Constructing discourse and discourse constructions1

Francisco José Ruiz de Mendoza IbáñezMaría de los Ángeles Gómez González

1. Introduction

One of the main concerns of discourse studies is the identification of the factors that play a role in the coherent “flow” of discourse, i.e. what allows speakers and hearers to align their mutual understanding of each other’s assumptions about what is being talked about (the topic) and what is being meant (the focus of information). There is now a tradition, which dates back to Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) pioneering work on text linguistics, according to which discourse connections are either a matter of linguistic mechanisms (so-called cohesion devices) or inference (which lies at the root of coherence). Much of the literature on discourse is related to the study of coherence and cohesion, whether explicitly or implicitly. Thus, some discourse accounts have looked at discourse connectivity in terms of rhetorical structure (Mann & Thompson, 1988; Asher & Lascarides, 2003) and pragmatic inferencing based on the principled use of world knowledge (e.g. Irmer, 2011). Others have investigated linguistic strategies such as lexical patterns (e.g. Hoey, 1991) and discourse markers (e.g. Schiffrin, 1986, Blakemore, 2002, 2005).

Our view in the present paper further expands on the cohesion/coherence dichotomy. We use the cover term discourse connectivity to refer to the result of the activity of cohesion/coherence mechanisms. We contend that discourse connectivity can be accounted for partly in terms of the inferential exploitation of knowledge structures of various kinds (which we identify with Lakoff’s, 1987, idealized cognitive models) and partly in terms of what we term discourse constructions, that is, form-meaning parings whose purpose is to set up connections that go beyond basic predications (i.e. saturated predicate-argument relations) realized as clauses.

Our starting point will be the account of discourse constructions found in Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza (2009). This account is based on the Lexical Constructional Model, or LCM, as initially laid out in Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal (2008). The LCM is a meaning construction model of language structured in four descriptive levels: level 1 deals with basic predicate-argument relationships, usually expressed through lexical or argument-structure characterizations; levels 2 and 3 deal respectively with non-illocutionary and illocutionary either constructional or implicational meaning and structure; level 4 addresses discourse meaning and structure, also from the constructional and an implicational perspectives. For example, at level 1, the sentence I won’t eat that garbage, let alone pay for it contains two different uses of the transitive construction (one where the object is affected and the other where it is not); at level 2 it conveys the additional constructional implication (X Won’t Y) that the speaker is upset at performing either action; at level 3, it expresses speaker’s refusal (I Won’t Y) to perform the actions; finally, at level 4, the X Let Alone Y construction makes the content of the Y element less likely to happen than the X element.

We cannot go into the details of the LCM. The reader may find critical overviews of the LCM in Butler (2009, 2013) and recent developments in Ruiz de Mendoza & 1 The research on which this paper is based has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, grants no. FFI 2010-17610/FILO and XXXXX

Mairal (2011), Galera & Ruiz de Mendoza (2011), and Ruiz de Mendoza (2012). The LCM specifies the way in which lexical, constructional, and inferential activity cooperate in meaning production and interpretation at all four levels. The combination of meaning construction and interpretation strategies is a principled process based on constraints that arise from conceptual compatibility between meaning representations and such conceptual re-construal phenomena as high-level metaphor and metonymy (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal, 2007). An up-to-date account of constraints is found in Ruiz de Mendoza (2012).

In the present paper we will briefly discuss the nature of level-4 or discourse constructions and their role in discourse structure. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we shall introduce the notion of cognitive model and discuss the role of different cognitive model types in meaning construction. Second, we will address the LCM notion of construction in terms of its role in making meaning in discourse (which involves the speaker-hearer alignment of assumptions in production and interpretation). Third, we will focus our attention on the nature of discourse constructions and discuss their specific contribution to the overall dynamics of building meaningful messages that are adapted to specific communicative needs. In this connection, we will propose the existence of constructional families at the level of discourse structure and enquire into their specific semantic nature. Finally, we will address the role of non-constructional mechanisms to create discourse coherence conditions.

2. A typology of cognitive models

The label Idealized Cognitive Model (ICM) stems from George Lakoff’s (1987) work on conceptualization, where he postulates the existence of a number of principles that structure knowledge thus giving rise to different kinds of ICMs. An ICM is thus a knowledge structure that arises from the activity of one such structuring principle. In Lakoff’s proposal, there are four basic types of ICM: (1) frames, (2) image schemas, (3) metaphors, and (4) metonymies. We offer a brief description of each ICM type.

Frames refer to sets of predicate-argument relationships, i.e. ICMs that capture what we know about the objects of our experience in the world including their properties, the situations and events in which they take part, and so on. Such notions as ‘mother’, ‘house’, ‘anger’, ‘hurricane’, ‘sleeping’, ‘driving’, etc., can be described in terms of knowledge frames that have been constructed on predicate-argument relationships. For example, we say that a mother is a woman that has children and takes care of them, that a house is a dwelling place for a family, that a hurricane is a tropical storm with winds that average 74 miles per hour or more, and so on.2

Image schemas, on the other hand, are pre-conceptual topological structures topological configurations such as spatial orientations (e.g. up/down, front/back), part-whole and container-contents relations, path and motion along a path, and others (cf. Johnson, 1987).

2 There is a lot more that we can associate to frame knowledge. A hurricane causes devastation and can cause severe loss of property and human life, so people are afraid of hurricanes and take measures to protect themselves. Government authorities and agencies also work on addressing the problem by declaring the state of emergency and performing evacuations when needed. Frames are called scripts when, rather than denote objects or actions, they take the form of rich scenarios containing what in Artificial Intelligence has been termed 'procedural knowledge' (cf. Schank & Abelson, 1977), i.e. stereotyped sequences of actions. A classical example is the restaurant script, where a customer enters, is directed by a waiter to a table, sits at the table, asks for the menu, reads the menu, orders a meal, is served the meal, eats it, asks for the bill, pays the bill, tips the waiter, and leaves.

Both frames and image schemas can be used to create metaphors or metonymies. For example, the concept ‘hand’, used to refer to one of the pointers of a clock, has been constructed metaphorically on the basis of the shape and functionality of a human hand. But ‘hand’ can also be used metonymically to stand for ‘help’ (often given with the hands) (e.g. He have me a hand with the bags). According to Lakoff & Johnson (1999), following Grady (1997), image schemas are used to construct primary metaphors. These are metaphors directly grounded in sensorimotor experience. For example, She’s full of anger treats a person as if she were a container of emotions; I’m all scattered sees a person inability to cope with different tasks in terms of the person having lost his or her part-whole integrity; We keep moving forward to our goals sees progress in terms of motion. These metaphors are different from others that require finding similarities between objects, states, situations or events. For example, the metaphorical use of ‘hand’ mentioned above is based on functional and physical resemblance.

In more recent research into cognitive modeling by Ruiz de Mendoza (2007, 2011), it has been proposed that metaphor and metonymy, given their more dynamic nature, are not cognitive models, as Lakoff (1987) proposed, but rather cognitive operations on cognitive models. This means that metaphor and metonymy, unlike frames and image schemas, do not involve any structuring principle. Thus, attributing a given shape to a hand amounts to making explicit a property that belongs to this concept; that is, the shape and other properties of a hand structure this concept. However, using the notion of hand metaphorically to understand some of the properties of the pointers in a clock does not give structure to the notions of hand or clock but simply presupposes the existence of a given set of properties in both the hand and the clock. What the metaphor does is put the two concepts in correspondence so that we can reason about relevant aspects of the shape and functionality of pointers in terms of corresponding properties of hands. The same holds for metonymy. We can use ‘hand’ to make it stand for ‘help’ simply because ‘hand’ is a subdomain (i.e. part) of the domain of ‘help with the hands’. We do not need the metonymy in order to know that people can give physical help by using their hands.

On the basis of these observations, it seems reasonable to discard metaphor and metonymy as cognitive models per se and to acknowledge their operational status. Recent research into high-level metaphor by Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal (2007, 2008) bears this point out. Consider the sentence He laughed me out of the room. There is a peculiarity in the syntax of this sentence: the verb laugh has an object that is not introduced by the preposition at (cf. He laughed at me but *He laughed me). In fact, this sentence treats the verb laugh as if it were a contact-by-impact verb capable of causing motion: He kicked/pushed/pulled, etc., me out of the room. Once the verbal action is re-construed in this way, the verb becomes available for use in the constructional framework for contact-by-impact predicates (V+OBJ+PP). This cognitive operation takes place at a more abstract level than the lexical metaphor hand or than primary metaphors. It uses actions denoting physical impact to help us understand other actions whose impact is psychological.

Metonymy can also work on high-level concepts. A case in point is when an effect stands for its cause. Panther & Thornburg (2000) illustrate this point through the What’s That N? construction, as in What’s that noise?, where ‘noise’ stands for ‘the cause of the noise’. There are other high-level metonymies (Ruiz de Mendoza & Pérez, 2001), some of which are listed in (1):

(1)

i. OBJECT FOR ACTION: He enjoyed the book (e.g. reading/writing the book)

ii. GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC: He will do the dishes while a do the carpets (‘do’ for ‘wash’ and ‘clean’).

iii. PROCESS FOR ACTION: The door opened (an agent or a force actually opened the door).

iv. AN ENTITY FOR ONE OF ITS PROPERTIES: There is a lot America in everything she does.

Ruiz de Mendoza (2007) argues that there also exist low-level situational ICMs such as those provided by scripts. In line with previous work by Panther (2005), it is argued that situation-based implicatures arise when either the whole scenario or part of it is accessed metonymically. As an illustration, think of the following exchange occurring in a restaurant script:

(2)

A: How did you like your meal at Jersey’s?B: I didn’t leave a tip.

Since leaving a tip is a sign of enjoying the meal and the service, it follows that not doing so involves the opposite. Thus, I didn’t leave a tip stands for a situation in which the service and the meal provided at the restaurant was not to the customer’s satisfaction.

In addition, Ruiz de Mendoza (2007) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi (2007) recognize the existence of high-level situational ICMs or high-level scenarios. These scenarios are constructed by abstracting knowledge away from multiple low-level situational scenarios. In a way that parallels the derivation of situation-based implicatures, the metonymic exploitation of high-level scenarios underlies the production of so-called illocutionary meaning. To give some illustration, think of the notion of begging. A begging scenario is grounded in the idea that people are expected to act in ways that are beneficial to other people. Within the context of this social convention, repeating the politeness marker please when asking for something, e.g. Please, please, don’t leave me, involves explicit submission to the addressee’s will thereby standing for a situation in which the speaker is in such serious need that he or she is recognizing that obtaining his or her request exclusively depends on the addressee’s mercy.

To sum up, we propose that ICMs can be classified along two lines: (1) their degree of genericity, which gives rise to high-level and low-level cognitive models; (2) their situational or non-situational nature. Metaphor and metonymy are to be regarded not as cognitive models but rather as cognitive operations on cognitive models, whether they are high-level, low-level, situational, non-situational or any combination of these.

3. Constructions

The Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) takes sides with comprehensive functional approaches to meaning such as Systemic Functional Grammar (cf. Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) and Functional Discourse Grammar (Hengeveld & Mackenzie, 2008) in its focus on verbal interaction as a primary factor in determining the shape of

utterances in their context of production and interpretation. However, the LCM markedly differs from these approaches in its emphasis on cognitive modeling as essential to determine the meaning impact of utterances. It also gives a much more prominent role to constructional meaning. By construction the LCM understands a pairing of form and meaning (or function) where meaning is realized by form and form affords access to meaning to the extent that such processes are recognized by language users to be stably associated or are at least potentially replicable by other language users (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza, 2012, for detailed discussion).

At level 1, constructions take the form of argument-structure configurations such as the transitive, intransitive, ditransitive, resultative, caused-motion, causative, inchoative, and middle constructions, among many others frequently discussed in the literature (cf. Levin, 1993; Goldberg, 1995, 2006). Listed in (3) are the basic descriptions of the canonical meaning of these level-1 constructions:

(3)Intransitive: X does something (e.g. Her heart was pounding wildly)Transitive: X does something to Y (e.g. He smacked her face)Ditransitive: X causes Y to receive Z (e.g. He donated a lot of money to a church)Resultative: X causes Y to become Z (e.g. The dog ate the bowl clean)Caused-motion: X causes Y to move Z (e.g. He pushed the table into a corner)Causative: X causes Y to do something (e.g. The wind opened the door)Inchoative: Y does something as caused by X (e.g. The door opened)

At levels 2, 3, and 4, constructions contain a greater amount of fixed elements. They can be highly fixed, as is the case of the level-2 construction (So) sue me!, which is formally short for So, if you feel offended, then take me to court and sue me or a variant of this longer expression. Speakers use (So) sue me! when they know that the hearer has taken offence, but they do not think they have to apologize or make amends in any way since the hearer is overreacting. This expression additionally conveys a degree of irritation on the part of the speaker. These meaning implications are now conventionally associated with the expression. However, their origin is found in inferential activity based on two cognitive operations (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza, 2011): one is the metonymic activation of a scenario in which people sue other people in order to obtain redress; this activation is cued by the use of the imperative form of sue often in connection with the consequence discourse marker so, which together act as an invitation for the hearer to take action if they feel wronged; in the second operation, which is metaphorical, the hearer is expected to see the real situation that bothers him in terms of the speaker’s invitation within the context of the more serious legal scenario. The mismatch between the real scenario, where the offence is immaterial, and the figurative scenario, where offences are serious and punishable by law, gives rise to the central meaning implication that the hearer is acting in a disproportionate way. From an illocutionary perspective, (So) sue me! has also conventionalized its meaning. In the original scenario, it is an invitation for the hearer to exercise his rights. However, the level-2 implication that the hearer is overreacting calls for a different illocutionary interpretation in which the hearer is being warned to stop his behavior. This interpretation is also conventional: it arises from the metonymic activation of the illocutionary scenario for warnings, where people who are acting in ways that affect other people negatively are strongly encouraged to change (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi, 2007; Baicchi & Ruiz de Mendoza, 2010).

An important source of highly fixed constructions is found in greetings such as Hello!, Good Morning!, and Wish you all the best! Greetings are often stereotyped expressions of good will that arise from the social convention according to which we need not only to act in ways that are beneficial to others but also to wish them the best. But greetings serve a discourse function too since the greeter expects an equally stereotyped response (often the same kind of salutation is returned) and they can act as preparatory devices for a more complex discourse development (e.g. Dear Sir(s), as an opening to a speech or letter).

Most non-argument structure constructions, however, contain variable elements. Consider the following cases:

(4)Level 2: Who Do You Think You Are X/To X? (e.g. Who do you think you are talking to/ to talk to me like this?); Who’s been Ving X? (e.g. Who’s been messing with my computer?); Don’t You X me! (e.g. Don’t you “honey” me!).Level 3: If I were you, I’d X (e.g. If I were you, I’d wait a bit longer); I want you X (e.g. I want you in my office in ten minutes/to clean your room, etc.); You Don’t Want Me X (Do You?) (e.g. You don’t want me to tell her, do you?).Level 4: X Let Alone Y (e.g. I won’t eat that garbage, let alone pay for it); X as is evidenced by Y (e.g. This threat is continuing to this day, as is evidenced by the recent attacks in Indonesia and Israel); X on condition that Y (e.g. She said she'd help with the costumes on condition that she would get ten free tickets).

There is an essential qualitative difference between constructions belonging to levels 2 and 3, on the one hand, and those belonging to level 4, on the other hand. While the former work by providing metonymic access to conventional situational cognitive models or scenarios, the latter exploit combinations of high-level non-situational cognitive models. For example, the interpretation of Don’t you “honey” me! is based on the common everyday scenario in which people make use of “honey” or other affectionate appellatives. Asking the addressee not to use the appellative suggests that there is a (probably temporary) breach in the speaker-addressee affective relationship. The linguistic expression, which only makes explicit part of the more complex situation that we have described, affords access to the whole of it for adequate interpretation. Illocutionary meaning is also based on the partial mention of a more complex scenario that has to be accessed metonymically. Consider You don’t want me to tell her, do you?, which has a clear default use as a threat. Threats are based on a more generic scenario where the speaker wants to control the addressee’s behavior by revealing the harmful consequences that not doing as told will have on him. The consequences are made explicit while the rest of the scenario has to be worked out inferentially. By contrast, at level 4, we have logical relations such as cause-effect or evidence-conclusion, temporal relations such as precedence and simultaneity, or conceptual relations such as similarity, contrast, conditioning, and concession, among others. The relations exploit high-level cognitive models. We explore discourse constructions in more detail in the next section.

4. Discourse constructions

Discourse constructions are idiomatic constructions with fixed and variable elements where the fixed elements capture relational meaning grounded in high-level cognitive models (e.g. addition, exemplification, contrast, cause-consequence, etc.). A preliminary

list of discourse relations has been offered in Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza (2009: 177). Below is an adapted version:

Discourse relation

Some basic constructional

layouts

Description Example

Restatement X, In Other Words Y;X, That Is (To Say) Y

The information in Y is fully or partially equivalent to the information in X

She has run out of money; in other words, she is broke

Comment X, Which Y The information in Y addresses all or part of the information in X

Only the driver survived the accident, which is still under investigation

Specification X V know/say/think. That Y

The information in Y gives details on the kind of state of affairs that the cognizer in X has represented in his mind

We all knew that a cyclone was coming

Exemplification X As Is Illustrated/Evidenced/Exemplified By Y

The information in Y exemplifies the information in X

Our cultural diversity is under threat as is illustrated by language loss

Addition X And Y The information in Y is added to the information in X in a way that preserves conceptual consistency

I wore a hat and sprayed my scalp every few hours

Exception X Except (For)/With The Exception of Y

The information in Y cancels out part of the information in X

I like the new candidate except for his foreign policy

Alternation Either X Or Y The information in Y cancels out all of the information in X (contrastive alternation) or complements it (complementary alternation)

Either he's evil, or he's a fool (contrastive)He is neither evil nor a fool (complementary)

Contrast X But Y/ X, however Y/ X

The information in Y is totally or partially in conflict with the information in X

He has a New York accent; however, he was born in Texas

Comparison X, Y Too; X, So Is/Does Y

The information in Y is similar to the information in X

Mary is careless and so is her sister

Time After X, Y/ Y After X;

The information in Y relates temporally to the

After he had walked for

Before X, Y/ Y Before X;When X, Y/Y When X;X At The Same Time as Y

information in X another hour, he felt unbearably thirsty

Location X (Exactly/Just) Where Y

The information in Y relates spatially to the information in X

He found the map exactly where he had left it many years before

Cause X Because/Since YX Because of Y

The information in Y is the reason why the information in X holds

Many teenagers join gangs because they need to fill emotional needs

Condition X On Condition That /(Only) If Y

The information in Y is a condition for the information in X to hold

Entry is granted on condition that you do not work full time

Table 1. Discourse relations and related constructions in the LCM

Each of these discourse relation types roughly falls under one of the three logico-semantic relations postulated in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004) as underlying complex clauses: elaboration, extension, and enhancement. The first six discourse relations (restatement, comment, specification, exemplification, contrast, comparison) are cases of elaboration, since they work by making the information in the second variable address all or part of the information in the first variable. The next three relations (addition, exception, and alternation) are a matter of expansion: the information in the second variable either adds to or takes away (partially or totally) from the information in the first variable. Finally, time, location, cause, and condition specifications relate to enhancement: the information provided by the second variable qualifies the information in the first variable.

In the LCM, discourse relations underlie the meaning part of discourse constructions. At the level of form, such relational meaning is realized by the fixed elements of the construction. In turn, each fixed element profiles the specific way in which the relational meaning in question is to be understood. For example, both only if and on condition that set up a condition connection between the constructional variables in their corresponding constructions. However, only if excludes any possibility of overriding the condition, which is not the case with on condition that:

(5) Admission to the program is granted only if the applicant has a university degree. ??Exceptions to this regulation are stated by individual departments.

(6) Admission to the program is granted on condition that the applicant has a university degree. Exceptions to this regulation are stated by individual departments.

We shall refer to this phenomenon by the term constructional discourse profiling. This phenomenon is but an extension into discourse activity of common profile-base

relationships postulated in Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar from its inception (cf. Langacker, 1987; see also Langacker, 1999). A straightforward example of profile-base relationships is provided, at the lexical level, by the notion of ‘plane’. Consider the different ways of understanding this notion within different contexts: a plane stationed on the runway; a plane flying; a plane on the assembly line; a plane being dismantled. Each context provided a different base domain for the notion of plane to be understood. If a plane is stationed on the runway, we either expect the plane to be about to take off or to have just landed after flying between locations. We thus think of the passengers in their assigned seats, with their safety belts fastened, waiting either to depart or to get off soon. But if we think of a plane flying, we envisage the passengers in their seats reading, sleeping, having a light snack, etc. On the assembly line, the plane is not a plane yet: it is being built on the basis of a blueprint; we think of workers and engineers taking part in the process, each with a specific role. If a plane is being taken apart, we assume that it is not in use any longer, perhaps because it is old or because of a crash. The plane is the profiled entity, i.e. the designated entity, in each of these conceptual contexts or base cognitive domains. The way we envisage the plane, that is, the way we picture this designated entity in our minds, is different for each base domain. Now, since discourse relations are based on connections between high-level cognitive models, it follows that they must be sensitive to profile-base activation. That this is so is evidenced by the comparison of the examples (5) and (6) above, where the choice of one profile versus another has consequences in terms of discourse coherence: only if profiles the conditional discourse connection in such a way that exceptions are impossible, while on condition that leaves the door open for exceptions. From this evidence, we conclude that for discourse coherence to be possible, profile-base relations have to be kept intact.

Another important aspect of discourse constructions is their broad realizational variability for a same profile-base relationship. Let us take the following utterances where the filler for the X variable substitutes for a (topical) portion of previous text thus making the underlying constructions discourse ones:

(7) A further example of this phenomenon is provided by the recently discovered trans-Neptunian dwarf planet Haumea.3 ([Previous topical texti]; A (further)/An additional/One more example of Xi is provided/supplied by/found in (connection to) Y)

(8) This phenomenon is further exemplified by the recent discovery of the trans-Neptunian dwarf planet Haumea ([Previous topical texti]; Xi is (further/additionally) exemplified by Y)

(9) The recent discovery of the trans-Neptunian dwarf planet Haumea further exemplifies this phenomenon. ([Previous topical texti]; Xi

(further/additionally) exemplifies Y).

Text (7) is an attested example, while (8) and (9) are artificial variants of (7) constructed for the sake of the ensuing discussion. The portion of text preceding (7) discusses a cosmological phenomenon of which (7) supplies extra exemplification or evidence. This is a case of what we have called “exemplification” in Table 1 above. Texts (8) and (9) are only two possible variants of (7), which are fully compatible with the previous portion of the text in terms of conceptual coherence, that is, both texts make use of a 3 http://journalofcosmology.com/Planets100.html (accessed on October 13, 2012)

constructional variant that preserves the profile-base structure of the underlying discourse relation in a way that is consistent with previous text. However, there are subtle differences in terms of focal structure among the three constructional realization options: (7) and (8) treat the explicit constructional marker of exemplification (a further example of X; X is further exemplified by Y) as a topic of conversation, while (9) gives exemplification focal prominence. This makes (7) and (8) more adequate choices than (9) for the overall discourse flow since they preserve topic continuity. At the same time, there is a difference between (7) and (8) in terms of what we can call construction-internal focus, to be differentiated from overall discourse focus. Thus, (7) situates the explicit exemplification marker (a further example) in topical rather than focal position within the topical part of the level-4 construction A further example of X is provided by Y (cf. Gómez-González, 2001). This is not the case in (8) and (9), where the explicit exemplification marker has a focal position within the same topical part of the construction.

To the extent that realizational variation brings about changes in focus, it is possible to talk about a constructional variant being a construction in its own right. For example, the choice between further/additional in (7) is almost immaterial since it does not affect either the profile-base exemplification relationship on which the construction is grounded or its focal structure. Therefore, it does not give rise to a new construction. By contrast, the choice between A further example of X is provided by Y, X is further exemplified by Y, and X further exemplifies Y has more important consequences in terms of shifts in construction-internal and discourse focal structure discussed above. However, since the three choices exploit the same profile-base relationships, we can say that they belong to the same constructional family, that is, they serve very similar discourse functions but introduce subtle changes in focal structure. This proposal is consistent with previous work in cognitively-oriented constructionist accounts. Thus, Gonzálvez-García (2009) has discussed the existence of constructional families at the level of argument structure characterizations. A constructional family is set up on the basis of the Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance relationships, a phenomenon that has received much attention in the cognitive-linguistic literature (cf. Taylor, 2003). Family resemblances are set up on the basis of partial overlapping similarities among conceptual items. For a lexical item, it is easy to see such resemblances when categorizing specific cases of an embracing concept, such as ‘bird’, ‘furniture’ or ‘games’. For example, a robin is a good example of bird, i.e. it is a prototypical bird. This is so because robins have an “S” shape, they have a beak and feathers, they are relatively small, they can fly, the perch on trees, and so on. Ostriches are also birds, but they cannot fly, they can run fast and are very big. A penguin is also a bird, but it cannot fly and has no feathers. It is also relatively big. Undoubtedly, there are overlapping similarities between ostriches and penguins, but there are also differences. In other words, there are family resemblances between them, which allow us to categorize them as birds. The same rational holds for furniture items (think of the strong similarities and small differences between chairs, stools, sofas, and then observe the strong differences they have with tables and wardrobes) and games (think of the similarities football and basketball; then contrast these games with chess and checkers, which scarcely share any structure with the other examples of game).

Gonzálvez-García (2009) argues that subjective-transitive constructions bear family resemblance structure, much in the same way as has been postulated by Goldberg & Jackendoff (2004: 536) for different cases of resultative construction, such as the intransitive resultative (The pond froze solid), the transitive resultative (The gardener watered the flowers flat), the unselected transitive resultative (They drank the

pub dry), and the fake reflexive resultative (We yelled ourselves hoarse). What these constructions have in common is their intrinsic telicity, but the rest of their properties change. Thus, the result can be seen as the end-point of a process, of a controlled activity or of an instigated action. In turn, subjective-transitive constructions, which have the manipulative (I want you in here tomorrow after school), the evaluative (I find your book very helpful and informative), the declarative (They call me a liar), and the generic (She likes her meat raw) variants, also share some properties. For example, the first participant is prototypically human and their predicative complement can only have a characterizing (never identifying) function (since they are variants of complex-transitive constructions). However, there are differences. For example, all the members of the family, except the manipulative construction, highlight at least one conspicuous property of the object. But this property is presented as the result of the subject’s personal reaction to the object (evaluative construction), as an unverified shared opinion (declarative construction) or as a (usually) verified observation (generic subjective-transitive construction). Evidently, this kind of analysis of family resemblance relations is also applicable to discourse constructions, as has been illustrated through our discussion of examples (7)-(9) above. The difference is to be found in the nature of the meaning structure of the constructions in question: in the case of argument-structure constructions, overlapping and non-overlapping features are arise from the way constructional arguments relate to one another through a predicate; in the case of discourse constructions, whatever elements they have in common is a matter of whether or not the same discourse relation is activated. Having the same underlying discourse relation provides us with enough conceptual material in common among constructions for family resemblance connections to hold. Constructional variants thus result from different exploitations of one basic discourse relation. Finally, we have observed that the choice of one constructional variant with preference to another has effects on the overall coherence of a text.

5. Constructing discourse

The architecture of the LCM has a dynamic nature. This allows for the online construction and interpretation of messages as needed according to ad hoc discourse needs. Thus, unlike SFG and FDG, the LCM is not exclusively a top-down model starting from speaker’s intentions and going down to linguistic realization. It is not a bottom-up model either, unlike projectionist theories of language such as Role and Reference Grammar (RRG; cf. Van Valin, 2005) and most constructionist accounts of language, including Cognitive Construction Grammar (Golderberg, 2006) and Cognitive Grammar (Langacker, 1999, 2008). Rather, the LCM is sensitive to the combination of bottom-up and top-down strategies, which are decided upon as discourse progresses.

This means that discourse is not constructed only on the basis of level-4 activity; discourse is the result of meaningful strategic choices that respond to speaker’s communicative goals and to speaker-hearer online re-adaptations as discourse progresses. For example, imagine a speaker is frustrated about the meal he has been offered after ordering at a fast food restaurant. On the spur of the moment, he first exclaims I won’t eat that garbage; then, as an afterthought, he continues after a brief pause by saying let alone pay for it. The first clause is an explicit refusal to eat and, perhaps, implicitly, a complaint. This is level-3 activity. The utterance could have stopped here, so, from the point of view of discourse, we could expect a verbal reaction

on the part of the hearers addressing the refusal and the complaint in some way (e.g. through a response like You’re right. Let’s find another place to eat, which combines two level-3 acts, agreement and suggestion, into a cause-consequence discourse unit). However, a context in which the incompetence of the restaurant outrages the speaker, he may decide to develop his utterance further into a more complex discourse unit: the afterthought mentioned above, let alone pay for it, conveys the idea that the speaker feels that since the food is terribly bad, he cannot be expected to pay for it. From a discourse perspective the let alone addition is a more emphatic version of I won’t eat that garbage and (of course) I won’t pay for it, which is an example of what we can call, following Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza (2009: 176) complementary alternation. By alternation is meant a relation that signals a change from one state of affairs to another and then (potentially) back again. Complementary alternation is distinguished from contrastive alternation in that, in the latter, but not in the former, the second member cancels out the first (e.g. Either he’s evil or he’s a fool). In complementary alternation the second member, in fact, complements the first one, thus shading off into a case of addition. This alternation follows the general constructional pattern Nor X, nor Y (cf. Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza, 2009) but it has a number constructional variants, including the X Let Alone Y (initially discussed by Fillmore & O’Connor, 1988) and X won’t Y; and X wont Z. Each constructional choice is thus determined by discourse needs that arise as discourse develops.

Imagine now a plausible context for the sentence What’s the child doing with the knife?, which is an example of the level-2 What’s X Doing Y? construction (Kay & Fillmore, 1999). A child handling a knife is a dangerous situation. So the sentence seems to be, first of all, a warning about the danger but probably also a call for urgent action on the part of the addressee and a reproach. This means that the sentence What’s the child doing with the knife? is multidimensional from an illocutionary perspective. Such multidimensionality has consequences for discourse construction: a question demands an answer; a request, like a warning, requires action, and a reproach either a change or the promise of a change in behavior patterns.

The question is where do all these meaning implications arise from? The answer lies in how level-2 meaning activates level-3 meaning structure and where this activation should stop. Let us start with level 2 meaning. As Kay & Fillmore (1999) have noted, the What’s X Doing Y? construction conveys the idea that the situation described bothers or worries the speaker. As noted in Mairal & Ruiz de Mendoza (2009: 169), this implication arises from the frequent use of examples of this construction in contexts in which the speaker knows that the addressee is aware of the situation that he is asking about. The rationale behind asking a question whose answer is self-evident in terms of content is that the speaker is drawing attention not to the content but to his emotional reaction to the state of affairs described in the content. In principle, the emotional reaction could be either positive (e.g. awe or admiration) or negative (e.g. irritation), but through frequent use with problematic situations, the construction has conventionalized the negative implications. At this stage is where level-3 structure comes into play, since there is a social expectation that people have to help other people to deal with negative situations in the best possible way (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza & Baicchi, 2007). This social expectation underlies the speech act interpretation of expressions of dissatisfaction as requests for action (e.g. I’m starving, mum! meaning ‘Mum, give me something to eat’). But What’s the child doing with the knife? is also a warning since its content describes an impending danger for someone that we have to take care of. A warning is in fact a request for remedial action when an unsatisfactory situation is potentially dangerous. Finally, the reproach derives from the fact that the

addressee should have acted on the situation on his own free will when first becoming aware of it but has not done so. The following are some plausible discourse developments that take into account one or more of the previously mentioned speech act values:

A: What’s the child doing with the knife? [the speaker shows concern and requests for addressee’s action]B: Oh my goodness! I’ll get it from him [the addressee shows compliance with speaker’s request]

A: What’s the child doing with the knife? [the speaker shows concern; he reproaches addressee and requests for action]B: OK, I’ve got it now. I won’t let that happen again. [the addressee shows compliance and promises change]

A: What’s the child doing with the knife? [the speaker shows concern; he reproaches addressee and requests for action]B: I don’t know. Why are you asking me? You take care of this [the addressee challenges the speaker’s convention-driven expectations]

These discourse developments are not based on level-4 constructions but on conceptual consistency between level-2 and level-3 meaning constructs. This observation should not be surprising in view of our discussion of cognitive model types in section 2. It has long been known that lexical concepts contribute, though their encyclopedic knowledge structure, to discourse coherence (cf. Graesser & Bower, 1990). In our view, non-lexical concepts, such as either low-level or high-level situational cognitive models, like those described above, are also crucial elements in the creation of discourse coherence. Such pairs as question-answer, request-compliance, and so on, are a clear example of how discourse can develop non-constructionally through the activation of situational cognitive models.

6. Conclusion

This paper has outlined a framework for the detailed study of discourse connectivity in terms of some of the descriptive and explanatory tools provided by the Lexical Constructional Model or LCM. Our point of departure has been the assumption that constructions are used to convey meaning beyond argument-structure representations of the kind investigated by Goldberg (1995, 2006). In line with previous work on the LCM, which recognizes a specific discourse level in meaning representation, we have postulated the existence of discourse constructions. We have refined part of this previous work by postulating that discourse relations such as restatement, contrast, condition, and others, provide cognitive base domains against which the fixed elements of discourse constructions are profiled. This is a cognitive mechanism that allows us to determine in what way a given discourse relation is to be understood. Then, we have argued that the different constructions that profile the same base domain are members of the same family. We have discussed the degree of interchangeability, in terms of discourse connectivity, of members of the same family. Finally, we have argued that discourse connectivity goes beyond the activity of discourse constructions. In this connection, we have examined some examples of how such connectivity can be

achieved on the basis of coherence relations arising from other levels of linguistic description.

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