8/14/2019 DoD IG MRAP brf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/dod-ig-mrap-brf 1/1

Report No. D-2009-030 (Project No. D2008-D000AE-0174.000)

December 8, 2008

i

Results in Brief: Marine Corps Implementation of the UrgentUniversal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush ProtectedVehicles

What We DidAt the request of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, we reviewed the MarineCorps decision making process to determinewhether the decision makers respondedappropriately and timely to the February 2005Urgent Universal Need Statement (UUNS)submitted by field commanders for MineResistant Ambush Protected (MRAP)-typevehicles. What We Found

Shortly after the June 2005 decision by theCommandant of the Marine Corps to replace allHigh Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles(HMMWV) in theater with the M1114up-armored HMMWV, the DeputyCommandant of the Marine Corps forInstallations and Logistics advised MarineCorps generals that the M1114 up-armoredHMMWV was the best available, mostsurvivable asset to protect Marine Corps forces.

In reaction, the Marine Corps CombatDevelopment Command (MCCDC) stopped

processing the UUNS for MRAP-type vehiclecapability in August 2005. Specifically,MCCDC officials did not develop a course of action for the UUNS, attempt to obtain fundingfor it, or present it to the Marine CorpsRequirements Oversight Council for adecision on acquiring an MRAP-type vehiclecapability. Further, the MCCDC did not, as itcould and should have in July 2005, request thatthe Deputy Commanding General, I MarineExpeditionary Force (Forward) take advantageof new Joint Staff processes available to addressan immediate and apparent joint warfighter needfor an MRAP-type vehicle capability.

DoD was aware of the threat posed by minesand improvised explosive devices (IEDs) inlow-intensity conflicts and of the availability of mine-resistant vehicles years before insurgentactions began in Iraq in 2003. Yet DoD did notdevelop requirements for, fund, or acquireMRAP-type vehicles for low-intensity conflicts

that involved mines and IEDs. As a result, theDepartment entered into operations in Iraqwithout having taken available steps to acquiretechnology to mitigate the known mine and IEDrisk to soldiers and Marines.  We are makingrecommendations only to the Marine Corpsbecause the scope of our audit was limited to areview of Marine Corps actions to address theIED threat. We plan to address other Services’actions to counter the IED threat during futureaudits.

What We Recommend

We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff establish procedures in Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01, “RapidValidation and Resourcing of Joint UrgentOperational Needs (JUONs) in the Year of Execution,” July 15, 2005, and that theCommanding General, MCCDC establishprocedures in Marine Corps Order 3900.17,“The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process(UNP) and the Urgent Universal NeedStatement (Urgent UNS),” October 17, 2008, toenable Service requirements developers to

forward urgent requirements that may have joint-Service applicability directly to theappropriate combatant commander forendorsement and subsequent submission to theJoint Staff for validation as a Joint UrgentOperational Need.

Client Comments and Our ResponseThe comments from the Director, Joint Staff andthe Commanding General, Marine CorpsCombat Development Command wereresponsive to our recommendations. Based onthe comments of the Director, Joint Staff, werevised both recommendations to provide forcombatant commander endorsement of urgentService requirements before submission of UUNS that may have joint-Service applicabilityto the Joint Staff. Please see therecommendations table on the back of this page.