272Phil.147

ENBANC

[G.R.No.83896,February22,1991]

CIVILLIBERTIESUNION,PETITIONER,VS.THEEXECUTIVESECRETARY,RESPONDENT.

[G.R.NO.83815.FEBRUARY22,1991]

ANTIGRAFTLEAGUEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,INC.ANDCRISPINT.REYES,PETITIONERS,VS.PHILIPELLAC.JUICO,ASSECRETARYOFAGRARIANREFORMCARLOS

DOMINGUEZ,ASSECRETARYOFAGRICULTURELOURDESQUISUMBING,ASSECRETARYOFEDUCATION,CULTUREANDSPORTSFULGENCIOFACTORAN,JR.,ASSECRETARYOFENVIRONMENTANDNATURALRESOURCESVICENTEV.JAYME,ASSECRETARYOFFINANCESEDFREYORDONEZ,AS

SECRETARYOFJUSTICEFRANKLINN.DRILON,ASSECRETARYOFLABORANDEMPLOYMENTLUISSANTOS,ASSECRETARYOFLOCALGOVERNMENTFIDELV.RAMOS,ASSECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSETEODOROF.BENIGNO,ASPRESSSECRETARYJUANITOFERRER,ASSECRETARYOFPUBLICWORKSANDHIGHWAYSANTONIOARRIZABAL,AS

SECRETARYOFSCIENCEANDTECHNOLOGYJOSECONCEPCION,ASSECRETARYOFTRADEANDINDUSTRYJOSEANTONIOGONZALEZ,ASSECRETARYOFTOURISMALFREDOR.A.BENGZON,ASSECRETARYOFHEALTH

REINERIOD.REYES,ASSECRETARYOFTRANSPORTATIONANDCOMMUNICATIONGUILLERMOCARAGUE,AS

COMMISSIONEROFTHEBUDGETANDSOLITAMONSOD,ASHEADOFTHENATIONALECONOMICDEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY,RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

FERNAN,C.J.:

These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9,1988[1] and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of theunconstitutionalityofExecutiveOrderNo.284 issuedbyPresidentCorazonC. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailedExecutiveOrderare:

"SECTION1.Evenifallowedbylaworbytheordinaryfunctionsof his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or

assistant secretary or other appointive officials of theExecutiveDepartment may, in addition to his primary position, hold notmore than two positions in the government and governmentcorporations and receive the corresponding compensationtherefor Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hocbodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies ofwhichthePresidentistheChairman.

"SECTION 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary orassistant secretary or other appointive official of the ExecutiveDepartmentholdsmorepositionsthanwhatisallowedinSection1hereof,they(sic)mustrelinquishtheexcesspositioninfavorofthesubordinateofficialwho isnext in rank,but innocaseshallanyofficial holdmore than twopositionsother thanhis primaryposition.

"SECTION 3. In order to fully protect the interest of thegovernment in governmentowned or controlled corporations, atleast onethird (1/3) of the members of the boards of suchcorporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, orassistantsecretary."

Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allowsmembersoftheCabinet,theirundersecretariesandassistantsecretariestohold other government offices or positions in addition to their primarypositions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter toSection13,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitution,[2]whichprovidesasfollows:

"Sec. 13. The President, VicePresident, the Members of theCabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unlessotherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office oremployment during their tenure. They shall not, during saidtenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,participate in any business, or be financially interested in anycontractwith,orinanyfranchise,orspecialprivilegegrantedbythe Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries. Theyshallstrictlyavoidconflictof interest intheconductoftheiroffice.

It is alleged that the abovequoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits publicrespondents,asmembersoftheCabinet,alongwiththeotherpublicofficialsenumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex C in G.R. No.83815[3]andasAnnex"B"inG.R.No.83896[4]fromholdinganyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure.InadditiontoseekingdeclarationoftheunconstitutionalityofExecutiveOrderNo.284,petitionerAntiGraftLeagueof the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of theextraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a temporaryrestraining order directing public respondents therein to cease and desist

fromholding,inadditiontotheirprimarypositions,dualormultiplepositionsotherthanthoseauthorizedbythe1987Constitutionandfromreceivinganysalaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of privileges and the likeappurtenanttotheirquestionedpositions,andcompellingpublicrespondentstoreturn,reimburseorrefundanyandallamountsorbenefitsthattheymayhavereceivedfromsuchpositions.

Specifically, petitioner AntiGraft League of the Philippines charges thatnotwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and selfexecuting" provision ofthe1987Constitution,thenSecretaryofJusticeSedfreyOrdonez,construingSection13,ArticleVIIinrelationtoSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXB,renderedon July 23, 1987Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,[5] declaring that Cabinetmembers, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant secretariesmayholdotherpublicoffice, includingmembership in theboardsofgovernmentcorporations: (a) when directly provided for in the Constitution as in thecaseof theSecretaryof Justicewho ismadeanexofficiomemberof theJudicialandBarCouncilunderSection8,paragraph1,ArticleVIIIor(b)ifallowedbylawor(c)ifallowedbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheirrespectivepositions and that on the basis of this Opinion, the President of thePhilippines,onJuly25,1987,ortwo(2)daysbeforeCongressconvenedonJuly27,1987,promulgatedExecutiveOrderNo.284.[6]

PetitionerAntiGraft Leagueof the Philippines objects to bothDOJOpinionNo. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together"Section13,ArticleVIIandthegeneralprovisioninanotherarticle,Section7,par. (2),Article IXB. This "strained linkagebetween the twoprovisions,eachaddressedtoadistinctandseparategroupofpublicofficersone,thePresidentandherofficialfamily,andtheother,publicservantsingeneralallegedly"abolishedtheclearlyseparate,higher,exclusive,andmandatoryconstitutional rankassigned to theprohibitionagainstmultiple jobs for thePresident, the VicePresident, the members of the Cabinet, and theirdeputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected toleadbyexample."[7]ArticleIXB,Section7,par.(2)[8]provides:

"Sec.7.xxxxxxxxx

"Unlessotherwiseallowedby laworby theprimary functionsofhis position, no appointive official shall hold any other office oremployment in the government or any subdivision, agency orinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries."

TheSolicitorGeneralcountersthatDepartmentofJustice(DOJ)OpinionNo.73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No.129,seriesof1987[9]andDOJOpinionNo.155,seriesof1988,[10]beingthefirst official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice ofSection 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article IXB of theConstitution,involvingthesamesubjectofappointmentsordesignationsof

anappointiveexecutiveofficialtopositionsotherthanhisprimaryposition,is"reasonablyvalidandconstitutionallyfirm,"andthatExecutiveOrderNo.284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of 1987 isconsequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion No. 129,series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988 construed thelimitationimposedbyE.O.No.284asnotapplyingtoexofficiopositionsortopositionswhich,althoughnotsodesignatedasexofficioareallowedbytheprimaryfunctionsofthepublicofficial,butonlytotheholdingofmultiplepositionswhicharenotrelatedtoornecessarily included inthepositionofthepublicofficialconcerned(disparatepositions).

Insum,theconstitutionalityofExecutiveOrderNo.284isbeingchallengedbypetitionersontheprincipalsubmissionthatitaddsexceptionstoSection13,ArticleVIIother than thoseprovided in theConstitution. According topetitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in thisConstitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office oremploymentinGovernmentarethoseprovidedintheConstitution,namely:(1)TheVicePresidentmaybeappointedasaMemberoftheCabinetunderSection3,par.(2),ArticleVIIthereofand(2)theSecretaryofJusticeisanexofficiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncilbyvirtueofSection8(1),ArticleVIII.

Petitioners furtherargue that theexception to theprohibition inSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXBontheCivilServiceCommissionappliestoofficersandemployees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do notapply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which appliesspecifically to the President, VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet andtheirdeputiesorassistants.

ThereisnodisputethattheprohibitionagainstthePresident,VicePresident,themembers of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants from holdingdual ormultiple positions in theGovernment admit of certain exceptions.The disagreement between petitioners and public respondents lies on theconstitutionalbasisoftheexception.Petitioners insistthatbecauseofthephrase"unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution"usedinSection13ofArticleVII,theexceptionmustbeexpresslyprovidedintheConstitution,asinthecaseoftheVicePresidentbeingallowedtobecomeaMemberoftheCabinetunderthesecondparagraphofSection3,ArticleVIIortheSecretaryof Justice being designated an exofficio member of the Judicial and BarCouncilunderArticleVIII,Sec.8(1).Publicrespondents,ontheotherhand,maintain that thephrase"unlessotherwiseprovided in theConstitution" inSection13,ArticleVIImakes reference toSection7,par. (2),Article IXBinsofarastheappointiveofficialsmentionedthereinareconcerned.

The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13,Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, theirdeputiesorassistantsareconcernedadmitofthebroadexceptionsmadeforappointiveofficials ingeneralunderSection7,par. (2),Article IXBwhich,foreasyreferenceisquotedanew,thus:"Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaw

orby theprimary functionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficial shallholdanyotherofficeoremploymenttheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyor instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlledcorporationortheirsubsidiaries."

Weruleinthenegative.

Afoolproofyardstickinconstitutionalconstructionistheintentionunderlyingtheprovisionunderconsideration.Thus, ithasbeenheldthattheCourt inconstruing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to beaccomplishedbyitsadoption,andtheevils, ifany,soughttobepreventedorremedied.Adoubtfulprovisionwillbeexaminedinthelightofthehistoryof the times, and the condition and circumstances under which theConstitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason whichinducedtheframersoftheConstitutiontoenacttheparticularprovisionandthe purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe thewhole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated toeffectthatpurpose.[11]

The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies andassistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of variousgovernment agencies and instrumentalities, including governmentownedand controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislativepowers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E.Marcospursuant tohismartial lawauthority. Therewasaproliferationofnewlycreated agencies, instrumentalities and governmentowned andcontrolledcorporationscreatedbypresidentialdecreesandothermodesofpresidential issuanceswhereCabinetmembers,theirdeputiesorassistantswere designated to head or sit as members of the board with thecorresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and otherperquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have remainedup tothepresenttime.

Thispracticeofholdingmultipleofficesorpositionsinthegovernmentsoonled to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of thisscheme for purposes of self enrichment. In fact, the holding of multipleofficesingovernmentwasstronglydenouncedontheflooroftheBatasangPambansa.[12]ThiscondemnationcameinreactiontothepublishedreportoftheCommissiononAudit,entitled"1983SummaryAnnualAuditReporton:GovernmentOwnedandControlledCorporations,SelfGoverningBoardsandCommissions"whichcarriedasitsFigureNo.4a"RosterofMembershipinGoverningBoardsofGovernmentOwnedandControlledCorporationsasofDecember31,1983."

Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety andmoralityingovernmentservicewerethedatacontainedthereinthatRobertoV. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of twentynine (29)governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations Imelda R.

Marcosoftwentythree(23)CesarE.A.Virataoftwentytwo(22)ArturoR.Tanco,Jr.of fifteen(15)JesusS.HipolitoandGeronimoZ.Velasco,offourteen each (14) Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13) Ruben B. AnchetaandJoseA.Ronooftwelve(12)eachManuelP.Alba,GilbertoO.Teodoro,andEdgardoTordesillasofeleven(11)eachandLiliaBautistaandTeodoroQ.Penaoften(10)each.[13]

TheblatantbetrayalofpublictrustevolvedintooneoftheseriouscausesofdiscontentwiththeMarcosregime.Itwasthereforequiteinevitableandinconsonancewith the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986ConstitutionalCommission,convenedasitwasafterthepeoplesuccessfullyunseated former President Marcos, should draft into its proposedConstitution the provisions under consideration which are envisioned toremedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of multiplegovernmentalofficesandemployment. In fact,askeenlyobservedbyMr.Justice Isagani A.Cruz during the deliberations in these cases, one of thestrongestsellingpointsofthe1987Constitutionduringthecampaignforitsratificationwas theassurancegivenby itsproponents that thescandalouspractice of Cabinetmembers holdingmultiple positions in the governmentand collecting unconscionably excessive compensation therefromwould bediscontinued.

ButwhatisindeedsignificantisthefactthatalthoughSection7,ArticleIXBalreadycontainsablanketprohibitionagainsttheholdingofmultipleofficesor employment in thegovernment subsumingboth elective andappointivepublicofficials, theConstitutionalCommissionshouldsee it fit to formulateanotherprovision,Sec.13,ArticleVII,specificallyprohibitingthePresident,VicePresident,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsfromholdinganyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheirtenure,unlessotherwiseprovidedintheConstitutionitself.

Evidently, from thismove as well as in the different phraseologies of theconstitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of theConstitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and hisofficial family in so far as holding other offices or employment in thegovernmentorelsewhereisconcerned.

Moreover,suchintentisunderscoredbyacomparisonofSection13,ArticleVII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications ofcertain public officials or employees from holding other offices oremployment.UnderSection13,ArticleVI,"(N)oSenatororMemberoftheHouse of Representativemay hold any other office or employment in theGovernment. . .. Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of thearmed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in anycapacity to a civilian position in the Government, including governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsoranyoftheirsubsidiaries."EvenSection7(2), Article IXB, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless otherwiseallowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive

officialshallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernment."

It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to holdother office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office oremployment in the government and governmentowned or controlledcorporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording ofSection13,ArticleVIIwhichstatesthat(T)hePresident,VicePresident,theMembers of theCabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution,holdanyotherofficeoremploymentduringtheir tenure."Inthe latterprovision, thedisqualification isabsolute,not being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The prohibitionimposed on the President and his official family is therefore allembracingandcoversbothpublicandprivateofficeoremployment.

Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides:"Theyshallnot,duringsaidtenure,directlyorindirectly,practiceanyotherprofession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in anycontract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by theGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries." Thesesweeping, allembracing prohibitions imposed on the President and hisofficial family,which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other publicofficials or employees such as theMembers of Congress,members of thecivil service ingeneralandmembersof thearmed forces,areproofof theintentofthe1987ConstitutiontotreatthePresidentandhisofficialfamilyasclassbyitselfandtoimposeduponsaidclassstricterprohibitions.

Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with thePresident and his official family was also succinctly articulated byCommissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong notedduring the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetrybetween the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the GeneralProvisions and the anticipated report on the Executive Department.Commissioner Foz commented, "We actually have to be stricter with thePresident and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise morepowers and, therefore,more checks and restraints on them are called forbecausethereismorepossibilityofabuseintheircase."[14]

Thus,while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed toholdotherofficeoremploymentinthegovernmentduringtheirtenurewhensuch is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistantsmaydosoonlywhenexpresslyauthorizedby theConstitution itself. Inotherwords,Section7,ArticleIXB ismeantto laydownthegeneralruleapplicabletoallelectiveandappointivepublicofficialsandemployees,whileSection13,ArticleVIIismeant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident,MembersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesandassistants.

Thisbeingthecase,thequalifyingphrase"unlessotherwiseprovidedinthisConstitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the broadexceptionsprovidedunderSection7,ArticleIXBofthe1987Constitution.Toconstruesaidqualifyingphraseasrespondentswouldhaveusdo,wouldrender nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent and purpose of theframersoftheConstitutiontoimposeastricterprohibitiononthePresident,VicePresident,Membersof theCabinet, theirdeputiesandassistantswithrespect to holding other offices or employment in the government duringtheir tenure. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VIIadmitsof theexceptions found inSection7,par. (2)ofArticle IXBwouldobliteratethedistinctionsocarefullysetbytheframersoftheConstitutionas to when the highranking officials of the Executive Branch from thePresidenttoAssistantSecretary,ontheonehand,andthegeneralityofcivilservants fromthe rank immediatelybelowAssistantSecretarydownwards,ontheother,mayholdanyotherofficeorpositioninthegovernmentduringtheirtenure.

Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in questionwould rendercertain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation appliesparticularly to the VicePresident who, under Section 13 of Article VII isallowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by theConstitution,butwhoasanelectivepublicofficialunderSec.7,par.(1)ofArticle IXB is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in anycapacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to saythat the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found inSection 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article IXBwould render meaningless the specific provisions of the ConstitutionauthorizingtheVicePresidenttobecomeamemberoftheCabinet.[15]andto act as President without relinquishing the VicePresidency where thePresident shall not have chosen or fails to qualify.[16] Such absurdconsequence canbeavoidedonlyby interpreting the twoprovisionsunderconsideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article IXB providing thegeneral rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting theexceptionthereto. InthesamemannermustSection7,par.(2)ofArticleIXBbeconstruedvisavisSection13,ArticleVII.

It is a wellestablished rule in constitutional construction that no oneprovision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to beconsidered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particularsubjectaretobebroughtintoviewandtobesointerpretedastoeffectuatethe great purposes of the instrument.[17] Sections bearing on a particularsubjectshouldbeconsideredand interpreted togetheras toeffectuate thewholepurposeoftheConstitution[18]andonesectionisnottobeallowedtodefeatanother, ifbyanyreasonableconstruction, thetwocanbemadetostandtogether.[19]

Inotherwords,thecourtmustharmonizethem,ifpracticable,andmustleaninfavorofconstructionwhichwillrendereverywordoperative,ratherthan

onewhichmaymakethewordsidleandnugatory.[20]

Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is toimpose a stricter prohibition on the President, VicePresident,members ofthe Cabinet, their deputies and assistantswith respect to holdingmultipleofficesoremploymentinthegovernmentduringtheirtenure,theexceptionto this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, thelanguage of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must beunderstood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of theprivilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily,wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to beunderstoodas intended tobeapositiveandunequivocalnegation.[21] Thephrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given aliteral interpretation to refer only to thoseparticular instances cited in theConstitutionitself,towit:theVicePresidentbeingappointedasamemberoftheCabinetunderSection3,par.(2),ArticleVIIoractingasPresidentinthoseinstancesprovidedunderSection7,pars.(2)and(3),ArticleVIIand,the Secretary of Justice being exofficio member of the Judicial and BarCouncilbyvirtueofSection8(1),ArticleVIII.

TheprohibitionagainstholdingdualormultipleofficesoremploymentunderSection13,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionmustnot,however,beconstruedas applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified thereinwithoutadditionalcompensationinanexofficiocapacityasprovidedbylawand as required[22] by the primary functions of said officials office. Thereason is that these posts do not comprise "any other office" within thecontemplationoftheconstitutionalprohibitionbutareproperlyanimpositionofadditionaldutiesandfunctionsonsaidofficials.[23]Tocharacterizethesepostsotherwisewouldleadtoabsurdconsequences,amongwhichare:ThePresident of the Philippines cannot chair the National Security CouncilreorganizedunderExecutiveOrderNo.115 (December24,1986). Neithercan the VicePresident, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries ofNationalDefense,Justice,LaborandEmploymentandLocalGovernmentsitin this Council, which would then have no reason to exist for lack of achairperson andmembers. The respective undersecretaries and assistantsecretarieswouldalsobeprohibited.

TheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentcannotchairtheBoardofTrusteesof the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the PhilippineOverseasEmploymentAdministration(POEA),bothofwhichareattachedtohis department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither can hisUndersecretariesandAssistantSecretarieschairtheseagencies.

TheSecretariesofFinanceandBudgetcannotsitintheMonetaryBoard.[24]Neithercantheirrespectiveundersecretariesandassistantsecretaries.TheCentralBankGovernorwouldthenbeassistedby lowerrankingemployeesinprovidingpolicydirectionintheareasofmoney,bankingandcredit.[25]

Indeed,theframersofourConstitutioncouldnothaveintendedsuchabsurdconsequences.AConstitution,viewedasacontinuouslyoperativecharterofgovernment, is not to be interpreted as demanding the impossible or theimpracticableandunreasonableorabsurdconsequences,ifpossible,shouldbeavoided.[26]

To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to beinterpretedascoveringpositionsheldwithoutadditionalcompensationinexofficiocapacitiesasprovidedbylawandasrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheconcernedofficial'soffice.Thetermexofficiomeans"fromofficebyvirtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official charactermerely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but ratherannexedtotheofficialposition."Exofficiolikewisedenotesan"actdoneinanofficial character, or as a consequenceof office, andwithout anyotherappointmentorauthoritythanthatconferredbytheoffice."[27]Anexofficiomemberofaboardisonewhoisamemberbyvirtueofhistitletoacertainoffice, and without further warrant or appointment.[28] To illustrate, byexpress provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation andCommunications is the exofficio Chairman of the Board of the PhilippinePortsAuthority,[29]andtheLightRailTransitAuthority.[30]

TheCourthadoccasion to explain themeaningof anexofficio position inRafaelvs.EmbroideryandApparelControland InspectionBoard,[31] thus:"Anexaminationofsection2ofthequestionedstatute(R.A.3137)revealsthatforthechairmanandmembersoftheBoardtoqualifytheyneedonlybedesignatedbytherespectivedepartmentheads.Withtheexceptionoftherepresentative from the private sector, they sit exofficio. In order to bedesignatedtheymustalreadybeholdingpositions intheofficesmentionedin the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a previousappointmentintheBureauofCustoms,cannot,undertheact,bedesignateda representative from that office. The same is true with respect to therepresentatives from the other offices. No new appointments arenecessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives sodesignatedmerelyperformduties in theBoard inaddition to thosealreadyperformedundertheiroriginalappointments."[32]

The term primary used to describe "functions" refers to the order ofimportance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is notrestricted to the singular but may refer to the plural.[33] The additionalduties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by theofficial'sprimaryfunctions.Examplesofdesignationstopositionsbyvirtueofone'sprimaryfunctionsaretheSecretariesofFinanceandBudgetsittingasmembersoftheMonetaryBoard,andtheSecretaryofTransportationandCommunication acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority[34]andtheCivilAeronauticsBoard.

If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotelyrelated,inconsistent,incompatible,orotherwisealientotheprimaryfunctionofacabinetofficial,suchadditionalfunctionswouldfallunderthepurviewof"anyotheroffice"prohibitedbytheConstitution.AnexamplewouldbethePress Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the PhilippineAmusement and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to suchpositionswhichconferonthecabinetofficialmanagement functionsand/ormonetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships ordirectorships in governmentowned or controlled corporations and theirsubsidiaries.

Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, VicePresident,Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistentwith thosealreadyprescribedby theirofficesorappointmentsbyvirtueoftheir special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executiveoffices is apractice longrecognized inmany jurisdictions. It is apracticejustified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity andcoordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in thedischarge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing lawsaffectingnational interestandgeneralwelfareanddeliveringbasicservicestothepeople.It isconsistentwiththepowervestedonthePresidentandhis alter egos, the Cabinetmembers, to have control of all the executivedepartments,bureausandofficesandtoensurethatthelawsarefaithfullyexecuted.[35]WithouttheseadditionaldutiesandfunctionsbeingassignedtothePresidentandhisofficialfamilytositinthegoverningbodiesorboardsof governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an exofficio capacity asprovidedby lawandas requiredby theirprimary functions, theywouldbedeprived of themeans for control and supervision, thereby resulting in anunwieldyandconfusedbureaucracy.

It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties orfunctionsmaynottransgresstheprohibitionembodiedinSection13,ArticleVII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must berequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheofficialconcerned,whoistoperformthesameinanexofficiocapacityasprovidedbylaw,withoutreceivinganyadditionalcompensationtherefor.

Theexoficiopositionbeingactuallyand in legal contemplationpartof theprincipaloffice, it followsthattheofficialconcernedhasnorighttoreceiveadditionalcompensationforhisservicesinthesaidposition.Thereasonisthat these servicesarealreadypaid for and coveredby the compensationattached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, theSecretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an exoficiomemberthereof,he isactuallyand in legalcontemplationperformingtheprimaryfunctionofhisprincipalofficeindefiningpolicyinmonetaryandbankingmatters,whichcomeunderthejurisdictionofhisdepartment. Forsuch attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extracompensation,whetheritbeintheformofaperdiemoranhonorariumor

an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it isdesignated,suchadditionalcompensationisprohibitedbytheConstitution.

ItisinterestingtonotethatduringthefloordeliberationsontheproposalofCommissionerChristianMonsod toadd toSection7,par. (2),Article IXB,originallyfoundasSection3oftheGeneralProvisions,theexception"unlessrequired by the functions of his position,"[36] express reference to certainhighranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet weremade.[37]RespondingtoaqueryofCommissionerBlasOple,CommissionerMonsodpointedoutthatthereareinstanceswhenalthoughnotrequiredbycurrent law,membershipofcertainhighrankingexecutiveofficials inotheroffices and corporations is necessary by reason of said officials' primaryfunctions.TheexamplegivenbyCommissionerMonsodwastheMinisterofTradeandIndustry.[38]

WhilethisexchangebetweenCommissionersMonsodandOplemaybeusedasauthorityforsayingthatadditionalfunctionsanddutiesflowingfromtheprimaryfunctionsoftheofficialmaybeimposeduponhimwithoutoffendingthe constitutional prohibition under consideration, it cannot, however, betakenasauthority for saying that this exception isbyvirtueofSection7,par.(2)ofArticleIXB.ThiscolloquybetweenthetwoCommissionerstookplace in the plenary session of September 27, 1986. Under considerationthenwasSection3ofCommitteeResolutionNo.531whichwastheproposedarticleonGeneralProvisions.[39]Atthattime,thearticleontheCivilServiceCommissionhadbeenapprovedonthirdreadingonJuly22,1986,[40]whilethe article on the Executive Department, containing the more specificprohibitioninSection13,hadalsobeenearlierapprovedonthirdreadingonAugust26,1986.[41]ItwasonlyafterthedraftConstitutionhadundergonereformattingand"styling"bytheCommitteeonStylethatsaidSection3ofGeneralProvisionsbecameSection7,par.(2)ofArticleIXBandreworded"Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition..."

Whatwasclearlybeingdiscussedthenweregeneralprincipleswhichwouldserve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of specific constitutionalprovisionsonthematter.Whatwasprimarilyatissueandapprovedonthatoccasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase "primaryfunctions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule covering allappointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission intended todilutethespecificprohibitioninsaidSection13ofArticleVII, itcouldhavereworded said Section 13 to conform to thewider exceptions provided inthenSection3oftheproposedGeneralProvisions,laterplacedasSection7,par.(2)ofArticleIXBontheCivilServiceCommission.

ThatthisexceptionwouldinthefinalanalysisapplyalsotothePresidentandhis official family is by reason of the legal principles governing additionalfunctionsanddutiesofpublicofficialsratherthanbyvirtueofSection7,par.

2,ArticleIXB.Atanyrate,wehavemadeitclearthatonlytheadditionalfunctions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by the primaryfunctionsmaybeconsideredasnotconstituting"anyotheroffice."

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates andproceedingsoftheconstitutionalconventioninordertoarriveatthereasonand purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort theretomay be had onlywhen other guides fail[42] as said proceedings are powerless to vary theterms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in theconstitutionalconvention"areofvalueasshowingtheviewsoftheindividualmembers,andasindicatingthereasonsfortheirvotes,buttheygiveusnolightastotheviewsofthelargemajoritywhodidnottalk,muchlessofthemassofourfellowcitizenswhosevotesatthepollsgavethatinstrumenttheforceoffundamentallaw.Wethinkitsafertoconstruetheconstitutionfromwhatappearsuponitsface."[43]Theproperinterpretationthereforedependsmore on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in theframers'understandingthereof.[44]

Itbeingclear,asitwasinfactoneof itsbestsellingpoints,thatthe1987ConstitutionseekstoprohibitthePresident,VicePresident,membersoftheCabinet,theirdeputiesorassistantsfromholdingduringtheirtenuremultipleofficesoremploymentinthegovernment,exceptinthosecasesspecifiedinthe Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts heldwithoutadditionalcompensationinanexofficiocapacityasprovidedbylawand as required by the primary functions of their office, the citation ofCabinetmembers(thencalledMinisters)asexamplesduringthedebateanddeliberationonthegeneralrulelaiddownforallappointiveofficialsshouldbeconsidered as mere personal opinions which cannot override theconstitution'smanifestintentandthepeople'sunderstandingthereof.

InthelightoftheconstructiongiventoSection13,ArticleVIIinrelationtoSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXBofthe1987Constitution,ExecutiveOrderNo.284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting thenumber of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistantsecretariesmayhold inadditiontotheirprimarypositiontonotmorethantwo(2)positionsinthegovernmentandgovernmentcorporations,ExecutiveOrderNo.284actuallyallowsthemtoholdmultipleofficesoremploymentindirectcontraventionoftheexpressmandateofSection13,ArticleVIIofthe1987Constitutionprohibitingthemfromdoingso,unlessotherwiseprovidedinthe1987Constitutionitself.

TheCourtisalertedbyrespondentstotheimpracticalconsequencesthatwillresultfromastrictapplicationoftheprohibitionmandatedunderSection13,Article VII on the operations of the Government, considering that Cabinetmemberswouldbestrippedoftheirofficesheldinanexofficiocapacity,byreason of their primary positions or by virtue of legislation. As earlierclarified in this decision, exofficio posts held by the executive officialconcerned without additional compensation as provided by law and as

requiredbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisofficedonotfallunderthedefinitionof "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutionalprohibition. With respect tootherofficesor employmentheldbyvirtueoflegislation,includingchairmanshipsordirectorshipsingovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsandtheirsubsidiaries,sufficeittosaythatthefearedimpractical consequences aremore apparent than real. Being head of anexecutive department is no mean job. It is more than a fulltime job,requiring full attention, specialized knowledge, skills and expertise. Ifmaximumbenefits are tobederived fromadepartmenthead's ability andexpertise,heshouldbeallowed toattend tohisdutiesand responsibilitieswithout the distraction of other governmental offices or employment. Heshouldbeprecludedfromdissipatinghisefforts,attentionandenergyamongtoomanypositionsofresponsibility,whichmayresultinhaphazardnessandinefficiency.Surelytheadvantagestobederivedfromthisconcentrationofattention,knowledgeandexpertise,particularlyatthisstageofournationalandeconomicdevelopment, faroutweigh thebenefits, if any, thatmaybegained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking inmorethanwhathecanhandle.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the CourtherebyordersrespondentsSecretaryofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesFulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government[45] Luis Santos,SecretaryofNationalDefenseFidelV.Ramos,SecretaryofHealthAlfredoR.A.BengzonandSecretaryof theBudgetGuillermoCaragueto immediatelyrelinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in thegovernment, including governmentowned or controlled corporations andtheir subsidiaries. With respect to the other named respondents, thepetitionshavebecomemootandacademicastheyarenolongeroccupyingthepositionscomplainedof.

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may beconsideredde factoofficersandas suchentitled toemoluments foractualservicesrendered.[46]Ithasbeenheldthat"incaseswherethere isnodejureofficer,adefactoofficer,who,ingoodfaithhashadpossessionoftheofficeandhasdischargedthedutiespertainingthereto,islegallyentitledtotheemolumentsoftheoffice,andmayinanappropriateactionrecoverthesalary, feesandothercompensationsattachedto theoffice. Thisdoctrineis,undoubtedly,supportedonequitablegroundssince itseemsunjust thatthepublicshouldbenefitbytheservicesofanofficerdefactoand thenbefreed fromall liability topayanyone for such services.[47] Any per diem,allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue ofactual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore beretainedbythem.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification abovestated, the petitions areGRANTED.ExecutiveOrderNo.284isherebydeclarednullandvoidandisaccordinglysetaside.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,MelencioHerrera,Gutierrez, Jr.,Cruz,Paras,Feliciano,Gancayco,Padilla,Bidin,Medialdea,Regalado,andDavide,Jr.,JJ.,concur.Sarmiento,andGrinoAquino,JJ.,nopart.

[1]p.71,RolloinG.R.No.83815andp.28,RolloinG.R.No.83896.

[2]Underscoringsupplied.

[3]pp,2930,Rollo.

[4]pp.1021,Rollo.

[5]Annex"A",Petition,G.R.No.83815,pp.2124,Rollo.

[6] Thereby, petitioner alleges, eliciting adverse published commentariesfromCONCOMCommissionersFr. JoaquinG.Bernas,S. J. andRegaladoE.Maambong, Congressman Rodolfo Albano of Isabela, and retired SupremeCourt JusticeFelixQ.Antonio,Annexes"D", Eand"F",Petition,G.R.No.83815,pp.4064,Rollo. CONCOMVicePresidentAmbrosioB. Padilla, in apublishedarticlecitedintheannexes,alsocommentedonEO284.

[7]p.11,RolloinG.R.No.83815.

[8]Underscoringsupplied.

[9]Annex"I",Comment,G.R.No.83896,pp.6267,Rollo.

[10]Annex"2",Ibid.,pp.6871,Rollo.

[11]Maxwellvs.Dow,176U.S.581,20Sup.Ct.448,44L.Ed.597.

[12]R.B.No.95,Monday,March11,1985,RecordoftheBatasan,VolumeIV,pp.835836.

[13]pp.1114.

[14]Recordofthe1986ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.I,p.553.

[15]Sec.3,Ibid.

[16]Sec.7,ArticleVII.

[17]OldWayneMut.LifeAsso.vs.McDonough,204U.S.8,51LEd.345,27SCt236Wallacevs.Payne,197Cal539,241P.879.

[18]Grantzvs.Grauman(Ky)320SW2d364Runyonvs.Smith,308Ky73,212SW2d521.

[19]Peoplevs.Wright,6Col.92.

[20]ThomasM.Colley,ATreatiseontheConstitutionalLimitations,Vol.I,p.128, citing AttorneyGeneral vs. Detroit and Erin Plank Road Co., 2 Mich.114Peoplevs.Burns,5Mich.114DistrictTownshipvs.Dubuque,7Iowa262.

[21]Varneyvs.Justice,86Ky5966S.W.457Huntvs.State,22Tex.App.396,3S.W.233.

[22]Asopposedtotheterm"allowed"usedinSection7,par.(2),ArticleIXB of the Constitution, which is permissive. "Required suggests animposition,andtherefore,obligatoryinnature.

[23]Martinv.Smith,140A.L.R.1073Ashmorev.GreaterGreenvilleSewerDistrict,173A.L.R.407.

[24]ExecutiveOrderNo.16,May9,1986,82O.G.2117.

[25]Sec.20,Art.XII,1987Constitution.

[26] Hirabayashi vs. United States, 320U.S. 81, 87 L. Ed. 1774, 63 S. Ct.1375OppCottonMills, Inc. vs.AdministratorofWageandHourDiv., 312U.S.126,85L.Ed.624,61S.Ct.524Gagevs.Jordan,23Cal2d794,174P2d287,citedin16AmJur2d,pp.100,464.

[27]Black'sLawDictionary,p.51615AWordsandPhrases,p.392.

[28]15AWordsandPhrases,p.392.

[29]Sec.7,E.O.778.

[30]Sec.1,E.O.210.

[31]21SCRA336(1967).

[32]Underscoringsupplied.

[33]33AWordsandPhrases,p.210,citingCollectorofRevenuevs.Louisiana

ReadyMixCo.,La.App.,197S.2d141,145.

[34]Sec.7,P.D.No.474.

[35]Section17,ArticleVII.

[36]Thephrase thatappears in theConstitution isnot "Unless requiredbythe primary functions" but "Unless otherwise allowed by law or by theprimaryfunctions..."

[37]Recordofthe1986ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V,pp.165166.

[38]Underscoringsupplied,Ibid.,p.165.

[39]Ibid.,Vol.V.,pp.8081.

[40]Ibid.,Vol.II,p.94.

[41]Ibid.,Vol.III,p.710.

[42]16CorpusJurisSecumdum2.31,p.105.

[43]Commonwealthvs.Ralph,111Pa.365,3Atl220.

[44]HouseholdFinanceCorporationvs.Shaffner,203S.W.2d734,356Mo.808.

[45]NowDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernments.

[46]Castillovs.Arrieta,G.R.No.L31444,November13,1974,61SCRA55.

[47]Pattersonvs.Benson,112Pac.801,32L.R.A.(NS)949.

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