Conti Cases

8/13/2019 Conti Cases

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1. [G.R. No. 143944. July 11, 2002.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON,accused-appellant.

Ponente: Puno, J.

Nature: An appeal of the Decision of the RTC of Iligan City finding accused Bongcarawan guilty beyondreasonable doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.

December 27, 1999, Trial Court rendered judgment finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonabledoubt as principal of the offense and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUAand a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment incase of insolvency.

Evidence of the Prosecution: At about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock atthe port of Iligan City when its security officer, received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoyabout her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit.The members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom theylater found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan.The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With hisconsent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) securityagents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase andbrought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase,revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.

Suspecting the substance to be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported the matter to theship captain.

At about 6:00 a.m., Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seizeditems the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystallinesubstance. NBI Forensic Chemist confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride,commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams.

Version of the accused: On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where hemet Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudito bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and watches to Iligan City, and to give it toMacapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying abig luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes hebought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi.

He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m. of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock atthe Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able todisembark ahead of the other passengers.

Five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co -passenger atcabin no. 106 came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went withthe group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage,so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase.

He left the small "maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscthe security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused tosame to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a secret combination losecurity personnel forcibly opened the suitcase.

The accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphehydrochloride or "shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in vof his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any evidence acquired purssuch unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also cothat People v. Marti is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deeperform the duties of a policeman.

ISSUE/S: WON the confiscated drug is admissible as defense against the accused

Ruling: The contentions of the accused-appellant devoid of merit.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purposeproceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invokconstitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It shostressed, however, that protection is against transgression committed by the government or its a

As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, "[i]n the absence of governmental interfliberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State." The constproscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only agai

government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of poimposed.

In the case at bar, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel personnel. It was only after they found "shabu" inside the suitcase that they called the PhilippinGuard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was thcarried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure perforthe vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by the police authoritiesthe latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security othe case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In copolice officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of tHistorically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that the protection aunreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case 7542 is AFFIRMED.


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2. [G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO,accused-appellant.Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Nature: An appeal from the decision,1 dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of Section16 ofRepublic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment rangingfrom six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months ofprisioncorreccional, as maximum, and of Section8 of the same law and sentencing him for such violation to

suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00.

2 Criminal Cases were filed against the accused-appellant for (1 Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357)possession and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and (2 Criminal CaseNo. Q-95-64358) for having in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams ofMarijuana.

Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution and the prosecution evidence established that:

December 26, 1995- Sr. Rodolfo Insp. Aguilar (Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City) appliedfor a warrantin the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence ofaccused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as hiswitness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12grams of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellant's room, and Baduasaw that the shabuwas taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside hi s room. The application was

granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.At about 10:30 p.m. of the same day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer,went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked onaccused-appellant's door, but nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparentlypanicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered the house.They served the warrant and started searching the house. They found 2.77 grams ofmethamphetamine hydrochloride and 850 grams of marijuana. A receipt of the items seized wasprepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. The police operative then took the accused-appellant and brought him to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they hadseized.

DEFENSE - accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano. Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds: (1) Theadmissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the groundthat the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana

allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine and (3) the employmentof unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.

ISSUE/S: WON the search warrant was valid.

RULING:FIRST. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a search warrant shallnot issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant awitnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the thingseized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. In issuing a search warrant, judges must strictly with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presuof regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to jusissuance. Nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisfulfilled.

NOTE: In the Search Warrant, it stated that the things to be searched are: UNDETERMINED QUOF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. Yet, no drug paraphernalia was found.

Existence of Probable CauseHowever, inAday v.SuperiorCourt, it stated that although the warrant was defective in the rnoted, it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Yet SC held that the first part of the warrant, authorizing the search of accused-appellant's house for an undetermined quantity of svalid, even though the second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.

Specificity of the Offense ChargedAccused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense bpossession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernpunished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.

In this case, the search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal PossesFirearms, etc.)." Although it is of different provisions, only one warrant was necessary to coviolations under the various provisions of the said law.

Particularity of the PlaceAccused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be search

sufficient particularity.The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrawith reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.

The address written on the warrant was merely: "Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City". Yet,proven as contended by the SOLGEN that the house raided by Aguilar's team is undeniably apphouse and it was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained ttheir informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operatio

SECOND. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shnot marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drseized within the "plain view" of the searching party.

Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be preseevidence. For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discothe evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police. The quewhether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this ca

In this case, the marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the two bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrap
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newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time ormanner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that theseizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine,"we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.

THIRD.Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the searchingparty in effecting the raid.Rule 126, Sec. 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Right to break door or window to effect search.The officer, if refused admittance to theplace of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break openany outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to

execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfullydetained therein.

In contrast, polices claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry cannot be doubted.The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the factthat the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore, the agents saw thesuspicious movements of the people inside the house. These circumstances justified the searchingparty's forcible entry into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of theirmission would be frustrated unless they do so.

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugsunder 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, andsentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, andfour (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation

of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant RobertoSalanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, andsentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00 is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, theconfiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of methamphetaminehydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court is AFFIRMED.

3. [G.R. No. 82585, G.R. No. 82827, AND G.R. No. 83979 - November 14, 1988.]MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOILI, and GODOFREDO L.MANZANAS,petitioners,vs.THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C.

VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA AND PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO,respondents.

Per Curiam:In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitionerswere denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of theexistence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, bythe President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated whenrespondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and

the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the firsmoot and academic.

On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration andthe resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima faagainst petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was deniedSecretary of Justice on April 7, 1988.

On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of theSecretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the ExSecretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they hav

denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

ISSUE/S:WON petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them athe finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justsubsequently, by the President.

WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warhis arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to detprobable cause

RULING:With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preinvestigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing c

affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actuallycounter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is requiredthe respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional pon the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papeffects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any pshall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue excepprobable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly desthe place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the gauthority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be autby law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the jpersonally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable causeissuance of warrants of arrest.

This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and presponsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In sahimself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judg


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required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine andprocedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by thefiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and requirethe submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to theexistence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be undulyladen with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentratingon hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that respondent judgehas deviated from the prescribed procedure.

Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish thatpublic respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack ofjurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on thepart of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en bancdated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

4. [G.R. No. 140946. September 13, 2004.]MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT ORPORATION,petitioners, vs.MAXICORP, INC.,respondent.

Ponente: CARPIO,J p:

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals' Decision dated 23December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777. The Court of

Appeals reversed the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Manila ("RTC"), denying respondentMaxicorp, Inc.'s ("Maxicorp") motion to quash the search warrant that the RTC issued against Maxicorp.Petitioners are the private complainants against Maxicorp for copyright infringement under Section 29of Presidential Decree No. 49 ("Section 29 of PD 49") and for unfair competition under Article 189 ofthe Revised Penal Code ("RPC").

FACTS:25 July 1996 NBI filed several applications for search warrants in the RTC against Maxicorp foralleged violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article 189 of the RPC. After conducting a preliminaryexamination of the applicant and his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants alldated 25 July 1996, against Maxicorp and thereafter conducted a search of Maxicorp's premises and

seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.

2 September 1996 - Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was noprobable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants."22 January 1997 - The RTC denied Maxicorp's motion to quash and its motion for reconsideration.The RTC found probable cause to issue the search warrants after examining NBI Agent Samiano (theone who files application for SW), John Benedict Sacriz ("Sacriz"), and computer technician FelixbertoPante ("Pante"). The three testified on what they discovered during their respective visits to Maxicorp.

NBI Agent Samiano also presented certifications from petitioners that they have not autMaxicorp to perform the witnessed activities using petitioners' products.

On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorariwith the Court of Appeals seeking to sethe RTC's order. On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's order dMaxicorp's motion to quash the search warrants. Petitioners moved for reconsideration. The C

Appeals denied petitioners' motion on 29 November 1999.

The Court of Appeals held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present during the preliminary examconclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the counterfeit products. The Court of Apointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence that he bou

products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."

ISSUE/s:WON the Petition raises question of law(question of law and of fact)WON petitioners have legal personality to file the petitionWON there is a probable cause to issue the SW.WON the SW are general warrants.

RULING:

On Whether the Petition Raises Questions of LawN.B. The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of lawwhen the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A questionexists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question of lawissue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evThe resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumsOnce it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or reof surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.

Of the three main issues raised in this petition the legal personality of the petitioners, the nathe warrants issued and the presence of probable cause only the first two qualify as queslaw. The pivotal issue of whether there was probable cause to issue the search warrants is a quof fact. At first glance, this issue appears to involve a question of law since it does not concerwith the truth or falsity of certain facts. Still, the resolution of this issue would require this Cinquire into the probative value of the evidence presented before the RTC. For a question to belaw, it must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the or any of them.

On Whether Petitioners have the Legal Personality to File this PetitionMaxicorp argues that petitioners have no legal personality to file this petition since the proper pdo so in a criminal case is the Office of the Solicitor General as representative of the PeoplePhilippines. Maxicorp states the general rule but the exception governs this case. The court Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appealsthat the petitioner-complainant in a for review under Rule 45 could argue its case before this Court in lieu of the Solicitor General if grave error committed by the lower court or lack of due process. This avoids a situation wcomplainant who actively participated in the prosecution of a case would suddenly find itself po


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to pursue a remedy due to circumstances beyond its control. The circumstances in Columbia PicturesEntertainment are sufficiently similar to the present case to warrant the application of this doctrine.

On Whether there was Probable Cause to Issue the Search WarrantsPetitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact that the salesreceipt was not in the name of NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out that the Court of Appealsdisregarded the overwhelming evidence that the RTC considered in determining the existence ofprobable cause. Maxicorp counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the RTC. Maxicorpmaintains that the entire preliminary examination that the RTC conducted was defective.

The Court of Appeals based its reversal on two factual findings of the RTC. First, the fact that the sales

receipt presented by NBI Agent Samiano as proof that he bought counterfeit goods from Maxicorp wasin the name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the fact that petitioners' other witness, John BenedictSacriz, admitted that he did not buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.

SCCA ERRED IN REVERSING RTCS FINDINGS.

Probable cause means "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautiousman in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a search warrant requires such facts and circumstances that would lead areasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought inconnection with that offense are in the place to be searched.

Theres something in here that I did not understand about the case

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23December 1998 and its Resolution dated 29 November 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 44777 are REVERSEDand SET ASIDE except with respect to articles seized under paragraph (c) of Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454. All articles seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, notfalling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, are ordered returned to Maxicorp, Inc. immediately.

5. [G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998.]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.CHIONG,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN,MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI,respondents.

Nature: In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of

the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) theOrder of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996, 2as well as (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for reconsideration. 3 Those orderswere handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after theaccused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.

Facts:PLACE SEARCHED IS DIFFERENT FROM THE PLACE MENTIONED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.

December 14, 1995- S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261,Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explo

Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Bulacan.December 15, 1995The SW was issued against Mr. Hussain was issued not at the place stateSW but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of fPakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects, such as watches, etc and cash, which were never mentioned in the warrant. However, the money was rto the respondents upon their request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; twoof plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items desc

the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c) caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine asammunitions.

December 19, 1995 - three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without menthe personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private respondentswas no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.

January 22, 1996 - private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense cand submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare EObtained Inadmissible).

Furthermore, the search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of th(herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffimmobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law. Alarticles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself; "the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126Rules of Court."

ISSUES/S: WON the search was valid. (NO)

RULING:The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the

warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seiz

unfortunately, the place they (police officer who searched the place) had in mindthe first of

separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of "Abigail Variety Store" was not what the Jud

issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described in the

warrant.

The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premise

searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a des

of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search war

premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Pal

Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more particular an

restrictiveby the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the p

herein described."


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SOLGENs argument: The assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff , AFP, allegedly to

the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is

relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to

the affidavit in the official court file. Burgos case was merely typographical error therefore, it is

inapplicable.

The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error"

involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place

different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the

inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants inquestion. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the

instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between the

applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for

the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had

in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search

a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched

although not that specified in the warrantis exactly what they had in view when they applied for the

warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence.

What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not

what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court

issuing the warrant.The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or

modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced insupport of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which

requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the

persons or things to be seized.

It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses hemay produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the thingsto be seized."

The contentions have just been stated again and again. Point is, it does not suffice, for asearch warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determinedby the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant. and thewitnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to besearched, 15 the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place sodescribed.There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that asearch warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement

necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained inviolation . . . (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for anypurpose in any proceeding."

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September11, 1996 which dismissed the People's petition for certiorari seeking nullification of theOrders of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 inCriminal Case No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby

AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.

6. [G.R. No. 149878. July 1, 2003.]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.TIU WON CHUA a.k.a. "Timothy Tiu" and QUI YALING y CHUA a.k.a. "Sun TeeChua",accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS:Appellants were convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by 7659. On appeal, they assailed the legality of the search warrant and the search and arrest conpursuant thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction.

The Supreme Court held that even if the search warrant used by the police did not contain the name of appellants Tiu Won or the name of Qui Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it becauplace to be searched was described properly and the test buy operation conducted before obtainsearch warrant showed that they have personal knowledge of the identity of the persons and thto be searched. The search conducted on the car parked away from the building, however, wa

because it was not part of the place described to be searched and it was not incidental to aarrest.

Nature:This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, coappellants Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu (Tiu Won) and Qui Paling y Chua a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy(Qui Yaling) for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise knownDangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

Facts:October 3, 1998 Accused were caught having in possession of: (1) A sealed plastic bag contwo three four point five (234.5) grams of white crystalline substance, (2) Four (4) separateplastic bags containing six point two two four three (6.2243) grams of white crystalline substanSixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags containing twenty point three six seven three (20grams of white crystalline substance; or a total of 261.0916 grams and (4) An improvised toot

traces of crystalline substance.A.K.A. SHABU

October 6, 1998Police conducted a test-buy operation and they were able to buy P2,000.00 wsubstance from appellants. When tested, it was found out that its positive for methamphhydrochloride. However, they did not immediately arrest the suspects but . applied for a warsearch Unit 4-B of HCL Building, 1025 Masangkay St., Binondo, Manila. Their application to seaunit supposedly owned by "Timothy Tiu" was granted by Judge Ramon Makasiar of Branch 35RTC of Manila on October 9.


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October 12 after several attempts, they were finally able to implement the SW. Failing to get thecooperation of the barangay officials, they requested the presence of the building coordinator, NoelOlarte, and his wife, Joji, who acted as witnesses.

DEFENSE: They presented appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling. They denied that Timothy Tiu and TiuWon Chua are one and the same person. They presented papers and documents to prove thatappellant is Tiu Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in the search warrant. Tiu Won also claimedthat he does not live in the apartment subject of the search warrant, alleging that he is married to acertain Emily Tan and is a resident of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo, Manila. Nonetheless, he admittedthat his co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his mistress with whom he has two children.

Qui Yaling admitted being the occupant of the apartment, but alleged that she only occupied one room,while two other persons, a certain Lim and a certain Uy, occupied the other rooms. Both appellantsdenied that they were engaged in the sale or possession of shabu. They asserted that they are in the

jewelry business and that at the time the search and arrest were made, the third person, whom theprosecution identified as a housemaid, was actually a certain Chin, who was there to look at some ofthe pieces of jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied that a gun was found in the possession of TiuWon.

They contended that the search warrant issued in the name of Timothy Tiu, did not include appellantQui Yaling and because of this defect, the search conducted and consequently, the arrest, are illegal.Being fruits of an illegal search, the evidence presented cannot serve as basis for their conviction.

ISSUE/S:WON the search and arrest was valid although the person being arrested was not the one beingstiplulated in the warrant.

RULING:SC disagreed. There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be issued upon"probable cause"; (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge mustexamine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4) thewarrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

As correctly argued by the Solicitor General, a mistake in the name of the person to be searched doesnot invalidate the warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities had personal knowledge of thedrug-related activities of the accused. In fact, a "John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so longas it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused. We have alsoheld that a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrantprovided the place to be searched is properly described.However, SC affirmed the illegality of the search conducted on the car, on the ground that it was notpart of the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant. It is mandatory that for

the search to be valid, it must be directed at the place particularly described in the warrant. Moreover,the search of the car was not incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid, such warrantless search must belimited to that point within the reach or control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish himwith the means of committing violence or of escaping. In this case, appellants were arrested inside theapartment, whereas the car was parked a few meters away from the building.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of RTC Br. 27, Manila as to the penalty of appellant Tiu Won isaffirmed, while that of appellant Qui Yaling is modified. Tiu Won Chua is sentenced to a penalty of

reclusion perpetua, and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) in accordancSection 16 and Section 20 (1st paragraph) of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Quy Chua is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of prision correccional as minimum to prisionas maximum, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

7. [G.R. No. 149462. March 31, 2004.]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee, vs. PRISCILLA DEL NORTE,appellant.

Nature:An appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 28, finding aPriscilla del Norte guilty of the crime of illegal possession of drugs.

Facts:August 1, 1997 In Caloocan City, Manila, the accused-appellant and a Jane Doe were contogether and mutually helping each other were in possession of MARIJUANA weighing 6748.3knowing the same to be a prohibited drug under the provisions of the above-entitl(INFORMATION FILED BY THE PROSECUTOR).

Same date-- The police was tasked to serve a search warrant against a certain Ising Gutierreresiding at No. 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for violation of Republic Act No. 6425 and was ordered to "forthwith seize and take possessioundetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana leaves." They found a bundle of marijuana wraManila paper under the bed and inside the room. They asked appellant who owned the marijuacried and said she had no means of livelihood. Appellant was brought to the police headquarfurther investigation.

DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED: Accused assailed the validity of the SW against her. She contendshe lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay Baesa, Caloocan City, 13 and that on August 1, 19was merely visiting a friend, Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service Road corner Cruzada St., Barrio, Caloocan City. She went to Marlyn's house to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she While appellant was seated near the door, several people introduced themselves as policemenher sign a white paper and entered the house. She heard them say "we already got Ising," asurprised why they suddenly arrested her. She saw Ising, her sister, at a house two steps awathe house where she was arrested. Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the policemen brouto the police station.

ISSUES/S:WON the SW was valid.WON accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. NO.

RULING:

SC reversed TCs decision.The Constitution requires search warrants to particularly describe not only the place to be searchalso the persons to be arrested. We have ruled in rare instances that mistakes in the nameperson subject of the search warrant do not invalidate the warrant, provided the place to be seaproperly described. (Cited People vs Tiu Won Chua)

The case at bar is different. The authorities did not have personal knowledge of the circumsurrounding the search. They did not conduct surveillance before obtaining the warrant. It w


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when they implemented the warrant that they coordinated with the barangay officials. One of thebarangay officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are one andthe same person, but said barangay official was not presented in court. The authorities based theirknowledge on pure hearsay.

The prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The prosecution's witnesses failed to establish appellant's ownership of the house where the prohibiteddrugs were discovered. Except for their bare testimonies, no other proof was presented.

In all criminal cases, it is appellant's constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary isproved beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, SC held that the prosecution's evidence treads onshaky ground and said that it detested drug addiction in society. However, SC also has the duty toprotect appellant where the evidence presented show "insufficient factual nexus" of her participation inthe commission of the offense charged.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is reversed.Appellant is acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

8. [G.R. No. 81567. October 3, 1991.]CONSOLIDATED CASESIN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDODURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS

V. SESE,petitioners,vs.FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.

ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,respondents.

Per Curiam;

Note: There are other cases before this one. But not part of the assigned readings.Nature: Petitions seeking reconsideration of the courts decision promulgated on 9 July 1990.

Petitioners in their motion for reconsideration assailed the validity of the questioned arrests madewithout warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the personsarrested.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention of petitioners was illegal or not, the Courtbefore rendering the decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests withoutwarrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, itwould follow that the detention resulting from such arrests is also in accordance with law.

As a general rule, no person shall be arrested without warrant though there can be exceptions asexpressly authorized by lawas found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.SEC. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,without a warrant, arrest a person:(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, oris attempting to commit an offense;(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of factsindicating that the person to be arrested has committed it

Facts of Umils Case:

1 February 1988 - military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow(NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wman in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Cmobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a roaalong Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, SouHomes, Bian, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded mRolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional

Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identifiedeyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

ISSUES/S: WON Rolando Dural was lawfully arrested.

RULING:

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organSubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or propcommit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection thconstitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

Durals arrest was not based on mere suspicion that hes a member of CPP/NPA but on PROCAUSE supported by facts. His arrest falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the RCourt, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrest without warrant: (1) that the persoarrested has just committed an offense, and (2) that the arresting peace officer or private perpersonal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who commitoffense.

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting othe suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is baactual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the prcause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founprobable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party mor a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. Thepredicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not o

unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 11of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arpeace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumsupporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, wimportant is that the Court be right.


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ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. Thisdenial is FINAL.

9. [G.R. No. 170233. February 22, 2007.]THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee, vs.JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and FERNANDO INOCENCIO y

ABADEOS,appellants.

Accused were charged before RTC of Olongapo City, Branch 75 with illegal possession of marijuana inviolation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

Facts:September 27, 1997Some police officers (Fami and Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance andmonitoring of illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. Theyhad received information that a certain male person, more or less 5'4" in height, 25 to 30 years old,with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, wouldmake a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat, they saw a male person who fit thedescription, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as Nuevas, alight from a motor vehicle. Theyaccosted Nuevas and informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he wasgoing. Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed in theWaray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain Vangie,an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers aplastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth.Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons wouldmake the delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.

Fami and Cabling (police officers), together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan,Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and Inocencio, couldbe located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons along the National Highway,introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a light blue plastic bag. When asked, Dindisclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it"marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." After confiscating the items, the police officersbrought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper documentation.

Accuseds Version (Nuevas):27 September 1997 morning, he was walking along Perimeter Street, on his way home from theBarangay Hall, when Fami called him. Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of his house,and asked why Fami had called him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside theroom where Fami handcuffed Nuevas's hands, got Nuevas's wallet, took out P1,500.00 and put it in his(Fami's) wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter denied the charge. Beforeleaving the house with Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag and told Nuevas to carry it.

Subsequently, they boarded a red owner type jeep and proceeded to Station B where Nuevas wasput in jail. Nuevas further stated that he did not know Din or Inocencio.

Accuseds Version (Din):27 September 199710oclock morning, Inocencio was visiting him, then suddenly 2 men entered thehouse looking for a woman. The two (2) introduced themselves as police officers. Then, Din andInocencio were immediately handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for their arrest andwere told that the reason will be explained to them in court. Next, they were brought to the Cabalan

precinct where the investigator asked for their names, and subsequently to Station B where theordered to stand up and be photographed with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the roomthey had their fingerprints taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table.

This version was however corroborated by his co-accused Inocencio.

ALL THREE (3) were found guilty if the charged crim.

4 July 2003 - Nuevas filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw appeal25 August 2003In a Resolution, the court granted Nuevas's withdrawal of appeal and considecase closed and terminated as to him.

22 September 2004In a Resolution, the case was transferred to the CA.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding the 2 guilty of the charges.

So, this petition. The accused were claiming that were rights were violated and that the TC efinding them guilty just based on the testimonies of the arresting officers.

ISSUE/S: WON the warrantless searches and seizures are valid.

RULING:Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial wotherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained thereinadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however,absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:

1.Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Co

prevailing jurisprudence);

2.Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion basedvalid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the righwhere they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justifieseizure of evidence without further search;

3.Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's imobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroufurnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the ocommitted a criminal activity;

4.Consented warrantless search;

5.Customs search;

6.Stop and Frisk; and

7.Exigent and emergency circumstances.


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The courts below (TC and CA) anchor appellants' conviction on the ground that the searches andseizure conducted in the instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of the exceptionsas Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the plastic bags containing marijuanato the police officers.

SC differs.

FIRST. SC holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first exception,warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned bythe Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the processcannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a searchsubstantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable causeto make the arrest at the outset of the search.

In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of the policeofficers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge of the factsindicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches conducted on theplastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone isnot sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition,that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense."

SECOND. The searches be neither be justified under the plain view doctrine. An object is in plain viewif it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself isnot in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaimsits contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious toan observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized

Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas and Din werecarrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In Nuevas's case, the driedmarijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a blue cloth. In Din's case, themarijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in newspaper and wrapped therein." Itcannot be therefore said the items were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of thearticles without further search.

Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal rightwhich may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in orderto validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific, andintelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to belightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consentto a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all thecircumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving

consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether hewas in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4)the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) thedefendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning;(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjectivestate of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positivetestimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

However, during the cross-examination, the police officers gave inconsistent and dissimilar testiregarding the manner by which they got hold of the bag containing the marijuana.

This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of Din's submission of the plastJurisprudence requires that in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guagainst obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear tthe right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the exof such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

The prosecution failed to prove that Din waived his right to unreasonable search/seizure.

The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakthe defense but on the strength of the prosecution. Same is true with Inocencio, the court likewthat he was wrongly convicted of the crime charged.

Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held by another, is same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold. Indeed, the act attributed to Inoceinsufficient to establish illegal possession of the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess theThe prosecution failed to show by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bthat he conspired with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeabltestimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Brain Criminal Cases No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified. Appellants ReynaldoGonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the BuPrisons is ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless tbeing held for some other lawful cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within

days from receipt hereof.

10. [G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999.]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARPASCUAL,accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS:Accused Joselito Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homiche was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim.

Del Rosario alleged that he was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to a cockpit. He was noof the plan of Santos and his two companions to rob and kill the victim. He was not able assistance because Santos threatened to shoot him if he did. He also failed to inform theauthorities about the incident because the culprits has threatened him and his family. He cexemption from criminal liability as he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible forc

The conviction of Del Rosario must be set aside and his claim for exemption sustained. He wunarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving thscene during the commission of the robbery and killing. He was also forced to help the culprits after the commission of the crime. Further, Del Rosario's failure to disclose what he knew abincident to the authorities does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people


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involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. Given his quite limited means, Del Rosariounderstandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, hewas threatened with physical harm should he squeal.

Nature: Review of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal inthe crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the heirs of victim VirginiaBernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun," Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and JohnDoe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. Whileaccused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias "Dodong"remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario wastried.

Facts (according to eye-witness Paul Vincent Alonzo):13 May 1996between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo saw the accused del Rosario driving histricycle. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag. Aftertaking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying tohelp the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, thearmed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bagtaken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside receivedthe bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When thetricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He alsorecognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported theincident.

Accuseds version (Del Rosario):

5:30PMaccused was hired by a Boy Santos (co-accused) for P120. Their original agreement wasthat he would drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. 7 However despite their earlierarrangement Boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and"Dodong" Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded. 8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot ofMerced Drugstore at the public market. 9 Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at thecorner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. Thelatter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. JunMarquez alighted from the tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya. 10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave andseek help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented h im from leaving and threatened infact to shoot him.

Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim's bag, but before boarding the tricycle"Jun" Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. Afterthe shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode behind delRosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del

Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where therewere cogon grasses. Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario notto inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. DelRosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner ofthe tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police

ISSUE/S:

WON there was lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules ofWON del Rosarios rights were constitutional rights were violated.

RULING:The conviction of Del Rosario must be set aside and his claim for exemption from criminal liabilit

Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force msustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunphis co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, aonly forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime. (Other aspects of the crelated to CRIMINAL LAW conspiracy and exempting circumstance AND TO NOT CONSTITUTLAW).

Well, in relation to Constitutional law, Del Rosario contended that there was violation of his remain silent, right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, ato be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. After the policeout that it was Del Rosario who was involved in the case, he was summoned and was invitedinterview.

The investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statwere only signed on May 16, 1996.

Del Rosario underwent a custodial investigation.

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiryunsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the policarry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-

that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41 This concept of cuinvestigation has been broadened by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of issuing an 'invitatioperson who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committstipulated in Section 2 of the RA 7438, it is the duty of a public officer of employee to inform pwho are arrested, detained or investigated of rights to remain silent, have a counsel, etc. anconstitutional rights.

However, Del Rosario was deprived of these rights during the custodial investigation. He also athat his arrest was unlawful having no warrant therefor

The arrest of del Rosario does not comply with the requirements under (Sec. 5, Rule 113, RCourt) since, as earlier mentioned, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed'' at the time the accusarrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the

to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were noteyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway only during the custodial investigation.

It was pretty clear that a transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent perher life and property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it willaccused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a


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victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. DelRosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. Onthe other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of adoubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused JOSELITODEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED andSET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE fromconfinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisonsis directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

11. [G.R. No. 121917. July 31, 1996.]ROBIN CARIO PADILLA,accused-appellant, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee.

Facts:

October 26, 1992The petitioner was allegedly involved in a hit-and-run incident. He was chased bythe police officers for such. It is to be noted that the petitioner (accused-appellant) was during this timewearing a short leather jacket, that was why, the police officers noticed him possessing a pistol. I t wasalso discovered that the accused-appellant also possessed other high-powered firearms with liveammunitions yet, there was no proof to show that he has the permit to do so. The firearms which wereconfiscated are as follows: (1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) liveammunitions; (2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) shortmagazine with ammunitions; (3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8)

ammunitions; and (4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.

December 3, 1992 Padilla was charged before the RTC of Angeles City with illegal possession offirearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. RTC ordered his arrest but his request for bail was granted.

RTC decision:

April 25, 1994 GUILTY and will be convicted and sentenced with an "indeterminate penalty from 17years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years ofreclusion perpetua, asmaximum".

April 28, 1994Filed a petition to appeal before the CA.

December 2, 1994SOLGEN filed a motion to cancel petitioners bail bond. Then, the court ordered hisbail bond to be cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue theOrder of Arrest of accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of Prisonsthru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant shall remain under confinementpending resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court.

August 9, 1995Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of arrest) andsame was denied by CA on its September 20, 1995 Resolution.

Petitioners contentions: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammtaken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) thatconfidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive anpunishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private persowithout a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually comor is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establor place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is por has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is acommitting or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting oprivate person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner'sfigured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private persothen sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not onlythat the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created

AND proceeds at once to the scene.HOT PURSUIT

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attenarrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated challenge theretfrom his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evplaced him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, pepatently waived such irregularities and defects.

Now, with regards to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search wthe admissibility in evidence of which, SC upholds.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,[as follows:

1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of thof Court[45] and by prevailing jurisprudence[46],

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally prethe pursuit of their official duties;


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(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d)"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[48]

3. search of a moving vehicle.[49] Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobilityreduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highlyreasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.[50]

4. consented warrantless search, and

5.customs search.

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled uponpetitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it iscommonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.

Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted of violating P.D. 1866because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms andammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt.Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. Thecontention lacks merit. The petitioner failed to produce and present said Mission Order andMemorandum Receipt.

Anent his third defense,petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D. 1866 in a democraticambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should have appliedinstead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposedunder P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 yearsfor simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are boundto apply the governing law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that lawsare repealed only by subsequent ones.[86] Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and applythe law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court cannot be faulted for applying P.D. 1866which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.

Consequently, the penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period ofthe complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years. "This penalty,

being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the rules therefor and not merelyimposable as a general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the range of theindeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of thepenalty next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in i ts maximum period to reclusion temporal in itsmedium period,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining peticonviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammuni

AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

12. [G.R. No. 136292. January 15, 2002.]RUDY CABALLES yTAIO,petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

SYNOPSIS:

The Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna convicted petitioner Rudy Caballes of the crime for stealing aluminum cable conductors worth P55,244.45 belonging to the National Power Corp

Accordingly, it sentenced petitioner to a prison term and ordered him to indemnify private compOn appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but deleted the award of dand modified the penalty imposed.

Hence, this appeal by certiorari. Petitioner questioned the validity of the warrantless search andmade by the police officers, and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof.

The searches without warrant of moving vehicles is allowed provided such searches are mborders or 'constructive borders', like checkpoints. The mere mobility of these vehicles, howevenot give the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warmade within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. In the case at bvehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on routinebecame suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leavesaccording to them, was unusual and uncommon.

The Court held that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not commsuch to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause'' as would justconduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities did not claim to have rany confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wiresvehicle, which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Our jurisprudence is replete witwhere tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless searseizure. Unfortunately, none exists in this case. Furthermore, it cannot be said that the cablfound in petitioner's vehicle were in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. It was clethe records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because they were placed in saccovered by kakawati leaves. The police officers even have to ask petitioner what was loadevehicle. Moreover, it was not established by clear and positive proof that the petitioner conse

the search or intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable search. Thus, the articlesfrom petitioner could not be used as evidence against him. For lack of evidence to establish hthe Court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged.

Nature:Appeal by Certiorari from the decision of CA dated September 15, 1998 which affirmjudgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, finding herein petitioneCaballes y Taio, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft, and the resolutionNovember 9, 1998 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.


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13. [G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003.]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.

AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA,accused.

SYNOPSIS

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City finding appellant and herco-accused guilty of violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the DangerousDrugs Act of 1972. For their conviction, each was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusionperpetua. The appellant argued that her arrest was unlawful and capitalized on the absence of awarrant for her arrest. She contended that at the time she was apprehended by the police officers, she

was not committing any offense but was merely riding a tricycle. She also impugned the search madeon her belongings as illegal as it was not done without a valid warrant or under circumstances whenwarrantless search is permissible. Consequently, she claimed that the evidence obtained therein wereinadmissible against her.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellant. According to the Court, the general rule isthat a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validlyissued by a judge as provided in the Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee is not ablanket prohibition against all searches and seizures. The warrantless search in this case is not bereft ofa probable cause. It was also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing acriminal offense, transporting prohibited drugs. Against the credible positive testimonies of theprosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of denial and alibi could not stand.

14. [G.R. No. 148825. December 27, 2002.]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee, vs. SUSAN CANTON,appellant.SYNOPSIS:

Appellant was charge with violation of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972(Republic Act No. 6425). At the trial, the prosecution established that at the time of the commission ofthe crime, appellant was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), being a departing passengerbound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through metal detector booth, a beeping sound wasemitted. Consequently, the frisker on duty frisked and searched appellant. The frisker felt somethingbulging at appellant's abdominal area so she was brought to a comfort room for a thorough physicalexamination. It was discovered that appellant was carrying packages containing shabu. After dueproceedings, the trial court found her guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal.

In affirming the conviction of appellant, the Supreme Court ruled that the search was made pursuant toroutine airport security procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235. Thisconstitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. In the saidprovision, passengers are subject to search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action ofthe airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and sending her home, andthereby depriving them of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search withoutwarrant, in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law

enforcement, to the detriment of society. Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room was just

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