中國事務委員會暨對中政策擴大會議

China Affairs Committee

Expanded Meetings on China Policy

2014對中政策檢討紀要

2014 China Policy Review: Summary Report

2014年 1月 9日

中國事務部

January 9, 2014

DPP China Affairs Department

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前言

在過去 20年間，東亞地區形勢發生權力格局重整，中國崛起對既存區域

秩序與台灣軍事外交構成挑戰。同時，兩岸之間也發生了實質的變化，交通便

捷，經濟關係密切，人員往來頻繁，交流深入各階層，兩岸之間也簽訂了多項

協議，這些發展都已不可同日而語。

兩岸人民之間本無相互敵意，更有語言與文化上的淵源，雙方政府理應在

各自體制之下，努力解決人民切身問題，提升人民權利與福祉，並且謀求兩岸

關係可長可久之道。

民主進步黨一向承擔台灣人民期待，也必然要對台灣未來承擔更重大的

責任。「生存是王道，民主是基石」，民主進步黨必須嚴肅回應台灣人民所期盼

的兩岸穩定與經濟發展之國家課題，也須堅持兩岸未來關係發展須經台灣人

民同意的核心價值，對於台灣所面對的區域形勢與兩岸關係更要有所掌握與

主張。

在此背景之下，民主進步黨成立中國事務委員會，檢視過去並策劃未來。

經過近卅位諮詢委員的共同商議，在 2013年 5月 9日，召開第一次委員會議，

並提出台灣的中國議程，作為委員會議的討論綱本。至 2013年 11月 14日止，

共召開了四次委員會議。在委員及社會各界建議之下，也在 2013年 7月 4日

召開了第一次對中政策擴大會議，邀請黨公職人員、黨內意見領袖、社會團體

領袖及學者專家參與。到 2013年 12月 26日止，共召開了九次對中政策擴大

會議。

對中政策擴大會議曾就台灣對中政策的核心價值與願景、台灣的經濟戰

略、如何處理「九二共識」、「中國因素」在台灣、兩岸公民社會交流、中國民

主化以及區域安全情勢進行深入討論，由中國事務委員會委員分別主持。在九

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次對中政策擴大會議中，共有 629人次出席，57篇引言報告，15篇書面意見，

227人次發言，對各不同議題進行討論。這是台灣有史以來對於兩岸關係最全

面、最深入的探討。

本紀要針對歷次中國事務委員會委員會議與對中政策擴大會議及書面報

告重要論點、對中政策擴大會議共同意見及主席結論進行整合。紀要本文依照

台灣核心價值與願景、政治層面、經濟層面、社會文化層面、國家安全進行整

理，盼能為台灣提出一個更為深入、更為全面的研析與政策主張，作為台灣的

中國議程。

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壹、 基本立場與核心價值不變

檢視台灣民眾對中國政策的立場與態度，顯示當前台灣民眾的國族認同

及統獨態度已經穩固，認同自己是台灣人，主張獨立的比例，從近年的民調來

看都是當前的主流民意，而台灣與中國同屬一個國家的兩岸定位，並不被台灣

民眾接受。

現今，台灣民眾的國族認同、統獨態度，以及台灣與中國的關係，與本黨

在 1999年通過的〈台灣前途決議文〉主張的立場已趨於一致，顯示經歷多年

來的民意檢驗，本黨的基本立場已被多數的台灣人民接受。

要守護國家主權，我們認為唯有堅持自由、民主的核心價值，確保台灣人

民對於未來前途有自由選擇的權利。在兩岸未來的關係上，本黨主張的「任何

有關（國家）獨立現狀的更動，必須經由台灣全體住民以公民投票的方式決定」，

沒有改變的必要。

本黨〈台灣前途決議文〉的基本立場與核心價值雖然毋須改變，但鑑於兩

岸的交流已更形密切，政府之間也簽訂多項協議，經濟、社會的往來深入各階

層，本黨對中政策的策略必須與時調整，以更務實態度來處理新生議題，讓台

灣民眾相信本黨有處理兩岸關係的能力，才能回應民意，守護台灣。

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貳、 確保台灣自由民主的兩岸政治定位與交流

〔基本情勢評估〕

21 世紀以來，台灣已經歷了兩次政黨輪替，人民的政治意識更加鞏固，

特別是在國族認同與國家認同上，多數民眾漸趨一致，明顯有穩定的主流民意：

我們是台灣人，台灣是一個主權獨立的國家，國號是中華民國，與中華人民共

和國互不隸屬，未來台灣的前途，應由台灣的 2,300萬人自行決定，此乃現階

段台灣人民的最大共識。但相對於台灣的政治變化，對岸的中國仍維持威權體

制的國家機器，甚至憑藉著高成長的經濟力，中共政權更形穩固，也更有實力

威脅、影響台灣。兩岸相互開放交流以來，進展快速，尤其是中國成為台灣最

大的貿易夥伴後，台灣與中國的各式交流更加密切，在中國對台灣有企圖的情

況下，台灣與中國的政治關係必然也會愈趨複雜。

〔當前問題〕

儘管台灣人民對於兩岸政治定位有明顯的主流態度，認定台灣與中國分

別為兩個互不隸屬的國家，當前執政者明知，卻意圖扭轉，一再宣示兩岸為一

個國家兩個地區，對岸的中共也無視台灣民意，要把台灣鎖進一個中國的框架

中。然而，台灣的憲政民主成就有目共睹，珍惜並捍衛台灣自由、民主、開放

的生活方式已是最大的台灣共識，兩岸交流也應以民主為基石。因此，台灣人

民對兩岸定位的主流民意，如何免於中共的威脅，如何在台灣的民主體制下獲

得確保，是當前最嚴肅的課題。進一步，台灣與中國的交流，如何擺脫少數人

的操控，創造正面、健康的互動關係，台灣的對中政策，如何避免與主流民意

脫鉤，如何能符合台灣最多數人的最大利益，都是迫切需要克服的問題。

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〔主張與對策〕

一、台灣與中國的關係定位，必須尊重台灣全體住民的意志與民主決定，

任何個人、政黨或其他國家的片面主張都無權否定。

二、在全球化的潮流下，兩岸交流是必然的趨勢，本黨應該積極自信參與

兩岸交流，包括智庫與地方執政縣市的城市交流。

三、兩岸的交流，不得傷害台灣的主權與安全，必須能確保台灣自由、民

主、開放的生活方式，應該積極凝聚台灣內部的共識做為兩岸對話的基礎。

四、兩岸協商應謹守民主程序與資訊透明原則，應制訂「兩岸協議監督條

例」，除納入風險評估及利益迴避機制外，更應有公民聽證程序，以確保任何

兩岸協議均能符合台灣的最大利益。

五、兩岸交流必須有更進步的思維，尤其是促成雙方在自由民主、人權保

障、生態維護、公民社會的提升等，應該有積極的作為。

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參、 強化優勢、共享利益與平衡發展的經濟戰略

〔基本情勢評估〕

當前台灣同時面臨全球化、區域主義盛行，以及中國經濟崛起三大衝擊，

對中經濟戰略必須放在台灣對外總體戰略下來思考，目的在確保台灣主體性

並促進經濟產業的平衡發展。中國經濟逐漸轉型，從藉由大量投資與出口導向

的成長模式，轉為倚重國內消費市場，此一趨勢正深刻影響兩岸經貿的型態與

內容。未來，兩岸經貿關係的演變，雙向投資將成為關鍵，如何與台灣的產業

政策相容，並且妥善規範資本所衍生的政商關係，將是台灣無可迴避的挑戰。

〔當前問題〕

近年來，台灣經濟表現不佳，主要病灶在於國內投資動能不足，以代工出

口為主的經濟成長模式面臨瓶頸。早期兩岸的產業垂直分工體系，也隨著中國

經濟的發展逐步瓦解，目前兩岸產業競爭已明顯大過互補程度。過去台灣一再

期待根留台灣，現在卻演變成產業空洞化、GDP 與國內生產活動脫節、失業

率居高不下、薪資水準倒退、貧富差距擴大等後遺症，特別是中國透過國家力

量補貼與扶植包括面板等特定產業，更讓台灣企業受到嚴重衝擊。

從 1990年代以來，台灣不具比較利益的部分傳統產業，以及適合做跨國

佈局的電子資訊高科技產業，陸續大舉外移到中國，並由投資帶動貿易，導致

中國從 2000年起成為台灣最大的出口市場。出口市場過度集中與電子資訊產

業一枝獨秀同時發生，台灣對外經貿傾斜其實與內部產業的失衡密切相關。

隨著世界貿易組織（WTO）多邊談判陷入困境，區域主義與自由貿易協

定（FTA）盛行，台灣卻由於中國刻意杯葛而被排除在外。台灣以往在政治與

外交領域方面被孤立，但 FTA風潮則進一步讓台灣的對外經貿拓展也處於不

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利的局面。尤其是，在台灣只能與中國發展兩岸經濟架構協議（ECFA），卻不

能與重要經貿夥伴簽訂 FTA的情況下，台灣經濟將加速邊緣化，並且日益以

中國為核心。

近來，中國政府的影響力已經有系統、有組織的深入台灣社會各階層，尤

其是以國營企業為主的中資來台，往往並非純粹商業考量，除了國安問題之外，

台灣也必須慎防日積月累的商業文明與社會基礎受到侵蝕。

〔主張與對策〕

一、台灣的最高經濟戰略應以發揮制度優勢，以及提高就業與創新能

力為目標。保持差異與技術領先，才能確保台灣在兩岸經濟整合中的主體

性與優勢地位。

二、因應中國經濟轉型與內需市場快速成長，台灣應積極發展自有品

牌與消費產品，以提升商品及勞務的附加價值、促進產業結構多元分散，

並提高台灣因應中國景氣循環的調整能力。

三、兩岸經貿交流的成果應由全民共享，政府尤應扮演「共同價值的

守護者，不同利益的平衡者」，透過社會安全體制扶持經貿自由化的弱勢

者，加大台灣面對自由化與外部衝擊的緩衝空間。

四、台灣應持續檢視兩岸各項經濟協議的內容與成效，尤其是 ECFA

及包括服務貿易、貨品貿易與爭端解決等後續協議的洽簽，更應符合互惠

與透明等國際規範，降低台灣企業因兩岸規模與制度差異所面臨的不利因

素。兩岸協議應納入規範不公平貿易行為與國營企業的專章，並要求中國

強化對台灣智慧財產權的保護，以促進公平競爭。

五、ECFA已讓兩岸經貿關係遠離多邊體系，而往更緊密的雙邊關係發

展，台灣應以既有的經濟協議為基礎，積極尋求與重要經貿夥伴洽簽

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FTA，尤其是跨太平洋夥伴（TPP）與區域全面經濟夥伴（RCEP）兩大區

域貿易協定，以維持對外經貿關係平衡發展。

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肆、 自由人權與經濟發展並重的兩岸公民社會交流

〔基本情勢評估〕

隨著全球化經濟秩序的成形，兩岸經貿、社會、文化交流日漸密切，雙方

人員往來也日趨頻繁。以兩岸旅遊為例，台灣每年到中國旅遊人數已超過 530

萬人，中國人到台灣觀光、從事交流的人數，去年也達 250萬人，因兩岸通婚

在台定居的陸配人數也已超過 30萬人；兩岸貿易金額，則從 1999年〈台灣前

途決議文〉制定時的 71億美元，大幅成長為 2012年的 1,216億美元。

另一方面，中國自改革開放以來，雖然在經濟發展上取得重大進展，但相

應的政治改革並未出現，以至於中國的公民社會雖已隱然成形，但在中共當局

高壓維穩之下，生存空間受到相當大的侷限。影響所及，兩岸之間的交流也在

中共當局有系統、有組織、有目的主導下，不但被扭曲，並限縮在政治及經濟

領域，而且在缺乏兩岸公民社會之間有意義的連結與互動下，反過來侵蝕、破

壞台灣自由、民主、開放的生活方式。

〔當前問題〕

中國經濟高速發展的核心是權貴資本主義，其仰賴政治權力壟斷，將經濟

利益分配到少數權貴集團，目前也與國民黨舊有的威權國家資本主義相結合，

也因此兩岸經濟越整合，越將呈現出國民黨威權復辟與中國權貴資本主義同

時發生的現象，包括：系統性貪污與尋租、貧富差距加劇、社會階層擴大而流

動減緩、勞動人權惡化、自然環境破壞等。

自由與人權是台灣社會的主流價值，是本黨創黨以來最重要的核心價值，

也是我們能領導台灣社會的力量所在。然而，在自由人權已經成為台灣共識的

時候，台灣人民的自由生活卻因為中國透過經濟力量滲透進台灣社會，逐步改

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變台灣人民的生活方式，從而在潛移默化中限縮台灣人民的政治選擇，這就是

所謂的「中國因素」。香港被逐步滲透吸收的經驗，為這個中國因素下了最好

的註腳。為了防止中國因素對台灣自由民主生活方式的侵蝕，改善當前兩岸交

流失衡的缺失，並在與中國互動的同時，確保台灣的自由、民主，已經成為現

階段兩岸公民社會交流與互動最迫切的課題。

〔主張與對策〕

一、為避免兩岸經貿往來被少數人壟斷，台灣應努力建構一個強調自由民

主與分配正義的台灣新公民社會。為達成此一目標，台灣應進一步深化民主理

念，並以此跟中國政府，特別是中國庶民社會交流；在經濟上，台灣應該以積

極提升庶民的福祉為主要考量。

二、台灣應從根本上建構更平等的普及式社會權。本黨更應在台灣民主深

化過程中與台灣公民社會發展更具深層意義的夥伴關係，將自由、人權與分配

正義從政治層面貫徹到社會各層面，有效改革台灣社會，才能在進一步的實質

交流中，創造兩岸三地的新格局。

三、台灣應透過對香港及中國公民社會的關注，積極與各類型非政府組織

或個人，以平等、開放的態度，彼此多方面理解與交流，分享台灣的民主歷程、

轉型正義、環境保護、社區營造、宗教組織等經驗，並積極關心中國民主與人

權發展，讓兩岸三地公民社會的力量匯聚，以發揮台灣對促進中國民主化的

「燈塔效應」。

四、兩岸交流與協議洽簽，應以聯合國《公民與政治權利國際公約》及《經

濟、社會與文化權利國際公約》為原則，以打破國共平台與兩岸政商集團對兩

岸關係的壟斷，確保基本人權、就業及勞動條件、公共衛生與環境保護、農工

及中產階層的權益。

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五、台灣應在國家安全、社會承載無虞以及制度完善配套的前提下，透過

對法令的逐步檢討與修正，營造一個讓陸配、陸生、與陸客，尊嚴生活、健康

學習及平安旅遊的友善環境，使其成為支持民主台灣的最佳夥伴。

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伍、 外交、國防與兩岸關係均衡並重的國家安全戰略

〔基本情勢評估〕

中國整體國力大幅提昇，在經濟成長支撐下，外交與軍事實力逐漸強大，

國際影響力與日俱增。在亞太地區，隨著美中兩國國力差距日漸拉近，區域權

力結構正浮現美中雙重領導體系。歐巴馬政府提出「再平衡」戰略，強化與亞

太各國在政治、軍事與經濟上的合作，共構和平穩定的安全環境，以降低朝鮮

半島、東海、台海與南海各可能衝突熱點的緊張情勢。中國則針對釣魚台與南

海，加強周邊海空域的軍事活動與演訓，2013年 11月更劃設東海防空識別區

引發區域緊張，中國顯不再韜光養晦。目前，中國正積極推動和美國建構新型

大國關係，並劃定包括台灣在內的核心利益勢力範圍，要求美方不得介入，並

停止對台軍售。無論中國國力是否能持續成長，均將對區域與台海安全環境帶

來嚴重衝擊。

台灣位處第一島鏈樞紐，地緣戰略重要性自不待言。2013年 10月，美國

國務院更期許台灣在跨國議題上能扮演區域領導者的角色，更凸顯台灣在美

國再平衡戰略中可以扮演的角色。因此，強化與周邊民主國家的連結，維持台

海兩岸的和平良性互動，善盡維護區域安全穩定的責任，是台灣國家安全戰略

的核心。

〔當前問題〕

當前政府國家安全戰略最大問題在於過度依賴與中國關係，造成國安戰

略失衡。馬政府的兩岸關係高於對外關係位階，呼應中國的「一中框架」，

漠視國防外交使兩岸軍力失衡擴大，讓中國對台戰略由反獨轉為促統。而當

前政府多次表態兩岸關係非國際關係，將使台灣自絕於國際大戰略棋盤之

15

外，排除友邦支援的正當性；推行外交休兵，以期待中國善意的外交以及與

中國協商的國際參與，也弱化了台灣主權與台灣人民的國際參與權利，並逐

步讓台灣的國際參與兩岸化。

〔主張與對策〕

一、台灣的國家安全戰略應建立在自由、民主、人權等價值認同上，並

從全球與區域的視野來看待中國議題，兩岸關係發展不應妨礙台灣的國際地

位，兩岸關係應以國防外交為後盾。台灣應與中國發展和平穩定、共存共榮

關係，雙方都負有維持區域和平的責任。

二、台灣是新興民主國家的榜樣，應積極參與國際組織與活動，強化與

邦交國的關係，並深化與民主先進國家的夥伴關係。台灣對外關係應以價值

外交為主軸，結合自由、民主、人權等普世價值與台灣在良善治理方面的經

驗，透過軟性國力、跨國組織、城市外交、災難救助等多元彈性方式，積極

與國際接軌，讓台灣的永續存在成為國際社會與中國民眾有所期待的正面資

產。

三、台灣追求和平與安全的環境，積極建構區域性危機預防機制，維持

區域穩定。台灣必須強化自我防衛的決心與能力，以避免中國的誤判與軍事

冒進。台灣無意與中國進行軍備競賽，但中國迄今仍不斷加強犯台的軍事準

備，因此台灣的國防預算必須提高，以建置不對稱戰力為優先，重建人民、

國軍與友邦對台灣國防的信心。

16

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17

China Affairs Committee

Expanded Meetings on China Policy

2014 China Policy Review: Summary Report

January 9, 2014

DPP China Affairs Department

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19

Forward

The past 20 years have witnessed a major realignment of the power structure

in East Asia. China’s rise poses a challenge to the existing regional order, as well

as to Taiwan’s defense and diplomacy. At the same time, substantive changes have

also taken place in the relationship across the two sides of the Taiwan Strait,

rendering more convenient travel, closer economic ties, increased frequency of

people-to-people interactions, and deepened exchanges across all sectors, to say

nothing of the multiple agreements signed between the two sides. The scale and

scope of these developments are unprecedented.

The people on the two sides of the Strait fundamentally do not harbor hostile

feelings toward each other, and indeed are connected through shared languages and

culture. Given this, both governments should strive, each from within their

respective systems, to focus on resolving the issues of the most immediate concern

to their people, promoting their rights and well-being, and seeking a sustainable path

for the long-term maintenance of cross-Strait interactions.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) always assumes the people’s

expectations as its mission, and is destined to shoulder greater responsibility for

Taiwan’s future. “Economic survival is the priority, with democracy as a

cornerstone.” As such, the DPP must take a solemn view of people’s expectations

for the national agenda on cross-Strait stability and economic development, while

upholding the core value that the future development of cross-Strait relations must

be subject to the consent of people of Taiwan. Not only that, but we must also

produce proposals that account for and are responsive to changes in the regional

situation and cross-Strait relations.

In consideration of the above, the DPP established the China Affairs

Committee (CAC) to examine the past and plan for the future. After consulting

with approximately 30 advisors, the CAC convened the first plenary meeting on May

9, 2013, and proposed an agenda on Taiwan’s China policy to serve as discussion

outlines for the subsequent meetings. As of November 14, 2013, the CAC has

convened a total of four plenary meetings. Simultaneously, at the suggestion of

committee members and all sectors of society, the CAC convened its first expanded

meeting on July 4, 2013, which was attended by party officials, party opinion leaders,

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civic groups’ leaders, scholars, and experts. As of December 26, 2103, the CAC

has convened a total of 9 expanded meetings.

The expanded meetings, each chaired in turn by a different member of the

CAC, have as a whole engaged in a deep probing of a wide range of issues, including

core values and vision of Taiwan’s China policy, Taiwan’s economic strategy

towards China, how to deal with the “Ninety-Two Consensus,” how to respond to

the “China Factor” in Taiwan, how cross-Strait civil societies can interact, strategies

for China’s democratization, and the implications of current trends in regional

security. A total of nine meetings consisted of 629 participants, 57 introductory

presentations, 15 written statements, and 227 floor statements. This has been the

most comprehensive and thorough discussion of cross-Strait relations in Taiwan’s

history.

This report summarizes the key arguments, written statements, consensus

opinions, and the session chairs’ conclusions from each of the CAC plenary and

expanded meetings. The report begins with a statement of Taiwan’s core values

and visions and continues on to summaries of the political, economic, socio-cultural,

and national security dimensions of the central question, with the goal of providing

a deeper, more comprehensive policy research, analysis, and proposals for Taiwan’s

China agenda.

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I. Fundamental positions and core values remain unchanged.

An examination of the positions and attitudes of the Taiwanese people towards

China policy reveals that their national identity and preferences for independence

versus unification have solidified. Taiwanese identity and preference for

independence have consistently been the mainstream public opinion in recent years.

Recent polls have also shown that the public rejects defining Taiwan and China as

one country.

The current national identity, preferences for independence versus unification,

and attitudes towards Taiwan’s relationship with China among Taiwan’s public have

all fallen in line with the DPP’s “Resolution Regarding Taiwan’s Future” passed in

1999. After years of public scrutiny, our party’s fundamental positions have been

accepted by most of the people of Taiwan.

To safeguard the country’s sovereignty, our view is that we must uphold the

core values of freedom and democracy, and must ensure people’s right to freely

choose their future. With regard to future cross-Strait relations, it is not necessary

to alter our stance that “any change in the independent status quo must be decided

by all the residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.”

Although the fundamental positions and core values of the DPP’s “Resolution

Regarding Taiwan’s Future” remain unchanged, our China policy must be adapted

over time to pragmatically address new issues that arise as a result of closer cross-

Strait ties, more bilateral agreements, and deeper economic and social exchanges in

all walks of life. We must convince the public that the DPP is capable of managing

cross-Strait relations so as to respond to the people’s desire to safeguard Taiwan.

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II. Securing Taiwan’s freedom and democracy in cross-Strait

political relations and interaction.

Background

Since the beginning of the 21st century, Taiwan has undergone two transition

of power, and in this time the political consciousness of the people has consolidated.

On the issues relating to national identity in particular, people’s viewpoints have

become harmonized over time, with a stable, clearly evident mainstream public

opinion emerging: we are Taiwanese; Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country,

its official name is the Republic of China, and it is not subject to the jurisdiction of

the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan’s future should be decided by the

23 million people in Taiwan—this is the point of broadest consensus among

Taiwanese at this stage. However, in contrast with the political changes that have

taken place in Taiwan, China still retains an authoritarian state apparatus, and with

its high-growth economic power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime has

become more entrenched and gained more strength to threaten and influence Taiwan.

Since both sides mutually opened up exchanges, cross-Strait relations have

developed rapidly. Especially after China became Taiwan's largest trading partner,

exchanges of all types between Taiwan and China have grown closer. But given

that China still maintains its underlying agenda, its political relations with Taiwan

will inevitably be complicated.

The present challenge

Although the current administration is fully aware that the people of Taiwan

manifest an unequivocal mainstream preference regarding the cross-Strait political

status—recognizing that Taiwan is not subject to the jurisdiction of the PRC—it

nevertheless attempts to reverse this situation by consistently declaring that the two

sides of the Strait are “one country, two areas.” For its part, CCP also ignores

public opinion in Taiwan and wishes to lock Taiwan into its one China framework.

However, the world has witnessed the achievements of Taiwan's constitutional

democracy. Cherishing and upholding Taiwan's freedom, democracy and open

way of life have come to be the greatest consensus in Taiwan, and this should also

be the cornerstone for cross-Strait exchanges. Therefore, the most critical

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challenge before us is safeguarding the mainstream consensus regarding the

definition of cross-Strait political relations within Taiwan’s democratic system, in

the face of the CCP’s threats. Other urgent problems that need to be overcome

include how to extricate cross-Strait exchanges from the control of a small minority

to create healthier and more positive interactions, and how to prevent the decoupling

of Taiwan’s China policy from mainstream public opinion, so that it can represent

the best interests of the majority of people in Taiwan.

Recommendations

1. The definition of the political relationship and status between Taiwan and

China must respect the will and democratic decision of all residents in Taiwan.

This cannot be denied by any individual, political party or other countries’ unilateral

claims.

2. With the tide of globalization, cross-Strait interaction is an inevitable trend.

The DPP should participate proactively and with confidence in cross-Strait

exchanges, including dialogues between think tanks and inter-city exchanges.

3. Cross-Strait exchanges must not undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty and security,

and must preserve Taiwan's free, democratic, and open way of life. Taiwan should

seek internal consensus to be the basis for cross-Strait dialogue.

4. Cross-Strait negotiations should observe democratic procedures and the

principles of informational transparency. Taiwan should enact regulations on the

oversight of cross-Strait negotiations, to include not only mechanisms for risk

assessment and prevent conflicts of interest, but also provide for a public hearings

process to ensure that any cross-Strait agreement will meet Taiwan’s best interests.

5. The cross-Strait exchanges should encompass more progressive thinking,

particularly in the areas of facilitating the promotion by both sides of freedom and

democracy, human rights protection, ecological protection, and civil society, etc., as

well as outlining concrete plans for implementation.

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III. An economic strategy for strengthening Taiwan’s advantages,

shared interests, and balanced development.

Background

Taiwan currently faces three major forces: globalization, regional economic

integration, and the economic rise of China. To preserve the country’s autonomy

and facilitate its balanced economic and industrial development, Taiwan’s economic

strategy towards China must be formulated as part of its overall approach to its

external relations. China’s economy is gradually transforming from a model

dependent on investment and export-led growth, to one that relies on domestic

markets. This shift will deeply affect the nature and content of cross-Strait

economic and trade relations. As bidirectional investment becomes more central

to the evolving cross-Strait trade relationship in the coming years, harmonizing this

dynamic with Taiwan’s industrial policy and properly regulating the intersection

between politics and capital will arise as challenges that Taiwan cannot avoid.

The present challenge

The main reason for Taiwan's poor economic performance in recent years is

the lack of domestic investment and the bottleneck of the export-oriented economic

growth model. The vertical division of labor that governed the early days of cross-

Strait industrial relations has gradually collapsed with China’s economic

development, and the present cross-Strait economic relationship has a far greater

degree of competition than complementarity. Taiwan continued to expect local

companies to keep their headquarters in Taiwan, but what occurred instead was a

hollowing out of industrial development while the GDP became decoupled from

domestic production activities, resulting in high unemployment, stagnant salary

growth, a widening wealth gap, as well as other consequences that follow these

phenomena. China’s national support for certain industries, and for the flat-panel

industry in particular, has severely impacted Taiwanese companies.

Since the 1990s, some of the traditional industries in Taiwan that do not have

comparative advantages, as well as high-tech electronics and information industries

that are in fact suitable for cross-border operations, have all moved to China in

25

significant numbers. Investment-led cross-Strait trade since 2000 has turned China

into Taiwan’s largest export market. Excessive concentration of exports in the

electronic information sector occurred simultaneously with the industry’s booming

heyday, highlighting the close correlation between Taiwan’s excessive export

orientation and the imbalance of its domestic industries.

While regionalism and free trade agreements (FTAs) gain increasing

prevalence in the wake of the WTO’s multilateral negotiations stalemate, Taiwan is

excluded from these processes because of China’s deliberate obstruction. Taiwan

used to be isolated in the political and diplomatic realm, but the FTA trend has further

endangered Taiwan’s external economic and trade expansion. Specifically under

the circumstances that Taiwan can only sign an Economic Cooperation Framework

Agreement (ECFA) with China but is not able to reach FTAs with other important

trading partners, this will accelerate the marginalization of its economy and

gradually make China its economic center of gravity.

In recent times, Chinese government has systematically and in coordinated

fashion exerted its influence on every level of the Taiwanese society. Chinese

investment in Taiwan, mainly by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), is often deployed

on the basis of more than purely business calculations. Apart from concerns over

national security, Taiwan must also take precautions to prevent erosion of the

foundation of the society and the norms and ethics of business that it has built up

over many years.

Recommendations

1. Taiwan’s ultimate economic strategy should aim to realize its institutional

advantages, expand employment opportunity, and promote innovation. Only

through maintaining its technological edge and leadership can Taiwan secure its

autonomy and preserve its privileged position in the cross-Strait economic

integration process.

2. In response to China’s economic transformation and the rapid growth of its

domestic market, Taiwan should vigorously develop its own national brands and

consumer products so as to raise the added value of its labor and products, as well

as the diversification of its industrial structure, and the ability to adapt to the

fluctuations of China’s business cycles.

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3. The benefits that result from cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges

should be shared by all citizens. The government in particular should play the roles

of “guardian of common values and balancer of different interests.” Through

supporting the disadvantaged of trade liberalization via the social safety net, the

government can expand the buffer zone for Taiwan to cope with the consequences

of liberalization and external shocks.

4. Taiwan should continue examining the content and result of each cross-Strait

economic agreements, especially ECFA and its follow-on agreements such as Cross-

Strait Agreement on Trade in Services, the agreement on trade in goods, and any

agreement on mechanisms for business dispute resolution to be negotiated in the

future. Furthermore, the agreements should conform to the international norms of

reciprocity and transparency, and seek to mitigate the disadvantages that Taiwan’s

enterprises face due to different scales and systems across the Strait. Besides SOEs,

many large private enterprises in China also receive government subsidies and

assistance. Therefore, the cross-Strait agreements should include special

provisions to regulate unfair trade behaviors and the SOEs in order to facilitate fair

competitions. The agreements should also require China to reinforce protection for

Taiwan’s intellectual property rights.

5. ECFA has distanced the cross-Strait trade relationship from the established

multilateral trade system, while moving it more firmly into the orbit of the bilateral

relationship. Building on the basis of existing trade agreements, Taiwan should

proactively seek to enter into FTA negotiations with its major trade partners,

especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Cooperation

Economic Partnership (RCEP), in order to maintain a balanced development of

external trade relations.

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IV. The equal importance of freedom and human rights with

economic development in cross-Strait civil society interactions.

Background

Along with emergence of the new global economic order, the trade, social,

and cultural interaction between the two sides of the Strait draws closer by the day,

with people coming and going more and more frequently. Taking cross-Strait

tourism as one example, the number of Taiwanese that travel to China for tourism

already exceeds 5.3 million per year, while the number of Chinese that come to

Taiwan to travel and work reached 2.5 million last year. The number of Chinese

nationals that reside in Taiwan as a result of cross-Strait marriage is already more

than 300,000, while the value of cross-Strait trade has significantly increased from

$7.1 billion USD in 1999 (when the Resolution on Taiwan’s Future was passed) to

$121.6 billion.

On the other hand, since China entered its era of reform, although it has

unquestionably achieved significant accomplishments in the realm of economic

development, a corresponding reform in the political realm has yet to materialize.

An incipient civil society exists beneath the surface, but under the tremendous

pressure exerted by the Chinese communist authorities in the name of maintaining

stability, it faces grave limits on its space for survival. One resulting extension of

this is that under the systematic, coordinated orchestration by these same Chinese

authorities in the service of a political objective, cross-Strait exchanges are similarly

restricted to realms of politics and economics. In the absence of meaningful

interactions and linkages between the civil societies on the two sides, these

exchanges have the adverse effect of eroding and damaging Taiwan’s free,

democratic, and open way of life.

The present challenge

China’s breakneck economic development has been driven at its core by a

model of crony capitalism, relying on the monopoly of political authority that

distributes economic benefits to a handful of elite cartels. Now this model has been

linked up to the old authoritarian capitalist structure of the Chinese Nationalist Party

28

(KMT), such that as cross-Strait economic integration accelerates, we will

increasingly see the emergence of two twin phenomena—the restoration of the

KMT’s power, and growing Chinese crony capitalism—each to be accompanied by

the following symptoms: systemic corruption and rent-seeking behavior, widening

income inequality, increased social stratification, diminished social mobility,

deterioration of labor rights, and environmental damage.

Freedom and human rights are the mainstream values of Taiwanese society,

the most important core values of the DPP, and the source of strength for our capacity

to lead Taiwan. But just when freedom and human rights became the consensus in

Taiwan, Chinese influence has, through China’s economic power, now begun to

permeate Taiwan’s society and gradually reshaped the free and open way of life that

the people of Taiwan have enjoyed, subtly but tangibly restricting the range of

political choice for the Taiwan’s voters—this is the so-called “China Factor.” Hong

Kong’s experience with gradual penetration and absorption serves as the most

definitive evidence of the China factor. If we are to prevent the erosion of Taiwan’s

open and democratic way of life by the China factor and correct the imbalances in

the current mode of cross-Strait dialogue, then safeguarding Taiwan’s freedom and

democracy in the course of interacting with China has become the most urgent

challenge for the present phase of cross-Strait civil society exchanges.

Recommendations

1. To prevent the concentration of cross-Strait economic exchanges in the hands of

the few, Taiwan must work towards building a renewed civil society aimed at

promoting liberty, democracy, and distributive justice. Achieving this end will

require a further deepening of democratic ideals in Taiwan’s politics, as well as

increased exchanges with Chinese civil society in addition to the Chinese

government. In the area of economics, the proactive promotion of the well-being

of ordinary citizens should be the main priority.

2. Taiwan must construct a set of equitable and universal social rights from the

bottom up. Accordingly, one of the questions that the party must address in the

course of Taiwan’s democratic deepening is how to build a more meaningful, deep-

rooted partnership with civil society, to project the realization of liberty, human

rights, and distributive justice from the political realm more fully into all facets of

the society through an effective reform of Taiwan’s social structures. Only then

29

can these substantive interactions lead to the creation of a new model of relations

among Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong.

3. Taiwan should closely monitor civil society organizations in China and Hong

Kong, and, on an open and equal basis, actively seek multi-faceted engagement or

dialogue with all types of non-governmental agencies or individuals, with the

purpose of sharing Taiwan’s experiences in democratization, transitional justice,

environmental protection, community empowerment, religious organizations, etc.

Proactive concern for the development of Chinese democracy and human rights and

a joining of forces between civil society in Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong will lead

to a fuller realization of Taiwan’s potential to serve as a beacon for China’s

democratization.

4. Cross-Strait economic exchanges and the signing of cross-Strait economic

agreements should conform to the standards embodied in the International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,

Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The monopoly on cross-Strait relations

currently wielded by the KMT-CCP platform and the cross-Strait state-business

cartel must be broken to safeguard basic human rights, preserve employment

opportunities, uphold labor protections, protect public health and the environment,

and defend the interests of the agricultural and industrial workers and the middle

class.

5. As long as national security interests are not compromised and complementary

measures of regulations are in place, the respective laws and regulations can be

gradually reviewed and amended to construct for the Chinese spouses, Chinese

students, and Chinese visitors an environment conducive to a dignified and fulfilling

life, productive studies, and safe travels, making them ideal candidates to become

the best partners for supporting a democratic Taiwan.

30

V. Foreign policy, national defense, cross-Strait relations, and a

balanced national security strategy.

Background

As China’s economic growth continues to sustain a corresponding expansion

of its national power, the global influence that accompanies its diplomatic and

military strength is increasing by the day. In the Asia-Pacific, the disparities in

national power between China and the U.S. are closing, leading to the emergence of

the phenomenon of a Sino-American dual leadership power structure in the region.

The rebalancing policy put forth by the Obama administration seeks to strengthen

the political, security, and economic cooperation among the various Asian countries,

jointly forging a peaceful and stable security environment by lowering tensions in

all the major flashpoints from the Korean peninsula, to the East China Sea, the

Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. With its eyes on the Diaoyutais and the

South China Sea, China has augmented its military exercises and activities in its

neighboring seas and airspace. The November, 2013 designation of the East China

Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which elevated tensions across the

region, signaled that China no longer plans to conceal its burgeoning military

capabilities. At the moment China is actively seeking to build a “new model of

great power relations” with the United States that includes relegating Taiwan within

the scope of China’s core interests, which demands that the U.S. not interfere as well

as terminate arms sales to Taiwan. Regardless of whether the trajectory of China’s

expanding national power is sustainable, the existing trends are certain to have a

profound impact on the security environment in the region and in the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan’s geostrategic importance is indisputable, given its position in the first

island chain. In October, 2013, the U.S. Department of State expressed its hopes

that Taiwan will assume a regional leadership role on various transnational issues,

demonstrating the potential part that Taiwan could play within the U.S.’s rebalance

to Asia strategy. Thus, strengthening the connections with neighboring

democracies, maintaining the peaceful and positive interaction between the two

sides of the Taiwan Strait, and preserving regional and peace and stability are the

foundations of Taiwan’s national security strategy.

31

The present challenge

The most critical flaw in the national security strategy of the current

government is its overreliance on the relationship with the People’s Republic of

China, which leads to a distorted conception of national defense. The Ma

administration prioritizes cross-Strait relations above foreign relations, responding

positively to the “one China framework” dictated by China, neglecting national

defense and diplomacy while the disparity in military capability across the Strait

continues to widen, and allowing China’s Taiwan policy to progress from opposing

independence to promoting unification. The administration’s repeated declaration

that cross-Strait relations are not international relations has removed Taiwan from

the global geostrategic map while thwarting the legitimacy of the assistance from

our allies. The diplomatic truce, the conducting of foreign relations conditioned

upon Chinese goodwill, and seeking international participation via negotiation with

China, have all undermined Taiwan’s sovereignty and the right of Taiwan’s people

to international space, relegating Taiwan’s international participation to a subset of

cross-Strait relations.

Recommendations

1. Taiwan’s national security strategy is founded on identification with the values

of freedom, democracy, and human rights, which views China affairs from a global

and regional perspective. The development of cross-Strait relations should not

diminish Taiwan’s international status; and cross-Strait engagement should be

buttressed by the broader national defense and foreign policy strategy. Taiwan

should forge a relationship of peaceful, stable coexistence and mutual prosperity

with China, in which parties bear the responsibility for maintaining regional peace.

2. Taiwan is a model for new democracies, and should proactively participate in

the activities of international organizations, strengthen relations with diplomatic

allies, and deepen its cooperation with advanced democratic countries. Taiwan’s

foreign relations should revolve around values diplomacy, combining the universal

values of freedom, democracy, and human rights with Taiwan’s accumulated

experiences in the area of good governance. By utilizing national soft power,

multilateral organizations, inter-city exchanges, disaster assistance, and other

diverse and flexible avenues for advancing international standards, Taiwan’s

32

sustained existence can become regarded as a positive asset to the global community

and to the Chinese people.

3. Taiwan seeks a peaceful and secure environment and the establishment of

regional conflict avoidance mechanisms to preserve regional stability. We must

strengthen its self-defense capability and resolve, so as to prevent Chinese

miscalculation and deter military adventurism. Taiwan has no intention of

engaging in an armed race with the PRC, but to this day China still continues to

increase its preparations for a military takeover of Taiwan. Under these

circumstances, the national defense budget must be raised, with primacy given to the

buildup of asymmetric capabilities, in order to rebuild confidence in Taiwan’s

defense among our people, our armed forces, and our friends and allies.