Cases Civ Pro 3

8/13/2019 Cases Civ Pro 3

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G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995

LOPE MACHETE, NICASIO JUMAWID, SANTIAGO JUMAWID, JOHN JUMAWID, PEDRO GAMAYA,RENATO DELGADO, FERNANDO OMBAHIN, MATIAS ROLEDA, PASIANO BARO, IGNACIO BARO,MAMERTO PLARAS and JUSTINIANO VILLALON, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J .:

Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals from leaseholdtenants?

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals anddamages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete, NicasioJumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin, MatiasRoleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras and Justiniano Villalon. The complaint alleged that the

parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings at PoblacionNorte, Carmen, Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or percentageof their harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason, petitioners failed to pay theirrespective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay him back rentals anddamages.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subjectmatter. They contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subjectmatter of the complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in theexercise of its quasi-judicial powers under Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of theDepartment of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, 1 and on 28 September 1989 denied themotion for reconsideration. 2

Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before respondent Court of Appeals which on 21 May1992 rendered judgment reversing the trial court and directing it to assume jurisdiction over the case 3 on thebasis of its finding that —

. . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform cannot be seen toencompass a case of simple collection of back rentals by virtue of an agreement, as the oneat bar, where there is no agrarian dispute to speak of (since the allegation of failure to pay theagreed rentals was never controverted in the motion to dismiss) nor the issue raised onapplication, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of these laws. 4

On 18 January 1993 the appellate court rejected the motion forreconsideration. 5

Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation andthat respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leaseholdcontract, hence, the dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws governing its execution and the rights and

obligations of the parties thereto are necessarily R.A. 3844, 6 R.A. 6657 7 and other pertinent agrarian laws.Considering that the application, implementation, enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matterswhich have been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the jurisdiction of the trial court.



The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17 of E.O. 229 8 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers todetermine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all mattersinvolving implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction ofthe Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordancewith law.

Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the DARAB toassume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. 9 Section 1, pars.(a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the DARAB explicitly provides —

Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform AdjudicationBoard shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicateall agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving theimplementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended byRepublic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and theirimplementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not belimited to the following: (a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged inthe cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian ReformProgram (CARP) and other agrarian laws, (b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and

determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals,disturbance compensation, amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning thefunctions of the Land Bank . . .

In Quismundo v . Court of Appeals, 10 this Court interpreted the effect of Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 on P.D. 946,which amended R.A. 3844, the agrarian law then in force —

The above quoted provision (Sec. 17) should be deemed to have repealed 11 Sec. 12 (a) and(b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relationswith original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted andobligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarianreform program.

Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of Republic Act No. 3844,the courts of agrarian relations had original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving therights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except thosecognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission" and "questions involving rightsgranted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rulesand Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program," exceptthose matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be exclusivelycognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 12

In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as theJudiciary Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into theregional trial courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. 13

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August29, 1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the Official Gazette, 14 theregional trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reformmatters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.

On 15 June 1988 R.A. 6657 was passed containing provisions which evince and support the intention of the

legislature to vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. 15 Section 50 thereofsubstantially reiterates Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 thus —



Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR . — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, exceptthose falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) . . .

Section 3, par. (d), thereof defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to any controversy relatingto tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted toagriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers' associations or representation of persons innegotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurialarrangements.

However it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial Courts have not been completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts designated by this Court — at least one (1) branch withineach province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts have,according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for thedetermination of just compensation to landowners, and (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. 16

Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by theDARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with privaterespondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrineof primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. 17

Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case. At anyrate, the present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as this Court was

quite emphatic in Quismundo v . Court of Appeals, 18 the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage ofthe parties since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agencypresumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein aresummary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and evidence, to

the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious andinexpensive proceeding. 19

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and28 September 1989 are REINSTATED. Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmittedto the appropriate Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for proper adjudication inaccordance with the ruling in Vda. de Tangub v . Court of Appeals 20 and reiterated in Quismundo v . Court of

Appeals, 21 as well as pertinent agrarian laws.

SO ORDERED.



SECOND DIVISION

NILO PALOMA, P e t i t i o n e r,

- versus -

DANILO MORA, HILARIO FESTEJO,MAXIMA SALVINO, BRYN

BONGBONG andVALENTINOSEVILLA,

R e s p o n d e n t s.

G.R. No. 157783

Present:

PUNO,

Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR.,

TINGA, and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ .

Promulgated:

September 23, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner NILO PALOMA is in

quest of the reversal of the Decision[1] and the Resolution,[2] dated 15 November

2002 and 01 April 2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

42553, affirming in toto the Orders dated 12 March 1996 and 28 June 1996 of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Palompon, Leyte, in Civil Case No. PN-

0016, dismissing his complaint for mandamus for being prematurely filed.

The undisputed facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals and as

unraveled from the records, follow:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/sep2005/157783.htm#_ftn1









Petitioner Nilo Paloma was appointed General Manager of the Palompon,

Leyte Water District by its Board of Directors in 1993. His services were

subsequently terminated by virtue of Resolution No. 8-95[3] dated 29 December

1995, which was passed by respondents as Chairman and members of the Board of

the Palompon, Leyte Water District, namely: Danilo Mora, Hilario Festejo, Bryn

Bongbong and Maxima Salvino, respectively. The Board, in the same Resolution,

designated respondent Valentino Sevilla as Officer-in-Charge.[4]

Pained by his termination, petitioner filed a petition for mandamu s[5] with

prayer for preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC on 11 January

1996 to contest his dismissal with the prayer to be restored to the position of

General Manager .[6]

Petitioner obdurately argued in his petition that the passage of Resolution

No. 8-95 resulting in his dismissal was a “capricious and arbitrary act on the part

of the Board of Directors, constituting a travesty of justice and a fatal denial of his

constitutional right to due process for the grounds relied upon therein to terminate

him were never made a subject of a complaint nor was he notified and made to

explain the acts he was said to be guilty of.” “Fundamental is the rule and also

provided for in the Civil Service Rules and Regulations that no officer or employee

in the Civil Service shall be suspended, separated or dismissed except for cause

and after due process,” so stressed petitioner .[7]
























In its Decision[15] dated 15 November 2002, the Court of Appeals yielded to

the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner, viz :

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack

of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court dated12 March 1996 and 28 June 1996 in Civil Case No. PN-0016, are

AFFIRMED in toto.[16]

Equally unavailing was petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which was

denied by the Court of Appeals on 01 April 2003.

Affronted by the ruling, petitioner elevated the matter to us via the instant

petition, contending that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALOMPON,

LEYTE, BRANCH 17.[17]

The central inquiry raised in this petition is whether or not the Court of

Appeals committed any reversible error in its challenged decision. Concretely, we

are tasked to resolve: (1) whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Board of

Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water District to reinstate the General Manager

thereof, and (2) whether or not the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the case for

illegal dismissal of petitioner.

Petitioner, in his brief, is emphatic that the Court of Appeals overlooked the

fact that mandamus may lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty in

case of non-observance of due process. He enthuses that the Court of Appeals

overlooked the fact that as an aggrieved party, he need not exhaust administrative

remedies and may resort to court action for relief as due process was clearly

violated.[18]


















Espousing a contrary view, respondents posit that petitioner breached the

rule against forum shopping as he filed another complaint for illegal dismissal

against them with the CSC after obtaining an unfavorable ruling in his Petition

for Mandamus filed before the RTC.[19] Not only is petitioner guilty of forum

shopping; he, too, is guilty of submitting a false certificate against forum shopping

as the certification he appended with the present petition omitted the fact that he

had previously filed a similar case with the CSC, so respondents say.[20]

Respondents theorize, as well, that the instant case has already been rendered moot

by the dissolution of the Palompon, Leyte Water District and its subsequent

absorption by the municipal government of Palompon effective 1 June 1999.[21]

Finally, it is respondents’ resolute stance that it was fitting for the Court of Appeals

to affirm the trial court’s ruling dismissing the petition filed by petitioner inasmuch

as Section 23 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 128 indeed clearly states that the

General Manager shall serve at the pleasure of the Board.[22]

We are not won over by petitioner’s avowals. The petition ought to be

denied.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides-

Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation,

board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act

which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,

or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of aright or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person

aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging

the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding

the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the

court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner



















and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the

wrongful acts of the respondent.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but

not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty.[23] Mandamus will not issue

to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law

imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in

reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to

be exercised and not that of the court.[24]

In the case at bar, P.D. No. 198,[25] otherwise known as THE PROVINCIAL

WATER UTILITIES ACT OF 1973, which was promulgated on 25 May 1973,categorically provides that the general manager shall serve at the pleasure of the

board of directors, viz :

Section 23. Additional Officers. - At the first meeting of the board,

or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority

vote, a general manager, an auditor, and an attorney, and shall define their

duties and fix their compensation. Said of f icers shal l serve at the pleasure

of the board.

Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 was later amended by P.D. No. 768 on 15

August 1975 to read:

SEC. 23. The General Manager. - At the first meeting of the board,

or as soon thereafter as practicable, the board shall appoint, by a majority

vote, a general manager and shall define his duties and fix his

compensation. Said officer shall serve at the pleasure of the board.

(Emphasis supplied)

Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon,

Leyte Water District to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary

















which we held in Feliciano v. Commission On Audit [28] to be the special enabling

charter of Local Water Districts, categorically provides that the General Manager

shall serve “at the pleasure of the board.”

Correlatively, the nature of appointment of General Managers of Water

Districts under Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 falls under Section 14 of the Omnibus

Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the

Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be

issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based on

the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject

to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the duration of

project or subject to the availability of funds.

The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows:

(1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-

existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose

employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;

(2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when

appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or athis pleasure;

(3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-

existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or

termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed

automatically abolished; and

(4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a

specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed

abolished; . . . (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court has previously sustained the validity of dismissal of civil servants

who serve at the pleasure of the appointing power and whose appointments are

covered by Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive







Order No. 292 as cited above. Thus, in Orcullo, Jr. v. Civil Service

Commission,[29] petitioner was hired as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating

Council of the Philippine Assistance Program-BOT Center. In upholding the

termination of his employment prior to the expiration of his contract, we held that

petitioner serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority. This Court ruled

in Orcullo –

A perusal of petitioner’s employment contract will reveal that his

employment with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase “unless terminated

sooner.” Thus, while such employment is co-terminous with the PAPS

project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasur e of the appointing

authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. We agree

with the appellate court’s interpretation of the phrase “unless terminatedsooner” to mean “that his contractual job as Project Manager IV from

March 11, 1996 to January 30, 2000 could end anytime before January 30,

2000 if terminated by the other contracting party-employer CCPAP.

(Emphasis supplied)

Neither is it the Court’s business to intrude into the Congressional sphere on

the matter of the wisdom of Section 23 of P.D. No. 198. One of the firmly

entrenched principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve

themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the

exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity

of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is

to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of

legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case.[30]

Moreover, laws change depending on the evolving needs of society. In a

related development, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo inked into law Republic

Act No. 9286, which amended Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 providing that











thereafter, the General Manager of Water Districts shall not be removed from

office, except for cause and after due process. Rep. Act No. 9286 reads:

Republic Act No. 9286

AN ACT FURTHER AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.

198, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE PROVINCIAL WATER

UTILITIES ACT OF 1973", AS AMENDED

Approved: April 2, 2004 . . .

Sec. 2. Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, is hereby

amended to read as follows:

Sec. 23. The General Manager. – At the first meeting

of the Board, or as soon thereafter as practicable, the Board

shall appoint, by a majority vote, a general manager and shall

define his duties and fix his compensation. Said officer shall

not be removed from office, except for cause and after due

process. (Emphasis supplied.)

. . .

Sec. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect upon its approval.[31]

Unfortunately for petitioner, Rep. Act No. 9286 is silent as to the

retroactivity of the law to pending cases and must, therefore, be taken to be of

prospective application. The general rule is that in an amendatory act, every case

of doubt must be resolved against its retroactive effect.[32] Since the retroactive

application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested,[33] the

rule in statutory construction is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a

prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give

them a retrospective effect is expresslydeclared or is necessarily implied from the

language used.[34]



















First , there is nothing in Rep. Act No. 9286 which provides that it should

retroact to the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 198, the original law. Next , neither is

it necessarily implied from Rep. Act No. 9286 that it or any of its provisions

should apply retroactively. Third , Rep. Act No. 9286 is a substantive amendment

of P.D. No. 198 inasmuch as it has changed the grounds for termination of the

General Manager of Water Districts who, under the then Section 23 of P.D. No.

198, “shall serve at the pleasure of the Board.” Under the new law, however, said

General Manager shall not be removed from office, except for cause and after due

process. To apply Rep. Act No. 9286 retroactively to pending cases, such as the

case at bar, will rob the respondents as members of the Board of the Palompon,

Leyte Water District of the right vested to them by P.D. No. 198 to terminate

petitioner at their pleasure or discretion. Stated otherwise, the new law can not be

applied to make respondents accountable for actions which were valid under the

law prevailing at the time the questioned act was committed.

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, at the time petitioner was

terminated by the Board of Directors, the prevailing law was Section 23 of P.D.

No. 198 prior to its amendment by Rep. Act No. 9286.

Petitioner, next, heaves censure on the Court of Appeals for subscribing to

the trial court’s view that the petition for mandamus was prematurely filed. We

recall in Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton[35] that water districts are government

instrumentalities and that their employees belong to the civil service. Thus, “[t]he

hiring and firing of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are

governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and

Regulations.” Tanjay was clear-cut on this matter:






. . . Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of

the petitioner, Tanjay Water District, and respondent Tarlac Water District

and all water districts in the country, they come under the coverage of the

civil service law, rules and regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate courts in the case at bar is

the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts cannot and will not resolve a

controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an

administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of

sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and

services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate mattersof fact.[36] In Villaflor v. Court of Appeals,[37] we revisited the import of the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to wit:

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this

doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of

administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in

character. . .

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearlyapplicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a

controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an

administrative body of special competence. In Machete vs. Court of

Appeals, the Court upheld the primary jurisdiction of the Department of

Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) in an agrarian dispute over

the payment of back rentals under a leasehold contract. In Concerned

Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs.

Vasquez [240 SCRA 502], the Court recognized that the MWSS was in the

best position to evaluate and to decide which bid for a waterworks project

was compatible with its development plan. (Emphasis supplied)

In a surfeit of cases, this Court has held that quasi-judicial bodies like the

CSC are better-equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of

employees as those in the Civil Service since it is within the field of their











expertise.[38] This is consistent with the powers and functions of the CSC, being

the central personnel agency of the Government, to carry into effect the provisions

of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws,[39] including, in this case, P.D.

No. 198.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the Decision and the Resolution dated 15 November 2002 and

01 April

2003, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42553, are hereby

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.











G.R. No. 133882 September 5, 2006

ANGELA DELA ROSA and CORAZON MEDINA, petitioners,vs.ORFELINA D. ROLDAN, LORNA SAN DIEGO, FLORDELIZA D. CATACUTAN, NORMA Y. LACUESTA,and ARSENIO DULAY, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J .:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.45560 affirming, on a petition for review, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac in Civil CaseNo. 8396, which in turn reversed on appeal the decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac inCivil Case No. 6089 for unlawful detainer.

The Antecedents

The spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado were the owners of two (2) parcels of land located in Tarlac,Tarlac, both covered by respective titles; the 261-square-meter lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. 7225, while the 772 sq. m. was covered by TCT No. 7226.

Sometime in 1957, the spouses Rivera executed a deed of sale2 over the properties in favor of the spouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa. Gideon dela Rosa, one of Asuncion's brothers, was one of theinstrumental witnesses in the deed. To pay for the property, the spouses Dulay, who were members of theGovernment Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured a P9,500.00 loan and executed a real estate mortgageover the two lots as security therefor. On September 16, 1957, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 29040and 29041 in the names of the spouses Dulay.

The spouses Dulay forthwith took possession of the lots, except a 500-square-meter portion which was thenoccupied by Gideon dela Rosa and his wife Angela and the portion where the house of Corazon Medina stood.The spouses Dulay declared the property for taxation purposes in their names and paid the realty taxestherefor.

Sometime in 1982, the spouses Dulay made demands on Gideon, Angela and Corazon to vacate the premises,as their three daughters would be constructing their respective houses thereon. Gideon, Angela and Corazonrefused to do so, prompting the spouses to file a complaint for recovery of possession (accion publiciana)against them with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Tarlac. The spouses Dulay alleged, inter alia, thatthey bought the lots from the spouses Rivera in 1957; defendants occupied a 370-square-meter portion on thewestern side, and were claiming ownership over one-half of the property, as shown by their letter to plaintiffsappended to their complaint; and they needed the property so that their daughters, who already had their

respective families, could build houses thereon. The spouses Dulay prayed that defendants be evicted from theproperty and be required to pay reasonable compensation for their use of the premises.3 The case wasdocketed as Civil Case No. 6261.

In their answer to the complaint, defendants alleged the following by way of special and affirmative defenses:Gideon and his sister Asuncion contributed equally to the purchase price of the property; plaintiffs secured aGSIS loan of P9,500.00, out of which P6,500.00 was paid to the vendors; Gideon and Asuncion verballyagreed that plaintiffs would be indicated as the sole vendees in the deed of sale as they were the GSISmembers; defendants had already paid their share of the purchase price of the property as of 1978, except forthe amount of P332.00; and, insofar as the one-half portion on the western side of the property was concerned,

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/sep2006/gr_133882_2006.html#fnt1














plaintiffs were trustees for defendants, who likewise owned the same. Defendants interposed counterclaims fordamages and prayed that the said one-half portion be reconveyed to them.4

During the trial, the spouses Dulay adduced in evidence the following: the Deed of Absolute Sale datedJanuary 16, 1957, with Gideon as an instrumental witness;5 the tax declarations in their names covering theproperty; and receipts of realty tax payments made over the property.6

Defendants spouses Dela Rosa adduced in evidence a small notebook containing therein an alleged list ofpayments to the spouses Dulay of their share in the purchase price of the property.7 They presented an NBIQuestioned Documents Expert to prove the authenticity of the signature of Asuncion Dulay on one of thereceipts.8 However, Asuncion denied that she bought the property with her brother Gideon, and that shereceived any amount from him and his wife as part of the purchase price of the property. She likewise deniedthat it was her signature that appeared on the purported receipt.

On July 17, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6261 in favor of the spouses Dulay andordered the spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina to vacate the property and turn over possession toplaintiffs.9 The trial court declared:

ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE, there is no doubt that the registered owners of the lots in question arethe plaintiffs-spouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (Exhibits "A" and "B"). They bought

these lots from the spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado (Exhibits "D" and "D-1").

Defendants' claim that they bought from the plaintiffs one-half (1/2) portion of the lots in question isuntenable. Firstly, if it is true as claimed by them that there was such an agreement to purchase fromthe plaintiffs a portion of the lots in question, why did they not reduce [the] same in writing? In fact, it'sthe defendants, particularly Gideon dela Rosa, who induced and accompanied the plaintiffs to go to aNotary Public for the execution of Exhibit "D." The amounts mentioned in Exhibit "5" does (sic) notclearly indicate whether they were payments made for the purchase price in installment or for monthlyrentals for their occupation of Lot 3-B-2. The defendants were the only ones who made entries; and aperusal of such entries were not recorded in sequence of alleged monthly payment but merely entriesdictated and/or written at will.

Regarding Exhibit 6 and the alleged signature of plaintiff Asuncion dela Rosa, the report (Exhibit "7,"

"7-A" and "7-B") and the testimony of the Chief NBI handwriting expert when presented by thedefendants themselves is very emphatic. Thus:

"However, the question signature was signed over a typewritten carbon or duplicate…."

What we mean by that, Sir, is that there is here a purported receipt with the body typewrittenunderlining below the supposed signature Asuncion R. Dulay, it is a little surprising because ifa document is prepared in one occasion, then the body should be in ribbon impression andthe underlining should be in ribbon. The supposed typewritten body above the signature is anoriginal ribbon impression, that is, it is direct from the typewritten with the ribbon striking thesheet of paper, the underlining, however, on which the signature is signed is a carbonimpression, that means it is a duplicate impression. (pp. 8-9, tsn., Oct. 30/85).10

The spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina appealed to the CA. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.15455 . On June 29, 1990, the appellate court rendered judgment granting the appeal and reversed the trialcourt's ruling. According to the appellate court, the complaint was premature on account of plaintiffs' failure toallege, in their complaint, that there had been earnest efforts to have the case amicably settled as mandatedunder Article 222 of the New Civil Code.11

The spouses Dulay filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review on Certiorari with thisCourt which was granted. The motion was recorded as UDK-10069. However, the spouses Dulay failed to filetheir petition. Thus, on November 19, 1990, the Court resolved to declare final and executory the decision of



































the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15455 for failure of plaintiffs-appellees to file their petition for review.12 Theresolution of the Court became final and executory.13

In the meantime, Gideon died. His wife Angela and Corazon Medina continued residing in the property withoutpaying any rentals therefor. Asuncion Dulay passed away on June 26, 1995, survived by her husband Arsenioand their children: Orfelina Roldan, Lorna San Diego, Flordeliza Catacutan, and Norma Lacuesta.

In a letter dated October 2, 1995, Arsenio and his children, through counsel, made demands on Corazon and Angela to vacate the property within 30 days from receipt thereof, with a warning that failure to do so wouldimpel them to file the necessary legal action.14 Nevertheless, they suggested a conference to discuss theamicable settlement of the matter. Corazon and Angela ignored the letter. This prompted Arsenio and hischildren to file a complaint for eviction against Angela and Corazon in the Office of the Barangay Captain. Theparties did not arrive at a settlement, and on December 1, 1995, the Pangkat Secretary issued a certification tofile action.15

On January 29, 1996, Arsenio and his children, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer againstCorazon and Angela, as defendants, in the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac. Plaintiffs alleged the following:

3. Plaintiffs are the co-owners of two adjoining parcels of residential land located at Tarlac, Tarlac, andmore particularly described as follows:

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29040

"A parcel of land (Lot "B" of the subdivision plan Psd-2284, being a portion of the landdescribed on the original plan II-5215, G.L.R.O. Record No. 7962), situated in the Barrio ofSan Roque, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac. Bounded on the N.E., by Lot "C" of thesubdivision plan; on the S.E., by Lot No. "3-B-2" of the subdivision plan and property ofConcepcion Cider; on the W., by property of Timotea Mercado; and on the N.W., by Lot "A" ofthe subdivision plan, containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-ONE (261) SQUAREMETERS, more or less."

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29041

"A parcel of land (Lot No. "3-B-2" of the subdivision plan Psd-2284, being a portion of Lot No."3-B," plan II-2977-Amd., G.L.R.O. Record No. 1955), situated in the Barrio of San Roque,Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac. Bounded on the N.E., by Lot 87-C of the subdivisionplan; on the S.E., by Lot No. 3-B-1 of the subdivision plan; on the S.W., by property ofConcepcion Cider; and on the N.W., by Lot B of the subdivision plan, containing an area ofSEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO (772) SQUARE METERS, more or less."

Copies of the transfer certificates of title are attached as Annexes "A" and "B," respectively.The total assessed value of said lands does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos(P20,000.00).

4. Said parcels of land were formerly owned by the spouses Asuncion dela Rosa and Arsenio Dulay.Plaintiffs Orfelina Roldan, Lorna San Diego, Flordeliza Catacutan, and Norma Lacuesta are the

children of the spouses Asuncion dela Rosa and plaintiff Arsenio Dulay. Upon the death of Asunciondela Rosa on 26 June 1995, said parcels of land became jointly owned by herein plaintiffs. A copy of Asuncion dela Rosa's certificate of death is attached as Annex "C."

5. The spouses Dulay bought said parcels of land sometime in 1957. Defendants and theirpredecessors-in-interest have occupied and are continuously occupying about five hundred (500)square meters, more or less, of said parcels of land. Defendants and their predecessors-in-interesthave occupied said parcels of land since 1957 without paying any rent.



















6. The occupation by defendants of said parcels of land were at the mere tolerance of the spousesDulay and, thereafter, of the plaintiffs. Defendants have promised to vacate the premises if and whenneeded by the spouses Dulay and plaintiffs.

7. Demands were made on defendants to vacate the premises, which demands, however, wereignored and not heeded. Defendants refused and continues to refuse to vacate the premises. A copyof the final demand letters sent to Angela dela Rosa and Corazon Medina are attached as Annexes"D" and "E," respectively.

8. In an attempt to arrive at an amicable settlement and in recognition of their being blood relatives,plaintiffs exerted earnest efforts towards a compromise with defendants. Defendants were invited todiscuss and settle the matter amicably. Defendants, however, refused to meet and discuss anysettlement and ignored the invitation extended by plaintiffs.

9. In compliance with Section 412 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) and as a furtherattempt to settle the dispute amicably, plaintiffs brought the matter to the lupong tagapamayapa of theirbarangay. Defendants, however, refused to discuss an amicable settlement. The certification to fileaction issued by the lupon chairman is attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex "F."

10. Defendants have been occupying and using the premises without paying any rent therefor. The

present reasonable rental value of the premises is Fifty Pesos (P50.00) per month, which amountdefendants should be made to pay from September 1957 until possession is restored to plaintiffs.

11. By reason of the unjustifiable refusal to vacate and the unlawful detainer of the subject property bydefendants and all persons claiming rights under them, plaintiffs were constrained to seek redress incourt to protect their own rights and interests, thereby causing them to incur litigation expenses in theamount of not less than Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), for which amount the defendant shouldbe made liable to plaintiffs.16

Plaintiffs therein prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs most respectfully pray that, after trial, judgment berendered by this Honorable Court in favor of plaintiffs and ordering as follows:

1. Defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to immediately vacate the premises;

2. Defendants to pay all rental arrears at the monthly rate of P50.00 from September 1957 untilpossession is restored or a total of P23,000.00;

3. Defendants to pay litigation expenses in the amount of P50,000.00; and

4. Defendants to pay the costs of this suit.

Plaintiffs pray for such other and further reliefs just and equitable under the premises.17

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6089.

In their answer, defendants reiterated their allegations in their answer to the complaint in Civil Case No.6261 in the CFI of Tarlac.

On April 30, 1996, Angela filed a complaint against Arsenio and his children in the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac forrecovery of ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. The case was docketed as Civil CaseNo. 6154. Angela, as plaintiff, reiterated her allegations in her answer and counterclaim in Civil Case No. 6261as allegations comprising her causes of action. She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be renderedin their favor, thus:











WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Hon. Court that judgment shall issue:

1. Ordering that an immediate temporary restraining order restraining the defendants from disturbingthe possession of the Plaintiff over the property in question until the case is finally dissolved;

2. Declaring the Plaintiff as owner of the one-half (1/2) property in question, thereby reconveying the

ownership thereof and cancelling the title;

3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P30,000.00 asattorney's fee, plus P1,000.00 per hearing;

4. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 asacceptance fee, plus P20,000.00 as litigation expenses;

5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 asexemplary damages;

6. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as moraldamages;

7. And granting such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises.18

On July 17, 1996, the MTC issued a pre-trial order in Civil Case No. 6089 defining the issue, thus:

Whether or not Unlawful Detainer is proper in the premises considering the claim of ownership bydefendants from the beginning of these litigations sometime in 1982 followed by this case at bench.Otherwise stated, is the occupation of the land in dispute by the defendants by tolerance of plaintiffs.19

On September 25, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6089 in favor of Corazon and Angelaand ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.20 The court held that the issuebetween the parties was one of ownership and not merely possession de facto. Thus, the possession of theproperty by defendants was not by mere tolerance, but by virtue of a claim of ownership; in fact, defendants

never recognized the plaintiffs' claim of ownership over the property. In ruling against Arsenio and his children,the trial court relied on their pleadings, the decision of the CFI in Civil Case No. 6261, the ruling of the CA inCA-G.R. CV No. 15455, and the resolution of this Court in UDK-10069.21 It declared that, although the CAreversed the decision of the CFI in Tarlac, the facts show that the dispute between the parties constitutespossession de jure; the action of the spouses Dulay in Civil Case No. 6261 which was an accion

publiciana cannot be converted into one for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 6089.

Arsenio and his children appealed to the RTC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 8396. On June 25,1997, it reversed the decision of the MTC and ordered the eviction of defendants, holding that the issue wasthe entitlement to the physical possession de facto of the property, an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction ofthe MTC;22 in contrast, the issue between the parties in Civil Case No. 6261 was possession de jure and notpossession de facto. The RTC further declared that the spouses Dulay had a torrens title over the propertywhich was conclusive against the whole world; as such, they were entitled to the possession of the property asowners thereof. Citing the ruling of this Court in Peran v. Espera,23 the RTC ruled that Corazon and Angela

possessed the property for a considerable length of time only through mere tolerance of plaintiffs.

Corazon and Angela moved to reconsider the decision, which the RTC denied in an Order 24 dated September22, 1997. They filed a petition for review in the CA, praying that the RTC decision be reversed and the decisionof the MTC be affirmed. Angela claimed that she owned one-half of the property as co-owner of the spousesDulay. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45560.

On March 16, 1998, the CA rendered judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 45560 affirming the decision of the RTC anddismissing the petition. The CA ruled that, contrary to the claim of Angela, there was no trust created over one-































half of the property in her favor. Since the complaint against Angela and Corazon in the MTC was one forunlawful detainer, the MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, they had been in possession ofthe property by tolerance. In any case, their action was barred by prescription and laches.

Angela and Corazon filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied.

Angela and Corazon, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, claiming that the CAerred as follows:

I

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THECASE AT BAR IS ONE OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER, WHEN IT IS ONE OF RECOVERY OFOWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION.

II

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THEREWAS NO TRUST CREATED BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.

III

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN CONSIDERING THAT THEPETITIONERS' CLAIM HAS BEEN BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.

IV

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'SFEE FOR RESPONDENTS.25

According to petitioners, during the pre-trial in the MTC, the parties stipulated on the following issues to beresolved by the court: whether or not the action for unlawful detainer of respondents was proper considering

that petitioners claimed ownership over the property in their answer to the complaint; and whether petitionerspossessed the property by mere tolerance of respondents. Petitioners insist that during the pre-trial conference,respondents admitted that they had filed a complaint for recovery of possession of property against petitionersin the CFI of Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 6261.

Petitioners maintain that the principal issue is one of ownership over the property and not merely whether ornot respondents, as plaintiffs, were entitled to possession de facto as the registered owners thereof; hence, theMTC had no jurisdiction over the action of respondents.

Petitioners are of the view that the trial court and the CA erred in declaring that there was no trust created overthe property. They maintain that there was a verbal agreement between Gideon and his sister Asuncion thatthe property would be purchased by them; that the purchase price thereof would be advanced by Asuncion;that Asuncion would be indicated as the vendee in the deed of absolute sale to enable her to secure a GSIS

loan to pay for the property, with the concomitant agreement that Gideon would pay one-half of the purchaseprice for the property; and that the property will be titled in their name as trustees for the spouses Gideon and Angela dela Rosa over one-half portion of the lots. They insist that they are not barred from assailing the deedof absolute sale executed in favor of the spouses Dulay by the spouses Rivera. There is likewise no factual andlegal basis for the award of attorney's fees.

In their comment on the petition, respondents aver that the stay of petitioners in the property after 1982 was bymere tolerance. The MTC had exclusive jurisdiction over their action because it was filed within one year frompetitioners' last demand to vacate the property. The CA correctly ruled that no trust was created over the







property, with petitioners as trustors and respondents as trustees; whether a trust agreement was created is aquestion of fact which cannot be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari .

In any event, petitioners' claim of a constructive trust was barred by prescription since more than ten years hadelapsed from the time the titles over the properties in favor of respondents were issued on September 16,1957.

Respondents further point out that the MTC of Tarlac rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6154 dismissing thecomplaint on the ground of prescription or laches; on April 6, 2000, the RTC affirmed the decision on appeal;the CA affirmed the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 58857 on February 14, 2002; and on January 22, 2003, thisCourt denied petitioners' petition for review of the decision of the CA in G.R. No. 155599.26 Thus, the fact thatno constructive trust existed in favor of petitioners has been laid to rest by the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The threshold issues are: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of respondents (plaintiffstherein); (2) whether the CA erred in declaring that there was no trust relationship between petitioners astrustors and respondents as trustees; (3) whether the appellate court erred in ruling that the action ofpetitioners to enforce the trust against respondents had prescribed; and (4) whether respondents are entitled toattorney's fees.

On the first issue, we agree with the decision of the CA that the action of respondents against petitioners wasone for unlawful detainer, and that the MTC had jurisdiction over the same. Indeed, petitioners claimedownership over one-half of the property in their answer to the complaint and alleged that respondents weremerely trustees thereof for their benefit as trustors; and, during the pre-trial, respondents admitted having filedtheir complaint for recovery of possession of real property (accion publiciana) against petitioners before the CFIof Tarlac, docketed as Civil Case No. 6261. However, these did not divest the MTC of its inceptial jurisdictionover the complaint for unlawful detainer of respondents.

It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs prayed for .27 The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over thenature of the action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to

dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. Once jurisdictionis vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.28

Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired throughor waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it conferred by the acquiescence of thecourt. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative incharacter. Thus, the jurisdiction over the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof is not affected bythe theories set up by defendant in an answer or motion to dismiss.29

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which was the lawin effect when respondents filed their complaint against petitioners, provides that "Metropolitan Trial Courts,Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases offorcible entry and unlawful detainer; provided that, when, in such cases, defendant raises the questions ofownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue ofownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issues of possession."

As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, respondents, as plaintiffs below, alleged that they were theowners of parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041, hence, entitled to the possession of theproperty; petitioners (defendants therein) and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied the said parcels ofland since 1957 without paying any rent; their possession over the property continued even after the spousesDulay purchased the property; and that their occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the spousesDulay and, after Asuncion died on June 26, 1995, by respondents; petitioners promised to vacate the premiseswhen respondents needed the property; demands were made by respondents on October 2, 1995 for



















petitioners to vacate the property but the latter refused, prompting an action to be filed in the Office ofthe Pangkat ; and, on December 1, 1995, the Pangkat Secretary issued a certification to file action. As gleanedfrom the petitory portion of the complaint, respondents likewise prayed for the eviction of petitioners from theproperty with a plea for judgment for reasonable compensation for petitioners' occupation of the premises.Respondents filed their complaint on January 29, 1996 in the MTC, within the period of one year from the finaldemand made against petitioners to vacate the property.

It is true that during the pre-trial, the MTC issued an order defining the issue to be litigated by the parties – whether or not unlawful detainer is proper in the premises considering defendants' claim of ownership from1982; otherwise stated, whether petitioners' occupation of the land in dispute was by mere tolerance ofrespondents. As framed by the MTC, the issue before it was basically one of physical or material possession ofthe property, although petitioners raised ownership as an issue. Thus, the MTC erred when it declared that,since defendants claimed ownership over the property, it was divested of its jurisdiction to take cognizance ofand decide the case on its merits.

It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution, independent of any claim ofownership by any party litigant, is: who is entitled to the physical and material possession of the propertyinvolved? The mere fact that defendant raises the defense of ownership of the property in the pleadings doesnot deprive the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case. In cases where defendantraises the question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without

deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve the issue of ownership but only for thepurpose of determining the issue of possession. However, the disposition of the issue of ownership is not final,as it may be the subject of separate proceeding specifically brought to settle the issue. Hence, the bare factthat petitioners, in their answer to the complaint, raised the issue of whether they owned the property astrustors of a constructive trust (with the spouses Dulay as the trustees), did not divest the MTC of its jurisdictionto take cognizance of the case and decide the same on its merits.30

Petitioners were well aware that the issue of ownership over the property had to be resolved in a proper actionfor the purpose, separate from and independent of Civil Case No. 6089 in the MTC of Tarlac. It is for thisreason that petitioner Angela filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of titleand damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 6154, wherein she prayed that respondents, asdefendants, be ordered to convey to her one-half portion of the property. However, her claim was rejected bythe trial court, which ordered the complaint dismissed; the RTC likewise dismissed the case on appeal. Inaffirming this dismissal in CA-G.R. SP No. 58857 promulgated on February 14, 2002, the CA ratiocinated as

follows:

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioner's complaint should bedismissed. This is so because petitioner miserably failed to establish her claim to the property. It mustbe stressed that while an implied trust may be established by parol evidence, such evidence must beas fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document.(Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of Appeals , 312 SCRA 603 [1999], at page 609). An implied trustcannot be made to rest on vague and inconclusive proof. (Ibid.)

Unfortunately for petitioner, the evidence she presented in her attempt to establish their so-called trustagreement is not sufficient or convincing. The list of dates and amounts written by her purportedlyshowing payments made to the late Asuncion dela Rosa Dulay cannot even be given credence asappreciation of such list can be equivocal (see Exhibit "H," page 152, Original Records). The list was

made in petitioner's handwriting and there was no counter-signature made by Dulay showingacknowledgment of such listing. At best, the list can merely be appreciated as it is, a list, but definitely,it does not prove payments made on the purchase price of the ½ portion of the property.

Also, the Court notes the NBI's Questioned Documents Report No. 316-884 (dated Nov. 14, 1984)finding that the signature of Asuncion Dulay in the receipt allegedly acknowledging partial payment inthe amount ofP500.00 was signed over a typewritten carbon or duplicate impression which is not partof the main entries in the receipt (see Exhibit "7," page 154, Original Records). Such conclusion showsthat the entries made on the receipt were not written on a single occasion but rather separately







executed. Thus, the Court cannot give any evidentiary value on said receipt considering that itscredibility is suspect.

Meanwhile, private respondents have in their favor TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041 in the name of thespouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (see Exhibits "1" and "2," pages 181-182, OriginalRecords); the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1957 by the spouses Adriano Rivera and AuroraMercado (petitioner's paternal grandparents) conveying the entire property to the spouses Dulay forthe price of P7,000 (see Exhibit "3," page 148, Original Records); the tax declaration receipts showingtax payments made by private respondents on the property (see Exhibits "3" to "3-b," pages 183-185,Original Records); and the tax declaration of real property for the year 1974 in the name of thespouses Dulay (see Exhibit "C" to "C-1," pages 150-151, Original Records).

All told, petitioner failed to discharge that onus incumbent upon her to prove her claim over theproperty.31

Angela assailed the decision of the CA in this Court in G.R. No. 155599, and this Court resolved to deny thepetition as follows:

G.R. No. 155599 ( Angela dela Rosa v. Orfelina Roldan, et al.). – Considering the allegations, issues,and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals dated February 14, 2002 and October 14, 2002, respectively, the Court Resolves toDENY the petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committedany reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise by this Courtof its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.32

The resolution of the Court became final and executory on May 20, 2003.33 Thus, the issue of whether or notrespondents were trustees of one-half of the property had been finally resolved by this Court in favor ofrespondents; in fine, the validity of TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041 in the names of the spouses Dulay had beenaffirmed by the trial court, the MTC, the CA and this Court. The claim of co-ownership of petitioner Angela andpossession over the western portion of the property thus have no factual and legal basis.

We agree with petitioners that the complaint of the spouses Dulay filed in 1982 docketed as Civil Case No.6261 was one for recovery of possession of the property (accion publiciana) and that they likewise later filed a

complaint with the MTC, on January 29, 1996, for unlawful detainer in Civil Case No. 6089 instead of an accion publiciana. However, respondents were not proscribed from filing a complaint for unlawful detainer five (5) orsix (6) years from the dismissal of their complaint for recovery of possession of real property. The dismissal ofrespondents' complaint in Civil Case No. 6261 by the CA was not based on the merits of the case, but solelybecause it was premature on account of the failure to allege that earnest efforts were made for the amicablesettlement of the cases as required by Article 222 of the New Civil Code. The dismissal of the complaint wasthus without prejudice.34

It bears stressing that, after the Court declared in UDK-10069 on November 19, 1990 that the decision of theCA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15455 was final and executory, respondents did not immediately file their complaint forunlawful detainer against petitioners for their eviction. Respondents filed their complaint only on January 29,1996, or after the lapse of almost six (6) years, but barely four (4) months after respondents' final demand tovacate the property on October 2, 1995 and the issuance of the certification of the Pangkat Secretary onDecember 1, 1995.

We agree with the contention of petitioners that for an action for unlawful detainer based on possession bymere tolerance to prosper, the possession of the property by defendant must be legal from the verybeginning.35 In this case, petitioners' possession of the property was tolerated by the former owners, thespouses Rivera, and by the spouses Dulay after they purchased the property. After all, Angela was thegranddaughter of Consolacion Rivera, the sister of Adriano Rivera, and Gideon was the brother of Asuncion.However, when the spouses Dulay needed the property for their children's use and requested petitioners tovacate the property, the latter refused. From then on, petitioners' possession of the property becamedeforciant. A person who occupies the land of another on the latter's tolerance, without any contract betweenthem, is necessarily barred by an implied provision that he will vacate the same upon demand.36 Respondents



























thus had the option to file a complaint for unlawful detainer within one year therefrom, or an accion publiciana beyond the one-year period from the demand of respondents as plaintiffs for petitioners to vacatethe property.

The Court notes that the property was sold to respondents, and that it was titled in their names (TCT Nos.29040 and 29041). The said deed and titles support the right of respondents to the material possession of theproperty.37 Under all the circumstances and facts in this case, petitioners' claim, that they had the right to thematerial possession of the property, has no factual and legal basis. We quote with approval the decision of theCA in CA-G.R. SP No. 45560:

Private respondents are entitled to its possession from the time title was issued in their favor asregistered owners. "An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord,vendor, vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfullywithheld after the expiration or termination of their right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract,express or implied."

Second. "The age-old rule is that 'the person who has a torrens title over a land is entitled topossession thereof'." Except for the claim that the title of private respondents is not conclusive proof ofownership, petitioners have shown no right to justify their continued possession of the subjectpremises.38

On the issue of whether the RTC acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction in awarding P50,000.00 asattorney's fees in favor of respondents, petitioners aver that under the Rules on Summary Procedure,respondents are entitled to a maximum amount of only P20,000.00; hence, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it awarded P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, as it is in excess of the maximum amount under thesaid Rules. Besides, petitioners aver, the amount of P50,000.00 is unjust and inequitable. Moreover, the RTCordered petitioners to pay attorney's fees of P50,000.00 without even supporting the award with its finding andciting legal provisions or case law.

For its part, the CA ruled that the award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees under the Rules on SummaryProcedure does not apply in a case where the decision of the MTC is appealed to the RTC. The latter courtmay award an amount beyond the maximum amount of P20,000.00 under the Rules on Summary Procedureas attorney's fees for the reason that, on appeal in the RTC, the regular rules of civil procedure apply.

According to the CA, there was factual and legal basis for the award of P50,000.00 as respondents' attorney'sfees:

Second. Decisional law states –

"There is no question that a court may, whenever it deems just and equitable, allow therecovery by the prevailing party of attorney's fees. In determining the reasonableness of suchfees, this Court in a number of cases has provided various criteria which, for convenientguidance, we might collate, thusly: a) the quantity and character of the services rendered; b)the labor, time and trouble involved; c) the nature and importance of the litigation; d) theamount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy; e) the novelty anddifficulty of questions involved; f) the responsibility imposed on counsel; g) the skill andexperience called for in the performance of the service; h) the professional character andsocial standing of the lawyer; i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services; j) the

character of employment, whether casual or for established client; k) whether the fee isabsolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly charge a higher feewhen it is contingent than when it is absolute; and l) the results secured."

In view thereof, the award of attorney's fees is justified. That is, in addition to the provisions of Article2208 of the New Civil Code which reads –

"In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicialcosts, cannot be recovered, except:











x x x x

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with thirdpersons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;"

x x x x

considering that petitioners refused to vacate the subject premises despite demands by the privaterespondents.

Finally, the Supreme Court has explained –

"The Rule on Summary Procedure applies only in cases filed before the Metropolitan TrialCourt and Municipal Trial Courts pursuant to Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. x x xHence, when the respondents appealed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court to theRegional Trial Court, the applicable rules are those of the latter court."

Thus, the award of the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees is justifiedconsidering that the jurisdictional amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) under Section 1,

paragraph (A), subparagraph (1) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure applies only to theMetropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal CircuitTrial Courts.39

We agree with the ruling of the CA. The ceiling of P20,000.00 applies only in the MTC where the Rules onSummary Procedure are applied. On appeal to the RTC, the RTC may affirm, modify or even reverse thedecision of the MTC; as such, the RTC may increase the award for attorney's fees in excess of P20,000.00 ifthere is factual basis therefor.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED







G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998

TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,vs.HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in hiscapacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.

REGALADO, J .:

Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411 which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondent fromadministrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department ofPublic Works and Highways (DPWH).

I

It appears from the statement and counter-statement of facts of the parties that petitioner Teresita G. Fabianwas the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which

was engaged in the construction business. Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent DistrictEngineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses forwhich he was administratively charged in the Office of the Ombudsman.

PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction projects including those under the FMED, andprivate respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorousrelationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course of which private respondent gifted PROMAT withpublic works contracts and interceded for it in problems concerning the same in his office.

Later, misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when petitioner tried toterminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent ofemploying acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed the aforementioned administrativecase against him in a letter-complaint dated July 24, 1995.

The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section 19, Republic Act No.6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with anancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For purposes of this case, the charges referred to may besubsumed under the category of oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.

On January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private respondentguilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under thelaw. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.

Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution withmodifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspensionwithout pay for one year. After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsmandiscovered that the former's new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibitedhimself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the nowchallenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsmanand exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.

II

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of

1989) 1pertinently provides that —



In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of theOmbudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of themotion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasissupplied)

However, she points out that under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of

the Office of the Ombudsman), 2 when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrativeproceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that theOffice of the Ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict, in the manner provided in itsaforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review ofthis Court. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she found it"necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt itcreates on the availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Respondents filed their respective comments and rejoined that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered bythe Constitution and the law to promulgate its own rules of procedure. Section 13(8), Article XI of the 1987Constitution provides, among others, that the Office of the Ombudsman can "(p)romulgate its rules ofprocedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law."

Republic Act No. 6770 duly implements the Constitutional mandate with these relevant provisions:

Sec. 14. Restrictions. — . . . No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy againstthe decision or findings of the Ombudsman except the Supreme Court on pure questions oflaw.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Rules of Procedure. — (1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall promulgate its ownrules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, andduties.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 23. Formal Investigation. — (1) Administrative investigations by the Office of theOmbudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with dueprocess. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — All previsionary orders at the Office of theOmbudsman are immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of theOmbudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be

entertained only on any of the following grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence areconclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure orreprimand, suspension of not more than one month salary shall be final and unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of theOmbudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten



(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of themotion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interestof justice may require.

Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority, petitionercannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman governing theconduct of proceedings before it, including those rules with respect to the availability or non-availability ofappeal in administrative cases, such as Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07.

Respondents also question the propriety of petitioner's proposition that, although she definitely prefaced herpetition by categorizing the same as "an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," she makesthe aforequoted ambivalent statement which in effect asks that, should the remedy under Rule 45 beunavailable, her petition be treated in the alternative as an original action for certiorari under Rule 65. Theparties thereafter engage in a discussion of the differences between a petition for review on certiorari underRule 45 and a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Ultimately, they also attempt to review and rationalize the decisions of this Court applying Section 27 ofRepublic Act. No. 6770 vis-a-vis Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07. As correctly pointed out by

public respondent, Ocampo IV vs. Ombudsman, et al . 3 and Young vs. Office of the Ombudsman, etal . 4 were original actions for certiorari under Rule 65. Yabut vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al . 5 wascommenced by a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45. Then came Cruz, Jr. vs. People, etal ., 6 Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al ., 7 Olivarez vs. Sandiganbayan, et al ., 8 and Jao, et al. vs.Vasquez , 9 which were for certiorari , prohibition and/or mandamus under Rule 65. Alba vs. Nitorreda, etal . 10 was initiated by a pleading unlikely denominated as an "Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/orProhibition," with a prayer for ancillary remedies, and ultimately followed by Constantino vs. Hon.Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, et al . 11 which was a special civil action for certiorari .

Considering, however, the view that this Court now takes of the case at bar and the issues therein which willshortly be explained, it refrains from preemptively resolving the controverted points raised by the parties on thenature and propriety of application of the writ of certiorari when used as a mode of appeal or as the basis of aspecial original action, and whether or not they may be resorted to concurrently or alternatively, obvious though

the answers thereto appear to be. Besides, some seemingly obiter statements in Yabut and Alba could bearreexamination and clarification. Hence, we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture thatSection 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is takenfrom a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original actionfor certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminalaction.

III

After respondents' separate comments had been filed, the Court was intrigued by the fact, which does notappear to have been seriously considered before, that the administrative liability of a public official could fallunder the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, theoffenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770 and

Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg.129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by the Civil Service Commission in administrative disciplinarycases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of theOmbudsman are appealable to this Court.

It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedingsagainst one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found itsway to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient casemanagement would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and toavoid possible conflicting decisions.



Then there is the consideration that Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o law shallbe passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without itsadvice and consent," and that Republic Act No. 6770, with its challenged Section 27, took effect on November17, 1989, obviously in spite of that constitutional prohibition. The conventional rule, however, is that a challengeon constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom did so in this case, but that isnot an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the governmentand the judges are sworn to support its provisions; the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard itscommands or countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested ina legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in acase before them for judgment. 12

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in thepleadings, 13 the rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a courtfrom inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If astatute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarilyfollows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute. 14

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejectedunless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may beraised at any time or on the court's own motion. 15 The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lackof jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. 16 The court has a clearly recognizedright to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding. 17

The foregoing authorities notwithstanding, the Court believed that the parties hereto should be furtherheard on this constitutional question. Correspondingly, the following resolution was issued on May 14,1998, the material parts stating as follows:

The Court observes that the present petition, from the very allegations thereof, is "an appealbycertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the "Joint Order (Re: Motion for

Reconsideration)" issued in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411, entitled "Teresita G. Fabian vs.Engr. Nestor V. Agustin, Asst. Regional Director, Region IV-A, EDSA, Quezon City," whichabsolved the latter from the administrative charges for grave misconduct, among others.

It is further averred therein that the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 ofthe Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of theOmbudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in thisproceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989, withSection 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to this Court inaccordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Court notes, however, that neither the petition nor the two comments thereon took into

account or discussed the validity of the aforestated Section 27 of R.A. No. 8770 in light of theprovisions of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passedincreasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitutionwithout its advice and consent."

The Court also invites the attention of the parties to its relevant ruling in First LepantoCeramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 110571, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA519) and the provisions of its former Circular No. 1-91 and Revised Administrative CircularNo. 1-95, as now substantially reproduced in Rule 43 of the 1997 revision of the Rules of CivilProcedure.



In view of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court is invoked and involved in thiscase, and the foregoing legal considerations appear to impugn the constitutionality andvalidity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to it, the Court deems it necessary that theparties be heard thereon and the issue be first resolved before conducting further proceedingsin this appellate review.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to require the parties to SUBMIT their position andarguments on the matter subject of this resolution by filing their corresponding pleadingswithin ten (10) days from notice hereof.

IV

The records do not show that the Office of the Solicitor General has complied with such requirement, hence theCourt dispenses with any submission it should have presented. On the other hand, petitioner espouses thetheory that the provision in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 which authorizes an appeal by certiorari to thisCourt of the aforementioned adjudications of the Office of the Ombudsman is not violative of Section 30, ArticleVI of the Constitution. She claims that what is proscribed is the passage of a law "increasing" the appellate jurisdiction of this Court "as provided in this Constitution," and such appellate jurisdiction includes "all cases inwhich only an error or question of law is involved." Since Section 5(2)(e), Article VIII of the Constitutionauthorizes this Court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari the aforesaid final

judgment or orders "as the law or the Rules of Court may provide," said Section 27 does not increase thisCourt's appellate jurisdiction since, by providing that the mode of appeal shall be by petition for certiorari underRule 45, then what may be raised therein are only questions of law of which this Court already has jurisdiction.

We are not impressed by this discourse. It overlooks the fact that by jurisprudential developments over theyears, this Court has allowed appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 in a substantial number of cases and

instances even if questions of fact are directly involved and have to be resolved by the appellate court. 18 Also,the very provision cited by petitioner specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplatedtherein is to be exercised over "final judgments and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composingthe integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence wheneverthe legislature intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable bythe Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the lawcreating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No such provision on

appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial system because they arewhat are referred to and already provided for, in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Apropos to the foregoing, and as correctly observed by private respondent, the revised Rules of Civil

Procedure19 preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for reviewon certiorari under Rule 45. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of Rule 45, on "Appealby Certiorari to the Supreme Court," explicitly states:

Sec. 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court . — A person desiring to appeal by certiorari froma judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, theRegional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law , may file with the SupremeCourt a verified petition for review on certiorari . The petition shall raise only questions of lawwhich must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis ours).

This differs from the former Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals, and had to be adopted in statutes creating and providing for appeals from certain administrative orquasi-judicial agencies, whenever the purpose was to restrict the scope of the appeal to questions of law. Thatintended limitation on appellate review, as we have just discussed, was not fully subserved by recourse to theformer Rule 45 but, then, at that time there was no uniform rule on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies.

Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final

orders of quasi-judicial agencies 20 are now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified



petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated andadopted to provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies. 21

It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicialagencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see noreason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards

the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, althoughthe latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which isa constitutionally-mandated but statutorily created body.

Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those comingfrom the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared than this Courtto resolve the same. On the other hand, we cannot have this situation covered by Rule 45 since it now appliesonly to appeals from the regular courts. Neither can we place it under Rule 65 since the review therein is limitedto jurisdictional questions. *

The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770, that fact may beviewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is unfortunately too tenuous.

The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Besides, wehave already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instanceswhen Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would notapply if it is a judicial review under Rule 65.

Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question,especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here,however, there is an actual case susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at theinstance of this Court, was raised by the proper parties, although there was even no need for that because theCourt can rule on the matter sua sponte when its appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional questionwas timely raised, although it could even be raised any time likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issueconfronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for theresolution of the present case. 22

It is, however, suggested that this case could also be decided on other grounds, short of passing uponthe constitutional question. We appreciate the ratiocination of private respondent but regret that we mustreject the same. That private respondent could be absolved of the charge because the decisionexonerating him is final and unappealable assumes that Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07is valid, but that is precisely one of the issues here. The prevailing rule that the Court should not interferewith the discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint is not applicable in thisadministrative case, as earlier explained. That two decisions rendered by this Court supposedly imply thevalidity of the aforementioned Section 7 of Rule III is precisely under review here because of somestatements therein somewhat at odds with settled rules and the decisions of this Court on the sameissues, hence to invoke the same would be to beg the question.

V

Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects, therefore, Section 27 of Republic ActNo. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman inadministrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of theConstitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argumenthas been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as correctly

explained inFirst Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. 23 was intended to give this Court ameasure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminateenactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court. 24



We perforce have to likewise reject the supposed inconsistency of the ruling in First LepantoCeramics and some statements in Yabut and Alba, not only because of the difference in the factualsettings, but also because those isolated cryptic statements in Yabut and Alba should best be clarified inthe adjudication on the merits of this case. By way of anticipation, that will have to be undertaken by theproper court of competent jurisdiction.

Furthermore, in addition to our preceding discussion on whether Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770expanded the jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent, private respondent's position papercorrectly yields the legislative background of Republic Act No. 6770. On September 26, 1989, the ConferenceCommittee Report on S.B. No. 453 and H.B. No. 13646, setting forth the new version of what would later be

Republic Act No. 6770, was approved on second reading by the House of Representatives. 25 The Senate wasinformed of the approval of the final version of the Act on October 2, 1989 26 and the same was thereafterenacted into law by President Aquino on November 17, 1989.

Submitted with said position paper is an excerpt showing that the Senate, in the deliberations on the procedurefor appeal from the Office of the Ombudsman to this Court, was aware of the provisions of Section 30, Article IIIof the Constitution. It also reveals that Senator Edgardo Angara, as a co-author and the principal sponsor ofS.B. No. 543 admitted that the said provision will expand this Court's jurisdiction, and that the Committee onJustice and Human Rights had not consulted this Court on the matter, thus:

INTERPELLATION OF SENATOR SHAHANI

xxx xxx xxx

Thereafter, with reference to Section 22(4) which provides that the decisions of the Office ofthe Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court, in reply to Senator Shahani's querywhether the Supreme Court would agree to such provision in the light of Section 30, Article VIof the Constitution which requires its advice and concurrence in laws increasing its appellate jurisdiction, Senator Angara informed that the Committee has not yet consulted the SupremeCourt regarding the matter. He agreed that the provision will expand the Supreme Court's jurisdiction by allowing appeals through petitions for review, adding that they should beappeals on certiorari . 27

There is no showing that even up to its enactment, Republic Act No. 6770 was ever referred tothis Court for its advice and consent. 28

VI

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down asunconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies inthe 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman inadministrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

There is an intimation in the pleadings, however, that said Section 27 refers to appellate jurisdiction which,being substantive in nature, cannot be disregarded by this Court under its rule-making power, especially if itresults in a diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Obviously, however, where the law is

procedural in essence and purpose, the foregoing consideration would not pose a proscriptive issue against theexercise of the rule-making power of this Court. This brings to fore the question of whether Section 27 ofRepublic Act No. 6770 is substantive or procedural.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or statutes which are procedural, hencewithin the scope of this Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule

may be procedural in one context and substantive in another. 29 It is admitted that what is procedural andwhat is substantive is frequently a question of great



difficulty. 30 It is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is takenwithin the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lowercourts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulatesprocedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for

justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

31

If the rule takes away a vestedright, it is no; procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as asubstantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule dealsmerely with procedure. 32

In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-makingpower, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrativedisciplinary actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdictionthereover, relates to procedure only. 33 This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrievedparty which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which the appealis to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no litigant has a vested right in aparticular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights, hence he canhave none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy. 34

Furthermore, it cannot be said that the transfer of appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals in thiscase is an act of creating a new right of appeal because such power of the Supreme Court to transferappeals to subordinate appellate courts is purely a procedural and not a substantive power. Neither canwe consider such transfer as impairing a vested right because the parties have still a remedy and still acompetent tribunal to administer that remedy. 35

Thus, it has been generally held that rules or statutes involving a transfer of cases from one court toanother, are procedural and remedial merely and that, as such, they are applicable to actions pending atthe time the statute went into effect 36 or, in the case at bar, when its invalidity was declared. Accordingly,even from the standpoint of jurisdiction ex hypothesi , the validity of the transfer of appeals in said casesto the Court of Appeals can be sustained.

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, RuleIII of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any otherprovision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals inadministrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declaredINVALID and of no further force and effect.



G.R. No. L-26816 February 28, 1967

PABLO DE JESUS, ENGRACIA DE JESUS and MANUELA DE JESUS, petitioners,vs.HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, Branch ITHE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., MAXIMA DE Jesus and SALVADORBARRIOS,respondents.

Feria, Feria, Lugto & La'O for petitioners.Salvador Barrios for respondents.

SANCHEZ, J .:

Before us upon an original action of certiorari and prohibition, are two jurisdictional issues: first , jurisdiction overthe subject matter; and second , the power of the City Court of Manila to issue a writ of preliminary or finalinjunction — upon the factual averments hereinafter to be recited. The problem cropped up becausepetitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction upon the abovegrounds, in that case filed by principal individual respondents against them in the city court,1 was denied, andtheir motion to reconsider rejected. The pivotal disputed allegations of the verified complaint below are these:Ten persons,2among whom are petitioners and respondent, Maxima de Jesus, are co-owners of six (6) parcels

of land running along España P. Campa and Adelina Streets in Sampaloc, Manila. Administratrix thereof andco-owners attorney-in-fact is Maxima de Jesus. Her stipulated compensation is 10% of the rentals. The monthlyreceipts signed by each co-owner, for his/her rental share, is in a form reproduced in the complaint as follows:

RECEIVED from Mrs. Maxima de Jesus Barrios the sum of .................. as my share, in the rentalcollected for this month, on the properties of which I am a co-owner. Ten per cent (10%) of said rentalshad been previously deducted as agreed upon by me, for her administration fee together with herexpenses concerning a collector and an Attorney that she may employ to INCREASE rate, preventarrears, and eject stubborn tenant. 1äwphï1.ñët

Lessee of the property is Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. The original lease contract was dated August23 and 29, 1953. This lease was renewed by instrument executed on January 10, 1966, where under, throughthe efforts of Maxima de Jesus, the monthly rentals were increased from P850.00 to P3,500.00 during the first

ten (10) years and to P4,000.00 for the subsequent five (5) years. Shell pays the rentals by issuing a check forP3,500.00 in the name of Maxima de Jesus who, in turn, distributes the shares of her co-owners. Petitioners'monthly shares on the basis of P3,500.00 monthly rentals are:

Manuela de Jesus 9/54 of P3,500.00 — P 583.33

Pablo de Jesus 9/54 of P3,500.00 — P 583.33

Engracia de Jesus 10/54 of P3,500.00 — P 684.14

P1,850.80

Petitioners (defendants below), in October, 1966 — so the complaint further avers — sought to unjustly depriveMaxima de Jesus of her 10% compensation. And, to fraudulently escape such obligation, they surreptitiouslyinstructed Shell not to pay their share in the rentals through said Maxima de Jesus but directly to them.

As against Shell, the complaint states:

... Pero ahora la compania demandada esta vacilando si va a cambiar esa FORMA DE PAGO, paraseguir dicho aviso de los 3 demandados individuales, de que ella pague directamente a ellos sus"shares" de P1,850.80 mensuales dejando a la demandante fraudulentamente privada y despojada desu 10% de compensacion que asciende a P185.08 mensuales.



The complaint winds up with the prayer:

POR TANTO, pedimos respetuosamente al Hon. Juzgado se sirva expedir una inmediata orden deinterdicto prohibitorio preliminar a la pagadora compañia demandada, para que se abstenga decambiar la presente FORMA DE PAGO, ...; y, despues de los tramites judiciales correspondientes,que el Hon. Juzgado se sirva dictar sentencia declarando definitivo el mismo interdicto prohibitorio, ycondenando a los 3 demandados individuales Manuela de Jesus, Engracia de Jesus y Pablo de Jesusa pagar dicho 10% de compensacion, deduciendolo de sus P1,850.80 de "shares" o participacionesrespectivas en la renta mensual, de acuerdo con la presents forma de pago. x x x x3

Upon the foregoing complaint filed on October 3, 1966, the respondent judge, on a P500.00-bond, issued ex- parte, on October 4, 1966, a writ of preliminary injunction, which reads:

It is hereby ordered by the undersigned Judge of the Court of Manila City that, until further orders, you,the said The Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd. and all your attorneys, representatives, agents, and anyother person assisting you, refrain from modifying the present "FORMA DE PAGO"; The Shell Co. ofthe Philippines, shall pay the monthly rentals with check to be issued in the name of Maxima de Jesusalone, who shall cash and distribute the amount of same, among the ten co-owners, previousdeduction of ten per cent (10%) thereof.

On the same date, October 4, 1966, in obedience to the writ of preliminary injunction, Shell delivered toMaxima de Jesus the sum of P3,500.00, covering the October, 1966 rental.

The jurisdictional question having been brought direct to this Court, we issued, on application, a cease-and-desist order bearing date of November 18, 1966.

1. As starting point, we have the rule-long in standing and frequent in application — that jurisdictionover the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by the will of theparties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of theparties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.4 Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of jurisdiction is vested in Congress.5 Congress may not delegate that power.6 We may not even look tothe Rules of Court in search of jurisdiction jurisdictional boundaries. For indeed, the constitutionalauthority of the Supreme Court on this point is circumscribed in the zone properly denominated as the

promulgation of "rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission tothe practice of law";7 and, consequently to determine the "means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised".8 Rules of Courtmust yield to substantive laws9 of which jurisdiction is a segment. A mistake in statutory jurisdictionmay not be corrected by executive fiat, "but by legislation".10

Well may we profit from the wise pronouncement in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, supra,at pages 529-530, thus: "Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Others provide for theprocedure by which that power or authority is projected into judgment. The one class deals with thepowers of the court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by which suchpowers are put into action. The one is the thing itself ; the other is the vehicle by which the thing istransferred from the court to the parties. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make thepowers of the court fully and completely available for justice. ... The purpose of such a procedure is notto restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous

action. ..."

2. And now we come to the jurisdictional area allocated to inferior courts. A rule, the validity of which isrecognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed; "it must appear clearly fromstatute or it will not be held to exist."11 Such jurisdiction cannot be broadened upon "doubtfulinferences" drawn from statutes. Absent a statutory grant, neither convenience nor assumed justice orpropriety of the exercise thereof in a particular class of cases "can justify the assumption of jurisdiction" by said courts.12



3. Jurisprudence teaches that the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what determinethe nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction. 13

But just exactly what does Maxima de Jesus desire in her complaint below? In plain language, sheasks of the court to compel two sets of defendants to toe the line: Shell to continue with the previousmanner of payment (forma de pago) of rentals by means of a check drawn in her favor alone; and thedissenting co-owners to pay her the 10% of the rentals as compensation to which she claims she isentitled as administratrix of the property — per agreement. By this she hopes to pay herself, as againsther defendant co-owners, the 10% of the latter's share in the monthly rentals (P1,850.80 from October1966, to December 31, 1975; and P2,074.07 from thence to December 31, 1980). A careful andconsiderate examination of the complaint below as a whole brings to the fore the fact that plaintiffMaxima de Jesus asks that these defendants comply faithfully with their respective commitments.Implicit, too, in the complaint is the demand that her said co-owners recognize her as administratrix. Itis in the context just recited that plaintiff's action below comes within the concept of specificperformance of contract. And in this posture, we express the view that jurisdiction resides in the courtof first instance. For, specific performance — the subject of the litigation — "is not capable ofpecuniary estimation".14

A case with factual environment similar to the present is Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu SiuLiong , L-21285, April 29, 1966. There, plaintiff sued defendant in the City Court of Manila to accept

delivery of 74,500 pieces of plastifilm bags, balance of 100,000 pieces ordered by defendant, whichthe latter for no justifiable reason refused to accept. The prayer of the complaint is that defendant beordered to pay plaintiff P3,376.00, total value of the 100,000 pieces of plastifilm bags. Defendantmoved to dismiss. Ground: The subject matter of the litigation is "specific performance" and, therefore,within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance. The City Court upheld defendant,dismissed the complaint. And the Court of First Instance affirmed. Before this Coat, plaintiff contendedthat "the subject of the litigation was the 100,000 pieces of plastifilm bags contracted for by defendantat a total price of P3,376.00, and, therefore, it was susceptible of pecuniary estimation". This Court, inan opinion by Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, ruled that the City Court of Manila had no jurisdiction, anddeclared:

That plaintiff's complaint also sought the payment by the defendant of P3,376.00 plus interestand attorney's fees, does not give a pecuniary estimation to the litigation, for the payment ofsuch amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the specific performance primarily

sought. In other words, such payment would be but an incident or consequence of defendant'sliability for specific performance. If no such liability is judicially declared, the payment can notbe awarded. Hence, the amounts sought do not represent the value of the subject of litigation.

This Court there lifted from Mebane Cotton Breeding St'n vs. Sides, 257 SW 302; 21 C.J.S., 59, note,the following, which is indeed illuminating:

The Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a contract, although thedamages alleged for its breach, if permitted, are within the amount of which that court has jurisdiction.

It will avail respondents nothing when they say that what they seek is to prevent Maxima de Jesusfrom being defrauded of her 10% compensation to only P185.08, covering the October, 1966 rental;

and that should defendants below insist in defrauding her of her share corresponding to any othermonth, in respondents' language, "entonces se podra repetir igual demanda por ese mes".15 Reasonsthere are which will stop us from giving our imprimatur to this advocacy. Courts will be swamped withher complaints. Multiplicity of suits is obnoxious to the administration of justice. Besides, the breach ofcontract charged against defendants below is total and indivisible. Monthly rentals will have to runthrough a number of years. There is an unqualified refusal to perform the contract. Such refusal goesto the entire contract. It is treated as a complete breach. Therefore, but one action — specificperformance — may be presented. For that action may not be split; successive actions may not bemaintained.16 Especially is this principle true in the case before us. For, nowhere in the complaint filedon October 3, 1966, is there an averment that at the time jurisdiction was sought in the City Court, the



October, 1966 rental was already due and payable. As a matter of fact, in Annex 2 of respondents'answer before this Court, which is Shell's answer to the complaint below, the following averment inparagraph 13 appears: "SHELL has to pay the monthly rentals of P3,500 within the first ten (10) daysof each contract month."

Nothing in the statute books would confer jurisdiction on city courts over actions where specificperformance of contract is primarily sought. Result: The city court has no jurisdiction over the subjectmatter.17

4. Nor does the law grant the city courts power to take cognizance of a case for final injunction. On thecontrary, such authority is expressly granted by statute to courts of first instance in the exercise of theiroriginal jurisdiction.18 And the city court is without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case for finalinjunction against Shell. .

5. But let us assume that what plaintiff below claims, as against her co-owners, is but a judgment forthe small sum of P185.08, her compensation for the month of October, 1966. Nonetheless, the citycourt remains without jurisdiction. This is because the sum of money action may not be divorced fromthe injunction suit. Both of them are the subject of only one complaint. For, really, without a mandatoryinjunction to Shell to issue the checks in plaintiff's favor, the certainty of collecting her allegedcompensation becomes problematical. The action then is indivisible. And, the city court's jurisdiction

must yield to the jurisdiction of the higher court of first instance. Expediency and convenience sodemand.19

6. Where much space was devoted by counsel for the parties herein is on the question of the power ofthe city court to issue the disputed writ of preliminary injunction earlier transcribed.

Historically speaking, the 1901 original organic act of courts in the Philippines (Act 136 of the PhilippineCommission) was silent on the power of the city (Justice of the peace) court to issue preliminary injunction.Neither did the old 1901 Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) grant this power to said court. When a later statute, Act 2041 of the Philippine Legislature (1911), did empower said court to issue preliminary injunction, itsexercise was limited to cases involving forcible entry. And, subsequent legislation's also carry thisprovision, viz : Act 2131, effective February 1, 1912; Act 3764, effective November 26, 1930; Act 3881, effectiveNovember 14, 1931; and the present Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

To be sure temporary injunctions could also be issued in cases other than forcible entry; but then onlymunicipal courts in provincial capitals are privileged to grant the same, and solely in the absence of the district judge.20

In Piit vs. de Lara, 58 Phil. 765, 766-767,21 this Court was asked to rule on the question of whether a justice ofthe peace may issue a writ of preliminary injunction in an illegal detainer suit. The answer was "No". Becausethe law limits the issuance of such writ only to forcible entry cases. We then ruled out the preliminary injunctionin the illegal detainer case as in excess of his jurisdiction.

The strong point on which respondents herein root their argument is Section 2 of Rule 58, which reads:

SEC. 2. Who may grant preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted by the judge

of any court in which the action is pending, or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals or of the SupremeCourt. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance in any action pending in aninferior court within his district.

They place the accent on the phrase "any court in which the action is pending." Argue respondents: Since thecase is pending in the city court, it has jurisdiction to issue preliminary injunction. This ratiocination suffers frominfirmities. First , we have ruled that the city court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; in consequence, itis powerless to grant an ancillary remedy therein. Second , the first sentence of Section 2 should be read incontext. The last sentence of the quoted statute, namely, that injunction "may also be granted by the judge of aCourt of First Instance in any action pending in an inferior court within his district", emphasizes the point that



the city court, except in the cases where it is specifically authorized by statute, cannot grant preliminaryinjunction. Third , as adverted to elsewhere in this opinion, absent an explicit and precise grant of jurisdiction inthe city court, no amount of expensive construction would give such court that jurisdiction. At any rate, the partyplaintiff is not without speedy remedy. He may seek injunctive assistance from the court of first instance.

Upon the view we take of this case, we hereby grant the petition for certiorari and prohibition; the preliminaryinjunction we issued herein is declared final; and the respondent court is directed to dismiss Civil Case No.153460, entitled "Maxima de Jesus, asistida de su marido Salvador Barrios, Demandantes versus Manuela deJesus, Engracia de Jesus, Pablo de Jesus, y The Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., Demandados". Costsagainst respondents other than the respondent judge.

So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. 162124 October 18, 2007

POLOMOLOK WATER DISTRICT, Petitioner,vs.

POLOMOLOK GENERAL CONSUMERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:

For the Court’s resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse the Decision1 of theCourt of Appeals (Third Division) dated August 29, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66037.

Polomolok Water District (PWD), petitioner, is a government-owned and controlled corporation engaged inproducing and supplying potable water to the residents of the Municipality of Polomolok, South Cotabato.

Polomolok General Consumers Association, Inc., respondent, is a non-stock, non-profit corporation organizedand existing under Philippine laws.

In October 1994, petitioner passed PWD Resolution No. 94-023, S. 1994 imposing new and higher water ratesupon its customers.

Respondent and its members vigorously opposed petitioner’s Resolution, hence, they filed an administrativecomplaint with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB). But in an Order dated October 13, 1999, theNWRB dismissed the complaint for having been filed out of time.

On November 3, 1999, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Polomolok, South Cotabato,a class suit for declaration of nullity of PWD Resolution No. 94-023, with prayer for a temporary restrainingorder and preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 281. Respondent alleged that the Resolution waspassed without due notice to its members and hearing as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, asamended.

In its answer, petitioner claimed that it posted notices at various conspicuous public places at least one weekbefore the public hearing; that it conducted two public hearings on March 2 and June 22, 1994; and that duringthe second hearing, 187 residents of Polomolok were present.

On December 3, 1999, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner fromdisconnecting the water supply of respondent’s members.

Meanwhile, on June 23, 2000, through the earnest efforts of the Mayor of Polomolok, the parties entered into a"Memorandum of Agreement." Respondent agreed to submit a list of all its members, the amounts of dues andthe dates of payments. Petitioner, in turn, committed to accept the payments of respondent’s members at therate ofP60.00 for the first 10 cubic meters of water consumption or any amount as may be decreed by the trial

court in Civil Case No. 281. The parties also agreed that payments of water dues would be made directly topetitioner rather than coursed through respondent; and that the "Memorandum of Agreement" would be withoutprejudice to the final outcome of Civil Case No. 281.

However, both parties violated their stipulations.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 2001, the trial court rendered an Order 2 which reads:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_162124_2007.html#fnt1









In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that plaintiff has established sufficient proof of violation of its rights to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in its favor during the pendency of the main suit fordeclaration of nullity of defendant’s Resolution No. 94-023.

Correspondingly, let therefore a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the defendant fromdisconnecting the water meter/connection of the plaintiff and its members.

The injunction bond is hereby fixed at P200,000.00 which the plaintiff will pay to such defendant all damagesthat it may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that the said plaintiff was notentitled thereto.

The Court Sheriff is hereby directed to serve this Order and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction to the defendantPolomolok Water District immediately upon receipt thereof and to make his return with proceeding thereon.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the trial court in its Order dated May 10,2001.

Thereupon, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari , contending that the trial courtcommitted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders datedJanuary 18 and May 10, 2001 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction; that respondent failed toexhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief; and that, therefore, the trial court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 281.

In its Decision of August 29, 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari andaffirmed the trial court’s questioned Orders, thus:

WHEREFORE, the assailed orders dated January 18, 2001 and May 10, 2001 are AFFIRMED. The case isremanded to the Regional Trial Court of Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39. The said court is ordered toresolve with deliberate dispatch the class suit for declaration of nullity of Polomolok Water District ResolutionNo. 94-023. Accordingly, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals held that the issue before the trial court was the validity of PWD Resolution No. 94-023,S. 1994 which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies is inapplicable.

Petitioner seasonably filed its motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in itsResolution3 dated January 21, 2004.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that based upon the allegations of the complaint, it is the National Water Rights Board,

created under P.D. Nos. 700 and 744, which has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 281. Its decision is appealableto the National Water Resources Council and the latter’s ruling should be appealed to the Office of thePresident. As respondent failed to exhaust all these administrative remedies, its complaint with the trial courtwas premature and should have been dismissed.

It is well settled that jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the material allegations of thecomplaint and the character of the relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to such relief .4 Thepertinent allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 281 are:

x x x











4. Sometime in October 1994, the defendant imposed new water rates, allegedly through PWDResolution No. 94-023, Series of 1994. A photocopy of the said Resolution is hereto attached as Annex "D.";

5. PWD Resolution No. 94-023 was passed without complying with the provisions of PD 198, Letter ofInstruction No. 700, Par (c), Section 1, as well as Letter of Instruction No. 744, and other related laws;

6. The non-compliance on the requirements of public hearing, posting, publication and otherrequirements, as required by the said law and Letters of Instruction would render Resolution No. 94-023 null and void;

7. Plaintiff originally filed before this Honorable Court Civil Case No. 115 for damages and PreliminaryInjunction, but since the issue in the said case intertwined with the proper rates that will be imposed,the Honorable Court dismissed the said case for lack of cause of action for clearly the issue of waterrates pertain to the National Water Rights Board (NWRB, for brevity);

8. The case filed by the plaintiff before the NWRB has already been withdrawn by the plaintiff. Aphotocopy of the withdrawal is hereto attached as Annex "E" as the NWRB resolved that it has no jurisdiction to pass on the legality of Resolution No. 94-023;

9. The present action is based only on the legality of the adoption of Resolution No. 94-023 (stress supplied);

x x x

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that a Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued after summary hearing restraining the defendant fromdisconnecting the water connection of the members of the plaintiff until further orders from the HonorableCourt;

AND AFTER DUE NOTICE AND HEARING

1. Declaring as null and void, PWD Resolution No. 94-023, Series of 1994 for failure to comply withexisting laws and Letters of Instruction;

2. Ordering the defendant to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P100,000.00;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00;

4. Ordering the defendant to pay the cost of suit.

From respondent’s allegations and relief prayed for in its complaint, the issue raised is whether PWDResolution No. 94-023, S. 1994 is valid. Respondent alleged that petitioner did not comply with the requisites ofnotice, publication and public hearing. Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the subject oflitigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. 1âwphi1 Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the

Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in "all civil actions in which the subject of thelitigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation."

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals (Third Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66037 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.



FERNANDA GEONZON VDA. DE BARRERA ANDJOHNNY OCO, JR.,

Petitioners,

- versus -

HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI, REPRESENTED BYPEDRO LEGASPI,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 174346

Present:

QUISUMBING, J ., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ .

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Under review before this Court is the July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals,1 which affirmed thatof the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, of Tangub City in Civil Case No. TC-97-001, ordering thedefendants-petitioners herein, Fernanda Geonzon vda. de Barrera and Johnny Oco. Jr. to returnpossession of the subject property to the plaintiffs-herein respondents, Heirs of Vicente Legaspi.

On October 1, 1996, petitioner Johnny Oco Jr. (Oco), said to be a "peace officer connected with the PNP,"accompanied by "unidentified CAFGU members," forced his way into respondents’ 0.9504-hectare irrigated

farmland located at Liloan, Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. After dispossessing respondents of the property,Oco and company used a tractor to destroy the planted crops, took possession of the land, and had sincetended it.2

Respondents thus filed on February 7, 1997 a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City forReconveyance of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages3 against petitioners.

In their Answer, petitioners claimed that the subject land forms part of a three-hectare property described inOCT No. P-447 issued on February 10, 1956 in the name of Andrea Lacson who sold a 2-hectare portionthereof to Eleuterio Geonzon who, in turn, sold 1.1148 thereof to his sister petitioner Fernanda Geonzonvda. de Barrera (Fernanda).4

Respondents, on the other hand, asserted that the land was occupied, possessed and cultivated by their

predecessor-in-interest Vicente Legaspi and his wife Lorenza since 1935;5 after a subdivision survey wasconducted in November 30, 1976, it was found out that the land formed part of the titled property of AndreaLacson;6 and despite this discovery, they never filed any action to recover ownership thereof since theywere left undisturbed in their possession,7 untilOctober 1, 1996 when petitioners forced their way into it.

Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative defense.8 In their Memorandum, however,they questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the complaint, the assessed value ofthe land being only P11,160,9 as reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565.10











































By Decision of November 27, 1998, the trial court found for respondents, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein respondents] and against thedefendants [-herein petitioners]:

1. Ordering the latter to return the possession of the land in question to the plaintiffs and

2. Ordering the latter to desist from further depriving and disturbing plaintiffs’ peaceful possession thereof,unless there be another court judgment to the contrary.

SO ORDERED.

On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the trial court, maintaining that it had, held:

The Court is not persuaded by [the defendants’] arguments. What determines the nature of the action aswell as the jurisdiction of the [c]ourt are the facts alleged in the complaint and not those alleged in theanswer of the defendants.

x x x x

In [p]ar. 2 of plaintiffs’ complaint, the land in question was described as a riceland "situated at Liloan,Bonifacio, Misamis Occ. and declared under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7564 in the name of Vicente Legaspiand bounded on the north by a creek, on the east Sec. 12, on the south Lot No. 007 and on the west alsoby Lot No. 007 which tax declaration cancels former [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 12933 under the name ofLorenza Bacul Legaspi which likewise cancels [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 5454 covering the bigger portion ofthe land under which the land described under [T]ax [D]eclaration No. 7565 is part and parcel thereof[sic]; the present estimated value being P50,000."11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s disposition of theissue of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

On the merits, the appellate court affirmed too the trial court’s decision, finding that "both testimonial and

documentary evidence on record established that appellees, through their predecessors-in-interest, havebeen in peaceful, continuous, public and actual possession of the property in dispute even before the year1930."12

The appellate court emphasized that in an accion publiciana, the only issue involved is the determination ofpossession de jure.13

Hence, the present petition for review which raises the following issues:

I. . . . WHETHER OWNERSHIP AND TITLE CANNOT BE AN ISSUE TO DETERMINE WHO HAS ABETTER RIGHT [TO] THE PORTION LITIGATED; AND

II. WHETHER . . . THE NATURE OF THE ACTION AS WELL AS THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

DEPEND ON THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT.14

For obvious reasons, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be first considered.

Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended byRepublic Act No. 7691 provides for the jurisdiction ofmetropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts andmunicipal circuit trial courts, to wit:



















x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, orany interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twentythousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does notexceed Fif ty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s

fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, thevalue of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (Emphasis, italicsand underscoring supplied)

Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the plenary action of accion publiciana wasto be brought before the regional trial court.15 With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994,the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actionswhere the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila.The first level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accionreivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.

Assessed value is understood to be "the worth or value of property established by taxing authorities on thebasis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not represent the true or market value of

the property."16

The subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in Tax Declaration No. 7565, a commonexhibit of the parties. The bare claim of respondents that it has a value of P50,000 thus fails. The case,therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court.

It was error then for the RTC to take cognizance of the complaint based on the allegation that "the presentestimated value [of the land is] P50,000," which allegation is, oddly, handwritten on the printed pleading.The estimated value, commonly referred to as fair market value,17 is entirely different from the assessedvalue of the property.

Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at anytime when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if

they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.18 That the issue of lack of jurisdiction wasraised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did not thus render them inestoppel.

En passant, the Court notes that respondents’ cause of action – accion publiciana is a wrong mode. Thedispossession took place on October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months thereafter or onFebruary 7, 1997. Respondents’ exclusion from the property had thus not lasted for more than one year tocall for the remedy of accion publiciana.

In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by respondents, all the proceedingstherein as well as the Decision of November 27, 1998, are null and void. The complaint should perforce bedismissed. This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first issue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged July 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City in Civil CaseNo. TC-97-001 is declared NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.



















G.R. No. L-2352 July 26, 1910

ELADIO ALONSO, plaintiff-appellee,vs.TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Ledesma, Sumulong and Quintos, for appellants.J. C. Knudson, for appellee.

MORELAND, J .:

This is an action brought to recover of the defendants the value of certain articles taken from a Roman CatholicChurch located in the municipality of Placer, and the rental value of the church and its appurtenances, includingthe church cemetery, from the 11th day of December, 1901, until the month of April, 1904. After hearing theevidence, the court below gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,581, with interest at 6 percent from the date of the judgment. The said sum of P1,581 was made up of two items, one of which, P741,was for the value of the articles taken from the church, and the other, P840, the rental value of the premisesduring the occupations by defendants. From this judgment the defendants appealed to this court.

It appears that the defendants were on the 11th day of December, 1901, members of the municipal board ofthe municipality of Placer, and that they on that date addressed to the plaintiff in this case, who was the priestin charge of the church, its appurtenances and contents, the following letter:

PLACER, 11th December, 1901.

R. P. ELADIO ALONSO, Benedicto, Suriago.

ESTEEMED PADRE: After saluting you, we take the liberty of writing you that in the municipality ofwhich we have charged we have received an order from the provincial fiscal, dated the 5th instant,which says: "The cemeteries, convents, and the other buildings erected on land belonging to the townat the expense of the town and preserved by it belong to the town, and for this reason the municipalityis under the obligation of administering them and of collecting the revenues therefrom, and for thisreason we notify you that from this date all of the revenues and products therefrom must be turned intothe treasury of the municipality in order that the people may properly preserve them.

In the same way we notify you that the image of St. Vicente which is now in the church, as it is animage donated to the people by its owner, by virtue of said order is also the property of said people,and therefore the alms which are given it by the devotees thereof must be also turned into themunicipal treasury for the proper preservation of the church and for other necessary purposes. Wehope that you will view in the proper light and that you will deliver to the bearer of this letter the key ofthe alms box of the said image in order that we may comply with our obligation in conformity with thedispositions of said order.

We beg to remain as always by your spiritual sons. Q. B. S. M.

(Signed) ANDRES OJEDA.

TOMAS VILLAMOR.

ANDRES CALINAUAN.

BERNARDINO TANDOY.

EUSEBIO LIRIO.



ELEUTERIO MONDAYA.

MAXIMO DELOLA.

SEGUNDO BECERRO.

ONOFRE ELIMANCE.

On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church and its appurtenances, and alsoof all of the personal property contained therein. The plaintiff, as priest of the church and the person in chargethereof, protested against the occupation thereof by the defendants, but his protests received no consideration,and he was summarily removed from possession of the church, its appurtenances and contents.

The only defense presented by the defendants, except the one that the plaintiff was not the real party ininterest, was that the church and other buildings had been erected by funds voluntarily contributed by thepeople of that municipality, and that the articles within the church had been purchased with funds raised in likemanner, and that, therefore, the municipality was the owner thereof.

The question as to the ownership of the church and its appurtenances, including the convent and cemetery,

was before this court on the 23rd day of September, 1908, in an action entitled "The Roman Catholic ApostolicChurch against the municipality of Placer."1 Substantially the same facts were presented on the part of thedefendants in that case as are presented by the defendants in this. The question there litigated was the claimupon the part of the municipality of ownership of said church and its appurtenances on the ground thataccording to Spanish law the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church was not the owner of such property, havingonly the use thereof for ordinary ecclesiastical and religious purposes, and that the true owner thereof was themunicipality or the State by reason of the contributions by them, or by the people, of the land and of the fundswith which the buildings were constructed or repaired. The court decided in that case that the claim of thedefendants was not well founded and that the property belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. The samequestion was discussed and decided in the case of Barlin vs. Ramirez (7 Phil. Rep., 41), and the case of TheMunicipality of Ponce vs. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Rico (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 737, 6 Off. Gaz.,1213).

We have made a careful examination of the record and the evidence in this case and we have no doubt that

the property sued for was, at the time it was taken by the defendants, the property of the Roman CatholicChurch, and that the seizure of the same and occupation of the church and its appurtenances by thedefendants were wrongful and illegal. We are also convinced, from such examination, that the conclusions ofthe court below as to the value of the articles taken by the defendants and of the rent of the church for the timeof its illegal occupation by the defendants were correct and proper. While some objection was made on appealby counsel for the defendants that the value of the articles taken and of the rent of the church and itsappurtenances had not been proved by competent evidence, no objection to the introduction of the evidence ofvalue was made at the trial and we can not consider that question raised for the first time here.

We have carefully examined the assignments of error made by counsel for defendants on this appeal. We findnone of them well founded. The only one which deserves especial attention at our hands is the one wherein thedefendants assert that the court below erred in permitting the action to be brought and continued in the name ofthe plaintiff instead of in the name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church was located, or in thename of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest.

It is undoubted the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostic Church itself is the real party ininterest. The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action. Section 114 of the Code of CivilProcedure requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. The plaintiff isnot such party.

Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides:



SEC. 110. Amendments in general . — The court shall, in furtherance of justice, and on such terms, ifany, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding and at any stage of theaction, in either the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by adding or striking out the name ofany party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistakenor inadequate allegation or description in any other respect so that the actual merits of the controversymay speedily be determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious, andinexpensive manner. The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be

made after the time limited by the rules of the court for filing the same. Orders of the court upon thematters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to theadverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

Section 503 of the same code provides:

SEC. 503. Judgment not to be reversed on technical grounds. — No judgment shall be reversed onformal or technical grounds, or for such error as has not prejudiced the real rights of the exceptingparty.

We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power, apart from that power and authoritywhich is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by substituting, asparty plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only are we confident that we may do so, but we are convinced that

weshould do so. Such an amendment does not constitute, really a change in the identity of the parties. Theplaintiff asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through the record, that he is engaged in theprosecution of this case, not for himself, but for the bishop of the diocese—not by his own right, but by right ofanother. He seeks merely to do for the bishop what the bishop might do for himself. His own personality is notinvolved. His own rights are not presented. He claims no interest whatever in the litigation. He seeks only thewelfare of the great church whose servant he is. Gladly permits his identity to be wholly swallowed up in that ofhis superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the diocese, or the Roman Catholic ApostolicChurch, for that of Padre Alonso, as party plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of one identity for another, ofone party for another, but is simply to make the form express the substance. The substance is there. It appearsall through the proceedings. No one is deceived for an instant as to whose interest are at stake. The form of itsexpression is alone defective. The substitution, then, is not substantial but formal. Defect in mere form can notpossibly so long as the substantial is clearly evident. Form is a method of speech used to express substanceand make it clearly appear. It is the means by which the substance reveals itself. If the form be faulty and stillthe substance shows plainly through no, harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the

substance.

No one has been misled by the error in the name of the party plaintiff. If we should by reason of this error sendthis back for amendment and new trial, there would be on the retrial the same complaint, the same answer, thesame defense, the same interests, the same witnesses, and the same evidence. The name of the plaintiffwould constitute the only difference between the old trial and the new. In our judgment there is not enough in aname to justify such action.

There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitatethe application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay,but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself, which courtsare always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing. Inother words, they are a means to an end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the

administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obviousduty.

The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage of it for other purposes than to cure it, does notappeal to a fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's case smacks of skill rather than right. A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art ofmovement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending partyfully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisiveall imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits,unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it desserts its proper office as an aid to



justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts. Thereshould be no vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted to challenge a record of a court ofthese Islands for defect of form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced thereby.

In ordering this substitution, we are in accord with the best judicial thought. (McKeighan vs. Hopkins, 19 Neb.,33; Dixon vs. Dixon, 19 Ia., 512; Hodges vs. Kimball, 49 Ia., 577; Sanger vs. Newton, 134 Mass., 308;George vs. Reed, 101 Mass., 378; Bowden vs. Burnham, 59 Fed. Rep., 752; Phipps and Co. vs. Hurlburt, 70Fed. Rep., 202; McDonal vs. State, 101 Fed. Rep., 171; Morford vs. Diffenbocker, 20 N. W., 600; Costelo vs.Costelo vs. Crowell, 134 Mass., 280; Whitaker vs. Pope, 2 Woods, 463, Fed. Cas. no. 17528; Miller vs. Pollock,99 Pa. St., 202; Wilsonvs. Presbyterian Church, 56 Ga., 554; Wood vs. Circuit Judge, 84 Mich., 521; InsuranceCo, vs. Mueller, 77 Ill., 22; Farman vs. Doyle, 128 Mich., 696; Union Bank vs. Mott, 19 How. Pr., 114; R. R.Co. vs. Gibson, 4 Ohio St., 145; Hume vs. Kelly, 28 Oreg., 398.)

It is therefore, ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings and decision in this action be, andthe same are hereby, amended by substituting the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead ofEladio Alonso as party plaintiff, that the complaint be considered as though originally filed by the CatholicChurch, the answer thereto made, the decision rendered and all proceedings in this case had, as if the saidinstitution which Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the party plaintiff, and that said decision ofthe court below, so amended, is affirmed, without special finding as to the costs.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-5675 April 27, 1953

ANTONIO CARBALLO, petitioner,vs.DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION in his capacity as Judge of First Instance of Manila and MARIANOANG,respondents.

J. Gonzales Orense for petitioner. Antonio Gonzales for respondents.

MONTEMAYOR, J .:

In the Municipal Court of Manila, Mariano Ang filed a complaint (civil case No. 8769) against Antonio Carballofor the collection of P1,860.84. The corresponding summons was served upon defendant Carballo forappearance and trial on October 10, 1949. As counsel for him Atty. J. Gonzales entered his written appearanceon October 12, 1949. On the same day said counsel filed a motion for postponement of the hearing for onemonth on the ground that he was sick, attaching a medical certificate to prove his illness. Hearing waspostponed to October 14, 1949 at which time defendant asked for another postponement on the ground that hiscounsel was still sick. The hearing was again postponed to October 24, 1949. Inn said last two postponementof the hearing, the municipal court warned the defendant that the hearing could not wait until his counsel

recovered from his illness, and that if said counsel could not attend the trial he should obtain the services ofanother lawyer.

On the day set for hearing, namely, October 24, 1949, neither defendant nor his counsel appeared althoughthere was a written manifestation of defendant's counsel requesting further postponement because he was stillsick. At the request of plaintiff's counsel, defendant was declared in default. The evidence for the plaintiff wasreceived after which judgment was rendered against the defendant ordering him to pay the sum of P1,860 withlegal interest. Counsel for defendant was duly notified of said decision and he filed a motion for new trial on theground that injustice had been done, and that an error was committed in the decision. The motion for new trialwas denied. Through his counsel defendant perfected his appeal to the Court of First Instance of Manila and helater filed an answer.

When the case was called for hearing on March 18, 1952, counsel for plaintiff argued that the decision

appealed from had become final and executory for the reason that said judgment having been rendered bydefault, no appeal could be validly taken from it. Despite opposition of the defendant, the Court of First Instancein an order dated March 18, 1952, considering said decision final and unappealable because it had beenrendered by default, and held that the only jurisdiction left to it was to order the execution of said decision, so itordered the return of the record to the municipal court for that purpose.

Defendant Carballo filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his appeal which motion wasdenied by an order 353 dated March 21, 1952, whereupon Carballo filed the present petition for certiorari,injunction, prohibition and mandamus wherein he asks that after due hearing the order and actuations ofrespondent Judge Encarnacion of the Court of First Instance of Manila be declared null and void; that he beordered to desist from executing said order and that furthermore, he be commanded to proceed with the trial ofthe case "de novo."

We agree that a decision by default rendered by an inferior court is not appealable (Lim Toco vs. Co. Fay,1 45Off. Gaz., No. 8, p. 3350). The question now is whether defendant (now petitioner Carballo) defaulted in themunicipal court of Manila. True, he filed no answer, but his counsel filed a written appearance. In addition, saidcounsel filed a motion or manifestation asking for postponement of the hearing on the ground that he was ill. Inthe case of Flores vs. Zurbito, (37 Phil., 746), this Court held that an appearance in whatever form withoutexpressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the courtover the person. It is, therefore, clear that petitioner Carballo made an appearance in the municipal court.Could he then be declared in default just because he filed no answer? The answer must be in the negative. Inthe case of Quinzan vs. Arellano,2 G.R. No. 4461, December 28, 1951, the Supreme Court said that in the justice of the peace court failure to appear, not failure to answer is the sole ground for default. What reallyhappened in the municipal court was that the defendant tho he filed no answer to the complaint, nevertheless,



he made his appearance and in writing at that, but because of his failure and that of his counsel to appear onthe date of the trial, a hearing ex-parte was held and judgment was rendered thereafter. The judgment,therefore, was not by default. So defendant Antonio Carballo had a right to appeal as in fact he appealed, andthe Court of First Instance should not have declared the decision appealed from final and executory under thetheory that it was not appealable.

The present petition is granted and the respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the trial of thecase. Respondent Mariano Ang will pay the costs.



Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 70640 June 29, 1988

INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION, Doing Business Under The Name And Style "FNCBFINANCE,"petitioner-appellant,vs.ROMEO EBARLE, HON. JOSE L. CASTIGADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXII, Pagadian City, TheDeputy Provincial Sheriff of Zamboanga Del Sur, and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURT, respondents-appellees.

SARMIENTO, J .:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision of the then respondent Intermediate AppellateCourt*sustaining the order of the trial court.**

These are the facts:

On January 7, 1980, in Ozamis City, Flaviano Fucoy Jr., for value received, executed a promissory note 1 infavor of Lido Motor Sales Ozamis in the amount of P56,976.00 which he promised to pay in 48 equal,successive, monthly installments. Jose Mariano O. Tan signed the promissory note as a co-maker. Onthe same day, to guarantee the payment of the promissory note in accordance with its terms, thepromissors executed a chattel mortgage 2 over the purchased car in favor of the promissee. Also, on thesame date, mortgagee Lido Motor Sales Ozamis executed a Deed of Assignment 3 of all its title, rights,equities, and interests (excluding obligations to the buyers for services and warranties which themortgagee-assignor retained) to, in, and/or arising out of the Deed of Chattel Mortgage with promissorynote, in favor of Investors' Finance Corporation, the herein petitioner.

For non-payment of four (4) monthly installments the petitioner corporation, as mortgagee, filed a

verifiedComplaint For Replevin With Damages 4 in the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, 15thJudicial District, Branch I (later became Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 15th Judicial Region,Branch XVII, Cagayan de Oro City, after the judicial reorganization of 1983) against Flaviano Fucoy Jr.,Jose Mariano Tan, and a John Doe, docketed as CIVIL CASE No. 8782, with a prayer for the issuance ofa writ of replevin for the seizure of the car "for the purpose of foreclosure and/or disposal in accordancewith law to satisfy defendants obligation the plaintiff." 5 Additionally, the plaintiff, the petitioner hereinprayed attorney's fees, liquidated damages, and costs. 6 There is no alternative prayer for the sum ofmoney in this complaint contrary to the finding of the respondent court. The plaintiff filed a good and

sufficient bond, approved by the trial court, in the amount of P25,146.34, which is double the value of thecar, the subject property. 7

On October 5, 1982, the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, 15th Judicial District, Branch 1,

Cagayan de Oro City, issued the writ of replevin. 8 The writ could not be implemented because the car wasnot in the possession of the mortgagors-defendants. It was only more than a year later that the car wasfound in the possession of the herein private respondent, Romeo Ebarle, of Pagadian City. 9 Due to thedifficulty, not to say danger, of getting the car from him because of his bodyguards, Romeo Ebarle beingthe son of former Provincial Governor Bienvenido Ebarle, a prominent political mogul not only in



Pagadian City but also in the province of Zamboanga del Sur and in the entire Region IX, and the brotherof the then incumbent Assemblyman representing Region IX, Renato Ebarle, 10 the petitioner fileda Motion For Approval To Deputize And Authorize A Military Personnel To Serve The Alias Writ OfRelevin And Alias Summons. 11 The motion was granted. 12

On October 17, 1983, the trial court appointed Technical Sergeant (TSgt., for short) Antonio Ibonia of the

Philippine Constabulary as special deputy sheriff and authorized him "to serve the alias summons and alias writof replevin issued in this case (C.C. No. 8782) on the defendants at their respective addresses." 13

On October 19, 1983, TSgt Ibonia, as special deputy Sheriff to serve the summons and implement the AliasWrit of Replevin, seized the car and placed it in the custody of the military authorities at Tubod Lanao del Nortefor safekeeping. On the following day, as a result of a written agreement between the lawyers of the petitionerand the private respondent, stipulating payment by the latter of the balance of the mortgage indebtednessincurred originally by Flaviano Fucoy Jr. and Jose Mariano Tan, subject to verification by the petitioner'scounsel as to the correctness of the amount, the car was returned to the private respondent. 14

Evidently, mortgagors Flaviano Fucoy Jr. and Jose Mariano Tan transferred the possession of the car to privaterespondent Romeo Ebarle without the consent of the petitioner. (The petitioner claims that it would "neveragree" to such a transfer "because the credit standing of respondent Ebarle was no longer good due toprevious account he had with petitioner which was delinquent forcing petitioner to foreclose on the mortgage"

of two units of Isuzu dump trucks.) 15 Thus the car remained registered in the name Flaviano Fucoy Jr.,even when it was seized by Special Deputy Sheriff Ibonia, under Registration Certificate No. RCM368382of the Ozamiz LTC Office. 16

In the second week of November, 1983, the petitioner sent to the private respondent a computation of theunpaid balance due from the mortgagors, which turned out to be higher than the computation at Tubod Lanaodel Norte. The private respondent refused to pay. 17

On December 13, 1983, the private respondent commenced a suit for Damages and Discharge of ChattelMortgage with Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XXII, PagadianCity, docketed as Civil Case No. 2312, against the petitioner, Investors' Finance Corporation, and SpecialDeputy Sheriff Antonio lbonia, who enforced the writ of replevin on October 19,1983. 18

In his complaint, the private respondent alleged that he was a well-known personality in Pagadian City, hebeing the son of the former govemor of the province and a brother of an assemblyman; that he had paid hisobligations to the petitioner but it refused to issue a receipt; and that he was humiliated and embarrassed bythe seizure of his car. He prayed "(T)hat pending hearing of the main case a writ of preliminary injunction beissued against the defendants' (herein petitioner and Special Deputy Sheriff lbonia), that "the chattel mortgageof the car be discharged," and for moral and corrective damages, attorney's fees, and a general prayer "forother remedies and relief provided for under the law under the present circumstance." 19

The petitioner, one of the two defendants in Civil Case No. 2312, filed its answer, dated February 21, 1984, inwhich the pendency of Civil Case No. 8782 in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental is averred withspecificity, a copy of the complaint thereof having been attached thereto as Annexes 5, 5-A, 5-B, 5-C, 5-D and5-E. In the said answer, the petitioner herein prayed for the dismissal of the case.20 In a subsequent Motion

For Preliminary Hearing Of Affirmative Defense As If A Motion To Dismiss Have (Sic) Been Filed, 21 the

petitioner reiterated in its answer the averment of the "pendency of another action involving the sameparties, interests, rights and vehicle." And invoking Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, 22 it movedthat a preliminary hearing be had as if a motion to dismiss had been filed and prayed for the dismissal ofthe complaint on the ground of litis pendentia provided in Section 1(e) of the same Rule 16. 23

After the filing of the Opposition and Rejoinder, on November 15, 1984, the respondent trial court issued a writof preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the petitioner to return the car even while its motion to dismisshad not yet been resolved. 24



The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court questioning thedenial of its Motion For Preliminary Hearing Of Affirmative Defense As If A Motion To Dismiss Have (Sic) BeenFiled and the issuance in favor of Ebarle of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction although the car was notin its possession." 25

The respondent Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition stating thus:

We find the petition without merit. Since after all, petitioner claims it does not have the car, thewrit of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot possibly be enforced. Petitioner, according to itsimply does not have the car which thru the writ is sought to be returned. Now then withrespect to the "motion to dismiss", We find no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretionon the part of the respondent Judge for having denied the same: firstly, Civil Cases No. 2312,includes a contempt charge, one not found in Civil Case No. 8782; secondly, there is adefendant in Civil Case No. 2312, Antonio Ibonia, who is not a party in the other case. Certainrequisites of litis pendentia are therefore absent. 26

The petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, 27 hence this petition.

We rule for the petitioner.

The respondent Intermediate Appellate Court committed a reversible error in denying the application of theprinciple of lis pendens duly invoked by the petitioner.

An action is dismissable on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for thesame cause, if the following requisites concur:

a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;

b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;and

c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one

would, regardless of which party is successful amount to res judicata in the other.28

Corollary to Section 1(e) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is the prohibition against splitting a single cause ofaction. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 2, ("I)f two or more complaints are brought for different parts of a singlecause of action, the filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in accordance withSection 1(e) of Rule 16, and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar in the others." Theformer is the principle of litis pendentia or lis pendens, while the latter is that of res judicata.

The doctrine of res judicata requires, among others, identity of parties as an indispensable condition. However,

this Identity does not mean total identity of all parties. For we already had ruled on various occasions 29 that theinclusion of new parties in the second action does not remove the case from the operation of the doctrineof res judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in evidence was also the party in the firstaction. This rule would ward off the possibility of renewing the litigation between the same parties by the

mere expedient of bringing in new parties in the second action.

Like res judicata as a doctrine, litis pendentia as a principle is also a sanction of the public policy againstmultiplicity of suits. This being so, the inclusion of another party does not by itself preclude the application ofsection 1(e) Rule 16 assuming that all the requisites are present. Otherwise stated, the inclusion of new partiesin the second action does not remove the case from the operation of the rule of litis pendentia as long as theprimary litigants are also parties in the first action. A different rule would render illusory the principle of litis

pendentia. The facility of its circumvention is not difficult to imagine given the resourcefulness of lawyers.



In Civil Case No. 8782 before the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, 15th Judicial District, BranchXVII, Cagayan de Oro City, the plaintiff is the petitioner corporation and the defendants are Flaviano Fucoy Jr.,Jose Mariano Tan, and a John Doe. John Doe, later, turned out to be private respondent Romeo Ebarle whowas the unauthorized transferee but in actual possession of the car. In Civil Case No. 2312 before the RegionalTrial Court, 9th Judicial District, Branch XXII Pagadian City, the plaintiff is the same private respondent RomeoEbarle while the defendants are the petitioner corporation and Antonio Ibonia the Special Deputy Sheriff, anofficer of the law who enforced the writ of replevin in compliance with the order of the then Court of First

Instance of Misamis Oriental, Branch XVII, at Cagayan de Oro City. It is clear that lbonia is not a real party ininterest in the Pagadian case. There, the real parties in interest, the principal protagonists are Investors'Finance Corporation and Romeo Ebarle. They are the same Identical real parties in interest, the principalprotagonists in the Cagayan de Oro case. This concurrence suffices to satisfy the requirement of Identity ofparties in the principle of litis pendentia.

We also find identity of the rights asserted in both cases.

The contempt charge in the Pagadian City case deserves scant consideration. It is merely an incident of thealleged non-compliance of the preliminary mandatory injunction by the Branch Manager and lawyer of thepetitioner as wen as the Special Deputy Sheriff.

The true subject matter of the controversy is the car (Corolla, 4-door de luxe Sedan, bearing Engine No. 4k-

5021908). The primary objective of the plaintiff, the petitioner herein, in the Cagayan de Oro case is theenforcement of the chattel mortgage due to non-payment of the balance of the purchase price of the said car.On the other hand, the plaintiff, the private respondent herein, in the Pagadian case, seeks as his primordialrelief, the discharge of the chattel mortgage over the same car due to alleged full payment of all theinstallments on the price of the same. By way of initial reliefs, the plaintiff in the Cagayan de Oro case(defendant in the Pagadian case and petitioner herein) prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin to takepossession of the car in order to foreclose the chattel mortgage thereon as the plaintiff in the Pagadian case(defendant in the Cagayan de Oro case and private respondent herein) sought an injunction to restrain thetaking of the same car. The denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the herein petitioner before the Pagadiancourt, resulted to a chaotic as well as a ridiculous situation for the parties. As the Cagayan de Oro court issued,

on March 30,1984, a Second Alias Writ Of Replevin 30 for the seizure of the car to be disposed of accordingto the Chattel Mortgage Law, the Pagadian court, also issued, more than seven months later, apreliminary mandatory injunction 31 ordering the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Zamboanga del Sur "to takepossession of the subject property (the car). . . and forthwith deliver it to the plaintiff' (private respondent

herein). Before that, on May 9, 1984, the Pagadian court already issued a Temporary RestrainingOrder, 32ordering the herein petitioner and its agents not to seize the said car. To all legal intents andpurposes, the Pagadian court issued a second writ of replevin to counteract and to annul the writ ofreplevin validly issued seven and a half months earlier by a coordinate and co-equal tribunal — theCagayan de Oro court-which has already taken jurisdiction. Worse, the Pagadian court practicallydismissed the case pending in the Cagayan de Oro court, pronouncing that "the replevin case, Civil CaseNo. 8782, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City appears, to all practical intents and purposes tohave been terminated." 33 We can not allow that. We can not countenance the spectacle of two co-equalcourts racing with each other to pre-empt judgment over the same subject matter of the two pendingactions. The resulting confusion in the event that the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the two courtscontradict and conflict with each other would do great damage to the administration of justice.

An action for damages against the person obtaining the writ of replevin and the sheriff who enforced the writ of

replevin, assuming that the seizure of the property was unlawful, should be litigated in the replevin suit and notby independent action. Thus, we ruled in Erlanger and Galinger Inc., et al. v. Villamor, et al . 34 that any claimfor damages due to the seizing of property in replevin ', the action being still pending and undetermined,should be litigated in the replevin suit and not by independent action. The doctrine is undisputed that nocourt has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or orders of another court of concurrent orcoordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction. 35

Moreover, under Section 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, delivery of personal property subjectmatter of the controversy should be made on orders of the court only if the plaintiff puts up a bond double the



value of the property as stated in his affidavit. This replevin bond answers for the damages that may be

awarded to the defendant in case the action will not prosper. 36 In the Cagayan de Oro court, the petitionerfiled a bond as required. 37

We take note that the filing of Civil Case No. 2312 before the Pagadian Court was a "specie of forum-

shopping" 38considering that the private respondent is an influential person in the locality. The respondent

trial judge was not perspicacious enough to notice this unethical and contumacious act.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court isREVERSED and Civil Case No. 2312 of the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial District, Branch XXII. PagadianCity is hereby ordered DISMISSED without prejudice to the prosecution of the claim for damages for wrongfulreplevin in Civil Case No. 8782 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch XVII, Cagayan de OroCity.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. No motion for extension of t ime to file a motion forreconsideration will be granted.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED