts so as to understand ofwhat kind of problems they are the possible explanations and how various concepts aremutually related within the text ofVkyapadyam. Let us now turn to [2] and see whatconstitutes the truth or reality of an entity and what are the entities:

[2] satysatyau tu yau bhvau pratibhva vyavasthitau |satya yat tatra s jtir asaty vyaktaya smt || Jti 32 ||

Between the two parts or / and7 two entities that are situatedin each entity, (i.e.) real/truth and unreal/untruth,the species is the real / truth and the individualsare known as unreal/ untruth.

Jti = species is the real part and the real existent in any given entity.. Here we havetwo equally tenable readings of the fourth word of the krik = verse, aphorism. Itreads as bhvau and also as bhgau..Bhva refers to an entity, thing, being, becoming,etc.Bhgau refers to parts or components. In the former lines of thinking, there is adivision within the entities and the bifurcation is between two entities, one real and theother unreal. In the latter lines of thinking, when we consider that each entity involvedin Complexity has, or is constituted of, two parts, then one is a species part and theother is an individual part. Before we see what is this species, one most important

6. System-specificity means that a set of concepts in identical terms is used and therefore sharedby a number of disciplines at one and the same historical period or at different periods ofhistory. The appearance of sameness is but at the formal level. After unquestioningly grantingto various systems the invention of a certain number of concepts (i.e., that they imbibed certainwords with certain special significations which constitute these respective systems and that

they are so established by the thinkers to be as such significant in their respective systems), itis prerogative to recognize that a thinkers thoughts are not only, and in a sense not at all, whatresembles those thoughts. Especially when the thinker in question is somebody like Bharthari,Ngrjuna or akara, the thinkers conceptual framework itself is a system. See for exampleGOKHALE (1982) for the system-specific signification of the term padrtha, as well as theexpression substance, etc., with reference to Vaieika contra Nyya. See also LARSON (1980)who makes certain important observations on the nature of Indian philosophical systems.

7. By the device of or / and I mean that a given word or phrase should be read in bothmeanings. The technique of conveying more than one sense with a single expression is calledtantram by Bharthari. From the point of view of the recipient, the same expression is read orheard twice or more to get at more than one meaning. This process is called repetition =vtti.


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distinction to be made is between the fundamental categories of Bhartharis ontologywhich I chose to call entities and the objects of the world, both being referred to by theword bhva. The former include (let us note that the following list is not exhaustive):

dravyam = substance is the primordial material basis of the world and the stuffall things are made out of, let that be aava = atoms or / and mahbhtni =the great elements: earth, water, fire air and space, and / or prakti orpradhnam = the primordial materiality or the Primary one.

gua = quality (properties and attributes) that causes formal and qualitativedifference within the substance so that various objects of different forms areconstituted.

sakhy = number is the fundamental differenciator that individuates the entitiesand the objects thus creating singularity and plurality of the entities and objects. (Infact, differentiating is a common characteristic of all these entities and what they

differentiate, divide, split, is nothing but each other. This is an important implica-tion of the statement that there is neither oneness nor manyness in itself for anyentity. Because all the entities are divided from without by the possession of otherforces.)8

dik= direction is the substratum, the locus of objects and activities and thefoundation for part-whole relation.89

sdhanam = (lit. the means) capacities of the objects, by virtue of which theyparticipate in the activities.

kriy = activity of any kind (including continuous flux, and the ultimatelydiscernible9 elements of activities, and events, i.e., not directly agent-basedactivities and also complex activities), and hence a realization of the capacities ofthe objects.

kla = time is the the primary instigator and mover of objects in realizing theircapacities.10

8. In fact, the real locus of the objects is space = ka, and direction determines the boundariesof all that is located in space.

9. Technically, the definition ofkriy implies that it has a sequence and parts. But since the lastpart of an activity is an atomic, partless moment, it cannot be a kriy. See also CARDONA(1991: 454) for the non-applicability of the word action to the last indivisible moment.

This is also a part of the problem of the limitations of language, which I will consider below.In other words, the ultimately describable elements, such as, rising upwards, stretchingforward, are covered by the terms kriy and karman. Those which are still subtler movementsare not covered because there are no words from them.

10. Here I have left unlisted ka = space, which does not figure as a chapter head in theVkyapadyam part III, but is directly relevant to ontology. Neither did I list liga = themark indicative of continuous flux, purua = person or self, upagraha = aspect, and vtti= complex words; though they are chapter-heads, they are not directly relevant to ontology asentities. However, these chapters contain enormous information about the entities, which I willuse wherever necessary. Expressions such as fundamental and primordial are meant to stressthe difference between metaphysical issues and empirical phenomena. For certain technicalreasons, I list activity under entities, and activities under things.


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sabandha = relation is the mutual, inseparable relationship among all theentities listed above.

These are highly simplified working definitions. They are inadequate for they do not

cover all the nuances of the things defined. Still, they are true to Bhartharis expositionof these entities and, most importantly, they are not too vague to start with. They clearlydemonstrate a fact that concerns us in this paper: the entities have to be understood onlywith reference to each other.

The other meaning of bhva is the things of the world referring to cow(s) andBrahmin(s) and tree(s) and jar(s) and reciting text(s), utterance (of sentence(s)) andcooking, walking, and their innumerable parts. In short, on the one hand objects and onthe other, the accomplished and in the process of being accomplished activities, forexample, the cooked food and the act of cooking are equally the referents of the wordbhva. In Vkypadyam, there are two chapters with the heading of substance, one

explaining the above mentioned primordial material basis of the world and the other itsmanifestation as objects which are referred to as this and that in a prepredicativestate. Therefore, in the second stage, substance is objectifiable and yet not directly intouch with quality, but is about to be so; in the final stage it becomes the content ofcognition, and also substantives and adjectives in sentences. For this last stage ofsubstance I shall reserve the word object: a cow, a Brahmin, Devadatta, a pot, thecolour white, etc. This is the stage at which the substance and the activities in thedivided form, or rather their divided forms are called vyaktaya = revelation, indi-viduals. In general, following Bhartharis method, I shall take dravyam =substance in both the above mentioned senses of the first two stages while reservingthe expression substances for the objects and occasionally use the word things forobjects and activities together.

In order for the species to be the real part of the entities, it must reside in them and inorder for it to be an entity in itself it must have a determinable ontological status. Nowthat we know what are the entities and what are the individuals, let us see what isspecies.

[3] sabandhibhedt sattaiva bhidyamn gavdiu |jtir ity ucyate ...11 || Jti 33 ||

Being itself is called species, being divided among

cows etc. due to the differences in the relata...Here we have the fundamental ontological trio of Satt = Being, species and objects.Being is the truth or reality of entities for Being itself is named species in its dispersion.First of all, species too is to be understood as a quality in the above defined sense ofgua = quality, a divider or a splitter of the substance, by virtue of which there are

11. Half-quotes are considered only if either part of the verse is totally meaningful in itself or if theunmentioned part is more problematic at a given context than representing the issue underconsideration.


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cows and pots, but neither a single cow nor one and only one pot. Though it shares thischaracteristic with the quality, species is not an existentially dependent entity, i.e., it isnot an entity which cannot exist subsisting by itself, but exists as a part of the alreadyexisting entity without which it cannot exist, which gua = secondary by definition

is.12 Nor is the concept of species restricted to the objects. Whereas the species onto-logical priority implies that it is not only the essence of the entities and objects by beingtheir real part, but also that it is their cause, and hence an independent entityhood. Thatis why, to be of anything is the referent of the expressions tva and tal = ...ness or...ity that stand for Being and species. Since species resides in them as the true part,the objects are partially real. That is, cows, Brahmins, etc. are not illusions and unreal.

A problem in Bhartharis ontology, and in his metaphysics in general, is the distinc-tion between the real and unreal in connection with ontological categories, and truth anduntruth13 in connection with what we state about them. This distinction is basically

adopted on the basis of the transience of the forms of substance.14

Although it is madeexplicit in so many words, the non-difference between them (the inseparability of realfrom unreal and vice-versa), is also stated in so many words.15 Thus we may say thatthe distinction between nityatva and anityatva = permanence and impermanence is ina way the only criterion for, and closely connected with, satya and asatya = real andunreal and truth and untruth. In this dialectic, let us call it material dialectic, substance,while being the primordial material basis of the world, is the permanent material causeof the world of objects. The objects are impermanent effects of substance and imper-manent causes of impermanent effects. Here there is no doubt that the latter are therevealed and therefore unreal, as [3] made it clear. Therefore, what I said above about

them, namely that they are neither illusions nor unreal, is incorrect. But since speciesresides precisely in cows and Brahmins, and pots and trees, therefore cow-ness and

12. But it is also doubtful whether the possibility or impossibility of representing A without Band the possibility and impossibility of As existing without B always go hand-in-hand, thatis to say, it is uncertain whether the classes of contents of representations derived from thedivisions based on these two criteria are identical. For there is firstly no necessary connectionbetween the psychological possibility or impossibility of representing something separatelyand the ontological possibility or impossibility of something existing separately. Further, thereare cases such that A cannot exist without B but where they can be separately represented inimagination... GINSBERG (1982: 268).

13. Truth in this sense is predicable to utterances (satya vada) and also to things, that is, tomatters of fact or states of affairs. When truth is predicated to cognitions (jna), it refers topram, a true cognition. Still, I render satyam also as true and truth in the former sense ofthe word true. For here it is predicated to bhva (an object). See MOHANTY (1980: 439 etpassim) for truth in the latter logico-epistemological sense. I must admit that I have no clue asto why MOHANTY did not consider satyam.

14. What BROOKS (1969: 394) mentions as his criteria of application of Reality in Indian Thoughtperfectly concords with those of the Vkyapadyam. The criteria in question are permanent andstable.

15. na tattvtattvayor bheda iti vddhebhya gama | atattvam iti manyante tattvam evvicritam||Dravya 7 ||


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Brahminhood, etc., are the real elements in them. It is just the same reality as that ofearthness, waterness, etc. (= the essence of substance), and also that of species, ofspace and time. That is, they too are made real by the fact that species resides in them.16

It is also the same reality as that of the individual substances in the form of species

called distinguishingness = vyvttidharmasmnyam of particularities = viea.These are the distinguishing elements of a given object that exclude the properties ofother objects. While residing in these, species particularizes an object as that object,on the basis of those elements, although on the basis of resemblance and causalefficacy it subsumes the same under a class. These particularities can again be equatedwith the essences of substance, i.e., substance as the substances.17 Basically, therefore,species is a permanent but non-material entity, and it is neither identical with substance,nor is it produced by it. While it is thus distinguished from substance, any enquiry intospecies avoids many of the intricacies that crop up with that of substance, etc. It does

not have two aspects called the real part and the unreal part. Most importantly, it is nota potentiality of substance, whereas all the other entities are somehow or other said tobe potentialities of the substances. For, as we know through [3], species is Being itself.Its inclusion as an entity within the ontological synthesis can be granted only after theseinitial considerations. The ontological synthesis is spelt out in [4] and [5].

Ontological synthesis

[4] tasmd dravydaya sarv aktayo bhinnalaka |sas pururthasya sdhak na tu keval || Jti 23 ||

Therefore, substance, etc., are all potentialities having different characteristics

(or / and: all potentialities, starting with substance, have different characteristics).Together, they accomplish the ultimate purposes of men, but not singly.

The entities that are mentioned under [2] are the potentialities to meet the ends of men,that is, in virtue and vice, in the affairs of the world, in the desires of the flesh and intheir quest for the absolute release. They are the potentialities of Being. This approachto the ontological categories, which consists in considering it impossible to assign exis-tence and non-existence to the entities, and insists on a transcendence of the identity-difference paradigm for them, is to clarify the complex, unified and the purposivenature of the entities and to account for the human goals. (Over and above this, as we

16. Why should this reasoning arise at all if substance is permanent just like species? Since themanifestation of water or earth, as we see them, is not what is meant by the elements, andsince everything that we perceive is a mixture of all five elements, the elements are not directlythe entities of categorization of what there is, but are included in the concept of substance: whatthe world of objects is constituted of.

17. It is not a self-contradiction. Nor, for that matter, the destruction of a fundamental distinctionbetween the particular and the universal. For what is clearly meant here is simply that all theparticularities share a property: distinguishingness. This common property is not actuallyidentical to jti = the universal or the species. But it works like a universal. See below forcommonness and species relation.


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shall see, there is the logical reason ofnarthakya, parsimony). There are two domainsof causality here that need not be confused. The entities are the means towards humanends and the human ends themselves motivate the humans to act. The first causality is ateleology without any particular beginning or end, and without necessarily implying

any conscious aim on the part of the entities. For the entities called substance, quality,time, direction, etc., do not together decide to act and then set forth towards an action,and their priority is a logical priority rather than an ontological priority. Nor is it thecase that the thing in relation to which they act is different from them; we too aresubstances, and entities such as time are an integral part of our being. But the teleologyhere is meant to indicate the inadequacy, if not the impossibility, of the analyticalenquiry into the nature of entities without this primordial ontological synthesis. Thissystem-specific foundationism must be constantly kept in mind, especially beforeconfronting the realist as well as anti-realist tendencies of the Vkyapadyam. And the

second causality is the culturally specified explanatory principle wherein human beingsact in a manner that results in the accumulation of virtue and vice, wealth and fame,satisfaction of their bodily and psychological drives and both sthetic and spiritualneeds. Here sometimes one, but often more than one, motive can instigate an individualaction.

Before we go further, a few comments on the concept of the ends of men: theBhartharian metaphysics is not aimed at merely classifying the entities, unifying themwithin Being and discussing them. But this teleological aspect is an integral part of theVkyapadyam. And let us be reminded that the concept ofpururthas,18 the principleof cultural explanation, is designed to exhaust any and all activities of human beings.

Therefore, the coming together of the entities to act towards the human goals is calledthe entities upakra = rendering service, help. Thus this help is the very nature ofthe entity called relation. Among the four pururhas, Bharthari is immenselyconcerned with ethics. On the other hand, he is concerned with the issues of thephilosophy of grammar which I understand as artha. That is, here we are dealing witha discipline that explains how the cognitions arise due to language and how languageinstigates actions in various spheres of cultural life, and also that which makes clearwhat are the necessarily presupposed realities of human interaction, not simply in termsof the beliefs of the people, but also in terms of the visions of the seers. Indeed,

Bharthari repeatedly states that various metaphysical postulates are for the sake ofvyavahra = day-to-day intercourse. The consequence of this is not only that themetaphysical discourse betrays a direct bearing on the cultural ethos, but also that anoverwhelmingly totalizing theoretical stance is made immediately accessible in therhetoric of everyday living and the usage of classical Sanskrit. Finally, certain claimstowards moka are not less pertinent. (The question of ethics in the Vkyapadyam isclosely connected with the philosophy ofabda.)

18. See KOLLERS short but illuminating discussion (1968) for pururthas in general and thespecial status ofmoka and dharma.


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[5] sarvaaktytmabhtatvam ekasyaiveti niraye |bhvnm tmabhedasya kalpan syd anarthik || Jti 22 ||

With the ascertainment that the real nature of all the potentialities belongs to one,that is, to Being only, let the postulation of difference among the essence and / or

soul of the entities be purposeless.There are, therefore, two explanations of ontological synthesis, represented in [4] and[5] respectively: one is a reason for the adaptation of a thesis of Complexity = thenecessary togetherness of all the entities, that only in this manner the entities areaccessible for the purposes of men; and the other that expresses itself as an epistemicmodality of certainty = niraya yielding logical concision. Here it is relevant tomention although further elaborations are beyond the present paper that certainty isunlike the other mental acts, because it is the true nature of the intellect itself. It is alsorelevant to remind ourselves that the certainty here is not the conclusion of a syllogistic

or any other form of argumentation (this misunderstanding might be strengthed by theword therefore): no argumentation is needed to prove ones own self.19 These twoverses [4 & 5] seem to reduce the status of entities to the potentialities of one singleBeing. This thesis is more of a unification than a simplification or reduction, forreasons that will become clearer in the course of our enquiry. One remarkable theoreti-cal advantage of the so-called ontological synthesis is that it saves us from getting lostin some issues of antinomies that characterize any metaphysical discourse. And aremarkable theoretical implication of the same is that since there exists one singleprinciple common to all the entities and objects, it renders all relations includingcausality internal.

It is necessary to note that Being is not discussed in itself as an entity, and thisdecisive principle called satt in the sense of Being or Brahman does not often figure inthe text of the Vkyapadyam. Yet Being, as well as the consequences of the ontologi-cal synthesis, are invoked at almost all crucial junctures of ontological discussions.Beings dispersed form, species, is constantly functional and a central issue inBhartharis metaphysics for it is situated in each entity as its truth and reality. In effect,in spite of the advantages, the ontological synthesis is not a simplification for it doesstate that everything is Being (a statement whose purport might even render it asgood as stating nothing), but does not stop at that. However, what is unreal is indi-

viduals, and since individuals are the individual instances of the revelation of species,Bharthari repeatedly reminds his readers that there is no difference or non-difference

19. Therefore, niraya here should not be understood as a kind of transcendental argument either.(See ROSEN (1980: 216-260) for a critical treatment of the question of certitude through theages and its status in the history of philosophy). For the net result here is not a subjectivecertitude: it rather concerns the soul-of-all but not Bhartharis alone. See also akara for thesame logic of the impossibility of logic in this case. His criticism against bulls without hornsand tail on this very issue finds its counterpart in Bhartharis discussion of tman. Thelatters discussions too involve a couple of bulls, but neither one is a logician!


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COMPLEXITY 11

between real and unreal. In this connection, his cautionary slogan is not to misconceivethe real as unreal, the reverse of certain Vedntins.

In other words, the fact that the entities have different characteristics, as it is men-tioned in [4], does not amount to their having different identities, but it does amount to

their having different roles and different definitions = lakaa. The characteristics =lakaa of one entity differ from those of the others in such a way that the entitiesentityhood as participants in the overall teleology, as well as each entitys uniqueness,is kept intact. Since the real nature of the entities is not only their togetherness but alsotheir uniqueness, i.e., the fact that one entity differs from the other entities by virtue ofits singular characteristics in this restricted sense, Bharthari uses the plural expressionwhile talking of the nature of the entities in [1]: tmatattveu = within their realnatures. And the same logic has made possible a few inadequate definitions of theentities under [2]. Since in their togetherness the entities divide each other, there is no

difference or non-difference in them. To be precise, the question of difference and non-difference arises concerning the relation between Being/ Brahman and the entities,between one entity and the other and in relation to each entity and its divisions.Nevertheless, for theoretical purposes, each one of the entities is one, to begin with.

It appears that we already have the answer to our first query. Namely, what is thereal nature of the entities = bhvnmtmatattvam. Thus we have expressions suchas: dravytm = soul of the substance, kltm = the time-soul, abdatattvam =reality ofabda, tmatattvam = reality of the self, with a specification of the Being-nature of the entities; and we also have expressions such as uddham = pure,kevalam = unique, referring precisely to this nature of theirs. Apart from the other

connotations, as a consequence of the ontological synthesis that all entities are but thepowers or potentialities of Being, the last two terms refer to the partlessness of theentities, i.e., pure and unique designate the self-sameness and indivisibility of all theentities and objects taken separately. In effect, the same meaning holds for the formerset of concepts.

Within the so-called material dialectic, however, the real is always the substance andthe unreal forms of the substance where the criterion is permanence and impermanence.And hence, with reference to the things of the world, the objects are real as the species,and as the substance in the sense of that which they are made out of. But as quality, in

the specific sense that we shall shortly see, they are unreal. Other pertinent aspects ofthis problem are closely related with Epistemology. I shall shortly elaborate upon onemain aspect in order to clarify the concept of pure entities with special reference to theconceptof substance. What now becomes imperative is to understand the idea of thesecond point of the analysis of [1], or the import of the ontological synthesis: thetogetherness of the entities, in the sense of the internal relationships of entities. Sincetheir togetherness is the essential requirement for the worldly behavior of men, it isessential to discern their mutual relationship which is the ground for their differenceand non-difference, and existence and non-existence. The key for this issue is the


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concept of potentiality itself. Presently we shall note why and how this concept is aleading one.

Potentiality, Complexity and Processuality

The entities mentioned under [2] are nothing but aktaya = potentialities. Bharthariin [4] and [5] includes all the entities under the concept of potentialities. Substance,quality and all others are potentialities with regard to Being. With regard to substancestoo there are said to be potentialities, viz., direction, capacities, activity and time. Thelatter are dependent on the objects, and hence they are potentialities, and substances arethe primary ones. Within the potentialities there are again aktis, for instance time haspast, present and future as aktis. Bharthari does use the word akti = in general,where there is a plurality of manifestation and functioning, but there is only one entitythat manifests them or accomplishes them. When such an aspect is meant, I shalltranslate akti as capacity (retaining the same translation for sdhanam, which is themodel of all instrumentality), for the sake of convenience.

The potentialities of substances are not only potentialities but also entities in them-selves, for any further hierarchies are redundant after the ontological synthesis(relation is a special exception to this rule). When they are understood as poten-tialities, they are subordinate to the objects. This means that the capacities of the objectsare existentially dependent on the objects; direction and time are representationallydependent on the objects; and the activities are existentially dependent on the objects,whereas the objects are existentially dependent on time, and so on. Let me paraphrasethese relations somewhat more precisely, in order to make clearer the mutual

relationships among these entities in terms of dependence and independence. Substanceis the primordial material basis of the world, it is permanent and unchangeable, andalthough it does not have any form, it can be possessed by all the forms. All the formsthat possess the substance are of the nature of quality. These are impermanent andtherefore perishable material manifestations, all things animate and inanimate that haveever existed, exist or will come to exist. Out of these, existing is the essential andinescapable activity that any object that can be conceived of and spoken about isparticipating in. Participation in any kind of activity is possible by virtue of eachobjects powers, natures (in at least one sense of that word), dispositions, suscepti-bilities, tendencies, etc. These are the capacities of the objects in generating activities.

Out of these, the concept of the six transformations is of special importance for theontology of things. But in order for the objects to realize their capacities, they need thepermission of time. That is, the time, so to say, must be ripe for something to come intobeing, to exist, to perish, and for something to produce, to be produced, or forsomething to possess some other object, etc. The objects are situated somewhere orother and sometime or other; either in the past or in the future or in the present. Thusthe situatedness is relative to direction and time, whereas the latter two are allpervading = vibhu. And in turn, direction and time are relative to the situatedness ofthe objects: East is where the sun rises and West is where the sun sets, behind is


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COMPLEXITY 13

behind myself or behind that big building. Time is either 5101 years after Yudhihirawent to heaven or 1999 years after the birth of Jesus of Nazareth. And the other unitsof time are based on the movements of the celestial objects. In turn, all activities aremeasured on the well-known basis of time-spans. While being in existence, each object

occupies only a certain amount of space, whereas space itself is all-pervasive. Thus theextension of material objects is delimited by space and space is represented as though itis delimited by the extended bodies. Here I have left the concepts of species, numberand others unmentioned because this simplified fragment of the whole story ofComplexity is directly relevant to the following verse.

[6] dik sdhana kriy kla iti vastvabhidhyina |aktirpe padrthnm atyantam anavasthit || Dik1||

Direction, means, activity and time are expressive of the substances. They are notat all stably situated in the form of the objects Potentiality. And / Or (The words)

direction, means, activity and time are expressive of substances. They (i.e., thesesubstances) are extremely unstable when situated in the objects in the form oftheir (i.e., as the objects) potentialities.

Here we have the second major grouping of the entities, again in terms of potentiality.The Potentiality-approach realized here belongs to the ontology of objects. Among thefour potentialities mentioned in [6], the capacities of substances represent only one ofthe potentialities belonging to the objects. This point needs to be mentioned, not due tothe formal similarity between potentiality and capacity (which are at times inter-changeable in English as well as in the Sanskrit original), but to draw our attention tothe fact that the concept of potentiality is an extended capacity-concept, and Bharthari

often uses the word akti, as I mentioned earlier, while referring to the capacities ofthe objects20 and various functions of the entities. The capacities represent substancessuch as: agent, destination, the object under production, object of perception or ofrecollection, instrument, source, point of origin, goal, proprietor, locus, etc. These arethe ontological counterparts of the semantics of the Sanskrit cases.21 These cases arenormally translated, within the sentences, as follows: Nominative:Rma goes. Accusative: He sees a horse. He goes to the village. He remembers his mother. Instrumental: He was killed by the enemy. He strikes with the mace. He goes

along with his son. Dative: He gives money to the servant. He leavesfor the sake ofmoney. Ablative: He comes from the village. He was killeddue toweakness.

20. See CHATTERJEE (1987) for a defence of the realist view of akti (in our context, capacities)and also for other philosophical positions in connection with the ontological status of akti.See LARSON (1974) for a comprehensive bibliography on akti.

21. For a concise division ofkraka rules, the things that are krakas, particular actions, verbs orclasses of verbs that are associated with the krakas, and a kraka categorization, seeCARDONA (1974: 232). It is essential to recognize that krakas are syntactico-semanticcategories of Pinian grammar. (See CARDONA 1974: 279-80).


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Genitive: Theboys mother. This book belongs toDevadatta. Locative: He is standing onthe mountain,in the village. Vocative:Hey, Rma, come here.However, sdhak = those which accomplish, the means, the entities, that are so

designated in unison in [4], have the same logical status in relation to Being as thecapacities of objects = sdhanam by virtue of which the objects participate in specificactivities, have in relation to substances. The resemblance stops here. One mustremember that Being is not merely an entity or object = bhva, whereas substancesare,22 and that the mode in which the entities are together is not the way in which thecapacities are situated in the objects, nor are they functional in the same way. Thepotentialities of Being are a unified set of all entities, whereas the capacities are tempo-rally determined, and the capacities of the objects are limited with reference to a givenobject. For instance, fire does not (have the capacity to) soak. (Though a conception

that transgresses this fact is called alakra = a beautifier, a figure of speech, or, forinstance utprek = poetic fancy, we know that the discoveries of various sciencesare mostly grounded in the findings of what things can do, how they react under certaingiven conditions, apart from what things exist.) And as for the ontological status of thecapacities, they are mostly, but not solely, dealt with by Bharthari as being dependentupon the knower-speaker. Whereas the teleology of potentiality is independent ofintentionality and encompasses all the entities.

The unstability of the above-mentioned entities is not to be understood as imper-manence (which is only the nature of the quality). Nor, more importantly, should it beunderstood as the nature of theirs. The ontology of unstability, in this context, is of

four entities: 1) direction, 2) capacities, 3) activity and 4) time. They are unstable withreference to a given object: 1) Near or far, ahead or behind, is only with respect to theobjects: near to.., far from.., ahead of.., behind.., etc. In this way, direction inrelational terms, as it were, becomes even a quality of the object. 2) It is one and thesame Harry who is jumping, from whom a letter came or to whom a letter is sent, or towhom these shoes belong, in his various capacities as agent, source, destination,possessor. 3) As individuals we do not always do one and the same thing, though wesometimes jump, send letters, receive letters and possess shoes. 4) Though it is thesame paper you are reading at this hour it has not been written at this your reading

hour. I become a past and lost author and you are the present reader-author, but theobject is more or less the same. That is how, simply put, the potentialities called

22. bhva and abhva in all the senses of these words are Brahman / Being together. When bhvais translated as Entity, it becomes an object of enquiry precisely in the lines we are followinghere. When the same word is translated as a thing, an object or an activity, it is that whichundergoes the six transformations. When bhva is contrasted with a-bhva, the existence andnon-existence of a particular object and sometimes of the whole world is an issue. When thesame contrast is carried on in epistemology, since the cognitions arise only while beingmediated by the language, the issues are many. Finally, when bhva is simply abhvapratyaya, i.e., that which is translated as ness or ity, it stands for the species.


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COMPLEXITY 15

direction, capacities, activity and time are unstably situated in the objects or substances.As for them:

[7] na aktn tath bhedo yath aktimat sthiti |na ca laukikam ekatva tsm tmasu vidyate || Dik27||

The differences among the potentialities (within themselves) are unlike what is inthe case of (or / and unlike the stability of) the objects that have potentialities.There is no worldly oneness in their selves.

Only a philosopher or a physicist is interested in potentialities for and in themselves. Inour commonsensical understanding and day-to-day interactions, we have to deal withtimes, like what time it is, or at the time of..., but certainly not with the question of whattime is. Thus the differences within the potentialities of substances are quite unlike thedifferences among the objects. (For the oneness as much as plurality of the objects isan empirical reality in that each of them has a determinable existence called oneness in

the sense of unity. We shall examine this point upto a certain detail below.) To repeatan important point, the subordination of the entities called direction, capacities, activityand time to the objects is purely for the representational purposes but not in reality.They are entities in their own right and the effects of their characteristics are displayedin relation to the objects. That is, the deduction of their various characteristics ispossible on the basis of their functionality, which is evidenced with respect to varioussubstances but nowhere else. Let me note in passing that the method most commonlyemployed by Bharthari in the deduction of the essential characteristics of the entities isthe inference of cause out of the effect. As per our commonsensical understanding, theactivity is not separable from the actor and there is nothing like activity which is notthis or that particular activity. This is but one instance of the contrast that repeatedlyappears as the one between vyavahra and tattva. What is a matter of every day socialrelations with special reference and appeal to the Sanskrit language and what is the casein reality, philosophically speaking, is a necessary distinction not only in the Vkya-padyam but in Indian philosophy in general.

Therefore, the potentialities of substances are unstably situated in the latter. Thisstatus of the potentialities primarily implies the internal relation among the entities andalso the representational dependence of the four potentialities on the objects, i.e., thatthey can be cognized only as being situated in the substances. As a consequence of this

fact, right from the moment of the division and formation of the substance into objects,and all through the stages of the objects constitution and in the accomplishment of thepotentialities in their task of becoming accessible to cognitions and functional in theends of men, the substance-approach in the Bhartharis metaphysics, although neverabandoned, is dominated by the process-approach or Processuality.

The philosophy of Potentiality is therefore one of the three central approaches inBhartharis ontology. It is also a most distinguishing approach. The other approach isComplexity, which we have been trying to understand right from [1], and the thirdapproach is Processuality. However, these three are neither contradictory to each other


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nor are they totally unrelated. The notion of complexity implies a necessary together-ness and mutual, inseparable interrelationship among the substance, etc.: in effect, thesystem of ontology23 . The Potentiality-approach of the ontological-synthesis [4 & 5]helps to reduce the complexity of the Complexity approach by subordinating the

entities to Being, from which point of view the entities must lose further hierarchiesand refer back to their necessary togetherness = Complexity. In this sense, Complexityitself is Being. Because all the entities are situated in it as its potentialities, although tobe related to each other belongs to all the entities as their common characteristic. Boththese aspects are paraphrased here:

[8] yathaiva cendriydnm tmabht samagrat |tath sabandhisabandhasasarge pi pratyate || Jti 24||

Just as the nature of being a cluster of causes is nothing but its own self in thecase of sense organs, etc., in the same way, the togetherness of those entities that

are related to Being as its potentialities appears to be their own self or / andBeings own self.24

For perception to take place, an aggregate of causes is required, starting with the senseorgans and ending with consciousness, involving an internal chain of causality. In thecase of perception, as well as in the case of the coming together of the potentialities, therelationships that a number of items come to have are their own potentiality or capacity,as per the above convention. In the case of potentialities, we know that they aretogether the means, a cluster of causes, to meet the ends of men. Let us look at thatnature of relation as their capacity.

[9] upakrt sa yatrsti dharmas tatrnugamyate |aktnm api s aktir gunm apy asau gua || Sabandha 5 ||

Where there is relation to serve (the potentialities), there its characteristics areunderstood. It is the capacity of the potentialities and secondary to the qualities.

This description encompasses two most important domains in which relations effectsare visible; namely, the entities togetherness and the substances relation with quality.Relation, in other words, is dependent on those that are either already situated in asubstratum, i.e., all the entities in Being/Brahman, and the four entities that are unstablysituated in the substances. Relation is also secondarily understood when the primaryone gets influenced by quality. Here, as we shall shortly see, quality is secondary

(=paratantra, a definition of quality) and substance is the primary one. Accordingly,

23. This thesis rules out the hypothesis that any avatars of idealism, such as psychologism,mentalism, phenomenalism, imagisms of various kinds, some forms of phenomenology, etc.,are primary in Bhartharis metaphysics. Among the three poles of Bhartharis philosophy,i.e., ontology, epistemology and abda, none is more important than the others.

24. In this second interpretation of the words sabandha and sabandhi, I quote Iyers translationof the same verse which highlights the point that relation is a power of Brahman: Just as thecollocation of the senses etc. is not an entity over and above the things composing it, in thesame way, the connection between the different powers of the Supreme is not a separate entity.(IYER 1971: 21).


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COMPLEXITY 17

the relation is an entity that is described as extremely dependent25 = atyantapara-tantra. We shall have a closer look at the effects of relation, or rather the effects of itscharacteristics called conjunction and inherence in the present paper.

Thus in both their modes of being as members of the Complexity, and as the unique

individual potentialities of Being, the entities are identical to Being. Being is Brahmanand Brahman is Being and this remains a meta-philosophical principle as such, simplybecause Bhartharis text is not a Vednta-manual. A consolidated working definitionof potentialities both with reference to Being and substances could be as follows:potentialities are inseparably linked to those which possess them in a substratum-subordinate relation and they are the possibilities and conditions of revelations andexpressions of those which possess them. In the case of species, the revelation is calledabhivyakti (see [28], [42] and [43]). In the case of substances, the expression is calledabhidhna [6]. The former is Beings presence as the species in all entities, and the

latter the presence of the second set of potentialities within objects, by virtue of whichthe substance becomes accessible.By Processuality, the third significant approach of Bharthari, I mean mainly change.

For instance, the transformation / revolution = vivartanam of Brahman as the beingof the objects and entities, the six transformations of objects and activities (namely,coming into being, existing, growing, changing, decaying and perishing) and thecontinuous flux: the non-stability of all the forms of objects, wherein stability itself is agreat wonder. This approach is realized in a number of concepts that are involved in theontological synthesis as well as in the ontology of the objects,26 and in particular in theconcept of anavashitavtti = the state of being in continuous flux itself, not to

mention the very idea of mutual relationship among the entities. These concepts will beexplained where and when the context demands.27 The inherent relationship of this

25. This description can also be interpreted as follows: due to its simultaneous existentialdependence on at least two entities or objects, relation is extremely dependent, whereas qualityis primarily dependent only on substance. See ARMSTRONG (1978: 76) from whom I got thisinterpretation. This is made possible because: Pinians conceive of a relation (sambandha) asobtaining between two relata (sambandhin); the relation is a composite (samha) of twoproperties, distinct from the relata but located in both. (CARDONA 1974: 247).

26. Although the entities called time, direction, capacities and activities are involved in both cases,the ontological synthesis is not to be reduced to the ontology of the objects. Therefore, the

instability that these entities assume when situated within the objects is not to be whollyidentified with their status as the potentiality of Being / Brahman.

27. The history of philosophy, Indian as well as Western, can be understood in terms of substance-metaphysics or process-metaphysics. In the former, the predominance and primacy is tosubstance, and in the latter, it is to change. The relation between them and their relativesignificance is made clear all through the present work. I take RESCHERs presentation of thisapproach to philosophy in general as the guideline and proceed. Needless to add that whatinterests us most is Bhartharis Vkyapadyam is how the processuality operates therein. Ageneral definition of processuality is as follows: The philosophy of process is a venture inmetaphysics, the general theory of reality. Its concern is with what exists in the world and withthe terms of reference by which this reality is to be understood and explained. The guiding ideaof this approach is that natural existence consists in and is best understood in terms of


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approach with Complexity and Potentiality is twofold: 1) The presence of species in theentities and the objects is explained in specific terms of Processuality. 2) All the poten-tialities of substances are as such situated in the latter as functional and unstable condi-tions. In other words, both instances of the definition of Potentiality involve

Processuality. Thus, the interrelation of the entities as the potentialities of Being and asthe potentialities of substances, wherein they are represented in two modes ofProcessuality, is expected to exhaust the second point of [1], namely, sasi = thetogetherness of the entities. The first mode is the ontological synthesis and the secondmode is the ontology of the objects or substances. This is how the system-specificconcept of potentiality is a leading one. Technically speaking, the concept of potentialityis opposed to that of part. Those which have potentiality are not the wholes of whichthe potentialities are parts. In effect, neither Being / Brahman nor individual substancesshould be considered as wholes. An elaboration of this logic is the topic of difference

and non-difference, which is a part of the defintion of the relation between them.Finally, potentialities are realities in this system but not simply possibilities.

Retrospect and Prospect

Let me recapitulate: so far I have represented two fundamental modes in which theentities of Bhartharian ontology are related. Substance, species, quality, direction,space, capacities, activity, time, number etc., are the fundamental categories ofontology. All these are potentialities of Being. This is their primordial nature. Some ofthese entities are related to the objects or substances as the latters potentialities. Bytheir own capacity called relation, all potentialities get related to each other. While intro-

ducing these two modes of relations, I have pointed out three organizing principlescalled approaches. These are Complexity, Potentiality and Processuality. Complexity isthe necessary togetherness of all the entities. Potentiality is of two types: 1) thetogetherness of all the entities belonging to Being as its potentialities28 and 2) thetogetherness of direction, capacities, activity and time with regard to substances, in asmuch as they are the potentialities of the objects. Processuality is of many types. But atleast two domains of processuality concern us in here: revelation and expression.Revelation is the manifestation of species in all the entities and objects, and expressionis the mode of existence and the givenness of substance and substances. Let me add inpassing that these three approaches are relevant to all three systems of Bhartharis

metaphysics: ontology, epistemology and the philosophy ofabda.

processes rather than things of modes of change rather than fixed stabilities. For processists,change of every sort physical, organic, psychological is the pervasive and predominantfeature of the real. (RESCHER 1996: 7).

28. The complex nature of the text in its literal sense of texture, grantha = that which has beenknit together, is impressive at the etymological and theoretical level. But when one re-presentsthe same as a new text while plucking out each thread to re-structure it, a redistribution with are-designing also creeps in, for a simple duplication is redundant, although there is a high riskof deconstruction in this exercise. I am ready to run the risk.


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COMPLEXITY 19

In the remaining portion of this paper I shall take up a comprehensive enunciation oftwo major issues. One of them concerns the nature of objects: for only by examiningthis point we shall be in a position to know what is meant by the objects with whosepotentialities we are already acquainted, and go on into the details of the other issues.

The other issue which has already been introduced but not fully represented so far, isthat Being as species resides in all entities. This major claim needs justification andclarification, for it is the heart of the ontological synthesis. To be more precise, everypotentiality of Being inherits species as a part which is nothing but Being, and this factis made clear in [2], with special emphasis on the objects. But a representation of theexact nature of species and the other entities relationship with species in these terms isdue.

Another major issue which needs clarification concerns the nature of the modes ofrelationship among the entities; that is, those aspects of relation that enable, in all

possible ways, the various entities to get related to each other. This is accomplished inpractice at every instance of our enquiry and at the introduction of every concept. Thetheory-part of relation will be taken up once again after we have become accustomed toits applications. While dealing with these issues, I will try to clarify the main features ofthe concepts of quality, the flux-theory, direction, space, activity, time and number,with an emphasis on their ontological status.

II. OBJECTS

Introduction

Objects are substances and the concept of substances is closely related to quality. Justlike species, space, gender and number, quality is not a potentiality of the substanceseither. Gua = quality means the secondary one. Thus any enquiry into it demandsthat we know also of the primary one in relation to which it is secondary. It is primarilyin relation to substance that quality is called secondary. Substance, which is the mostcelebrated concept in the history of Indo-European philosophies, has three modes ofbeing according to Bharthari.29 First and foremost as the materiality of the world,secondly as the referent of the prepredicative this or that, and thirdly as the objects.In all these modes it is identical with Being: it is a potentiality in terms of ontologicalsynthesis. Still in the first mode its characteristics are primordial materiality, perma-

nence and omnipotence. In the second mode it is a part of the indicative gesture, beingthe referent therein. In the third mode it is the objects that we are acquainted with, thinkabout, live with and live as. In all these three modes it somehow or other retains itspurity. Its purity consists in aloofness or seclusion and oneness. Thus its impurityconsists in relatedness and manyness. This is the state in which we are situated andthus it is also the starting point of our enquiry.

29. It is possible, with all the ifs and buts, to translate these three modes into the ontological,perceptual and linguistic levels of being of substance.


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Since our objective here is to go into the details of interrelations, I postpone thediscussion of one and many and concentrate on relatedness. In this connection, afundamental principle should be recalled, which is that all the entities get influenced byall the other entities. The purport of this principle is that all the entities come into close

relationship with each other and impose their respective characteristics on each other.The relata in question here are quality and activity. Therefore, understanding the natureof substance would involve understanding its various relations with these entities.30

The following two verses depict the nature of substance in its third mode, namely, asthe objects.

[10] kevaln tu bhvn na rpam avadhryate |anirpitarpeu teu abdo na vartate || Vtti 475 ||

The form of the objects in their seclusion is not cognized. When and since [theconcept of] their form is not formed, language does not operate there.

[11] yat pradhna na tasysti svarpam anirpat |guasya ctman dravya tadbhvenopalakyate || Vtti 351||

That which is primary (i.e., substance) does not have a form, for the concept of itcannot be formed, and substance is perceived in the being of quality as qualitysown being.

Our conceptuality operates with those things of which concepts can be formed, andconcepts of pure entities cannot be formed31 . For example, substance in its uniquenessdoes not have any form and it can be conceptualized only as having a form, i.e., as andin quality. Certainly it is a dependence. This dependence is not to be understood as an

existential dependence defined under [3], but as a representational dependence orconceptual dependence: all the formless entities are representationally dependent onforms, so as to become objects of cognitions, and the objects (substances) are represen-tationally dependent on activities, for they cannot be conceptualized otherwise thanbeing involved in an activity. The latter part of this definition has a direct bearing onqualitys own being. For the nature of quality is to involve in continuous flux. One

30. Hereafter, we shall have more than a little digression from ontology proper to an excursuswithin the problems involving epistemological issues. This is necessary and proves the pointthat my part-wise division of the text is but for re-presentational purposes, and that there are nosuch distinctions as Ontology, Epistemology and the philosophy of abda in the Vkya-

padyam. I shall try to skip over many ontological issues after the immediately necessaryclarifications for the sake of continuity and the convenience of reading, and not out of mystubborn adherence to my own division of the text into three different systems.

31. Here one might ask the following question: what about substance, time, activity, etc.? Have wenot been describing, following Bharthari, that the primordial materiality is the pure nature ofsubstance? This is a methodological question. These characteristics of the pure entities areabstracted from the sentences on the basis of the conceptualizations of the enlightened ones andthrough the deduction from the usage of language to which in turn they are connected. Sincethe word-meanings seem to constitute the sentence-meaning, these pure entities arepadrthas. I cannot go any further into this topic here. I can simply say that just as it ispossible to abstract the ontological system from the Vkyapadyam, it was possible to abstractthe pure entities and their characteristics on the basis of the sentences.


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requires a way in order to philosophize about those entities which transcend normalperceptions and conceptions. Working through the objects is the path to reach the non-conceptualizable for the sake ofourenlightenment. There are various means for validcognitions of the entities nature, and while working through in this sense, Bharthari

gives different criteria depending upon the differences in the natures of the conceptual-izable aspect of various entities. Therefore, in anticipation of a fitting answer, andfollowing the above description of pure entities, there need not be any doubt here thatquality too must have a pure form, while being an entity itself. How can that form beconceptualized, since all entities have a pure form and the pure forms of the entitiescannot be conceptualized? In general, among all the entities (not only with reference tosubstance), only quality has a nature which is conceptualizable, simply because onlyquality is and has the perceivable and conceptualizable form. Most importantly,activities are real while their parts are unreal, for they are secondary = gua. For

example, cooking consists of parts which are secondary, and cooking is conceptualizeddue to its identification with them. (The end resultant, food in this instance, is asubstance. This extended meaning of quality does not immediately concern us). Torepeat, to say that only quality has form means that none of the entities (substance,direction, capacities, activity, time, and number, etc.) have form, and that they all aredependent on quality to be represented. For that matter, cognitions too are dependent inthe same way on forms. Though the logical structures of the intentional acts are not sodependent, cognitions are describable only as the cognitions of something, whereintheir content is the forms of the objects involved in activities. We shall shortly see how,and out of what operation, substances are named and conceptualized, so that our

language becomes operative there. It has now become clear that quality has and is form,and in that being of quality, substances are cognized. Another point closely connectedwith this is a conditionality imposed on the objects by activity. As I have pointed outabove, purity consists of inactivity and seclusion (or uniqueness). But:

[12] kriynuagea vin na padrtha pratyate |satyo v viparto v vyavahre na so sty ata || Vkyaka 428||

No object can be cognized without being related to activity. That is why, whetherit is real or unreal, such an object does not exist in usage and in day-to-day inter-course.

Since, in this way, there is a relation of representational dependence between theobjects and activities,32 the objects cannot retain their purity. However, one must notoverlook the fact that Bharthari uses the word dravya = substance for all threemodes of its being. Therefore, though substance qua substances loses its purity,substances qua substance are still pure.

32. This move is to be essentially understood as a drift from substance-philosophy towardsprocessuality.


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The referent of this and that

Let us now look at the second and, in a way, intermediary mode of being of substance,through which it is possible to understand these points in detail. Whereas the secondmode of being of substance, the prepredicative this and that, is the purestsingling out of substance, say, as a proto-object, after which any contact with theobjects at the conceptual and linguistic level is with quality, the quality-infusedsubstance, or an object.

[13] vastpalakaa yatra sarvanma prayujyate |dravyam ity ucyate so rtho bhedyatvena vivakita || Bhyodravya 3 ||

Where a pronoun is employed, indicating an object (or / and at the sight of anobject), that object is called substance, while being intended to be distinguished(or / and while being intended to be spoken about) as a distinguished object.

Thus, the designating as this and that is not only an egocentric deictic gesture, but it

also has an ontologically real entity for its object. That object is nothing but substancein its pure form, and it is yet to be distinguished as a particular object with a specificname. By its very definition, it is quality that so distinguishes. Thus the singled outnon-conceptualizable substance as a referent of the pronoun is not in impurity, a matterof participating in activity. Because impurity does not emerge from the mere existenceof a substance, at which level that object is identical with substance itself. Or, as theontological synthesis made it clear, it is a potentiality of, and therefore identical with,Being itself. Here existence and non-existence, and identity and difference aretranscended, for these problems arise with reference to the entities when they are

understood in their togetherness, but not within their uniqueness; the uniqueness hasonly one point of reference, that is, Being. This meaning of Being as existence is notmerely the outcome of interpretation, but has its basis in etymology which promptedthe practice of translating satt as existence. But impurity emerges from existing as adeterminate object, which is but one of the moments of the six transformations =abhvavikr. These are the becoming, existing, growing, changing, decaying anddissolving or perishing of the objects to which they are destined, and, therefore, thedeterminate existing is an activity. And in effect, purity is untouchedness with theactivity = kriynlhatvam, as Vabha succinctly defines it. The Vtti on Brahma-ka 23 gives the following defintion: kevala vastu tyaddn vastpalaka-

n viayamtram = the unique object is simply the referent of this and that whichindicate the object. The difference between substance and the referent of this andthat is that substance is a shapeless, formless, birthless, destructionless and alsonameless entity which is the soul of living beings (whereas the latter are but a type ofobjects, say, subjects), and the real material of all the objects. Hence the referent ofthis and that is a given object which is about to be conceived as having form, birthand destruction, and, therefore, activity and designation. Then, what kind of cognitionexpresses itself in the pronoun will depend upon what is its referent. For no objects canbe conceived without being related to activity, and pure substance is untouched by it.


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As we shall shortly see, the distance from, and the proximity to, quality is inherent inthe pronoun itself, and this fact also answers the question: why, after all, a pronoun?

We know that the referent of the prepredicative this and that is not involved inactivity. We understand through the above quote [12] the relationship of representa-

tional dependence between objects and activity. Thus arises the necessity of an inser-tion of form and of activity in the substance. Let us be reminded that activity as apotentiality resides in substances, and that there is no need of quality to insert it. But inthe first place the objects have to be established. Then it is possible that the objects,having various forms, do possess potentialities. To be more explicit, quality is not apotentiality of substance, simply because only objects endowed with forms havepotentialities, or only substances have potentialities, but not substance; therefore qualitycannot be a potentiality of itself. Here two facts become relevant: that quality is under-stood only along with activity and that substance can be conceptualized only in the

being of qualities. Hence, while formatting the objects, quality certainly exerts itsinfluence. Further gaps in this representation will be filled in the following paragraphs.Firstly, we have three modes of being of substance: as the primordial materiality, as thereferent of this and that, and as the objects. We have three dimensions of thesubstance-quality relation. 1) As form, quality makes possible the conceptuality ofsubstance. 2) As an entity participating in activity, quality makes possible the conceptof substance. 3) As the distinguisher, it makes possible the naming.

[14] sasargi bhedaka yad yat savypra pratyate |guatva paratantratvt tasya stra udhtam || Gua 1 ||

That entity which is, in close contact, a distinguisher and understood along withactivity, is considered within the discipline as possessing qualityness due to itsdependence on the other.

[15] dravyasyvyapadeasya ya updyate gua |bhedako vyapadeya tatprakaro bhidhyate || Gua 2||

That quality attached to the unnameable substance is the distinguisher =bhedaka = (also) divider, splitter etc., of the latter, for the sake of naming, and itis called degree.

The first verse gives a definition of quality which is an extension of the one given in[15]. We know that all the entities are in close contact with each other and all of them

divide the others. From this point of view, number, the divider par excellence, isprimarily a quality. And with the epithet, that quality is associated with activity,Bharthari indicates the relation between activity and the capacities. The latter are asso-ciated with the activities, and they are secondary to activity, whereas activity is theprimary one. From an epistemological point of view, quality, as it were, delimitssubstance by causing a concept and a name of the objects. Ontologically speaking,though it contributes to the constitution of the object, it does not do it alone, since formalone is not an object. It divides substance from the enormous mass of the world whichis substance or primordial materiality, as the object, and designates it. And it restrains it


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as the referent of a particular word, for word is a quality. But the words this andthat are special, as we shall shortly see. In this procedure, quality is defined asprakarahetu = that which causes degree, excellence, etc., of substance. Why isquality an enhancement, making more of the primordial material, that which constitutes

the world? This making more is nothing but depriving substance of its uniqueness.After the formation as an object, substance is, from this point of view, no longerunique or aloof.

We are led to the following tentative conclusion out of the preceding discussionsabout the quality: in material dialectic, substance is not an object if substance is under-stood to refer to Devadatta, a bull by name Bhuleya, a tree, a Brahmin, etc., but it isthe material basis, the raw material out of which those objects are made, whichBharthari variously calls primordial materiality, the primary one = pradhnam,atoms and pthivydaya = earth, (water, fire, air and space) etc, adhering to an

essentialist re-view of substance-metaphysics.33

Thus substance in the Vkyapadyamis the most generalizable element out of the philosophical speculations over thequestion about the nature of the primordial material out of which is constituted all thevisible and experienceable world. And quality is neither simply property, permanentlyaccompanying attributes of substances, nor the accident, contingent attributes ofsubstances. Nor is it therefore simply what we predicate to substances: Brahminhood,treeness, cowness, white-cow, tall-tree, greedy-Brahmin, etc. But quality is that whichcauses our conception, in the sense of form + word,34 of the objects. If and since thatitself is understood as the accident that seems to happen to substance, that is, thinkingof the unconceptualizable and naming the unnameable (cf. [10] & [11]), then, within

the material dialectic, quality is considered as an external (with due attention toontological synthesis) contingency. Thus, the model of external contingency =updhi as quality is primarily derived from the fundamental material basis of theworld versus form + word or image + word, and is extended to accidents, for there areno properties in the above-defined sense, excepting species as property; that is,cowness and Brahminhood, whiteness and the state of being fragrant. Thoughproperties too are external contingencies, they do continue to be, for they are notexistentially dependent on substances, even when accidents like a particular color(which necessarily is of a particular hue and shade), a fragrance residing in a particular

species of flower, a specific constitution, a body, cease to exist. It is, therefore, in theaccidents that the properties are manifested. That is, the revelation of the permanent

33. By essentialism I mean an understanding of the entities which extracts, notwithstanding thedifferences among the conceptions of the metaphysical entities, the most common element toredefine the entities.

34. The concept ofrpa or nirpaa, the epistemic counterpart of form, is closer to conceptand the mental representation of forms. But bhvan, the epistemic counterpart of bhva, isalmost equivalent to imagination. The other important meanings of these terms are at the heartof the philosophy of abda, where nirpaa is also description and bhvan also hasMmsic overtones.


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OBJECTS 25

species is dependent on quality as much as the expression of the permanent substance,because there is no whiteness which is not of a particular hue and shade, etc., andquality by definition is the degree. We shall shortly see the other criteria of thedistinction between gua = quality and species. Quality, therefore, by inserting

activity in substance makes it accessible to the cognitions and also names theunnameable. What makes quality so close to activity involves the concept of continuousflux, which is the very nature of quality. But let me add that rpam = form is just aname for all these qualities. It is not the shape, but the whitecolor (of a cow), the smell(of a jasmine flower), etc. If and since by quality are meant the continuously changing,but still somehow perceived objects like the color white, there is nothing over andabove them that can be termed as form.

[16] sakhynma na sakhysti sajaieti yathocyate |rpa na rpam apy eva saj s hi sitdiu || Sakhy 25 ||

Just as there is no number by name number, for it is just a name [for one, two,etc.], in the same way, there is no form called form, for it is a name applicable towhite, etc.

Let me first of all list certain distinct, but closely related phenomena, that we shallencounter in the following highly mixed-up representation: 1) form; it is not an entity initself but always stands for 2) qualities; i.e., a white color, jasmine-smell, a word-sound. 3) masculinity, femininity and neutrality; these are also species of objects likecowness. 4) genders; the masculine, feminine and neutral genders of Sanskrit nouns. 5)sattva = stability, rajas = activity and tamas = obscurity; according toSkhya philosophy, these are independent metaphysical phenomena that inhere ineverything excepting the Purua, and they are the constituents of 6) the tripartiteprocess = pravtti.35 But for us now, they have a direct correspondence with 7)coming into being, retreating or disappearing, and staying still, which happens toindiscernible elements within qualities,

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Bhartrhari Ontology