Hasegawa v. Kitamura (2007) Petitioner: KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Respondent: MINORU KITAMURA Ponencia: NACHURA, J. DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. FACTS:

1. Petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm, entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national residing in the Philippines. The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999.

2. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines.

3. When the STAR Project was near completion, the DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon for supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement project (BBRI) to which Kitamura was named as project manager.

4. Hasegawa, Nippons GM for its international division, informed Kitamura that the company had no plans of renewing the latters ICA hence his services will only be until the substantial completion of the STAR project.

5. Respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.

a. Nippon insisted that respondents contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.

6. Respondent consequently initiated Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.

7. Nippon contended that the RTC lacked jurisdiction because the ICA was perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals hence it moved to dismiss the complaint.

8. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration hence Nippon filed two petitions for certiorari before the CA. The first was dismissed due to lack of statement of material dates and for insufficient verification and certification against forum shopping.

Nippon however filed the second petition within the reglementary period fixing the defects and with the same issues.

9. CA eventually affirmed the ruling of the RTC. ISSUES:

1. WON the dismissal of the first petition for certiorari before the CA barred the filing of a second petition of the same nature.

2. WON Hasegawa was authorized to verify and certify the petition for certiorari filed before the CA.

3. Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens.

PROVISION: RULING + RATIO:

1. No When the CA dismissed the first petition for certiorari, it was

a dismissal without prejudice. The dismissal being without prejudice, petitioners can re-file

the petition, or file a second petition attaching thereto the appropriate verification and certificationas they, in fact didand stating therein the material dates, within the prescribed period in Section 4, Rule 65 of the said Rules.

Because the said dismissal is without prejudice and has no res judicata effect, and even if petitioners still indicated in the verification and certification of the second certiorari petition that the first had already been dismissed on procedural grounds, petitioners are no longer required by the Rules to indicate in their certification of non-forum shopping in the instant petition for review of the second certiorari petition, the status of the aforesaid first petition before the CA.

2. No Respondent contends that Hasegawa, Nippons GM, was

only authorized to verify and certify the first petition for certiorari and not the instant petition.

The court affirmed such fact however the Court has liberally applied the rules. Given that petitioners herein sufficiently explained their misgivings on this point and appended to their Reply an updated Authorization for Hasegawa to act on behalf of the company in the instant petition, the Court finds the same as sufficient compliance with the Rules.

However, Hasegawa was truly not authorized to verify and certify the petition because the authorizations for both

petitions were issued only by Nippon's president and chief executive officer, not by the company's board of directors.

We have ruled that corporate powers are exercised by the board of directors; thus, no person, not even its officers, can bind the corporation, in the absence of authority from the board.

3. No

Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the respondent. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts have no substantial relationship to the parties following the [state of the] most significant relationship rule in Private International Law.

To elucidate, in the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.

Analytically, jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.

In this case, only the first phase is at issuejurisdiction, particularly jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the claims.

What the petitioners raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the state of the most significant relationship rule.

i. Lex loci celebrationis law of the place of ceremony or law of the place where the contract is made

ii. Lex contractus law of the place where a contract is to be executed or performed.

iii. State of the most significant relationship rule to ascertain which state law to apply, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties

Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

Furthermore, the invocation of the choice of law rules was premature because the petitioners failed to point out any laws in conflict between Japanese laws and ours. Also, the laws in Japan were not pleaded and proved.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.

Digest Author: Bugsy FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE (2008)

Petitioner: Venancio Figueroa y Cervantes Respondent: People of the Philippines Ponencia: Nachura, J. DOCTRINE: The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. FACTS:

10. An information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against FIGUEROA before the RTC of Bulacan.

11. The trial court convicted FIGUEROA as charged. 12. An appeal was filed before the CA questioning, among others, for the

first time, the trial court's jurisdiction 13. The CA considered FIGUEROA to have actively participated in the

trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC; thus, he was already estopped by laches.

14. Dissatisfied, FIGUEROA filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:

WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case WON raising the issue of jurisdiction may be barred by laches

PROVISION: RULING + RATIO: NO

As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts, not the RTC.

NO GENERAL RULE: The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at

any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. o Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend

upon the will of the parties. The lack of it affects the very authority to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.

SIBONGHANOY RULING (Exception): Lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost 15 years after the questioned ruling has been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised for being barred by laches.

o Therefore, estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy

The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes

In the case at hand, petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal before the CA. Also, that no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.

DISPOSITION: GRANTED. Criminal case is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Formaran III (2009)

Petitioner: Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation Respondent: Hon. Pablo C. Formaran, Romeo Y. Tan, Roberto L. Obiedo and Atty. Tomas A. Reyes Ponencia: CHICO-NAZARIO, J. DOCTRINE: The court acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. Hence, payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. The determination of whether an action is not capable of pecuniary estimation must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each. FACTS:

15. Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents Tan and Obiedo secured by REM over 5 parcels of land.

16. Petitioner was unable to pay the loan. 17. Both parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA),

pursuant to which petitioner executed Deeds of Sale over the mortgaged parcels of land in favor of said respondents (dacion en pago arrangement).

a. The MoA also provided petitioner a right to redeem the properties.

b. Failure, however, to redeem the properties over the period stipulated would entitle respondents to have the properties registered in the Registry of Deeds for the issuance of TCTs under their name.

c. The Deeds of Sale were notarized by Atty. Reyes on the same day of execution.

18. Petitioner failed to redeem the properties and as consequence, respondents had the parcels of land registered under their name and new TCTs issued.

19. Petitioner filed before the RTC against respondents Tan, Obiedo and Atty. Reyes for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO.

20. Petitioner paid docket fees based on the fact that the action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

21. Respondents contend that petitioner failed to pay the correct docket fees since the action was actually a real action (docket fees should be based on value of the property involved)

ISSUES: 4. Whether or not petitioner paid the correct amount as docket fee.

PROVISION:

RULING + RATIO:

4. No Premise: The court acquires jurisdiction only upon the

payment of the prescribed docket fee. Hence, payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

To resolve the issue, it is necessary to determine the true nature of the Complaint.

i. The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or Complaint itself, rather than by tis title or heading.

ii. HOWEVER, the Court finds it necessary, in ascertaining the true nature of the case, to take into account facts and circumstances beyond the Complaint which petitioner failed to disclose.

Petitioner failed to disclose that the property was already in the name of the respondents and that the latter were already in possession of the property.

Hence, the true nature of the action is a real action involving the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property.

i. The docket fee should therefore be based on the value of the property and not on a fixed rate prescribed for actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Case-to-case basis determination: The determination of whether an action is not capable of pecuniary estimation must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts and circumstances of each. (p. 160 of Riano)

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

Chavez v. CA (2007)

Petitioner: Francisco Chavez and People of the Philippines Respondent: Court of Appeals, Rafael Baskias, Ricardo Manapat Ponencia: Tinga, J. DOCTRINE: Since the place of printing and first publication or the place of residence at the time are matters dealing with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of the RPC mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself. The absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective. FACTS:

22. An Information for libel was filed before the RTC of Manila against respondents Baskias (editor-in-chief) and Manapat (author), with petitioner Chavez as complainant.

23. The Information stated that the libelous articles were caused to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila

24. The RTC denied respondents motion to quash the information. The CA granted it.

25. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

5. WON the Information sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila

PROVISION: RULING + RATIO:

5. NO Art.360 of the RPC provides for the rules on venue for libel

cases: i. The criminal and civil action for libel shall be filed

with the court of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published, or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.

If the Information for libel does not establish with particularity any of these two venue requirements, the trial court would have no jurisdiction to hear the criminal case.

i. Note that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.

In this case, the Information failed to allege that the City of Manila was the place where the articles were printed and first published, or that petitioner was a resident of Manila at the time of publication.

i. The fact that Smart file was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was publish and first printed in Manila.

Illustration: Granting this petition would allow a resident of

Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because Inquirer or Phil. Star are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is what the law seeks to avoid.

DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED.

Springfield Development v. RTC Judge

Petition: Petition for Review on Certiorari Petitioners: Springfield Development Corp and Heirs of Petra Capistrano Piit Respondents: Judgeof RTC Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro, DARAB, DAR Region X Director, et. al. Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J. DOCTRINE: Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control.

FACTS: 1. Petra Piit previously owned a land in Cagayan de Oro, part

thereof was acquired by Springfield Dev. and developed it into a subdivision.

2. In 1990, the Department of Agrarian Reform issued a Notice of Coverage declaring such property under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

3. The heirs of Piit opposed. The Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board took cognizance of the case.

4. In its decision, DARAB, through the Provincial Adjudicator, declared the property as a residential land and not suitable for agriculture.

5. The DAR Regional Director appealed but the Provincial

Adjudicator disallowed such appeal for being frivolous. The decision became final and executory.

6. The DAR Regional Director then filed a petition for relief from

judgment of the DARAB decision. DARAB then granted the petition and upheld the Notice of Coverage. It also ordered the heirs of Piit and Springfield to pay the farmer-beneficiaries P12 Million.

7. Springfield and the heirs of Piit then filed with the RTC a petition to annul such DARAB decision. The farmer-beneficiaries opposed claiming that the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC.

8. RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction arguing that the action for annulment was actually an action for certiorari in a different color. Thus, it does not have jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners then filed an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA claiming that RTC exercised grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed the case stating that RTC was correct.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over

DARAB decisions. 2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may pass upon the validity

of the DARAB decision. PROVISION: 1997 Rules of Procedure RULE 43 Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals Section 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Department of Agrarian Reform and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. RATIO + RULING:

1. No. RTC does not have jurisdiction over DARAB decisions as they are co-equal bodies.

The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control.

2. No. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The question of whether the DARAB Decision is null and void and enforceable against petitioners for having been rendered without affording petitioners due process is a factual question which requires a review of the records of this case for it to be judiciously resolved.

STA. ANA v. CARPO (2008) Petitioner: OTILIA STA. ANA Respondent: SPOUSES LEON G. CARPO and AURORA CARPO Ponencia: NACHURA, J. Petition: Review on Certiorari DOCTRINE: (Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction) The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence. Agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform, among others, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary. FACTS:

26. Respondent Leon Carpo (Leon) and his brother Francisco G. Carpo are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 2175 of the Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision, situated at Sta. Rosa, Laguna

27. 3.5 hectares of the land was tenanted by petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana and her husband Marciano. (The portion was devoted to rice and corn production and was first tenanted by Domingo and Adoracion. After Domingos death, Adoracion transferred her rights in favor of petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana by executing a notarized Pinanumpaang Salaysay with the conformity of Leon, and for a consideration of P72,500.00).

28. The parties had a harmonious tenancy relationship until respondents filed a Complaint for Ejectment due to Non-Payment of Lease Rentals.

29. Respondents: - Alleged that it was their agreement with petitioner and Marciano

to increase the existing rentals from 36 cavans to 45 cavans - If respondents wanted to repossess the property, they only had

to pay the petitioner the amount of P72,500.00, the same amount paid by the latter to Adoracion

- They further averred that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay the actual rentals from July 1985 to September 1989, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 817

- That the subject land had been declared, upon the recommendation of the Human Settlements Committee, suitable for commercial and industrial purposes, per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

30. Petitioners Answer: - They denied that there was an agreement to increase the

existing rental which was already fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a year depending on the availability of irrigation water

- that neither was there an agreement as to the future surrender of the land in favor of the respondents

- that they did not refuse to pay the rentals because they even sent verbal and written notices to the respondents, advising them to accept the same; and that in view of the latters failure to respond, petitioner and Marciano were compelled to sell the harvest and to deposit the proceeds thereof in Savings Account No. 9166 with the Universal Savings Bank at Sta. Rosa, Laguna under the names of Leon and Marciano.

31. PARADs (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator) RULING: in favor of respondents - That petitioner and Marciano deliberately defaulted in the

payment of the rentals due the respondents. - The PARAD found that the deposit made with Republic Planters

Bank was actually in the names of petitioner and Marciano, hence, personal to them and that it was only during the hearing that petitioner and Marciano deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the Universal Savings Bank for the unpaid rentals regarding such as late payments.

- It also ruled that the subject land is not covered by P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, not on the basis of the allegation in the complaint, but on the respondents' right of retention.

32. DARABs (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) RULING: in favor of petitioner - Respondents failed to show by substantial evidence that the

petitioners deliberately failed or refused to pay their lease rentals. It has been held that the mere failure of a tenant to pay the landowners share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay

33. CA upheld the ruling of PARAD - petitioner and Marciano failed to pay the rentals and that there

was no valid tender of payment. - that this failure to pay was tainted with bad faith and deliberate

intent - held that the subject land was not covered by P.D. 27, Republic

Act (R.A.) No. 6657 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228, since

the same had become a residential, commercial and industrial land

PROVISION: Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or the Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his issuances ISSUE:

1. W/N the Honorable Court Of Appeals seriously erred in arrogating upon itself what is otherwise DARs power to determine whether the subject agricultural land has become residential/industrial/commercial.

2. W/N the petitioner, as an agricultural tenant, failed to pay her lease rentals when the same fell due as to warrant her dispossession of the subject land.

RULING + RATIO:

6. YES. The rulings violated the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

a. PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the subject land was no longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of the respondents.

b. The CA likewise acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land had become non-agricultural based on a zoning ordinance of 1981 on the strength of a mere vicinity map.

For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in DAR; more specifically, in DARAB. EO 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DA and DENR.

Agrarian disputes, as defined by law and settled in jurisprudence, are within the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB, while issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under agrarian reform, among others, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary. Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents in this case. Therefore, an action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD

and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect to the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, the same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.

Courts of justice have no power to decide a question not in issue. A judgment that goes beyond the issues, and purports to adjudicate something on which the parties were not heard, is extra-judicial, irregular and invalid. This norm applies not only to courts of justice, but also to quasi-judicial bodies such as the PARAD.

7. NO. Respondents failed to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of petitioner as lessee. There was no deliberate and willful refusal to pay lease rentals.

SC agrees with the findings of the DARAB that it was not the fault of petitioner that the lease rentals did not reach the respondents because the latter chose to ignore the notices sent to them. The factual circumstances negate the PARAD findings of Marcianos and petitioner's deliberate and willful intent not to pay lease rentals. Good faith was clearly demonstrated by Marciano and petitioner when, because respondents refused to accept the proffered payment, they even went to the point of seeking government intervention in order to address their problems with respondents.

DISPOSITION: the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60640 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated June 24, 1998 in DARAB Case No. 2203 is REINSTATED without prejudice to the rights of respondent-spouses Leon and Aurora Carpo to seek recourse from the Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary on the other issues they raised. No costs.

Digest Author: Alyssa Rodriguez Garcillano v House of Representatives (2008)

Petitioner: VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO Respondent: THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS Ponencia: Nachura, J. DOCTRINE on locus standi: A party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21 FACTS:

1. A wiretapped conversation purportedly between then President Gloria Arroyo and Commissioner Garcillano, a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections.

2. It was Senator Chiz Escuderos Tale of Two Tapes speech that

then set in motion a congressional investigation. After prolonged and impassioned debates by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.

3. Petitioner Garcillano filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition

and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 17033 praying that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using the illegally obtained tape recordings.

4. Without finality, the debates on the Garci Tapes abruptly stopped.

More than two years after, it was Senator Panfilo Lacsion who revived the discussions in his privileged speech, The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness

5. Retired justices of the Court of Appeals, Ranada and Agcaoili, filed

before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry arguing that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.

6. The court then resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 (filed by Garcilliano) and 179275 (filed by Ranada, Agcaoili, et al).

ISSUES: 1st Case: W/N the Court may issue an injunctive 2nd Case: W/N the Senate can be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without the duly published rules of procedure. PROVISION: 1987 Constitution, Article III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Article VI, Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. RULING + RATIO: First Case: NO. While Garcillano has legal standing under the direct injury test as he stands to be substantially and personally affected by the outcome of this petition still, the petition must be dismissed for being moot and academic. The court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its members. Second Case: ,NO. First of all it is important to stress out that the petitioners in the second case have legal standing, as recently the Court has relaxed the application of the direct injury test This Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. On the merits of this case, the Senate CANNOT be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without the duly published rules of procedure as to do so would be in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 but the organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. DISPOSITION: First petition, dismissed. Second petition, granted.

LAZATIN v DESIERTO (2009) Petition: Certiorari Petitioners: Carmelo F. Lazatin, Marino A. Morales, Teodoro L. David, Angelito A. Pelayo Respondent: Omb. Aniano A. Desierto, Sandiganbayan Third Division, Ponencia: Peralta, J. DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof (First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals) FACTS: 1. Subject of Certiorari: Ombudsmans disapproval of Special Prosecutors

recommendation of dismissal of cases against petitioners 2. The Ombudsmans Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau filed a complaint

against the Lazatin, et. al., for illegal use of public funds, in particular, Congressman Lazatins Countrywide Devt Fundyou know, the pork barrel.

3. Another Ombudsman department, the Evaluation and preliminary Investigation Bureau, recommended filing Malversation and Violation of RA 3019 charges against Lazatin, et. al., in the Sandiganbayan.

4. Lazatin and the others moved for reinvestigationgranted. 5. The Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended dismissal of the case for

lack/insufficiency of evidence. 6. Ombudsman ordered the Office of Legal Affairs to review the OSP Resolution.

OLA recommended disapproving the OSP Resolutionwhich the Ombudsman did. That led to the certiorari being filed with the Supreme Court.

7. PETITIONERS ARGUMENT: The Ombudsman has no power to prosecute cases. This power belongs to the OSP. The Constitution provides that the OSP is a separate office. The Ombudsman has no power over the OSP. Therefore, RA6770 (Ombudsman Act) is unconstitutional for placing the OSP under the Ombudsman. And the Ombudsman cannot disapprove the OSPs recommendation to dismiss the cases against Lazatin, etc. Further, the Ombudsmans resolution was based on misapprehended facts, speculatons, surmises, and conjectures.

ISSUES:

1. W/N the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion/acted in excess of jurisdiction

a. Threshold question: is RA6770 unconstitutional? 2. W/N the Ombudsmans Resolution disapproving the OSP is based on a

misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises, and conjectures (Rule 65-related)

HELD/RATIO:

1. NO, because the Ombudsman has the power to prosecute. Because the question of the Ombudsmans jurisdiction IS LONG SETTLED by Acop v. Ombudsman (1995), which affirmed both the Ombudsman exercising prosecutorial powers, and placing the OSP under its office.

a. Court noted: if you ask the Court to abandon stare decisis, it must be based only on strong and compelling reasons.

2. NO, but this is only because Lazatin, et. al. CANNOT USE CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS TO CORRECT ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.

a. What Lazatin is actually arguing is that the Ombudsman committed an error of judgment in resolving that there was enough evidence to support probable cause against Lazatin.

i. An Error of Judgment is one which a court may make in the exercise of its jurisdiction, such as an error in evaluation of evidence.

b. See the doctrine above. Certiorari proceedings DO NOT INCLUDE CORRECTING ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.

c. Moreover, Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto emphasized that the Supreme Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, as long as his rulings are supported by substantial evidence.

d. What does it take to overturn the Ombudsmans resolution? Grave abuse of discretion: a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Which standard Lazatins arguments and presented facts did not meet. Therefore:

DISPOSITION: DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

Digest Author: Dompor Ferdinand Cruz vs. Judge Mijares (2008)

Petition: Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus Petitioner: Ferdinand A. Cruz Respondent: Judge Priscilla Mijares, Benjamin Mina Jr. Ponencia: Nachura DOCTRINE: A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTC should be filed with the Court of Appeals. Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. FACTS: 1. Ferdinand Cruz sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his

behalf before the RTC Pasay City as plaintiff in a civil case for abatement of nuisance

a. Cruz is a 4th year law student b. Section 34, Rule 138 on non-lawyers appearing before any court

and conducting their litigation personally 2. During pre-trial, Judge Mijares required Cruz to secure written

permission from the Court Administrator in order for the latter to represent himself.

3. Atty. Cabrera, counsel for defendant, filed a motion to dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief. Cruz vehemently objected.

4. Judge Mijares then proceeded to hear the pending motion to dismiss and

calendared the next hearing 5. Cruz then filed a motion to inhibit praying for Mijares voluntary inhibition

alleging expected partiality based on the Judges remarks during pre-trial. In an order, Judge Mijares denied the motion saying that the uttering of said remarks is not enough to warrant voluntary inhibition

6. In another order, the motion was denied with finality. In the same order,

the trial court held that Cruzs failure to submit the promised documents and jurisprudence, and his failure to satisfy requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A, his appearance was denied. Cruz filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.

7. Thus, Ferdinand Cruz directly filed with the court the instant petition

ISSUES: 1. W/N the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus

may issue (are cognizable) 2. W/N the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from the case

PROVISION: Rule 138 Section 34, Rule 138-A Rule 65

RULING + RATIO:

1. YES - SC jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and

mandamus is not exclusive and is in fact concurrent with the CA - This concurrence, however, is not to be construed as an

absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where the application will be directed

- Judicial hierarchy o Issuance of extraordinary writs against RTC should be

coursed through CA - Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the

SC take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it - However, that this case requires an interpretation of the Law

Student Practice Rule, the SC takes cognizance of the petition herein

o Petitioner Cruz is warned not to continue the practice of filing directly before the SC petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the CA

2. YES (partially) a. Although Rule 138-A provides that the law student must be

enrolled in a recognized law schools clinical legal education program and under the direct supervision and control of a member of the bar duly accredited by the law school, Rule 138 provides that in any other court other than the justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation personally

b. The litigant may pursue litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney

c. Litigant runs the risk though of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance

d. Trial court erred in applying Rule 138-A when the basis of petitioner was Rule 138

e. Party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without lawyers assistance, effectively undertake the pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so

i. The concerns espoused in the Constitution concerning criminal cases and the right to counsel/to be heard by counsel does not obtain in a civil cae

f. Bar Matter 730 further clarified this matter g. However, RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion

when Judge Mijares refused to inhibit herself from the case i. The grounds for bias and prejudice were not well

established

DISPOSITION: Petition partially granted.

Digest Author: Ann Catherine Co FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v CA (1994)

Petitioner: First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. Respondent: Court of Appeals, MARIWASA Manufacturing Ponencia: Nocon, J. DOCTRINE: Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals. FACTS:

34. The Board of Investment (BOI) granted First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles

35. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same

36. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91

37. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

38. First Lepanto filed a "Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court has no appellate jurisdiction over the case, the same being exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

39. CA denied petitioner's motion to dismiss 40. Upon receipt of a copy of the resolution, First Lepanto decided not to

file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is essentially legal in nature and immediately filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court

41. First Lepanto argued that the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain Mariwasa's appeal from the BOI's decision. They contended that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) couldnt be deemed to have superseded Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).

ISSUES: W/N the CA has jurisdiction over the case RULING + RATIO: YES.

The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which,

under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems.

Respondent correctly argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what manner such appeal can be brought.

The Supreme Court has the power to regulate, by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers, procedural aspects such as the court and the manner an appeal can be brought.

In other words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal.

Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 19, 1993 is hereby LIFTED

Ampong vs. CSC (2008) Petition: Certiorari Petitioner: Sarah Ampong (now Sarah Navarra) Respondent: CSC Ponente: Reyes DOCTRINE: (Jurisdiction of SC of its employees) As granted by the Constitution, the SC has exclusive administrative supervision of its employees, and it therefore is the only one who can investigate a case against any of their employees. This supervision applies even if such acts were committed prior to working in the judiciary. FACTS: 8. On Nov. 10, 1991, a certain Evelyn Junio-Decir took the Professional

Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) in Kapitan Tomas Monteverde Elementary School, and later on passed with a rating of 74.12%.

9. At this time, Sarah Ampong was still a public school teacher under the supervision of DECS. She only started working in the Judiciary on Aug. 3, 1993.

10. On July 5, 1994, however, when a person claiming to be Evelyn Junio-Decir went to the Civil Service Regional Office (CSRO) No. XI of Davao City to claim her PBET Certificate of Elegibility, it was confirmed that such person did not resemble in any way the person in the photo taken of the examiner under the name of Evelyn Junio-Decir.

11. A prima facie case for dishonesty and grave misconduct was filed

against Sarah Ampong and Evelyn Decir.

12. In Decirs sworn statement on November 3, 1994, she denied the accusation that she approached her husbands first cousins wife, Sarah Ampong (now Navarra), and made her take the exam in her stead.

13. Petitioner Ampong, however, saying that she wanted things to be over

with, voluntarily appeared before the CSRO on Feb. 2, 1995, and admitted to the wrongdoing. She was reminded of her right to counsel and waived it such right.

14. CSC found Ampong guilty, and sanctioned her with the penalty of

dismissal and accessory penalties. Ampong moved for reconsideration RAISING FOR THE FIRST TIME the issue on jurisdiction being solely under the Supreme Court, but such reconsideration was denied.

15. She elevated the case to the CA on appeal under Rule 43 (Appeals from CTA and Quasi-Judicial Bodies to the CA), but such petition was also denied for lack of merit.

ISSUES:

3. WoN Supreme Court has jurisdiction to discipline its

employees, notwithstanding that the acts to be disciplined happened prior to being an employee of the judiciary.

4. WoN petitioner is estopped from raising the defense of lack of

jurisdiction after she has voluntarily appeared and admitted to the acts before the CSRO.

PROVISION: Section 6. Article VIII. 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court shall

have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

RULING + RATIO:

3. Yes. Citing the cases of CSC vs. Sta. Ana, and Bartolata vs. Julaton,

the Supreme Court held that the proper procedure should have been to file a case with the Office of the Court Administrator, since only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to supervise and discipline its employees.

On the matter of the act committed being one prior to working for the judiciary, the Supreme Court held that it irrelevant whether such act was committed before or after since allowing another branch of government to acquire jurisdiction would be to violate the principle of separation of powers.

4. Yes.

a. However, since it was Ampong herself who appeared voluntarily to the CSRO and waived her right to counsel and admitted to the charges, she is estopped from later on raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied for lack of merit. Hindi naming papayagan ang pandaraya sapagkat inaasahan ng Hudikatura ang pinakamabuti sa lahat nitong kawani.

FIGUEROA v. PEOPLE (2008) Petitioner: CGP TRANSPORTATION AND SERVICES CORPORATION Respondent: PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INCORPORATED Ponencia: CHICI-NAZARIO, J. DOCTRINE: An appeal for certiorari made with questions of fact may be referred by the SC to the CA for resolution of factual issues. FACTS:

42. CGP obtained two loans from PCI. Collective sum of which was around 16,000,000 pesos. The loans were secured by real estate mortgages over two parcels of land.

43. CGP failed to pay its indebtedness to PCI prompting PCI to foreclose the real properties subject to the REM. PCI was the highest bidder of both the subject real properties.

44. CGP failed to redeem the properties. PCI insisted that actual possession be turned over to it. CGP refused to do so.

45. PCI filed a petition for an ex-parte issuance of a writ of possession at the RTC of Muntinlupa City.

46. RTC rules in favor of PCI. It eventually overturns its decision and rules in favor of CGP instead claiming that the case involved issues which required both parties to be present.

47. This prompts to PCI file a petition to the SC for certiorari. The SC refers the case to the CA as it involved factual issues.

48. The CA rendered a decision finding that the RTC judge had gravely abused his discretion in suspending the proceedings relating to the writ of possession asked by PCI. Thus prompting CGP to file a petition for review on Certiorari under rule 45 of the ROC.

ISSUES: WON the referral court of appeals gravely erred in giving due course

to the petition for certiorari of PCI there being already a final finding by the SC and that the said petition by PCI raised questions of facts not propert for petition for certiorari.

RULING + RATIO: NO

PCI filed an incorrect mode of appeal in the form of a special civil action for certiorari as there were questions of fact that were assigned as errors in the issue.

In an appeal by certiorari under rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts.

Section 15 of the ROC provides: Questions that may be raised on appeal xxx he may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised nthe court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.

Under section 5 (f) of rule 56 of the RoC, an improper appeal MAY- be dismissed on the ground of erroneous choice or mode of appeal.

Section 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. The appeal MAY be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds: xxx (f) error in the choice or mode of appea.

However, under paragraph 2 section 6 of the same rule, it states: Section 6. Disposition of improper appeal xxx An appeal by certiorari taken to the SC from the RTC submitting issues of fact may be referred to the CA for decision or appropriate action.

The SCs discretion to refer the CA is by reason of the term MAY- in both sections.

It must also be born in mind that procedural rules are intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. Rules of procedure ought not to be applied ina very rigid, technical sense as they are adopted to help, and not override substantial justice.

DISPOSITION: Petition by CGP denied

Digest Author: Kai Kapunan

RPC VS. CA (2002) Petitioner: Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. Respondent: Court of Appeals and Manuel Dulawon Ponencia: Ynares-Santiago, J. DOCTRINE: RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Actions for specific performance, such as the complaint for breach of contract of lease, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; hence fall under RTCs jurisdiction. FACTS:

1. In 1997, Manuel Dulawon filed with the RTC of Tabuk, Kalinga, a complaint for breach of contract of lease with damages against Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). Said lease contract was effective for 3 years with advance payment; but the latter was not given in lump sum but on installment. One check that was given was stale. In addition, RCPI failed to pay rentals due for the months of January to March 1997.

2. RCPI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of unpaid rentals in the sum of P84,000, which does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P100,000 for RTCs. But the trial court denied the motion to dismiss; hence, RCPI went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari. In 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Dulawon? PROVISION: Section 19 of RA 7691; Administrative Circular No. 09-94 RULING + RATIO: YES Under Section 19 of RA 7691, RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following cases, among others:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds P100,000 or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds P200,000.

Also, under item no. 2 of the Administrative Circular No. 09-94, the exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court. In Russell, et al., v. Vestil, et al., the Court held that in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is capable of pecuniary estimation, and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim. But if the issue is other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, the action is one where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is cognizable exclusively by RTCs. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondents cause of action is breach of contract. It is settled that a breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or rescission of contracts. Actions for specific performance are incapable of pecuniary estimation; hence fall under RTCs jurisdiction. The complaint filed was aimed to enforce their lease contract which would incidentally entitle him to monetary awards if the court should find that the subject contract of lease was breached. The prayer, therefore, for the payment of unpaid rentals in the amount of P84,000 plus damages is merely incidental to the main action for specific performance. Clearly, the action for specific performance case, irrespective of the amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Court. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying petitioners motion to dismiss. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45987 is AFFIRMED.

Digest Author: Coco Navarro

ENCARNACION v AMIGO (2006)

Petitioner: Victoriano Encarnacion Respondent: Nieves Amigo Ponencia: Ynares-Santiago DOCTRINE: 1. The length of time of an owners dispossession of property determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of possession of property. 2. If lower court tries a case on merits but without jurisdiction over the subject matter, RTC may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction/if it is the proper court to try the case. It shall decide the case based on evidence presented in the lower court without prejudice to amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. FACTS:

1. Lot 2121 in Isabela was originally owned by Valiente who subsequently sold it to Mallapitan, who later sold it to Victoriano Magpantay. Upon his death, his widow Anita Magpantayexecuted a waiver of right in favor of her son-in law, Petitioner Encarnacion. Encarnacion caused his lots to be divided in two and these titles were issued on July 1996.

2. Respondent Amigo allegedly entered and took possession of the property without permission while it was still owned by the late Victoriano Magpantay. His occupation continued until after titles were issued to Petitioner Encarnacion.

3. In February 2001, Petitioner Encarnacion, through counsel, sent a

demand letter for Respondent Amigo to vacate the premises. After refusal to vacate, Petitioner Encarnacion filed a complaint for ejectment.

4. MTC ruled in favor of Petitioner but RTC dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction of the MTC (hence it acquired no appellate jurisdiction). Hence this petition.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in holding that the proper action in this case was accion publiciana and not unlawful detainer (accion interdictal)? RULING + RATIO: NO. The material element that determines the proper action to file for recovery of possession of property in this case is the length of time of dispossession. Under the Rules of Court, the summary remedies of unlawful detainer and forcible entry are available within one year from such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. If dispossession has not lasted for more than a year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the MTC/inferior courts has jurisdiction. However, if dispossession lasts for more than one year, the proper action to be filed is accion publiciana which should be brought directly to the RTC. In this case, Petitioner Encarnacion became owner as early as 1995 but he only sent a demand letter & filed for an ejectment case in 2001. While it is true that the filing of the ejectment case fell within the requisite of one year within sending a demand letter, it is equally true that he has already been deprived of property for about 6 years. The length of time of dispossession made his cause of action beyond the ambit of accion interdictal and effectively made it one for accion publiciana. However, the RTC should have not dismissed the case. [Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides] SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings. DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of Civil Case No. Br. 20-1194 to the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, for further proceedings, is AFFIRMED

Digest Author: Czar Paguio

PLANTERS PRODUCTS vs FERTIPHIL (2004) Petitioner: Planters Products, Inc. Respondent: Fertiphil Corporation Ponencia: Puno, J. DOCTRINE: As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, hence, retrospective in nature. However, the general rule is not without an exception. Retrospective application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired. FACTS: 1.) Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) and Fertiphil Corporation are domestic corporations engaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.

2.) President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1465 which mandated domestic corporations engaged in the fertilizer business, such as Fertiphil, to pay P10.00 for every bag of fertilizer sold in the country to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) which in turn would remit the amount to PPI for its rehabilitation.

3.) After the EDSA revolution, the imposition of P10.00 per bag sold was voluntarily stopped. Fertiphil then demanded from PPI the refund of P6,698,144.00 but PPI refused. Hence, Fertiphil filed a collection and damage suit against FPA and PPI before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, contending that the LOI was void and unconstitutional for being a glaring example of crony capitalism as it favored PPI only. PPI filed its answer but for failure to attend the pre-trial conference, it was declared in default and Fertiphil was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

4.) RTC decided in favor of Fertiphil- declaring the LOI void and unconstitutional and ordering PPI to return the amount. PPI appealed in 1992. In 2001, Fertiphil moved to dismiss the appeal citing as grounds the non-payment of the appellate docket fee and alleged failure to prosecute the appeal within a reasonable time.

The trial court denied the motion in an Order in 2001 ruling that the payment of the appellate docket fee within the period for taking an appeal is a new requirement under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which was not yet applicable when PPI filed its appeal in 1992.

6.) Fertiphil filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

The CA granted the petition and ruled that although PPI filed its appeal in 1992, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should nevertheless be followed since it applies to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. Due to PPIs failure to pay the appellate docket fee for three (3) years from the time the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect until Fertiphil moved to dismiss the appeal in 2001, the trial courts decision became final and executory.

Hence, this petition by PPI.

ISSUES: W/N the 1997 Rules of Procedure would have a retroactive application to PPIs appeal RULING + RATIO: As a general rule, rules of procedure apply to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, hence, retrospective in nature. However, the general rule is not without an exception. Retrospective application is allowed if no vested rights are impaired.

In 1992, all that the rules required for the perfection of its appeal was the filing of a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or order appealed from, within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. PPI complied with this requirement when it filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, after receiving a copy of its Order and PPIs appeal was therefore already perfected at that time.Thus, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which required that appellate docket and other lawful fees should be paid within the same period for taking an appeal, cannot affect PPIs appeal which was already perfected in 1992. It cannot also be considered a ground for dismissal thereof since PPIs period for taking an appeal, likewise the period for payment of the appellate docket fee, has long lapsed in 1992.

While the right to appeal is statutory, the mode or manner by which this right may be exercised is a question of procedure which may be altered and modified only when vested rights are not impaired. Thus, failure to pay the appellate docket fee when the 1997 Rules of Procedure took effect cannot operate to deprive PPI of its right, already perfected in 1992.

The failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. And in determining whether or not to dismiss an appeal on such ground, courts have always been guided by the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case.

DISPOSITION: Petition is granted.

Badillo v. Court of Appeals Petitioner: Oscar Badillo Respondent: Pedro Del Rosario and Court of Appeals Ponencia: Carpio DOCTRINE:

When an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specializations are deemed to be included within its jurisdictions. Split jurisdiction is not favored.

FACTS:

1. Petitioners in this case were alleged registered owners of a road lot known as Apollo Street. However the it is indicated in the TCT that the lot is registered in the name of respondent Pedro Del Rosario. In the TCT it was indicated that it the lot shall not be closed or disposed without court approval.

2. The petitioners then allege that the respondents violated the

TCT by selling a portion of the property to the co-respondents in this case Conejero, without court approval. Subsequently the sold lot covered by TCT No. 35101 ended up with Goldkey. Petitioner then prays that the sale made in favor of Conejero and Goldkey be declared void.

3. Goldkey then argues that the HLURB and not the RTC or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case involved. Furthermore Goldkey argues that the petitioners are using the present case to substitute for an already lost appeal of a previous case, where the building officials of Quezon City declared the property a residential and not a road lot.

4. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out how the building official had already rendered a decision on the matter and that the petitioners should have appealed it directly to the secretary of public works. The RTC also argued that the HLURB had also approved the building for development into a town house thus removing the case from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.

5. The CA likewise dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

The CA ruled that since the complaint was to enforce the statutory and contractual obligation of del Rosario, the agency who has jurisdiction is the HLURB.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the RTC or the CA has jurisdiction over the case? 2. Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the

proper remedy for the petitioners? Provision: PD 957, EO 648, EO 90 RULING + RATIO:

1. No the RTC and the CA have no jurisdiction over the case as the HLURB is the sole regulatory body for housing and land development. The HLURBs jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved, and the parties. The case at hand is a case for specific performance of the respondents statutory and contractual rights, which falls squarely under the HLURBs jurisdiction. The SC referred to Pena v. GSIS in ruling that when an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specializations are deemed to be included within its jurisdictions. Split jurisdiction is not favored.

2. No, Rule 65 is not a remedy for a lost appeal. Petitioners should have directly taken the appeal to the SC by filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The

special civil action for certiorari a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. In this case the petitioners chose the wrong mode of appeal.

DISPOSITION: Petition Denied

Digest Author: Logronio, Angelo J. FORT BONIFACIO v. DOMINGO (2009)

Petitioner: FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION Respondent: MANUEL N. DOMINGO Ponencia: Chico-Nazario J. DOCTRINES:

The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Fort Boni entered into a Trade Contract with right to retain 5% of the contract price to ensure performance with LMM Construction for the Bonifacio Ridge Condominium.

2. Due to problems in the work of LMM, Fort Boni replaced LMM with another contractor. However, Fort Boni was still liable to pay LMM for works already performed.

3. Fort Boni received a Notice of Garnishment in favor of Asia-Con Builders and against the receivables of LLM; it issued by the CIAC.

4. LMM assigned its receivables from Fort Boni to Respondent Domingo to settle its obligations to the latter.

5. Fort Boni informed Domingo of the retention money; that such was not yet due and demandable and may be ascertained only after completion by the new contractor. Also, it informed Domingo that part of the receivables was being garnished by other creditors.

6. Unsatisfied, Domingo sent a letter asserting over a portion of the retention money assigned to him and maintaining that such amount can no longer be garnished to satisfy obligations of LMM construction to other persons since it already ceased to be the property of LMM.

7. Fort Boni denied Domingos claim on the retention money claiming that there was no more left of the retention money after completion and satisfaction of garnishment orders.

8. Domingo filed for collection against LMM and Fort Boni in the RTC of Pasay City.

9. Fort Boni filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that since Domingo merely stepped into the shoes of LMM construction, it was the CIAC and not the regular courts that had jurisdiction over the dispute as provided in the Trade Contract.

ISSUE: W/N the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case RULING + RATIO: NO, the CIAC has no jurisdiction over the case.

According to E.O. No. 1008, the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines.

Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

o What the allegations in the complaint are pointing out is clear. LMM had an outstanding obligation to Respondent Domingo; that in payment of said amount, LMM assigned to Domingo its receivables from Fort Boni which was properly made known to Fort Boni.

o It can be seen that Domingos claim is not construction related at all. Fort Bonis insistence on the application of the arbitration clause under the Trade Contract which says that disputes arising therefrom should be brought before the CIAC is anchored on an erroneous premise that respondent is seeking to enforce a right under the same.

o The right to the receivables of LMM from Fort Boni under the trade Contract is not being disputed therein. What Domingo is demanding is that a portion of such receivables should have been paid to him first before the other creditors of LMM, which, clearly, does not require the CIACs expertise and technical knowledge of construction.

o The adjudication of this case necessarily involves application of pertinent laws and jurisprudence to matters such as obligations and contracts, and if appropriate, even preference of credits, a task more suited for a trial court to carry out after a full-blown trial, than an arbitration body specifically devoted to construction contracts.

DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BELISTA (2009)

Petitioner: Land Bank of the Philippines Respondent: Rene Ralla Belista Ponencia: Peralta, J. DOCTRINE: Determination of just compensation cases are an exception to DARs exclusive original jurisdiction, for such cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. FACTS:

49. Spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Ralla donated 8 parcels of land in Albay, to their daughter Rene Ralla Belista.

50. These lands were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Because of this, Rene Belista sought payment of just compensation.

51. The lands were assessed as follows: a. P227,582.58 by DAR b. P317,259.31 by LBP

52. Belista found these grossly underestimated and filed a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation before the DARAB. The DARAB-Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V) issued a decision in favor of Belista, the amount of the just compensation amounting to P2,896,408.91.

53. Upon filing of motions for reconsideration by both parties, the amount was reduced to P2,540,211.58.

54. LBP then filed an original Petition for Determination of Just Compensation at the same sala of the RTC. However, the court dismissed this motu propio for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

55. LBPs Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and so the case was elevated before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that:

a. LBPs filing of the case before the RTC violated the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

b. Since the case was filed in the RTC on October 28, 2003, when the DARAB Rules were already in effect, then such rules should govern

56. LBPs Motion for Reconsideration being denied again, this present petition then was filed before the Court.

ISSUES: 6. WoN it is necessary in cases involving claims for just compensation

under RA No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to the DARAB before a resort to the RTC may be had

PROVISION:

Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. x x x

RULING + RATIO:

8. No. A resort to the RTC may be effected even without appealing the decision to the DARAB

Section 50 of RA 5567 states that DAR has i. primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate

agrarian reform matters ii. exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters

involving implementation of agrarian reforms EXCEPT those under the jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.

Section 57 further provides an exception to DARs exclusive original jurisdiction, which includes

i. petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners

ii. prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657. Those falling under Section 57 are within the jurisdiction of

the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Such ruling is supported by the following jurisprudence:

o In Land Bank v. Wycoco, the court upheld the RTCs jurisdiction over the petition of just compensation, even where no summary administrative proceedings were held before the DARAB.

o In Land Bank v. Natividad, the Court ruled that while the DAR may determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for lands under the agrarian reform program, such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function.

o In Land Bank v. Celada, the Court stated that the valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and NOT with administrative agencies.

The RTC erred in dismissing the case, relying on Sections 5, 6, and 7(see below) of Article XIX of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. These rules essentially provide that an appeal must be filed with the Adjudicator if they wish to contest the decision of the DARAB (Section 5), and it is only when this appeal is complied with that an original action may be filed with the SAC (Section 7)

However, the above-mentioned rules could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA 6657, that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC.

Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitioners for determination of just compensation.

DISPOSITION: Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The RTC is directed to hear without delay the petition for determination of just compensation. For reference: Section 5. Appeal. A party who disagrees with the resolution of the Adjudicator may bring the matter to the Board by filing with the Adjudicator concerned a Notice of Appeal within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution. The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the appeal within the remaining period, but in no case shall it be less than five (5) days.

Section 6. When Resolution Deemed Final. Failure on the part of the aggrieved party to contest the resolution of the Adjudicator within the aforecited reglementary period provided shall be deemed a concurrence by such party with the land valuation, hence said valuation shall become final and executory.

Section 7. Filing of Original Action with the Special Agrarian Court for Final Determination. The party who disagrees with the decision of the Board may contest the same by filing an original action with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) having jurisdiction over the subject property within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the Board's decision.

Municipality of Pateros v CA (2009) Petition: Appeal Petitioner: MUNICIPALITY OF PATEROS Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES Ponente: NACHURA, J. DOCTRINE: Issues which deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a case are pure questions of law, and should be done through certiorari and not an ordinary appeal. FACTS:

1. Case concerns portions of Fort Bonifacio that are situated in Makati and in Pateros. Proclamation No. 2475, issued by Marcos, dictated that these portions (Barangays Cembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo) were in Makati.

2. Pateros filed a claim to RTC Pasig, which was denied, as the property was in Makati and thus the case should be filed in Makati. Pateros then filed to Makati RTC.

3. Pateros claimed that, based on historical and official records, it had an original area 1,038 hectares. However, when a cadastral mapping was conducted by the Bureau of Lands in 1978, Pateros was reduced to 166 hectares, allegedly due to the Proclamation.

4. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. RTC held that the Proclamation specifically declared that the subject property is within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati and, inasmuch as the Proclamation was not declared unconstitutional, the same is a valid and subsisting law.

5. Pateros appealed to CA. The CA denied their appeal, because only a question of law was raised, and thus the proper method was certiorari directly to the SC, and not an ordinary appeal to CA. Thus, this case.

6. Pateros argument was that their appeal to the CA involved mixed questions of fact and law, because Pateros sought the determination of its territorial boundaries and the nullification of Proclamation No. 2475. Respondent Makatis argument was that the sole issue in Pateros' appeal before the CA is jurisdiction and as the question of jurisdiction is a question of law and as the CA lacks jurisdiction over

pure questions of law, therefore, Pateros resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

2. WoN the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the boundary dispute between Pateros and Makati.

RULING + RATIO: 5. NO.

a. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law; it is conferred by the Constitution or by law. Consequently, issues which deal with the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a case are pure questions of law.

b. Thus, being a pure question of law, the proper remedy is certiorari,and not an ordinary appeal to the CA.

c. HOWEVER, the rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and thus the procedural guidelines were loosened in this case to prevent a commission of a grave injustice. Which leads to..

6. YES, but ONLY AFTER failure to settle problems in the manner prescribed by the LGC.

a. Sec 118 of the LGC states: i. (d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or

municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.

ii. (e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above

b. The parties failed to even try to settle amicably using the parameters of the LGC. It is only after failure to settle using these steps when appeal to the RTC is allowed (Sec 1119, LGC)

PETITION: DENIED parties are hereby DIRECTED to comply with Section 118(d) and (e) of the

Local Government Code, and Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 without prejudice to judicial recourse, as provided in the Local Government Code.

Tri-Corp v. Court of Appeals (2009) Petition: Certiorari Petitioner: Tri-Corp Respondents: Court of Appeals and Greystone Ponente: Quisimbing DOCTRINE: Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has the technical expertise to resolve the technical issue of an alleged unsound real estate business practice. FACTS: 16. Greystone Corp. executed in favor of Tri-Corp. Land and

Development, Inc. a Contract to Sell whereby Tri-Corp is to pay P13,500,000 (exclusive of interests) in installments of a unit of Casa Madeira (a residential condo project at Fatima St., San Miguel Village, Makati City.

17. Such unit is to be used as a family residence of Tri-Corps officers and stockholders.

18. However when Tri-Corp applied for membership with the San Miguel Village Homeowners Assoc. (SMVHA), it was denied and was not given gate passes for its vehicles due to the reason that the construction of the Casa Madeira condo project was in violation of village restrictions inscribed at the back of the TCTs covering the lots on which the condo was constructed.

19. SMVHA filed a case against Greystone for its violation and prayed for the cancellation of the CCTs of the condo before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Tri-Corp filed a Complaint-in-Intervention in said case for suspension of payments until the issue shall have been resolved.

20. Tri-Corp filed a petition against Greystone before the HLURB for Suspension and Cancellation of Cetificate of Registration and License to Sell of Greystone.

21. Greystone filed an ejectment suit against Tri-Corp in MTC.

22. Tri-Corp also filed before the RTC, sitting as a Land Registration Court, a Petition for Correction of Error/Misrepresentation in the Master Deed with prayer for TRO.

23. RTC dismissed the case for reason that it has no jurisdiction to try and decide the case the same being within the exclusive jurisdiction of HLURB.

24. Tri-Corp appealed to the CA. CA dismissed for being out of time and without merit, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WoN the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Tri-Corps motion for reconsideration for beibng filed out of time, in declaring Tri-Corp as not a party in interest and in affirming