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C L A R I T Y ▪ A S S U R A N C E ▪ R E S U L T S
M I D W E S TR E L I A B I L I TYO R G A NI Z A T I O N
“Maintain and improve the quality of life through a reliable regional bulk power system.”
AuthorRich Quest
2016 MRO Reliability Conference: Protection SystemsMay 25, 2016
Effective Application of Breaker Failure SchemesSecurity and Reliability Considerations
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
2 General Schemes with Over Sized Impact
Bus Differential Schemes• Primary Reliability Impact from Unnecessary Operation
Breaker Failure Schemes• Reliability Impact due to Unnecessary Operation is Similar to that of Bus
Differential Schemes• Reliability Impact due to Failure to Operate can be Especially Severe
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Straight Bus Differential False Operation
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Straight Bus BF False Operation
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Bus Differential False Operation
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115kV Bus 1
115kV Bus 2
DistXfmr
Transmission Lines
Generator
Shunt Capacitor
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
BF Relay False Operation
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115kV Bus 1
115kV Bus 2
DistXfmr
Transmission Lines
Generator
Shunt Capacitor
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Bus Protection System Failure to Operate
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115kV Bus 1
115kV Bus 2
Transmission Lines
Generator
500kVGenerator
35 Miles
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
BF Relay Failure to Operate
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115kV Bus 1
115kV Bus 2
Transmission Lines
Generator
500kVGenerator
35 Miles
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Power Circuit Breakers
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
N-1 vs N-X
TPL standards require the study of effects of single contingencies (N-1) on a properly operating power system• Some contingencies include proper response to “stuck” breakers
Protection Systems operate in N-1 conditions• In most cases the condition is really N-1 AND COUNTING!• Ideally Protection Systems will operate, and leave the power system in an
N-1 condition—Reality is not always ideal—Breakers can and do Fail
• Conditions are now N-X, and it is crucial to limit the value of X
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Basic Breaker Failure Scheme
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X50 0 86
62X62Y52
TC2
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Basic Breaker Failure Scheme for Shared Breakers
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21P1 21G1 21P2 21P2
62P 62P 62G62G
94-1 62x
Digital Line Relay
94-1 Trips Line Breakers Coil 1
62x Initiate BF Timing on Line Breakers
Trip Line BkrsCoil 2
Initiate BFLine Bkrs
86B 62B
(94-2) (62y)
87BA
87BB
87BC
86B Trip & Lock Out all Bus Breakers
62B Initiate BF on all Bus Breakers
50 0X
OR
AND 86BF
62y62x
62B
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Basic Scheme Features
Fault Detecting Relays are used to initiate timing• Initiation occurs when trip commands are sent to the breaker• Control trips do not initiate breaker failure timing
The presence of fault current supervises timing• Successful interruption of current ends timing even if the initiating contacts
are latched, or otherwise sealed in• Timing continues in the event that the breaker operates but fails to interrupt
the fault current
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Determining BF Time Delay
Considerations that tend to shorten Time Delay• Proximity to Generation• High Fault Level
—Stability Issues—Equipment Damage
• Trip Coil Duty (Not really a consideration?)Considerations that tend to lengthen Time Delay• Low Fault Level• Load Loss
Time delay must be short enough to ensure stability and Coordinate with over reaching relay elements
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Determining Breaker Failure Time Delay
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Order 754 Events
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Washington DC Event
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
MRO Event
The circuit breakers failed to open for the fault because of a firmware update improperly performed on the line primary and secondary digital distance relays. When the firmware in the relays was updated the IEC61850 file that controls the GOOSE messaging in the relays was not reloaded, resulting in non functional GOOSE messaging. The GOOSE messaging in these relays is used to trip the power circuit breakers and initiate Breaker Failure timing.• Loss of two 115kV lines, one 230kV line, and a 230:115kV transformer.• Testing Issues
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Modification for very low fault current levels
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Improper Logic Misoperation
Prefault Conditions• 50BF/52a OR logic was in fact AND logic• B phase Breaker Operating Rod Broken
B Phase Fault Occurs• Breaker operates opening A & C phases, but not B phase• 52a contact opens ending breaker failure timing• Fault persists until cleared by multiple remote Protection Schemes
—Finally, a bit of good luck
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
NERC Responses
NERC issued a Lesson Learned Report (2010)• The NERC Lesson Learned discusses the importance of weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of combining breaker position indication and fault current indication to create a logical AND requirement versus a logical OR requirement to supervise breaker failure protection.
NERC SPCS Report Noted:• Security of the breaker failure protection scheme can be improved by
creating a logical AND requirement with breaker position indication and fault current detection. However, the negative impact on dependability outweighs any improvement in security…
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Unnecessary BF Operations 2013 - 2015
3 Misoperations due to continuously energized fault detectors• 1 as left jumper, 1 miswired polarity, 1 setting• All should have been observable
3 Miswired CT connections to 50BF element4 Improper Settings• 2 improperly set outputs, 2 unidentified setting issues
2 Initiated during non fault conditions1 Operation on overcurrent without fault detection2 SBFU trips on transients (2 Entities)1 Unidentified cause
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
50BF Wiring
3 Misoperations whereimproper wiring indicatedcurrent flow through anopen breaker
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52-1
52-2
50 21-R 21-2 67G
50
RcvBlock
95 62x
Trip52-152-2
Ini BF52-152-2
50BF
50BF
50BF
Proper location of 50BF relayImproper location of 50BF
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Use Your Digital Recordings
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Initiation time to current interruption• Compare to BF Time Allowance• Compare to Expected Breaker
Operating Time• Look at each phase current
Program Inputs and Outputs• Use Trip Surge Detectors• Program a slow interruption alarm
Studying your breaker performance during faults can prevent future breaker failures
CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
IEEE C37-119
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CLARITY ▪ ASSURANCE ▪ RESULTS
Questions?
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