Collector of Internal Revenue v Campos Rueda

PRELIMINARIES

ANGARA V ELECTORAL COMMISSION

ABAKADA GURO V ERMITA

METHOD AND INTERPRETATION

ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING, LEGAL REALISM, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION

ROBERT CLINTON (1987)

CONSTITUTIONAL EMPIRICISM: QUASI-NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL TRUTHS

TIMOTHY ZICK (2003)

ART XVII: REMAKING THE CONSTITUTION

MALOLOS: THE CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC

TEODORO AGONCILLO (1997)

FROM MCKINLEYS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM

VICENTE MENDOZA

(SEE LEGAL HISTORY REVIEWER)

MABANAG V LOPEZ VITO

GONZALES V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

; November 9, 1967TOLENTINO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

; October 16, 1971PLANAS V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

; January 22, 1973JAVELLANA V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

; March 31, 1973

SANIDAD V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

; October 12, 1976

MITRA V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

; April 4, 1981

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES V AQUINO

EN BANC; May 22, 1986

FACTS/ISSUES

- Petitioners questioned legitimacy of Aquino government.

- Her govt was said to be illegal since it was not established pursuant to 1973 Consti.

- Proclamation No. 3- Aquino govt is installed through direct exercise of power of the Filipino people, in defiance of the provisions of 1973 Consti.

- April 10- Court already voted to dismiss.

- April 17- Atty. Lozano withdrew petitions and said that they would pursue it by extra-judicial methods.

HELD

Petitions have no merit.

(1) Petitioners have no personality and no cause of action.

(2) Legitimacy of govt is NOT justiciable, and is a political question where people are the only judge.

(3) People have already accepted such govt, which is in effective control of the country, making it a de jure govt.

(4) Community of nations has also accepted it.

(5) Eleven members of SC have sworn to uphold law under her govt.

IN RE: SATURNINO BERMUDEZ

;October 24, 1986

DE LEON V ESGUERRA

; August 31, 1987

SANTIAGO V COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

DAVIDE; March 19, 1997

FACTS

Atty. Jesus Delfin filed to the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution through a peoples initiative. In his petition, he wanted to amend Sec 4 and 7 of Article 6, Sec 4 of Article 7 and Sec 8 of Article 10 in order to lift the term limits of all elective government officials. He asks the COMELEC to assist them in gathering the sufficient number of signatures by setting up signature stations all over the country, as required by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The COMELEC took cognizance of their petition and set the case up for hearing. Senator Raul Roco then filed a motion to dismiss before the COMELEC, stating that it was not the initiatory petition properly cognizable before the COMELEC. Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, on the other hand, filed a special civil action for prohibition, saying that RA 6735 is deficient insofar as the initiative for amending the Constitution is concerned. She further alleges that what the petitioners are willing to propose are not amendments, but revisions. Thereafter, LABAN, DIK and MABINI filed their motions for intervention, arguing on the same points.

ISSUES

1. WON the court can take action of this case despite there being a pending case before the COMELEC

2. WON RA 6735 is an adequate enabling law for peoples initiative

3. WON the COMELEC resolution no. 2300 is valid

4. WON the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin petition

HELD

1. Yes. Comelecs failure to act on rocos motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under sec 2 rule 65 of rules of court

- Case may be treated as a special civil action for certiorari since delfin didnt come up with the minimum number of signatures

- Court may brush aside technicalities in cases of transcendental importance.

2. No. The law is inadequate.

- First, in Sec 2 of the Act (Statement and Policy), it seems that the word Constitution was a delayed afterthought. The word Constitution was neither germane nor relevant to the said section. It only proves that it is silent to amendments in the constitution.

- Second, in the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the constitution.

- Third, there is no separate subtitle for initiative for the Constitution.

- Therefore, it seems that the main thrust of the act is on initiative and referendum of national and local laws. It failed to provide for details in implementation of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

- Comelec cannot be delegated power, since the law is incomplete as it fails to provides a sufficient policy and standard for the delegated power.

3. No. It only follows that since the RA 6735 is incomplete, it does not have the power to prescribe rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

4. Yes. There was insufficient number of signatures. Also, comelec acquires jurisdiction upon filing of the petition. The delfin petition was only in its initiatory pleading.

Decision Petition granted

SEPARATE OPINION

PUNO [concur and dissent]

RA 6735 is not defective. The intent of the framers was to provide for a law for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (he cited the sponsorship remarks of Roco)

VITUG

The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition, since it did not have the required number of signatures.

FRANCISCO [concur and dissent]

looking at the definition of terms in the said RA, the law clearly intends to include amendments to the Constitution.

PANGANIBANRA 6735 is not perfect but taken together with the Constitution and COMELEC Res. No. 2300, it is sufficient to implement Constitutional initiatives.

RESOLUTION

;ESTRADA V DESIERTO

PUNO;

FACTS

- Nature: Writ of Preliminary Injunction against complaints against him until his term is over

- May 11, 1998 ~ Estrada was elected President; Arroyo was VP; some 10 million Filipinos voted for Estrada and both Estrada and Arroyo were to serve a 6-year term.

- Oct. 4, 2000 ~ Estrada's "sharp decent from power" began; Chavit Singson, Estrada's long time friend, publicly accused Estrada, Estrada's family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.

- Oct. 5, 2000~ Sen. Teofisto Guingona Jr. delivered a speech entitled "I ACCUSE" wherein he accused Estrada of receiving 220 million pesos worth of jueteng money from Gov. Singson from November 1998 till August 200 and obtained another 70 million peson on excise tax still from Gov. Singson

- The privilege speech was referred by Sen. Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice for joint investigation

- The House of Reps also decided to investigate the expose of Gov. Singson.

- Reps. Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach Estrada.

- Oct. 11, 2000 ~ Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement asking Estrada to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern

- Oct. 13, 2000~ CBCP also cried out for Estrada's resignation

- Oct. 17, 2000~ Former Pres. Aquino joined the calls for resignation and former Pres. Ramos joined the chorus as well.

- But before that, on Oct 12, Arroyo already resigned as DSWD Secretary and also asked for Estrada's resignation but Estrada really held on to his office and refused to resign. (According to J. Puno: "The heat is on.")

- November ended with a "big-bang" because on November 13, House Speaker Manuel Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment (which was based on the grounds of bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution) signed by 115 representatives to the Senate.

- Nov. 20, 2000~ Senate finally opened the impeachment trial. 21 senators took their oath as judges with SC Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr, presiding.

- Dec. 7, 2000~ The impeachment trial started.

- Dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, the SVP of Equitable-PCI BANK. Ocampo testified that she was one foot away from Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a 500 million pesos investment account with their bank on Feb 4 2000.

- Impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas and when January came, more bombshells were exploded.

> Sec. of Finance Atty. Espiritu testified that Estrada jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.

> Jan. 16, 2001~ with a vote of 11-10, the Senator judges ruled against opening the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held 3.3 billion pesos in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."

> In short, this resulted to what we know as "EDSA II"

- January 19, 2001~ withdrawal of support from the Armed Forces, PNP and mass resignations ensued

- Jan 20, 2001~ Estrada surrendered. At 12 nn, CJ Davide administered the oath to Arroyo as the President of the Philippines.

> Estrada left Malacaang and issued a press statement saying that he now leaves Malacaang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.

> He also wrote a letter saying that the VP shall be the acting president and said letter was transmitted to former Speaker Fuentebella and Sen. Pres. Pimentel.

- Jan 21, 2001~ Arroyo discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. The SC issued a resolution, which confirmed the authority given by the 12 members of the Court then present to the Chief Justice to administer the oath of office to GMA.

- Jan. 24, 2001~ Despite the receipt of Estrada's letter, House of Reps. passed House Resolution No. 175 experiencing full support to GMA's administration and also HR no. 176

- Feb 7, 2001~ Despite receipt of Estrada's letter claiming inability, Senate passed Resolution No. 82 confirming GMA's nomination of Teofisto Guingona as VP and the Senate's support of the new gov't. and also in the same date, Senate passed Res. No. 83 recognizing that the impeachment court is functus offictio.- Feb. 8, 2001~ Senate passed Res. No. 84 certifying vacancy in the Senate.

- Feb 15, 2001- CJ Davide and J. Panganiban inhibited themselves from participating in this case as per Saguisag's motion. They of course debunked his charge "that they have compromised their weight on one side" but nonetheless recused themselves.

ISSUES

1. WON the petitions present a justiciable controversy

2. WON the petitioner resigned as president

3. WON the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as president

4. WON the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit (and assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity)

5. WON the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

HELD

1. The Court shall consider as justiciable the issue of WON the change in the presidency was done in the manner prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. (In this part, the ponente differentiated EDSA I from EDSA II saying that EDSA I was a revolution, change of presidency was done extra-constitutionally whereas EDSA II was not a revolution, the change was done to an element of the government only and it was done intra-constitutionally because GMA swore to uphold or protect the 1987 Constitution. Read it if u want a better understanding. Also, the Court is interpreting ART II sec 1, ART VII Sec 8 and ART VII Sec 11 in this case so look at those provisions too.()

2. The Court held that resignation shall be determined from the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (In relation to this, see Art. VII, Section 8)3. The Court held that the question WON it may review and revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing GMA as the de jure President of the Philippines is a political one. (Congress has laid Estrada's claim of inability to rest because of its recognition of GMA as president. The issue is a political question and the Court cannot review Congress' decision without violating the principle of separation of powers.)

4. The Court held (shall rule) that the President enjoys immunity only during his tenure. (Reasoning in the In Re: Bermudez case that the incumbent President is immune from suit or from being brought to court during his period of his incumbency and tenure but not beyond.)5. The Court shall rule that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Deicison The petitions of Joseph E. Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

GONZALES V NARVASA

GONZAGA-REYES; August 14, 2000FACTS

- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform or PCCR was created by then President Joseph Estrada on Nov 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. > The PCCR was instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. On Feb 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 which extended the time frame of the PCCRs work until Dec 31 1999.

> The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on Dec 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day.

- Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, assailing the constitutionality of the creation of the PCCR on two grounds:

> it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law

> by creating the PCCR, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution, i.e. the amendment of the fundamental charter.

- In this regard, Gonzales:

> seeks to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such

> seeks to enjoin Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora from enforcing their advice and recommendations

> seeks to enjoin the Commission on Audit from passing in audit expenditures for the PCCR and the presidential consultants, advisers and assistants

> prays for an order compelling respondent Zamora to furnish petitioner with information on certain matters.

ISSUES

1. WON the case has become moot and academic

2. WON petitioner has standing as a citizen

3. WON petitioner has standing as a taxpayer

4. WON the President has power to create positions (70) in the Office of the President and appoint presidential consultants (20), advisers (22) and assistants (28)

5. WON the Court may issue a writ of mandamus ordering Exec Sec Ronaldo Zamora to provide petitioner with names of executive officials holding multiple positions in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of Customs and turned over to Malacaang.

HELD

1. Ratio An act is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. It is beyond the scope of judicial power to give advisory opinion.

Obiter The case has already become moot and academic as the PCCR has already ceased to exist. Relief prayed for by Gonzales (prohibition) is impossible to grant and is an inappropriate remedy as body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. Any ruling regarding the PCCR would only be in the nature of an advisory opinion.

2. Ratio A citizen has standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Obiter The interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.

3. Ratio A taxpayer has standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution, the action of which is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.

Obiter Under Sec 7 of EO No 43 which created the PCCR, the amount of P3 million is appropriated for its operational expenses to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The appropriations were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriation at all since appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury. The funds for the PCCR was taken from the funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec 25 (5) Art VI of Constitution.

4. Appointment is not synonymous with creation.

- Petitioner does not have the personality to raise this issue as he has not proven that he has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any injury as a result of the appointment, and he has not alleged the necessary facts to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest.

5. As enshrined in Sec 7 of the Bill of Rights, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

- The right to information is a public right, and the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and therefore part of the general public which possesses the right.

- matters of public concern is a term which embrace(s) a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

Decision Petition is dismissed, with the exception that respondent Zamora is ordered to furnish petitioner with information requested.

THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

(ART I, II, IV, V)

STATE DEFINED

COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V CAMPOS RUEDAFERNANDO; October 29, 1971FACTS

- Collector of Internal Revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the stun of P 161,974.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. - Ruedas request for exemption was denied on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

- Rueda requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption. However, respondent denied this request on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country.

- Court of Tax Appeals ruled that the expression 'foreign country,' used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code

HELD

- Supreme Court affirmed Court of tax Appeals Ruling.

- If a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law.

- it is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.

- The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.

- State is a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. Moreover, similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. With the latter requisite satisfied, international law does not exact independence as a condition of statehood.

- Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara: There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

- This Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the traditional sense, did fall under this exempt category.

SOVEREIGNTY AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

ART II DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIESSec 1: The Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates form them.

ART V SUFFRAGESec 1: Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least 18 years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage

Sec 2: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and illiterates to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect secrecy of the ballot.

TANADA V ANGARAPANGANIBAN; May 2, 1997FACTS

- Petition for Certiorari

- DTI secretary Rizalino Navarro signed the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. (Final Act). By signing it, he agreed on behalf of the Philippines

To submit the WTO agreement to competent authorities for their approval

Adopt the ministerial declarations and decisions

(Basically, the final act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development.)

- The president then sent to the senate a letter which submits the Uruguay Round Final Act for their concurrence

- Another letter was sent by the president. This time, he submits the Uruguay Final Round Act, the Agreement Establishing the WTO, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services to the Senate for its concurrence.

- The Senate adopted Resolution number 97, which expresses their concurrence in the ratification of the president of the Agreement Establishing the WTO.

- The President signed the Instrument of Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the WTO and the agreements and associated legal instruments of that agreement.

- The final act signed by Secretary Navarro, on the other hand, embodies not only the WTO agreement but also the ministerial declarations and decisions and the understanding on commitments in financial services.

- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the treaty. They also claim that since the Senate only concurred with the WTO agreement and not on all the contents of the Final act, they impliedly rejected the Final act.

ISSUES

1. WON the case is justiciable.

2. WON the parity provisions and national treatment clauses in the WTO agreement violates Sec. 19 Article 2, Sec. 10 and 12 Article 12 of the Constitution (economic nationalism clauses).

3. WON the WTO agreement unduly limits, restricts and impairs legislative power of the Congress.

4. WON the WTO agreement intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.

5. WON the concurring of the senate only in the WTO agreement and not in the final act implies rejection of the final act.

HELD

- Petition dismissed.

1. Yes.

- The judiciary has the duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including Congress

2. No

- The declaration of principles are not intended to be self-executing, rather, they are just aid and guides by the judiciary in judicial review, and by the legislature in enacting laws. These broad principles need legislative enactments to implement them.

- The economic nationalism provisions should be read with other constitutional mandates, especially Sec 1 and 13 of Article 12.

- The WTO protects the weak economies. There are specific provisos in the agreement with respect to tariffs, domestic subsidies and protection from unfair competition which are intended to help developing economies.

- The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy.

- The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should be pampered with total prescription of foreign competition.

- Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.

3. No

- Sovereignty is not absolute because it is subject to restrictions and voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines.

- The Constitution did not envision a hermit type isolation of the country.

- By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty

- There are certain restrictions to the Constitution

- Limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations.

- Limitations imposed by treaty stipulations

- When the Philippines join the UN, it consented to restrict its soverign rights under the concept of auto-limitation. (Reagan vs Commission of Internal Revenue)

- The underlying concept in the partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens.

4. No.

- The burden of proof is not transferred in cases of patent infringement. It is still on the patent owner to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product.

- The new rule should not really present any problem in changing the rules of evidence as the present law on the subject, RA 165 (Patent Law), provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patent design.

- Conclusion in the third issue also applies.

5. No.

- The final act need not be ratified. It is not the treaty itself. Rather, it is just a summary of the proceedings. The final act only required that the senate concur with the WTO agreement, which they did.

- The Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring to as shown by the members deliberations.

REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUEFERNANDO; December 27, 1969FACTS

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals

Petitioner: William Reagan civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines

Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue

July 7, 1959 Reagan was assigned at the Clark Field Air Base

April 22, 1960 He imported a tax-free Cadillac with accessories valued at $6,443.83

July 11, 1960 petitioner asked Base Commander for permit to sell the car which was granted provided that he sell it to a member of the US Armed Forces or a US citizen employed in the Philippine military bases. On the same date, he sold his car for $6,600.00 to Willie Johnson, Jr. of the US Marine Corps.

- As a result of the transaction, respondent, after deducting the landed cost of the car as well as petitioners personal exemption, fixed his net taxable income arising from the sale at P17,912.34 rendering him liable for P2,979.00 income tax. After paying the sum, petitioner sought a refund claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request, he filed the case with the Court of Tax Appeals which denied his petition.

- Petitioner asserts that he is exempt from paying the income tax. He contends that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond its jurisdiction to tax.

- Petitioner relies on a statement of Justice Tuason in Co Po v. Collector of Internal Revenue: While in army bases or installations within the Philippines those goods were in contemplation of law on foreign soil. The court resolved this by pointing out that the statement was merely obiter dictum in that case and therefore, cannot be invoked in this case.

ISSUEWON the Clark Field Air Base is Philippine territoryHELD

Yes. Bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 remain part of Philippine territory.

- The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.

- Concept of auto-limitation: Any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.- Therefore, the Philippines jurisdictional rights over the bases, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax matters, an appropriate exemption was provided for.

- Judgment (7 concur, 2 concur in the result, 1 did not take part)

The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the refund of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed.

REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN

CORONA; July 15, 2003

FACTS- Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

- Dec 17 1991, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government or PCGG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. - Marcos, represented by his Estate/heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379.

PCGG was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 1 issued on February 28, 1986 by then President Corazon Aquino, and was charged with the task of assisting the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during is administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.

- In said case, petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) sought:

a. the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (estimated to be US$658 million inclusive of interest as of the time of decision) deposited in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB), as ill-gotten wealth.

*The ff account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks, previously held the funds:

1. Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts

2. Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus-

Avertina-Foundation accounts

3. Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts

4. Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts

5. Maler Foundation accounts

b. the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. These treasury notes are frozen at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas by virtue of freeze order issued by PCGG.

- Oct 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R Marcos, Ma. Imelda M Manotoc, Irene M Araneta and Ferdinand R Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.

The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements

- Before case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated Dec 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family

- The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein.

- It was stated in one of the whereas clauses the fact that petitioner Republic obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on Dec 21 1990 that the US$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditions are met. The decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Cosandey granting legal assistance to Republic. Cosandey declared the various deposits in the name of the foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution.

- Sandiganbayan conducted hearings on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.

- Oct 18 1996 petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondents filed their opposition.

- Nov 20 1997 Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement (took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment

- May 26 1998 Mrs. Marcos filed manifestation claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that the owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.

The Fund Transfer

- Aug 10 1995 petitioner Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in PNB. This was granted.

- Marcoses appealed, Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed ruling of District Attorney of Zurich, and funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow in 1998.

The Petition for Summary Judgment

- Mar 10 2000 petitioner filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on ff grounds:

a. essential facts which warrant the forfeiture of the funds are admitted by respondents in their pleadings and other submissions made in the course of the proceeding

b. respondents admission made during pre-trial that they do not have any interest or ownership over the funds tenders no genuine issue or controversy as to any material fact in the present action

- Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition, which was later adopted by co-respondents Marcos children.

- Mar 24 2000 hearing on motion for summary judgment was conducted

- Sep 19 2000 Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary judgment, stating that there is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, and declared the funds, which were deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth, forfeited in favor of the State.

- Mrs. Marcos filed motion for reconsideration on Sep 26 2000; Marcos children followed.

- In Jan 31 2002 resolution, Sandiganbayan reversed its Sep 19 2000 decision, stating that the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds, and thus denied petitioners motion for summary judgment. Hence, the present petition.

- Petitioner asserts in the main that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions and their authenticated translations have not been submitted to the Court, when in fact the Sandiganbayan quoted extensively a portion of the Swiss decisions in denying a previous motion dated July 29 1999. Petitioner adds that nowhere in the respondents motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.

- Respondents, of course, assert that the petition should be denied.

Analysis of Respondents Legitimate Income

- the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984.

- This amount includes Ferdinand Marcos salary as Senate President in 1965, (P15,935) and as President from 1966 to 1985 (1966-1976 at P60,000/year; 1977-1985 at P100,000/year), Imelda Marcos salary as Minister of Human Settlements from 1976 to 1986 (P75,000/year), income from legal practice (P11,109,836), plus other sources.

- Ferdinand Marcos made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became President, and that he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after- Computations establish the total net worth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 to 1984, in the amount of US$957,487.75. (assuming income from legal practice is valid)

- The five group accounts have a total balance of US$356 million.

ISSUES

1. WON petitioner Republics action for certiorari is proper.

2. WON respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment.

3. WON petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.

HELD

1. Ratio Where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.

Obiter Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is long overdue.

2. Ratio Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment

Obiter Court held that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Summary judgment should take place as a matter of right.

- a genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance.

- Respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules (Sec 10 Rule 8 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). Their answers include they have no sufficient knowledge or they could not recall because it happened a long time ago or the funds were lawfully acquired without stating the basis of such assertions.

- Question: Whether the kind of denial in respondents answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. No. The Court holds that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.

- The allegations for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted pursuant to Sec 11 Rule 8 of 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.

a. Propriety of Summary Judgment

- Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action. The Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that the issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious.

motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact.

It is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact.

b. Whether petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial and had legally waived right it had to move for summary judgment.

- Court rules that petitioner could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment.

c. Whether by the time motion for summary judgment was filed on Mar 10 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner.

- Doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights. Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.

estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.

in invoking doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred.

3. Ratio The prima facie presumption raised by the law that a property is unlawfully acquired when the amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it stands as proved unless defendant shows, and proves, that these were lawfully acquired and that there are other legitimate sources of income.

Obiter burden of proof was on respondents to dispute presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.

- the Court not only took into consideration that respondents themselves made admissions in their pleadings and testimonies, but that petitioner was able to present sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses participation in the illegal acquisition of funds.

RESOLUTIONCORONA; November 18, 2003

- SC: Respondents in their motions for reconsideration do not raise any new matters for the Court to resolve.

Is summary judgment in forfeiture proceedings a violation of due process?

- Respondents: RA 1379 is penal in substance and effect, hence they are entitled to constitutional safeguards enjoyed by accused.

- SC: Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural. There must be a compliance with both substantive and procedural requirements in order that a particular act may not be impugned as violative of the due process clause.

- substantive due process refers to intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the rights of a person to his property

there is no showing that RA 1379 is unfair, unreasonable or unjust. Respondents were not deprived of their property through forfeiture for arbitrary reasons.

- procedural due process means compliance with procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.

forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem, thus civil in nature, contrary to respondents contention that they are penal in character. The proceedings under RA 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of penalty but merely in the forfeiture in favor of the State of properties illegally acquired.

Civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under RA 1379 may be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Government is required only to state the known lawful income of respondents for the prima facie presumption of illegal provenance to attach. Petitioner Republic having established this presumption, burden of proof shifted to respondents to show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. Respondents failed on this part.

essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit ones evidence in support of his defense

Respondents were repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case, defenses and pleadings. They obstinately refused to do so and have tried to confuse the issues and the Court and to delay the disposition of the case

- the people and the State are entitled to favorable judgment, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, the salutary objective being to restore the ownership of the Swiss deposits to the rightful owner that is, the Republic of the Philippines in the shortest possible time.

Motions for reconsiderations denied with finality.

DOMINIUM AND IMPERIUM

CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT

HOLMES; February 23, 1909

FACTS

- Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of Benguet, contests dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral land through writ of error.

- Carinos ancestors maintained fences for cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is also used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom.

- Although the plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established possessory title. - Procedure - Court - application of land registration granted (March 4, 1904 )

- CFI of Benguet appeal on behalf of Government of the Philippines and US having taken possession of property for military and public purposes; application dismissed

- Philippine SC affirmed decision of CFI Benguet

- Federal SC writ of error reviewing judgment of Philippine SC

- Respondents argue:

- Given that

- Spain assumed and asserted that they had title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be acquired

- No prescription against the Spanish Crown

- Decree of June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make the title good

- And US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris)

- Plaintiffs land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere trespasser

- Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether registration granted was under Spanish laws

- Plaintiff argues:

- Argument seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important Island of Luzon

ISSUE

WON Carino owns the land

HELD

Ratio Prescription, mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.- Decree of June 25, 1880 states: possession for certain times shall be deemed owners; cultivated land 20 years, uncultivated 30 years. Plaintiffs father was owner of land by the very terms of this decree.

- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.Obiter Writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC), and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.

- Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like present.

- The reason for taking over the Philippines was different (compared to occupation of white race against Native Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain.

- The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

Decision REVERSED

- Applicant should be granted what he seeks and should not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.

KRIVENKO V REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA

MORAN; November 15, 1947FACTS

- Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila

- December, 1941-Krivenko, alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate. Inc

- The registration of the lot was interrupted by the war.

- May, 1945-Krivenko sought to accomplish said registration but the Register of Deeds of Manila (RDM) denied on the ground that he is an alien and cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction.

- Krivenko filed as suit in the CFI of Manila by means of a consulta.- CFI affirmed RDM's refusal hence this appeal.

- After the briefs have been presented, Krivenko filed a motion to withdraw the appeal.- The case was already voted upon and the majority decision was being prepared.

- Rule 52, section 4 of the Rules of Court: Court's discretion to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented.

- The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it.

- While the motion was pending, a new circular of the Department of Justice (Circular No. 128) dated August 12, 1947 was issued, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens.

- RDM naturally obeyed the circular.

ISSUEJurisdiction:

WON the Court should grant the motion withdrawing an appeal with the issuance of the said circular of the DOJ

Primary Issue:

WON an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.

HELDThe Court denied the motion withdrawing the appeal. Granting a withdrawal of appeal is discretionary upon the Court after the briefs have been presented.

- It cannot grant appellant's motion withdrawing his appeal only because the constitutional issue should be avoided.

- Also, the withdrawal was denied because under the circumstances, particularly (1) the circular of the Dept. of Justice issued while this case was pending before the Court and ordering all registers of deed to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens, together with the circumstance that (2) probably a similar question may never come up again before the Court, the effect of the withdrawal would be offensive to the opinion reached by a majority of the members of the Court after long and exhaustive deliberations on the constitutional question.

- To allow the withdrawal under such circumstances is equivalent to tolerating an offense to the constitution, offense that may be permanent.

- The Court held that NO, aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential lands. (The votes were: 8-3)

- The case was decided under section 5 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it PROHIBITS THE TRANSFER TO ALIENS OF ANY PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND INCLUDING RESIDENTIAL LAND WHATEVER ITS ORIGIN MIGHT HAVE BEEN.

- This provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands.

- This provision should be read in connection with section 1 of Article XIII "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated" and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.

- This provision secures the policy of nationalization in Sec. 1 of Art. XIII.

- It would be futile to prohibit the alienation of public lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of the Filipino citizens.

- Ratio The Court shall rule that it cannot grant a motion withdrawing an appeal if such a withdrawal would result to a permanent offense to the Constitution.

- The Court shall rule that under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and as a consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the Constitution became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.LEE HONG HOK V DAVID

FERNANDO; December 27, 1972FACTS- Pedro, Simeon, Rosita and Leoncio LEE HONG HOK, petitioners

- Aniano DAVID, the Hon. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Director of Lands and Court of Appeals

- APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

- Petitioners wanted to declare null and void Davids Torrens Title (OCT No. 510) because they alleged to own the disputed lot (226 m2 Lot 2892, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre) through accretion.

- Jun 18, 1958 Director of Lands issued David a sales patent of the lot

- Aug 26, 1959 Undersecretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources issued David a Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209

- Oct 21, 1959 Naga City Register of Deeds issued David OCT No. 510

ISSUES

1. WON Lot 2892 came into being not by reclamation but by accretion, therefore a private not public - domain (this court says it does not warrant any further consideration)

2. WON authoritative doctrines do not preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant (this court says it does)

3. WON the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year should not be recognized (this court says it should be).

HELD

1. Imperium is the government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and dominium is the states capacity to own or acquire property. Dominium enables the state to provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. The present Constitution adopts the modified concept of jure regalia, in which all lands in Spain and its earlier decrees were held by the Crown, and the present Constitution holds that it is the state which possesses ownership (Cario v Insular Government). In Valenton v Murciano (1904), all lands held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us (the Spanish state) according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming in them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may wish.

In Montano v Insular Government, unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power is vested in Congress.

The land in question is not private property; the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public character thereof by virtue of reclamation (and not by accretion which the petitioners claim).

Therefore, the only remedy for the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud committed by respondents.

There was no fraud; everything was done in the open notices were published, sale and awarding of land to David were public official acts of a Government officer.

The disputed lot is a result of reclamation, therefore a public land.

2. Only the government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. Plaintiffs are private parties and not government officials, and therefore cannot institute for the nullification of Davids Torrens Title, since they are not the registered owners of the land and they had not been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.

Maninang v Consolacion states that [t]he fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set aside, the defendant (in this case, the respondents) cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government.

Only the government can question the validity of the title which it gave.

3. Since the filing of the sales application of David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.

After registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land patent, the land is automatically covered by RA 496 --- RA 496 48 says that any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.

In Aquino v Director of Lands (1919), [t]he proceedings under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final.

In Cabacug v Lao, a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period of five years.

Davids application was a renewal of his deceased wifes application, wherein his deceased wife occupied Lot 2892 since 1938.

The decision of Court of Appeals of January 31, 1961 and its resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed

GONZALES V MARCOS

FERNANDO; July 31, 1975

FACTS

- Gonzales assailed the validity of EO 30 as an impermissible encroachment by the President on the legislative prerogative

- EO 30 has the creation of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to awaken our peoples consciousness in the nations cultural heritage and encourage its preservation, promotion and development

- In the Court of First Instance, stress was laid on the funds administered by the Center as coming from donations and contributions and not a single centavo raised by taxation

- Respondents argue EO 30 as: 1) legitimate exercise of executive power and that 2) this is supplementary to rather than a disregard of RA 4165 creating the National Commission on Culture and that 3) petitioner Gonzales did not have the requisite personality to contest as a taxpayer the validity of EO 30 as the funds held by the Cultural Center came from donations and contributions and not one centavo came from taxation

- Later, PD 15 was issued creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines

ISSUES1. WON petitioner has standing2. WON EO 30 encroached on the legislative prerogative

3. WON the issue on the validity of EO 30 became moot and academic

HELD1. The court shall rule that taxpayer has no legal standing to question executive acts that do not involve the use of public funds2.The court shall rule that the President had the power to administer a trust created by an agreement with a foreign country

3.EO 30 was superseded by PD 15, hence the suit has assumed a moot and academic character

Obiter(1)-The funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations and contributions and not by taxation

-There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or monetary interest

(2) As head of State, as Chief Executive, as spokesman in domestic and foreign affairs, in behalf of the estate as parens patriae, the President has authority to implement for the benefit of the Filipino people by creating the Cultural Center consisting of private citizens to administer the private contributions and donations given not only by the US government but also by private persons-Creation of rules governing the administration of a trust may be concurrently exercised by the President and Congress

Decision DISMISSED, No standing and even if there was, still no encroachment and that it is already moot and academicCRUZ V SECOF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESPER CURIAM; 6 December 2000

FACTS- Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997)

- Indigenous peoples/cultural communities (IP/ICC)

-Group of people identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory;

- Ancestral lands (sec.3b IPRA)

- Land occupied by members of the ICC/IP since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,... including residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms, and tree lots.

- Ancestral domains (sec.3a IPRA)

- Areas generally belonging to ICC/IP comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICC/IP, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial continuously to the present... including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other resources, and lands no longer occupied exclusively by ICC but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of ICC who are still nomadic or shifting cultivators.

- Procedure: CRUZ and EUROPA, as citizens and taxpayers (upon the plea that questions raised are of "transcendental importance"), filed for PROHIBITION (directing NCIP to cease from implementing IPRA and its IR; DENR Secretary to cease from implementing Circular 2; DBM Secretary to cease from disbursing public funds) and MANDAMUS (commanding DENR Secretary to comply with his duty of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate) assailing certain provisions of RA8371 (IPRA) as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

ISSUES

The following provisions of RA8371 and its Implementing Rules were questioned -

(1) Sections 3a, 3b, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (including the minerals and other natural resources therein) in violation of the REGALIAN DOCTRINE.

(2) Sections 3a and 3b violate the RIGHTS OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS.

(3) Sections 51, 52, 53, 59, 63, 65, 66 which define the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and make customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and lands, violate the DUE PROCESS clause of the Constitution.

(4) Rule 7, Part 2, Section 1 of the NCIP Admin. Order No.1, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination", is invalid as it infringes upon the President's power of control over executive departments.

HELD

There was NO MAJORITY VOTE reached as the Justices were equally divided at 7-7. The case was then redeliberated upon, but the voting still remained the same. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

- Those in favor of dismissing petition:

J. Kapunan, J. Davide Jr., J. Bellosillo, J. Quisumbing, J. Santiago, J. Puno, J. Mendoza

- Those in favor of granting petition:

J. Panganiban, J. Vitug, J. Melo, J. Pardo, J. Buena, J. Gonzaga-Reyes, J. De Leon

SEPARATE OPINIONS

PUNO [dismiss]

- Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System

A. Laws of the Indies: All lands became the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.

B. Valenton vs. Murciano (1904): "While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner."

C. Public Land Acts (PLA) and the Torrens System: Under the PLA, "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of such property described. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible.

D. Philippine Constitutions: The Regalian Doctrine was established 1935 Constitution, and it was reiterated in the 1973 and 1987 Consti.

-Provisions of IPRA do NOT contravene the Constitution

(1) AD and AL are the private property of the IP and do not constitute part of the land of the public domains, as they have acquired such properties by NATIVE TITLE (AD/AL) and TORRENS TITLE (AL).

a. Native title presumes that the land is private and was never public. Carino is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title.

b. For purposes of registration under the PLA and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts AL into public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that AL is private.

(2) The right of ownership and possession by the ICC/IP to their AD is a LIMITED form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate such AD.

a. It is private because it is not part of the public domain. But the AD is owned in common by the ICC/IP and not by one particular person. Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors but extends to all generations of the ICC/IP.

b. Lands may be transferred only to the members of the same ICC/IP; in accord with customary laws; and subject to the right of redemption of IP for a period of 15 years if transferred to a non-member of IP.

c. The indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title.

(3) The Regalian Doctrine has not been violated as the right of ICC/IP to develop lands and NR within the AD does not deprive the State of ownership over the NR, and of control and supervision in their development and exploitation.

a. Sec.7a limits the right of ownership of the IP. But the Implementing Rules of IPRA included the term "natural resources" in such rights of ownership which is CONTRARY to Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti.

b. The small-scale utilization of NR in Sec.7b of the IPRA is allowed under par.3, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. Managing and conserving these resources, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.

c. The large-scale utilization of NR in Sec.57 of IPRA may be harmonized with par.1 and 4, Sec.2 Art.12 of the 1987 Consti. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources and who has the power to grant such preferential rights.

(4) IPRA is a recognition of our active participation in the International Indigenous Movement.

VITUG [grant]

(1) IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the ancestral domains, as the notion of community property involves matters of proprietary interest AND also some forms of self-governance over the property.

(2) The decision of the US Court in Carino vs. Insular Government cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution.

(3) Art.12 sec.5 par.2- "The constitutional aim is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of the stream of laws." There should be a balancing of interests between specific need of IP and imperatives of national interest.

KAPUNAN [dismiss]

~Preliminary issues-

(1) The petition presents an actual controversy.

(2) Petitioners have the requisite standing.

As citizens, they possess the public right to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. As taxpayers, they possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.

(3) The petition for prohibition and mandamus is not an improper remedy.

(4) Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, (petition should have been filed in the lower court first) the Court assumes jurisdiction in view of the importance of the issues raised.

~Substantive issues-

(1) The provisions recognizing ownership of IP over the ancestral lands and domains are not unconstitutional.

a. The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.

b. Sec.1 Art.12 of 1935 Constitution does not state that certain lands which are "absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence," shall then be owned by the State.

c. Sec.5 Art.12 expresses sovereign intent to "protect the rights of IP to their AL." Framers did not intend Congress to decide whether AD shall be public or private property, as they have acknowledged that AD shall be treated as private property.

(2) The provisions of RA8371 do not infringe upon the State's ownership over the natural resources within the ancestral domains.

a. Sec.3a merely defines coverage of AD; its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title. It does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the IP.

b. The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has NOT been recognized in the Philippines.

(3) The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not unconstitutional.

a. Sec.2(3) Art.12 of the 1935 Consti allows small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. The State retains full control over such activities, through the imposition of requirements and conditions for the exploration, development and utilization of the NR.

b. Under sec.7b, rights given to IP are duly circumscribed and are limited:

to manage and conserve NR within territories;

to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of NR;

to negotiate the terms and conditions for exploration of NR in the area (refers only to the preliminary activity of search and prospecting of mineral resources);

to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project that will affect AD;

to receive just and fair compensation for any damages sustained by such projects;

to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with these rights

c. Priority rights do not mean exclusive rights. The grant of said priority rights is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent laws and regulations.

~Corollary issues-

(1) IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.

a. The property rights referred to in Sec.56 ("Existing property regimes should be protected") belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous or non-indigenous. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.

b. The fact that NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of IP does not mean that the NCIP is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-IP.

c. The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the AD, where ALL parties involved are members of IP.

(2) Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President's power of control over the Executive Department.

Although NCIP is independent to a certain degree, it was placed by Congress "under the Office of the President" and as such, is still subject to the President's power of control and supervision under Sec.17 Art.7 of the Consti.

MENDOZA [dismiss]

(1) It is not a justiciable controversy.

Judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without upsetting balance of power.

(2) Petitioners do not have legal standing.

In Tanada v. Tuvera, when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest. But in this case, what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common with other citizens??

PANGANIBAN [grant]

- RA8371 is unconstitutional in that-

A. It recognizes and grants rights of ownership over "lands of the public domain which are owned by the State."

B. It lessens the authority of the State to oversee the "exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources" which should under be the full control and supervision of the State."(1) All Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Because of the State's implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.

(2) The concept of ownership of ICC/IP, even if it is a collective right, still perpetually withdraws such property from the control of the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. Ownership of NR is in ALL the Filipino people.

(3) Sec.3 Art.12 of the Consti provides that Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of alienable public land, but RA8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. Based on ethnographic surveys, solicitor general estimates that AD cover 80% of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10 million of the 30 milion hectares of land in the country.

(4) Sec.2 Art.12 of the Consti provides that the State may directly undertake exploration, development and utilization of NR or it could enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens or entities at least 60% Filipino-owned (and such agreements shall not exceed 25 years). RA 8371 relinquishes this power in favor of ICC/IP and they may even exercise such right without any time limit.

(5) Yes, ICC/IP should be given priority in the use of their AD and AL but they should not be granted perpetual ownership and control of the nation's substantial wealth to the exclusion of other law-abiding Filipino citizens.

SUITS AGAINST THE STATE

ART XVI GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec 3: The State shall not be sued without its consent

SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS

REGALADO; November 27, 1990

FACTS

Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the United States Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. She had functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time she applied for the same position in 1976. her application was forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had some reservations regarding Shaufs work experience. Persi then requested the Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO). Persi was then informed by CORRO that an Edward B. Isakson was selected for the position. Isakson was placed on the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 1977.

By reason of her non-selection to the position, Loida Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against respondents for alleged discrimination against the former by reason of her nationality and sex. Trial court held in favor of Shauf, while Court of Appeals reversed decision.

ISSUES

1. WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under the Philippine American Military Bases Agreement are immune from suit (even w/o consent of the State).

2. WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination against petitioner Shauf.

3. WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory damages.

HELD

As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti, the state may not be sued without its consent. This is a generally accepted principle of International law under Art II, Section 2. The case at hand may be construed as a suit against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be taken from funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. Unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials by one whose rights have been invaded by such offenses, is not a suit against the State covered by the rule of immunity. The respondents are being sued in their private and personal capacity. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. A public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.Doctrine Yes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento.

1. The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the consent of the State.

2. Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf. Despite Shaufs qualifications, Persi did not even consider the formers application. Since the petitioner was able to prove the discrimination in the non-consideration of her application, the burden shifted to the respondents. The respondents however answered with mere denials of the charges.

3. Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. There was no proof that she really was to earn $39,662 if she was employed at the time. Damages which are merely possible are speculative. There must be an actual proof of loss.WYLIE V RARANG

GUTIERREZ; May 28, 1992FACTS

Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the assistant administrative officer and commanding officer, respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the merchandise control guard.

Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of the Plan of the Day a daily publication that featured among others, an action line inquiry. On feb.3,1978, an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the merchandise control inspector and that a certain Auring was, in herself, a disgrace to the office. Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said office, went to press an action for damages against Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the inadvertent publication.)

She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.

Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in performance of their official functions as officers of the US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties involved.

Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages because acts were not official acts of the US government, but personal and tortious acts (which are not included in the rule that a sovereign country cant be sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base was dismissed.

ISSUES

1. WON officials of the US Naval Base inside Philippine Territory, in discharge of their official duties, are immune from suit.

2. Are US officers who commit a crime or tortious act while discharging official functions still covered by the principle of state immunity from suit?

HELD

1. Yes, they are immune.

Ratio Officers of the US Navy as instrumentalities of the US government are immune from suit (but only when they are acting/ discharging their official functions. ( this is part of the second issue)

Art.XVI, sec.3 of 1987 consti provides that state may not be sued without its consent. But even without this affirmation, court is still bound by the doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable not only to suits against the state but also to complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their official duties.

The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of States.

Because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.

There is no question, therefore, that the petitioners actively participated in screening the features and articles in the POD as part of their official functions. Under the rule that U.S. officials in the performance of their official functions are immune from suit, then it should follow that the petitioners may not be held liable for the questioned publication.

It is to be noted, however, that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities for their alleged tortious acts in publishing a libelous article.

2. No.

Ratio Our laws and, we presume, those of the United States do not allow the commission of crimes in the name of official duty. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic.

Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V GUINTO

CRUZ; February 26, 1990FACTS

- Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the decision of the RTC of Angeles City

- This case is a consolidation of four separate cases, all involving state immunity.

G.R. No. 76607

- Private respondents Valencia, Tanglao and del Pilar sued officers of the U.S. Air Fo