Ethics Canons 7-12

7/28/2019 Ethics Canons 7-12

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EN BANC[A.C. No. 244 . March 29, 1963.]IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OFTELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G.MARTINEZ, petitioner.SYLLABUS1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION TO BAR OBTAINED UNDER FALSEPRETENSES. Admission to the Bar obtained under false pretenses must berevoked.2.ID.; REQUISITES TO BECOME ATTORNEY-AT-LAW. Before the study of law,an applicant for admission to the Bar must haveDECISIONBENGZON, J p:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falselyrepresented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisiteacademic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor-General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted areport recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court,he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially inthe following particulars:(a)Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b)Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A.diploma therefrom which contradicts the credentials he had submittedin support ofhis application for examination, and of his allegationtherein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admitsthe first charge; but he claims that although he had left high school in his thirdyear, he entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification Testgiven therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma,and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered hisarmy service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

We have serious doubts about the validity of this claim, what with respondent'sfailure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the properschool official. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the secondcharge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from QuisumbingCollege; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A.graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A.title from the Arellano University in April 1949, he says he was erroneouslycertified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school


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records.This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion"was obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his havingobtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got itin April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of

1948- 1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And thenhe would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rulesprovide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "Thatprevious to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed therequired pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of PrivateEducation." (italics on "previous")Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the barexaminations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it,luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission havingbeen obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact

that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinationis not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribedcourses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name ofTelesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma withinthirty days. So ordered.Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes,Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.EN BANC[A.C. No. 389 . February 28, 1967.] IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORAQUINGWA, complainant, vs. ARMANDO PUNO, respondent. Domingo T. Zavallafor complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respond.SYLLABUS1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; EVIDENCE OF MORAL CHARACTERS; ESSENTIAL DURINGCONTINUANCE OF PRACTICE. One of the requirements for all applicants foradmission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Courtsatisfactory evidence of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127 of the Old Rule ofCourt, now Sec. 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a

license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during thecontinuance of the practice and the exercise of that privilege (Royong vs. Oblena,Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil., 567).2.ID.; LAWYER MUST MEET EVIDENCE QUESTIONING HIS INTEGRITY. When thelawyer's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies thecharges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for therelator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still


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maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expectedof him.3.DISBARMENT; STATUTORY ENUMERATION OF GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENTCANNOT LIMIT COURT'S POWER TO SUSPEND OR DISBAR. It is already asettled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or

suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts tosuspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.4.ID.; LAWYER MAY BE REMOVED FOR GROSS MISCONDUCT. Times withoutnumber, the Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only formalpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct,which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges whichhis license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil., 567, citing In reSmith, [1906] 73 Kan. 743; Balinon vs. De Leon, Adm. Case No. 104, Jan. 28,1954, 50 Off. Gaz., 58; 3 Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, 100 Phil. 586;

53 Off. Gaz., 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one ofthe grounds for suspension or disbarment (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).5.ID.; LAWYERS MUST CONFORM TO HIGHEST STANDARDS OF MORALITY. Itis important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law mustconform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. Asstated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: ". . . The lawyer shouldaid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidatesunfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. Heshould strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of theprofession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice".

DECISIONREGALA, J p:On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaintcharging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality andmisconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations ofthe complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein donot constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under Section 25, Rule 127of the former Rules of Court.The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation,report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman

Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presentedevidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as well as his counselcross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified.He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotelon June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing inthe hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging


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respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:"That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa andrespondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the saidrespondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their waythe respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before

going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotelat R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor ofthe said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant thatthey go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we aregetting married;' that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engenderedby love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage,complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel roomrespondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A.Puno'; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shovedcomplainant inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room,someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to thebed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not tomolest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'Anyway I have promisedto marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance ofcomplainant to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; thatthereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed herpantie, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands tokeep her flat on the bed; that when respondent was already on top ofcomplainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit torespondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from

3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left thehotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexualact with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposedto have some more but complainant refused telling that they had betterwait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy onJune 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family way,complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promiseof marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20,1959, complainant gave birth to a child."That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with thecomplainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill andhas refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which showsthat respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integritywhich at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members ofthe Philippine Bar."The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon,he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took


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complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage,succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admittedthat sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts untilNovember, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left forZamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer that

he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed thatthe complaint be dismissed.This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of thehearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submittedthe case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for therespondent.Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention topresent additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right topresent such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963),the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where

respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine thewitnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139of the Rules of Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in thecomplaint. Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public schoolteacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took her to theSilver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A.Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise ofmarriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2)shows that "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00

P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, whenthe latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had leftfor Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that yeartelling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in Septemberand another one in October on the same year, telling him that she was pregnantand she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she wentto Zamboanga City in November, 1958 where she met the respondent and askedhim to comply with his promise to marry her.Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he

and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact thatcomplainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted inrespondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), whichwas duly identified by the respondent to be his.Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternityand Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birthcertificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila and a certificate of


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admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by themedical records clerk of the hospital.To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and thecomplainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondentwhenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria

Jaca, a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3,1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by therespondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony.In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averredthat he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The factthat they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by thetestimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.);respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); andrespondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because ofrespondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexualgratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of

Appeals; G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966)One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that theapplicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of goodmoral character. (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2,Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege toenter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of thepractice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No.

376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567) When his integrity ischallenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal andJudicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains thehighest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and hadsexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence toshow where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria 17 Phil.303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:"An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the

State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect theState to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which heowes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he ishardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wideconsideration which the state voluntarily gives to those who byreasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so whenhe not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the Statethe very means by which it may assist him."


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With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to thecharges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall underany of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar asenumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already asettled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or

suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts tosuspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that anattorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in hisprofession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for theoffice and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer uponhim. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan., 743;Balinon vs. de Leon, Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627) As amatter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension

or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed agrossly immoral act and has thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics ofhis profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learnedprofession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the higheststandards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:". . . The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the professionof candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character oreducation. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignityof the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice."

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence,his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchezand Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

EN BANC[A.C. No. 6273. March 15, 2010.]ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA,complainant, vs.ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, respondent. DECISIONCARPIO MORALES, J p:

An Information for Estafa 1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against Atty. Iluminada M.Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others based on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent) prepared and notarized. Asthe joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate the involvement of complainant,complainant filed a Motion to Quash the Information which the trial courtgranted. 2 Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the quashal of theInformation was denied. 3 CEDScARespondent also filed six other criminal complaints against complainant for


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violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of thePhilippines) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually fileda Motion to Withdraw them. 4On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano

Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), received a Notice of Special

General Assembly of GEMASCO on October 14, 2001 to consider the removal offour members of the Board of Directors (the Board), including her and theGeneral Manager. 5 The notice was signed by respondent.

At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by respondent andPNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who were not members of thethen current Board, 6 Gerango * , complainant's predecessor, as Chair of theGEMASCO board, declared himself Chair, appointed others to replace theremoved directors, and appointed respondent as Board Secretary.On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the GEMASCO officeand its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities, and operations. On even

date, respondent sent letter-notices to complainant and the four removeddirectors informing them of their removal from the Board and as members ofGEMASCO, and advising them to cease and desist from further discharging theduties of their positions. 7Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative Development

Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment of the proceedings takenduring the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly.The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of February 21, 2002,declared the questioned general assembly null and void for having beenconducted in violation of GEMASCO's By-Laws and the Cooperative Code of the

Philippines. 8 The RD's Resolution of February 21, 2002 was later vacated forlack of jurisdiction 9 of CDA. HcTIDCIn her present complainant 10 against respondent for disbarment, complainantalleged that respondent:. . . PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR UNLAWFUL SUIT,

AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE SAME 11. . . DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D] DISRESPECT FORLAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 12. . . DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS ANDCANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED INHARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL 13. . . VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENTWITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW 14. . . RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN. MARIANO ALVAREZSERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO, INC.) BUT THE ENTIREWATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS WELL 15Despite the Court's grant, 16 on respondent's motion, 17 of extension of time tofile Comment, respondent never filed any comment. The Court thus required him


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to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with, 18 but just thesame he failed to comply. 19The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 20It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainant

proposed the following issues:1.Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of theCode of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following: TIaCAc1.1Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey thelaws of the land and promote respect for law and legal[processes].1.2Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues,and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.1.3Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to

the court.1.4Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal withinthe bounds of the law.1.5Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions oftime to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the periodlapse without submitting the same or offering anexplanation for his failure to do so.2.Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute violations ofhis lawyer's oath, particularly the following:2.1support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legalorders of the duly constituted authorities therein

2.2will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court2.3will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same2.4will delay no man for money or malice THIASE3.Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of aregrounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys by theSupreme Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of theRevised Rules of Court. 21Respondent's counsel who represented him during the conference proposed theissue of whether, on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, misconduct

was committed by respondent. 22After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered to submitposition papers. 23 Complainant filed hers, 24 but respondent, despite grant, onhis motion, of extension of time, did not file any position paper.In her Report and Recommendation, 25 Investigating Commissioner Lolita A.Quisumbing found respondent guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath as well asCanons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Noting that respondent had already been previously suspended for six months,


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the Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors opted for thedismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of merit. 26On Motion for Reconsideration, 27 the IBP-CBD Board of Governorsrecommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six

months.The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board ofDirectors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of theCooperative Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violatedthe Lawyer's Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitutionand obey the laws.When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints againstcomplainant, he violated the Lawyer's Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly orwillingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid orconsent to the same." CScaDH

When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint,respondent failed to file any and ignored this Court's subsequent show causeorder, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, whichstates that "A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to filepleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting thesame or offering an explanation for his failure to do so."Sebastian v.Bajar 28 teaches:. . . Respondent's cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders ofthe Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.Respondent's conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A

Court's Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor shouldit be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively". Respondent'sobstinate refusal to comply with the Court's orders "not only betrays arecalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect ofthe Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes andrespondent's deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregardthereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt butto disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposedupon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts andto show respect to their processes. 29 (Citations omitted).

The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from thepractice of law for six months for violation of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 30 he having been found to have received an acceptance fee andmisled the client into believing that he had filed a case for her when he hadnot. 31 It appears, however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. A moresevere penalty this time is thus called for.WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is SUSPENDED for two years


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from the practice of law for violation of Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, effective immediately. SIacTELet copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to beappended to respondent's personal record as an attorney; the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.Puno, C.J., Carpio, Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Brion,Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez andMendoza, JJ., concur.FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. L-27654. February 18, 1970.]IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDING FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINSTATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN in L- 27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO vs.VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.SYLLABUS1.REMEDIAL LAW; SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT; MINUTE RESOLUTIONS NOT

DECISIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION. Short resolutionsor, in current Court practice, minute "resolutions," are not decisions within theabove constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petitions for reviewshould not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

A petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, butof sound judicial discretion. And so, there is no need to fully explain the Court'sdenial.2.ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE ON SERVICE OF PLEADINGS,MANDATORY. As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion for

reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must notonly serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but alsonotify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly hedid not). Since there is lack of notice in this regard, the Court cannot act uponsaid motion for it is nothing but a useless piece of paper. If Atty. Almacenfailed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he hasonly himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy ofappeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right.3.ID.; ID.; COURTS AND JUDGES NOT SACROSANCT; DUTY OF LAWYERTHERETO. Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect

critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislativebranches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished bythe periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Criticism ofthe courts is an important part of the traditional work of the lawyer. In theprosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. Hence, as acitizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercisethe right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right.


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4.ID.; ID.; NATURE AND STANDARDS OF CRITICISM TOWARDS THE COURT. The cardinal condition of all such criticism directed against the Courts or its

judges that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency andpropriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, andabuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate

and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is sucha misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.5.ID.; ID.; DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERS OF THE BAR. Membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which arenot mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places uponhis shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative thanthat of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conducthimself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." The Rules of Court constantlyremind him to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and

judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards

the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent ofthe judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." A lawyermay not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a merecitizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in privateconversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, ifcouched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute theadministration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.6.ID.; ID.; PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT, WHAT CONSTITUTES. Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts andtheir judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend

the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tendto bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity andin the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconductwhich may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinarysanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in itas the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.7.ID.; ID.; PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF CONTEMPT COVERS PENDING AS WELL ASDECIDED CASES. To view the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle ofcontempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or maliciousinnuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion

thereof, is erroneous. The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceedingshas terminated has lost much of its vitality. As expressed by Chief Justice Moran,there may still be contempt by publication even after a case has beenterminated.8.ID.; ID.; DUTY OF THE COURT, NOT ONLY TO ADMIT BUT ALSO TODISCIPLINE AND EXCLUDE. By constitutional mandate, the Court has thesolemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the


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practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority todiscipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have provedthemselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Indeed, in this

jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mereinherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the

Rules of Court.9.ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING AGAINST A MEMBER OFTHE BAR. Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings likethe present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, thisproceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but israther an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not beingintended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.

Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may beinitiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective andthe real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit

person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of itsdisciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preservingthe purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of

justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct haveproved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties andresponsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there canthus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.10.ID.; ID.; NATURE AND EXTENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST A MEMBER OF THEBAR, DISCRETIONARY UPON COURT. The discretion to assess under the

circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to thesound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic normotivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by theimperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulouslyguarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.RESOLUTIONCASTRO, J p:Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer'sCertificate of Title," filed on September 26, 1967, in protest against what hetherein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme

Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by menwho are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their ownapplicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution withimpunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar ofhypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, heridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the


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present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf anddumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," sothat "the people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," andthat "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must neverbe repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

". . . a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receivethe certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law INTRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in theevent we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our titleto assume the practice of the noblest profession."He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementionedpetition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statementsattributed to him, as follows:"Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, saidhe did it to expose the tribunal's `unconstitutional and

obnoxious'practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appealswithout any reason."Because of the tribunal's `short-cut justice,' Almacendeplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, withoutknowing why he lost the case.xxx xxx xxx"There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said inthis petition, `where our Supreme Court is composed of men whoare calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasontheir own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations ofthe Constitution with impunity'.

xxx xxx xxx"He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his titleby which he earns his living, the present members of the SupremeCourt `will become responsive to all cases brought to its attentionwithout discrimination, and will purge itself of thoseunconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "deniedresolutions.'" (Italics supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that". . . our own Supreme Court is composed of men who arecalloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own

applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of theConstitution with impunity,"was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the ManilaChronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commentedthat Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious thatthe Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutionalbases for impeachment."The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.


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Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero, 1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for thedefendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against hisclient. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twentydays later, or on July 6, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on theadverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time

and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiffmoved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trialcourt denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party acopy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the requiredregistry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, wasordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of

Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had alreadyperfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the recordon appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of

Appeals.But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in ManilaSurety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24,1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:"Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967,filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, andof the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the CourtRESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for thereason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1966 (pp.90-118, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time

and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece ofpaper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1966), which did not interrupt therunning of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal wasperfected out of time."

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety& Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled"Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion forReconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.

Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as theapplicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion forreconsideration, thus:"Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9,1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed bydefendant-appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolutionof May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal."Appellant contends that there are some importantdistinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and


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Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636,June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs.

Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Courtconcerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is

contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & FidelityCo., Inc. case."There is no substantial distinction between this case andthat of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co."In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolutiondenying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similarto those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, whichwas much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision inthe Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, theresolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and theSupreme Court issued it `without prejudice to appellee's restoringthe point in the brief.' In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs.

Venturanza), the Supreme Court passed upon the issue subsilencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to theresolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the ManilaSurety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is noauthority on the matter in issue."

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take thecase, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter washis motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a secondmotion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was

made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filedby him after the said date was ordered expunged from the records.It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment byfiling his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent,contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbeforereproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior thatis as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28. 1967 to withholdaction on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate.

Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him.So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferouslyoffered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To saidreminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with CaseG.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;"that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either apositive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to


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pursue the negative act."In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar forcontumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved torequire Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be takenagainst him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he

asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary actionshould be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing." This Courtresolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five daysfrom notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shallbe deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution hemanifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," hepreferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open andpublic hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He alsoasked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no timeto hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was

allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers noapology. Far from being contrite, Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his

jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm andinnuendo. Thus:"At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible,Chapter 7, St. Matthew: " `Do not judge, that you may not be judged. Forwith what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, andwith what measure you measure, it shall be measured to

you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye,and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or howcanst thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speckfrom thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye?Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own eye,and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thybrother's eyes." `Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, evento do you also to them; for this is the Law and theProphets.'xxx xxx xxx

"Your respondent has no intention of disavowing thestatements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirmsthe truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that`he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscoredstatements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous,grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of


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the Court, that they tend to bring the entire court, withoutjustification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming ofa member of the noble profession of lawxxx xxx xxx"Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne

by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE ANDAFTER THOUGHT but only motivated with the highest interest ofjustice that in the particular case of our client, the members haveshown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadingswill bear us on this matter, . . .xxx xxx xxx"To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility,appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathyand above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE what did we getfrom this COURT? One word, DENIED with all its hardiness andinsensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleasand prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards ourparticular case.xxx xxx xxx"Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the membersof the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution,you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order ofnatural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on yourrespondent for acts he said in good faith."Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings andsupplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS?

Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with anysemblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is giventhe opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement withemphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this the way of life in the Philippinestoday, that even our own President, said: `the story is current,though nebulous as to its truth, it is still being circulated that

justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be beforethe war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutallythat justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in thePhilippines.'xxx xxx xxx

"We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest theACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not themembers. . . . We were provoked. We were compelled by force ofnecessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of thedecision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. Wenever interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties.But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality


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on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have notperformed your duties with `circumspection, carefulness,confidence and wisdom', your Respondent rise to claim his God-given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of freespeech.

xxx xxx xxx"The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Courtand the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedlyshared by our President. . . .xxx xxx xxx"What has been abhored and condemned, are the verythings that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famousapostrophe during the French revolution, Ò Liberty, what crimesare committed in thy name', we may dare say, Ò JUSTICE, whattechnicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, ÒJUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name.'xxx xxx xxx"We must admit that this Court is not free from commissionof any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering thatyours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must begenerated so as to curtail these abuses.xxx xxx xxx"The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings thatcan be found in all courts and government offices. We have addedonly two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in thesense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for

charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and forjustice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings,supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal hasbeen DENIED,. not one word was spoken or given . . . We refer tono human defect or ailment in the above statement. We onlydescribe the impersonal state of things and nothing more.xxx xxx xxx"As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence inthe members of this Court and for which reason we offered tosurrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because whathas been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was

intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decideas to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choosebetween forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in themembers of the Court but disregard our Constitution, and touphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of thisCourt, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter."But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not


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intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of hisgrievances.He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quiteaware of the criticisms 2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejectingpetitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state

the facts and law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given thissuggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyerwho tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshallshis arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial.Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolousand ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, thisCourt has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or Write a full opinion for everypetition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed

upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. ChiefJustice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only thosecases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importancebeyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is theobservation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio show, 94L. ed 562, 566:"A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, andas to the same petition different reasons may read different

justices to the same result . . ."Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed,

even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it hasbeen suggested from time to time that the Court indicate itsreasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order thatthe Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect,within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Courtdisposed of 260, 217, 224 cases. respectively, on their merits. Forthe same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to doits work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, forrefusing to take there cases. The time that would be required is

prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated differentreasons not infrequently move different members of the Court inconcluding that a particular case at a particular time make's reviewundesirable."Six years ago, in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May 31,1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon,articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioner's counsel


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urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of theConstitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:"In connection with identical short resolutions, the samequestion has been raised before; and we held that these`resolutions' are not `decisions' within the above constitutional

requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review shouldnot be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rulesof Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time sounderstood it. It should be remembered that a petition to reviewthe decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but ofsound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explainthe court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are alreadymentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion."By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patternedafter the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions forreview are often merely ordered `dismissed'."We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitionsfor certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review.Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court isto be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory

jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended togive every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 46of the Rules of Court which recites:"Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary. Areview is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and

will be granted only when there are special and important reasonstherefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fullymeasuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasonswhich will be considered:"(a)When the Court of Appeals has decided a question ofsubstance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, norhas decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with theapplicable decisions of the Supreme Court;b)When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from theaccepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far

sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for theexercise of the power of supervision."Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoingexamination of the pleadings and records, that the Court of Appeals had fullyand correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law andapplicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted andusual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by thisCourt in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to


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exercise its supervisory power.As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty.Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a motion forreconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must notonly serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also

notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly hedid not). This rule was unequivocally articulated inManila Surety & Fidelity vs.Batu Construction & Co., supra:"The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed formotions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26),which provides that such notice shall state the time and place ofhearing and shall be served upon all the parties concerned at leastthree days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the sameRule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof ofsuch notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion

is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.Damasco, L-18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil.81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reasonis obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearingthe Court would have no way to determine whether that partyagrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear himon his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any periodwithin which he may file his reply or opposition."If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's

judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the

forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right.To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and,in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifyingthis Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. Itwould thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalousoutbursts.Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the mostcircumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express hisdissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a

meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given wide latitude to differ with, andvoice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but also the manner inwhich they are handed down.Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize theactuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that thecriticism is aimed at a judicial authority, 4 or that it is articulated by alawyer. 5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a


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concluded litigation, 6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open topublic consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said theSupreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press and the peoplehave the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them asthey see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their

official actions before the chancery of public opinion."The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one'sintegrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administrationof justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment onthose who assail their actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a case asthis where those who sit as members of an entire Court are themselvescollectively the aggrieved parties.Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assailstheir actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands thatweave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the

court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also toconsider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and

judges. 11Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect criticalevaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislativebranches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished bythe periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the courtand as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimatechannels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that

"An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the importantplace accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as acitizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectfulmanner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the

judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts." (In reAdes, 6 F Supp. 487)Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditionalwork of the lawyer. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors oflower courts. In articles written for law journals he dissects with detachmentthe doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for all to see

the flaws and inconsistencies of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood inEx Parte Steinman, 40 Am.Rep. 641:"No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scopein the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity,impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. Theyhave the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct

judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. . . . To


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say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject underliability to be called to account and to be deprived of his professionand livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it hisduty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to beentertained. . . .

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only toexercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No lawmay abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny intothe official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legalanimadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dec. 657, 665)."Above all others, the members of the bar have the bestopportunity to become conversant with the character and efficiencyof our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as noother class has as great an interest in the preservation of an ableand upright bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116

N.W. 212, 216)To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges isto seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who mightconsider it their duty, to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as thebar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to hisdemerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, andshall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm existsbetween fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the

judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violationof the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer todisciplinary action.For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties whichare not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession placesupon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperativethan that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conducthimself "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts;" 14 and the Rules of Courtconstantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of

justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "tomaintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of thetemporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of itssupreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:". . . the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if theydo not by express declaration take upon themselves, when theyare admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to theConstitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect dueto courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not


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discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor inopen court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insultinglanguage and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their

judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to

the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to reinup their tempers."The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler ormore learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patienceand temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, butdiscipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderlyadministration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of anarmy. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he isthe tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be

the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In ReScouten, 40 Atl. 481)"We concede that a lawyer may think highly of hisintellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may sufferfrustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is hismisfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not beallowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court'sdecision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorismthat courts are the temples of right." (Per Justice Sanchezin Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June 26, 1967)In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to

be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statementsmade by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in thecourse of a political campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring intoscorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney todisciplinary action.Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallelprecedents.1.Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune topublic criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a

lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justicedemands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," addingthat:"It would be contrary to every democratic theory to holdthat a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments andcriticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth orwhich are not aimed at the destruction of public confidence in the


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judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment ofthe administration of justice is the direct product of false andscandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise."2.In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting outand circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a

municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as todeny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of agroup of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justiceis BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF andDUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went. much furtherthan the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do."The entire publication evidences a desire on the part of theaccused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it intodisrepute with the general public."3.In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the

two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judgewho at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circularwhich referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the

judge "used his judicial office to enable said bank to keep that money." Said thecourt:"We are aware that there is a line of authorities which placeno limit to the criticism members of the bar may make regardingthe capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though itextends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable ofcorrect reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligenceand integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart.116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Exparte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first casementioned it was observed, for instance:" 'It may be (although we do not 80 decide) that alibelous publication by an attorney, directed against a

judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as tojustify the disbarment of its author.'"Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that casewere of graver character than those made by the respondent here.But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who

are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictestobservance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty andfairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end thatthe public confidence in the due administration of justice beupheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained.In re Collins 81 Pac. 220."4.In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who


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set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letterand gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge andothers. The letter began:"Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is clearedup so that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury

committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort tosuch drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants."Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow suchdastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealingwith men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men.Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:". . . Judges are not exempt from just criticism, andwhenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against a

judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievancesto the proper authorities, but the public interest and the

administration of the law demand that the courts should have theconfidence and reject of the people. Unjust criticism, insultinglanguage, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally byattorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring thecourts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidencein their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the

judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in thedischarge of judicial functions, and the bringing of theunauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers,was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute withthe public."

5.In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state ofbeing influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the SupremeCourt were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any ofthe opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged withunprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years.The Court said:"A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend toweaken the authority of the court against whose members it wasmade, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influenceas an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the

administration of justice. . . ."Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not,under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any partof that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. Theacts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that havereached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honestcomment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends thelimits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an


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abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that anindependent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilantdefender of civil rights." In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723, 725.6.In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six monthsfor submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial

integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Courtsaid, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice,notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, andasserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what heconsidered grave injustice. The Court said:"We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growinghabit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of

judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and therebyreflecting on the administration of justice and creating theimpression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or in proper

motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen,has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authoritiesin whom is vested the power to remove judicial offices for anyconduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation ofhis duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust,or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; andsuch charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences,will be encouraged, and the person making them protected. . . .While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a casedecided against him, or the right of the public generally, to criticizethe decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the

habit of criticising the motives of judicial offices in the performanceof their official duties, when the proceeding is not against theofficers whose acts or motives are criticized, tends to subvert theconfidence of the community in the courts of justice and in theadministration of justice; and when such charges are made byofficers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect theadministration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guiltyof professional misconduct."7.In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:"I accepted the decision in this case, however, with

patience, barring possible temporary observations more or lessvituperative, and finally concluded, that, as my clients wereforeigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for adecision in their favor against a widow residing here."The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:". . . the expressions above set out, not only transcend thebounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are anunwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon


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the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a primafacie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holdsa license from this court and who is under oath to demean himselfwith all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client."The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the

Court.8.In State ex rel Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published ina newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and itsmembers to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinisterpurpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspendedthe respondent for 30 days, saying that:"The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar isone most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of suchmembers does not measure up to the requirements of the lawitself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. . . .

"The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicialdetermination as of prime importance under our system and idealsof government. No right thinking man would concede for a momentthat the best interest to private citizens, as well as to publicofficials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,would be served by denying this right of free speech to anyindividual. But such right does not have as its corollary thatmembers of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorablyboth with their client and with the courts where justice isadministered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve theirclient or the public good by designedly misstating facts or

carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose bymembers of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health ofa municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supplythan is the health of the thought of a community toward the

judiciary by the filthy, wanton, and malignant misuse of membersof the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly establishedcourts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the privateindividual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength andmoney to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part ofthe members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not

the court."9.In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of anaffidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judgesthe terms "criminal, corrupt, and wicked conspiracies," "criminal confederates,""colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality,""a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming ofa member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered strickenfrom the roll of attorneys.


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10.In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorneyclaimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finallyadjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to theChief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligenceand the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of

certain appeal in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. Theletters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained thisparagraph:"You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has nobetter right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems likerobbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as afence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got notundue advantage. . . . The point is this: Is a proper motive for thedecisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculatedintelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty?

If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank,or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researchesof its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of thecourt, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correctmotive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before itis stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it."The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney forsix months, delivered its opinion as follows:"The question remains whether the accused was guilty ofprofessional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter

addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the verypurpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; andthe insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because ofacts done by him due his associates in their official capacity. Such acommunication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose.Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angryattorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not andcould not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicialcapacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of anyconstitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable

attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion ordesire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position,can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned bylaw; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, orindecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have noredress in any action triable by a jury. `The sending of a libelouscommunication or libelous matter to the person defamed does notconstitute an actionable publication.' 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d


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Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of thisletter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other actscharged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly differentprinciples are applicable thereto."The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable;

but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by theConstitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, towhich reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, fromthe penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights asa citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumedas an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thusassailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right whichthe court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated hisobligation to maintain the respect due to court and judicial officers.`This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules ofcourteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out ofcourt from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the

judges personally for their official acts.' Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.(U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction,as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of anassault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act,and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken wordsaddressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home ofelsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different fromcriticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. Thedistinction made is, we think, entirely logical and well sustained by

authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod, supra. while thecourt in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of acitizen to criticize rulings of the court in actions which are ended, itheld that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicialofficer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in acause wholly concluded. `Is it in the power of any person,' said thecourt, `by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts,if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves thebuilding, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respectto the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, orelse set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult

be taking the law in his own hands? . . . No high-minded, manlyman would hold judicial office under such conditions.'"That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judgepersonally, constitutes professional delinquency for which aprofessional punishment may be imposed, has been directlydecided. `An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote apersonal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and


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reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct andwill be disciplined by the court.' Matter of Manheim, 133 App. div.136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 the same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case itappeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter

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Ethics Canons 7-12