Eur Pol Cult W 03 Almond & Verba

8/2/2019 Eur Pol Cult W 03 Almond & Verba

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THECIVICCULTUREPolitical Attitudes andDemocracy in Five NationsG A BR IE L A . A L M O N DStanford University

S I D N E Y V E R B AStanford University

. I:IDRAR17 01; 1 ilE- c E u CENTRAL EUROPFAA.1. UNIVERSWYBUDAPFST .-m AGE PUBLICATIONSThe Publishers of P rofessional Social Science.fi8


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Chapter XI IProfiles of Nations and Groups . , . . . . 307

~btionalpatterns. ther demographic patterns.CHAPTER I

Chapter XIIIThe Civic Culture and Democratic Stabili ty . 337

Power and respoflsiveness. Norms, perceptions,and activity. The management of afect. Con-sensus and cleavage. Political culture and stabledemocsacy. Th e sources of the civic culture. The'future of the civic culture.

Index, 375

An Approach to Political Culture

T IS IS A STUDY of the political cultu re of democracy and ofthe social structures and processes that sustain it. The faithof the Enlightenment in the inevitable triumph of humanreason and liberty has been twice shaken in recent decades.Th e development of Fascism and Communism after WorldWar I raised serious doubis about the inevitability of de-mocracy in the West; and we still cannot be certain thatthe continental European nations will discover a stableform of democratic process suitable t o their particular cul-tures and social institutions: nor can we more than hopethat together they will discover a European democracy.

Without having first resolved these doubts, the eventssince World Wa r I1 have raised questions of the future ofdemocracy on a world scale. Th e "national explosions" inAsia and Africa and the almost universal pressure by previ-ously subjected and isolated peoples for adrhission intothe modern world put this more special political questioninto the broader context of the fu ture character of theworld's culture. Culture change has acquired a new sig-nificance in world history. The groping toward enlighten-ment and control over nature that acquired momentumthree or four centuries ago in the West has become aworld-wide process, and its tempo has shifted from cen-turies to decades.

Th e central question of public policy in the next dec-


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. L . .

2 An Approach to Political Cultureades is what content this emerging world culture will have.We already have a partial answer to this question and couldhave predicted it from ou r knowledge of the processes of cul-tural diffusion.' Physical goods and their mode of productionseem to present the least difficulties in diffusion. It is apparentthat these aspects of Western cul ture are diffusing rapidly,along with the technolog)r upon which they depend. Sinceeconomic modernization and national unification require alarge social overhead investment in transportation, communi-cation, and education, and since these in turn call for taxation,regulation, and administration, t he model of a rational bu-reaucracy also diffuses relatively easily. The idea of an efficientbureaitcracy has much in common with the idea of a rationaltechnology. Lucian Pye refers to motlern social organization asbeing based on an organizational technology.2 I t has in com-mon with engineering and technology a mixture of rationalityand authority. Engineering is the application of rationalityand authority to material things; modern social organization istheir application to human beings and social groups. Thoughthe non-Western world is far from havingsuccessfully developedan industrial technology and an efficient bureaucracy, therecan be little question that i t wants these institutions and hassome understanding of them.

t%%atis.pr~hlematira! about.. he content of the emerg ingworld-____ulture is its political__d~~racter.Although the movc-ment toward technology and rationality of organization ap-pears with great uniformity throughout the world, the direc-tion of political change is less clear. But one aspect of this .r ,#',new 'world politidal .cultu re is discernible: it w il lb b a .p_o-ii t ~ ~ ~Jit ical cul t~ r~_o fpx~ dpat ion.f there is a political revolu-tion going on throughout the world, it is what might hecalled ~ h ~ p ~ r ~ ~ ~ p _ a t i o n ~ p j ~ ~ ~ ~ i o ~ n .n all the new nations ofthe world the belief that the or$nary man is politically rele-vant- that he ought to be an involved participant in the po-litical system-is widespread. Large groups of people who .

1Ralph Linton, Th e Surdy of Man: An Introduction. New York. 1936.pp . 324-46.aCommittcl on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council.Memorandum on the Concept of Modernirotion, November 1961.

An Appronct~ o Political Ct~lture 3have been outside of politics are demanding entrance into thepolitical system. And the political elites are rare who do notprofess commitmetit to this goal.

Though this coming world political cul ture appears to bedominated by the participation explosion, what the modeof participation will be is uncertain. Tk ~ e r g i n g - n a t i o n sal;e_,pres.entedwi th tws .different..models-of. he. modern .par-ticipatoq-state,. t ~ e m o c r a t i c ' nd the:1:totalitarian;) The. .democradc..state g e r he ordinary man the 'bpt;LGtinity to

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take part in the political decision-making process as an influ-ential cit ize n2h e totali.tarianb&s him the role of the "par-'' / -- -ticipant subject.'Ja Both modes have appeal to the new na-

tions, and which will win out -if indeed some amalgam ofthe two does not emerge- annot be foretold.If the democratic model of the participatory state is to de-velop in these new nations, it will require more than theformal inst itut ions of democracy -universa l suffrage, the po-litical party, the elective legislature. These in fact are alsopart of the totalitarian part idpa tbn- patt ern, in a formal ifnot functional sense. Kde moc rat ic fo& of participatov.po-.Jitical system 'requires as well a :political culture-consistentwith it. But the transfer of the&itfica~cu!turee~f-the..West--,.... - -ern. democratic states to ~h ce me rg ng -n at io nsencounters se-

~ . . , .- .rious difficulties. There ar e t~o.principa!.~eas~n66-,~he. i r h f iS"lthese concerns thenamre-oLthe-cIemocratic.culture.jrse1f.Th e great ideas of democracy- the freedoms and dignitiesof the individual, the principle of government by consent ofthe governed- re elevating and inspiri ng. Th ey capture theimaginations of many of the leaders of the new states and ofthe modernizing older ones. But t h ~ ~ , o ~ ~ ~ ~ p r i n c i ~ 1 e s o f - t h edemocratic po1it~a_n_dmts~&ic_cu1ture q t h e ways in whichpolitical elites make decisions, their normi and attitudes, aswell as the norms and a ttitudes of the ordinary citizen, hisrelation to government and to his fellow citizens-aresubtler culturalcomponents. They have the more diffuse proper-, , , .,. . . .aScc Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet, Political Culture." a paper pre-pared For the Summer Insti tute on Pol i t ical Culture . sponsored by theCommittee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council. Sum.

mCr 1962.


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4 An Approach lo Political Cultureties of belief systems or of codes of personal relations, whichthe anthropologists tell us spread only with great difficulty.undergoing substantia l change in the process.

Actually. Western social science has only begun to codifythe operating characteristics of the democrat ic polity itself.The doctrine and practice of a rational bureaucracy as an in-strument of the democratic political powers are less than acentury old. Doubts about the possibility of a neutral bu-reaucracy were expressed in England as recently as the 1930's,and on the European continent such doubt is widespread to-day. The complex infrastructure of the democratic pdity-political parties, interest groups, and the media of communi-cations- nd the understanding of their inner workings, op-erating norms, and social-psychological. ,.-- preconditions are onlynow being realized in the West. Th ui? he image of the dem -~csatic~poli tyhat is co nve yed .to the eli tes. of the new na-tions is... bscure.and .ir?completeand,heavi!yF~tresses ideolagyand legal ,norms. W u s t - b c l e a r n e h a b o u t democracy-isa.- .

, matter of attitude-and. . . . feeling, and this-is harder. ~... to learn,? ) ~he~sdjprincipal reason why-the-diff~sion~of-democ-~q-encounters. .dificu!liesamong . t h e ~ cw .ations.Concerns-&~bjerlivg..~mblems..confronting-these-..nations.hey areentering history with archaic technologies and social systems,drawn toward the gleam and power of the technological andscientific revolutions. I t is not difficult to see why they shouldbe drawn toward a technocratic image of the polity: a polityin which authoritarian bureaucracy predominates and politicalorganization becomes a device for human and social engineer-ing.

In almost every instance, however, though in differing meas-ure, the leaders of the modernizing nations appreciate the dis-tortions and the risks in adopting an authoritarian form ofpolity. ~h'oughhey cannot fully understand the subtle bal-ances of the democratic polity and the nuances of the civicculture, they tend to acknowledge their legitimacy as the ex-pression of an impulse toward the hum ane polity. In charac-terizing their situation, we have left out a significant element.Forthough it is true that they are fascinated by science andtechnology and are drawn to an impatient technocratic polity

An Approach to Political Culture 5as a means of at taining the new things of this world, they arealso the creatures -.of- their-. own--traditional-.cultures and^.wou!d..prefer.f~..deal.eptly-with-these-.cultures-ifhis choicewereavailable..rnq~~._gL'=a

It is as an answer to this ambivalence that the civic culturerecommends itself. For the civic culture is not a modem cul-ture, but one that ~ m b i n e smodpmity_~!ich..tr_a~i~ti~~.ritainoffers an example of how such a c u b r e an develop. Th e de-5 --ve!opment..of_rhe.civ,ic.cultu~e_in(Brjtaimay-be_"@erstood--as th gr od uc t of a -..eries_ofencounters-beween.-moderniza-.--tin~-a_n&_t~ti_o.na!isrn- ncounters sharp enough to effectsignificant change but not so sharp or so concentrated in timeas to create disintegration or polarization. Partly because ofher insular security, Britain came into the era of national uni- .fication and of absolutism able to tolerate a greater measureof aristocratic, local, and, corporate autonomy than could con-..-, .- -tinental Europe. A @rst s t e3 toward secularization was the-- -,.., .~.separation from the Church of Rome an d the beginnings of. ~toleration of religious diversity. Ae c o n d 8@ was the emer-__.--gence of a thriving and self-confident merchant class, and theinvolvement of court and aristocracy in the risks and calcu-lations of trade an d commerce.

Independent aristocrats with secure local power in thecountryside, courageous nonconformists, rich and self-confi-dent.merchantsV these were the forces that transformed thetradition of the feudal estates int o the parliamentary tradi-tion and enabled Britain to pass through the era of abso-lutism without destroying her pluralism. Britain thus enteredthe industrial revolution with a p o l i t i ~ l r ~ u r e a m o n g j t serites which-madq.~i~p_qs$~e,,to~ass~milate- the~.ross..and. apidchanges in social. tructure in the eighteenth~ . and nineteenth. .. ..- .centur ies. without sharp-_discontinuities. Th e aristocratic. .. .,Whigs found it possible to enter a coalition with noncon-formist merchants and industrialists, to establish securely theprinciples of parliamentary supremacy and representation.The traditional aristocratic and monarchic forces assimilatedenough of this civic cultu re to compete with the secularist


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tendencies for popular support and, indeed, to mitigate theirrationalism and impart to them a love and respect for thesacredness of the nation and its ancient institutions.W h a t e m e r g e d w a ~ ~ r d ~ u l ~ r e ,either_tra(1it~io@ nor r.fl4r- odern but .pauaking-ot..both; ~ - p l ~ ~ j ~ t i c _ ~ ! t ~ r e e , h a s e dn ! "wGfcommunication and persuasion, a cultu re of consensus anddiversity, a culture t hat permitted change bu t moderated it.This was the civic culture. With.this.ci_vIccul&re.a?ready-c-solidated, the workingc_la_sses ~ ~ 1 d ~ ~ ~ r - i ~ 0 - p 0 ~ i t . i ~ ~ . ~ 1 ! d ,na_processo. rial and..error, find-~thcanguagc..in.which..tocouch. their~dcmands~and..the..means..to.make..them..effective.1t was in this cultu re of diversity an d consensualism, ration-alism and traditionalism, that the structu re of British democ-racy could develop: parliamentarism and representation, theaggregative political party and the responsible and neutralbureaucracy, the associational and bargaining interest groups,and the autonomous and neutral media of communication.English parliamentarism included the traditional and modernforces; tHe party system aggregated and combined them; thebureaucracy became responsible to the new political forces;and the political parties, interest groups, and neutral media ofcommunication meshed continuously with the diffuse interestgroupings of the community and with its primary communica--tions networks.

~ ~ , . , h a v e - ~ c o n c c ~ r r a ~ e .n British.,experience because thewhole- .+ story of.-~_gm$rgence.of . ,the ivi c_~l ture .s told in&-i&h_history, whereas~.de_velopments. ... in,,the-.,United Statesand, he,couptees of , he "Old . Commonwealth". began- aftersome of the major bat tles had been . . ~on. Actually, in thecourse of the nineteentli' ien tory the development of the dem-ocratic culture and infrastructure was more rapid and moreunequivocal in the United States than in Britain, since theUnited States was a new and rapidly expanding society andrelatively unimpeded by traditional institutions. xh*zgh_theirbasic patternsa_resimilar, th~ci.vicvultures of Britain and theUnited States... have somewhg.different contents, reflecting

,. .. . .th~e_di~erenc~.in.nati.ona~.~~ 71 istories._; -, and gocia!pt&tures.On the ~European continent>the record is more mixed.. ~~.. - ,.. .~ -- .

.Though their patterns dif fer in many respects from those of 3Britain and America, the S,~-ndiaavinlr.~~us~ies.owC?pn-trks, and Switzerland appear-to.havgworked out-the ir own.version of a .political culture and practice of accommodationand compromise. I n France. Geemy, and ~ta~~. . the . .en~oun- .te~bekweg-modanizing.bendenciesnd the_tMitional.pow:ers seem to have .been .too_massive..and_to^. uncompromisi.ng-to-permit the.emergence of a shared culture of political ac-commodation. T h ~ c f G i ~ ~ c u i E u ~ i ~ ~ p r e ~ e n t ~ i ~ . . t h e ~ f o ~ ~ ~ o f- _ _ pp in t i~n , nd the democratlc~nfrastructure s still far frombebg.atcsincd.Th e civic cultu re and the open polity, then, represent thegreat and problematic gifts of the West. T he technology andscience of the West have now already passed ou t of her uniquepossession and everywhere are destroying and transformingtraditional societies an d cultures. Can the open polity and thecivic culture- an's discovery of a humane and conservativeway to handle social change and participation- pread aswell?

As we consider the origin of the open polity and the civicculture- ndeed, as we consider the areas in the West wheretheir emergence is still in doubt- e may fall victim to oneor both of two moods. T h e first is one of mystery or awe overa process whereby mankind on only a small part of the earth'ssurface muddled toward a hu mane an d reasoned taming ofviolence and groped toward its transformation into a con-structive instrument available to all interests. As mystery, itbecomes a unique cultural heritage unavailable to foreigners.Th e second mood is one of pessimism, which seems toh av ereplaced the mood of democratic optimism that existed be-fore World War I. How can a set of arrangements and atti-tudes so fragile, so intricate, and so subtle be transplantedout' of historical and cul tural context? Or, how can thesesubtleties and these humane etiquettes survive even amongourselves in a world caught in the g rip of a science and tech-nology run wild, destructive of tradition and of communityand possibly of life itself?No one can provide definitive answers to these questions.But as social scientists we can put the questions in such a way


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8 An Approach to Political Cultureas to get useful answers. Though we may share the mood ofwonder and awe at the intricacy of the democratic mecha-nisms and the unique historical experience out of which theyemerged, we are confronted with a contemporary historicalchallenge for which mood by itself is an inadequate re-sponse. If we are to come closer to understanding the problemsof the diffusion of democratic culture, we have to be able tospecify the content of what has to be diffused, to develop ap-propriate measures for it, to discover its quantitative inci-dence and demographic distribution in countries with awide range of experience with democracy. With such knowl-edge we can speculate intelligently about "how much ofwhat" must be present in a country before democratic insti-tutions take root in congruent attitudes and expectations.Efforts to deal with this problem have usually been basedon impressions and inferences from history, on inferencesfrom democratic ideology, on certain kinds of sociologicalanalyqis, or on psychological insights. Thus in our efforts toestimate the prospects of democracy i n countries such as Ger-many and Italy, o r in the developing areas of the non-Westernworld, we frequent ly try t o draw "lessons" from British andAmerican history. I t has been argued, fo r example, that thelong continuity of British and American political experienceand the gradual process of change have both contributed toeffective democratization. Similarly, the growth of a vigorousand numerous middle class, the development of Protestantism,and in particular the nonconformist sects, have been consid-ered vital to the development of stable democratic institiltionsin Britain, the Old Commonwealth, and the United States.There have been efforts to derive from these experiencessome standards as to what attitudes and behavior must bepresent in other count ries if they are to become democratic.Even more common than drawing inferences from historyhas been our tendency to derive criteria of what has to be.diffused from the insti tut ional and ideological norms of de-mocracy itself. I t is argued that if a democratic system is basedon the sharing of influence among the adult population as awhole, then, if the system is not t o be subverted, the indi-vidual must use his power inte lligently fo r the good of the

An Approach to Political Culture 9polity. Thear ist s.o f democracy fr om.Aristotle toBryce havestressed"that,democraciesre maintained-by active citizen par-ticipation in civic affairs, by_a high level af-informationabout..- . - .. . . . , . .public-affairs, and by a widespread sense of,civic responsibil-ity, These doctrines tell us what\&emocratic c i t i aw g ht - t o-. . . .. .~".,. -h d l k e . f he . s to behave according.. o. the requi rement s. ofthesystem.Still a third type of investigation of the conditions favoringthe development of stable democracy are studies of the eco-nomic and social conditions associated, with d&ocraticsys-tems. Both Lipset and Coleman find a strong correlation be-tween indices of modernization and. . .desq&ization.' Themain problem presented by. these studies is tha t the'dirituraland psychological "consequences of "modern" technologiesand processes are left to inference. We know that democracies,in comparison to other political systems, tend to have moreliterate and educated people, that their per capita incomeand wealth are higher, and that they enjoy in greater propor-tions the amenities of modern civilization. But this type ofanalysis not only omits the psychological basis of democratiza-tion, it also cannot explain the significant deviant cases. ThusGermany and France, which rank high on the indices of mod-ernization, are classified by Lipset as unstable democracies.Cuba and Venezuela, both of which rank high in economicdevelopment in Lat in America, have lon g histories of dictator-ship and instability. This kind of itudy is suggestive of hy-potheses but does n6t tell us directly what kind of cluster ofattitudes is associated with democracy.Another type of approach to the culture and psychology ofdemocracy is based on the insights of psychoanalysis. HaroldLassyell has gone furthest in specifying the personality char-acteristics of the "democrat." 6 In his list of democratic char-acter @alities hk ini:f idi';v) an "open ego," by which hemeans a warm and inclusive attitude toward. other human be-4 SeymourM . Lipset, Political Man, New York, 1960, pp. 45R.: Gabriel

A. Almond and James Coleman, Th e Polifics of the Drucloping A r e a ,Princeton. N.J.. 1960, pp. 538ff.

6 ~ h colilicnl Writings of Harold D. Larswell, Glencoe, Ill., 1951, pp.495ff.; Lasswell. Power and Personality, New York, 1946, pp. 148ff.


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IU An Approach to Political Culture Iings; (2) a capacity fo r .sharing values with others; (3) amultivalued rather than a single-valued orientation; ('4) trustand confidence in the human environment, and (5) relativefreedom from an&ty. Though the relationship between these'charactiristin and democratic hehavior seems to he clear,Lasswell's democratic qualities are not specifically politicalattitudes and feelings, add they may actually be encounteredin great frequency in societies that are not democratic in Istructure.

Our study grows ou t of this body of theory about the char- .acteristin and preconditions of the culture of democracy.What we have done amounts to a series of experiments in-tended to test some of these hypotheses. Rather than inferringthe properties of .democratic culture from political institu-tions or social conditions, we have attempted to specify itscontent by examining atti tudes in a number of operatingdemocfatic systems. And rather than deriving the social-psychological preconditions of democracy from psychologicaltheory, we have sought to determine whether and to what ex-tent these relations ,actually exist in functioning democraticsystems. We do no t a rgue th at our study will shu t off specula-tion and provide the precise and tested propositions of a com-plete theory of democracy, but , rather, tha t some of thesepropositions will survive the test of empirical-quantitativeanalysis and some will not. T hi s stage of experiment shouldfocus and direct inquiry by providing some answers to oldquestions and suggesting some new questions.

In still another respect we hope to contribute to the de-velopment of a scientific theory of democracy. By far thegreatest amount of empirical research on democratic attitudeshas bein done in the United States. In our study we have in-cluded, in addition to o ur own country, Britain, Germany,Italy, A d Mexico. Why we selected these particular countriesis.discussed below. Our five-country study offers us the oppor-tunity to escape from this American parochialism and to dis-coverwhether or not relations found in the American data arealso encountered in democratic countries whose historical ex-periences and political and social structures differ from oneanother.

An Approach to Political Culttrre 11TYPES OF POLITICAL CULTURE

In ou r comparison of the political cultures of five contem-porary democracies, we employ a number of concepts andclassifications which it will be useful to specify and define.We speak of the "political culture" of a nation rathe r thanthe "national character" or "modal personality," and of "po-litical socialization" rather than of child development or childrearing in general terms, not because we reject the psycho-logical and anthropological theories that ]-elate political atti-tudes to other components of personali ty, or because we rejectthose theories which stress the relationship between child de-velopment in general terms and the inttuction of the childinto his adult .political roles and attiiudes. Indeed. this studycoultl not have been made without the prior work of thosehistorians, social philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists,psychologists, and psycl1i:ttrists v;ho have been concerned withthe relationships between the psychological and politicalcharacteristics of nations. I n pa rticular, this study has beengreatly influenced by the "cu! tur ~pe rsonal ity '~ r "psychocul-tural approach" to the study of political phenomena. .Th isapilroach has developed a substaniial theoretical and mono-graphic literature in llie past twenty-five yearsn

OGener a l tl,eol.etical statclncnrs ol this approach a r c to be fotlnd inferalin in R t ~ l l l Ie~>et l ict ,Poller~Is f Cu11~1.e.Ne w Yort. 1984; Alex idclesand Daniel Lcrinson. "National Character: T h e Study of hlodal i'crson-ality an d Socio-Cultural Systems." in Gal-dnrr Lindzey (ed.), Hal~dbook fSocial I'rychology, Cambridge, hlars.. 1931, Vol. 11: Bert Kap l an (cd.).Studying Perroi~al i fy Cross-Culttrmliy, Evanston. 111.. 1I)GI:Abram Kardi -ner. Thc Psyclrologka! Fro,tlicrs of Sociely, Ne w York, 1939; Kardincr.T l ~ rndioidul nrnd His Society, Ncw York. 194% Clyde Kluckhohn . HenryMurray, and David Scltncirler, Perronnlity b r h'rrlarr, Sociely, a nd Ctr ll~r re ,Ne w York, IB55; Harold D. asswell, Psychopollrology and Politics in Polil-ical Wriliilgs, op. cil.: Kathan Lcitcs. "Ps)~cl~ocultt~ralypotheses About Po -litical Acts," i n Cllorld Polilics, Vol. I. 1940: Ralph Linton. The CulturalDncl~grorr,rdof Personnlil?, N c ~ v I'nl-L. 1945; 3l;llgarct hlcad, "'Tl~c S t u d yof Nationa l Character." in Daniel Lcrncr a n d Harold D. Lassrvell, ThePolicy Scie~rces, tanIor t l , 1951. Particularly relevant to our work is AlexInkelea. "National Character and Modem Political Systems." in Francis L. K.Hsu (ed.),Psychological Afllllro{~ology,Homcwaod, Ill.. 1961. A n d on e ofthe most important recent contributions to th e theory of national charac-


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14 An Approach to Political Ctrll~rreclassification of types of political orientation follo~vParsonsand Shils, as has been suggested elsewhere.' "Qrientat,@n:' re-fers to the internalized aspects of objects and relationsllips. I tincludes (1) "'cognitive orientation," that is, knowledge 01and belief aboui the political iystem, its roles and the in-cumbents of these roles, its inputs, and its outputs; (2) "af-fective orientation," or feelings about the political system, its,-- .-- - . . .-.roles, pers o~ne l, and performance, and (3) "ev:lluational..orientation," the judgments and opinions about political ob-'jects that typically involve the combination of value standardsand criteria with information and feelings.

In classifying objects of political orientation, we start withthe "general" political system. We deal here with the system_-as a whole and include such feelings as patriotism o r $!cna-tion, such cognitions and evaluations of the nation as "large"or "small." "strong" o r "weak," an d -of the g o c g- as "demo-natic;' "constitutional," or "socialistic." At the other extremewe distinguish orientation~oward-.. . ... thi,:>elf:' as politics1 ac-tor; the content and quali ty of norms of personal politicalobligation, and the content and quality of the sense of per-sonal competence vis-a-vis the political system,,.In treating thecomponent parts of the political system we disting~~isll,irst,three broad classes of objects: (1) specific. . . roles or slructrrres,. _ .such as legislative bodies, executives, ,p r bureaucr.?Ges; (2)incutnbents of roles,. such as part icu lar monarchs, legislators.and administrators, and. (3) particular public.. . policies, de;cisions, o r enforcements of decisions. These structores, in-cumbents, and decisions may in turn be classified hrontlly bywhether they are involved either in the political or "input"process or in the administrative or "o&pyt" process. ny "po-litical" or "input" process we reEer to the Row of demandsfrom the society into the polity and the conversion oI thesedemands into authoritative policies. Some structures that arepredominantly iqydy$cl in the input process are political.parties, interest groups, and the media of c om n iu ni rn ti ~~ ~ythe administrative or ou.cput process we refer to t l n t process

7 Gabriel A. .4lmond, "Comparative Political Systems." Jorlrnnl o/ 1'01-il ia , Vol. XVIII. 1956; Tal cot t Parsona and Edrvarcl A. Shils. Toulnrd aCcneral Theory of Action. Ca mbrid ge, Mass., 1951, pp. 538.

An Approach to Politicni Cullure 15by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced. Struc-tures predominantly involved in this process would includebureaucracies and courts.

We realize that any such distinction does violence to theactual continuity of the political process and t o the multi-functionality of political structure3 Much broad poliey ismade in bureaucracies and by co uru; and structures that welabel as input, such as interest' groups and political ~a rti es ,are often concerned with the details of administ ration and en-TABLE.1 Dimensions of political orientation

1. 2. 3. 4.System asgeneral Input Output Self luobject objects objects objectCognitionAffectEvaluation

forcement. What we a re rehr rin g to is a difference in empha-sis, and one that is of great impor;gnce in the classificationof political cultures. Th e distinct ion we draw between-par-ficipant and subject politi&i cultu res .turns in part on thepresence 6; absence of orientation toward. . specialized inputstructures. For our classification of political cultures it is notof great importance that these specialized input structuresare also involved in the performance of enforcement func-tions and that the specialized administrative ones are involvedin the performance of inp ut functions. T h e important thingfor our classification is what political objects individuals areoriented to, how they are oriented to them, and whetherthese objects are predomi nantly. involved i n the "upward"flow of policy making or in t he "downward" flow of policyenforcement. We shall treat this problem in greater detailwhen we define the ma jor classes of political culture.

We can consolidate what we have thus far said about indi-vidual orientations toward the polity in a simple 3 x 4 matrix.Tab le 1.1 tells us that the politi cal orientati on of an individualcan be tapped systematically if we explore the following:

~ ~ . .~


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16 An Approach to Political Culture1. Whatknowledge does he have of his nation and of his

political system .in general terms,, its history, size, location,power, "constitutional" characteristics, a nd the like? What arehis feelings toward these syst.emic ,characteristicd What arehis more o r ess considered opinions and judgments of them?

Z2;What knowiidge does he. . have of the structures and roleslthe various political' elites, and the policy proposals that are

, . -involved in the upwari flow of policy making? What are hisfeelings and opinions about these structures, leaders, and pol-icy proposals?

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Eur Pol Cult W 03 Almond & Verba