Bince vs Comelec

8/9/2019 Bince vs Comelec

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SUNGA vs. COMELEC (288 SCRA 76, G.R. No.125629, March 25, 1998) ......................................... 2PENERA vs. COMELEC (599 SCRA 609, G.R. No.181613, November 25, 2009) .................................. 5RULLODA vs. COMELEC (395 SCRA 535, G.R. No.154198, January 20, 2003) .................................... 10SULIGUIN vs. COMELEC (485 SCRA 219, G.R. No.

166046, March 23, 2006) ....................................... 11

PACANAN vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 186224, August25, 2009, 597 SCRA 189) ...................................... 15

AGUILAR vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 185140, June30, 2009, 591 SCRA 491) ...................................... 19TAGUIAM vs. COMELEC (594 SCRA 474, G.R. No.184801, July 30, 2009) .......................................... 23BINCE, JR. vs. COMELEC (242 SCRA 273, G.R.Nos. 111624-25, March 9, 1995) ........................... 25LIBANAN vs. HRET (283 SCRA 520, G.R. No.129783, December 22, 1997) ................................ 31MARUHOM vs. COMELEC (331 SCRA 473, G.R.No. 139357, May 5, 2000) ..................................... 36PEA vs. HRET (270 SCRA 340, G.R. No. 123037,March 21, 1997) .................................................... 42


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SUNGA vs. COMELEC (288 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 125629,March 25, 1998)1

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside, for having beenrendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction, the 17 May 1996 Resolution of theCOMELEC 2nd Division in Sunga v. Trinidad, SPA No. 95-213 1dismissing the petition for disqualification against privaterespondent Ferdinand B. Trinidad pursuant to COMELECResolution No. 2050 promulgated 3 November 1988, asamended by COMELEC Resolution No. 2050-A promulgated 8August 1990, and 30 July 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC EnBanc affirming the 17 May 1996 Resolution of the COMELEC2nd Division.

Petitioner Manuel C. Sunga was one of the candidates for theposition of Mayor in the Municipality of Iguig, Province ofCagayan, in the 8 May 1995 elections. Private respondentFerdinand B. Trinidad, then incumbent mayor, was a candidatefor re-election in the same municipality.

On 22 April 1995 Sunga filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint 2 for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him ofusing three (3) local government vehicles in his campaign, inviolation of Sec. 261, par. (o), Art. XXII, of BP Blg. 881 (OmnibusElection Code, as amended). On 7 May 1995, Sunga filedanother letter-complaint 3 with the COMELEC charging Trinidadthis time with violation of Sec. 261, par. (e) (referring to threats,intimidation, terrorism or other forms of coercion) of the OmnibusElection Code, in addition to the earlier violation imputed to himin the first letter-complaint. This was followed by an AmendedPetition 4 for disqualification consolidating the charges in the two(2) letters-complaint, including vote buying, and providing morespecific details of the violations committed by Trinidad. The casewas docketed as SPA No. 95-213.

In a Minute Resolution dated 25 May 1995, 5 the COMELEC 2ndDivision referred the complaint to its Law Department forinvestigation. Hearings were held wherein Sunga adducedevidence to prove his accusations. Trinidad, on the other hand,opted not to submit any evidence at all.

Meanwhile, the election results showed that Trinidad garneredthe highest number of votes, while Sunga trailed second.

On 10 May 1995 Sunga moved for the suspension of theproclamation of Trinidad. However, notwithstanding the motion,

Trinidad was proclaimed the elected mayor, prompting Sunga tofile another motion to suspend the effects of the proclamation.Both motions were not acted upon by the COMELEC 2ndDivision.

On 28 June 1995 the COMELEC Law Department submitted itsReport 6 to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that Trinidadbe charged in court for violation of the following penal provisionsof the Omnibus Election Code: (a) Sec. 261, par. (a), on votebuying; (b) Sec. 261, par. (e), on threats, intimidation, terrorismor other forms of coercion; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (o), on use of

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any equipment, vehicle owned by the government or any of itspolitical subdivisions. The Law Department likewiserecommended to recall and revoke the proclamation oFerdinand B. Trinidad as the duly elected Mayor of IguigCagayan; proclaim Manuel C. Sunga as the duly elected Mayorand, direct Sunga to take his oath and assume the duties andfunctions of the office.

The COMELEC En Banc approved the findings of the LawDepartment and directed the filing of the correspondinginformations in the Regional Trial Court against TrinidadAccordingly, four (4) informations 7 for various elections offenseswere filed in the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, CagayanThe disqualification case, on the other hand, was referred to theCOMELEC 2nd Division for hearing.

On 2 May 1996 Sunga filed a Second Urgent Motion to Suspendthe Effects and Annul the Proclamation with Urgent Motion foEarly Resolution of the Petition. But in its 17 May 1996Resolution, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petitionfor disqualification, holding in its Resolution No. 2050 that

1. Any complaint for disqualification of a duly registeredcandidate based upon any of the grounds specificallyenumerated under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, fileddirectly with the Commission before an election in whichrespondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by theCommission for the purpose of determining whether the actscomplained of have in fact been committed . . . .

In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, theCommission may motu propio, or on motion of any of the partiesrefer the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission asthe instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive powerto conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involvingcriminal infractions of the election

laws . . . .

2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Sec. 68 othe Omnibus Election Code in relation to Sec. 6 of Republic AcNo. 6646 filed after the election against a candidate who hasalready been proclaimed as a winner shall be dismissed as adisqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referredfor preliminary investigation to the Law Department of thisCommission.

Where a similar complaint is filed after election but beforeproclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shallnevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. Howeverthe complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to theLaw Department. If, before proclamation, the Law Departmentmakes a prima facie finding of guilt and the correspondinginformation has been filed with the appropriate trial court, thecomplainant may file a petition for suspension of theproclamation of the respondent with the court before which thecriminal case is pending and said court may order thesuspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

As interpreted in the case of Silvestre v. Duavit, SPA 94-003Resolution No. 2050 provides for the outright dismissal of the


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disqualification case in three cases: (1) The disqualification casewas filed before the election but remains unresolved until afterthe election; (2) The disqualification case was filed after theelection and before the proclamation of winners; and (3) Thedisqualification case was filed after election and afterproclamation.

If the instant case is deemed to have been filed upon receipt bythe COMELEC of the letter-complaint on April 26 1995, itnevertheless remained pending until after the election. If it isdeemed to have been filed upon filing of the amended petition on11 May 1995, it was clearly filed after the election. In either case,Resolution No. 2050 mandates the dismissal of thedisqualification case.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by theCOMELEC En Banc, Sunga filed the instant petition contendingthat the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion indismissing the petition for disqualification in that: first, Sec. 6 ofRA No. 6646 requires the COMELEC to resolve thedisqualification case even after the election and proclamation,and the proclamation and assumption of office by Trinidad didnot deprive the COMELEC of its jurisdiction; second COMELEC

Resolution No. 2050 is null and void as it contravenes Sec. 6 ofR.A. No. 6646; third, the fact that COMELEC authorized the filingof four (4) informations against private respondent for violation ofthe penal provisions of the Omnibus Election Code shows morethan sufficient and substantial evidence to disqualify Trinidad,and he should have been so disqualified; and fourth, sinceTrinidad was a disqualified candidate, it is as if petitioner was theonly candidate entitled to be proclaimed as the duly electedmayor.

In his 17-page Comment and Manifestation dated 3 December1996, the Solicitor General concurred with petitioner'sarguments.

Private respondent, on the other hand, postulates inter alia thatSunga's letters-complaint of 22 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 werenot petitions for disqualification because no filing fee was paid bySunga; the letters-complaint were never docketed by theCOMELEC; and, no summons was ever issued by theCOMELEC and private respondent was not required to answerthe letters-complaint. It was only on 13 May 1995 when petitionerfiled the so-called Amended Petition, docketed for the first timeas SPA No. 95-213. Thus, the COMELEC correctly dismissedthe disqualification case for having been filed only after the 8May 1995 elections and the proclamation of private respondenton 10 May 1995, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2050.

COMELEC filed its Comment on 21 April 1997 relying heavily onResolution No. 2050 and the Silvestre v. Duavit 8 ruling insupport of the dismissal of the disqualification case. TheCOMELEC insisted that the outright dismissal of adisqualification case was warranted under any of the followingcircumstances: (a) the disqualification case was filed before theelection but was still pending (unresolved) after the election; (b)the disqualification case was filed after the election but beforethe proclamation of the winner; and, (c) the disqualification casewas filed after the election and after the proclamation of thewinner.

The issue in this case is whether the COMELEC committedgrave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the disqualificationcase against private respondent Trinidad.

The petition is partly meritorious.

We find private respondent's arguments on the propriety of theletters-complaint puerile. COMELEC itself impliedly recognized

in its Resolution that the petition was filed before the 8 May 1995election in the form of letters-complaint, thus

This case originally came to the attention of this Commission on26 April 1995 in a form of letter from petitioner accusingrespondent of utilizing government properties in his campaignand praying for the latter's immediate disqualification. Anotheletter dated 7 May 1995 and addressed to the COMELECRegional Director of Region II reiterated petitioner's prayer whilealleging that respondent and his men committed acts of terrorismand violated the gun ban. Finally, on 11 May 1995, an AmendedPetition was filed with the Clerk of Court of the Commissioncontaining substantially the same allegations as the previousletters but supported by affidavits and other documentary

evidence.

That the Amended Petition was filed only on 11 May 1995, orafter the elections, is of no consequence. It was merely areiteration of the charges filed by petitioner against privaterespondent on 26 April 1995 and 7 May 1995 or before theelections. Consequently, the Amended Petition retroacted tosuch earlier dates. An amendment which merely supplementsand amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relatesback to the date of the commencement of the action and is notbarred by the statute of limitations which expired after the serviceof the original complaint. 9

The fact that no docket fee was paid therefor was not a fataprocedural lapse on the part of petitioner. Sec. 18, Rule 42, ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides, "If the fees abovedescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to takeaction thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action orproceeding." The use of the word "may" indicates that it ispermissive only and operates to confer a discretion on theCOMELEC whether to entertain the petition or not in case ofnon-payment of legal fees. That the COMELEC acted on and didnot dismiss the petition outright shows that the non-payment ofees was not considered by it as a legal obstacle to entertainingthe same. Be that as it may, the procedural defects have beencured by the subsequent payment of docket fees, and privaterespondent was served with summons, albeit belatedly, and he

submitted his answer to the complaint. Hence, privaterespondent has no cause to complain that no docket fee waspaid, no summons served upon him, or that he was not requiredto answer.

Neither do we agree with the conclusions of the COMELEC. Wediscern nothing in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 declaringordering or directing the dismissal of a disqualification case filedbefore the election but which remained unresolved after theelection. What the Resolution mandates in such a case is for theCommission to refer the complaint to its Law Department forinvestigation to determine whether the acts complained of havein fact been committed by the candidate sought to be


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disqualified. The findings of the Law Department then becomethe basis for disqualifying the erring candidate. This is totallydifferent from the other two situations contemplated byResolution No. 2050, i.e., a disqualification case filed after theelection but before the proclamation of winners and that filedafter the election and the proclamation of winners, wherein it wasspecifically directed by the same Resolution to be dismissed as adisqualification case.

Moreover, Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v.Duavit infringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, 10 which provides:

Sec. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate whohas been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall notbe voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Iffor any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgmentbefore an election to be disqualified and he is voted for andreceives the winning number of votes in such election, the Courtor Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of theaction, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant orany intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order thesuspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever theevidence of his guilt is strong (emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC shouldcontinue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to itsconclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered thereon. The word"shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory,operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. 11The implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretionbut to proceed with the disqualification case even after theelection. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of thedisqualification case which remains unresolved after the election,Silvestre v. Duavit in effect disallows what RA No. 6646imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislationby the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalidfor having been issued beyond the scope of its authority.

Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrativeagencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes andshould be for the sole purpose of carrying their generalprovisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrativerulings, of course, the scope of the law itself cannot be limited.Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for thatmatter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of adiscrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative oradministrative ruling, the basic law prevails.

Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is notdifficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses wouldbe undeservedly rewarded, instead of punished, by the dismissal

of the disqualification case against him simply because theinvestigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, todetermine before the election if the offenses were indeedcommitted by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that theerring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics sothat the disqualification case based on the commission ofelection offenses would not be decided before the election. Thisscenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not themain intent and purpose of the law.

The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumedthe position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authorityand jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the

disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC 12 this Court held

Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on theprinciple that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvassand proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that acandidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is nobar to the exercise of such power. It of course may not beavailed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Sinceprivate respondent's petition before the COMELEC is preciselydirected at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, weperceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated bythe Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a victimof a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validitythereof after that proclamation and the assumption of officethereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualificationproceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, ifelected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of theelection laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has beenproclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification isdeemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a

separate investigation.

It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well aselectoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the ascertainmenof the guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in anyother criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and thequantum of proof required to secure a conviction is beyondreasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is adetermination of whether the offender should be disqualified fromoffice. This is done through an administrative proceeding whichis summary in character and requires only a clearpreponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electora

aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erringcandidate may be disqualified even without prior criminaconviction. 13

It is quite puzzling that the COMELEC never acted on Sunga'smotion to suspend the proclamation of Trinidad. The lassentence of Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646 categorically declares thatthe Commission may order the suspension of the proclamationof a candidate sought to be disqualified whenever the evidenceof his guilt is strong. And there is not a scintilla of doubt that theevidence of Trinidad's guilt was strong as shown in the Reporand Recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department

Parenthetically, there is merit to petitioner's petition against therespondent for disqualification for the alleged commission oelection offenses under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Codesuch as use of armed men and act of terrorism, intimidation andcoercion of voters, massive vote-buying and others, dulysupported by affidavits of witnesses and other documentsConsequently, the petitioner's evidence supporting thedisqualification of respondent remain unrebutted simply becauserespondent has expressly waived his right to present evidence inSPA No. 95-213 in his Manifestation and objection to thepresentation of evidence in SPA No. 95-213 dated 16 June1995, thus the waiver is the intentional relinquishing of a knownright of respondent TRINIDAD.


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In fact, on the basis of this Report and Recommendation theCOMELEC directed the filing of four (4) criminal informationsagainst Trinidad before the Regional Trial Court, an indicationthat there was indeed prima facie evidence of violation ofelection laws.

However, Sunga's contention that he is entitled to be proclaimedas the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Iguig, Province of

Cagayan, in the event that Trinidad is disqualified finds nosupport in law and jurisprudence. The fact that the candidatewho obtained the highest number of votes is later disqualified forthe office to which he was elected does not entitle the candidatewho obtained the second highest number of votes to be declaredthe winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a disqualifiedperson may not be valid to install the winner into office ormaintain him there. But in the absence of a statute which clearlyasserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, ifthe votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate wasqualified, they should not be treated as stray, void ormeaningless. 14

Sunga totally miscontrued the nature of our democratic electoralprocess as well as the sociological and psychological elementsbehind voters' preferences. Election is the process of completeascertainment of the expression of the popular will. Its ultimatepurpose is to give effect to the will of the electorate by givingthem direct participation in choosing the men and women whowill run their government. Thus, it would be extremely repugnantto the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right tosuffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority orplurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as therepresentative of a constituency, the majority of whom havepositively declared through their ballots that they do not choosehim. 15

While Sunga may have garnered the second highest number ofvotes, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the peopleof Iguig, Cagayan. "The wreath of victory cannot be transferredfrom the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because thelaw then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favorof the person who has obtained a plurality of votes and does notentitle a candidate receiving the next highest number of votes tobe declared elected." 16 In Aquino v. COMELEC, 17 this Courtmade the following pronouncement:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would havereceived the other votes would be to substitute our judgment forthe voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lostthe election. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of

voters. He could not be considered the first among qualifiedcandidates because in a field which excludes the disqualifiedcandidate; the conditions would have substantially changed. Weare not prepared to extrapolate the results under suchcircumstances.

Also, what Sunga wants us to do is to disregard the expressmandate of Sec. 44, RA No. 7160, 18 which provides in part

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the Governor,Vice-Governor, Mayor, Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanentvacancy occurs in the office of the Governor or Mayor, the Vice-

Governor or Vice-Mayor concerned shall become the Governoor Mayor . . .

For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises whenan elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses toassume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from officevoluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated todischarge the functions of his office . . . .

This provision is echoed in Art. 83 of the Implementing Rulesand Regulations of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thusadmits no room for interpretation but merely application. This isthe basic legal precept. Accordingly, in the event that Trinidad isadjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy will be createdfor failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the said office. Insuch eventuality, the duly elected vice-mayor shall succeed asprovided by law. 19

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 17

May 1996 and 30 July 1996 Resolutions of the COMELEC areANNULLED and SET ASIDE. COMELEC is ordered toREINSTATE SPA No. 95-213, "Manuel C. Sunga v. FerdinandB. Trinidad," for disqualification, and ACT on the case taking itsbearings from the opinion herein expressed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PENERA vs. COMELEC (599 SCRA 609, G.R. No. 181613November 25, 2009)2

We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion foreconsideration of this Courts Decision of 11 September 2009(Decision).

The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and affirmedthe Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc aswell as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELECSecond Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from runningfor the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte anddeclared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.

In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera submits thefollowing arguments:

1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of the incidentunder Section 11 of RA 8436 as amended by Section 13 of RA9369.

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2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing andsubstantial evidence against Penera for violation of Section 80 ofthe Omnibus Election Code.

3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition fordisqualification and has consistently disputed the charge ofpremature campaigning.

4. The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is notthe same as admitting she engaged in premature electioncampaigning.

Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a"candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an electivepublic office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy x x x." Thesecond sentence, third paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, asamended by Section 13 of RA 9369, provides that "[a]ny personwho files his certificate of candidacy within [the period for filing]shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of thecampaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."The immediately succeeding proviso in the same third paragraphstates that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate

shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaignperiod." These two provisions determine the resolution of thiscase.

The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts and[the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds withhis/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we canalready consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC andprior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her electionas a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, forwhich he/she may be disqualified."1

Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable forpremature campaigning after the filing of the certificate ofcandidacy but even before the start of the campaign period.From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long beforethe start of the campaign period, the Decision considers thepartisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate ofcandidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate."Thus, such person can be disqualified for prematurecampaigning for acts done before the start of the campaignperiod. In short, the Decision considers a person who files acertificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before thestart of the campaign period. lawphil

The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of

the law.

The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC,2 which held that aperson who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate untilthe start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:

Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of theOmnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an electioncampaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed topromote the election or defeat of a particular candidate orcandidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.

The second element requires the existence of a "candidate."Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed acertificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless onehas filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." Thethird element requires that the campaign period has not startedwhen the election campaign or partisan political activity iscommitted.

Assuming that all candidates to a public office file theicertificates of candidacy on the last day, which under Section 75of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start of thecampaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation ofSection 80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such lastday, there is no "particular candidate or candidates" to campaignfor or against. On the day immediately after the last day of filingthe campaign period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply sinceSection 80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.

Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on thelast day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such lasday, which is before the start of the campaign period and after atleast one candidate has filed his certificate of candidacy. This isperhaps the reason why those running for elective public officeusually file their certificates of candidacy on the last day or closeto the last day.

There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election campaigningor partisan political activities were committed outside of thecampaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, whofiled his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a"candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of thecampaign period on 24 March 2004.

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the

deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 daysbefore election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. The cruciaquestion is: did this change in the deadline for filing thecertificate of candidacy make one who filed his certificate ofcandidacy before 2 January 2004 immediately liable for violationof Section 80 if he engaged in election campaign or partisanpolitical activities prior to the start of the campaign period on 24March 2004?

Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:

SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall prescribethe size and form of the official ballot which shall contain thetitles of the positions to be filled and/or the propositions to bevoted upon in an initiative, referendum or plebiscite. Under eachposition, the names of candidates shall be arrangedalphabetically by surname and uniformly printed using the sametype size. A fixed space where the chairman of the Board ofElection Inspectors shall affix his/her signature to authenticatethe official ballot shall be provided.

Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.


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For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate ofcandidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to participate inthe election shall not be later than one hundred twenty (120)days before the elections: Provided, That, any elective official,whether national or local, running for any office other than theone which he/she is holding in a permanent capacity, except forpresident and vice-president, shall be deemed resigned onlyupon the start of the campaign period corresponding to theposition for which he/she is running: Provided, further, That,unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall takeeffect upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,

finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections, thedeadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the positionsof President, Vice-President, Senators and candidates under theparty-list system as well as petitions for registration and/ormanifestation to participate in the party-list system shall be onFebruary 9, 1998 while the deadline for the filing of certificate ofcandidacy for other positions shall be on March 27, 1998.

The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing Officeand/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price comparablewith that of private printers under proper security measureswhich the Commission shall adopt. The Commission maycontract the services of private printers upon certification by the

National Printing Office/Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannotmeet the printing requirements. Accredited political parties anddeputized citizens arms of the Commission may assign watchers in the printing, storage and distribution of officialballots.

To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through theCommittee shall ensure that the serial number on the ballot stubshall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be easily detectable byinexpensive hardware and shall be impossible to reproduce on aphotocopying machine, and that identification marks, magneticstrips, bar codes and other technical and security markings, areprovided on the ballot.

The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to eachcity/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every registeredvoter with a provision of additional four (4) ballots per precinct.

Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the earlyfiling of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for theprinting of official ballots. This is clear from the followingdeliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee:

SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaignperiod, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and national

officials?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I wouldagree to retaining it at the present periods.

SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate ofcandidacy, hes already a candidate, and there are manyprohibited acts on the part of candidate.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .

SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the campaignperiod has not yet began (sic).

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we dont provide thatthe filing of the certificate will not bring about ones being acandidate.

SENATOR GONZALES. If thats a fact, the law cannot change afact.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can providethat the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not result in thaofficial vacating his position, we can also provide that insofar heis concerned, election period or his being a candidate will not yecommence. Because here, the reason why we are doing an earlyfiling is to afford enough time to prepare this machine readableballots.

So, with the manifestations from the Commission on Elections

Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its proposal andwill agree to the 120-day period provided in the Senate version.

THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, MrChairman.

x x x x

SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition againscampaigning or doing partisan acts which apply immediatelyupon being a candidate?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since theintention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec enoughtime to print the ballots, this provision does not intend to changethe campaign periods as presently, or rather election periods aspresently fixed by existing law.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should besubject to the other prohibition.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Thats right.

THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words, actuallythere would be no conflict anymore because we are talking abouthe 120-day period before election as the last day of filing acertificate of candidacy, election period starts 120 days also. Sothat is election period already. But he will still not be consideredas a candidate.


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Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 forpurposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificateof candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, neverintended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a"candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Thislegislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the earlydeadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the"election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be

considered as a candidate."3 (Emphasis in the original)

Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a certificateof candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaignperiod. This ground was based on the deliberations of thelegislators who explained the intent of the provisions of RA 8436,which laid the legal framework for an automated election system.There was no express provision in the original RA 8436 statingthat one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidateuntil the start of the campaign period.

When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to

expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing thatLanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in holdingthat

The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "electionperiods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and thatone who files to meet the early deadline "will still not beconsidered as a candidate."4 (Emphasis supplied)

Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate ofcandidacy under the early deadline required by the automatedelection system would be disqualified or penalized for anypartisan political act done before the start of the campaignperiod. Thus, in enacting RA 9369, Congress expressly wrotethe Lanot doctrine into the second sentence, third paragraph ofthe amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus:

x x x

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for thefiling of certificate of candidacy/petition forregistration/manifestation to participate in the election. Anyperson who files his certificate of candidacy within this periodshall only be considered as a candidate at the start of thecampaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:

Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to acandidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaidcampaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding apublic appointive office or position, including active members ofthe armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso factoresigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at thestart of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.(Boldfacing and underlining supplied)

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute byspecifically inserting it as the second sentence of the thirdparagraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot

be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of itsunconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot withoutrepealing this second sentence, because to reverse Lanot wouldmean repealing this second sentence.

The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does noclaim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15 ofRA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In fact,the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law. Thus, theDecision is self-contradictory reversing Lanot but maintainingthe constitutionality of the second sentence, which embodies theLanot doctrine. In so doing, the Decision is irreconcilably inconflict with the clear intent and letter of the second sentencethird paragraph, Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA9369.

In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the firsproviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436. Theoriginal provision in RA 8436 states

x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissionsapplicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of the

aforesaid campaign period, x x x.

In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the firstproviso now reads

x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to acandidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaidcampaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened itsmandatory directive that election offenses can be committed by a

candidate "only" upon the start of the campaign period. Thisclearly means that before the start of the campaign period, suchelection offenses cannot be so committed.

When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by RA9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not considePenera a candidate for purposes other than the printing ofballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutelyno room for any other interpretation.

We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of JusticeAntonio T. Carpio:

x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of theOmnibus Election Code should be read together with theamended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "candidate refers to anyperson aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who hasfiled a certificate of candidacy by himself or through anaccredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties."However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate ocandidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because"any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [thefiling] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start othe campaign period for which he filed his certificate ocandidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacyon any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of


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candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, forpurposes of determining ones possible violations of electionlaws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no"election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed topromote the election or defeat of a particular candidate orcandidates to public office simply because there is no"candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period.Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, thelaw does not consider Penera a candidate at the time of thequestioned motorcade which was conducted a day before thestart of the campaign period. x x x

The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March 2007and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her certificate ofcandidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus a candidate on29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing the ballots. On 29March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate forpurposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed byPenera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a"candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisanpolitical activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of theOmnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of acitizens protected freedom of expression. Acts committed byPenera within the campaign period are not covered by Section

80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the campaignperiod.5

The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explainingaway the first proviso in the third paragraph, the amendedSection 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable tocandidates take effect only upon the start of the campaignperiod. The Decision states that:

x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, asamended, which provides that "any unlawful act or omissionapplicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start ofthe campaign period," does not mean that the acts constituting

premature campaigning can only be committed, for which theoffender may be disqualified, during the campaign period.Contrary to the pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in saidproviso was it stated that campaigning before the start of thecampaign period is lawful, such that the offender may freelycarry out the same with impunity.

As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC butprior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start ofthe campaign period), can already commit the acts describedunder Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as electioncampaign or partisan political activity, However, only after saidperson officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the

campaign period, can said acts be given effect as prematurecampaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the startof the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought foracts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only atthe start of the campaign period, when the person officiallybecomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantagesof his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shallaccrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates whoare only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate whohad previously engaged in premature campaigning alreadyenjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.6(Emphasis supplied)

It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unlessexpressly declared unlawful by law. This is specially true toexpression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except onvery narrow grounds involving clear, present and imminendanger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declarean act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thusthere is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activitiesbefore the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficienfor Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omissionapplicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of

the campaign period." The only inescapable and logical result isthat the same acts, if done before the start of the campaignperiod, are lawful.

In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable for anelection offense only for acts done during the campaign periodnot before. The law is clear as daylight any election offensethat may be committed by a candidate under any election lawcannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. Inruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning fopartisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, theassailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of thelaw.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commitspremature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted onlyafter the start of the campaign period. This is not what the lawsays. What the law says is "any unlawful act or omissionapplicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start ofthe campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is thatthe effective date when partisan political acts become unlawfuas to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before thestart of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts arelawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, tha

partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaignperiod are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start othe campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisanpolitical acts done by a candidate before the campaign periodare temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start ofthe campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the lawBesides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which definesa criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speechwould be void for vagueness.

Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable foelection offenses only upon the start of the campaign periodThis Court has no power to ignore the clear and express

mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate ofcandidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered acandidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filedhis certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blindeye to the express and clear language of the law that "anyunlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall takeeffect only upon the start of the campaign period."

The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enactingremedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature. ThisCourt has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, conciseand express as the second sentence, and its immediately


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succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. PenerasMotion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of thisCourt in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009,as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July 2007 and 30 January2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC EnBanc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224. Rosalinda A. Penerashall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.

RULLODA vs. COMELEC (395 SCRA 535, G.R. No. 154198,January 20, 2003)3

In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda

and Remegio L. Placido were the contending candidates for

Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed

away at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center.1

His widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" Rulloda, wrote a letter tothe Commission on Elections on June 25, 2002 seeking

permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman of Sto.

Tomas in lieu of her late husband.2Petitioners request was

supported by the Appeal-Petition containing several signatures

of people purporting to be members of the electorate of

Barangay Sto. Tomas.3

On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a

directive to the Chairman and Members of the Barangay Board

of Canvassers of Sto. Tomas as follows:

Just in case the names "BETTY" or "PETRONILA" or the

surname "RULLODA" is written on the ballot, read the same as itis written but add the words "NOT COUNTED" like "BETTY NOT

COUNTED" or "RULLODA NOT COUNTED."4

Based on the tally of petitioners watchers who were allowed to

witness the canvass of votes during the July 15, 2002 elections,

petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido

received 290 votes.5 Despite this, the Board of Canvassers

proclaimed Placido as the Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas.6

After the elections, petitioner learned that the COMELEC, acting

on the separate requests of Andres Perez Manalaysay and

Petronila Rulloda to be substituted as candidates for Barangay

Chairman of Barangay La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and

Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, respectively,

issued Resolution No. 5217 dated July 13, 2002 which states:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission RESOLVED, as it

hereby RESOLVES, to ADOPT the recommendation of the Law

Department as follows:

1. To deny due course the Certificates of Candidacy of ANDRES

PEREZ MANALAYSAY and PETRONILA S. RULLODA; and

3

2. To direct the Election Officer of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and

San Jacinto, Pangasinan to delete the name of ANDRES PEREZ

MANALAYSAY, candidate for Barangay Chairman in Barangay

La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija; and the name o

PETRONILA S. RULLODA, candidate for Barangay Captain in

Barangay Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

Let the Law Department implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.7

The above-quoted Resolution cited as authority the COMELECs

Resolution No. 4801 dated May 23, 2002, setting forth the

guidelines on the filing of certificates of candidacy in connection

with the July 15, 2002 synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang

Kabataan elections, more particularly Section 9 thereof which

reads:

Sec. 9. Substitution of candidates. There shall be no

substitution of candidates for barangay andsangguniang

kabataan officials.8

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to

annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No

5217, both of the COMELEC, insofar as they prohibitedpetitioner from running as substitute candidate in lieu of he

deceased husband; to nullify the proclamation of respondent

and to proclaim her as the duly elected Barangay Chairman o

Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan.

Private respondent Remegio Placido filed his Comment, arguing

that since the barangay election is non-partisan, substitution of

candidates is not allowed. Moreover, petitioner did not file any

certificate of candidacy; hence, there was only one candidate for

Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, namely, responden

Placido.9

Public respondent COMELEC also filed its Comment. It contendsthat its Resolution No. 4801 was issued not pursuant to its quasi

judicial functions but as an incident of its inherent administrative

functions over the conduct of the barangay elections. Therefore

the same may not be the subject of review in a petition fo

certiorari. Further, the COMELEC alleges that it did not commit

grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to petitioners

certificate of candidacy and in proclaiming responden

considering that he was the only candidate for Barangay

Chairman of Sto. Tomas.10

We find merit in the petition.

At the outset, there is no dispute that petitioner garnered 516

votes while respondent got only 290 votes. Respondents did no

deny this in their respective Comments.

In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection o

candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the

ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the

will of the electorate. An election is the embodiment of the

popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people

The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or

plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound policy dictates

that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the

highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in


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all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one

can be declared elected and no measure can be declared

carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal

votes cast in the election.11

Respondents base their argument that the substitution of

candidates is not allowed in barangay elections on Section 77 of

the Omnibus Elections Code, which states:

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or

withdrawal of another. If after the last day of the filing ofcertificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or

accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any

cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same

political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the

candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute

candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his

certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with

the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If

the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between

the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said

certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in

the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case ofcandidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the country,

with the Commission.

Private respondent argues that inasmuch as the barangay

election is non-partisan, there can be no substitution because

there is no political party from which to designate the substitute.

Such an interpretation, aside from beingnon sequitur, ignores the

purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than

frustrate, the will of the voters.12 It is a solemn duty to uphold

the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-

settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed

as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed

through the ballot.13Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific

provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay

elections can not be inferred as a prohibition against said

substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into

the law where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more

reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political

parties are involved than when political considerations or party

affiliations reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.

Private respondent likewise contends that the votes in

petitioners favor can not be counted because she did not file any

certificate of candidacy. In other words, he was the only

candidate for Barangay Chairman. His claim is refuted by the

Memorandum of the COMELEC Law Department as well as the

assailed Resolution No. 5217, wherein it indubitably appears that

petitioners letter-request to be allowed to run as Barangay

Chairman of Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late husband was treated

as a certificate of candidacy.14

To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes

in the contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties

in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the

true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must

be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the

choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technica

objections.15

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and

procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to

the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice o

their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation

of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and

intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct

ascertainment of the results.16

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the

Commission on Elections, insofar as it denied due course to

petitioners certificate of candidacy, is declared NULL and VOID

The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as

Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan is

SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers of the said Barangay

is ORDERED to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Barangay

Chairman thereof.

SO ORDERED.

SULIGUIN vs. COMELEC (485 SCRA 219, G.R. No. 166046March 23, 2006)4

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the RevisedRules of Court seeking to reverse the Resolution1 of theCommission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-209dated November 18, 2004 which denied petitioner MargaritoSuliguins motion for reconsideration of the July 21 , 2004Resolution2 of the Comelecs First Division. The Comelecnullified his proclamation as the 8th Sangguniang Bayanmember of Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for theSangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 102004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said date, respondenMunicipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvassthe votes for all the candidates. Petitioner received 6,605 voteswhile respondent Ecelson Sumague received 6,647 votesHowever, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering Precincts 1Ato 19A, Sumague appears to have received only 644 voteswhen, in fact, he received 844 votes. The MBOC failed to noticethe discrepancy and proclaimed the winning candidates aaround 7:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed as

the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Lagunagarnering a total of 6,605 votes.3

Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votesreceived by him and Suliguin in a Letter4 dated May 15, 2004, iappearing that there was a mistake in adding the figures in theCertificate of Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officiallygarnered 6,647 votes, as against petitioners 6,605 votes.

4


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The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to aconference. Upon review, the MBOC discovered that it had,indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200 votes fromPrecincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he shouldhave been proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan memberof Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of petitioner Suliguin.

On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a"Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes" forCouncilor. The error was attributed to extreme physical andmental fatigue which the members of the board experiencedduring the election and the canvassing of votes.

In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath ofoffice before Judge Renato B. Bercades.5

On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued aResolution6 granting the petition of the MBOC. The Commissionnullified the proclamation of petitioner Suliguin as the 8thSangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna during theMay 10, 2004 National and Local Elections "for being based onan erroneous computation of votes." It then ordered the MBOC

of Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessarycorrections in the SOV, and forthwith proclaim Sumague as the8th duly elected Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan,Laguna.7

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but theComelec En Banc denied the motion on November 18, 2004;hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that respondentCommission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling against him. In support ofhis petition, he alleges that:

4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THESTATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN,LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, and

4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THESTATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN,LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OFCANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE OF EXISTING COMELECRULES AND REGULATIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS INFAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANDICATE ECELSONC. SUMAGUE.8

Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35,9 36(c) and (f)10

of Comelec Resolution No. 6669 (General Instructions forMunicipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers inConnection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC shouldnot have entertained the letter-request of respondent Sumagueas it was filed only on May 17, 2004, or four (4) days after thecanvassing of votes was terminated and after he (petitioner) wasproclaimed winner as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member ofNagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore, respondent Sumague neverentered any objection during the proceedings of the canvassingof votes. The MBOC itself filed the "Petition to Correct EntriesMade in the Statement of Votes" before the Comelec only onMay 26, 2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes wasterminated. Petitioner maintains that the Comelec should havedenied the petition, since according to the Revised Comelec

Rules, it should have been filed not later than five (5) daysfollowing the date of the proclamation.

Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itselto file the petition before the Comelec. He further argues thaupon the proclamation of the winning candidates in the electionthe MBOC adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.

The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred ingranting the petition of the MBOC to nullify petitionersproclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan inNagcarlan, Laguna.

The petition is bereft of merit.

In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by almeans within its command who the real candidate elected by theelectorate is. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the lawor the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free andintelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correctascertainment of the results.11 In the case at bar, the simple

mathematical procedure of adding the total number of votesgarnered by respondent Sumague as appearing in the Statemenof Votes submitted to the Comelec would readily reveal the resulthat he has forty-two (42) votes more than petitioner. Such resulwould, in effect, dislodge petitioner from said post, and entitlerespondent Sumague to occupy the eighth and last seat of theSangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himselnever disputed the discrepancy in the total number of votesgarnered by respondent Sumague, and instead questioned thepersonality of the MBOC to file the petition and insisted that suchpetition was not filed on time.

Sections 312 and 413 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules ofProcedure explicitly provide that such rules may be "liberallyconstrued" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has thediscretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same timesuspend the rules or any portion thereof in the interest ojustice.14 Disputes in the outcome of elections involve publicinterest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers shouldnot be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to thedetermination of the true will of the electorate in the choice oftheir elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must beliberally construed to the end that the will of the people in thechoice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technicaobjections.15

What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a

manifest error in reflecting the actual total number of votes for aparticular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of ComelecResolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votesof any candidate as a manifest error.16 As correctly cited by theComelec,17 a manifest clerical error is "one that is visible to theeye or obvious to the understanding and is apparent from thepapers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does notinclude an error which may, by evidence dehors the record beshown to have been committed."

The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the truewinner elected by the voting public, to occupy the eighth position


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as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. InCarlos v. Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:

In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection ofcandidates to public office by popular vote" through the use ofthe ballot, and the elected officials of which are determinedthrough the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodimentof the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of thepeople." "Specifically, the term election, in the context of theConstitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including thelisting of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and thecasting and counting of votes." The winner is the candidate whohas obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in theelection. "Sound policy dictates that public elective offices arefilled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast inthe election for that office. For, in all republican forms ofgovernment the basic idea is that no one can be declaredelected and no measure can de declared carried unless he or itreceives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in theelection."19

We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (FirstDivision) granting the petition of the MBOC:

A careful perusal of the records show that there was, indeed, anhonest error committed by petitioner MBOC in the computationof votes for candidate Ecelson Sumague which resulted in theerroneous proclamation of respondent as one of the winners forthe said office.

"A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye orobvious to the understanding and is apparent from the papers tothe eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include anerror which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown tohave been committed."

The contention of respondent that the instant petition should bedismissed for being filed out of time cannot be given meritbecause his proclamation was flawed. It must be stressed that "aproclamation based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and apetition to correct errors in tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 ofthe COMELEC Rules of Procedure, even if filed out of time, maybe considered, so as not to thwart the proper determination andresolution of the case on substantial grounds and to prevent astamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation based on anerroneous tabulation of votes."

Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was

based on a clerical error or mathematical mistake in the additionof votes and not through the legitimate will of the electorate,there can be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same canbe challenged even after the candidate has assumed office."

There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with manifestbias and committed a grave abuse of discretion. "Grave abuse ofdiscretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise ofjudgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where thepower is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reasonof passion or personal hostility which must be so patent andgross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtualrefusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in

contemplation of law." Petitioner MBOC is merely doing itsfunction that is mandated by law to canvass votes in theelection returns submitted to it in due form, adding or compilingthe votes cast for each candidate as shown in the face of suchreturns and eventually proclaim the winning candidatesRespondent miserably failed to prove that petitioner exhibitedmanifest bias thereby thwarting his chances of winning the lasslot for Sangguniang Bayan Member. "Absent a strong showingto the contrary, the court must accept the presumption oregularity in the performance of official duty and strong evidenceis necessary to rebut this presumption."

Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC violated thesanctity of the ballots. Unlike the Board of Election Inspectorswhich counts the votes from the precinct levels, the MBOCcomputes the votes as appeared in the election returns.

Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation of therespondent does not constitute a clear violation of his right. Inthe first place, there is no valid proclamation to speak of. He wasnot elected by a majority or plurality of voters. His alleged rightwas based on an erroneous proclamation. By any mathematicaformulation, the respondent cannot be construed to have

obtained such plurality of votes; otherwise, it would be sheerabsurdity to proclaim a repudiated candidate as the choice of thevoters. "Where a proclamation is null and void, the proclamationis no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidatesassumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the poweto make such declaration a nullity." Respondent also cannoclaim that he was denied of his right to due process of law sincehe was given the opportunity to be heard. He was duly notifiedby petitioner MBOC of the erroneous computation which resultedin his proclamation and was afforded the opportunity to be heardby this Commission.

"The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and controover the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors and

Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and controincludes the power to revise, reverse or set aside the action ofthe boards, as well as to do what boards should have done, evenif questions relative thereto have not been elevated to it by anaggrieved party, for such power includes the authority to initiatemotu proprio or by itself steps or actions that may be requiredpursuant to law."20

Petitioner posits that the Comelecs reliance in the ruling of thisCourt in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections21 is misplacedsince, unlike the present petition, petitioner therein was anaffected candidate who filed his petition on time.

The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, inBince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 declared that:

Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed ouof time, this incident alone will not thwart the propedetermination and resolution of the instant case on substantiagrounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp ovalidity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable resulof frustrating the peoples will cannot be countenanced. In Benitov. COMELEC, we categorically declared that:


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x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not ontechnicalities has been consistently observed by this Court. Inthe case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited inDuremdes v. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), thisCourt had the occasion to declare that:

Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve publicinterest, and technicalities and procedural barriers should not beallowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to thedetermination of the true will of the electorate in the choice oftheir elective officials. And also settled is the rule that lawsgoverning election contests must be liberally construed to theend that the will of the people in the choice of public officials maynot be defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v.Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoniv. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v.Macalaang, G.R. No. L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v.Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). Inan election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain byall means within its command who is the real candidate electedby the electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512, December29, 1960). x x x (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Italics ours)

In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated and the Court went on tostate that:

Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), thisCourt has made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation ofthe law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the freeand intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also thecorrect ascertainment of the results. This bent or dispositioncontinues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).

The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of thelegal rules enunciated in the election laws should not frustratethe determination of the popular will.

Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved isthe allowance of the correction of what are purely mathematicaland/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received byboth candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes;neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation ofballots. The correction sought by private respondent andrespondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction ofmanifest mistakes in mathematical addition. Certainly, this onlycalls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correctvotes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this

case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve theproper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities ofTayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.23

The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v.Commission on Elections,24 to wit:

The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicatethat respondents assumption of office was effected by a clericalerror or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes andnot through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus,respondents proclamation was flawed right from the very

beginning. Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there canbe no valid proclamation to speak of insofar as respondenCastillo is concerned. As this Court once said:

"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on theprinciple that Comelec is with authority to annul any canvass andproclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidateproclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to theexercise of such power. It, of course, may not be availed ofwhere there has been a valid proclamation. Since privaterespondents petition before the Comelec is precisely directed athe annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceivethat inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by theConstitution and law to Comelec.

x x x

"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of aproclamation may be challenged even after the irregularlyproclaimed candidate has assumed office.

x x x

"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy ofany party aggrieved in an election is to be found in an electionprotest. But that is so only on the assumption that there hasbeen a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar theproclamation itself is illegal, the assumption of office cannot inany way affect the basic issues." (Aguam v. Commission onElections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commissionon Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]).25

Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of

petitioner for being based on an erroneous computation of votesAs the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on Elections,26where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimedcandidates assumption of office cannot deprive the Commissionthe power to declare such proclamation a nullity. Weemphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be deemedelected to the office.27

In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion inannulling the proclamation of petitioner. In a special civil actionfor certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove notmerely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the publicrespondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse o

discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise ojudgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse odiscretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the poweris exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason ofpassion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so grossas to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtuarefusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all incontemplation of law.28

To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made amistake in computing the total number of votes for respondentSumague, it took swift action and called the attention of the


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Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct Entries Made in theStatement of Votes for Councilor.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of theCommission on Elections in SPC No. 04-209 dated July 21,2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status QuoOrder issued by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

PACANAN vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 186224, August 25, 2009,597 SCRA 189)5

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari which seeks to setaside 1) the Order1 dated March 17, 2008 of the Commission onElections (Comelec) First Division and 2) the Resolution2 datedJanuary 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc dismissing petitionerConstancio D. Pacanan, Jr.s appeal from the Decision3 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, inElection Case No. 07-1, which declared private respondentFrancisco M. Langi, Sr. as the winning Mayor of Motiong, Samar.

In the Order of March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Divisiondismissed the appeal for failure to pay the correct appeal fee asprescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-day reglementary period.

In the assailed Resolution dated January 21, 2009, the ComelecEn Banc denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, declaringthat the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appealbecause of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time, and thatthe Comelec First Division was correct in dismissing the saidappeal.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and private respondentFrancisco M. Langi, Sr. were candidates for mayor in themunicipality of Motiong, Samar during the May 14, 2007elections. After the canvassing of votes, the Municipal Board ofCanvassers (MBC) of Motiong, Samar proclaimed petitioner asthe duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 3,069 votesagainst private respondents 3,066 votes.

Thereafter, private respondent filed with the RTC a Protest4dated May 25, 2007 which was docketed as Election Case No.07-1, contesting the results of the elections in ten (10) of theforty-nine (49) precincts in Motiong, Samar, and alleging acts ofviolence and intimidation and other election irregularities in theappreciation of the votes by the MBC. Thereafter, petitioner filedhis Verified Answer with Counter-Protest5 dated June 4, 2007,asserting that private respondents allegations of threat andintimidation, fraud and other irregularities in the conduct ofelections were mere allegations unsupported by anydocumentary evidence. Petitioner also disputed the electionresults with respect to seven (7) precincts.

5

On January 7, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision6 in ElectionCase 07-1, which declared private respondent as the winner inthe May 14, 2007 mayoralty race for Motiong, Samar with aplurality of six (6) votes, viz:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing Protestant Francisco MLangi, Sr. having obtained the over all total votes of 3,074 andthe Protestees 3,068 total and final votes is declared the winner

in the Mayoralty contest in Motiong, Samar with a plurality of (6votes. Therefore the proclamation on May 17, 2007 is herebyannulled and declared Francisco Langi, Sr. y Maceren as theduly elected Mayor of Motiong, Samar. The winner is awardedthe amount of P 32,510 as actual damages and no evidencealiunde for damages for the court to award. xxx

On January 10, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and paidP3,000.00 appeal fee per Official Receipt No. 6822663 beforethe RTC, Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar. He also appealed theRTC decision dated January 7, 2008 to the Comelec whichdocketed the case as EAC No. A-13-2008. Out of the P3,000.00appeal fee required by Section 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rulesof Procedure, petitioner only paid the amount of P1,000.00 (plusP200.00 to cover the legal research/bailiff fees) to the CashDivision of the Comelec, per Official Receipt No. 0510287. Thesaid payment was made on February 14, 2008.7

On March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division issued an Order8dismissing the appeal, viz.:

Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules ofProcedure which provide for the payment of appeal fee in theamount of P3,000.00 within the period to file the notice of appealand Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the same Rules which provides thafailure to pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for the dismissa

of the appeal, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED as ihereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant case for ProtesteeAppellants failure to pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed bythe Comelec Rules of Procedure within the five-(5)-dayreglementary period.

SO ORDERED.

On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion forReconsideration9 which the Comelec En Banc denied in theResolution10 dated January 21, 2009, declaring that the appeawas not perfected on time for non-payment of the completeamount of appeal fee and for late payment as well. The ComelecEn Banc held that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction overthe appeal because of the non-payment of the appeal fee ontime. Thus, the Comelec First Division correctly dismissed theappeal.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari raising the followinggrounds:

The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that thecorrect appeal fee was not paid on time.


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The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to considerthat assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time,the alleged non-payment of the correct appeal fee is not inanyway attributable to herein petitioner.

The respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in failing to consider

that assuming that the correct appeal fee was not paid on time,there are highly justifiable and compelling reasons to resolve thesubject case on the merits in the interest of justice and publicinterest.

Petitioner further claims that he paid a total of P4,215.00 for hisappeal, as follows:

a. To RTC on January 10, 2008 ------ P3,000.00

10.00

5.00

TOTAL P3,015.00

b. To Comelec on February 14, 2008 -- P1,000.00

50.00

150.00

TOTAL P1,200.00

Petitioner submits that it is incumbent upon the RTC to transmitto the Comelec the entire P3,000.00 appeal fee that he paid onJanuary 10, 2008. Petitioner also advances anotherinterpretation of the Comelec Rules that the RTC is underobligation to remit to the Comelec the P2,000.00 representingthe excess amount of the P1,000.00 appeal fee. Thus, petitionerclaims that he must be deemed to have complied, in full or atleast substantially, with the Comelec Rules on the payment ofappeal fees.

Petitioner maintains that the alleged non-payment of the correctappeal fee is not due to his own fault or negligence. He claimsthat the laws on appeals in election protest cases are not yetwell-established, thus, he must not be made to suffer for anoversight made in good faith. The Resolution No. 8486 of July15, 2008 adopted by the Comelec to clarify the rules oncompliance with the required appeal fees in election casesshould not be applied retroactively to the subject election protest.

Lastly, petitioner invokes liberality in the application of theelection law. He asserts that the popular will of the peopleexpressed in the election of public officers should not bedefeated by reason of sheer technicalities. Petitioner argues thatthe true will of the people of Motiong in the May 14, 2007elections should be determined by ordering the Comelec to givedue course to his appeal and to resolve the same on the merits.

In his Comment, respondent Langi, Sr. states that the petitionwas just a mere rehash of the Motion for Reconsideration thatpetitioner filed with the Comelec En Banc. Respondent maintainsthat for the Comelec to exercise its authori

Documents

Bince vs Comelec