Introduction

For executives, employees, and operators involved, the management of safety is an

absolute requirement for any aviation business to continue in its longevity and total

sustainability. In airlines, airports, and other aviation services, Safety Management Systems

(SMS), which is an organized approach to managing safety, (ICAO, 2013), can greatly

contribute to the sustainability of any business by increasing the likelihood of employees

detecting and correcting safety issues before those problems result in an aviation accident or

incident. SMS provides organizations with a powerful framework of safety philosophy, tools,

and methodologies that improve their ability to understand, construct, and manage proactive

safety systems (Stolzer, et. al, 2008). Gone are the days when safety measures were implemented

in response to unfortunate incidents and accidents, with today’s safety environment geared

towards a more proactive and predictive method in approaching safety issues. Inherent in any

proactive safety organization is the ability to look forward and identify potential safety risks

(Wells, 2001).

About College Park Airport

College Park Airport (CGS) located in College Park, Maryland is the world’s oldest

continuously operating airport and it is currently owned by the Maryland National Capital Parks

and Planning Commission (MNCPPC). We currently have 50 tenants with private aircraft and a

hanger which bases 2 helicopters for PG Police Department Helicopter Squad. Despite this

honorable distinction as one of the most significant sites in aviation history, the past several

years after 9/11 have seen a dramatic decline in air traffic due to substantial restrictions barring

certain types of flight operations and an extensive vetting procedure that requires the prospective

pilot to physically be present in multiple locations after filling out an application and completing

a third-party fingerprinting process. All this is due to the fact that CGS is now one of three

Maryland airports located in an airspace known as the Flight Restriction Zone (FRZ), which was

put in place in response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, stretching in a 15-mile radius from

Washington, D.C. These fixed limitations as a direct result from the Federal mandate to place the

FRZ has severely marginalized CGS in every sense of the word, hampering any economic

viability that could come about and make this airport the pinnacle of general aviation greatness.

With a superb convenience in location, 1 mile from Univ. Maryland and 1 block from Metro

Station, CGS is GA airport that most major cities would die for, and it’s a shame that we have

been heavily restricted in the types of activities we are able to have. Overall with limited

operations and a tight budget, managing our safety procedures in a linear procedural manner has

been more of a formality than the active method of identifying underlying hazards and associated

risk. Our ultimate goal as operators is to properly maintain and enhance the service of our

airport, thus we must ensure the highest quality of safety by enacting procedures that reflect

proactiveness in tackling safety issues before they arise into incidents or accidents.

What is SMS?

In order for our current method of aviation safety to develop to the next level, with the

ongoing growth of our operations, further actions must be made to establish a proactive &

predictive safety structure. That safety structure is Safety Management Systems (SMS), and as

operators we must encourage ourselves to introduce our own version to the airport. SMS, as

defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), is a systematic approach to

managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and

procedures (ICAO, 2013). Essentially SMS is a systematic way to identify underlying hazards

and control risk with a focus on overall organizational safety rather than isolated standard safety

issues. One of the main purposes of an SMS is to improve the safety performance, and therefore

reduce exposure to the risk of having an accident or suffering bankruptcy (Muller, et. al, 2014).

For this very fact, SMS should be seen as the most important process in any business, with its

survival and financial sustenance latched on to upkeep of safety. Any accident due to negligent

safety management can create an economic disaster for an airport involved, with several costs

associated with repair, clean-up, legal claims, damage of reputation, etc. A focus on safety is a

focus on sustainability.

SMS can be described as a set of processes or components that combines operational and

technical systems with financial and human resource management (Muller, et. al, 2014). In all of

our activities at CGS we must take a systematic approach to safety with the emphasis on setting

tangible objectives and a clear cut description on who’s accountable throughout our airport,

starting from the manager and down to our operators. We want to be able to veer away from our

typical reactive procedures and start to develop the building blocks towards a proactive safety

culture that will allow us to recognize hazards and possible agents of incidents before they are

able to turn into a bad event.

In order to move closer to our goal in enacting SMS, we must understand the four basic

components in which it’s structured upon, in order to create a framework for implementation.

The four components, known as the 4 Pillars of SMS according to FAA’s AC 120-92, is as

follows:

Safety Policy

Defines roles & responsibilities for all employees with a written deed

describing the firm’s objectives and commitment to safety containing clear

requirements on how to go about procedures

Safety Risk Management (SRM)

Process that allows organization to systematically detect hazards and to

implement mechanisms of control that mitigate risks associated with those

hazards

Safety Assurance (SA)

An organization’s effort in making sure the guarantee of safety goals are

being met and thoroughly accomplished

Safety Promotion

An organization’s effort to encourage safety as the number priority with

actions geared towards the continuous backing of a sound safety culture

Following these four pillars will allow us to independently create specific elements and

procedures for each component in order to construct a basis for SMS that is tailored to our

operation. Elements of each pillar will contain several processes that will combine and

complement other pillars, thus creating a regenerative system that allows for proactive safety

management.

The Need for SMS in General Aviation

The FAA has been putting lot of effort recently through its Implementation Study in

trying to put together a rulemaking framework to enact mandatory SMS to Part 139 airports. The

Study gave the FAA an opportunity to assess implementation of SMS within various operating

environments and to evaluate the validity of SMS documentation developed during the Airport

SMS Pilot Studies (FAA, 2011). With FAA intending to use the Study results to develop SMS

standards Part 139, it leaves non-Part 139 services like general aviation (GA) airports out of the

rulemaking process since GA airports don’t serve a certain amount and type of air carrier

operations. The weight now falls on CGS and other GA airports to take the initiative on

implementing a SMS framework by leveraging existing structures from larger more established

airports, and scaling them down to fit the needs and budget of its operations. As a GA airport, we

as operators at CGS must make an effort in enacting short-term procedures that reflect the

organized and proactive method of SMS so that we can form a foundation to build upon towards

full implementation.

The goal of implementing SMS for the future of GA airports is imperative and should be

trialed to enactment as soon as practicable since GA operations make up the majority of air

traffic in the United States, as well as having the highest average of fatal accidents (GAO, 2000).

In the United States only about 21 percent of aviation activity and 12 percent of aviation

fatalities occur in the major airline and commuter segments of the industry (Oster, et. al 1992).

With glaring evidence on the need to improve overall GA safety, it’s truly our obligation here at

CGS to seek methods on how to track hazards with associated risks, and to create a platform in

which employees can digitally record data linked to each hazard so that each operator can put in

place controls to mitigate related risks. We have a lot to do to improve our current system

regarding safety, and it’s going to take a lot of trials and test runs of each component of SMS in

order to fully grasp the entire process. Some airports (Class IV or non-hub airports) operate

under a constrained annual budget, and a mandatory airport SMS could impose a substantial

financial burden on those airports’ operations so low-cost airport SMS application is therefore

necessary (Lu, et. al, 2011). We will encounter various barriers and possible opposition within

our organization, but we must persist on improving our aviation safety by setting up a systematic

and organized approach to detect underlying hazards and mitigate the associated risks. Before we

can get to that we must identify the problems regarding our current safety procedures by

conducting gap analysis.

Statement of Problem through Gap-Analysis

CGS lacks the various proactive safety measures inherent in SMS, and in comparing the

requirements of SMS, gap analysis will provide our airport with an initial SMS development

plan and roadmap for compliance (FAA, 2007).  Essentially gap analysis will allow us to spot

various deficiencies so that we can take proper action in developing procedures that fulfills the

goal for SMS. The analysis makes use of established standards to determine between what is and

what should be (Stolzer et al, 2008). These standards & benchmarks need to be identified in

order to conduct a proper gap analysis. However, we need to be mindful that existing

benchmarks have been established regarding Part 139 airports, and as a result it is more than

likely that the majority of elements and criteria cannot be feasible due to budget constraints and

necessity. Knowing that the majority of Pilot Studies & SMS literatures for implementation are

more tailored towards large aviation organizations, our objective through gap analysis is to

examine the key elements of SMS through its 4 Pillars and to create preliminary safety programs

that address each component of safety management, starting with Safety Policy.

Safety Policy

The Safety Policy of a firm is a written outline that describes the roles & responsibilities

of all employees as well as specific objectives and goals committed towards maintaining safety.

SMS policy must include clear requirements for all operational departments to document their

procedures, controls, training, process measurements and change management systems

(Stolzer,et. al, 2008). A concrete objective with specific tasks characterizes a firm that has an

identity and knows what it wants to accomplish. The Safety Policy serves as guidance regarding

who has a direct or indirect impact on safety performance and should provide specific directions

to ensure that any safety management activity targeted has an impact on the improvement of the

safety level within the organization (Muller, et. al, 2014).

At CGS we have several scattered policies that describe airport rules, basic operations,

and emergency procedures, as well as a decentralized method in obtaining safety information

regarding fueling and other activities. Although as a whole we demonstrate a solid pledge to

overall safety, we presently lack any written safety policies that describes roles, responsibilities,

and tangible safety objectives. Policies and procedures are described in an informal fashion by

word of mouth, with partial use of supporting documents and training modules through CD-

ROMs. Certain procedures like our Emergency Procedure, written on small laminated cards

lying about on the side of our front desk, is seldom mentioned and training on how to use the

various types of fire extinguishers around the airfield in case of an emergency is not taught

either.

The lack of policies and certain training procedures at CGS is mainly due to the operating

and business environment that lacks constant activity. For over a year we did not have a manager

that oversaw day to day operations, and a lot of the delegating fell upon an acting manager that

had a full-time job at the FAA and a senior operator, who did what was necessary to keep the

airport running. We’ve just hired a new manager that is a long-time tenant at the airport and is

fervently passionate about the airport and its future, so that will indeed bring stability. Our

current staff is made up of 7 part-time employees with work schedules ranging from 4 days to 1

day a week. No more than two of us are present at any given time which means that we are

constantly split from one another, with some of us never seeing the other. That’s an acceptable

nature of our staff, but it will complicate disseminating changes through policies with the

prospect of staff meetings being off the table since most staff are generally busy outside their

shifts. Besides me and another senior operator, all employees are pursuing degrees full-time at

university with no displayed interest in aviation outside their job. They have taken the airport

position probably in order to supplement their end goals whether it’s for financial reasons or to

add experience to their resume, but for whatever motives they have, all are performing brilliantly

for the task of maintaining the airport’s operation. The question is, if certain additions to policy

were put in place that mandated extra tasks towards proactive safety management, will they

accept those changes? Since we are owned by the Maryland National Parks and Planning

Commission (MNPPC) the position falls under the title of “Non-Career” meaning employees

cannot work more than 37 hours a week. As someone looking to further my aviation career out

of college I took the job at CGS aspiring to work full-time, but instead I was later reminded that

non-career employees could only work a maximum of 37 hours. I didn’t mind too much and I

accepted the fact that I was limited to 37 hours, which still made me the only employee with the

maximum amount of hours, with next highest, the senior operator, working about 24-30 hours.

All this is not surprising at all because our airport since 9/11 has had low revenues and

little day to day operations, with the commission subsequently deciding to axe certain positions,

like the airport office accountant, and to hire only part-time operators to break-even. This is all

well and good, with the commission making a sound business decision, but what is the overall

consequences to this? The underlying consequence is the fact that there is less cohesion amongst

all staff with no unity towards foreseeable objectives regarding safety and other future issues.

The fault is not among the staff or manager, but the situation in which we’ve all been placed in.

The culture and environment of our airport dictates straightforward tasks towards basic

operations and repeatable procedures. On occasion we are able to partake in maintenance of the

airport such as cutting grass, plowing snow & other physical duties, but only 2 or 3 are able to do

those tasks with training on those responsibilities given informally or self-taught.

There’s no clear policy on outlining who’s responsible and what role each operator plays.

When hired, we are all given a basic summary on the core duties that we must complete

regarding fueling aircraft, inputting flight operations data, processing sales (fuel, tenant

payments, merchandise, etc.), inspecting runway, testing fuel sump/documenting results, &

opening/closing out procedures. These duties are essential to the day to day operations of the

airport and if not completed properly, it can cause difficulty to the overall functioning of the

airport. I’m proud to say that all of us do an excellent job in performing the duties given to us,

and as a whole working interdependent from a distance, we all have a certain camaraderie in

getting things done for the sake of the airport. The only problem is that we do not display that

objective into philosophy or a combined document that outlines our entire objective. Let alone a

solid objective aside from our duties, we do not have any policy towards the improvement of

safety in a written expression that outlines our safety goals. Although we have 2 proactive

procedures towards safety, we need to conduct further risk management techniques such as SRM

to identify underlying hazards, which will be discussed later on. We need to make a long-term

effort in bringing change to our current culture and safety philosophy into a more comprehensive

and all inclusive manner that gets every operator involved in the mission of the airport. Overall,

we need to find ways to add guidelines and goals into a unified CGS safety policy that will give

our airport an identity and will gear our staff towards a solid purpose. All that starts with a

proper Safety Policy.

Instead of the disjointed method of disseminating information regarding certain policies

and procedures, we have to consolidate every separate detail of every procedure into one

document that will serve as our Safety Policy. Safety should be seen as the core value of any

business, and understanding the essential factors of our safety will bring sustainability and a

competitive edge. Policy documentation is extremely important to SMS, just as a Quality

Management System must have a Quality Policy Manual, an SMS must have the equivalent of a

Safety Policy Manual, and you can recognize an SMS by its documentation (Stolzer, et. al,

2008). We need to shape an environment that induce safe behavior and promotes increased

safety awareness as a cause instead of a chore.

First and foremost we must document the roles and responsibilities of all involved at

CGS. As far as safety we must ensure those who are involved in the SMS process are

documented properly and communicated with so that we understand that everyone is functioning

throughout the process properly. Specifically for us we have to ensure the manager and operator

have precise and detailed responsibilities pertaining to upkeep of our SMS. Here’s how a basic

outline for responsibilities will go for our airport regarding SMS:

Airport Manager

o Need to establish and implement SMS

o Create and ensure adherence to Safety Policy

o Actively promotes SMS among operators

o Ensures all resources for safety management is available

o Guarantees the effectiveness of SMS

o Communicates organizational goals and objectives towards safety

Airport Manager/Senior Operator

o Oversees the process of SMS

o Collects hazard reports and analyzes possible risks

o Ensures adequate training

o Confirms that corrective actions to mitigate risks are satisfactory

Senior Operator/Operator

o Takes appropriate action handling certain hazardous conditions

o Identifies and reports hazards, mishaps, irregularities, unsafe practices

o Adhere to safety procedures regarding work practices

o Understands and is familiar with the process of SMS

With roles and responsibilities for our SMS and other activities, we can have a better

sense of who is accountable for each activity and will give us an organized method recognizing

who we can reach out to if a particular area or issue needs to be looked at. In addition to the

safety responsibilities listed, other tasks necessary for day to day operations can also be shed to

light by adding them on a separated document in conjunction to our Safety Policy to give our

airport a more structured look on who’s responsible for what.

Our next item for our Safety Policy is our Safety Objective, which normally is the first

element of any policy. For CGS, our purpose in creating objectives that can be realistic and

attainable is to ensure the success and effectiveness of our overall safety. Goals can be set

annually and can be regularly revised and updated based on yearly measurements of

performance. Our objectives have to start out small and easily obtainable so that we can progress

further and achieve more complex goals in the future Here’s sample of what can be our

inaugural safety objectives for CGS:

Objective 1: Increase overall safety awareness

o Establish and implement fully functioning SMS tailored to our operation

o Have all operators trained to be familiar of concept of SMS based on the 4 Pillars

o Have at least half the tenants aware of the ongoing safety measures in identifying

hazards

o Have the PG Police Helicopter Squad conscious of our ongoing SMS

Objective 2: Reduce hazards and associated risks

o Receive at least 10 reports of existing underlying hazards around the airfield

o Receive at least 2 reports from tenants

o Receive at least 2 reports from PG Police Pilots/Mechanics

o Receive a reduction of annual deer sightings

o Take immediate action to mitigate at least 2 risks associated with reported hazards

Objective 3: Provide additional Emergency Training

o Update and review the CGS Emergency Reponses Plan among all operators

o Train operators on the use of the different types of fire extinguishers for various

situations

o Document and train operators on the use of AED defibrillation machine to treat

life threatening cardiac problems

Once we have created tangible objectives that can be achieved in a year we need to

finally construct a statement that sets into stone our pledge and commitment to safety. It might

seem cheesy or silly but its importance should not be greatly underestimated, because it ties the

vision and belief of our airport into a written expression that can be revisited by all of us to

galvanize our commitment towards safety, and it will allow others to interpret our message and

better appreciate our mission. A quick sample safety policy message could be: Our policy at

College Park Airport is to provide the highest standard of service to our pilots and

passengers by constantly improving our safety through risk management. We are

committed to building a culture that reflects a proactive approach to identifying hazards

and mitigating risk. Our aim is provide valuable service in a safe, efficient, and reliable

way so that every customer feels at home when they arrive. Safety is our top priority, and

we will foster an environment that will for encourage openness and reporting of hazards so

that we achieve the highest level of safety performance.

By having a Safety Policy, we create a backbone from which the crux of SMS can

develop. The framework achieved through the creation of Safety Policy will guide us on how to

design risk management programs that are scaled appropriately to our size of operations. By

shedding light to our deficiencies through gap-analysis, we are able to compare proper existing

elements of SMS that will allow us to fix and create components of our organization in order to

better reflect the system of proactive safety management. Creating a Safety Policy inches closer

to the goal of SMS implementation, and with its direction we can move on to the next pillar of

SMS: Safety Risk Management.

Safety Risk Management (SRM)

SMS requires reliable, repeatable processes that produce data used for decision-making in

a structured, engineered environment (Stolzer, et. al, 2008). Safety Risk Management (SRM) is

the bread and butter of safety management and is seen as the crux of proactive safety. The

process consists of identifying hazards, assessing the risks, developing mitigation measures,

controlling safety risks and monitoring the effects of safety actions (Muller, et. al. 2014). The

process of SRM allows an organization to systematically detect hazards in its day to day

operations and to implement mechanisms of control that would prevent risks linked with those

hazards. Essentially, SRM is the basis for total aviation safety in how to contain and handle

possible incidents that could affect the lives and safety of others. SRM includes specifying the

means of collecting, recording, acting on and generating feedback about hazards and risks in

daily operations (Muller, et. al. 2014). According to the FAA, SRM consists of 5 main processes

to mitigate risk which are: Task Analysis, Hazard Identification, Risk Analysis, Risk

Assessment, and Risk Mitigation. CGS lacks the data driven safety structure inherent in SRM

process that would allow us to proactively assess hazards/risks and subsequently generate a

predictive environment that is simple to control. Going through the process of SRM will assist us

by methodically identifying hazards that are latent in the airfield and will provide us a platform

to make informed conclusions on the known risk associated with those hazards. SRM will

require us to develop scaled procedures that will for allow hazard identification and efficient

reporting. And once we’ve identified the underlying hazards, we need to incorporate procedures

to analyze and assess the risk. Starting with Task Analysis we will work our way through the 5

processes of SRM to create launch pad for proactive safety.

Task analysis is essential in understanding the inner-workings of the entire system. For

risk management, we as operators have to understand the key areas of operation at our airport

and where the “hot spots” of activities are located in order for us to carefully assess the entire

system and operation environment for any hazards. For us this is a difficult step because of the

inherent nature of this airport in not having enough operations to shed light on a lot of hazards.

Since spotting operational hazards CGS is hard to accomplish when there’s little going on,

there’s one possible method in easing the process by selecting target areas of interest and then

dividing each into separate categories such as Fuel Farm, Runway/Taxiway, Tarmac & Natural

Area/Forest. Dividing up target areas will allow us to incrementally develop methods of seeking

out hazards in a way that won’t excessively overwhelm us in scouring the entire airport. By

using task analysis, we are able to establish a clear understanding of the airport environment and

where most hazards are likely to happen. The next step for us is to identify hazards.

A hazard is a condition or an object with the potential of causing injuries to personnel,

damage to equipment, or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform prescribed

function (Stolzer, et. al 2008). According to ICAO, there are three types of hazards which are

Natural, Economic, and Technical. Natural hazards can be described as an unforeseen or

uncontrollable natural event of unusual intensity which has a negative effect or possibly

threatens a safe aircraft operation, such as adverse weather conditions, and geophysical events

(ICAO, 2009). Economic hazards can occur at any time within an organization, whether it is

currently in a growth period or suffering from a recession (ICAO, 2009). Technical hazards are

hazards associated with all maintenance and operational environments where humans interact

with technological systems (ICAO, 2009).

After reviewing the airport through task analysis the one hazards that stand out in its

respective category is the deer population in the Natural Area/Forest. There are other potential

hazards as well such as blown out taxiway/runway lights and ice during winter, but the ever

present deer always manages to be a threatening hazard. Although the deer hazard is always

visible, there are other possible hazards around the airport that are latent and undetected. When

we conduct our daily inspections checking the runway/taxiway and the fuel farm we must scan

every carefully and take notes on what oddities we might find. We have to keep in mind that the

biggest goal of hazard identification is to spot discrepancies and irregularities that look off,

regardless of how harmless it might seem. In order for these hazard reports to be documented we

must establish a computerized hazard management system that is capable of tracking and is

paperless (Lu, et. al, 2011). We start by creating an excel database in which the user interface is

designed to be intuitive for employees. This database will include the date/time and a row which

will include a drop down column of the hazard type, weather, wind, and visibility. On the next

column it will contain a box where the operator will fill out his personal observation describing

the potential hazard that he saw. Another feature that will heighten the visualization is to add a

centralized airport map that allows each hazard entry’s location to be hyperlinked to it. So if the

database gets created and first 3 observations are inputted, then the accompanied airport map will

show all three hazards like little pins with hyperlinked information. This visual reference of the

airport map showing all the identified hazards will make it easy for the airport manager to

discern areas of interest and will create trends and will allow for the evaluating of risk.

Risks are disruptions resulting from the unpredictability of the future caused by

accidental derogation possibilities of planned targets (Muller, et. al, 2014). Risk is basically the

likelihood that harm or damage will come to a person or aircraft through a hazard. Risk is

measured in terms of severity and probability that an occurrence of a hazard will happen. After

identifying our deer hazard we must conduct a thorough risk analysis by listing possible

outcomes that might result from the presence of deer near the runway. There has been over 1,112

deer strikes at GA airports within the 24 years (FAA, 2013). One possible outcome is the risk of

deer striking an aircraft during a landing or takeoff, which can severely damage the aircraft and

can cause serious injury or death. After determining the severity of the outcome and the

likelihood that it might happen, it is safe to say that the risk is unacceptable and action is

required to mitigate this safety issue. The only one option for mitigation is to add a high barrier

fence along the front of the airfield facing the road and industrial park. The current fences along

this area are about 5 feet and can be easily jumped by an able deer during the night. We must

replace the old fence with a brand new high barrier fence that’s at least 8 feet and includes

barbed wire, just like the fences we have facing the metro rails and the forest. With SRM, we are

able to create necessary procedures for identifying hazards and their associated risks within our

airport. If the mitigation is sufficient for a prescribed period, then the process can graduate to the

safety assurance component (Lu, et. al, 2011).

Safety Assurance (SA)

Safety Assurance (SA) is essentially an organization’s effort in making sure the guarantee

of safety goals are being met and thoroughly accomplished. Additionally, the organization’s duty

in SA is to ensure that the controls put in place to mitigate a risk/hazard are working properly

and efficiently. The 3 main processes of SA are Performance monitoring and measurement

(PMM), Change Management (CM), and Continuous Improvement (CI).

With PMM, SA further requires systematic monitoring of operations in order to detect

new hazards so that organizations can find ways to revise existing procedures and practices that

would maintain safety. Going back to the deer issue in CGS, let’s say we hypothetically, after

analyzing and assessing the risk through the process of Safety Risk Management (SRM) we

decide to put up a high barrier fence (the control) around the perimeter of the airport in order to

keep the deer out of airport grounds and mitigate any risk of deer incursion. After the placement

of this risk control, our task now is to measure the effectiveness of this control in conjunction

with our safety objectives. In order to accurately measure performance of the control, we need to

collect relevant data that demonstrates the effectiveness of the fence in keeping the deer out. A

good base to start out with is to create a flow chart and tally the number of deer that are spotted

on airport grounds before and after the control is put in place. With the raw data collected from

the flow chart we can then analyze and transform it into tangible information that can be used to

confirm the validity of the control based on the expected performance (safety objective). If all

goes well and the data confirms the high barrier reduced the number of deer sightings to zero,

then we’ve accomplished our safety objective in mitigating the risk of deer, with SA allowing us

to confirm that fact.

If by chance through the process of SA we happen to spot more deer after the placement

of the previous control, or if airports sudden expansion added new hazards then we have to go

through the step of Change Management (CM). This process will require us to revert back to the

process of SRM and further analyze/assess the related risks and fix the existing control or design

a new one in order to keep out the deer. Once we have gone through that process we can add

additional controls that would mitigate the risks associated with those newly identified hazards

and then we return back to monitoring our controls which is done through Continuous

Improvement (CI). Through the collection of data from new and existing controls as well as

employee reports and evaluations, CI will allows us to validate the effectiveness of the risk

controls, and would allow us to increase our confidence in the functioning of our safety program.

SA is an essential part in having confidence in our mitigation strategies. SA provides processes

and procedures to ensure mitigations developed through the airport’s SRM are functioning

effectively. Processes and procedures remain in the SA phase unless additional unresolved

hazards are identified (Lu, et. al, 2011).

Safety Promotion

To boost a sound safety culture, an organization must constantly strive for safety

excellence and promote safety as the core value (Stolzer, et. al, 2008). If enacted, our airport

manager must do everything he can to encourage us operators into staying committed and

interested in the process of SMS. The modes of promotion include safety policies and

procedures, newsletters, and presentations which should harmonize and develop the

organization’s safety culture (Muller, et. al, 2014). The manager must make sure that all

operators are properly trained to work with SMS and understand airport’s safety culture A way

of promoting sound safety culture is to have a poster or two hung up in the ops building, and the

manager actively communicating the importance of the SMS policies, procedures, and other

relevant information. Meetings should be conducted with all staff in which we all get together

annually to discuss prevailing issues and safety objectives. Safety should be seen as the core

value within our airport and should be the main talking point when we have our meetings. Our

safety culture should encourage reporting of safety-related issues, no matter how insignificant it

might seem. We need to foster a non-punitive environment that allows operators to freely

document mistakes and unsafe practices. Non-Punitive culture allows mandatory and voluntary

safety reporting programs to provide valuable information from the reporting of unintentional

errors and mishaps (Mateou, et. al, 2010). Another effective way to promote safety is to use

websites, bulletins, and email to circulate safety information and guidance amongst our staff.

There’s only 7 of us including the manger so it won’t be difficult to get the message around, the

only thing is that we’re all generally separated from each other between shifts so the manager

will take most of the burden in sharing the message. For purposes of training, we must develop

personnel training and record keeping program that meets the requirements developed under the

airport’s SMS program. Overall Safety Promotion provides processes and procedures to foster an

airport’s safety environment and further encourages support of SMS. Safety Promotion will offer

the much need structure for SMS sustainability through constant awareness and training for

airport operators.

Conclusion

SMS increasingly gaining recognition amongst all aviation services providers, it is

imperative for our airport to follow the trend and plan for full implementation. Our airport is

opening a brand new operations building around December 2015 and it will mark a new

beginning for our airport. We’ve been mired by profit losses and inactivity of flight operations

since 9/11 and a lot of negative air was circulating around this airport since. Now we with our

new manager, we are determined to create change within our airport and bring new services and

amenities for pilots. With the turning of the new leaf we want to build steps toward enacting

SMS and bring proactive safety in the mix. I am confident that we can use the 4 pillars of SMS

to guide us in creating a framework for proactive tools and procedures that will help us identify

hazards and its associated risks, regardless of our budget constraints.

References

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