Evidence 1. 12/1/15 10:40 AMRULE 128General ProvisionsSection 1. Evidence defined. — Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact. M, S B T R, o A, i A J P, t T R a M o FSection 2. Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. CTH, exc: L/RSection 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. R, Exc: excluded by L/RSection 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. — Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

People v. Wagas: Estafa case, presumption of innocence not overcome if offender cannot be properly identified. Under NEGO, Ligaray must still pay as party primarily liable in instrument payable to bearerFACTS: Gilbert Wagas ordered by telephone, 200 sacks of rice from Alberto Ligaray. The former assured the latter that he had the means to pay him through a lending business. On April 30, 1997, he released the goods to Wagas and the latter gave him a BPI check worth 200k payable to cash and postdated. Ligaray deposited the check with his own back, Solid bank, for collection, but the account was closed due to insufficiency of funds. Despite several demands, Wagas failed to pay.

The two never met, and the goods were coursed directly through Robert Canada, the brother in law of Wagas. Wagas claims there were no telephone calls, and that the said check was issued in consideration of a parcel of land that Canada was selling to Wagas. The sale, not having pushed through, payment on the check was stopped. Wagas acknowledged the debt through a letter, in which he indicates that he assumes responsibility. He claims he only signed this letter because his sister and Canada begged him to, and that Canada was a seafarer whose application for overseas employment was undergoing evaluation.RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt having proved all the elements of estafa. Denied motion for new trial/reconsideration, opining that evidence desired to be presented was not newly discovered (testimony of Canada who was back and Ligaray in another case)ISSUE: Whether the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crimeHELD: Appeal meritorious, but since Ligaray is HIDC, under the negotiable instruments law, Wagas must pay the amount of the check. Actual damages of 200k.Elements of estafa under Art. 315 of RPC: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonorHOWEVER, In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the perpetrator, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to discharge this burden, and prove that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Ligaray's declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then

The law punishes the deceit or fraud used, not the mere issuance of a worthless check. The fact that the check was payable to cash, meaning it is negotiated by mere delivery, makes it highly probable that it was issued to someone like his own brother in law. Proof of guilt must clearly show that it was Wagas who defrauded Ligaray.No factual or legal basis exists to conclude that Canada was acting on behalf of Wagas. Letter signed by Wagas only served as rebuttal evidence of the prosecution to controvert any denial by Wagas regarding the transaction of the rice. Under the law of evidence, the court shall only consider evidence based on the purpose for which it was presented. He who asserts must prove.

People v. Lauga – confession to bantay bayan and barangay tanod inadmissible BUT rape case has basis, rape kit, witness testimony of victim and brotherFACTS: On March 15, 2000, AAA was left alone at home. Her brother BBB went out with some neighbors, while her mother left because appellant had a tendency of physically abusing her when he got drunk, and he was on a drinking spree. That night, appellant allegedly, through threats of using his fists and threatening to use a knife on her, raped AAA, his daughter, who was 13 at the time. BBB went home and found her crying. Appellant stated that she was crying because she stayed out late and he scolded her. When BBB took AAA out, the latter recounted her experience with her father. The two went to the house of their grandmother and a bantay bayan named Moises Banting was called in. Banting confronted the appellant and requested that he go to the police station, to which the latter complied and it was at this time that he confessed to raping AAA because he “couldn’t control himself.”RTC: guilty of rape qualified by relationship (father-daughter) and minority (under 18)ISSUE: Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan", as he was not accompanied by a lawyer and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution as they are allegedly ill-motivatedHELD:

Doctrine of People v. Malngan – barangay tanods are considered as law enforcement officers. If confession was through interrogation, the rights of the accused must have been made known to him with respect to his Miranda rights. Otherwise the confession is inadmissible. The exception to this rule is when the confession was made outside interrogation, and not to law enforcement officers or their agents, as when the confession is made to a neighbor in an ordinary manner.Pursuant to EO 309, any inquiry of a bantay bayan has the color of a state related function and objective, so far as the Miranda rights are concerned. The extrajudicial confession is therefore, inadmissible in evidence. However, the basis for the conviction was deduced from a confluence of evidence showing appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.As to the alleged inconsistencies in testimony, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed

Garcilliano v. House of Representatives “HELLO GARCI” – no publication of rules by house or senate, no investigation

Facts:  During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of representative investigation.  Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law.  Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.Issue:  Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?Held:   No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a person’s life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law.  

RA 4200 ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACTAuthorized by all parties. Any person not following sec. 1 punished. Sec. 1.       It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:   

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Peace officer authorized Sec. 3.       Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

EFFECT: Inadmissibility Sec. 4.       Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Salcedo Ortanez v. CA – both parties must have knowledge and consent. Military husband!FACTS:On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Rafael presented evidence among which were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. The trial court admitted these despite objection of Teresita. Motion for reconsideration denied. Petition for certiorari with the CA.CA: Improper remedy. Should be ordinary appeal on the merits since the ruling on the admissibility of the tapes is interlocutory (leaves something to be done)Teresita filed a petition for review with the SC stating that the decision of the CA has no basis in lawISSUE: whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the petitioner in the Court of AppealsW/N the cassette tapes are admissible as evidenceHELD: Remedy may be availed of in this case. Cassette tapes are inadmissible. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

The tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone. Under RA 4200, such tape recordings are expressly made inadmissible in evidence. Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap or record such communication or spoken wordSection 4. Any communication obtained in violation of this act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation

Ramirez v. CA – insulted employee. Anti-wire tap act punishes also those who record their own conversations without the knowledge or consent of the accused.FACTS:A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner (SR) Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of QC alleging that the private respondent, (EG) Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy." In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion.EG filed a criminal case for violation of RA 4200 in the RTC of Pasay. SR filed a motion to quash on the ground that the offense punished by RA 4200 refers to the taping of communication of persons other than a participant to the communication. RTC granted in favor of Ramirez. EG filed a petition for Review on certiorari with the CA. CA held that the trial court’s order was null and void.ISSUE: Whether RA 4200 refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a person other than the parties to the conversation – NOPE. Whether the substance of the conversation must be alleged in the informationHELD:

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any." Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200The nature of the conversation is immaterial to the violation of the statute. What RA 4200 penalizes is the act of overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumeratedSCOPE: communication – to share or impart. Conversation – process by which meaning or thoughts are shared. Both definitions include verbal, non-verbal, written or expressive communications

GAANAN v. IAC – extortion, anti-wire tap act does not extend to telephone line extensionsFACTS: Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon called Laconico and informed him that they had decided the terms with which they would drop their complaint for direct assault. Laconico called Gaanan to advise him during the settlement call since his regular counsel was away on a business trip. During the call to Laconico, Gaanan was listening through an extension line. Gaanan overheard Atty. Pintor demand 8k to drop the charges and executed the following day, an affidavit against complainant for extortion. Complainant charged Gaanan with violation of the anti-wire tapping act or RA 4200, for listening to the conversation without his consent.TRIAL COURT: found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty.IAC: affirmed the decision, stating that the conversation was a private one and that listening without consent was a clear violation of RA 4200 and that the extension line was used within the meaning of “device” under RA 4200

ISSUE: whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.HELD: No. In favor of petitioner Gaanan. This case is one concerning a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. Although the conversation was a private one, in a sense that it was not between a speaker and the public, what is in issue here is whether the affirmance of a criminal conviction would bring the effect that by merely using a telephone line, the caller can force the listener to secrecy. The law was not intended for mischievous results.When RA 4200 was being considered as a bill in the senate, extension lines were already widely used, and the same were part of the discussions in the framing of the bill. In the result however, no mention is made of extension lines. Telephone party lines were deliberately and intentionally deleted from the provisions of the act.Further, there must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. Telephone lines are not installed for the same purposes as devices and arrangements mentioned, but just so happen to be there for ordinary office purposes. It is of common usage.

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."||| (People v. Aminnudin y Ahni, G.R. No. 74869, [July 6, 1988], 246 PHIL 424-435)

Pollo v. CSC – letter tip, right to privacy does not extend to CSC computers

FACTS: An unsigned letter-complaint was addressed to the chairperson of the CSC from a certain “Alan San-Pascual” stating that an employee from the CSC was representing an accused government employee with a case pending with the CSC. Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four to investigate and back up all the files of the personnel of the Mamayan Muna and Legal divisions. Petitioner Pollo’s files were found to contain pleadings and letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC. Chairperson David required petitioner to submit his explanation on the matter. Pollo denied that he is the person mentioned in the letter as he is not a lawyer, and that he merely lent his computer to close acquaintances and friends. He argued that requiring him to explain was a violation of his right against self-incrimination and that the files that were copied were personal files of relatives such as his sister and some friends. He also argued that the letter was not actionable as it failed to comply with the requisites under the uniform rules on administrative cases in the CSC.CSC: charged with grave misconduct, dishonesty and placed him under 90 day suspension. Petitioner filed for reconsideration stating that the charge was based on an illegal search which is beyond the power of the CSC. CSC denied and gave warning that if he wasn’t present for the pre-hearing conference, the prosecution would be entitled to present evidence ex parte. He didn’t appear. Ruled that he was dismissed from the service and was no longer allowed to take future CS exams, disqualified form holding public office and forfeiture of retirement benefits.ISSUE: whether the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, was a transgression on his constitutional right to privacyHELD: No. 2 questions should be asked: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner's computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?

First: negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. He normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer.Further, office memorandum states that the property of the CSC may be used only for legitimate business purposesThe CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.Reasonableness of search: affirmative. The search of petitioner's computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct.INCEPTION: The Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received which put into question the trust and confidence of the general public in the CSC as a dispenser of administrative justice.The fact that the investigation and copying of the files was conducted in a public manner, in view of the other employees, and on a company computer brings about the presumption that the investigation and search was conducted in a reasonable manner.There was no need for the letter-complaint to follow the requisites of the CSC admissibility rules as the complaint filed by chairperson david herself, acted as the official charge against petitioner.

PEOPLE v. AMINNUDIN – M/V Wilcon, disembarked from boat and was arrested based on a tip from a “reliable source”FACTS: Idel Aminnudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City.The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffedTC: unconvinced. He only had 2 watches with him although he claims he was selling watches. He said he gave away a watch, but to whom, he could not say. He did not supply enough proof of his injuries to show he was manhandledHELD: Where it is not disputed that the PC officers had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin while he was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and seized the bag he was carrying, and that their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained was inadmissible.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehensionThe exceptions do not apply: in flagrante delicto, search incidental to lawful arrest, search of moving vehicle, search of vessels and aircrafts, plain view evidence

PEOPLE V. MENGOTE – eyes looking side to side, 11am arrest, gun and fanknife FACTS: the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place.

As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division. An information was filed with the RTC of Manila for illegal possession of firearms without the proper license or permit.Danganan was a witness who stated that Mengote and Morellos robbed his house of the firearm. Mengote claims the weapon was planted on him.Warrantless arrests when allowed: Rule 113 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (IN FLAGRANTE)(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

HELD: The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court. Exclusionary rule: There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. This is based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed."The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court. We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution. Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.

PEOPLE v. JUDGE LAGUIO - BMW, Wang, 2am car full of guns and meth, DEMURERFACTS: Police operatives arrested de Dios, Anoble and Arellano for unlawful possession of meth/shabu. This led to the arrest of the source of their drugs, one Frank (teck) and Junio. The two were arrested while handing drugs to the company of de Dios. They claim they are a talent manager and gym instructor, respectively and that they work for one Lawrence Wang. They gave details of where Wang could be found and that there was a scheduled delivery of meth the next morning. The officers placed Wang under surveillance. At about 2am, Wang was on his way to his BMW when the police officers frisked him and asked him to open the trunk of the car, which contained meth, a gun, 650k in cash and 2 measuring scales. Wang resisted the arrest and warrantless search.Wang filed a demurrer to evidence praying for acquittal and the dismissal of the cases against him which was granted by Judge Laguio for lack of evidence.ISSUE: Whether the prosecution may appeal the granting of demurer to evidence and whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure in this case.HELD: (As a general rule, the granting of a demurer to evidence amounts to a trial on the merits and is unappeallable. The exceptions to the rule are (a) when the prosecution is denied due process of law and (b) when the trial court commits GAODATL/EOJ in dismissing a criminal case by granting the demurer)

There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest.Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search.Rule 113 section 5 provides the instances where a police officer may make a valid warrantless arrest. None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

PEOPLE V. DELA CRUZ – talking with drug dealer in the drug dealer’s house does not constitute constructive possession of dangerous drugsFACTS: In the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with Dela Cruz. They informed him that they had an arrest warrant against him. Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Dela Cruz was holding a shotgun through a window, but dropped it once a police officer pointed his gun at him. Entering the nipa hut, they arrested Dela Cruz and found meth/shabu, a digital weighing scale and other drug paraphernalia and ammunition.

Dela Cruz was indicted for illegal possession of a firearm and for violation of RA 9165. According to him, he was only in Boy Bicol’s house for a welding job and that he didn’t participate in the shootout. Also according to him, he was informed by the PO who arrested him that the cause for his arrest was his being a companion of Boy Bicol. He was acquitted of possession of a firearm but was found guilty of drug possessionISSUE: whether the RTC and CA erred in finding him guilty of possession of dangerous drugs HELD: Appeal has merit.The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The third element must be attended by animus possidendi (mental state of awareness) and this may be determined by the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused as well as the surrounding circumstances.Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu, whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant. The fact that the shabu was on the table where Dela Cruz and Boy Bicol were talking is too broad to be interpreted as constructive possession (dominion and control)Cases of constructive possession: under the bed, inside the drawer of the accused, in the master’s bedroom of his house. In this case, Dela Cruz was not the owner of the nipa hut. He was merely found in a room where shabu was confiscated.The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5 (a), arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer

Republic v. RoqueFACTS:

On July 17, 2007, private respondents Roque etc., filed a Petition for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372:

Sec. 3, RA 9372: Definition of Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:a. Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Watersb. Rebellion or Insurrectionc. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;d. Article 248 (Murder);e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction) or under…

1. The Law on Arson2. Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 19903. Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 19684. Anti-Hijacking Law5. Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 19746. Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the

Void for vagueness

populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorismSec. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. - The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications

violating the right to privacy of communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships

between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.

SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of

for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;

terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.

SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court. He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence

for violating the right to travel;

SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. -The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about

for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to provide the desired information, when so ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners, the Republic of the Philippines (represented by the executive secretary and the secretaries of national defense, ILG, FA, F, BAM) moved to suspend the proceedings, averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372’s constitutionality have been lodged before the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases. These were subsequently dismissed.The Republic filed a motion to dismiss stating that the issue on the constitutionality of the RA have already been ruled upon in the Southern Hemisphere cases.ISSUE: Whether the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismissWhether the Court resolved the issue on the Constitutionality of the RA or dismissed only based on technical groundsWhether the requisites for declaratory relief were metHELD:1. Yes, only insofar as the ruling that private respondents were entitled to declaratory relief. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It is well settled that to be qualified as "grave", the abuse must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. Requisites to delaratory relief: (1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.4, 5 and 6 are wanting. PR failed to state how they are likely to or are directly to sustain injury as a result of the enforcement of the RA, or that the dispute may be tried in its inception (RIPE SEEDS), allegations are merely theorized and are speculative

2. Issue on constitutionality: WAS NOT RULED UPON. To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was improper; (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi;

and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy.

Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.

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