Derrida - Parergon

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The ParergonAuthor(s): Jacques Derrida and Craig OwensSource: October, Vol. 9 (Summer, 1979), pp. 3-41Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/778319.

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The Parergon*

JACQUESDERRIDAtranslated yCRAIG OWENS

I and thepositionwhichThe OriginoftheWorkofArtgrantsto theLectureson Aesthetics"the mostcomprehensivereflectionn the natureof artthatthe Westpossesses"') can be determined nlywithin certainhistorical opography eginningwith theCritiqueof Judgment.Heideggerdoesnotmention tbyname n The Origin,butelsewhere edefendstagainst Nietzsche's reading.The Lectures rigorously pecifywhat is valid inspeculativedialectics n general:an essential ffinityith theCritique,theonlybook-book three-that it can almost immediately eflectnd appropriate.Thefirstwocritiquesofpurereason speculative nd practical) openedan apparentlyinfinite ulf.The third ould, would, would have to,would have to be able tobridge t: that s, to fill, o fulfill,n infinite econciliation. Kantian philosophynot only feltthe necessity f this point of juncture (Vereinigungspunkt) utrecognized t in a precise way, by supplying its representation."2 he thirdCritiquewas able to identifyn art in general)one of themiddle termsMitten) oresolve (aufl6sen) the "opposition" between mind and nature, internal andexternal henomena,the nsideand theoutside,-etc.till t sufferedrom lacuna,a "lack" (Mangel), it remained a theory f subjectivity nd of judgment (ananalogous reservation s expressed n theOrigin). Confined nd unilateral,thereconciliation s still not effective. he Lectures must supplementthis lack,structured,s always,as a recurrentnticipation.Reconciliationwas promised,representedn theCritiqueonlyas a kindofduty, Sollen projectedto infinity.And so it appears.On theone hand, Kant declareshimself neitherwillingnor n a position"to examine whether"common sense" (here reinterpreteds an indeterminate* This text s a translation fsection I of thefour-partssay ntitled Parergon"published nLavkriten peintureParis,Flammarion,1978), obe issued n Englishtranslation yThe UniversityfChicago Press;partsofthis text riginally ppearedin Digraphe2 and 3 (Paris,Galilee, 1974).Unlessotherwisendicated, ll footnotes re bythetranslator.1. MartinHeidegger, The Originof theWork ofArt,"Poetry, anguage, Thought, rans.AlbertHofstadter, ew York,Harper&cRow, 1971,p. 79.2. This citationhas been translated irectly romDerrida'sFrenchtranslation fHegel.

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norm,neither onceptualnor ntellectual) xists s a constitutiverincipleofthepossibilityof aesthetic xperience, r whether eason,as a regulativeprinciple,commandsus to produce hervorbringen)t for oftier nds.3This commonsenseis constantly resupposedbytheCritique,whichnevertheless ithholds nalysisof it. We could demonstrate hat this suspenseassuresthecomplicity fmoraldiscourseand empiricalculturalism.A permanentnecessity.On the otherhand,recallingthe division ofphilosophyand all the rreduc-ible oppositionsdeterminedn the firstwoCritiques,Kantprojects heplan ofaworkthatwill reducetheenigmaofaestheticudgment nd fill crack, cleavage,an abyss Kluft):"Albeit,then,between he realmof thenaturalconcept, s thesensible, nd therealmof theconceptoffreedom,s thesupersensible,here s agreatgulffixed, o that t is not possible to pass from he formero the atter bymeans of the theoretical mployment f reason), ust as if theywere so manyseparateworlds, hefirst f which is powerlessto exercise nfluence n the second:still thelatter s meantto influence he former. . There must, therefore,e agroundof the unity. . "4 Further n, relatedmetaphors r analogies: we aredealing again with the immense"abyss" thatseparatesthe two worldsand theapparent mpossibility fthrowing bridge Briicke) rom ne bankto the other.To call this analogy is still to have said nothing.The bridge s not an analogy.The recourse o analogy,theconceptand theeffectfanalogyare orconstruct hebridge tself--bothn theCritiqueand in thepowerful radition owhich t stillbelongs.The analogyof theabyssand ofthebridgeover theabyss s an analogywhich says thatwe require an analogy betweentwo absolutelyheterogenousworlds, a "third" forcrossingthe abyss,cauterizingthe gaping wound, andbindingtheseparation. n brief, symbol.The bridge s a symbol, tmovesfromone bank to theother, nd thesymbol s a bridge.The abysselicits analogy-the activerecourseof theentireCritique-butanalogy succumbs to theabyssas soon as a certain rtfulnesss requiredfortheanalogical description f theplay ofanalogy I- todo without heabyss:notonlytospareour-selves a fall into itsbottomless epthsbyweavingand foldingback thefabric oinfinity,extual rt ofthereprise,multiplication fpartswithinparts;,but lso toestablish aws ofreappropriation, oformalize ulesthat onstrain he ogicofthe3. ImmanuelKant,The CritiqueofJudgement,rans.J., . Meredith, xford,OxfordUniversityPress,1952,p. 85.4. Ibid., p. 14.



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abyss and shuttle betweeneconomy and extravagance, esolutionand fall, theabyssalprocessthatnecessarilytrives orresolution nd withinwhichcollapse isrepeatedly roduced I

what then s the ob-jectofthethirdCritique?The critiqueofpuretheoretical easonpresupposestheexclusion (Ausschliessung)of everythinghat is not theoretical ognition: theaffectGefiihl) n its twoprincipalaspects pleasure/displeasure)nd thepowerofdesire Begehrungsvermbigen).t carvesout its field ycutting tself ff rom heinterests fdesire,by becomingdisinterestedn desire.Sinceunderstandingloneis capable of affordingonstitutive rinciplesofknowledge, heexclusion bearssimultaneously upon reason, which transgresses he limits of our possibleknowledgeofnature.The a prioriprinciplesofreason, fregulativewithrespectto thefaculty fknowledge, re constitutivewithrespect o thefaculty f desire.Thus the critique of pure theoreticalreason excludes both reason and desire,desire'sreasonand reason's desire.What is basically n question?The base.Understandingnd reasonarenottwodisjunctfaculties; hey rearticulatedin a specific askand a specificnumber of processes,preciselythose which setarticulation, hat s, discourse, n motion.Between he twofaculties,n effect,narticulatemember, third acultyomes ntoplay.This intermediary,hich Kantrightfullyalls Mittelglied,middlearticulation,s judgment Urteil).Butwhat sthenatureofthea prioriprinciplesofthemiddle articulation?Arethey onstitu-tive or regulative?Do theygive a priori rules forpleasure and displeasure?Rememberthatregulative principles do not allow us to distinguisha specialrealm eigenesGebiet).Since theMittelglied lso constitutes hearticulation fthetheoretical ndthepractical in the Kantian sense),we areplungedinto a spacewhich s neithertheoretical orpractical,or ratherbothpractical nd theoretical. rt in general)or rather hebeautiful,f t takesplace, is inscribedhere.But thishere, hisplace,declares tself s a place deprived fplace. If it had a place, itmightnot have aspecial realm.This is nothowever odeprive t of urisdiction rfoundation: hatwhich has no special realm (Gebiet) or field Feld), a "fieldof objects" which



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definests "realm,"mayhave a "territory"nd a "ground" (Boden) with tsown"jurisdiction."The Mittelglied, ntermediary ember,must be treated s a detachablepart,a separate part (als ein besondererTheil). But also as a nondetachablepart,anonseparatepart, since it constitutes he articulationbetweentwo others-wemighteven say,anticipating Hegel, an originary art (Ur-teil). t is in effectquestion of udgment.The sameparagraphrecallsthat critiqueofpurereason,that is, of our faculty f judging according to a priori principles,would be"incomplete" (unvollstdndig) fa theory f udgment,oftheMittelglied, werenotdealt withseparately."But immediatelyfterwards,n thenextsentence, hatin a purephilosophytheprinciplesof udgmentwould notconstitute separatepartbetween hetheoretical nd practicalparts,butmightbe connected, nnexed(angeschlossen)to either.Kant thusseems tocontradict imself: t is necessary odisengagethe middlemember s a detachablepart,but it is also necessary o re-member hewhole byreconstitutinghenexus,theconnection, hereannexationof thepartto the twomajorcolumns ofthecorpus.We mustnotforgethatwe aredealing with judgment (Urteil), the functionof the copula. Does it play adetachablerole, tsownpart,ordoes it worktoorchestrateeason, n concertwiththepracticaland the theoretical?Let us examine thisparagraph in theprefaceto the thirdCritiquemoreclosely. t involvesno contradiction. he separationof thepart s notprescribedand forbidden rom he samepoint of view.Withina critiqueofpure reason,ofour faculty f udging accordingto a prioriprinciples, hepartmustbe detachedand examined separately.But in a pure philosophy, in a "systemof purephilosophy,"everything ill be reconciled. he critiquedetachesbecause t s butone momentand one part of the system.Criticalsuspension-the krinein, hebetween-two,he question of whether he theory f judgment is theoretical rpractical,regulative rconstitutive-istheprocedure fthecritique.But a systemof pure philosophy will have to subsume the critiqueand construct generaldiscoursewhichwill rationalize hedetachment. his system fpurephilosophyis whatKant calls metaphysics.t is notyetpossible.There is as yetno possibleprogramoutside thecritique.The questionofdesire, fpleasureand displeasure, s thereforelso that f adetachmentneither he wordnor theconcept appears as such in theCritique)which will determine, ismember,rre-membertself: etachment-separation fa member-; detachment-delegationof a representative;ignor symbol hargedwith a mission beauty s thesymbolofmorality, roblemsofhypotyposis,fthetrace Spur],of "coded writing" Chiffreschrift],f the ntermittentign[Wink];cf.for xampleparagraphs42 and 59)--; detachment-disinterests theessence faesthetic xperience.To speak oftherelationshipbetween wopossibilities thepresent ossibil-5. Ibid., p. 15.



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ityof thecritiqueand thatto come ofmetaphysics), antproposesa metaphorborrowedfromart,which has not yetbeen discussed,from the technique ofarchitecture,rom he rchitectonic:hepure philosopher, hemetaphysician, illhave to proceedlikea good architect,ike a good technites f edification. e willbe a kind of artist.He mustfirstecure heground, hefoundation, hefundamen-tals. "A Critique of pure reason, i.e., of our facultyof judging on a prioriprinciples,would be incomplete fthecritical xaminationof udgement,whichis a faculty fknowledge, nd, as such, aysclaimto ndependent rinciples,werenotdealt withseparately. till,however, tsprinciplescannot, n a systemfpurephilosophy,form separate onstituent artbetween hetheoreticalnd practicaldivisions,butmaywhen needfulbe annexed toone or other s occasionrequires.For if such a systems some dayworkedout . .. thecritical xaminationofthegroundforthisedificemusthave beenpreviously arrieddown to thevery epthsofthefoundations f thefaculty fprinciples ndependent fexperience, est nsomequarter tmightgiveway,and, sinking, nevitably ringwith t theruin ofall.''6The proper evel of thecritique: thearchitect f reasonexcavates, ounds,prepares heterrain,n searchof a solidfoundation, heultimateGrund on whichall ofmetaphysicsmaybe erected, ut also ofroots,of thecommon root whichbranches nto the ightofday,yetnever ubmits oexperience.n this, he ritiqueattempts odescendto buthos, o thebottom ftheabyss,notknowingwhethertexists.It is stilltoo early oexaminethegeneralfunction fmetaphor nd analogyin the thirdCritique. This functionmay not be simplyreflectedy thetheorywhich, n thebook, subsumes t and is embeddedthere.We have been dealing with the firstmetaphor":beginningof thePreface(Vorrede).However, t the end of the ntroductionEinleitung)whichfollows, sif to framethe entireprolegomenon,we encounter hemetaphorof thebridge(Briicke)projectedover the enormous abyss (grosseKluft), the artificialworkwhich assurespassage over thenatural chasm. Here philosophy,which in thisbook must conceive art-art in general and fine rt-as part of its fieldor itsedifice, epresentstself s a partof tspart, s an artofarchitecture.t re-presentsitself, etaches tself, ispatches n emissary,ne partof tself utside tself obindthewhole, to fillup or to heal thewhole whichhas sufferedetachment. hephilosophyof artpresupposesan artofphilosophizing-major art-but also, inits preliminary ritique, a minor one, that of the architect's difying rection(brectiondificatrice). nd if, s will be stated ater, ine rtwill alwaysbe an artofspirit,thenAnthropology romthePragmaticPoint of View will be likelytodelegatea Germanto thecritic'spost:theGermanspirit s manifestedmostoftenin theroot,the Italian in thecrown of leaves,theFrench n theflower,nd theEnglish in thefruit.Thus, ifthispurephilosophyor fundamentalmetaphysics6. Ibid., pp. 4-5.



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proposes to accountfor, mong otherthings, esire, leasure,and displeasure, texposes itself t theoutset,representsts own desire. Reason's desire s a funda-mentaldesire, he desirefor hefundamental, orbuthos.Not an empiricaldesire,since it leads toward theunspecified,nd what is givenunder theauspices ofadeterminatemetaphor,themetaphorof reason,will have to make sense of allothermetaphors. t would representhebeing-desirefdesire, hedesire freasonas desirefor grounded tructure. difying esirewould be producedas the rtofphilosophizing,commandingall others nd rationalizing ll rhetoric."Considerable difficulties"rise.A theory f udgment sMittelgliedmustbeconstructed. ut therewill be "considerabledifficulties"grosseSchwierigkeiten)finding prioriprinciplespeculiarto udgmentwhichat thesametimemaintainthe theory f empiricism.We can onlyfind prioriconcepts n understanding.The faculty f udgmentemploysthese, pplies them,but there reno conceptsproperto or specifically eserved or t. The only conceptthat t can produceisempty, s itwere, nd contributes othingtoknowledge. Properly peaking," t"knows nothing." It provides a subjective "rule" of thumb which has noobjectivity, o relationwith theobject,no cognition.The faculty f judgmentregulates itself;otherwise t would have to call upon yet anotherfacultyofarbitration, o infinity. evertheless,hissubjective uleapplies to udgments, ostatementswhichclaim to have a universally bjective tructure.This is thedifficulty,heconstraint,he onfusion, heVerlegenheit.t seemsto confirm certainHegelian verdict, ater confirmed y Heidegger: thatthisdiscourseon the beautifuland on art,by remaininga theory f judgment, sencumberedwiththe--secondary-oppositionof subjectand object.The beautiful nd arthave notyetbeenquestioned.Nothingup tothispointin thePreface ndicatesthatthey ught to be. Here,however,Kantdeclaresthatthe "considerabledifficulties"fprinciple (subjectiveorobjective)are "encoun-tered" (findetsich) "chiefly" hauptsaichlich) n judgments "that are calledaesthetic."They offerne example,a majoroccurrence f the"difficulties."heyare actuallytheprincipal example, theunique specimenwhichconfersmeaningand orientsmultiplicity. he examinationof thisexample,theaesthetic omain,constitutes hechoice part,the"most importanttem" (die wichstigste tiick)ofthecritiqueof thefaculty f udgment.Even if estheticudgments, s udgments,contributenothingto knowledge,they rise from heunique faculty f know-ledge,which s connected ythem ccording oan a prioriprinciple opleasureordispleasure.The relationshipbetweenknowledge nd pleasure s thusrevealednits purity:there s nothing to know. But such is preciselythe enigma, theenigmatic das Rdtselhafte) t the heartof judgment.This is whya "separatedivision" (besondereAbteilung), special cut,a detachedpart, sectionconsti-tutes heobjectof thethirdCritique.We mustnot expectfrom the Critique what in principle, n its declaredintention, t does not promise. This critique of taste is not concernedwithproduction.Neither he"formation"nor "culture" of taste rerelevant nd they



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areeasilydispensedwith. And since theCritiquewill demonstratehatwecannotassignconceptualrulesto thebeautiful,t will notbeconcernedwithconstitutingan aesthetic, o matterhow general,but withanalyzingthe formal onditionsofpossibilityof aesthetic udgment in general, thus, of aestheticobjectivity ngeneral.In this transcendental mbition, Kant asks that we read him withoutindulgence.But,for herecord, erecognizes hegaps,the hortcomingsMangel-haftigkeit)fhis work.Hegel uses the sameword.Where s thegap? Whatgap arewe talkingabout?And f twere heframe. fthegap constituted heframe fthetheory.Not tsaccident,but tsframe.Moreor lessrestated:fthegap werenotonlythe ackofatheory f theframe, ut also theplace of thegap in thetheory f theframe.

Edge/gapAccording oKant atleast, he"shortcomings" f hiswork re due tothefactthatnaturehas entangled, omplicated, onfused verwickelt) heproblems.Theauthor'sexcusesapplyonlyto thefirstartof thework, o thecritique faestheticjudgment, nd not to thecritiqueofteleological udgment.Only thefirstartoftheargumentwill lack theclarity nd thedistinctionDeutlichkeit)we have theright oexpectofknowledgefrom oncepts.Having lamented hefact hatnaturehas tangledthethreads, cknowledging hegaps and projecting bridge ver theabyss of the two othercritiques, t themomentat which he bringshis criticalundertakingto completion (Hiermit endige ich also mein ganzes kritischesGeschiift), antmentionshis age. He mustgain time,notprolongthedelay,pressforwards owarddoctrine

we areconcernedwithplea-sure,purepleasure, hebeing-pleasure fpleasure.The thirdCritiquewaswrittenforpleasure's sake,and so must t be read. A pleasurewhichis somewhat rid-without oncept nd without njoymentjouissance)-and somewhat trict, ut tteaches us once more that there s no pleasure withoutrestriction.n takingpleasure as my guide, in one movement acknowledgeeven as I lead astray ninjunction.I pursue it: theenigmaofpleasuresetstheentirebook in motion.lead itastray: ytreatinghethirdCritique s a workof artor as a beautiful bject,which itwas not simplymeant to be, I act as if theexistence f thebookdid not



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matter o me (which,Kantexplains, s a prerequisite f all aesthetic xperience);view it with an imperturbable etachment.But what is the existence f a book?1. I pursueit. The possibility fpleasure s thequestion.Demonstration: hefirstwoparagraphsofthe"FirstMomentoftheJudgementf Taste: MomentofQuality," FirstBook ("Analyticof theBeautiful")of the FirstSection "AnalyticofAesthetic udgement") f Part ("Critique of Aesthetic udgement").Why alla judgmentof taste aesthetic? ecause in order to determinewhether omethingmaybe said to be beautiful, do not consult therelationoftherepresentationotheobject,withcognition n mind (the udgmentof taste ffers one),but to thesubject and its affectpleasure or displeasure).The judgmentof taste s not ajudgmentofknowledge, t is not "logical," butsubjective nd thereforeesthetic:relationtoaffectaisthesis).Every elation f a representation,vena sensibleone,can eventually e objective,but neverpleasureordispleasure.Certainly estheticrepresentationsmay give rise to logical judgmentswhen theyare relatedbyjudgmentto theobject;butwhen udgment tself s relatedto thesubject,tothesubjective ffect-which s thecase here-it is and can onlybe aesthetic.The Wohlgefallen, suallytranslated s subjective atisfaction,hepleasurewhich definesaesthetic udgment, must, we know, be disinterested.nterest(Interesse) s always relatedto theexistenceof an object. I am interestedn anobject when its existence Existenz)matters o me in one way or another. Butknowingwhether may saythat omething s beautifulhas nothing ntrinsicallyto do with the interest mayor maynot demonstraten its existence.And thepleasure (Lust), that kind of pleasing known as pleasure,which I experiencebefore hatwhich I judge tobe beautiful equires n indifferencer,more trictly,an absolute lack of interestn thething'sexistence.This pure and disinterestedleasure (not indifferent:eideggerreproachesNietzsche n thispoint forhavingmisunderstoodhenonindifferenttructurefthis aissez-etre),hispleasurewhichdirectsme towards nonexistence rat leasttowards thing butwhat s a thing? heneed tograft heHeideggerianquestionarises)theexistence fwhich does notmatter ome,a pleasureof this sortdefinesthe judgment of tasteand the enigmaticrelation of mourning-the work ofmourning begun beforehand-with beauty. As in a kind of transcendentalreduction,the ?poche of a thesisof existencewhose suspense liberates,undercertainformal onditions, hepure feeling fpleasure.We arefamiliarwith theexample: I standbefore palace. Someone asks mewhether think t s beautiful, rratherwhether can say"this sbeautiful." t is aquestion of judgment,of a judgmentofuniversalvalidity, nd everythingmustthereforee in the form fstatements,uestions,and answers.Even thoughtheaesthetic ffects irreducible,udgmentdemands that say"this is beautiful"or"thisis not beautiful."Is thepalace ofwhich I am speakingbeautiful?A variety fanswerswouldmiss the point of the question. If I say: "I do not care for thingsmade for



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rubbernecks,"rrather,withthe roquois sachem, I preferhepubs," orrather, ila Rousseau, "There stands signfor hevanity f therichwhoexploitthepeoplein order oproducefrivolities,"rrather, If I wereon a desert slandand had themeans, stillwould nottake thetrouble ohave it mported," tc.-none oftheseanswers constitutes n intrinsically esthetic udgment. I have evaluated thepalace as a function of extrinsicmotives, n termsof empirical psychology,relationswitheconomicproduction,political structures,echnicalcausality, tc.We must know of what we speak, what concerns the value of beautyintrinsically nd what remains external to our immanentsense of it. Thispermanent emand-to distinguishbetween he nternalorpropermeaningandthe circumstances f the object in question--organizeseveryphilosophic dis-courseon art, hemeaningof art ndmeaning tself, rom lato toHegel,Husserl,and Heidegger. tpresupposesa discourseon the imitbetween he nside and theoutsideofthe artobject, n thiscase a discourse n theframe.Wheredo we findt?According o Kant,what I want to know when I askmyselfwhether thinkthispalace is beautifulor not is whether find t to be beautiful, lternatively,whethert is therepresentationftheobject-in and ofitself--which leasesme,however ndifferentgleichgiiltig) remain towardstheobject'sexistence. It isquite plain that n order o saythattheobject s beautiful, nd to showthat havetaste, verythingurns n themeaningwhich can giveto thisrepresentation,ndnoton anyfactorwhichmakesme dependent n the real existence ftheobject.Everyonemustallow thata judgementon the beautifulwhich s tingedwith theslightestnterest,s very artial and nota pure udgementoftaste.One mustnotbe in the eastprepossessedn favour f thereal existence fthethingbutmustpreserve omplete ndifferencen thisrespect,n order oplaythepartof udge inmatters f taste.This proposition,which is of theutmost mportance, annot bebetterxplainedthanbycontrastinghepuredisinterestedelight uninteressertenWohlgefallen]which appears in the judgementof tastewith that allied [ver-bunden]to an interest:-especially fwe can also assureourselves hat here renootherkindsof nterest eyondthosepresentlymentioned."'Whenthe xistence fthe agreeable and the existenceof the good are concerned, t is a question ofinterest

II disinter-ested pleasure: the phrase is too familiar,too common, like the dismissal it

7. Ibid., pp. 43-4.



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continuesto provoke.The angerofNietzsche nd Artaud:disinterestrdisinter-estingnessgoes overboard.Heidegger's meditativemurmurat the end of TheOrigin: pleasureis superfluous r insufficient.Butconclusionsshouldneverbe hastywhenpleasure s at ssue.In this ase,a pleasurewhich s pureand disinterested,hich deliverstself p in thepurity fits essence,withoutany contaminationbyexternals. t no longer depends uponany empirical phenomenon, any specified xistence of subject or object; myempiricity eferspreciselyto the existenceof the beautifulobject, or to theexistence fmysensiblemotivation.To thisdegree, nd consideredntrinsically(but how to delimittheintrinsic, hat which borders, ecus,the nternal imit),pleasure does not presuppose the pure and simple disappearance, but theneutralization,not simplythedeath but theentombment,f everything hichexists nsofar s itexists.This pleasure spurely ubjective:n aestheticudgment,itdesignates bezeichnet) othingobjective.But tssubjectivitysnotan existence,it does notevenrefer oexistence. t is an in-or anexistent ubjectivityising verthe tombof theempiricalsubjectand itsentireworld.And which nevertheless njoys. No, does not enjoy: Kant distinguishespleasure (Wohlgefallen,Lust) fromenjoyment Genuss). Takes pleasure, then.No, because it also receives t. If thetranslation fWohlgefallenwithpleasure snot entirely igorous,then with satisfaction t is even less; thepleasing risksidentificationwith the agreeable and suggeststhateverythingomes fromthepleasing object. In Wohlgefallen,n fact, enjoy myself, ut withoutcomplai-sance, I am not interestedn myself, specially in so faras I exist, I enjoysomething.Not somethingwhich exists,whatever t maybe. I enjoymyenjoy-mentof-that which is beautiful. nsofar s it does notexist.Since thisaffect f enjoyingsomethingremainsthoroughly ubjective,wemay speak hereofan autoaffection.he role ofthe maginationand thusoftimein theentirediscourseconfirmshis.Nothingwhich exists, s such,nothing ntime and in space can produce this affectwhich affectstselfwith itself.Andnevertheless,njoying omething, hesomething fenjoyment lso indicatesthatthis autoaffectionxtendsbeyond tself: t is a pure heteroaffection.he purelysubjective ffects provokedbythatwhichwe call thebeautiful, hatwhich s saidto be beautiful:outside, in the object and independentof its existence. Fromwhich, the indispensable,critical characterof the recourseto judgment: thestructure f autoaffections such thatit is affected ya pure objectivity boutwhich we must say, "This is beautiful," and "This statement as universalvalidity."Otherwisetherewould be no problem-and no discourseon art.Thewhollyotheraffectsme withpure pleasurewhile deprivingme ofbothconceptand enjoyment.Without this wholly other,no universality,no demand foruniversality,utfor hesamereason,no enjoymentsingular, mpirical, xistent,interested) f eitherthe determinant oncept or of knowledge.Of eitherthepractical or the theoretical. Utterly irreducible heteroaffectionnhabits-intrinsically-themosthermetic utoaffection:his s the"grosseSchwierigkeit":



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it does not install itselfin the comfortable rrangement f the overworkedsubject/objectcouple, within an arbitrarily etermined pace. Nor in somemachine oiled withmimesis,homoiosis,adequatio. We knowthat, t least atfirst,Kant rejects hevalue of imitation. As to homoiosis and adequatio, the ssue iscomplicated,to say the least, since it is no longera question of determinantjudgment,butofreflectiveudgment, nd since the res n questiondoes notexist,or atleast ts existence s thing s not taken nto account. t s at theend of a totallydifferenttinerary hat we will confirm he efficacyf these values (mimesis,homoiosis,adequatio) in Kantiandiscourse8

Salmost nothing s left (me): neither hething,nor tsexistence, ormyown,northepure object,northepuresubject-nointerestwhatsoever n anything hatexists.All the same, I like; no that s stillexcessive, hatstillprobably mplies nterestn existence. do notlike,but takepleasurein thatwhichdoes not interestme, at least nsofar s it does not matterwhether like itornot. I do nottake thispleasurewhich take.Rather, give t.givewhat take, receivewhat give, do nottakewhat receive.Andall the sameI give t tomyself. an I saythat give t tomyself?t s so universally bjective-in the claim ofmyown judgmentand in commonsense-that it can comeonlyfroma pure outside. Inassimilable. At the limit,thispleasurewhich I give tomyselfr towhich givemyself, ywhich give myself,do notevenfeel,fto feelmeans to experience:phenomenally,empirically, n the space and timeofmyinterested nd interestingxistence.A pleasureimpossibleto experience. nevertake t,receive t,giveit,or giveit tomyself,ince (existing ubject)neverhaveaccess to thebeautiful s such. I neverhavepure pleasureinsofar s I exist.And all thesameitis there, leasure, omething emains; t s there, sgibt,(a donne,pleasure s what s given;forno one,but t remains nd it s thebest, hepurest.And it is thisremainder hatgivesrise tospeech, ince t s discourse n thebeautiful hat s primarily nderconsideration nceagain,discursivity ithinthestructurefthe beautiful nd notonlya discourse risingout of the beautiful.8. "Economimesis," in Mimesis (in collaborationwith S. Agacinski,S. Kofman,Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe,J.-L. Nancy,B. Pautrat). n thecollection "La philosophie en effet," ubier-Flammarion,1975. Author'snote.)



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2. I lead itastray: ytreating he thirdCritiqueas a workofart, neutralizeor entomb ts existence.But I cannotknowwhether,n order o do so, I mustacton theauthority f theCritique, inceI do not know whattheexistence f a thingis, and thuswhat nterestn theexistence fa thing s. What s it toexist, orKant?According o the conditionsof a transcendentalesthetic, o be present,n spaceand timeas an individual thing.Nothing s less aesthetic n thissense thanthebeautiful object which must not interestus as aistheton.But this aestheticinexistencemust ffectme and this swhythewordaesthetics from hebeginningjustified.Whenthe beautiful) bject s a book,what exists ndwhat no longer xists?The book is not to beconfusedwiththe ensiblemultiplicityf tsexisting opies.Thus theobjectbookofferstself s such, n its ntrinsictructure,s independentfrom ts copies. But then whatwe call its ideality s notpure; an extremely ineanalysismustdistinguish t from deality n general,from hatofothertypes fobject,and, in the case of art,from heidealityof otherclasses ofbook (novel,poetry, tc.)orfromnondiscursive rnonbookish rtobjects painting, culpture,music,theater,tc.). n each case thestructurefexemplaritysingleormultiple)is unique, thereby rescribing differentffect. nd n eachexample t remains obe decided what example is to be made of theexample: is it to be dropped asextrinsic xcrement r retained s intrinsicdeality?Here is one example, but en abime: the thirdCritique. How to treat hisbook. Is it a book. What makes t a book.What s it to read thisbook.How totakeit. Have I therightto saythat t is beautiful, nd first f all even to ask

- forexample, the question of order.The spatial, so-calledplastic,workof artdoes notnecessarily rescriben order freading. canplacemyselfnfrontof it, begin with the top or bottom, t timesmove around. Undoubtedlythispossibilityhas an ideal limit.Let us sayfor hemoment hatthestructurefthislimitpermits reater lay than n thecase ofthetemporal rts discursive rnot),unless a certainpulverization, precise patial staging either ffectivervirtual)allows us tobeginfrom everaldifferentlaces,so that he peedand thedirectionvary.But a book. And a book ofphilosophy. f t is a workofmetaphysicsn theKantiansense,thusofpurephilosophy,we can rightfullypen itanywhere:t s akind ofarchitecture.n the thirdCritiquethere spurephilosophy, nd itsplan is



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drawn.Following theanalogy (buthow dowefollow t),we mustbe able tobegineverywherend to follow no particularorder, ven fthequantity ndquality,thestrength f reading may depend, as with architecture,n point of view and acertain elationto the deal limit-which constituteshe frame.But therenever sanythingbutpoint of view: thesolidity, heexistence, hestructuref theedificedo not depend upon it. Can we say the same of a book byanalogy?We do notinevitablygain access to architecture y followingthe orderof its production,from ts foundations o itspinnacle. And hereperception, nalysis,penetration,utilization, vendestruction,mustbedistinguished. ut dowe reada book ofpurephilosophyifwe do notbeginwiththefundamentals nd followtheprescribedorder n which it was written.What s it then to read philosophy,and mustweonlyread t. Certainly heprescribed rder ustainedbythefundamentals oesnotcoincide with the orderof itswriting:forexample,Kantwrotehis Introductionafterfinishing he book, in an effort o reassemble the entire systemof hisphilosophy,to legitimizehisdiscourse, o articulate iscritiquewithphilosophy.The Introductionfollows its preparation.But even if it were grantedthat, nKantianmetaphysics,t is necessary o beginwith thefoundation, hecritique snotmetaphysics:t s,from hebeginning, searchfor hefoundation thereforetin factcomes after), uspended like a crane or a dredger bove a pit, scraping,excavating,clearing, n an efforto redeemsome solid ground. In what ordershould a critiquebe read. The order n which twas written, rtherightfulne.The ordo inveniendi or the ordo exponendi. All these differentuestions,subordinate oone another, o matter owdenselynterwoven,regenerally alidfor ll criticaltexts I

- a supplementarycomplicationforcesus to reconsider heorder of all thesequestions. The thirdCritique is not just one critiqueamong others. ts specific bject is a particulartype of judgment-reflectiveudgment-which treatsthe example in a verysingularway. The distinction, othfamiliar nd obscure,betweenreflectivenddeterminantudgmentcontrols ll of thebook's internaldivisions. restate t initsmost mpoverished enerality. he faculty f udging in generalallows us tothink ftheparticular s containedunderthegeneral rule,principle, aw). Whenthegeneral s givenfirst,heoperationof udgment ubsumes nd determinesheparticular. It is determinant bestimmend), t defines, arrows,comprehends,



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The Parergon 17

compresses. n theopposite assumption, reflectivereflectirend)udgmentbeginswiththeparticular nd mustreturn, etrace hewayto thegeneral:theexample(whatmatters ous here) s givenpriorto the aw, and maythusberevealed n itsexemplary unity.Currentscientific r logical discourseproceedsaccordingtodeterminantudgments,the examples follow in order to determineor, in adidacticdrawing,to illustrate.But in art and in life, nyplace wherewe must,according to Kant, proceed by means of reflectiveudgmentsand assume (byanalogy with art: we will return o thisrule later)an endwhose concept s notgiven,theexampleprecedes.The result s a singularhistoricitynd (taking ntoaccount thesimulacrum)a certainfictureregulated, elative)ofthetheoretical- Ion theauthority fthisreflectivereak, beginmyreadingofthethirdCritiquewithsome examples.Nothingas yet llows us todeterminewhether hisobedience s perverse rnot.

I begin therefore ith some examples: not with the Introduction,whichgivesthe aws,norwiththebeginningofthe book (theAnalytic ftheBeautiful).Nor with themiddle,nor the end, but somewherenear the conclusion of theAnalyticof theBeautiful,withparagraph 14,entitled Exemplification"Eclair-cissement ar des exemples;Erlaiiterung urchBeispiele).Kant's obvious intention s to clarify hestructuref "theproperobjectofthepure udgement ftaste" deneigentlichen egenstand esreinenGeschmacks-urtheils). am not evengoing to citeevery xample, onlya few, nd I provision-ally setaside his extremelyonvolutedtheory fcolor and sound,ofdrawing ndcomposition,which comes betweenthe two fragmentswhich I translatehere.Unless in theprocess t is broached. n anycase, I will assume it has been read."Aesthetic, ust like theoretical logical) judgements,are divisible intoempiricaland pure.The firstrethosebywhichagreeableness rdisagreeableness,the second those by which beauty, s predicatedof an object or its mode ofrepresentation. he former re judgementsof sense (materialaesthetic udge-ments), he atter as formal) lone judgementsoftasteproper."A judgementof taste,therefore,s only pure so faras its determiningground is taintedwithno merely mpiricaldelight Wohlgefallen].But such ataint is always presentwhere charm [Reiz] or emotion have a share in thejudgementbywhichsomething s to be described s beautiful.



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"All form fobjectsof sense bothofexternal nd also,mediately,f nternalsense) s either igure rplay. In the atter ase itis either layoffiguresin space:mimic and dance), or mereplayofsensations in time).The charmofcolours,orof theagreeabletonesof nstruments, aybe added:but thedesign n the formerand the composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the purejudgementof taste.To say that thepurity like ofcolours and of tones,of theirvariety nd contrast eem to contribute o beauty, s byno means to implythat,because in themselvesgreeable,they hereforeieldan addition supplement] othedelight n the formWohlgefallen n derForm]and one on a parwith t.Thereal meaning rather s that theymake this form more clearly,definitely,ndcompletelyntuitable, nd besidesstimulate herepresentation ytheir harm, sthey xcite and sustainthe attention irected o theobject itself.

"Even what is called ornamentationZierathen: ecoration, rnamentation,adornment] parerga), .e. what is onlyan adjunct,and notan intrinsic onstitu-ent n thecompleterepresentationf an object, n augmenting hedelight f tastedoes so solelybymeansof its form.Thus it is withtheframesEinfassungen] fpicturesor the draperyon statues,or the colonnades of palaces. But if theornamentation oes not itself nter ntothe omposition f a beautiful orm-if tis introduced simplement pplique] like a gold framegoldeneRahmen]merelyto win approval for thepicture bymeans of its charm-it is thencalled finery[parure;Schmuck]and takesaway from hegenuine beauty."9

II the heorymoves longsmoothly II thus hedraperyn statues-forxample-wouldbe ornamentation: arerga.Elsewhere Kant explains thenecessity f his recourseto archaic,scholarlylanguages. Here Greek confers omething pproximating onceptualdignity nthenotionofthehorsd'oeuvrewhichdoesnotremain imply utsideof thework,actingfrom hesidelines,next to thework ergon).Dictionariesmostoftengive9. Kant,Critique,pp. 65-8.



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"horsd'oeuvre,"which s themost iteral ranslation, ut also "accessory, oreign,or secondary object," "supplement," "aside," "remainder." It is that whichshould not become, by distinguishing tself,the principal subject: the legaleducationofchildren Laws, 766a), or the definitionf science Theatetus,184a)should not be treateds parerga. n the nvestigationf causesor theknowledge fprinciples, parerga should not be allowed to takeprecedence ver theessential(Nicomachean Ethics, 1098-30). Philosophical discourse is always against theparergon.Butwhat is it against.A parergon is against,beside,and above and beyondthe ergon,theworkaccomplished,the accomplishmentof the work. But it is not incidental;it isconnected o and cooperates n itsoperationfrom heoutside.[...]If theparergon,this supplementary ors d'oeuvre,has something ike thestatus of a philosophical concept, then it must designate a general formalpredicativestructurewhich may be carriedover, either ntactor consistentlydeformed, eformed,o otherfields,where new contentsmaybe submitted o it.Kant uses the word parergonelsewhere:the context s verydifferent,ut thestructures analogous and equally problematic.We find t in a lengthynoteappendedto thesecond and subsequenteditionsofReligion withintheLimits ofReason A one. The form n which it occurs s extremelymportant.To what is the Note appended?To a "General Observation"which con-cludes PartTwo.Whatis theparergon? t is theconceptof theobservation, fthis"GeneralObservation," nsofar s it defineswhataugmentsReligion withinthe Limits ofReason Alone while beingneitherpartof it nor absolutely xtrinsic o it. EachPart includesa "General Observation" AllgemeineAnmerkung), arergonon aparergon.Since there re fourParts,these fourObservationson parerga,horsd'oeuvres, adjuncts"which areneithernternalnorexternal, ffectivelyrame hework,butalso square it.At the beginningof the Note appended in the second edition to the first"GeneralObservation," he tatus ftheObservations defineds parergon: ThisGeneral Observation s thefirst ffourwhichareappended,one to each Book ofthis work, and which mightbear the titles, 1) Works of Grace, (2) Miracles,(3) Mysteries,nd (4) Means of Grace. These matters re, as it were,parergatoreligionwithinthe imitsofpurereason;they o notbelongwithin t,butborderupon it [aberstossen doch an sie an: they ouchupon it,putpressure n it,pressagainstit,seekcontact, xertpressure t theboundary].Reason,conscious of herinability o satisfy ermoralneed,extendsherself ohigh-flowndeas capable ofsupplyingthis ack [Mangel],without,however, ppropriating hese deas as anextension of her domain [Besitz: possession]. Reason does not dispute thepossibility rthereality ftheobjectsofthese deas;shesimply annotadoptthemintohermaxims of thought nd action.She even holds that, f n the nscrutablerealm ofthesupernatural here s somethingmore hanshe can explaintoherself,



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The Parergon 21

whichmay yetbe necessary s a complement o her moral insufficiency,hiswillbe,eventhoughunknown, vailable tohergood will. Reason believes thiswithfaithwhich (with respectto the possibilityof this supernatural omplement)mightbe called reflective;ordogmaticfaithwhichproclaims tself s a form fknowledgeappears to herdishonestorpresumptuous.To remove hedifficulties,then, n thewayof thatwhich formoralpractice) tandsfirmn and for tself,smerely by-workparergon),whenthosedifficultiesavereferenceo transcendentquestions."10"By-work" is the translation of Nebengeschdfte: econdarybusiness orbusyness,activityor operation from the sidelines or nearby.The parergoninscribes omething xtra,exterior o thespecific ield here,ofpurereasonandReligion withinthe Limits ofReason Alone), but whose transcendentxterioritytouches,plays with, brushes,rubs,or pressesagainst the limit and intervenesinternally nly insofar s the inside is missing.Missing something nd is itselfmissing.Since reason s "conscious of her nability osatisfy ermoralneed,"shehas recourse to the parergon, to grace, mysteries,miracles. She requires asupplementary by-work." ertainly he djunct s a threat. tsfunction s critical.It entails a risk and enjoys itself t the expense of transforminghe theory.Adamage,an injury prejudice;Nachteil] corresponds o eachparergonnReligion,and the fourclasses ofprejudice correspondto thefourkinds ofparerga: 1. tosupposed internal xperience effectsfgrace),fanaticism, . tosupposedexternalexperience miracles), uperstition, . to supposed lightofunderstanding f thesupernaturalorder, lluminism,4. to supposed supernatural ctions (throughgrace), thaumaturgy.Nevertheless,hesefour deviationsor seductions f reasonare also aimed at a particularpleasure: pleasure-unto-God gottgefdlligerb-sicht].

Thus,the draperyon statues,a privilegedexample, would function s parergon,asornamentation. his means (das heisst)preciselywhat s not interior r intrinsic(innerlich), in the sense of an integralcomponent (als Bestandstiick), o thecompleterepresentationf theobject in dieganzeVorstellung esGegenstandes),but whichbelongsto itonly n an extrinsic ashion nur iusserlich),s a surplus,an addition,an adjunct (als Zuthat).10. ImmanuelKant,Religion within theLimits ofReason Alone, trans.T. M. Greene nd H. H.Hudson, New York,Harper& Row, 1960,pp. 47-9.



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The drapery n statues,whichsimultaneously dorns andveils their udity,is horsd'oeuvreclingingto the work'sedgesas to thebodyrepresented,ut-sotheargument oes-not a partof therepresentativehole. What s representedytherepresentations thenudebody, u naturel; herepresentationalssence f thestatue tallies with it; and only in it may the representation e beautiful-essentially,purely, and intrinsicallybeautiful,"the proper object of a purejudgementof taste."This definition f thecenter nd of the ntegrityf therepresentation,f tsinside and outside,may alreadyappear peculiar. We mayask as well wherethedrapery egins.Where parergonbegins,and where t ends. Whether ll draperyisparergon-G-strings nd the ike.What todo with bsolutely ransparenteils.And how to transpose hestatement opainting.Forexample,Cranach'sLucretiaholds nothingbut a flimsy ransparent eil overher sex: where s theparergon?Must we also considera parergon-not partof her nude body,au naturel-thedaggerwhich shepoints at herself nd whichtouchesherskin onlythepointoftheparergon touchesher body,in themiddle of a triangleformedbyher twobreasts nd hernavel)? Is hernecklace also a parergon? t concerns heobjectify-ing, representational ssence, its inside and outside, the criteriaused in thisdefinition,he value attributed o thenatural, and, either econdarily r princi-pally, theprivilegedposition of thehuman body. fevery arergon s added, asproved in Religion, only because of a lack within thesystemt augments, henwhat deficiencyn therepresentationf thebodydoes drapery upplement?Andwhathas artto do with t?

Our surprise t thisparagraphhas onlybegun. (Parergonalso signifiesheexceptional,the peculiar, the extraordinary.) have somewhattoo hastilytorn"drapery"from the contextof three xamples,threeparergawhich are no lessstrange-firstn themselves,nd in relationto one another.The examplewhichfollows immediately s that of the colonnades of palaces (SiiulengiingeumPrachtbiiude).These columns are also supplementary arerga.After rapery, hecolumn. Why should thecolumn be externalto the edifice?Accordingto whatcriterion,whatcritical rgan,what organonof discernment?t is no less obscurethan in the precedingcase and presentsyetanotherdifficulty:n this case theparergon ugments workwhich represents othing nd which itself ugmentsnature.We believewe knowwhat s partand what s notpartof thehumanbody,whatmaybe detachedfromt andwhatmaynot-even iftheparergon spreciselya detachmentwhich is not easily detached.But in an architecturalwork,theVorstellung, herepresentation,s not structurallyepresentational--ort is, butaccordingto a detour o complicated hat t would undoubtedly isconcertnyonewho wanted to distinguish,n a criticalmanner, he nside from heoutside,theintegral rom he detachable.So as not tocomplicatethis evenfurther,set side,provisionally, olumns n theform f thehumanbody upporting rrepresentingthesupportof a window (and thewindow itself-is it partof theedifice? nd awindowin a paintingofa building?), nd whichmaybe nude ordrapedandmayrepresent ither man or a woman-a distinction owhichKant does not allude.



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With theexample ofthecolonnade,we encounter heentire roblematic finscription n a milieu,of distinguishing he work from ground. t is alwaysdifficulto determinewhether heground s naturalor artificialnd, in the attercase,whether t is parergon rergon.The ground, ven f t s contiguouswiththework,doesnot constitute parergonn theKantian sense.The natural site hosenforthe erection f a temple s obviouslynot a parergon.Nor is an artificialite:neither hesquare, nor thechurch,nor themuseum,nor theother urroundingworks.Butdrapery r thecolumn,yes.Why?Notbecausethey reeasilydetached;on the contrary, heyare verydifficulto detach. Withoutthem,withouttheirquasidetachment, he ackwithin the workwould appearor,what amountstothesame,would notappear. It is not simply heir xteriorityhatconstitutes hem sparerga,but the nternal tructuralinkbywhichthey re nseparablefrom lackwithintheergon.And this ack makes for hevery nity f theergon.Without t,theergonwould haveno need ofa parergon.The lackoftheergon s the ack of aparergon, fdrapery r columns whichneverthelessemain xterior o t.How dowe determine herole of energeia?May we attachthe third xample to this seriesofexamples,to thequestionwhichthey aise?The third s in fact hefirst-Ihaveproceeded nreverse.t is,atleast apparently,difficulto associate with the other two. It is the framesofpaintings EinfassungenderGemdilde). he frame: arergon ike the others. hisseriesmaybe surprising.How do we assimilate hefunction f theframe othat fdrapery n (in, around,or against)sculpture, nd tothat fcolumnssurroundingan edifice?And what about a framewhich frames painting representingbuilding surroundedby columns in the form of draped human figures? heincomprehensibilityf the border, t theborder, ppears not only at the innerlimit,between he frame nd thepainting,thedrapery nd thebody,the columnand thebuilding,but also at its outer imit.Parergahave a thickness, surfacewhichseparates hemnotonly,as Kantwould have it,from hebodyof theergonitself, utalso from heoutside,from hewall on whichthepainting shung,thespace in which the statueor column stands, s well as from he entirehistoric,economic, and political field f inscription n which thedriveof the signaturearises an analogous problem, s wewill see ater).No "theory," o "practice,"no"theoreticalpractice" can be effective ere if it does not reston theframe, heinvisiblelimit of (between)the interiorityf meaning (protected y theentirehermeneutic,emiotic, henomenological, ndformalistradition) nd (of)all theextrinsic mpiricalswhich,blind and illiterate, odge thequestion.The parergon is distinguishedfromboth the ergon (the work) and themilieu; it is distinguished s a figuregainsta ground.But it is notdistinguishedin the same way as thework,which is also distinguishedfrom ground.Theparergonalframe s distinguishedfrom wo grounds,but in relation to each ofthese, tdisappears nto theother. n relationto thework,whichmayfunction sits ground, it disappears into the wall and then,by degrees, nto the generalcontext. n relationto thegeneralcontext, tdisappears nto thework.Always



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formon a ground,theparergon s nevertheless formwhich has traditionallybeen determinednot by distinguishing tself,but by disappearing,sinking n,obliterating tself, issolving ust as it expends itsgreatest nergy.The frame snevera ground in theway the contextor the workmaybe, but neither oes itsmarginalthickness orm figure.At least, it is a figurewhich arisesof itsownaccord.What would Kant have said about a frame which framesa paintingrepresenting buildingsurrounded ycolumns there remanyexamples) in theform f thedrapedhumanfigurethefrescoesn the vaultofthe SistineChapel-what is their frame?-are paintingsin which therepresented, ainted object issculpturewhich tself epresents,t Jonah's right or xample,puttiwhich formcolumn supportinga ceiling, etc. The same applies to the Persian sibyl,toZachariah,who holds a book in his hand,toJeremiah,nd to theLibyan sibyl; tis hard to say whetherthese putti-columnsare draped or not; they supportdrapery), nd which is set on an easel-the whole thing representedn anotherpainting.I mayappear to be takingunfair dvantageby persistingwith twoor threepossiblyfortuitous xamples from secondary ubchapter; tmightbe better odeal withparts ess marginalto thework,closer to its center nd its depth.Ofcourse.But theobjectionpresupposesthat we alreadyknowwhat the center ndthedepth of the thirdCritique are, that we have already ocated its frame nddelimited ts field.Yet nothingis more difficulto determine. he Critique is awork ergon) n severalways;as such,it must center nd frame tself, elimit tsgroundbydistinguishingtself, ymeansof a frame, rom generalbackground.However this frame s problematic. do not knowwhat is essentialand what issecondary o a work. Above all I do not know what thisthing s which s neitheressentialnorsecondary, either ropernor mproper,whichKantcalls parergon,for xample,the frame.What s theplace of theframe. oes ithave a place. Wheredoes it begin.Wheredoes it end. What is its inner imit.Outer.And the surfacebetween hetwo imits. do notknow fthepassage in theCritiquewhichdefinesparergon s itself parergon.Beforedecidingwhat is parergonal n a textwhichposes thequestion of theparergon,we must knowwhat a parergon s, at least fone occurs n thetext.For my impatientcritics, f they nsist on seeing the thing itself:everyanalyticof aesthetic udgmentpresupposes thatwe can rigorouslydistinguishbetween he ntrinsic nd theextrinsic. estheticudgmentmust oncern ntrinsicbeauty, nd not the around and about. It is thereforeecessary o know-this isthe fundamental resupposition, he foundation-how to define he ntrinsic, heframed,ndwhatto excludeas frame ndbeyond heframe.We are thusalready tthe unlocatable centerof the problem. And since,when we ask, "What is aframe?",Kantresponds, It is a parergon, compositeof nside and outside,but acompositewhich is not an amalgam orhalf-and-half,n outsidewhich is calledinside the nside to constitutet as inside." And when he givesas examplesof the



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parergon,besidestheframe, rapery nd columns,we say to ourselves hat hereare indeed "considerabledifficulties,"nd that the choice of examples,as well astheir ssociation, s not self-evident.All the more because theparergon,followingthe ogic of thesupplement,dividesinto two. At the limitbetween the work and theabsenceofthework, tdivides nto two.And thisdivisiongivesrisetoa sort fpathologyoftheparergon,whoseformsmust be namedand classified,ust as Religion specified our ypes fparergonal njuriesor"prejudices."Kant s in effectn theprocess fdefiningtheproperobjectof thepure udgementoftaste."Buthe does not simply xcludetheparergon s such and ingeneral.Onlyunder ertain onditions.Here thecriterionforexclusion is a formality.What s meantbyformality?The parergon frame, rapery, olumn) may augmentthepleasureof taste(Wohlgefallendes Geschmacks),may contribute o the intrinsically estheticrepresentationtself,f tintervenes ymeansof tsform durch eineForm),andonly bymeansof tsform. f t has a "beautifulform,"tenters ntothe udgmentof tasteproperly peaking,or in anycase its nterventions essential. t is, ifyouwill, the normal parergon. But if,on the contrary,t is not beautiful,purelybeautiful, hat s,formally eautiful, hen tis merefineryparure;Schmuck)andtarnishes he beautyof thework,detractsfrom t and is unfairto it. It is theanalogue of thedamage or "prejudice" (Nachteil) in Religion.The exampleofthedegradationnto seductive ineryfthesimple parergonis again theframe, histime thegildedframe goldeneRahmen), thegildingon

theframewhich calls our attention othepaintingbymeansof ts charm Reiz).What is bad, therefore,nd externalto thepure object of taste s that whichseducesbycharm; nd the xampleofthatwhichdiverts ymeansof tscharm s acolor,gilding,as nonform, ensiblecontent, r matter. he deterioration ftheparergon-the perversion,the allure-is the charm of sensible content.Asdrawing,the arrangement f lines and formation f angles, the frame s notalluring at all and is indispensable. But to retain its purity, t must remainwithoutcolor,free rom ll sensible,empiricalmateriality.This opposition form/matterominates,as we know, the Critique as awhole,inscribing t within a powerful radition.According o The Origin oftheWork of Art, t is one of threedeterminationshypokeimenon/sumbe ekos,aistheton/noeton,idos-morphe/hyle) hich encroachviolently pon thething.Itprovides "conceptualschema" (Begriffschema)or very heory fart.Weneedonlyassociatethe rationalwithintheformal, he rrationalwithmatter,he atterwith llogic, theformerwithlogic, to connect he ensemble o thesubject/objectpair, to setup a Begriffsmechanichichnothingcan withstand.Butwhat s theregion of origin of this determination f the thing as informedmatter? tswholesale usage byaesthetics llows us to conceiveof an originfarbeyondtherealm of art. And the Christiancreationmythcontributes n "additional im-pulse," a supplementarymotivation o consider he form/matteromplex as the



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structure f every ntity, 'ens creatum s theunityofformaand materia.Faithhavingdisappeared, he chemata fChristian hilosophyremainforceful. Thusthe interpretationf 'thing' by means of matter nd form,whether t remainsmedievalorbecomesKantian-transcendental,as becomecurrentnd self-evident.But for that reason, no less than the other nterpretationsmentioned of thethingness f thething, t s an encroachmentUeberfall] pon thething-beingfthething.This situation tandsrevealed s soon aswe speakofthingsn the trictsense as mere things blosseDinge, naked things].The 'mere' [bloss], after ll,means theremoval Entblbssung] fthecharacter fusefulness nd ofbeingmade.The mere hing s a sort fequipment, lbeitequipmentdenudedof tsequipmen-tal being.Thing-beingconsists n what is then eft ver. But thisremnant s notactuallydefined n itsontological character..." Iand if the Ueberfallhad the structure f thepar-ergon?This violent superimpositionwhich falls aggressively pon the thing,"insults" it,as the Frenchtranslator trangely, utpertinently as it,enslaves tand, literally, onjugates it undermatter/form-is hisa contingency,n acci-

dent,or a necessityhatremains o be examined?And what f, ike theparergon,tis neither ne nor theother?Andwhat ftheremnant,n itsstructures remnant,mightneverbe determinedn itself,f twereno longerevennecessaryo scan thishorizon

I- the wordparergonoccursprecisely paragraphs13 and 24) at themoment t whichKantarrives t thedistinction etweenmaterial nd formal udgments;onlythe atterare constitutive f udgmentsof taste n theproper ense. t is self-evidentlyot a

11. Heidegger, Origin," p. 30.



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question of a formalistaesthetic (it could, from another point of view, bedemonstrated hat the opposite is the case), but of formality s the space ofaestheticsn general,ofa "formalism"which,rather hanrepresenting specificsystem,s confoundedwiththehistory fartand aesthetics tself.And formalityalways implies the possibilityof a system f framingwhich is simultaneouslyimposed and effaced.The question of the frame s alreadyframedwhenitappearsat thisturn ntheCritique.Whyframed?"Exemplification"paragraph14)belongsto the Analytic f theBeautiful,"Book I of the "Analyticof AestheticJudgement." his analyticofthe beautifulhas fourdivisions,four ides,fourmoments.The judgmentof taste s examinedfrom our ides: 1. accordingto quality,2. accordingtoquantity, . accordingtorelation to ends (here the parergonfinds ts accommodation),4. according tomodality.According to quality, the beautiful is the object of a disinterestedWohlgefallen;according to quantity, that which, withouta concept,pleasesuniversally; ccordingto the relation to ends, theformof finalitywithouttherepresentationfan end (finality ithout nd);according omodality, hatwhich,withouta concept, s recognized s theobjectof a necessaryWohlgefallen.Such is thecategoricalframe f this nalyticofthebeautiful.Wheredoes itcome from?Who supplies it? Who constructst? Where s it introduced rom?From the analytic of concepts in the Critique of Pure Reason. A briefreminder: this analyticof concepts is one of two parts of the transcendentalanalytic transcendental nalyticand dialectic, divisionreproducedn thethirdCritique: analytic and dialectic of aesthetic judgment). The transcendentalanalyticcomprises n analyticofconcepts nd an analytic fprinciples.The firstdecomposesthepowerofunderstandingn order o encounter hepossibility faprioriconcepts n their country fbirth," hat s,understanding, here onceptslie dormantand are held in reserve. ince (receptive) ntuitionalone is relatedimmediately o theobject,understandings related oobjects bythe ntermediaryof judgments.Judgment s themediatedknowledgeof an object. And we can"refer ll actsofunderstanding o udgements,n sucha waythatunderstandingin generalmaybe representeds a faculty f udging (Urteilskraft)."2 he powerto think s thepower to udge. Thus we will find hefunctions funderstandingbydetermining hefunctions funity n judgment.The concepts re related, spredicates fpossible udgments, otherepresentationf an object.Consequently,byconsidering hesimpleform funderstanding, bstracting rom t thecontentof judgments,we can establish the list of the formsof judgmentunderfourheadings and twelvemoments fourtimes three:thefour-times-threelso con-structs he table [Tafel] of thesuperiorfaculties t the end ofthe ntroduction o12. This citationfromThe Critique ofPure Reason is translated irectly romDerrida's Frenchtranslation fKant.



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thethirdCritique.n a noteKant nswers hosewhoobject o his "threefold"[dreiteilig]ivisionsndhis taste or trichotomy";nd three one nformsherelation f thefacultiesequired ythefinearts--imagination,nderstanding,soul-withtaste: thefirsthree acultiesrefirstroughtntounionbymeans fthefourth,"s thenote oparagraph0specifies):uantityuniversal,articular,singular), uality affirmative,egative,ndefinite),elationcategorical,ypo-thetical,isjunctive), odalityproblematic,ssertive,podictic). ableof welve.There re smany ure onceptsfthe nderstanding,riginaryndunderivableconcepts,s there re ogicalfunctionsn udgment.romwhich nededuceshetable fcategoriesas opposedto Aristotle'supposed rammaticalmpiricism)beginning ith he able f udgments.Kant hus ntroduceshis able, his ableauTafel), hisboard,'3hisborderinto the analytic f aestheticudgment.The procedures legitimate,incejudgmentsreconcerned,ut thetransfers notexempt rom ifficultiesndanartfulort fviolence: logicalframe as beentransposedndforced ponanonlogical tructure,structure hich oes notessentiallyoncern relationotheobjectas an objectof cognition.Aestheticudgment, ant nsists,s notcognitiveudgment.Theframeoesn't it. hedifficultysperceptibleromhe irstaragraphfthebook, rom he Firstmoment f the udgementf taste onsideredromhepointof viewofquality." The judgementf taste s aesthetic":nwhich ase,unique,notprovidedor y he nalyticf onceptsndofudgmentsnthe therCritique; heudgments not "cognitiveudgement."hus tdoesnotbelong othe ranscendentalogicfromwhich heboardwasborrowed.The violence f framing roliferates.t confineshetheoryfaestheticswithin theoryf thebeautiful,hetheoryf thebeautiful ithin theoryftaste,ndthe heoryf tastewithin theoryf udgment.hesedecisionsmightbecalled xternal:he elimitationasfar-reachingonsequences,ut ven tthiscost certainnternaloherencemayberetained. notherctofframing hich,by he ntroductionftheborder,iolatedhe nteriorfthe ystemnd distortedits properarticulations, ould not have the same effect.n lookingfor arigorouslyffectiverip,wemust hereforeirstoncernurselves ith his rame.Thus in the ourse fthefinal elimitationthe heoryftaste s the heoryof udgment)Kantappliesan analytic flogical udgmentso an analytic faestheticudgments hile t the ame imensistingn theirmutual rreducibil-ity.He neverustifieshis raming,or herestrainttartificiallymposes ponadiscourse hich ontinuouslyhreatensoexceedtsboundaries.n thefirstoteon thefirstage,Kant tates hat he ogicalfunctionsf udgment ave ervedhimas a guide Anleitung).hisnote lludes oa difficultyo decisivehat t sunclear why it did not constitutethe principal text forwhich it forms thefundamental ass,that s, theunwritten runderwrittenpace,theallegedscope13. In English in theoriginal.



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of the harmonics:"The definitionf tasteherereliedupon is that t is thefacultyofestimating hebeautiful.But thediscoveryentdecken] fwhat s requiredforcallingan objectbeautifulmustbereserved or he nalysisof udgements f taste.In my[interventionf thefirst erson in a footnote] earchforthemoments owhich attention s paid by this udgement n its reflection, have followedtheguidance of the logical functions f judging (fora judgementof tastealwaysinvolves referenceounderstanding). have brought hemoment fqualityfirstunderreview, ecause this s whataestheticudgementof thebeautiful ooksto nthe firstnstance."'4The reference o thisnote s in the title"Firstmomentofthe udgementoftaste onsidered rom hepointof view ofquality."Thus thenote n a certainwayprecedesthetextoftheargument,t is relatively etachedfrom t. It is thesamewiththeparenthesiswhich tincludes:"(fora judgementof taste lways nvolvesa reference o understanding)."This parenthesisinsertedwithin note which sneither nside nor outside the argument,neither nside nor outsideits content)attempts o ustify-and it is theonlysuch attempt-theframe f theargument,that is, the analyticof judgment whose border was hastily ntroduced at thebeginningoftheargument.Beforethe noteand itsparenthesis before,fwe scan thepage from ottomto top, but after fwe stickto thatorderwhichplaces thenote at thetop of thepage, in theplace of tsreference),nother, riefer arenthesis reates pocket nthe so-called principal text, nvaginates t in some way: "Ifwe wish to discernwhethernythings beautiful rnot,we do not refer herepresentationf t totheObject bymeans ofunderstandingwith a view tocognition,butbymeansoftheimagination (actingperhaps in conjunctionwithunderstanding).We refer herepresentationo thesubjectand itsfeeling fpleasureor displeasure." 5The two parentheses, arerga inside and outside the argument,have thesameobject, he ame end:the quitevisibly mbarrassed)ustificationf theframeintroduced, heanalytic mposed in orderto transfer hetableand to adjust theborder, heunsupported laim of a hypothetical liaison" withunderstanding,owhich the udgmentoftaste, ven fthere s nothing ogical about it, s "always"related.Like a long-standing elationshipwhich is difficulto break,or a second-hand framewhichmaybe difficulto sell butwhich mustat all costs be placed.The frame f thisanalyticof thebeautifulwith tsfourmomentswas thusprovided by the transcendental nalytic for the single, unhappy reason thatimagination,theessential resource n relation to beauty,mayperhapsbe linkedwithunderstanding,hat someunderstandingmayperhapsstillresidewithin t.The relationwithunderstanding,which s neither ertainnoressential, rovidestheframefortheentirediscourseand, within t,for hediscourseon the frame.14. Kant,Critique,p. 41.15. Ibid.



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Not to force hepoint,but to describe certainforcing n Kant'spart,we will saythatthe entire rame ftheanalyticof thebeautiful unctions, ithrespect othatwhich determines ontent r internal tructure,ike a parergon; t has all therightcharacteristics:either imply nterior otsimply xterior; otfallingto one sideof thework, s we mightsayof an exergue; ndispensableto energeia o liberatesurplusvaluebecauseit confines hework all contracts nd firstf all thecontractofpaintingpresupposea processofframing; nd to be effective eretheworkofdeconstruction annot dispense with a theoryof the frame);summoned andassembled like a supplement because of the lack-a certain "internal"indetermination--in he verything it enframes.This lack, which cannot bedetermined,ocalized, situated,halted nside or outsidebefore heframing s, toborrowconcepts belonging preciselyto the classical logic of theframe, nd toKantiandiscourse, othproduced by ndproductionoftheframe.fweapplyto ttheruledefinedn "Exemplification,"nd if tbecomes n its turn n exampleofwhat tallows us toconsider s an example (frame escribedn theframe),wecantake the contentof theanalyticof judgmentas a work of art,a tableau whoseframe,mported rom heotherCritique,playstheroleofa parergonbecauseof tsformalbeauty. fit wereonlya charming, eductive,musingexerguewhich didnot cooperatewiththe work tself, puredepreciation fvalue and squanderingof surplus value, then it would be merefinery. ut it happens that this veryanalyticof udgment, n its frame, s what allows us to define heprocedure fformality,heoppositionofthe formal nd thematerial, hepureand the mpure,theproperand the mproper, he nside and theoutside.The analyticdeterminesthe frameas parergon,thatwhich simultaneously onstitutes nd destroyst,makes thold (as in hold together,tconstitutes,mounts, nshrines, ets,borders,assembles, rotects-so manyoperations ssembledbytheEinfassung) nd fallatthesame time. A frame s in essence constructed nd thereforeragile, his s theessenceor the truth f theframe. f such a thingexists.But this"truth"can nolonger be a "truth," it definesneither the transcendentnor the contingentcharacter f theframe, nly its character s parergon.Philosophywants to examinethis"truth,"butnever ucceeds.That whichproducesand manipulatestheframe etseverythingn motionto efface tseffect,most oftenby naturalizing t to infinity,n God's keeping to be confirmednKant). Deconstructionmust neitherreframenor fantasizethepure and simpleabsenceoftheframe. hese twoapparently ontradictoryctions reprecisely hesystematicallyndissociable ones of that which is presently econstructed.If theprocedures nitiated, f the criteriaproposed by the analyticof thebeautifuldependupon thisparergonality;fall theoppositionswhich dominatethephilosophyof art before nd afterKant)depend upon itfor heir ertinence,their igor, heirpurity, heir ropriety,hentheywill be affectedythis ogic oftheparergonwhich is morepowerfulthan the logic of theanalytic.We couldpursue the consequences of this infectious ffectionn detail. They cannot belocal. The reflectiverocedurewritten n the frame thisis-written about the



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frame):a general law which is no longera mechanical or teleological law ofnature,of the accord or harmonyof the faculties etc.), but a certainrepeateddislocation,an irrepressible, egulateddeterioration,which splits the frame ngeneral, mbeds t n thecorners f tsanglesandarticulations, endersts nternallimitexternal, akes tsthickness ntoaccount,makesus see thepaintingfrom hesideof the canvas or thewood, etc.To citeonlythefirstonsequenceofthis nitialforcing,ook at theend of thefirst ote (anotherparergonwhichframes oththe text nd theparenthesis).Justas Kant cannotstrictlyustify he ntroduction rom heanalyticof udgment,heis unable to ustify he orderhe follows n applyingtheframe, hefour ategoriesfrom heanalyticofconcepts.Like thetransposition f thetable Tafel), that s,the frame,the order of the argumentdoes not successfully ationalizeKant'sinterestn philosophic terms.His motivation s dissimulated behind arbitraryphilosophic decree. Indeed, the argument begins with the two mathematicalcategories quantity nd quality).Whynotbeginwiththetwodynamic ategories(relation nd modality)?Andwhyreverse heorder f themathematical ategoriesin the original argument quantitybeforequality)? This last reversal s surelyexplained by the fact that cognition is neitherthe end nor the effect f thejudgmentof taste: uantity here,universality)s not thefirstspectof a judgmentof taste.Atthe endofthenote: "I havebrought hemoment fqualityfirst nderreview,because this s what theaestheticudgementon the beautiful ooks to inthefirstnstance." 6 Whyfirst?rioritys notprescribed ythetable,bytheorderof udgment,by thelogic properto theframe.Nothing n the logical) analyticcan account for hispriority. ut ifa reversal f the ogical order sproducedhereforreasonswhich arenot logical, whynotpursuethis?What is therulehere, rthecritical imit?Quality (disinterest)s thevery hingthat determines heformalityf thebeautifulobject: it must be freeof all charm,all power to seduce, t mustnotprovokeany emotion,allow any enjoyment.Thus the opposition betweentheformal nd thematerial,between ine and color as nonform), etween omposi-tionand sound (as nonform), heformalparergon nd thematerialparergon, heoppositionbetween hegood and thebad parergonwhich n itselfsneither oodnor bad) dependsupon theframing fthisquality,thisframing-effecthich wecall quality,aspectofaspects, ccording owhich,violently,verythingppearstobegin.Position: opposition: frame.In "Exemplification" hediscourseon sound and colordevelops, n similarfashion, within the angle of the two mathematicalcategories (quality andquantity),while the entire nalyticofthebeautifulundoes--incessantlynd as ifunwittingly-thework ofthe frame.Actually, the framewarps as it works. As a locus of work, an originstructurallyorderedwith surplusvalue, that s, exceededon both sidesbythat16. Ibid.



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which texceeds, n effecttwarps.Like wood. Itsplits,breaksdown,breaksup, atthesame time that tcooperates n theproduction f theproduct, texceeds tanddeducts tself. t never implyexposes itself.The analyticof the beautifulwarps,constantly ndoing thework of theframensofar s, whileallowing itself obe cross-ruled ythe nalytic fconceptsand thedoctrine f udgment, tdescribes he bsenceof theconcept n the ctivityof taste. "The beautiful is that which apart fromconcepts [sans concept] isrepresenteds theobjectof a Universaldelight Wohlgefallen]."This definition(second moment,categoryof quantity)derivesfrom the qualitative definition(disinterest).The object of a disinterested leasure does not depend on anempirical nclination,butappeals to freedom nd toucheseveryonen theplacewhereeveryone-anyone-may be touched. t is therefore niversal. However nexplaining whythisuniversalitymust existapartfrom oncepts,Kantexhibits, sit were,the forcing-the imposition of an analyticof conceptsupon a processwithoutconcepts-but justifies is operationwithan argumentwhichwe mayconsider s theconstitution,hatbywhichthe entire difice f the thirdCritiquestandsand holds together etween ts twogreatwings (the critiqueof aestheticjudgmentand thecritiqueofteleologic

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Derrida - Parergon