bojóvtich sobre vigotski e estudos sobre personalidade

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20 JOURNAL OF RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN PSYCHOLOGY

Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, vol. 42, no. 4,July–August 2004, pp. 20–34.© 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved.ISSN 1061–0405/2004 $9.50 + 0.00.

L.I. B OZHOVICH

L.S. Vygotsky’s Historicaland Cultural Theory andIts Significance forContemporary Studies of thePsychology of Personality

English translation © 2004 M.E. Sharpe, Inc., from the Russian text © 2001“Moskovskii psikhologo-sotsial

’

nyi institut.” “O kul’

turno-istoricheskoikontseptsii L.S. Vygotskogo i ee znachenii dlia sovremennykh issledovaniipsikhologii lichnosti,” in Problemy formirovaniia lichnosti: izbrannye

psikhologicheskie trudy (Moscow: Moskovskii psikhologo-sotsial’

nyi institut,

L.S.Vygotsky’s historical and cultural theory of psychologicaldevelopment contains a number of ideas that have become semi-nal for the construction of new original theories. We are referringhere, first of all, to the idea that activity plays a leading role in thepsychological development of children. This idea formed the basisof A.N. Leontiev’s creation of an independent area of study—thetheory of activity—which is the focus of a large number of currentstudies. Vygotsky’s idea that the higher psychological functionsare a result of the interiorization of initial practical human formsof activity has been developed in the theory of the formatin of development of psychological processes (P.Ia. Galperin and his



JULY–AUGUST 2004 21

school). The idea that true teaching must lead development madeit possible to understand the process of instruction as a type of activity with a special kind of structure and content, which can bespecially organized and guided (V.V. Davydov and colleagues).Vygotsky’s notion of the linkage between the processes of forma-tion of the higher psychological functions and new physiologicalstructures was further developed by A.R. Luria and his students.Today, attempts are under way in psychology and in a number of related disciplines (psycholinguistics, psychiatry, psychopathol-ogy, etc.) to illuminate and refine Vygotsky’s concept of “units”as the indivisible psychological “cells,” and to develop and makemore concrete his view of meaning (A.G. Asmolov, B.V. Zeigarnik,V.P. Zinchenko, A.A. Leontiev, and others).

However, it seems to us that it is of particular importance totrace the logic of Vygotsky’s own thought without going beyondthe theories he constructed and to continue his studies in accor-dance with their original logic. Before moving on to a discussionof this logic, we must emphasize that Vygotsky constructed histheories on the basis of experimental data, rather than using logi-cal schemas arrived at a priori, and thus we will try to describe thedevelopment of his ideas in the context of the results of specificpsychological studies.

From our point of view, the logic of his ideas is the following:First, Vygotsky comes to the conclusion that qualitatively new

psychological structures develop during the process of ontogenyand that these, the higher psychological functions, determine thespecific features of human psychology. This development oc-curs along two lines: the maturation of the neurological appara-tus that represents the organic (physiological) basis for everypsychological process and the functional (cultural) developmentthat results from an individual’s assimilation of his society’s cul-tural attainments.

The method of double stimulation used by Vygotsky and hisstudents established that the initial elementary psychological func-ti hi h i th f ti d i t ti ith th




are mediated by a socially developed system of signs—undergochanges in structure and content. They become intellectualized and“voluntarized.” In other words, they enter into certain relationshipswith thinking and become amenable to the individual’s control.Vygotsky’s study of these complex psychological structures showedthat, after being formed through the process of human interactions,they then undergo a kind of transformation (interiorization) andbecome the property of the individual. In other words, higher psy-chological functions represent the psychological reality that con-stitutes the inalienable essence of a human individual, serving asthe content of his life, the regulator of his behavior, and the interiormilieu through which all external influences are refracted. As aresult of this, the new psychological structures that arise duringontogeny themselves begin to act as factors influencing furtherpsychological development.

Vygotsky reviewed the theoretical and methodological presup-positions of traditional psychology in light of these ideas. He con-sidered its major methodological error to be the creation of adichotomy between the biological and historical views of psycho-logical development, between mind and body, a separation thatinevitably leads to W. Dilthey’s dichotomy. It seems to me that itwas Vygotsky who best succeeded in incorporating the tenets of dialectical and historical materialism in psychology. He did notrestrict himself to the theoretical analysis of the problem, but cre-

ated experimental models appropriate to it.Vygotsky did not arrive at the solution of the “two psycholo-gies” problem by chance. In searching for the causes of the crisisthat had beset psychology, he meticulously investigated all the at-tempts to resolve it in Soviet as well as foreign psychology. Someimportant positive tenets of his theory were based on a criticalanalysis of psychological directions taken by other psychologistswho had attempted to search for a way out of the existing impasse.

Thus, he not only considered the idea of a unified structural ap-proach as formulated in Gestalt psychology to be important to thet ti f ifi d h l gi l i b t h d t d it




However, while he embraced the idea of this structure, Vygotskyrejected the basic theoretical foundation of Gestalt psychology asa whole. He had fundamental objections to putting structures per-taining to natural processes characteristic of animal psychologyand the extremely complex acquired social structures* that areunique to human beings into a single category.

The idea of a unified approach led Vygotsky to introduce theconcept of the social context of development. He proposed to an-swer the question of the unique nature of psychological develop-ment, and the distinguishing features of each age through theanalysis of this special unit. This unit involved the relationshipbetween the external and internal contexts determining the age-related and individual characteristics of the child. In this analysis,he significantly altered any previous understanding of the envi-ronment as a factor in psychological development.

The next stage in Vygotsky’s research is associated with hisforay into the discipline of psychopathology. This allowed him toinvestigate the characteristics of the human psyche not only underconditions of normal personality formation but also under condi-tions of various types of failure and disintegration of personalitydevelopment. This marked the first appearance of the concept of psychological systems.

Vygotsky comes to the conclusion that during developmentqualitative changes occur, not so much in the structure of indi-

vidual psychological functions as in their multifunctional associa-tions and relationships. He proposed that such interfunctionalstructures be called psychological systems .1

And so Vygotsky resolved the crisis in psychology by analyz-ing the origin and structure of higher psychological functions andcreating a method for studying them.

Thus, in the first phase of his creative work, he defined the subject appropriate for study by psychological science: the new psy-

*Bozhovich uses the word for neoplasm, but what seems to be meant are




chological structures arising in the course of a person’s life andactivity, based on his historical human experience. He also de-fined the research methodology: the decomposition of the wholehe was studying not into elements but into units that retained themajor features of the whole, that is, its unique qualities.

During this period he continued and deepened his considerationof the psychology of the child’s personality. In his own words,Vygotsky considered this problem to represent “the pinnacle of all psychology,” and he was rigorously moving toward its solu-tion. He believed this required taking decisive steps in going be-yond the methodological limits of traditional child psychology.The science of psychological systems made this possible.

Vygotsky failed to create a complete science of personality: hedied too soon. But his approaches to creating such a science canbe seen in his work. After all, the last stage of his scientific explo-ration was associated with developing the problem of affect andits “meeting” with the intellect—with the problems of developingemotions and forming higher feelings. Evidently, it was here thathe sought the key to understanding the special systemic structures,the higher psychological synthesis that, as he wrote, “can withcomplete justification be called a “child’s personality” (Vygotsky,1960, p. 60).

In my opinion, further psychological studies using the logicoutlined by Vygotsky and his systems of concepts should lead to a

productive study of the psychological processes specific to humanbeings, and of the personality as a whole.However, contemporary psychology is focused more on the

development of individual aspects of Vygotsky’s theory and theconstruction of overarching theories outside of his logic. Thisseems to us to be a significant reason for the current crisis inpsychological science. Of course, within the framework of dia-lectical materialism no one postulates an opposition between

material and spirit. However, there is no unity in our consider-ation of purely psychological problems, especially those associ-t d ith l i g th bl f th i t bj t d




Among the proposed subjects for psychological research are:“set” seen as uniting psychological and physiological reactions;“activity,” which provides the context for an individual’s assimila-tion of the cultural attainments of past generations, and the “orien-tational basis” of this activity. The current disagreement on theappropriate subject of psychological study first and foremost at-tests to the state of crisis that psychology is in today. Thus, A.N.Leontiev has written that “crisis phenomena . . . have only goneinto hiding, and have begun to manifest themselves in less overtforms” (1975, p. 74). Leontiev suggests that the failure to resolvethe question of the appropriate subject and methodology for psy-chology has led psychologists to conduct spurious applied investi-gations. In his Introduction to Psychology [Vvedenii v psikhologiiu],Galperin has written that the psychological experiment is develop-ing extremely slowly, and that its successes are slight compared tothe effort expended.

This crisis shows up especially clearly in the discussion of thesubject and methodology of psychology that occurred in 1972. 2

Many psychologists participating in this discussion came to theconclusion that the higher psychological processes (significantexperiences, semantic structures, etc.) cannot be studied experi-mentally and thus cannot be the subject of scientific psychologi-cal research. In other words, the psychological experiment in thestrict, so to speak Galilean, definition of the term cannot be used

here. Higher-order (personality) psychological processes cannotbe formalized and studied as scientifically and rigorously as cog-nitive processes.

The most well-grounded attempt to resolve the crisis in psy-chology today is A.N. Leontiev’s theory of activity. It is based onKarl Marx’s tenet that an activity is embodied in its product. Theideas that give rise to and regulate the product are “objectified” init. Thus, these ideas take on a new type of existence in the product.

From this it follows that when a person operates with real worldobjects that were created by human culture throughout history, hei il t bj tifi d h l gi l lit Thi i th f




the problem of psychological development, Leontiev has also dis-covered many very important psychological concepts. In particu-lar, he provides a special interpretation of the concepts of need,motivation, and personality. For example, he treats motivationsnot as internal drives coming from the subject’s personality, butas real objects embodying needs. The category of activity, whichaccording to Leontiev, subsumes both the “subject pole” and the“object pole” of activity, leads to understanding personality it-self as both a component of activity and as its product.

By thus transforming the psyche into the reality of human ac-tivity and denying the possibility that it can be considered a realitythat is intrinsic to a single subject, Leontiev has actually taken thesubject of psychological study beyond the bounds of studying theinterior life of the individual.

It seems to us that Leontiev’s theoretical structure cannot beconsidered a resolution of the crisis in psychology because, in it,psychological reality per se disappears and is replaced by the real-ity of action.

One might ask the following. If the appropriate subject of psy-chological study was already identified in Vygotsky’s works andan approach to it outlined, why has the crisis not been resolved,and why is there again discussion of the appropriate subject of study and methodology appropriate to the science of psychology?

We can suggest two basic reasons by way of explanation. First,

there may be some fear that acknowledgment that the appropriatesubject of psychological study should be internal, purely psycho-logical structures, which actually exist, might lead to a “sub-stantional”* understanding of the mind. Second, there is the difficultyof the experimental approach to the study of the higher aspects of ahuman being’s psychological life, especially personality.

However, it seems to me that both of these barriers are beginningto be overcome. Investigations of complex psychological processes

that have been undertaken, in spite of the continuing dispute about




the appropriate subject of psychological study, shows that thesevery processes, which arise as a by-product of an individual’s ac-tions, his interactions with the world of people and objects, cannotbe reduced either to actions or to interactions.

The research on a child’s emotions and needs with which ourscientific team began its work has led us to conclude that develop-ment in this area occurs in accordance with the same laws as thedevelopment of cognitive processes. 3 Initially, the elementary, un-mediated needs of the child, motivated by socially acquired expe-rience, enter into certain associations and relationships with variouspsychological functions, resulting in the development of completelynew and separate psychological structures. These include both af-fective and cognitive components, which gives them unique prop-erties. Unlike simpler psychological structures that require somesort of external stimulation to trigger their functioning, these newformations have their own stimulating force.

As an example we may cite the differences between two of thesenew structures—habit and skill. Learned motor skills develop whensome external conditions stimulate a person to perform some sortof action. Without this external stimulation the automated skilldoes not manifest itself. However, a habit, which contains its ownmotive force triggers its own performance. Furthermore, if for somereason the habit cannot be implemented, the individual experi-ences a sense of discomfort or lack of satisfaction.

Other such structures that are even more complex include, forexample, moral feelings, consciously set goals and intentions, andconvictions—in other words, the systemic structures that definethe personality.

Results of the experimental research we performed on volitionconfirm this idea. They showed that volition develops in phasesanalogous to those that have been established through study of other psychological processes.

The very first voluntary behavior occurs as a result of “biologi-cal” needs, which directly stimulate actions to overcome whateveri d th i ti f ti Thi t th d f E K h i




teristic of infants and patients suffering from the disintegration of higher psychological systems.

Next, under the influence of conflict between equally strongbut opposing affective tendencies, the individual resorts to an in-tellectual plan of action. He weighs, evaluates, and imagines theconsequence of his actions, inducing affects that correspond toeach of the choices, and as a result makes a decision, sets himself a goal, or creates an intention. Thus, decisions, goals, and inten-tions are the kind of higher-order new structures in which there isa “meeting” of affect and intellect, which is the source of theirmotive force. This is the second stage in the development of voli-tion. Here, volitional behavior occurs through an individual’s con-scious regulation of his motivations, but the motivation that is mostimportant to the individual has additional weight in the process of analyzing, weighing, and evaluating.

Finally, the third and last stage of development of volition oc-curs as a result of interiorization of ways of organizing behavior,as well as the formation of other higher psychological systems.The latter have enough stimulating force of their own to inducethe individual to perform the voluntary act directly, bypassing anyact of conscious self-regulation. At this stage, behavior takes onthe appearance of something involuntary and impulsive. Thus, anindividual may race to help someone who is in danger or take risksfor some cause vital to him without contemplation or hesitation.

We have called this behavior postvolitional.Postvolitional behavior occurs where there is a certain constel-lation of internal personality components, on the one hand, and inresponse to a particular situation, on the other. Every situation inlife makes specific demands on the organization of volitional be-havior, as well as on an individual’s consciousness, emotions, andcharacter traits. From this it follows that it would be more appro-priate to speak of the volitional structure of an individual’s per-

sonality rather than of volition as a separate psychological structure.Studies of motivation have also helped us understand anotherf d t l t f lit it i t ti




forms in the process of development. Furthermore its stability, andthus that of human behavior, results from motivations generatedby higher-order systems of developmentally acquired structures.The motivations that occupy a dominant place in the motivationalhierarchy are generally a decisive determinant of the individual’spersonality. It is these motivations that determine the orientationof the personality and its moral stability. We studied the basis of the most essential types of personality orientation: concerningoneself (ego orientation), the interests of other people (social ori-entation), and the task (task orientation). People who differed inthese orientations were also found to be different in many otherpersonality traits.

Our research also revealed that dominant orientations may bedifferent at the conscious and unconscious levels. Thus, somepeople can have one conscious goal they are striving to attain, yetbehave in a way that contradicts that goal, in accordance withmotivations that are dominant on the unconscious level. In suchcases the personality has an inharmonious structure (as if it is bro-ken from the inside), which is constantly beset by internal contra-dictions. Clearly, a personality is harmonious not so much becauseall its aspects are equally developed, but because there exists aparticular relationship among these internal components. Individu-als who demonstrate the motivational aspects of their personali-ties have developed harmoniously can attain higher levels of

development. In such personalities, motivations associated withthe interests of others and not their own egotistical interests showstable dominance. They do not need to make a special effort inorder to act in the interest of others or in the interests of a sociallysignificant cause. In other words they are characterized by post-volitional behavior.

The decisive role of motivations can also be seen in the study of such acquired systemic structures as the individual’s character traits.

We studied the process through which the traits of responsibility,diligence, and carefulness develop in children. It transpired thatll th t it f d th b i f i il ti f t i




cur is the presence of a certain motive, one that stimulates thechild to master the appropriate forms of behavior. If mastery oc-curs resulting from motives that are external to the trait (e.g., fearof punishment, desire for reward) the child acquires the necessaryskills, but the corresponding personality traits do not appear andhe does not feel an internal need to behave in accordance withthese traits. Thus, as soon as he is not being monitored, the childceases to be diligent and responsible. The trait that develops hasthe greatest stability when the desire to master it is part of theindividual’s value system, that is, is mediated by his strongestmotivations.

Analysis of the formation of human emotions suggests that theirdevelopment is also linked to the process of cultural and historicaldevelopment of needs (Vygotsky had already made this point inhis time). And this is easy to understand because a psychologicalneed is nothing more than the psychological experience of a bio-logical need. In itself a biological requirement does not triggeractions in an individual. Thus, the development of psychologicalneeds and feeling are two sides of the same process.

Our research confirms that the feelings that arise in the process of social development of human psychological needs (moral, aesthetic,intellectual, etc.) are systems structures that have new psychologi-cal content. They differ qualitatively from primary (“biological”)emotions insofar as their structure is mediated, and they occupy a

different place in the structure of personality, and serve a differentfunction in behavior, action, and human psychological development.We note here two such differences:It has been found that, under certain circumstances, which have

not yet been studied adequately, the feelings or experiences asso-ciated with satisfaction of one or another need can acquire an in-dependent value for a person and they themselves become the objectof a need (e.g., the need for love, for aesthetic experiences, for the

experience of success, etc.). Thus, these experiences cease to beonly a system of signals allowing the individual to orient to hisd ti b h i Th b th t i t t h l gi




cal content of a person’s life and loss of this content leads to adevaluation of human life.

The second characteristic is a direct result of the first. When apsychological experience associated with the process and result of meeting a need itself begins to have value for a person, he beginsto try to induce this experience over and over. In this way, to useF. Brentano’s term, “insatiable needs” develop, needs that areunique to human beings. They are not quenched by satisfaction,but instead increase in strength, inducing the individual to under-take new attempts and new creative acts to create objects to satisfyhim/herself. Here it should be emphasized that what is importantto the development of the personality is determined precisely bywhich one of the “biological” needs becomes insatiable. It is onething when, for example, the need for impressions grows into aninsatiable cognitive interest, and quite another thing if the drive toacquire food turns the individual into a miser or glutton.

Certain concepts allowed us to make some progress in approach-ing the study of the content, structure, and formation of children’spersonalities: the idea that affective and motivational developmenttraverse the same cultural and historical developmental route asthe cognitive processes as well as the systematic empirical studyof these psychological systems. Vygotsky believed that these sys-tems stand in special relationship to the personality and that theirbreakdown is associated with personality disintegration. It became

clear that central to such development is the process of “intellec-tualization” and “voluntarization” of affect and motivation, andthe resultant development of higher psychological systems, whichare the source of special drives, unique to human beings. The pres-ence of this type of system renders the human being capable of conscious self-regulation. Thus, we use the concept of “personal-ity” to refer to a level of psychological development that allows anindividual to control both the circumstances of his life and him-

self. From this standpoint, the concept of “personality” is not iden-tical to the concept of individuality, and personality cannot bed fi d ith f t ’ i di id l t it A h




being as a personality is characterized by a set of his own viewsand attitudes, his own spiritual requirements, and the definite lifegoals that he strives to attain. All this renders him relatively stableand independent of the influences of the environment external tohim. His characteristic behavior is active rather than passive.

The above pertains only to the personality development of anadult, but its formation begins very early and passes through a seriesof sequential, qualitatively distinct phases. The center of this devel-opment is consciousness, which includes both intellectual and af-fective components. All the developmentally acquired psychologicalstructures are integrated in consciousness and determine the humanpersonality as a “higher psychological system” (L.S. Vygotsky).

The unit for studying personality as a unified hierarchical sys-tem must be the act. The concept of an act differs from the conceptof action (which does not necessarily include internal motivation),and from the overly broad concept of activity.

An act always presupposes a special type of activity in the subject. It is accompanied by a competition among motives and themaking of a decision, although in many cases this competition isnot consciously perceived by the individual. Thus, a person’s actcharacterizes his personality because he performs it in accordancewith the winning motive, the one that is stably dominant in hispersonality structure. If we analyze various acts from this view-point, we may construct a hypothetical model of the given person-

ality. Then we can test this model experimentally by varying thesituation.Of course, we could use the “collision method” in such experi-

mentation. However, in this case we cannot expect clear results: inthe “collision method” the subject will solve the problem he is setrationally. Motivational systems, unconscious, and even consciouslyrejected, will always participate in an actual act. In this approach,using different variations of the methodology for experimental study

of the act, we may be able to establish both age-related and indi-vidual characteristics, and the process of their development as welli t d th l gi l




Preliminary experimental testing conducted in this area sup-ports optimism that this is a promising approach.

In conclusion, I wish to return to the controversial questionsthat were posed at the beginning of this report, especially the ques-tion of the appropriate subject of study and the methodology of psychology. In our view, there is no basis for searching for thesubject of psychological research in any reality other than thereality of the human psyche, as a special form of the motion of matter, which is not reducible to any other forms.

Objections to this understanding of the object of psychologicalstudy seem to me to result from a false fear of acknowledging theobjective existence of the psyche.

The belief that the study of psychological processes per se inexo-rably leads to reductionism is unfounded, or at any rate, debatable.Reductionism represents a failure not only of those adherents of traditional psychology who have not yet found their subject, butalso of those psychologists who have lost it and are looking for themechanisms of psychological processes in psychology, logic,performance—in other words, outside of psychology.

The assertion that the psyche is the subjective form of the objective world, in no way presupposes that as an object of study itmust be removed from the boundaries of the subjective, to be stud-ied in the form of “actions,” and “activity,” and its products.

L.S. Vygotsky’s cultural and historical theory showed the way

to scientific understanding of the higher forms of psychologicalhuman life, and, until psychology includes these aspects in thesubject of experimental research, it cannot progress in the study of the psychology of the living whole of human personality.

Current studies (including our own) refute doubts that it is pos-sible to study higher forms of psychological life, that is,“personality”(significant experiences [ znachashchie perezhivaniia , meanings,moral feelings, and volition), by experimental means, which were

voiced in the discussions of 1972. These structures are amenableto experimental study, which will establish the objective laws thatg th




Notes

1. Here we use the concepts of system and structure in the way they were usedby Vygotsky.

2. Editor’s note: Here Bozhovich is referring to the discussion that was startedby F.V. Bassin’s article “O razvitii vzgliadov na predmete psikhologii” [On theDevelopment of Views on the Subject for Psychological Study] ( Voprosy psikhologii ,1971, no. 4, pp. 101–13) and continued in 1972 by articles in subsequent issues:L.I. Bozhovich and M.S. Neimark, “Znachashchie perezhivaniia kak predmetpsikhologii” [Significant Experiences as the Subject of Psychological Study](Voprosy psikhologii , no. 1, pp. 130–34); E.I. Boiko, “V chem sostoit ‘razvitievzgliadov’ (po povodu stat

’

i F.V. Bassina ‘O razvitii vzgliadov na predmetepsikhologii’)” [What Is the Development of Views? (on F.V. Bassin’s article “Onthe Development of Views on the Subject for Psychological Study”)] ( Voprosy

psikhologii , no. 1, pp. 135–41); A.A. Vetrov, “Zamechaniia po voprosu o predmetepsikhologii (psikhologiia i kibernetika)” [Remarks on the Subject for Psychologi-cal Study (Psychology and Cybernetics)] ( Voprosy psikhologii , no. 2, pp. 124–27);G.I. Ivanov, “Chelovek, psikhika, i predmet psikhologii” [The Human Being, thePsyche, and the Subject of Psychological Study] ( Voprosy psikhologii , no. 2, pp.128–32); F.V. Bassin, “Znachashchie perezhivaniia i problema sobstvennopsikhologicheskoi zakonomernosti” [Significant Experiences and the Problem of Real Psychological Laws] ( Voprosy psikhologii , no. 3, pp. 105–24).

3. Editor’s note: What is referred to here is the Personality Formation Labora-tory of the General and Pedagogical Psychology Scientific Research Institute,USSR Academy of Pedagogic Sciences, which L.I. Bozhovich headed between1946 and 1976.

References

Leont’

ev [Leontiev], A.N. 1975. Deiatel’

nost ’

. Soznanie. Lichnost ’

[Activity.

Consciousness. Personality]. Moscow: State Publishing House for PoliticalLiterature.Vygotskii [Vygotsky], L.S. 1960. Razvitie vysshykh psikhicheskikh funktsii

[Development of Higher Psychological Functions]. Moscow, 1960.



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bojóvtich sobre vigotski e estudos sobre personalidade