EVROPSKE PERSPEKTIVE I PRAKSA EUROPEAN

Srbija i KoSovo:

evropSKe perSpeKtive i praKSa

Serbia aND KoSovo:

europeaN perSpectiveS aND

practicalitieS

SRBIJA I KOSOVO:

EVROPSKE PERSPEKTIVE I

PRAKSA

Beograd, 2014.

SRBIJA I KOSOVO: EVROPSKE PERSPEKTIVE I PRAKSA | 5

Predgovor

Ekonomski aspekti dijaloga Srbije i Kosova* – trgovinski odnosi i poslovna saradnja lokalnih zajednica ...................................................................................9

Opšti pregled ekonomskih odnosa između Srbije i Kosova 1999–2012. ........................................................................................................9Normalizacija odnosa Srbije i Kosova – ekonomska dimenzija .......................14Proces stabilizacije i pridruživanja – dugoročni strateški i politički pristup EU zemljama zapadnog Balkana – okvir za normalizaciju odnosa Srbije i Kosova ...................................................................................................21Grad Leskovac – Studija slučaja ........................................................................24Izvoz po sektorima delatnosti i robnim grupama za Jablanički okrug i grad Leskovac .......................................................................29Uvoz po sektorima delatnosti i robnim grupama za grad Leskovac sa prostora Kosova ................................................................................................................32Preporuke za unapređenje trgovinskih odnosa i poslovne saradnje lokalnih zajednica ............................................................................................................34

Prilog 1 ....................................................................................................................37

Srbija i Kosovo: Potencijal za saradnju i ključni izazovi zajedničke evropske perspektive .........................................................................49

Evropski put Srbije i Kosova ..............................................................................49Pregled odnosa EU sa Kosovom .......................................................................52Pregled odnosa EU sa Srbijom ..........................................................................56Dijalog Prištine i Beograda uz posredovanje EU ..............................................59Briselski sporazum ............................................................................................60Regionalne implikacije pregovora Srbije i Kosova i „Prvog sporazuma o principima koji regulišu normalizaciju odnosa” ...............................................63

Sadržaj

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Sadržaj

Zastupljenost u regionalnim inicijativama i međusobna saradnja srpskih i kosovskih institucija i/ili organizacija civilnog društva, lokalnih samouprava i dr. ................................................................................................66Uloga regionalnih inicijativa u rešavanju bilateralnih pitanja Srbija–Kosovo, ili pitanja od njihovog zajedničkog interesa ............................71Ka zajedničkoj evropskoj perspektivi ................................................................74Zaključci i preporuke .........................................................................................76Prilog 2 ...............................................................................................................79


Foreword ................................................................................................................93

Economic Aspects of the Dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo* – Trade Relations and Business Cooperation of Local Communities .......................95

An Outline of Economic Relations Between Serbia and Kosovo in the Period 1999-2012 ...................................................................................95Normalization of Relations between Serbia and Kosovo – the economic dimension ........................................................................................................100Stabilization and Association Process – EU’s long-term strategic and political approach to the Western Balkans countries – a framework for normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo ...........................................................................................107City of Leskovac – Case Study .........................................................................110Export per activity sectors and groups of products in Jablanica District and Leskovac ...................................................................115Import from Kosovo to Leskovac per sectors of activities and groups of products ..........................................................................................................118Recommendations for promotion of trade relations and business cooperation of local communities .................................................................120

Annex 1 .................................................................................................................123

Serbia and Kosovo*: Potential for Cooperation and Key Challenges of a Common European Perspective ........................................................................135

The European path of Serbia and Kosovo ......................................................135Overview of the EU’s relations with Kosovo ..................................................138Overview of the EU’s relations with Serbia ....................................................142EU mediated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade .................................145The Brussels Agreement .................................................................................146

Table of Content

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Table of Content

Regional implications of negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo and the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations” .....................................................................150Participation in Regional Initiatives and Mutual Cooperation between Serbian and Kosovo Institutions and/or Civil Society Organizations, Local Self-Governments, etc. .................................................154The role of regional initiatives in solving bilateral issues between Serbia and Kosovo, or issues of common interest .........................................159Towards a Joint European Perspective ...........................................................162Conclusions and Recommendations ..............................................................165

Annex 2 .................................................................................................................167


Predgovor

Ova publikacija rezultat je rada na pripremi dva okrugla stola organizovanih u okviru projekta Srbiја i Kоsоvо*: Еvrоpskе pеrspеktivе i praksa. Projekat je tokom druge polovine 2013. i prve polovine 2014. godine, realizovao Evropski pokret u Srbiji u saradnji sa Institutom zа rаzvојnu pоlitiku INDЕP iz Prištine, uz podršku Ambasade Danske u Beogradu. Projekat je nastojao da dоprinеse procesu unаprеđеnja svеukupnih оdnоsа Srbije i Kоsоvа kroz pokretanje civilnog dijaloga o dve bitne teme: međusobnim ekonomskim odnosima i perspektivama u procesu evropskih integracija.

Briselski spоrаzumi iz аprila i mајa 2013. godine i diјаlоg pоd оkrilјеm Еvrоpskе uniје kојi bi trеbаlо dа vоdi kа “vidlјivоj i оdrživоj nоrmаlizаciјi оdnоsа”, dubоkо su mоtivisаni еvrоpskim pеrspеktivama Srbiје i Kоsоvа, i rezultirali su оtvаrаnjem pristupnih prеgоvоrа Srbiјe i EU i оtvаrаnjеm prеgоvоrа о stаbilizаciјi i pridruživanju izmеđu Kоsоva i ЕU. Imajući to u vidu, Evropski pokret u Srbije je inicirao niz aktivnosti kako bi proširio krug sagovornika na ove teme i omogućio razmenu iskustava i mišljenja između stručnjaka, poslovnog sektora, organizacija civilnog društva i građana lokalnih zajednica.

Prvi okrugli sto pod nazivom „Ekonomski odnosi Srbije i Kosova* - Uticaj na lokalne privrede i zajednice“ održan je u Leskovcu, 17. decembra 2013. godine, i imao je za cilj da identifikuje najvažnije probleme i prepreke u trgovinskim i ekonomskim odnosima lokalnih zajednica Srbije i Kosova, kao i predloži mеre zа unapređenje sаrаdnje umrеžаvаnja zаintеrеsоvаnih strаnа. Kao podloga za diskusiju, sačinjen je dokument: Ekonomski aspekti dijaloga Srbije i Kosova – trgovinski odnosi i poslovna saradnja lokalnih zajednica sa studijom slučaja grada Leskovca, kojim su autori, Radmila Milivojević, Genc Krasniqi, Bisera Šećeragić i prof. dr Predrag Bjelić, analizirali stanje iz ugla obe strane i izneli glavne preporuke za prevazilaženje problema.

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Predgovor

Drugi okrugli sto organizovan je u Beogradu, 29. aprila 2014. godine, na temu potencijala saradnje i ključnih izazova zajedničke evropske perspektive Srbije i Kosova. Za tu priliku priređena je analiza stanja evropskih integracija Srbije i Kosova, sa posebnim akcentom na mogućnostima koje otvaraju Briselski sporazumi kao i brojne inicijative regionalne saradnje na prostoru Zapadnog Balkana. Autori dokumenta, dr Filip Ejdus, dr Jelica Minić i Vjosa Musliu, razmatrali su potrebnu legislativu i reformske korake koje treba da doprinesu ukupnoj modernizaciji i demokratskom i ekonomskom razvoju regiona i dali ključne preporuke.

Dokumenti su dopunjeni najvažnijim zaključcima sa oba događaja i pretočeni u sažetu, ali sadržajnu publikaciju koja se nalazi pred vama. Poseban kvalitet istraživanju daju podaci i tabele u prilozima.

Zahvaljujemo se partnerima iz Prištine, Institutu za razvojnu politiku, koji je koordinirao aktivnostima na Kosovu i omogućio da publikacija bude dostupna i na albanskom jeziku, autorima tekstova i priloga na predanosti u istraživanju i radu na pripremi publikacije, učesnicima okruglih stolova na aktivnom doprinosu i konkretnim preporukama, kao i Ambasadi Danske u Srbiji koja je prepoznala potrebu da se diskusija o ovim pitanjima, sa najviših državnih prenese na lokalni nivo i otvori za građane kojih se tražena rešenja direktno tiču.

Ivan Knežević U Beogradu, septembar 2014.


Ekonomski aspekti dijaloga Srbije i Kosova*1 – trgovinski odnosi i poslovna saradnja lokalnih zajednica

Opšti pregled ekonomskih odnosa između Srbije i Kosova 1999–2012.

Kada je 1999. godine Evropska komisija (EK) postavila osnovne elemente Procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja (PSP) kao svog dugoročnog strateškog i političkog pristu-pa za odnos sa zemljama Zapadnog Balkana – Albanijom, Bosnom i Hercegovinom, Crnom Gorom, Hrvatskom, Makedonijom, Srbijom i Kosovom (u skladu sa Rezoluci-jom Saveta bezbednosti 1244/99), započet je proces političke i ekonomske konsoli-dacije zemalja regiona Zapadnog Balkana, nakon perioda mučnih političkih sukoba i drastičnog pada njihovog ekonomskog rasta i razvoja. Konačni cilj procesa je bila integracija zemalja Zapadnog Balkana u EU u skladu sa kriterijumima za proširenje Evropske unije (EU) – Ugovor o Evropskoj uniji (1992/1993), ispunjavanje kriterijuma iz Kopenhagena (1993) i kriterijuma iz Madrida (1995), zaključka sa sastanka Evrop-skog saveta iz 2000. godine, da su sve države uključene u proces stabilizacije i pri-druživanja potencijalni kandidati za članstvo u EU, kao i da je cilj EU što potpunija integracija država Zapadnog Balkana u političku i ekonomsku strukturu Evrope. Na Samitu u Zagrebu 2000. godine potvrđeno je da je proces stabilizacije i pridruživanja put koji vodi zemlje Zapadnog Balkana prema članstvu u Evropskoj uniji. Na Sami-tu u Solunu, održanom 2003. godine, zemljama procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja još jednom je potvrđena evropska perspektiva, a proces je „obogaćen“ elementima pretpristupne strategije, tj. elementima koji su do tada bili otvoreni isključivo država-ma kandidatima za članstvo.

1 Ovim se ne prejudicira status Kosova i u skladu je sa Rezolucijom 1244 Saveta bezbednosti Ujedininjenih nacija i mišljenjem Međunarodnog suda pravde o kosovskoj Deklaraciji o nezavisnosti.

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Ekonomski aspekti dijaloga Srbije i Kosova* - trgovinski odnosi i poslovna saradnja lokalnih zajednica

Kao osnovni elementi procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja postavljeni su:·· ugovorni odnosi – Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, kao nova vrsta

ugovornih odnosa (tzv. sporazum o pridruživanju treće generacije);·· razvoj ekonomskih odnosa – asimetrična liberalizacija trgovine kroz uvođe-

nje autonomnih trgovinskih mera (ATM);·· finansijska pomoć – fondovi i programi EU.

EU je do sada potpisala Sporazume o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SSP) sa Albanijom, Bosnom i Hercegovinom, Hrvatskom, Makedonijom, Srbijom i Crnom Gorom.

Kosovo je od samog početka takođe deo Procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja za regi-on u celini. U skladu sa tim, ali i sa napretkom u razvoju dijaloga između Beograda i Prištine, 2012. je Evropska komisija sačinila i Studiju o izvodljivosti koja je potvrdila spremnost Kosova za otvaranje pregovora za zaključivanje Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju uz uvažavanje stavova pojedinih članica EU u vezi sa statusom Kosova (što praktično znači da će se ovi pregovori voditi u cilju zaključenja Prelaznog trgo-vinskog sporazuma o trgovini i trgovinskim pitanjima odnosno sporazumu o slobod-noj trgovini između Kosova i EU). Jedna od ključnih konstatacija preporuke Evropske komisije2 za otvaranje pregovora je isticanje značaja da Kosovo nastavi da u dobroj nameri sprovede sve sporazume i dogovore postignute između Beograda i Prištine. Konačno, Odlukom Saveta ministara EU iz aprila 2013. godine formalno je započet proces pregovora u cilju zaključivanja Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između EU i Kosova koji su formalno zaključeni maja 2014. godine. Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju parafiran je u Briselu 25. jula 2014. Sledeći korak je usvajanje Sporazu-ma u Savetu Evropske unije i potpisivanje koje se očekuje na proleće 2015. godine.

S druge strane, Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju Srbije i EU stupio je na snagu septembra 2013. godine, i štaviše, Srbija je otpočela pristupne pregovore sa EU u januaru sledeće godine. U paralelnom vremenskom okviru su se odvijali i razgovori Srbije i EU u vezi sa zahtevom Srbije za dobijanjem statusa kandidata kao i datuma za

2 Preporuka za odluku Saveta kojom se ovlašćuje otvaranje pregovora o Sporazumu o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između Evropske unije i Kosova videti u: European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Decision au-thorizing the opening of negotiations on Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo*, Brussels, Apr. 22, 2013, COM(2013)200 final.


otpočinjanje pregovora, i obe odluke su bile uslovljene napretkom u dijalogu između Beograda i Prištine. Dijalog je započet još 2011. godine pregovorima o tehničkim pitanjima u vezi sa prometom roba između carinske teritorije Kosova3 i carinske teri-torije ostatka Srbije. Ključni problem je bilo prihvatanje kosovskih carinskih dokume-nata i carinskog pečata u situaciji posle proglašenja nezavisnosti institucija iz Prišti-ne.4 U oktobru 2011. godine postignuto je kompromisno rešenje u vezi sa kosovskim carinskim dokumentima i pečatom. Naime, Srbija je prihvatila primenu pečata na kome stoji „Carina Kosova” ali bez naziva „Republika Kosovo” na carinskim deklaraci-jama. To je potvrđeno usvajanjem dogovora koji je stavljen na papir, ali nije zvanično potpisan i potvrđen od organa Srbije i Kosova.

Veliki problem u trgovini ne samo Srbije i Kosova, već trgovini robom u regionu Za-padnog Balkana posle proglašenja nezavisnosti institucija u Prištini 2008. godine je bilo kako primenjivati CEFTA 2006 sporazum s obzirom da je Kosovo odbijalo učešće UNMIK-a u njegovo ime na regionalnim sastancima. Imajući u vidu da Srbija i Bosna i Hercegovina nisu priznale nezavisnost Kosova za razliku od drugih država u regionu Zapadnog Balkana, to je predstavljalo prepreku funkcionisanju organa CEFTA 2006.

Srbija je inače prepoznala Kosovo kao posebnu carinsku teritoriju samim činom potpisivanja Centralnoevropskog sporazuma o slobodnoj trgovini iz 2006. godine u kome je UNMIK bio jedna od strana potpisnica u ime carinske teritorije Kosova i u skladu sa ovlašćenjima iz Rezolucije 1244. Problem primene CEFTA 2006 sporazu-ma je posebno bio vidljiv 2011. godine, kada je Kosovo predsedavalo radom CEFTA 2006, što je definisalo neophodnost postizanja dogovora koji će omogućiti Kosovu učestvovanje na regionalnim skupovima i u radu regionalnih organizacija i tela, sa kojih se Srbija povlačila ako Kosovo nije bilo predstavljeno od strane UNMIK-a.5

3 Srbija je 2006. godine potpisivanjem CEFTA 2006, odnosno Centralnoevropskog sporazuma o slobodnoj trgovini iz 2006. godine, de facto priznala carinsku teritoriju Kosova* kao zasebnu carinsku teritoriju, imajući u vidu da je UNMIK na osnovu ovlašćenja po osnovu rezolucije 1244/1999 imao status potpisnice u ime ove carinske teritorije.

4 Kompromisno rešenje vezano za kosovski carinski pečat i drugu dokumentaciju postignuto je oktobra 2011. godine.

5 Centar za regionalizam, Monitoring implementacije dogovora između Kosova i Srbije u oblasti kretanja ljudi i robe, Novi Sad, 2013.

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Kompromis je postignut kroz Dogovor o regionalnom predstavljanju i saradnji koji je usklađen 2011. godine.6

Međutim, najznačajniji dogovor koji je postignut u sklopu tehničkog dijaloga Beogra-da i Prištine pod okriljem Evropske unije i koji je otvorio put za relativnu normalizaciju ekonomske saradnje i prometa ljudi i robe između Kosova i Srbije, bio je Dogovor o integrisanom upravljanju administrativnom linijom, koji je predviđao zajedničko upravljanje carinskom linijom i obavljanje carinske i imigracione kontrole na jednom mestu na administrativnoj liniji između dve carinske teritorije.

Po usklađivanju ovog dogovora nije odmah došlo do njegove primene, iako je Vlada Srbije zvanično prihvatila njegovu primenu 6. decembra 2012. godine. Najteže je bilo primeniti ovaj dogovor na prelazima na severu Kosova, jer je postojao otpor lokalnog srpskog stanovništva. Oni su izneli bojazan da će ostati odsečeni od Srbije, jer će pro-cedura biti komplikovana i neće moći da dobijaju robu iz centralne Srbije. Postavilo se i pitanje naplate carina i poreza na ovim administrativnim prelazima od strane Carine Kosova. Da bi se rešila ova pitanja između Srbije i vlasti u Prištini, usmeno je dogovoreno da se roba koja je potrebna za žitelje severnog Kosova ne carini ako ulazi u kamionima nosivosti do 3,5 tone i ne naplaćuje akciza za šest akciznih proizvoda, već se na ovim prelazima vrši samo carinsko evidentiranje. Srbija je sa svoje strane ukinula tranzitne konvoje za kamione koji sa Kosova tranzitiraju kroz Srbiju, a koji su bili obavljani u 8 i u 15 časova svakoga dana. Carinski nadzor nad robom sa Kosova koja je tranzitirala kroz Srbiju obavlja se u Vranju, a za neke vrste robe i u Nišu.7

Dogovor o carinama se još ne primenjuje u potpunosti. Jedno od pitanja je osigura-nje vozila, jer se to odnosi i na transportna vozila kojima se transportuje roba između dva carinska područja, ali i kojima roba tranzitira kroz ova carinska područja. Za sad je uspostavljen režim osiguranja koji zahteva uplatu tzv. graničnog osiguranja, jer Koso-

6 Sporazum o glavnim principima normalizacije odnosa Beograda i Prištine koji predviđa da Kosovo* bude predstavljeno na regionalnim skupovima u svoje ime i za svoj račun uz korišćenje naziva „Kosovo*”. Zvezdica uz naziv Kosova* označava da uz naziv ide i fusnota koja glasi: „Ovaj naziv je bez prejudiciranja statusa i u skladu je sa Rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija 1244 i mišljenjem Međunarodnog suda pravde o Deklaraciji o nezavisnosti Kosova”. O primeni dogovora stara se Evropska unija.

7 Centar za regionalizam, Monitoring implementacije dogovora između Kosova i Srbije u oblasti kretanja ljudi i robe, Novi Sad, 2013.


vo ne može postati član kluba zelene karte. Problem je i obavljanje platnog prometa između Srbije i Kosova. Srbija je propisala da se naplata robe sa Kosova može vršiti u stranoj valuti, ali se ta strana valuta prodaje Narodnoj banci Srbije i dobijaju se dinari. Međutim, za sada ne postoje uslovi da se platni promet obavlja bezgotovinski, iako na Kosovu postoje banke sa kapitalom iz Srbije, kao što je Komercijalna banka, koja ima filijalu u Prištini, i Dunav banka a.d. Zvečan.8

8 Isto.

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Normalizacija odnosa Srbije i Kosova – ekonomska dimenzija

Trgovinski režimi između Srbije i Kosova su se menjali po fazama od 2000. godine do danas. Prva faza, od 2000. do 2004. godine, odlikuje se time da je Srbija nastojala da još uvek tretira trgovinu sa Kosovom kao unutrašnju trgovinu, iako je Kosovo u okviru Rezolucije SB 1244, postalo posebna carinska teritorija, s tim da su ovlašće-nja u kreiranju i sprovođenju spoljnotrgovinske politike Kosova preneta na UNMIK. Druga faza od 2004. do 2008 godine se odlikuje rastom robne razmene između dve carinske teritorije. Poseban značaj ima potpisivanje CEFTA sporazuma 2006. godine, međutim, do nove krize u odnosima dolazi 2008. godine, kada Kosovo jednostrano proglašava nezavisnost. Treću fazu trgovinskih odnosa, koja je počela 2008. godine, karakterišu tehnički problemi u trgovini i pregovori o tehničkim pitanjima koji treba da olakšaju trgovinu između ove dve carinske teritorije. Iako je proglašenje nezavi-snosti značajno komplikovalo trgovinu Kosova i Srbije, deo roba sa Kosova je stizao u Srbiju putem reeksporta preko Crne Gore i Makedonije, sa carinskim dokumentima tih država uz naznačeno poreklo sa Kosova. Usled činjenice da je većinski naseljeno srpskim stanovništvom i nemogućnosti Carine Kosova da uspostavi svoje ispostave na Jarinju i Brnjaku, severno Kosovo je bilo de facto slobodna carinska zona sve do polovine decembra 2013. godine, kada je počela naplata carine i na ova dva carinska punkta.

Promet robe između carinske teritorije Kosova i carinske teritorije Srbije9 je u prvim godinama posle sukoba na Kosovu bio veoma malog obima, da bi tek od 2004. godi-ne počeo značajnije da raste, o čemu svedoče podaci Privredne komore Srbije, kao i kompletna analiza tih kretanja, koja je nedavno objavljena u dokumentu Monitoring implementacije dogovora između Kosova i Srbije u oblasti kretanja ljudi i robe, Cen-tar za regionalizam, Novi Sad, 2013.10

9 Isto.

10 Radi se o podacima koji se registruju kao interni promet od strane poreskih organa, što ne uključuje tokove iz sive zone.


Tabela 1: Izvoz Srbije na Kosovo i uvoz sa Kosova u Srbiju, 2001.-2012.

350

mil.

EUR

300

250

200

150

100

50

02001 2002 2003

Uvoz sa Kosova Izvoz na Kosovo

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Izvor: Centar za regionalizam, Monitoring implementacije dogovora između Kosova i Srbije u oblasti kretanja ljudi i robe, Novi Sad, 2013.

Značajnije kretanje isporuka roba ka Kosovu počinje od 2007. godine, kao rezultat delovanja liberalizacije robnih tokova u okviru CEFTA 2006 sporazuma. Štaviše, taj se trend rasta nije promenio ni u vreme tenzija, kada je Kosovo jednostrano proglasilo nezavisnost niti nakon izbijanja svetske finansijske krize. Otprema robe iz Srbije ka Kosovu je 2012. godine dostizala nivo od oko 300 miliona evra, što je dokaz prvog reda značaja ovog tržišta za Srbiju i važna determinanta za buduće ekonomsko pozi-cioniranje Srbije na ovom tržištu. Sa druge strane, ulaz roba sa Kosova je bio manji, mada je i tu bila prisutna dinamika rasta sve do izbijanja ekonomske krize. Prema po-dacima Privredne komore Srbije, sa Kosova je u Srbiju dopremljeno robe u vrednosti od oko 10 miliona evra.

Srbija je bila u mogućnosti da na Kosovo izveze značajno više robe nego Kosovo u Srbiju, najviše zbog političkih prepreka, uprkos delovanju mnogih specifičnih eko-nomskih faktora. U Statističkom izveštaju o spoljnoj trgovini11 uočava se promen-ljiv trend kosovskog izvoza u Srbiju. Porast izvoza beleži se do 2007. godine, kada je

11 Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Series 3: Economic Statistics, External Trade Statistics 2011, https://ask.rks-gov.net/ENG/publikimet/doc_download/1040-external-trade-statistics-2011, 21.8.2014.

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ukupni izvoz ka Srbiji bio 19.280 hiljada evra, a počinje da opada sa jednostranim proglašenjem nezavisnosti Kosova. Iako je 2011. izvoz dostigao 7.198 hiljada evra, u poređenju sa 3.941 hiljadom evra godinu dana ranije, to je u poređenju sa izvozom Srbije uglavnom neznatno. Isti Izveštaj pokazuje stalan porast izvoza robe iz Srbije na Kosovo, što je umnogome doprinelo povećanju deficita Kosova tokom godina. Trgo-vinski bilans Kosova sa Srbijom ostaje pitanje od velike važnosti za kosovske vlasti. Izvoz iz Srbije na Kosovo ima uzlazni trend od 2007. godine, uz mali pad sa 222.534 hiljade evra u 2007. na 208.951 hiljadu evra u 2008. Pogotovo je tokom 2010. zabe-ležen veliki porast na 260.471 hiljadu evra, što je potom neznatno palo na 254.971 hiljadu evra u 2011. godini. Značajan trgovinski suficit Srbije ili značajan deficit Koso-va (s koje god strane da gledate) pokazuje veliki trgovinski disbalans dve ekonomije, što ne odražava nužno njihove ekonomske statuse, već radije njihove političko-eko-nomske odnose.

U strukturi otpreme robe iz carinske teritorije Srbije na Kosovo u 2012. godini, pri-marno mesto su imali prehrambeni proizvodi sa oko 30% učešća, zatim industrij-ski proizvodi razvrstani prema materijalu, sa učešćem 21,3%, hemijski proizvodi sa 13,9% učešća, mineralna goriva i maziva 11,34%. Inače, u posmatranju kretanja za period 2008–2012. godine, raslo je učešće prehrambenih proizvoda, dok je opadao značaj otpreme, značaj mašina i transportnih sredstava, kao i mineralnih goriva i ma-ziva.


Tabela 2: Izvoz iz ostatka Srbije na Kosovo prema grupama proizvoda SMTK, rev. 3, 2008–2012.

SMTK grupa proizvoda 2008 2010 2012

Br naziv 000 € % 000 € % 000 € %

Prim

arni

pro

izvo

di

Siro

vine

0 Hrana i žive životinje 61.464 26,28 76.120 25,68 95.926 32,47

1 Pića i duvan 10.560 4,51 9.475 3,20 12.783 4,33

2 Sirovine i materijali 3.794 1,62 4.161 1,40 4.296 1,45

3 Mineralna goriva i maziva 26.030 11,13 55.394 18,68 33.483 11,34

4 Životinjska i biljna ulja 2.709 1,16 2.984 1,01 5.452 1,85

Indi

stru

jski

pro

izvo

d 5 Hemijski proizvodi 29.970 12,81 31.520 10,63 41.068 13,90

6 Proizvodi razvrstani prema materijalu

57.843 24,73 60.526 20,42 62.912 21,30

7 Mašine i transportna sredstva

29.963 12,81 40.328 13,60 23.491 7,95

8 Razni industrijski proizvodi 11.560 4,94 15.959 5,38 15.970 5,41

9 Ostale vrste robe i transakcija

- - - - - -

UKUPNO 233.898 100,00 296.471 100,00 295.385 100,00

Izvor: Centar za regionalizam, Monitoring implementacije dogovora između Kosova i Srbije u oblasti kretanja ljudi i robe, Novi Sad, 2013, podaci Privredne komore Srbije.

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Tabela 3: Glavni pojedinačni izvozni proizvodi Srbije prema Kosovu 2012. godine

Rang HS kod Naziv Vrednost

(EUR)Udeo u ukupnom izvozu (%)

1. 1001.19 Pšenica i napolica, ostalo 16. 403.403 5,55

2. 2709.00 Nafta, sirova, ostalo 12.407.378 4,20

3. 1101.00 Brašno 10.129.674 3,45

4. 6905.10 Crepovi (krovni) od keramike 8.784.774 2,97

5. 2106.90 Proizvodi za ishranu 7.785.683 2,64

6. 2716.00 Električna energija 7.493.761 2,54

7. 3003.20 Lekovi koji sadrže ostale antibiotike 7.222.675 2,45

8. 3105.90 Đubriva 7.072.913 2,39

9. 2202.90 Bezalkoholna pica 5.753.177 1,95

10. 2103.90 Začini mešani 5.406.449 1,83

Sve navedeno iznad 88.459.887 29,97

UKUPNO 295.358.692 100,00

Izvor: Centar za regionalizam, Monitoring implementacije dogovora između Kosova i Srbije u oblasti kretanja ljudi i robe, Novi Sad, 2013, podaci Privredne komore Srbije.

Važni proizvodi koje tržište Kosova traži su pšenica i brašno, kao i građevinski mate-rijal, konkretno krovni crepovi od keramike. Značajno se izvoze i ostali prehrambeni proizvodi sem pšenice i proizvoda od pšenice, kao što su proizvodi za ishranu, be-zalkoholna pića i mešani začini. Značajni proizvodi iz grupe hemijskih proizvoda su: lekovi i đubriva, a od energije značajan je izvoz električne energije.

Sa druge strane, privreda Kosova se i dalje zasniva na uvozu. Zbog geografske blizine, Kosovo najviše uvozi iz zemalja članica CEFTA, za kojima slede države EU. Države pot-pisnice sporazuma CEFTA i članice EU najveći su spoljnotrgovinski partneri Kosova. U periodu između 2003. i 2008. godine više od tri četvrtine uvoza i izvoza realizo-


vano je sa zemljama koje pripadaju ovim grupama, a slično je bilo i pre 2003. Kada govorimo o trgovini sa zemljama članicama CEFTA, odnosi sa bivšim jugoslovenskim republikama i dalje su jaki. Glavni regionalni partneri Kosova pri uvozu i izvozu su Ma-kedonija i Srbija, sa kojima je ostvareno oko jedne trećine ukupnog prometa (videti Tabelu 1 i 2 u Aneksu).

Lokalna proizvodnja na Kosovu poslednjih godina eksponencijalno raste. Iako lokalna proizvodnja beleži stabilan rast, Kosovo i dalje mora da uvozi robu i sirovine kojih nema na lokalnom tržištu. Ne samo da se lokalna potražnja sada može trajno osloniti na lokalnu proizvodnju, već Kosovo sve više izvozi svojim glavnim trgovinskim partne-rima, zemljama članicama EU i potpisnicama sporazuma CEFTA.

Negativni trgovinski bilans samo je jedan od ekonomskih problema sa kojima se Ko-sovo suočava. Institucije Kosova svesne su činjenice da su za promenu ovakve real-nosti potrebni sveobuhvatan ekonomski i politički pristup i reforme kako bi se izme-nio poslovni ambijent, a u cilju bolje konkurentnosti Kosova na svetskom tržištu. Kao rezultat toga, institucije Kosova nastoje da izmene i dopune postojeću ekonomsku politiku i povećaju funkcionalnost institucija. Ovo bi u velikoj meri unapredilo poslov-ni ambijent na Kosovu. Ova obaveza jasno je naznačena u svim relevantnim držav-nim dokumentima.

Sadašnji nivo ekonomskih odnosa, odnosno na prvom mestu ekonomske razmene Srbije i Kosova je, i pored učinjenih poboljšanja, još uvek opterećen problemima i poteškoćama u vezi sa carinskim postupkom, platnim prometom, postupkom i pro-cedurama u vezi sa tranzitom roba.

Ključne barijere identifikovane u trgovini Srbije sa Kosovom su:

·· Cena usluga carinskog terminala u Severnoj Mitrovici je jedna od najviših u Evropi (41 EUR), kao i primena više carinske osnovice prilikom obračuna poreskih dažbina i taksi za pojedine proizvode koji se iz Srbije upućuju na Kosovo;

·· Vreme i iznos troškova prevoza u međunarodnom prometu robe ka južnom delu Kosova i iz njega, pri čemu roba ne može da se transportuje u tranzitu kroz Srbiju;

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·· Osiguranje vozila – obezbeđivanje povoljnije cene polise, ispisivanje uput-stva o korišćenju polise na oba jezika, sprečavanje zloupotrebe i naplate ne-osnovanih potraživanja, davanje garancije da će nastala šteta biti naplaćena. Kosovo nije deo sistema zelenog kartona, već ono izdaje svoje osiguranje koje Srbija ne priznaje, što dodatno poskupljuje robu koja se prodaje na tr-žištu Kosova;

·· Neregulisan platni promet koji je veoma skup. Troškovi platnog prometa sa južnim delom Kosova su veoma visoki (promet sa južnim delom Kosova se obavlja preko posrednika – uz proviziju 1–8%);

·· Nedostatak bankovne garancije ili obezbeđenja prema kupcima u južnom delu Kosova;

·· Lista 141 vrste proizvoda inoproizvođača koji ne mogu da uđu na Kosovo iz Srbije, za koje postoje predstavništva ili licence za distributivnu mrežu i promet na teritoriji Kosova;

·· Problem stranih građana koji ne mogu da prolaze kroz Srbiju sa Kosova u povratku ukoliko nemaju pečat u pasošu da su prethodno ušli u Srbiju. Zah-tevom za izdavanjem privremenih dokumenta za one koji sa Kosova ulaze u Srbiju, kreiraju se problemi i prepreke u slobodnom kretanju ljudi;

·· Privrednici se žale da kosovski izvoznici predugo čekaju na srpskoj granici (i do 12 sati). Nije primećeno da postoje zadržavanja na kosovskoj strani granice;

·· Srbija i dalje zahteva plaćanje poreza na dodatu vrednost (PDV) na robu koja se izvozi sa Kosova. Kosovski izvoznici su zbog toga primorani da se regi-struju kod organa republike Srbije koji nezakonito deluju na teritoriji Kosova;

·· Srbija zabranjuje da na njenu teritoriju ulazi roba sa sertifikatima kosovske Agencije za hranu i veterinarstvo, čak i kada se vrši tranzit do trećih zemalja, zemalja EU i obratno.

·· Neprihvatanje veterinarskih sertifikata za unutrašnji promet od strane ca-rinskih organa i Srbije i Kosova koji se tiču prometa robe animalnog porekla, kao i fitosanitarnih sertifikata izdatih od strane akreditovanih laboratorija;

·· Problem nefunkcionisanja železničkog i poštanskog saobraćaja između Sr-bije i Kosova;

·· Veliki deo trgovinske razmene se i dalje odvija u sivoj zoni.


Proces stabilizacije i pridruživanja – dugoročni strateški i politički pristup EU zemljama zapadnog Balkana – okvir za normalizaciju odnosa Srbije i Kosova

Imajući u vidu nastupajuće pregovore Kosova sa EU o zaključivanju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, odnosno faktički sporazuma o trgovinskoj liberalizaciji sa pratećim obavezama u vezi sa merama trgovinske politike, očekivano je da će uređi-vanje kosovskog tržišta biti značajan faktor za razvoj interesovanja stranih investitora, kao i povećanje uvoza iz EU. S obzirom da trgovinske odnose Srbije i Kosova uređuju pravila CEFTA 2006 i da obim razmene prema raspoloživim podacima raste, pravi je trenutak za pokretanje odgovarajućih inicijativa i projekata u pravcu jačanja ekonom-ske saradnje dve carinske teritorije.

Važan okvir za jačanja postojeće trgovinske razmene je postavljen sadržinom Memo-randuma o razumevanju PKS i Trgovinske komore Kosova, potpisanim pod okriljem Asocijacije evropskih privrednih i trgovinskih komora – Eurochambers 24. jula 2013. godine. Sadržina ovog Memoranduma je postavila i osnove za osnivanje posebnih radnih grupa za pitanja carina, dokumentaciju koja prati promet roba, poreska i pita-nja plaćanja poreza na dodatu vrednost, promocije trgovine kao i sva ostala pitanja tehničkog karaktera koji predstavljaju smetnju slobodnom protoku roba. Ovaj Me-morandum je i ujedno okvir za definisanje zajedničkih projekata snažnijeg umreža-vanja srpskih i kosovskih privrednika, kao i drugih projekata koji su od zajedničkog interesa, a imaju karakter važnih i velikih investicionih projekata – u oblasti drum-ske infrastrukture (autoput Beograd–Priština), obnavljanja železničke komunikacije, projekti u oblasti energetike, ekološke rehabilitacije koji su u biti „prekograničnog“ karaktera, a imaju i te kako važnu ulogu u razvoju i unapređenju mnogih privrednih delatnosti (poljoprivreda, turizam). Svaki od takvih projekata koji u biti privlači veli-ke strane investitore je i šansa za angažovanje lokalnih preduzeća kao izvođača, što ima multiplikatorni efekat na privredni oporavak lokalnih zajednica. Oporavak infra-strukture je i pokretač novih investicija, kako na strani lokalnih zajednica juga Srbije (otvaranje novih pogona za proizvodnju roba za koje postoji važna niša na kosovskom tržištu, bilo od strane domaćih investitora, bilo stranih), tako i teritorije Kosova, ima-jući u vidu očekivano poboljšanje i unapređenje pravnog okvira za poslovanje u sve-tlu njihovih pregovora sa EU. Ne treba izgubiti iz vida i da je očekivano da se tražnja

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sa Kosova pojača upravo u svetlu poboljšanja koja će doneti unapređenje ambijenta za poslovanje kroz dijalog sa EU (prilivi iz evropskih fondova, kao i iz institucionalnih i privatnih fondova).

Posle niza razgovora pod okriljem Evropske unije, u aprilu 2013. godine, Srbija i Ko-sovo potpisali su Prvi sporazum o principima normalizacije odnosa Beograda i Pri-štine. Ovaj sporazum predstavlja najvažniji korak napred, a očekuje se da će i jednoj i drugoj strani povećati izglede za evropske integracije i doprineti miru i stabilnosti u regionu. Sporazum se zasniva na prethodnim dogovorima koji su bili prevashodno tehničke prirode. Naime, između marta 2011. i februara 2012. godine, zvaničnici obeju vlada održali su niz sastanaka. Doneto je ukupno sedam zaključaka: (1) carin-ski pečati, (2) matične knjige, (3) univerzitetske diplome, (4) sloboda kretanja, (5) re-gionalno predstavljanje Kosova, (6) katastarske knjige i (7) zaključci o Integrisanom upravljanje granicama (IUG). Od oktobra 2012. do januara 2013. godine, u Briselu je održano još nekoliko rundi sastanaka između dva premijera, koji su se dogovorili da: 1) sprovedu IUG; 2) stvore multietničku komponentu kosovske policije za zaštitu srpskih pravoslavnih crkava i manastira na Kosovu; 3) razmene odgovarajuće oficire za vezu, i da 4) osnuju razvojni fond za četiri opštine sa srpskom većinom na severu Kosova.

Dijalog Beograda i Prištine u smislu postizanja vidljivog i održivog napretka u me-đusobnim odnosima je i jedan od ključnih preduslova napretka i Srbije i Kosova u procesu evropskih integracija, što je u slučaju Srbije potvrđeno i činjenicom da će ovo pitanje biti razmatrano u okviru posebnog poglavlja pregovora između Srbije i EU – poglavlje 35.

Suština sadržine ovog poglavlja je preuzimanje obaveze Srbije da sprovede u do-broj nameri sve sporazume postignute u dijalogu sa Kosovom i da u potpunosti ispoštuje principe sveobuhvatne regionalne saradnje, što je i jedan od ključnih principa obaveza iz Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između Srbije i EU. Ovo podrazumeva i da se postignuti dogovori oko tehničkih pitanja sprovedu na opera-tivan i održiv način, kao i obavezu efikasne saradnje sa EULEX-om. Navedene oba-veze će verovatno važiti i za Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju koje će Kosovo da potpiše sa EU. Kosovo treba da nastavi da radi na preostalih osam prioritetnih oblasti utvrđenih u studiji izvodljivosti kako bi bilo u stanju da primeni SSP i ispuni


obaveze koje sporazum predviđa. Osim toga, Komisija je identifikovala još neke rezultate koje Kosovo mora ostvariti kako bi ispunilo obaveze iz svih prioritetnih oblasti u okviru SSP-a.

Generalno treba imati u vidu da će pitanje normalizacije odnosa Srbije i Kosova u svakom momentu prožimati razvoj budućih pregovora Srbije i EU i odnosa Kosova i EU, što ukazuje na neophodnost da se već sada strateški razmišlja o ovom pitanju i da se i u ekonomskim pitanjima normalizacija odnosa postavi u vrh prioriteta.

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Grad Leskovac – Studija slučaja

Grad Leskovac ima izuzetan geografski položaj. Nalazi se na tromeđi Bugarske, Make-donije i Srbije, i uz samu administrativnu liniju sa Kosovom, duž transkontinentalne drumske saobraćajnice E-75 koja moravsko-vardarskim pravcem povezuje srednju Evropu sa Grčkom i Bliskim istokom. Leskovac je i svojevrsno saobraćajno čvorište, jer međunarodni vozovi koji iz Evrope putuju do Skoplja, Soluna i Atine prolaze kroz ovaj grad. Iz Leskovca regionalni putevi vode do Prištine, Pirota i Bosilegrada.

Put Leskovac–Priština, preko Medveđe, ima izuzetan značaj za revitalizaciju ekonom-skih odnosa ovog dela Srbije i Kosova, ali njegova izgradnja nalazi se u senci drugih nerešenih pitanja na relaciji Beograd–Priština. Takođe, i nedostatak carinskog ter-minala na prelazu Mutivode kod Medveđe ne samo da bitno ograničava trgovinu između susednih lokalnih tržišta, već predstavlja ograničavajući faktor za razvoj pre-duzetničkih inicijativa čitavog Jablaničkog okruga, uključujući i grad Leskovac.

Prema popisu iz 2011. godine, u Jablaničkom okrugu je bilo 216.304 stanovnika, što čini 3,0% ukupnog stanovništva Republike Srbije, prema 3,2% u odnosu na po-pis iz 2002. godine. Od ukupnog broja stanovnika 92,4% izjasnilo se kao Srbi, 5,3% kao Romi, 0,2% kao Albanci, 0,1% su Crnogorci, 0,1% se izjasnilo kao Makedonci, a preostalih 1,9% pripada ostalim etničkim grupama (Bugari, Hrvati, Jugosloveni, Rusi, Rumuni, Muslimani, Goranci i ostali). Leskovac je grad sa najvećim brojem stanovni-ka u kome, prema popisu iz 2011. godine, živi 66,7% ukupne populacije Jablaničkog okruga.

Od početka 2000. godine do današnjih dana, javljaju se velike oscilacije u pogledu broja zaposlenih u Leskovcu. U strukturi zaposlenih dominira, sa velikim oscilaci-jama, učešće zaposlenih u javnom sektoru (83,5% u 2001, 74,4% u 2005, 70,1% u 2011) ali je, takođe, evidentno i povećano učešće zaposlenih u privatnom sektoru (sa 25,6% u 2005. na 29,9% u 2011). Može se, generalno, zaključiti da je povećano učešće zaposlenih u privatnom sektoru, pre svega, rezultat privatne preduzetničke ideje, ali i borbe ljudi ovog prostora za preživljavanje u teškim tranzicionim vreme-nima.


Leskovac kao privredni i kulturni centar Jablaničkog okruga ima u sastavu pet opšti-na (Bojnik, Medveđa, Lebane, Vlasotince i Crna Trava), koje su do 2005. godine, na osnovu Zakona o nedovoljno razvijenim područjima Republike Srbije (Službeni gla-snik RS, br.53/95), bile razvrstane u najnerazvijenije opštine, dok je Leskovac bio u ka-tegoriji ostalih opština. Zakonom o regionalnom razvoju iz 2009. Leskovac je svrstan u III grupu, sa stepenom razvijenosti od 60% do 80% od republičkog proseka, dok su ostale opštine Jablaničkog okruga svrstane u IV grupu, sa stepenom razvijenosti ispod 60% republičkog proseka.

Od 2005. godine i grad Leskovac ekonomski ozbiljno posustaje i poprima karakteri-stike ostalih opština Jablaničkog okruga, što argumentuje i indikator: broj zaposlenih na 1000 stanovnika po opštinama, ostvaren u odnosu na republičke i okružne indi-katore. Ovaj indikator za grad Leskovac, krajem 2011. godine iznosi nešto više od 2/3 ostvarenog proseka na nivou Republike Srbije.12

Privatni sektor nije bio dovoljan da apsorbuje celokupan višak radne snage iz javnog sektora, koja jednim delom odlazi na tržište rada i povećava broj nezaposlenih lica, iz godine u godinu. Prema zvaničnim podacima Nacionalne službe za zapošljavanje, ukupan broj nezaposlenih lica za grad Leskovac iznosi 22.138 (stanje 31. 10. 2013), što predstavlja oko 60% ukupnog broja nezaposlenih na nivou Jablaničkog okruga. U kontingentu nezaposlenih konstantno prednjače muškarci, koji čine 52,3% od uku-pnog broja nezaposlenih lica na nivou grada Leskovca. I obrazovna struktura nezapo-slenih u Leskovcu je zabrinjavajuće nepovoljna, sa aspekta dominantnog učešća ne-zaposlenih lica sa I, II i III stepenom kvalifikacije od 59,2% (13.107) koja ne poseduju adekvatno specijalizovano znanje. Deluje deprimirajuće i nisko učešće nezaposlenih sa visokom stručnom spremom (5,3%), što i ovu obrazovnu strukturu nezaposlenih lica dovodi u nezavidnu poziciju prema brojnim izazovima sa kojima se suočavaju i grad Leskovac i Jablanički okrug.

12 Republički zavod za statistiku Republike Srbije, Opštine i regioni u Republici Srbiji 2012, Beograd, 2012.

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Tabela 4: Nezaposlena lica po polu i stepenu stručne spreme, grad Leskovac, 31. 10. 2013.

Stepen stručne spreme

Grad Leskovac, stanje 31. 12. 2009. Grad Leskovac, stanje 31.10.2013.

Ukupno % učešća žena

% učešća, ukupno

Ukupno % učešća žena

% učešća, ukupno

Indeks20132009

I stepen 5.143 49,0 24,6 5.197 46,7 23,5 101,1

II stepen 389 52,9 1,9 369 50,9 1,7 94,8

III stepen 7.295 42,1 34,8 7.541 36,4 34,1 103,4

IV stepen 6.272 58,7 30,0 6.606 53,5 29,8 105,3

V stepen 135 21,5 0,6 161 32,2 0,7 119,2

VI-1 stepen 919 54,7 4,4 807 54,7 3,6 87,8

VI-2 stepen 32 68,7 0,1 281 64,0 1,3 878,2

VII-1 stepen 729 54,0 3,5 1.164 55,3 5,3 159,7

VII-2 stepen 8 37,5 0,04 12 41,6 0,1 150,0

Ukupno 20.922 49,8 100,0 22.138 46,2 100,0 105,6

Izvor: Republički zavod za statistiku Republike Srbije, Opštine i regioni u Republici Srbiji 2012, Beograd, 2012.

Nepovoljna obrazovna struktura nezaposlenih lica u direktnoj je vezi sa nepovoljnom strukturnom privredom grada Leskovca, kao i okruga. Privredna struktura Leskovca u odnosu na nasleđene višedecenijske okolnosti do 2000. i neuvažavanje „specifično-sti ovog regiona kao granične regije“ od strane kreatora uravnoteženijeg regionalnog razvoja, sa ove vremenske distance nije uspela da odgovori novim izazovima na rela-ciji Srbija–Kosovo i pored potencijala kojima raspolaže (prirodni resursi, geostrateški položaj, tradicionalna poslovna saradnja sa susednim kosovskim tržištem, ogroman potencijal radne snage, čije obrazovanje je u disproporciji sa sadašnjim potrebama okruženja).

Razlozi ovakvog kretanja zaposlenosti u gradu Leskovcu, pa i celom Jablaničkom okrugu, nisu vezani samo za sporu i neefikasnu tranziciju, već ih velikim delom treba


tražiti i u prekidanju ekonomskih veza ovog područja sa njegovim prirodnim i najbli-žim tržišnim partnerima, a to su preduzetnici sa Kosova.

Zvanična stopa nezaposlenosti, sa stanjem iz oktobra 2013. godine13, u svim opština-ma Jablaničkog okruga je, izuzev Crne Trave (17,53%), iznad zabeležene stope neza-poslenosti na nivou Republike (28,64%), pri čemu je stopa nezaposlenosti u Leskov-cu veća u odnosu na prosek u Republici Srbiji za 1,5 puta.

Evidentno je da je privreda Leskovca ostala „nereformisana i zarobljena“ u odnosu na dešavanja krajem devedesetih, što argumentuje i sledeći podatak – kretanje ude-la nacionalnog dohotka Leskovca u narodnom dohotku Republike Srbije:

učešće iznosilo

1,51%učešće iznosilo



0,96%

1989. 2000. 2005. 2012.

*Odnosno, učešće udela nacionalnog dohotka Leskovca u nacionalnom dohotku Republike Srbije gotovo da je prepolovljeno zaključno sa 2012. u odnosu na period devedesetih. Izvor: Nacionalna služba za zapošljavanje, Stope nezaposlenosti po opštinama, oktobar 2013. godine.

Zarade po zaposlenom zaokružuju pregled ekonomske situacije i na pravi nači dife-renciraju svaku od opština unutar Jablaničkog okruga. Krajem 2005. godine lična pri-manja po zaposlenom niža su u odnosu na prosek ostvaren na nivou Republike Srbije za 42,3%. Tendencija zaostajanja zarade po zaposlenom, na nivou regiona, u odnosu

13 Nacionalna služba za zapošljavanje Republike Srbije, „Podaci o nezaposlenosti i zapošljavanju po okruzima i opštinama“, u: Mesečni statistički bilten: Nezaposlenost i zapošljavanje u Republici Srbiji, br. 134, Beograd, oktobar 2013.

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na republički prosek, ima svoj kontinuitet, do današnjih dana, i krajem oktobra 2013. niža je u odnosu na republički prosek za 24,2%, odnosno, nominalno niža za 10.454 RSD. Na nivou grada Leskovca, krajem oktobra 2013, zarade po zaposlenom su niže u odnosu na republički prosek za 29,6%, odnosno, nominalno za 12.774 RSD. Prosečne zarade po zaposlenom u Leskovcu su, u kontinuitetu, bile niže u odnosu na republički prosek za oko 30%.

Tabela 4: Prosečne zarade po zaposlenom, bez poreza i doprinosa u dinarima

OPŠTINE 2005. 14 % učešća

2011.15 % - IX 2013.16 %

Bojnik 7.244 41,5 28.535 75,1 34.153 79,0

Lebane 5.524 31,7 26.988 71,1 30.419 70,4

Leskovac 11.265 64,6 29.022 76,4 30.457 70,4

Medveđa 8.419 48,3 34440 90,6 38.492 89,0

Crna Trava 14.675 84,1 23.457 61,7 30.799 71,2

Jablanički okrug 10.065 57,7 28.314 74,5 32.777 75,8

REPUBLIKA SRBIJA 7443 100,0 37976 100,0 43231 100,0

Izvor: Republički zavod za statistiku, Saopštenje br. 317: Statistika zaposlenosti i zarada, god. LXIII, Beograd, 25. 11. 2013.14 15 16

14 Opštine u Srbiji 2006. Zarade bez poreza i doprinosa, godišnji prosek 2005.

15 Opštine i regioni u Republici Srbiji 2012. Zarade bez poreza i doprinosa, godišnji prosek 2011.

16 Republički zavod za statistiku, Saopštenje br. 317: Statistika zaposlenosti i zarada, god. LXIII, Beograd, 25. 11. 2013.


Izvoz po sektorima delatnosti i robnim grupama za Jablanički okrug i grad Leskovac

Prema podacima Privredne komore Srbije17, izvoz iz ovog dela juga Republike Srbi-je18 na carinsku teritoriju Kosova značajnije raste 2006. i 2007. godine, što se može objasniti primenom CEFTA 2006 sporazuma, koji liberalizuje regionalnu trgovinu, a čiji potpisnici su i Srbija i UNMIK/Kosovo. Ukupan izvoz prikazanih opština na Kosovo je u 2008. godini udvostručen (indeks 230,7) u odnosu na 2007. godinu, i pored činjenice da je 2008. godine Kosovo proglasilo nezavisnost. Do značajnijeg pada je došlo krajem 2009. godine, kada je ukupan izvoz opština opao u odnosu na 2008. godinu za 15,2% (indeks 84,8), odnosno, pad izvoza je evidentan preko prikazanih podataka na nivou grada Leskovca, jer je u toj godini izvoz na Kosovo niži u odnosu na 2008. godinu, za 15,8% poena, što se može objasniti padom opšte privredne aktivnosti koja je prikazana preko radikalnog smanjenja ukupnog broja zaposlenih na nivou grada u tom periodu.

Može se zaključiti da izvoz opština ovog dela juga Republike Srbije na carinsku te-ritoriju Kosova ima rastući trend u periodu 2010–2012 godina, da bi krajem 2012. godine iznosio 28,3 miliona USD, sa učešćem od oko 6,86% ukupnog izvoza Srbije na Kosova (izvoz Srbije na Kosovo je 2012. godine dostigao nivo od oko 300 miliona EUR)19, što ovu teritoriju svrstava u prioritetno izvozno tržište. Ukupan izvoz po opšti-nama za period 2005–2012. dat je u Aneksu (Tabela A3).

17 Privredna komora Srbije, Beograd, 6. 12. 2013.

18 Carinski zakon Republike Srbije (Službeni glasnik RS, br. 18/2010) definiše carinsku teritoriju Srbije kao teritoriju koja je identična teritoriji Republike Srbije, što takođe podrazumeva i Kosovo (Carinski zakon RS, član 3). Ovaj Zakon je primenljiv u svim oblicima protoka robe između carinskih teritorija Srbije i svih ostalih carinskih teritorija, što samim tim reguliše i spoljnu trgovinu Srbije sa ostatkom sveta (Carinski zakon RS, član 1). Međutim, član 309 Carinskog zakona predviđa primenu njegovih odredbi i na „protok robe sa Autonom-nom pokrajinom Kosovo i Metohija tokom važenja Rezolucije 1244“. Ovim Zakonom je predviđena obaveza uspostavljanja carinskih prelaza i na administrativnoj liniji razdvajanja sa Kosovom, gde takođe carinski nadzor i carinske procedure treba da se sprovode. Ovi detalji se regulišu usvajanjem podzakonskih akta.

19 Centar za regionalizam, Monitoring implementacije dogovora između Kosova i Srbije u oblasti kretanja ljudi i robe, ekspertski izveštaj, Novi Sad, 2013.

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Ukupan izvoz grada Leskovca na carinsku teritoriju Kosova iznosio je u 2012. godini 7,7 miliona USD, što je niže za 4,4% poena u odnosu na 2011. godinu (indeks 98,1). U strukturi izvoza20 dominiraju sektori: industrija građevinskog materijala (19,5%), metalna industrija (15,3%) i farmaceutska industrija (11,6%), dok proizvodi hemijske i prehrambene industrije učestvuju u ukupnom izvozu grada sa 6,2%, odnosno sa 5,2%:

Tabela 5: Ukupan izvoz po sektorima, grad Leskovac, 2012. godina

R.B. S e k t o r 2012.

(USD u 000)% učešća 2012.

1. Industrija građevinskog materijala 1.506 19,5

2. Metalna industrija 1.183 15,3

3. Farmaceutska industrija 896 11,6

4. Hemijska industrija 478 6,2

5. Prehrambena industrija 402 5,2

Ukupno Grad Leskovac 7.715 100,0

Izvor: Privredna komora Srbije, Robna struktura izvoza Leskovačkog regiona na Kosovo rađena na osnovu raspoloživih tabela: Robe za prvih 20 roba, od ukupno 316, Beograd, 6. 12. 2013.

Prema podacima Privredne komore,21 najznačajnije robe koje se izvoze iz Leskovač-kog regiona na Kosova u 2012. godini su: tečni butan (13,8%), aparati za zagreva-nje (12,2%), bezalkoholna pića (8,3%) sa gotovo dupliranim rastom izvoza u odnosu na 2011. (indeks 275,6). Zatim slede: tapacirani proizvodi proizvođača nameštaja (5,6%), crepovi od keramike (5,2%), polietilenske vreće i trake (4,6%), paneli od lima, gvožđa i čelika (4,1%), tečni propan (4,0%), te razne celularne strukture (3,9).

20 Struktura izvoza, po sektorima, na nivou grada Leskovca urađena na osnovu dostupnih podataka Privredne komore Srbije: Tabela prvih 20 preduzeća ovog dela juga Republike Srbije, Beograd, 6. 12. 2013.

21 Privredna komora Srbije, Robna struktura izvoza Leskovačkog regiona na Kosovo rađena na osnovu raspoloživih tabela: Robe za prvih 20 roba, od ukupno 316, Beograd, 6. 12. 2013.


U robnoj razmeni sa Kosovom dominira učešće aparata za zagrevanje (12,2%) i tečni butan (13,8%), ali je, takođe, indikativno da ova vrsta roba beleži pad izvoza u odnosu na 2011. godinu za 32,2%. Najveći pad izvoza roba sa liste, u odnosu na 2011. godi-nu, beleže lekovi za preko 80% (indeks 17,4) i tečni butan za preko 30% (indeks 67,8), dok najveći rast izvoza roba sa liste beleže razne celularne strukture za preko 170% (indeks 277,7), bezalkoholna pića za preko 150% (indeks 275,9), crepovi od keramike 68,1% (indeks 168,1), mineralna voda (indeks 159,3), itd. Izvoz po robnim grupama za Jablanički region za 2012. godinu je dat u Aneksu (Tabela A4). Krajem 2012. godi-ne ukupan izvoz na Kosovo iz regiona Leskovac22 iznosio je 28,3 miliona USD, što je, u odnosu na 2011. godinu, više za 14,3%.

22 Privredna komora Srbije, Beograd, 6. 12. 2013.

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Uvoz po sektorima delatnosti i robnim grupama za grad Leskovac sa prostora Kosova

Izvoz Kosova na prostor Jablaničkog regiona je mnogo manji, ali i on ima svoju di-namiku, i možemo konstatovati da beleži značajniji rast oko 2006. godine, da bi оd 2007. godine došlo do njegovog pada. Krajem 2012. godine izvoz Kosova na prostor ovog regiona iznosi svega 155 hiljada američkih dolara. Iako je ovo zanemarljiv iznos, treba imati u vidu činjenicu da Kosovo kao nerazvijena privreda, generalno, ima mali izvoz. Ukupan uvoz po opštinama, period 2005–2012. je dat u Aneksu (Tabela A5).

Ukupan uvoz grada Leskovca sa Kosova iznosio je u 2012. godini 100 hiljada ame-ričkih dolara, uvećan je za 4 puta u odnosu na 2011. godinu, i učešćem od 64,4% ukupnog uvoza sa Kosova. Dakle, grad Leskovac je u 2012. godini, u odnosu na sve ostale opštine regiona, bio najveći uvoznik roba sa Kosova. Uvoznik je PEŠIĆ-VINET d.o.o. – Veliko Trnjaje, Leskovac, a uvoz se odnosi na robe agrosektora (paprika slat-ka, sveža ili rashlađena).

Rezultati ovog istraživanja upućuju na to da je neophodno promeniti pristup u reša-vanju suštinskih pitanja razvoja i grada Leskovca i ostalih opština Jablaničkog okruga, da ne postoji opšti pristup, već pristup prilagođen konkretnim potrebama lokalnih zajednica i njenih stanovnika, koristeći sve raspoložive resurse. Sve reforme koje je neophodno uraditi moraju da polaze od preciznih i istinitih podataka, jer je samo na osnovu takvih podataka moguće razvijati planove razvoja koji će u praksi imati kon-kretne rezultate i dugoročne efekte.

Regionalne razlike posmatrane u proteklom, višedecenijskom periodu, ostavile su dubok trag na ekonomsko-razvojne perspektive ovog dela juga Republike Srbije, pa i samog grada Leskovca, privrednog i kulturnog centra Jablaničkog okruga. Privreda grada Leskovca ostala je „nereformisana i zarobljena“ u odnosu na dešavanja kra-jem devedesetih, što argumentuje indikator: kretanje udela nacionalnog dohotka Leskovca u nacionalnom dohotku Republike Srbije koji gotovo da je prepolovljen za-ključno sa 2012, u odnosu na period devedesetih. Međutim, izvoz opština ovog dela juga Republike Srbije na carinsku teritoriju Kosova ima rastući trend u periodu 2010–2012. godina, da bi krajem 2012. godine iznosio 28,3 miliona dolara, sa učešćem od


oko 6,86% ukupnog izvoza Srbije na teritoriju Kosova. Da podsetimo da je izvoz Srbije na Kosovo 2012. godine dostigao nivo od oko 300 miliona evra, što ovu teritoriju svrstava u prioritetno izvozno tržište. Grad Leskovac je od kosovskog tržišta udaljen oko 100 km i blizina kosovskog tržišta je izuzetna konkurentska prednost ovog kraja.

Kreatorima razvojne politike na lokalnom i nacionalnom nivou se preporučuje da rešenje za sigurniju egzistenciju i privredni razvoj stanovnika Jablaničkog okruga pro-nađu u konkurentskim prednostima ovog dela juga Srbije, sa karakteristikama blage nadmorske visine i kontinentalne klime pogodne za život i sve privredne aktivnosti.

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Preporuke za unapređenje trgovinskih odnosa i poslovne saradnje lokalnih zajednica

Najvažniji politički prodor u dijalogu Beograda i Prištine je bilo postizanje Sporazuma o glavnim principima normalizacije odnosa Beograda i Prištine, što je bio i preduslov za otpočinjanje pregovora Kosova sa EU u pravcu zaključenja Sporazuma o stabilizaci-ji i pridruživanju, a za Beograd dokaz o ispunjenju potrebnog političkog kriterijuma iz Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju i preduslov za donošenje odluke EU o dobijanju datuma za pregovore.

Dosadašnji razvoj u sistemu komunikacije i dijaloga Srbije i Kosova, kao i u procesu stabilizacije i pridruživanja obe strane, formirao je okvir i za jednu od suštinskih pretpostavki stabilizacije politički osetljive situacije na jugu Srbije, ali, što je možda daleko značajnije i sa stanovišta političke održivosti postignutih i budućih rešenja, za jačanje ekonomske razmene i drugih vidova ekonomske saradnje Srbije i Koso-va.

Sadašnje okolnosti dijaloga Srbije i Kosova, kao i potencijali koji postoje na strani ekonomske saradnje, predstavljaju osnovu i za zajedničko delovanje prema Briselu u pravcu zagovaranja dodatnih sredstava za finansiranje projekata koji bi bili u funkciji ekonomske obnove i razvoja srpskih i kosovskih zajednica, i podsticanja i podržavanja ekonomskog dijaloga i zajedničkih ekonomskih projekata Srbije i Kosova.

Ovo je posebno značajno, imajući u vidu najnoviji razvoj u sprovođenju tzv. Bri-selskog dogovora, odnosno očekivano formiranje Zajednice srpskih opština, kao i odluku Evropske komisije od 31. oktobra 2013. godine da odobri početna sredstva od 15 miliona evra pomoći opštinama sa srpskom većinom na Kosovu za potrebe obnove i razvoja opštinske infrastrukture, javnu upravu, seoski i regionalni razvoj, zapošljavanje i zaštitu prirodne sredine. Treba na vreme prepoznati da je deo ovih sredstava i indirektno u funkciji ekonomske rehabilitacije i razvoja srpske zajednice na Kosovu (infrastruktura, seoski i regionalni razvoj, zapošljavanje, zaštita prirodne sredine – ali i reforma javne uprave kao važan faktor olakšavanja poslovnog ambi-jenta za preduzeća), što ukazuje na neophodnost blagovremene izrade odgovara-jućih projekata.


Ono što je važno naglasiti jeste da postoji evidentan pomak u rešavaju problema koji opterećuju trgovinsku razmenu između Srbije i Kosova, međutim, postoje otvorena pitanja koja treba rešavati u međusobnom dijalogu.

Ključne barijere identifikovane u trgovini Srbije i Kosova koje je neophodno elimini-sati u cilju unapređenja trgovinske razmene u narednom periodu su:

·· U oblasti transporta i carinskih usluga neophodno je sniziti cenu usluga ca-rinskog terminala u Severnoj Mitrovici, koja je jedna od najviših u Evropi (41 EUR), kao i primeniti adekvatnu carinsku osnovicu prilikom obračuna pore-skih dažbina i taksi za pojedine proizvode koji se iz Srbije upućuju na Kosovo. Takođe, neophodno je učiniti sve kako bi se prestalo sa praksom naplate PDV na robu koja se izvozi sa Kosova. U cilju smanjenja vremena prevoza u me-đunarodnom prometu robe ka južnom delu Kosova i iz njega neophodno je kroz dijalog pronaći adekvatne načine kako bi se roba sa Kosova transporto-vala u tranzitu kroz Srbiju. Takođe, kroz dijalog rešavati probleme u vezi sa nesmetanim transportom robe, uključujući i skraćivanje vremena provede-nog na administrativnoj liniji, kao i što skorije uspostavljanje funkcionalnog železničkog i poštanskog saobraćaja između Srbije i Kosova;

·· U oblasti osiguranja vozila neophodno je obezbeđivanje povoljnijih cena po-lise, ispisivanje uputstva o korišćenju polise na oba jezika, sprečavanje zlou-potrebe i naplate neosnovanih potraživanja, davanje garancije da će nastala šteta biti naplaćena;

·· U oblasti platnog prometa i bankarskih usluga neophodno je regulisati platni promet između Srbije i Kosova i na taj način sniziti veoma visoke troškove, imajući u vidu da se promet obavlja preko posrednika – uz proviziju 1–8%. Takođe, neophodno je uspostaviti adekvatan sistem bankovnih garancija ili obezbeđenja prema kupcima u južnom delu Kosova;

·· U oblasti slobodnog kretanja ljudi treba rešavati problem stranih građana koji ne mogu da prolaze kroz Srbiju sa Kosova u povratku ukoliko nemaju pečat u pasošu da su prethodno ušli u Srbiju. Takođe razmotriti praksu izda-vanja privremenih dokumenata za one koji sa Kosova ulaze u Srbiju, pri čemu se kreiraju dodatni problemi i prepreke u slobodnom kretanju ljudi;

·· U oblasti sertifikata za promet robe neophodno je hitno rešavanje problema veterinarskih sertifikata za unutrašnji promet od strane carinskih organa i

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Srbije i Kosova koje se tiču prometa robe animalnog porekla, kao i fitosani-tarnih sertifikata izdatih od strane akreditovanih laboratorija;

·· Neophodno je da obe strane preduzmu sve raspoložive mere kako bi se dra-matično smanjio udeo trgovinske razmene koji se odvija i dalje u sivoj zoni.

Za rešavanje identifikovanih otvorenih problema koji su navedeni u ovom radu po-trebno je uložiti mnogo volje i napora.

Proces evropskih integracija je ključan za uspeh procesa uspostavljanja i unapređe-nja ekonomskih odnosa između Srbije i Kosova, međutim, neophodno je intenzivirati međuopštinsku saradnju, saradnju privrednih komora, saradnju mladih i saradnju organizacija civilnog društva iz Srbije i Kosova kako bi se potencijali za saradnju koje proces evropskih integracija pruža u ovom kontekstu i iskoristio. Za ubrzano rešava-nje identifikovanih problema neophodan je pritisak sa lokala, zbog čega je neophod-no podizanje poverenja između lokalnih zajednica sa Kosova i Srbije kako bi opštine iz Srbije i Kosova počele da sarađuju direktno na konkretnim projektima.

Usled identifikovanih prepreka u ekonomskoj saradnji između Srbije i Kosova na gu-bitku su svi, ali najviše građani na jugu Srbije. Ekonomska međuzavisnost juga Srbije i Kosova je izgrađivana vekovima i isti problemi, ali i šanse, predstavljaju objektivnu, interesnu, dugoročnu podlogu za preduzimanje mnogih i raznovrsnih zajedničkih, pre svega lokalnih akcija. U interesu svih na tom prostoru jeste da se stvore uslovi koji će pogodovati slobodnom kretanju radne snage, a Srbija bi tu mogla da iskoristi prostor Sandžaka za dodatno unapređenje robne razmene sa Kosovom, dok slična rešenja Kosovo već koristi.


Prilog 1

Tabela A1: Trgovinska razmena Kosova sa svetom 2012–2013.

Država Izvoz Uvoz

2012 2013 2012 2013

Oktobar Oktobar

Vrednost % Vrednost % Vrednost % Vrednost %

Ukupno 25.584 100.0 26.198 100.0 222.478 100.0 218.821 100.0

27 država članica EU

8.113 31.7 9.805 37.4 85.155 38.3 87.457 40.0

Austrija 218 0.9 410 1.6 3.204 1.4 3.718 1.7

Belgija 27 0.1 55 0.2 617 0.3 739 0.3

Bugarska : : 69 0.3 2.959 1.3 3.148 1.4

Češka 177 0.7 0 0.0 1.554 0.7 1.624 0.7

Danska : : : : 347 0.2 116 0.1

Francuska 119 0.5 127 0.5 1.547 0.7 2.229 1.0

Grčka 34 0.1 80 0.3 9.849 4.4 12.606 5.8

Holandija 128 0.5 241 0.9 2.059 0.9 3.356 1.5

Irska : : 0.0 0.0 269 0.1 365 0.2

Italija 5.876 23.0 6.193 23.6 19.086 8.6 18.738 8.6

Luksemburg : : : : 4 0.0 29 0.0

Mađarska 13 0.1 54 0.2 2.121 1.0 2.871 1.3

Nemačka 1.077 4.2 450 1.7 25.711 11.6 21.403 9.8

Poljska 15 0.1 73 0.3 2.322 1.0 3.976 1.8

Rumunija 1 0.0 14 0.1 1.860 0.8 2.597 1.2

Slovačka 181 0.7 0 0.0 735 0.3 762 0.3

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Prilog 1

Država Izvoz Uvoz

2012 2013 2012 2013

Oktobar Oktobar


Slovenija 6 0.0 277 1.1 6.704 3.0 5.264 2.4

Španija : : 36 0.1 1.055 0.5 1.903 0.9

Švedska 58 0.2 83 0.3 1.061 0.5 304 0.1

Ujedinjeno Kraljevstvo

149 0.6 187 0.7 1.545 0.7 1.346 0.6

Druge zemlje članice EU

34 0.1 1.454 5.6 546 0.2 363 0.2

CEFTA 11.260 44.0 9.794 37.4 77.680 34.9 67.321 30.8

Albanija 3.404 13.3 3.769 14.4 13.082 5.9 9.161 4.2

Bosna i Hercegovina

143 0.6 137 0.5 9.520 4.3 7.242 3.3

Crna Gora 2.509 9.8 1.345 5.1 1.167 0.5 1.503 0.7

Hrvatska 228 0.9 234 0.9 8.302 3.7 4.714 2.2

Makedonija 2.830 11.1 2.377 9.1 22.347 10.0 16.557 7.6

Moldavija : : 0.5 0.0 33 0.0 8 0.0

Srbija 2.145 8.4 1.931 7.4 23.229 10.4 28.137 12.9

EFTA 471 1.8 387 1.5 2.853 1.3 2.074 0.9

Island : : 0.0 : : : 1 0.0

Lihtenštajn : : 0.0 : 17 0.0 : :

Norveška : : 0.0 : 471 0.2 111 0.1

Švajcarska 471 1.8 387 1.5 2.364 1.1 1.962 0.9

Druge države – Evropa

953 3.7 584 2.2 20.529 9.2 16.831 7.7

Turska 953 3.7 569 2.2 19.863 8.9 15.814 7.2

Ukrajina : : 15 0.1 666 0.3 1.017 0.5


Država Izvoz Uvoz

2012 2013 2012 2013

Oktobar Oktobar


Druge zemlje – van Evrope

10 0.0 7 0.0 10.552 4.7 11.586 5.3

Brazil : : : : 4.243 1.9 3.843 1.8

Kanada : : : : 71 0.0 70 0.0

Meksiko : : : : 203 0.1 103 0.0

SAD 10 0.0 7 0.0 6.036 2.7 7.550 3.5

Druge zemlje – Azija

2.744 10.7 3.060 11.7 15.800 7.1 19.255 8.8

Indija 2.705 10.6 2.891 11.0 802 0.4 1.873 0.9

Japan : : 0.0 : 984 0.4 788 0.4

Kina 39 0.2 169 0.6 14.014 6.3 16.594 7.6

Ostalo 2.034 7.9 2.561 9.8 9.909 4.5 14.317 6.5

42 |

Prilog 1

Tabela A2: Kosovski izvoz u pojedinačne države (2005–2011)

Države Izvoz

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Austrija 1,017 1,211 2,005 2,072 1,978 5,670 5,711

Belgija 19 17 5,587 28,113 5,176 11,455 5,085

Bugarska 970 13,506 10,005 2,632 2,709 6,765 936

Češka Republika

1 356 159 1,127 463 297 168

Danska 142 44 94 53 75 44 52

Francuska 515 232 145 247 639 1,084 1,305

Grčka 5,522 3,914 8,400 10,851 240 222 194

Holandija 124 1,128 2,413 1,888 1,506 1,018 2,923

Irska 3 20 48 10 3 6 7

Italija 5,668 12,654 9,672 25,485 46,218 80,193 83,924

Luksemburg : : : : : : 8

Mađarska 92 18 112 105 396 29 89

Nemačka 5,965 3,952 16,190 7,205 7,563 15,587 24,144

Poljska 102 281 121 102 53 150 650

Rumunija : : 1,142 43 232 272 987

Slovačka 34 37 395 241 391 920 2,405

Slovenija 1,231 4,515 4,290 6,304 2,882 6,203 6,001

Španija : 49 114 196 51 49 57

Švedska 18 43 8,155 4,390 322 1,116 365

Velika Britanija 72 62 154 173 249 681 1,343

Druge članice EU

126 69 169 2737 129 50 294

27 EU država 21,621 42,108 69,370 93,974 71,275 131,811 136,648


Države Izvoz

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Albanija 5,784 12,645 20,799 21,113 26,182 30,841 34,566

Bosna i Hercegovina

3,411 5,126 5,287 5,919 1,206 1,847 612

Brazil 45 : : : : : 43

Crna Gora 743 2,207 2,913 3,770 3,084 3,920 6,988

Hrvatska 928 1,123 1,837 793 2,151 2,744 2,794

Japan : : : : 3 12 5

Kina 10 5 18 31 1,596 14,779 28,268

Makedonija 10,828 9,734 17,384 20,046 17,355 26,308 30,949

SAD 182 3 17 286 290 116 182

SRBIJA 8,158 20,910 19,280 9,893 3,504 3,941 7,198

Švajcarska 681 7,047 12,937 7,380 10,510 17,786 17,611

Turska 1,041 1,668 2,660 3,044 6,512 9,357 7,831

Ukrajina* 4 : 50 : : : :

Druge 2,847 8,198 12,560 32,214 21,660 52,495 45,470

UKUPNO* 56,283 110,774 165,112 198,463 165,328 295,957 319,165

44

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2005

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2006

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380

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845

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241

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2010

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2011

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46 |

Prilog 1

Tabela A4: Izvoz po robnim grupama za Jablanički region, 2012. godina.

LESKOVAC (03) USD u

1.000Učešće Indeks USD u

1.000Učešće

RB Cartar Robe 2012 2012 2012/2011 2011 2011

1) 2711.13 97 00 Butan, tečni, ostalo 3.968 13,8 67,8 5.852 23,2

2) 7321.89 00 00 Aparati neelektrični za zagrevanje, ostalo, uključujući aparate na čvrsta goriva

3.498 12,2 120,7 2.899 11,5

3) 2202.90 10 00 Pića bezalkoholna, bez mleka i proizvoda od mleka

2.385 8,3 275,9 864 3,4

4) 9401.61 00 00 Sedišta, drvena, tapacirana, ostala

1.600 5,6 115,4 1.387 5,5

5) 6905.10 00 00 Crepovi (krovni) od keramike 1.493 5,2 168,1 888 3,5

6) 6305.32 11 00 Vreće, od polietilenskih traka, pletene, za rasute materijale

1.314 4,6 127,1 1.034 4,1

7) 7308.90 51 00 Paneli od dva profilisana lima, od gvožđa i čelika

1.179 4,1 113,6 1.039 4,1

8) 2711.12 97 00 Propan, tečni, ostalo 1.162 4,0 155,5 747 3,0

9) 3921.13 10 00 Oblici, poliuretanski, fleksibilni, celularne strukture

1.115 3,9 277,7 402 1,6

10) 6904.10 00 00 Opeke zidarske, keramičke 774 2,7 212,4 364 1,4

11) 421.39 20 90 Uređaji za filtriranje ili prečišćavanje vazduha, ostali

756 2,6 - - -

12) 3004.90 00 99 Ostali lekovi, ostalo 511 1,8 - - -

13) 3920.10 40 00 Oblici, od polimera etilena, d<=0, 125mm, ostalo

509 1,8 120,9 421 1,7

14) 2201.10 19 00 Voda, mineralna, prirodna, sa dodatkom CO2, bez šećera

461 1,6 259,3 178 0,7

15) 3208.90 91 00 Boje i premazi, od sintet.polimera, nevodeni, ostalo

451 1,6 90,0 501 2,0

16) 5607.41 00 00 Kanapi za vezivanje od polietilena sl.

448 1,6 141,1 317 1,3

17) 2202.10 00 00 Voda, uklj. mineralnu i gaziranu, sa šećerom, ostalo

431 1,5 ***,* 24 0,1


LESKOVAC (03) USD u 1.000

Učešće Indeks USD u 1.000

Učešće

RB Cartar Robe 2012 2012 2012/2011 2011 2011

18) 4819.40 00 00 Vreće i kese, ostalo, uključujući fišeke

406 1,4 165,1 246 1,0

19) 3004.90 00 91 Ostali lekovi, za prodaju na malo, ostalo

385 1,3 17,4 2.209 8,8

20) 2103.90 90 90 Začini mešani - meš. začinska sredstva i sosovi ostali

347 1,2 249,6 139 0,6

20 Sub Total: 23.192 80,6 118,9 19.509 77,5

316 Total Robe: 28.320 100,0 114,3 25.169 100,0

Napomena: ***,* -indeks je veći od 1000

Izvor: Privredna komora Srbije

48

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50 |

Prilog 1

A6: Lista najvećih izvoznika iz grupe „prvih 20“, od 162 preduzeća ovog regiona i grada Leskovca:

1. NIS-SVETLOST, d.o.o– Bujanovac (17,8%, metalna industrija), 2. ALFA-PLAM a.d.– Vranje (12,4%, metalna industrija), 3. FLUIDI d.o.o.–Preševo (8,8%, prehrambena industrija)4. Simpo a.d.– Vranje (5,5%, drvna industrija)

Sa područja grada Leskovca, najveći izvoznici na Kosovo u 2012. godini su bila slede-ća preduzeća:

1. IGM MLADOST d.d.o.–Leskovac (5,2%, industrija građevinskog materijala),2. INTERLEMIND a.d.– Leskovac (4,1%, metalna industrija), 3. ZDRAVLJE a.d.– Leskovac (3,1%, farmaceutska industrija),4. NEVENA COLOR d.o.o.– Leskovac (1,7%, hemijska industrija)5. MESOKOMBINAT-PROMET d.o.o.– Leskovac (1,2%, prehrambena industrija).

Najveći pad izvoza preduzeća sa liste „prvih 20“, u odnosu na 2011. godinu, beleže:

1. ZDRAVLJE a.d. – Leskovac za oko 60% (indeks 40,6), 2. NIS-SVETLOST d.o.o. – Bujanovac za oko 27% (indeks 73,1),3. SIMPO a.d. – Vranje za 13,5% (indeks 73,1),

dok najveći rast izvoza preduzeća sa liste beleže:

1. FLUIDI d.o.o. – Preševo za 170% (indeks 270,2), 2. IGM MLADOST d.o.o. – Leskovac3. SIMPEN d.o.o. – Bujanovac za 160% ( zajednički indeks 260,5), 4. HEBA a.d. – Bujanovac za oko 160% (indeks 257,5), 5. NUTRIKO d.o.o. – Vranje za oko 80% (indeks 179,4), 6. MESOKOMBINAT-PROMET d.o.o. – Leskovac za oko 50% (indeks 147,7)


Srbija i Kosovo: Potencijal za saradnju i ključni izazovi zajedničke evropske perspektive

1. Evropski put Srbije i Kosova

Politika Evropske unije prema regionu Zapadnog Balkana zasniva se na procesu sta-bilizacije i pridruživanja koji je započet 1999. godine. Svrha procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja je da donese mir, stabilnost i ekonomski razvoj u regionu i da stvori mogućnost za integraciju u Evropsku uniju. Od samita u Solunu u junu 2003. godine, potvrđeno je da su sve zemlje Zapadnog Balkana „potencijalni kandidati“ za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji.

U Solunu, evropski politički akteri poslali su jasnu poruku zemljama koje pretenduju na članstvo – da je EU odlučna da dalje ulaže u dugoročni mir, regionalnu bezbed-nost, stabilnost, demokratiju i ekonomski razvoj u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana. U tom smislu pokrenuti su novi instrumenti kao što je Evropsko partnerstvo, dodatna podrška za demokratsku izgradnju institucija, promovisanje ekonomskog razvoja, uvođenje u programe i agencije Zajednice. Iako na samitu nije izričito pomenuto Ko-sovo, ovaj događaj se naizgled posmatra kao polazna tačka evropske budućnosti za Kosovo, uglavnom zbog toga što je to bio prvi veliki događaj EU na kome su politički lideri Kosova bili prisutni.

52 |


Program integracije Srbije i Kosova u EU podržan je i tehničkim dijalogom između Prištine i Beograda, kao i ispunjavanjem obaveza koje proističu iz Sporazuma o sta-bilizaciji i pridruživanju i kriterijuma za proširenje iz Kopenhagena. Iako SSP između Srbije i EU stupa na snagu u septembru 2013. godine, postignut je mali napredak u Sporazumima o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju i opštim obavezama kriterijuma iz Kopen-hagena kada govorimo o procesu evropskih integracija Kosova. Trenutno su rasprava i energija aktera EU i Kosova usmereni na posredovani tehnički dijalog EU, Prištine i Beograda. Iako se zove „tehnički” u govornom i pisanom diskursu EU, razmatrana pitanja i njihove implikacije su inherentno političke, kao što su prekogranična mobil-nost, priznavanje dokumenata, itd.

Odnosi između EU, Kosova i Srbije su međusobno povezani. Pre svega, za EU je za-jednički evropski put Kosova i Srbije prevashodno definisan u proširenom dnevnom redu pomirenja EU sa Zapadnim Balkanom. Trenutno, ovo je materijalizovano teh-ničkim posredovanim dijalogom EU u Briselu. Ovo omogućava da se put jedne ze-mlje ka EU suštinski poveže sa uspehom i ispunjenjem održivog odnosa normaliza-cije između Beograda i Prištine. Zatim sledi proširenje agende, koje bi po ispunjenju traženih uslova trebalo da kulminira članstvom Srbije i Kosova u EU. Dok bi za Kosovo i Srbiju ovo označilo prekretnicu u njihovoj istoriji i političkom razvoju, na nivou EU se na to gleda kao na pokazatelj jedinstvene akcije EU za spoljnu politiku, a, na širem planu, kao uspešan primer strukturne spoljne politike EU.

U nastavku su dati pregled agende proširenja Evropske unije i njenih odnosa sa Sr-bijom i Kosovom. U analizi puta ka evropskim integracijama Kosova i Srbije poklanja se pažnja lokalnom angažovanju EU u tehničkom dijalogu između Kosova i Srbije i po pitanju viznog režima, koji i dalje važi za Kosovo. Takođe, u ovom radu će se razmatrati dva regionalna aspekta dijaloga23 i normalizacije odnosa Srbije i Kosova. Prvi aspekt je učešće Srbije i Kosova u regionalnim inicijativama i strukturama i di-namika njihovih odnosa u regionalnim okvirima. Drugi aspekt je koliko te inicijative i strukture doprinose, sa svoje strane, normalizaciji odnosa Srbije i Kosova i kako se njihova uloga u tom smislu do sada manifestovala. Na kraju ovog rada date su ocene regionalne dimenzije pregovora o normalizaciji odnosa Srbije i Kosova i preporuke

23 Proces „Dijaloga između Beograda i Prištine” uz posredovanje Evropske unije pokrenut je na osnovu Rezo-lucije Generalne skupštine Ujedinjenih nacija A/RES/64/298 od 9. septembra 2010. godine.


o tome kako bi se regionalni okvir u budućnosti mogao bolje iskoristiti. U zaključku rada predstavljeni su izgledi za zajednički evropski put Kosova i Srbije, kao i uloga EU u tom procesu.

54 |


Pregled odnosa EU sa Kosovom

Kada je reč o proširenju EU na Zapadni Balkan, neophodno je istaći da je prvi put u svojoj istoriji EU uključena u pripremanje svojih budućih država članica angažova-njem u programima izgradnje države, platformama pomirenja i rešavanja konflikata i strukturnim promenama u demokratiji i vladavini prava. Izgleda da je u slučaju Koso-va ova uloga EU još jača, s obzirom na to da je slučaj Kosova sui generis sa (inicijalno) nerešenim političkim statusom, a potom i sa stavom EU prema njemu. S jedne stra-ne, Kosovo nije priznato od strane svih članica EU, budući da pet njenih članica (Grč-ka, Kipar, Rumunija, Slovačka i Španija) ne priznaju njegov status. Posle Deklaracije o nezavisnosti Kosova 2008. godine, dok je isticao uverenje EU da nezavisnost Kosova predstavlja slučaj sui generis, Evropski savet je izjavio da je na državama članicama EU da odluče o svojim odnosima sa Republikom Kosovo u skladu sa sopstvenom lokalnom praksom i međunarodnim pravom. EU zadržava neutralan stav prema Ko-sovu i naziva ga „Kosovom* (ovo je oznaka bez prejudiciranja stavova o statusu i u skladu je sa Rezolucijom 1244 i mišljenjem Međunarodnog suda pravde o Deklaraciji o nezavisnosti Kosova).

Posle Deklaracije o nezavisnosti 2008. godine, Vlada Republike Kosovo je usvojila Plan za evropske integracije 2008–2010, reformski paket koji je napravljen sa ciljem da se nastavi razvoj institucija unutar evropskog okvira integracija kako bi se održao korak sa povećanim obavezama koje proizilaze iz PSP. Nakon toga, 2008. godine, Vla-da je ustanovila nove međuinstitucionalne strukture za evropske integracije. Evrop-ska agenda uneta je u sve lokalne institucije, strukture, planiranja i izbor politike.

Dana 28. februara 2012. godine, ministri spoljnih i evropskih poslova zemalja članica EU, okupljeni u Savetu za opšte poslove i spoljne odnose, podržali su nameru Evrop-ske komisije da pokrene studiju izvodljivosti za Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između Evropske unije i Kosova. Komisija i visoki predstavnik Unije za spoljne poslove i bezbednosnu politiku utvrdili su da je Kosovo ispunilo standarde. Ipak, glavni izazovi ostaju u oblastima kao što su vladavina prava, naročito u borbi protiv organizova-nog kriminala i korupcije, reforma državne uprave, migracija, sloboda izražavanja, zaštita i unapređivanje prava manjinskih zajednica, posebno Srba, sa ciljem njihove integracije u društvo, kao i unapređenje dijaloga i pomirenja između svih zajednica.


Konačno, zahteva se konstruktivan pristup svim kosovskim susedima kao neophodna komponenta u omogućavanju potpunog uključivanja Kosova i učešća u svim inicijati-vama regionalne saradnje, posebno kada je u pitanju trgovina, usklađivanje politike i prekogranična pitanja.

S druge strane, EU je u velikoj meri prisutna na Kosovu od 1999. godine, a u među-vremenu je i najveći donator po glavi stanovnika. Od 1999. godine, EU je dala 2 mili-jarde evra Kosovu za razvojne programe koji se protežu od vladavine prava i promo-visanja demokratije sve do džez koncerata. U 2008. godini, Evropska komisija je bila domaćin donatorske konferencije za Kosovo u Briselu na kojoj su se EU i njene države članice obavezale na kombinovani iznos od 508 miliona evra (od ukupno obećanih 1,2 milijarde evra) koje treba da budu isplaćene u narednom trogodišnjem periodu. Kancelarija Evropske unije na Kosovu spada u fizički tri najveće zgrade kancelarija EU širom sveta (druge dve su u Beogradu i Moskvi). U spoljnoj politici, veličina „amba-sada” i zgrada koje se koriste u inostranstvu su pokazatelji posvećenosti i značaja koji se pridaje pojedinim zemljama. Uprkos nemogućnosti da uđe u ugovorne odnose sa Kosovom, kao i sa drugim državama koje teže pridruživanju, ovo nije sprečilo Savet da uspostavi i učini misiju EULEKS-a odgovornom za vladavinu prava i specijalnog predstavnika EU (EUSR), koji posluju pod istim krovom kao Međunarodna civilna kancelarija (MCK, engl. ICO), odgovornim za nadgledanje prelaznog perioda ka punoj funkcionalizaciji ključnih državnih institucija. Sa oko 2000 sudija, tužilaca i policajaca, Misija vladavine prava EU na Kosovu je koncentrisana na mentorstvo, nadgledanje i savetovanje lokalnih vlasti. Ova do danas najveća misija ESDP u Briselu se smatra la-kmus testom zajedničke akcije EU, testom sposobnosti EU da govori jednim glasom, a šire i kao test za zajedničku i spoljnu politiku EU.

U oktobru 2012. godine Evropska komisija se postarala da budu otklonjene zakon-ske prepreke za Kosovo u potpisivanju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju sa EU (SSP), pod uslovom da je postignut dalji napredak u oblasti vladavine prava, državne uprave, zaštite manjina i trgovina. Pregovori su pokrenuti u jesen 2013. godine.

SSP predstavlja prvi sveobuhvatni ugovorni odnos između Kosova i EU, a kao i u slu-čaju ostalih država Zapadnog Balkana, on će služiti kao putokaz za Kosovo da osigura bliskije odnose sa EU. Pored prioriteta SSP u oblastima kao što su vladavina prava, državna uprava, zaštita manjina i trgovina, SSP ima dodatni uslov za zemlje Zapadnog

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Balkana – komponentu „regionalne saradnje”. Ona se smatra kamenom temeljcem okvira politike EU, a u kontekstu Zapadnog Balkana shvata se neophodnim uslovom za stabilnost, pomirenje, dobrosusedstvo i dobre političke odnose.

Uprkos velikim izdacima EU na Kosovu i prisustva u strukturama bez presedana, koje je usmereno na vladavinu prava i organizovani kriminal, upravo ova dva domena su ono zbog čega i međunarodne organizacije, ali i unutrašnje javno mnjenje, kritikuju Kosovo zbog lošeg učinka. U izveštaju Evropskog revizorskog suda je takođe nave-dena ova nesposobnost EU da ispuni ciljeve sopstvene misije. To je produbilo jaz integracije Kosova u EU u odnosu na zemlje u regionu.

Dok se pitanje pet država članica EU koje ga nisu priznale vidi kao makropolitički pro-blem koji bi imao posledice u daljim fazama integracije Kosova u EU, pitanje bezvi-znog režima za Kosovo je najhitniji problem koji utiče i na svakodnevne probleme. Kosovo je jedini potencijalni kandidat za članstvo na Zapadnom Balkanu koji nema liberalizaciju viznog režima sa EU. Pošto su EU i Kosovo pokrenuli dijalog o viznoj liberalizaciji u januaru 2012. godine, kasnije te godine Kosovo je dobilo uputstvo za li-beralizaciju viznog režima sa EU koje potanko razmatra neophodne reforme. Izveštaj o napretku sprovođenja plana za Kosovo koji je predstavljen 2013. godine ukazuje da je kapacitet Kosova da se bori protiv organizovanog kriminala i korupcije ostao ograničen, što bi potencijalno imalo oštar uticaj na unutrašnju bezbednost EU. EU je zadržala čvrsto stanovište da je pre početka viznog dijaloga sa Kosovom potreban dalji napredak u oblasti readmisije i reintegracije. U julu 2013. godine Skupština Ko-sova je usvojila paket od osam zakona, kao što to zahteva EU u okviru Uputstva za liberalizaciju viznog režima. Za razliku od Evropske komisije i Saveta, Evropski parla-ment kontinuirano naglašava rizik od neotvaranja vizne liberalizacije za Kosovo i da bi se to u budućnosti moglo vratiti EU kao bumerang . Civilno društvo na Kosovu je izrazilo svoju zabrinutost da je set zakona donet na prilično nespretan način koji ne sledi demokratska načela javnih rasprava.

Zemlje unutar EU pokazale su jasne rezerve po pitanju vizne liberalizacije sa Koso-vom, plašeći se velikog priliva imigranata u zemlje EU, što bi imalo bezbednosne i političke implikacije. Iskustvo sa povećanim brojem imigracionih dosijea iz Srbije, Makedonije i Bosne i Hercegovine u periodu nakon liberalizacije viznog režima pot-krepilo je strahove, posebno imajući u vidu da je oko 70% stanovništva na Kosovu


ispod 35 godina, dok se nezaposlenost, uprkos neslaganju podataka, procenjuje na između 30-40%. Ambasade država članica EU u Prištini su takođe pooštrile i dalje birokratizovale procedure zahteva za vizu i u međuvremenu je postao primetan blagi porast „stope odbijanja“ zahteva za vizu. U pogledu uslova za liberalizaciju viznog režima i njihovo ispunjenje, izgleda da se Uputstvo za liberalizaciju viznog režima Kosova metodološki razlikuje u poređenju sa uputstvom za druge potencijalne kan-didate. Iako uslovi principijelno izgledaju slično u pogledu mera bezbednosti granica, bezbednosti dokumenata, borbe protiv korupcije i organizovanog kriminala, itd, Ko-sovu je zadato više merila, podvrgnuto je pojačanim mehanizmima nadzora, strožem i faznom procesu vrednovanja i složenijoj proceduri odlučivanja.

Vizni režim je pre svega ozbiljna prepreka slobodi kretanja ljudi, usled čega ostaju najizolovanija grupa u Evropi. Osim toga, on stvara i prepreku ekonomskom razvo-ju Kosova. Konačno, kao jedinom potencijalnom kandidatu izostavljenom iz politike bezviznog režima, EU šalje negativan signal Kosovu i težnji njegovog naroda za inte-graciju u EU. Na Balkanskom samitu u decembru 2013. godine, član parlamenta EU, Doris Pak, tvrdila je da bi EU mogla da izgubi svoju pokretačku silu na Kosovu i na Zapadnom Balkanu ukoliko nastavi da šalje poruke koje znače izolaciju.

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Pregled odnosa EU sa Srbijom

Kada je u oktobru 2000. godine svrgnut režim Slobodana Miloševića, Srbija je za-počela sa procesima demokratizacije i evropeizacije. Ovaj dvostruki proces podra-zumevao je ne samo institucionalne reforme, već i transformaciju identiteta. Kako je tranzicija napredovala, Srbija je, zahvaljujući sve kompleksnijim interakcijama sa evropskim društvom država, sve više preuzimala identitet države koja je u isto vreme evropska i demokratska. Ova dva identiteta su snažno uticala na to kako je Srbija de-finisala svoje nacionalne interese. Nakon promene režima Srbija (i SRJ) se nije odre-kla svog zahteva u vezi sa Kosovom, mada je rešenje sada tražila „samo zajedno sa međunarodnim činiocima, nikako u sukobu sa njima”.24

Članstvo u EU je strateški cilj Srbije koji se zasniva na ekonomskim, političkim i vred-nosnim razlozima. EU je najvažniji trgovinski partner Srbije, sa ukupnim udelom od 60%, kao i najveći investicioni partner (60% svih investicija od 2001). Posle demo-kratskih promena Srbija je 2000. godine počela da učestvuje u procesu stabilizacije i pridruživanja. Kao jedna od dve federalne jedinice SR Jugoslavije, Srbija je u januaru 2002. godine započela institucionalne pripreme za pristupanje EU. U to vreme je u okviru Ministarstva za međunarodne ekonomske odnose Vlade Srbije formirano odeljenje za evropske integracije. Sadašnja republička Kancelarija za evropske inte-gracije (SEIO) osnovana je 2004. godine, što je jasno pokazalo rešenost Vlade Srbije da ubrza pripreme za integraciju u EU. Usvojivši Nacionalnu strategiju za pristupanje EU 2005. godine, vlada je postavila pristupanje EU kao jedan od najviših prioriteta i dugoročni strateški cilj. Kratkoročni cilj je bio potpisivanje Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju EU (SSP) u što je moguće kraćem roku. Kako definiše Nacionalna strategija za pridruživanje EU, srednjoročni cilj za kraj 2008. ili početak 2009. godine jeste dobijanje statusa kandidata.

U oktobru 2005. godine započeli su pregovori između Evropske unije i Državne Za-jednice Srbije i Crne Gore o potpisivanju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, što

24 Ekspoze ministra spoljnih poslova Gorana Svilanovića pred Narodnom skupštinom SRJ, 24 oktobra 2001. Dostupno u: Dragojlović Nataša sa saradnicima, Spoljna politika Srbije–strategije i dokumenta, Evropski pokret u Srbiji, Beograd, 2010, str. 295.


je bio prvi korak ka integraciji u EU. Zbog nedovoljne saradnje sa Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom za bivšu Jugoslaviju pregovori su obustavljeni u periodu od maja 2006. do juna 2007. godine. Dok su pregovori bili suspendovani, EU je činila napore kako proces evropskih integracija Srbije ne bi kasnio. Nastavak dijaloga sa Srbijom kroz tehničke razgovore i putem sastanaka sa trojkom EU pokazao je snažnu od-lučnost EU da zadrži Srbiju na evropskom putu. Nakon što je rasformirana Državna Zajednica Srbije i Crne Gore, po objavljivanju deklaracije o nezavisnosti Crne Gore posle referenduma iz maja 2006. godine, nastavljen je politički dijalog sa Srbijom kao naslednicom državne zajednice.

Pregovori oko zaključivanja Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SSP) nastavljeni su u junu 2007. godine. SSP je konačno potpisan u aprilu 2008, a stupio je na snagu septembra 2013. Prema Izveštaju o napretku koji je sačinila EU, Srbija je postigla zna-čajne rezultate u primeni SSP, ali će se primena ovog sporazuma i dalje pratiti tokom procesa pridruživanja

Dobivši mandat od Saveta EU, Evropska komisija je 2006. godine otpočela pregovo-re o viznim olakšicama sa Srbijom. Nacrti sporazuma potpisani su septembra 2007. godine. Sporazumom o viznim olakšicama smanjena je cena manipulativnih troškova za građane Srbije i potpuno su ukinute vize za izvesne kategorije podnosilaca zahte-va. Povrh toga, smanjen je broj propratnih dokumenata neophodnih za podnošenje zahteva za vizu i omogućeno je izdavanje viza za više ulazaka pojedinim kategorijama čestih putnika. Sporazum o readmisiji jasno je naznačio obaveze i procedure kojih se i vlasti Srbije i zemalja članica EU moraju pridržavati pri readmisiji ljudi koji nezakoni-to borave na teritoriji EU.

Evropska komisija je početkom 2008. godine započela dijalog o viznoj liberalizaciji sa Srbijom i ostalim zemljama Zapadnog Balkana. Ključni deo dijaloga predstavljale su mape puta koje je izradila Evropska komisija, a u kojima su naznačeni uslovi koje svaka zemlja mora ispuniti. Evropska komisija je jula 2009. godine predložila ukida-nje viza za građane Srbije, Crne Gore i Makedonije. Evropski parlament je novembra 2009. dao pozitivno mišljenje. Bezvizni režim stupio je na snagu u decembru 2009. Građanima Republike Srbije više nisu potrebne vize za putovanje u 25 država članica Evropske unije (EU), kao ni za putovanje u tri zemlje koje nisu njene članice, ali jesu u šengenskom prostoru.

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Srbija je 2009. zatražila da postane članica EU, a zvanični status kandidata za članstvo joj je Evropski savet dodelio u martu 2012, dok je ista institucija potvrdila datum međuvladine konferencije u decembru 2013, koji je tokom grčkog predsedavanja EU zakazan za 21. januar 2014, čime je Srbija stigla do faze pristupnih pregovora sa EU. Proceduralno i faktički, pristupni pregovori, koji se odnose na dinamiku i modalitete usvajanja i primene pravnih tekovina EU, uz veoma malo ili bez ikakvih mogućnosti da će propasti, prošireni su merilima za otvaranje, zatvaranje i prolaznim merilima. Povrh toga, pregovori počinju od „najtežih“ poglavlja – tj. od 23. i 24, koji se bave pravosuđem i osnovnim pravima, kao i pravdom, slobodom i bezbednošću. U slu-čaju Srbije će u 35. poglavlju, pod naslovom „Ostala pitanja“, biti posvećena osobita pažnja i pitanjima Kosova i dijaloga između Beograda i Prištine, koji snažno utiču na dinamiku procesa pristupanja. Opseg evropskih pravnih tekovina koji je i „predmet“ pregovora treba izmeniti, primeniti i sprovesti u pravnom sistemu Srbije. Stoga je verovatno da će pregovori trajati više godina i da će se razumni i pozitivni efekti po društvo i privredu postepeno pojavljivati čak i pre nego što Srbija postane članica EU.

Kao potencijalnom kandidatu za članstvo u EU, Srbiji je od 2000. omogućeno da koristi pretpristupne finansijske instrumente EU kako bi sprovela političke, ekonom-ske, društvene i institucionalne reforme u okviru procesa stabilizacije i pridruživanja. Poslednjih godina uloženo je mnogo napora u stvaranje nacionalne institucionalne strukture koja će moći da efikasno koordinira reformama koje imaju podršku u pro-jektima koje finansira EU.

EU je između 2004. i 2006. godine pružila Republici Srbiji značajnu pomoć kroz pro-gram CARDS. U ovom periodu pomoć EU Zapadnom Balkanu iznosila je 4,2 milijarde EUR, od kojih je 1.390.600.000 EUR otišlo Republici Srbiji.

Tokom 2007. godine EU je uvela novi finansijski instrument za pretpristupni pro-ces u periodu 2007–2013. Tokom ovog budžetskog perioda pretpristupni fondovi su usmereni kroz jedan jedinstveni instrument, Instrument za pretpristupnu pomoć (IPA), namenjen pružanju fokusirane podrške državama kandidatima i potencijalnim kandidatima. Kao država potencijalni kandidat, Srbija može da koristi I i II kompo-nentu IPA. U periodu 2007–2013 Srbiji je u proseku dodeljivano 200 miliona evra godišnje, dok će ukupan iznos dodeljene pomoći u navedenom periodu iznositi oko 1,4 milijardi evra.


Dijalog Prištine i Beograda uz posredovanje EU

Od proglašenja nezavisnosti Kosova, beogradske vlasti drže se stava da su nastavak borbe za Kosovo i nastavak napora u pridruživanju EU dva nezavisna cilja kojima se istovremeno može težiti. Međutim, u poslednje dve godine, postalo je jasno da su ova dva cilja mnogo manje povezana nego što to Beograd prikazuje.

EU je jedinstveno i jednoglasno zatražila od Srbije i Kosova da „normalizuju odnose“ kao preduslov za početak razgovora o pristupanju. Iako je ispunjenje merila bio ne-ophodan uslov za početak pregovora o Sporazumu o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju sa Kosovom i pregovora o članstvu sa Srbijom, za EU je bilo ključno da se ostvari neka-kva stabilizacija, odnosno normalizacija odnosa između Kosova i Srbije. Iako nije bilo strogo definisano šta bi „normalizacija odnosa“ podrazumevala, sve je u velikoj meri ukazivalo na nužnost da se reši problem sporne teritorije na severu Kosova. Dijalog započet 8. marta 2011. do sada je bio usmeren na tri glavna pitanja: 1) regionalnu saradnju, 2) slobodu kretanja i 3) vladavinu prava. Doneti su zaključci u vezi sa carin-skim pečatima, matičnim knjigama, univerzitetskim diplomama, slobodom kretanja, regionalnim predstavljanjem Kosova, katastarskim knjigama, integrisanim upravlja-njem granicama, stvaranjem multietničke komponente u kosovskoj policiji kako bi se sačuvale srpske pravoslavne crkve i manastiri na Kosovu, razmenom oficira za vezu i razvojnim fondom za srpsku većinu u opštinama na severu Kosova. Ipak, unutrašnje podele u okviru EU ponovo su vidljive povodom toga koliko se dijalog može inkor-porirati i iskoristiti u okviru principa uslovnosti EU. Dok se s jedne strane Austrija, Holandija, Nemačka i Velika Britanija zalažu za pritisak na Srbiju da formalno prizna Kosovo, pet članica EU koje ga ne priznaju, zajedno sa Češkom i Italijom po svoj prilici zastupaju mekši pristup prema vršenju pritiska na Srbiju.

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Briselski sporazum

Sporazum postignut 19. aprila 2013. između vlada Srbije i Kosova je od naročitog značaja. Njime je regulisan mehanizam podele vlasti na severu Kosova koji bi bio pri-hvatljiv i vlastima u Beogradu i onima u Prištini, a koji između ostalog nalaže da ove države neće blokirati jedna drugu niti podsticati ostale da blokiraju napredak druge strane na putu ka EU. Ovaj sporazum je pozdravljen kao ključni korak ka normaliza-ciji odnosa, a iako ne podrazumeva da Beograd prizna nezavisnost Kosova, prema mišljenju visoke predstavnice EU za spoljnu politiku i bezbednost Ketrin Ešton, ovaj sporazum za obe strane predstavlja „korak dalje od prošlosti, a korak bliže Evropi”. Nekoliko dana nakon što je postignut sporazum, Evropska komisija je dala zeleno svetlo za početak pregovora o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između EU i Kosova, kao i za početak pregovora sa Srbijom o članstvu. Dijalog je u tom smislu imao ulogu da sa jedne strane Kosovu olakša put ka Sporazumu o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju i pregovo-re sa Srbijom, a sa druge strane nastavak normalizacije odnosa.

Briselski sporazum ima svega 15 tačaka. Prvih 6 tačaka posvećeno je Zajednici srpskih opština na Kosovu. Tačke 7, 8 i 9 posvećene su integrisanju srpskih bezbednosnih struktura u jedinstven kosovski sistem. Deseta tačka reguliše integrisanje sudske vla-sti na Kosovu. Tačka 11 se odnosi na raspisivanje lokalnih izbora. Tačka 12 najavljuje usvajanje implementacionog plana, a tačka 13 pregovore o telekomunikacijama i električnoj energiji. U tački 14, koja je posebno važna za ovaj rad, obe strane su se obavezale da „neće blokirati niti ohrabrivati na blokiranje napredak druge strane prema EU“. Konačno, tačka 15 predviđa osnivanje implementacionog komiteta uz pomoć EU.

Sažetost Sporazuma je sigurno olakšala njegovo sklapanje. Da su se strane zaglibile u dogovaranju detalja, postizanje Sporazuma bi verovatno bilo mnogo teže. Među-tim, sažetost teksta je takođe stvorila i mnoge nejasnoće koje sada opterećuju im-plementaciju. Svi rokovi koji su pomenuti u Sporazumu su prekoračeni. Sa velikim zakašnjenjem, i uz velike probleme i ponavljanja, održani su lokalni izbori na Kosovu. Po prvi put, izbori su održani po kosovskim zakonima u četiri severne opštine, što je za sada najveće dostignuće Briselskog sporazuma. Ipak, Zajednica srpskih opština još uvek nije formirana. Beograd i Priština još uvek ne mogu da se dogovore ni kako će se


ona zvati (Zajednica ili Asocijacija), a kamoli oko njenih detaljnih nadležnosti i načina finansiranja. Imenovan je kosovski Srbin za regionalnog policijskog komandanta za sever Kosova, ali se on u praksi suočava sa brojnim opstrukcijama. Zatvorene su sve kancelarije MUP Srbije na severu Kosova, ali je jako malo srpskih policajaca integri-sano u KPS. Strukture civilne zaštite na severu ostale su potpuno netaknute i pred-stavljaju potencijalni bezbednosni problem. Sudovi Republike Srbije prestali su da primaju nove slučajeve, ali dogovor oko formiranja i sastava okružnog suda u Kosov-skoj Mitrovici još uvek nije postignut. Integracija srpskih sudija u kosovski pravosudni sistem nije ni otpočela. Dogovori o energetici i telekomunikacijama su postignuti, ali implementacija ide teško i sporo (posebno u oblasti telekomunikacija).

Postizanje Briselskog sporazuma odblokiralo je proces evropskih integracija Srbije. Tokom junskog samita Evropski savet je podržao otvaranje pregovora o članstvu sa Srbijom, što se i dogodilo održavanjem prve međuvladine konferencije 21. januara 2014. EU je usvojila pregovarački okvir u kome je veoma važno poglavlje 35. Ina-če rezervisano za „ostala pitanja“, poglavlje 35 će u slučaju pregovora sa Srbijom biti uglavnom posvećeno normalizaciji odnosa sa Kosovom. Ovo poglavlje će, kao i poglavlja 23 i 24 koja se tiču pravosuđa i bezbednosti, biti prvo otvoreno i posled-nje zatvoreno. Osim toga, za implementaciju obaveza koje proističu iz poglavlja 35 biće zadužena Evropska spoljna služba, a ne Evropska komisija. Osim toga, izvesno je da će vlasništvo nad procesom pristupanja Srbije Evropskoj uniji Komisija deliti i sa prestonicama, među kojima će istaknutu ulogu igrati Berlin. Ovo je sa jedne strane dobro za sam dijalog sa Prištinom, ali može negativno da se odrazi na proces pravne harmonizacije i unutrašnjih reformi u Srbiji. Tačnije, postoji opravdana bojazan da će demokratizacija i evropeizacija biti potisnute u drugi plan i da će Srbija pristupiti Uniji iz „strateških“ razloga. Iako se u pregovaračkom okviru ne definišu konkretni uslovi vezani za normalizaciju odnosa sa Prištinom, pretpostavlja se da će to biti poštovanje dogovorenog, inkluzivna regionalna saradnja koja uključuje Kosovo, saradnja sa mi-sijom EULEX, kao i nastavak pregovora u dobroj veri kako bi se proces normalizacije okončao pravno obavezujućim. Visoki zvaničnici za sada ne pominju zahtev da Beo-grad prizna nezavisnost Kosova, ali to nije isključeno u budućnosti.

Što se tiče Kosova, postizanje Briselskog sporazuma je dovelo do progresa u procesu evro-integracija, mada manje nego u slučaju Srbije. Samo nekoliko dana nakon posti-zanja „istorijskog dogovora“, Evropska komisija je predložila otpočinjanje pregovora o

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zaključivanju Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SSP) sa Kosovom, što je Evrop-ski savet i potvrdio na junskom sastanku. Pregovori su počeli u oktobru, a sklapanje sporazuma se očekuje do leta 2014. Za razliku od prethodnih SSP-a koji su morali da budu ratifikovani u svim državama članicama EU, po novim pravilima koja su stupila na snagu sa Lisabonskim ugovorom, to više neće biti slučaj. Pošto je EU stekla status pravnog lica, sporazumi ovog tipa koje ona potpisuje ne moraju prolaziti ratifikaciju u državama članicama. Zbog toga će proces pridruživanja Kosova biti daleko olakšan, imajući u vidu da 5 država članica nije priznalo Kosovo i da bi proces ratifikacije u ovim državama verovatno bio blokiran. Ipak, sam sporazum o članstvu, ako i kada do njega dođe, moraće da prođe proces ratifikacije u svim državama članicama.

Prethodna 2013. godina je po mnogo čemu bila istorijska za odnose Beograda i Pri-štine, kao i za proces evropske integracije ovog dela Zapadnog Balkana. EU je u svoj spoljnopolitički dosije, koji je inače ispunjen prosečnim ocenama, upisala jedan ve-liki, gotovo sjajan uspeh. Ipak, tokom 2014. godine nije realno očekivati veliki na-predak ni u normalizaciji odnosa ni u evropskim integracijama. Izbori su bili održani najpre u Srbiji (mart 2014), zatim u EU (maj 2014) i konačno na Kosovu (jun 2014). Tokom ovog perioda barem jedna od tri strane neće biti u mogućnosti da u punom kapacitetu odlučuje što faktički znači da je teško očekivati veliki pomak napred. Dija-log o normalizaciji će od jeseni 2014. godine najverovatnije voditi tri potpuno nova lica i biće neophodno neko vreme da se ovaj tim uigra. Osim toga, za razliku od Srbije i Kosova, čiji odlučioci neće hrliti da prave neophodne ali kod kuće uvek nepopularne kompromise sa drugom stranom, EU će biti zaokupljena izborima kod kuće i ukrajin-skom krizom napolju. Osim ukoliko se stvari značajno ne pogoršaju na terenu, Zapad-ni Balkan će tokom 2014. najverovatnije biti stavljen na autopilot dok se ne steknu uslovi za prebacivanje u narednu brzinu. Dakle, do kraja 2014. godine moguće je u najboljem slučaju očekivati varenje i implementaciju postignutih dogovora, mada nam iskustvo govori da se na Zapadnom Balkanu najbolji scenario retko kada odvija u praksi. Budući da će pregovori kako o članstvu sa Srbijom, tako i o pridruživanju sa Kosovom napredovati u dobroj meri u skladu sa dijalogom o normalizaciji, ni na ovom frontu nije realno očekivati veliki pomak osim onoga što je već najavljeno.


Regionalne implikacije pregovora Srbije i Kosova i „Prvog sporazuma o principima koji regulišu normalizaciju odnosa”25

Osim Briselskog sporazuma potpisanog 2013, marta 2011. godine, postignut je i tzv. sporazum o fusnoti u vezi sa učešćem Kosova na balkanskim regionalnim sastancima. Kosovo je na regionalnim sastancima u prethodnom periodu predstavljala Misija UN na Kosovu (UNMIK), koja je nakon rata iz 1999. osnovana rezolucijom Saveta bezbed-nosti UN br. 1244. Kako je posle deklaracije o nezavisnosti iz 2008. ovo postalo ne-prihvatljivo vlastima u Prištini, Beograd je nastavio da insistira na prisustvu UNMIK-a, čime je blokirao učešće Kosova u regionalnim strukturama. Ovaj sporazum ima veliku praktičnu i ekonomsku vrednost, dok se iz političke perspektive na Kosovu smatra ko-rakom dalje ka potpuno razvijenom identitetu suverenosti. Za Srbiju je ovaj sporazum pred domaćom javnošću predstavljao dokaz da će se kroz dijalog i dalje poštovati stav Srbije prema statusu Kosova. Konačno, sporazum o fusnoti je u EU pozdravljen kao us-peh normativne moći u prevazilaženju mentaliteta „blokiranja“ na Zapadnom Balkanu.

Tema pregovora između dve strane odnosila se prvenstveno na naziv, način predstav-ljanja i potpisivanja Kosova u regionalnim organizacijama i inicijativama u kojima već učestvuje. Mada u prvoj odredbi postignutog Dogovora o regionalnom predstavljanju i saradnji „obe strane potvrđuju svoju posvećenost delotvornoj, inkluzivnoj i reprezenta-tivnoj regionalnoj saradnji”26, srpska strana se nije obavezala da će podržati učlanjivanje Kosova u regionalne inicijative u kojima do sada nije učestvovalo, ili se uzdržati od ome-tanja takvih nastojanja. Član 1027 ovog dogovora ipak daje određeni prostor slobode da se u budućnosti omogući članstvo Kosova i u onim regionalnim inicijativama u kojima do sada nije učestvovalo, mada se to u praksi nije pokazalo kao lako dostižno.

25 Analiza koja sledi zasniva se prvenstveno na raspoloživim zvaničnim dokumentima o toku pregovora između Srbije i Kosova, zaključenim sporazumima i preuzetim obavezama. Drugi izvor podataka su same regionalne inicijative, podaci o njihovom članstvu i aktivnostima koji su javno dostupni na njihovim stranicama na inter-netu, kao intervjui sa predstavnicima reprezentativnog broja inicijativa u kojima učestvuju i Srbija i Kosovo.26 Dogovor o regionalnom predstavljanju i saradnji postignut je 24. februara 2012. godine, u Briselu, tokom devete runde pregovora predstavnika Srbije i Kosova, uz posredovanje EU.27 Član 10 „Pod regionalnim organizacijama iz ovog aranžmana smatraju se postojeće i buduće međuvladine organizacije ili dogovori čiji je cilj da promovišu saradnju ili integraciju u regionu Balkana. „Regionalni sus-reti” uključuju susrete ovih organizacija, kao i ad hoc tela i neformalne susrete sa sličnim ciljem. Takođe, ovo uključuje i susrete sa institucijama EU u kontekstu Evropske agende”.

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Sa druge strane, kosovski pregovarači su nastojali da taj problem reše nakon zaključi-vanja ovog dogovora, time što su tokom dogovora o implementaciji pojedinih odred-bi Dogovorenih zaključaka u vezi sa IBM (o integrisanoj kontroli administrativne lini-je) tokom Četvrtog sastanka Grupe za implementaciju, održanog 29. i 30. novembra 2012. godine, kada su svoju saglasnost oko procedure za razmenu informacija u okvi-ru Tehničkog protokola uslovljavali prijemom u članstvo regionalnih organizacija čiji je rad u vezi sa IBM-om (MARRI i SELEC)28, što je srpska strana odbila. To se ponovilo 17. aprila 2013. godine, kada je Srbija prihvatila svih 15 tačaka Prvog sporazuma o principima koji regulišu normalizaciju odnosa29, izuzev one koja vezuje pitanje polici-je na severu Kosova sa članstvom Kosova u međunarodnim organizacijama.

Tumačenje postignutog dogovora o regionalnom predstavljanju se pokazalo kao novi problem, koji se pojavio odmah nakon njegovog postizanja. Naime, u samom tekstu dogovora nije precizirano da li usaglašena fusnota, koja prati naziv Kosovo*, treba da stoji i na tablama koje služe za identifikaciju učesnika na skupovima. Tako su predstav-nici iz Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Srbije napustili sastanak Upravnog odbora Saveta za regionalnu saradnju, koji je održan 16. marta 2012. u Sarajevu, jer nije bilo fusnote na tabli kosovskog predstavnika, dok su predstavnici institucija i nevladinih organizacija sa Kosova istog dana napustili sastanak nevladinih organizacija u Beogradu, u organi-zaciji Balkanske mreže za razvoj civilnog društva (BCSDN) i programa za civilno društvo Evropske komisije, zato što je fusnota bila napisana na tabli koja ih je predstavljala.

Potom je usledila instrukcija Vlade Srbije da njeni predstavnici ne treba da učestvuju na skupovima na kojima su kosovski učesnici predstavljeni tablama ili radnim mate-rijalima koji ne sadrže fusnotu30.

28 Videti: Dogovor o regionalnom predstavljanju i saradnji, detaljnije u pregledu inicijativa koje se bave pravosuđem i unutrašnjim poslovima u Aneksu 1, str. 4.29 Prvi sporazum o principima koji regulišu normalizaciju odnosa parafiran je 19. aprila 2013. godine u Briselu, bez ove sporne tačke.

30 „Vlada je 20, odnosno 29. marta 2012. godine donela Zaključak o usvajanju „Instrukcije za postupan-je predstavnika državnih organa Republike Srbije na određenim skupovima posvećenim regionalnoj sarad-nji na kojima učestvuju predstavnici PIS u Prištini”, a zatim i novu „Listu organizacija i inicijativa posvećenim regionalnoj saradnji u Jugoistočnoj Evropi“.“ Izveštaj o dosadašnjem procesu političkog i tehničkog dijaloga, sа privrеmеnim instituciјаmа sаmоuprаvе u prištini uz pоsrеdоvаnје Еvrоpskе uniје uključuјući prоcеs implеmеntаciје pоstignutih dоgоvоrа, str. 18 i 19. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/akta_procedura/2013/1666-13.pdf 11.4.2014.


Ispostavilo se da postupanje predstavnika državnih organa Republike Srbije u skla-du sa takvom instrukcijom može naneti štetu spoljnopolitičkim odnosima Srbije i nastavku procesa evropskih integracija, pa se prihvatilo da na tabli ispred predstav-nika kosovskih institucija stoji samo natpis Kosovo* bez ispisivanja teksta fusnote na samoj tabli. Tako je Vlada Republike Srbije na sednici održanoj 2. septembra 2012. godine usvojila novu „Instrukciju za postupanje predstavnika državnih organa Re-publike Srbije na skupovima posvećenim regionalnoj saradnji na kojima učestvuju predstavnici privremenih institucija u Prištini”31. Usvajanjem nove instrukcije otklo-njena su različita tumačenja u implementaciji postignutog aranžmana i omogućeno je potpuno poštovanje dogovora iz Brisela u skladu sa tumačenjem Evropske unije.

Ipak, srpska strana je u potpunosti ostala na svojim pozicijama o asimetričnom pred-stavljanju Kosova sa jasnom referencom na Rezoluciju 1244 SB UN, kao i Savetodavno mišljenje Međunarodnog suda pravde o deklaraciji o nezavisnosti Kosova. Smatralo se da bi razvlašćenje UNMIK-a vodilo gašenju Rezolucije 1244 SB UN, pa je ovim aran-žmanom ostavljena mogućnost UNMIK-u da i ubuduće učestvuje na sastancima regi-onalnih organizacija i inicijativa zajedno sa predstavnicima kosovskih institucija. Nagla-šava se takođe da postignuti dogovor predviđa da će se domaćini sastanaka podsticati da izbegavaju prikazivanje nacionalnih simbola osim svojih sopstvenih i simbola EU.

Imajući u vidu ovakav stav Srbije, kao i odbijanje kosovskih vlasti da na bilo koji način budu predstavljane preko predstavnika UNMIK-a ili u njihovom prisustvu, član 6 ovog dogovora može da komplikuje rad regionalnih organizacija ukoliko je UNMIK potpi-snik nekog međudržavnog sporazuma32. To već predstavlja problem u potpisivanju dodatnih protokola oko dalje liberalizacije trgovine uslugama u okviru CEFTA spora-zuma, u kome je potpisnik u ime Kosova UNMIK. Srbija ne prihvata da se predstavlja-nje Kosova preko UNMIK-a u ranije zaključenim međunarodnim ugovorima menja, dok Kosovo ne prihvata da bude predstavljeno preko ovog posrednika prilikom da-ljeg preuzimanja obaveza u međunarodnim ugovorima.

31 Isto.

32 Član 6 Dogovora o regionalnom predstavljanju i saradnji glasi: “U pogledu izmena postojećih sporazuma potpisanih od strane UNMIK-a, ovi zaključci neće biti tumačeni tako da prejudiciraju zakonska prava UNMIK-a. Predstavnik Misije Ujedinjenih nacija na Kosovu (UNMIK) biće pozvan na susrete organizovane u okviru dogov-ora u kojima je on jedan od ugovornih strana. Na UNMIK-u je da odluči da li će prisustvovati nekom sastanku.“

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Prilog 1

Zastupljenost u regionalnim inicijativama i međusobna saradnja srpskih i kosovskih institucija i/ili organizacija civilnog društva, lokalnih samouprava i dr.

Na osnovu analize podataka o članstvu Srbije i Kosova u regionalnim inicijativama, radnim grupama ili mrežama, na reprezentativnom uzorku od 46 regionalnih orga-nizacija (detaljan pregled je dat u Aneksu 1 ovog rada)33, može se videti da je uče-šće Srbije na nivou proseka za Zapadni Balkan – punopravno članstvo u 44 i status posmatrača u jednoj od njih. Kosovo učestvuje kao punopravni član u 20 i kao po-smatrač u jednoj regionalnoj inicijativi. Pri tome, budući da nema regularnu vojsku i Ministarstvo odbrane, Kosovo nije zastupljeno u 6 inicijativa u kojima učestvuju voj-no-bezbednosne strukture, a u 9 inicijativa koje okupljaju predstavnike ministarstava unutrašnjih poslova i pravosuđa, Kosovo učestvuje samo u jednoj od njih. Može se zaključiti da je zastupljenost Kosova u regionalnim inicijativama znatno manja nego zastupljenost Srbije i drugih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana. Ipak, u domenima socijalnog i ekonomskog razvoja, infrastrukture i energetike, izgradnje ljudskog kapitala (obra-zovanja, istraživanja i razvoja i kulture), parlamentarne saradnje, unapređivanja do-bre uprave i oblastima saradnje koje pokrivaju dve krovne regionalne organizacije, Proces saradnje u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, koja ima glavnu ulogu u političkoj saradnji i Savet za regionalnu saradnju, koji ima glavnu koordinacionu ulogu, Kosovo učestvu-je u dve trećine ovih inicijativa i aktivni je učesnik procesa povezivanja i saradnje u regionu. Imajući u vidu veličinu i ekonomsku snagu svih učesnica ovog procesa, kao i administrativne kapacitete i finansijske obaveze koje saradnja nameće, a pre svega političku volju da se sarađuje, prirodno je da su Srbija i Hrvatska (i nakon ulaska u EU) okosnica ove složene strukture koja funkcioniše i dalje se razvija.

33 Aneks 1: Radne grupe i inicijative u Jugoistočnoj Evropi u 2014. godini, na osnovu mapiranja regionalnih inicijativa i radnih grupa iz 2010. godine od strane Saveta za regionalnu saradnju, brošure „Pregled regionalnih inicijativa i radnih grupa u Jugoistočnoj Evropi”, Aneksa III Strategije i radnog programa 2014–2016. Saveta za regionalnu saradnju, vesti na adresi: www.rcc.int i internet stranica ostalih regionalnih inicijativa. Ovo je tabe-larni pregled relevantnih regionalnih inicijativa koje deluju u 2014. godine sa detaljima o njihovom članstvu i sedištima. Prikaz inicijativa je grupisan po oblastima po kojima su grupisane (uz manje izmene) i u krovnoj regionalnoj međuvladinoj organizaciji Savetu za regionalnu saradnju, koji je počeo sa radom 2008. godine sa sedištem u Sarajevu, kao naslednik Pakta za stabilnost Jugoistočne Evrope.


Na osnovu ankete sa 12 predstavnika reprezentativnog uzorka regionalnih inicija-tiva došlo se do opštih nalaza o angažmanu učesnika u ovim procesima i posebno, o međusobnoj saradnji Kosova i Srbije, problemima koji se javljaju, kao i uspešnim formulama kojima se oni prevazilaze.

Srbija i Kosovo su ravnopravno zastupljeni u 20 regionalnih inicijativa u kojima, uz razlike vezane za karakter ovih inicijativa (međunarodni ugovor, međuvladina organi-zacija, mreža vladinih institucija, organizacija civilnog društva, lokalnih samouprava i dr.) uglavnom dobro sarađuju. U nekima od njih, u kojima ne dominiraju zvanične in-stitucije, saradnja se dobro odvija od samog početka, kao što je to slučaj sa Mrežom asocijacija lokalnih uprava Jugoistočne Evrope (NALAS) ili Mrežom za razvoj civilnog društva u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, gde je do povremenih incidenata dolazilo samo kada su se ti regionalni forumi koristili za politizaciju inače tehničkih pitanja kao što su, u prvom slučaju, izazovi decentralizacije, urbanog planiranja, fiskalne decentralizacije, energetske efikasnosti, tretmana otpada i otpadnih voda, održivog turizma i dr., ili, u drugom slučaju, razvoja civilnog društva, njegove održivosti, transparentnosti, izvora finansiranja, regionalnog umrežavanja, odnosa sa vlastima na nacionalnom nivou, saradnje na evropskom nivou i podrške evropskih institucija. Ove dve inicijative su počele sa radom još početkom prošle decenije, uz punu podršku predstavnika Srbije i Kosova i njihovo zajedničko angažovanje u upravnim strukturama, zastupanju orga-nizacija prema drugima i zajedničkog lobiranja za interese svojih ciljnih grupa.

Ovaj model je u velikoj meri bio prisutan i kod drugih inicijativa koje su imale veće probleme zbog učešća zvaničnih institucija iz Srbije i sa Kosova. U meri u kojoj je rad regionalnih struktura bio isključivo posvećen strogo sektorskim, tehničkim i funkcio-nalnim aspektima saradnje, nije bilo većih problema. Saradnja se odvijala uz povre-mene izostanke neke od dve strane kada su se politički odnosi zaoštravali, a domaćini skupova imali diferenciran pristup zavisno od toga da li su njihove zemlje priznale nezavisnost i državnost Kosova. Mada je, uglavnom, uspostavljena dobra lična komu-nikacija predstavnika dve strane, bilo je rezervi i uzdržanosti u uspostavljanju institu-cionalne saradnje, jer do sporazuma u Briselu, zvanične instrukcije nisu ohrabrivale takvu vrstu direktnog povezivanja. To se odnosilo na uzajamne posete, uzajamnu po-dršku u konkretnim aktivnostima, razmenu iskustava i sl. Uglavnom, uz retke izuzet-ke, one inicijative koje u svom članstvu imaju i Srbiju i Kosovo, izbegavale su da drže važnije skupove na političkom nivou bilo u Srbiji ili na Kosovu. Tako su, u kontinuitetu

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održane sve godišnje ministarske konferencije čak i onih inicijativa koje imaju izrazito međudržavni, pa čak i ugovorni tip odnosa, kao što su Centralnoevropski sporazum o slobodnoj trgovini (CEFTA 2006), ili Energetska zajednica za Jugoistočnu Evropu (ECT), u kojima obe strane učestvuju, ili Transportna opservatorija za Jugoistočnu Evropu (SEETO) ili Savet za regionalnu saradnju (RCC), gde su predstavnici Kosova izostali samo 2012. godine, neposredno po usvajanju Dogovora o regionalnom pred-stavljanju, kada je godišnji ministarski sastanak održan u Beogradu, u vreme kada natpisi na tablama za predstavljanje delegacija još nisu bili konačno usaglašeni.

Članstvo Kosova u međunarodnim organizacijama, takođe, može se pokazati kao presudno za dobijanje članstva u nekim regionalnim inicijativama koje se odvijaju pod njihovim pokroviteljstvom. Tako se, na primer, tumači odsustvo Kosova u Zdrav-stvenoj mreži Jugoistočne Evrope (SEEHN), u kojoj niti je sama mreža predstavnika ministarstava zdravlja pokazala inicijativu da pozove Kosovo u članstvo, niti je ono podnelo zahtev za učlanjenjem. Deo objašnjenja može biti da Kosovo nije član Svet-ske zdravstvene organizacije (WHO) koja je glavni pokrovitelj ove mreže.

Po tom principu, još uvek nije postignuta puna saglasnost o prerastanju Transportne zajednice za Jugoistočnu Evropu, koja je formirana 2004. godine pod okriljem Pakta za stabilnost u Jugoistočnoj Evropi i EU, a na osnovu Memoranduma o razumevanju, koji su potpisale sve zemlje Zapadnog Balkana i UNMIK u ime Kosova, u Transportnu zajed-nicu za Jugoistočnu Evropu (TCT) na osnovu međudržavnog ugovora. Srbija ne prihvata da ovaj međunarodni ugovor potpiše Kosovo* kao ugovorna strana i da time Transpor-tna zajednica postane prvi slučaj uspostavljanja ugovornog odnosa Kosova i EU. Pored toga što dve EU članice imaju neke ograde oko tehničkih pitanja koja nisu nepremostiva prepreka, neke od njih koje nisu priznale Kosovo takođe ne prihvataju zaključivanje ugo-vora sa Kosovom. Očekuje se da bi potpisivanje Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju Evropske unije sa Kosovom, koji bi uveo međusobne ugovorne odnose, moglo olakšati rešavanje ovog problema, a kraj godine se pominje kao mogući rok.

Ponekad je preovlađivao pragmatični pristup – ne ugrožavati ono što već dobro funk-cioniše. Tako je, uprkos činjenici da je Kosovo 2013. godine preimenovalo svoje učešće u Savetu za regionalnu saradnju od zastupljenosti preko UNMIK-a na predstavljanje po Dogovoru o regionalnom predstavljanju kao Kosovo*, uz odgovarajuću fusnotu, u Investicionom komitetu za Jugoistočnu Evropu pri istom Savetu Kosovo je ostalo u


statusu posmatrača, učestvujući u punoj meri i ravnopravno u njegovom radu sa pred-stavnicima Srbije i drugih zemalja regiona. Tako je Kosovo jedan od aktera formulisa-nja i usvajanja strategije Jugoistočna Evropa 2020, uz preuzimanje svih obaveza koje iz toga proističu. Tako se Kosovo u nekim regionalnim inicijativama i dalje pojavljuje pod okriljem UNMIK-a, u nekim kao posmatrač, u nekima se bez promene prosto pojavljuju kosovske institucije, organizacije ili lokalne uprave od samog osnivanja, dok je u većini status preimenovan u skladu sa postignutim dogovorom. Mada UNMIK formalno i da-lje figurira u nekim inicijativama, u skladu sa odgovarajućim odredbama Dogovora, on uz pismeno zahvaljivanje na pozivima na sastanke, više na njima ne učestvuje.

Ocenjuje se da su Srbija i Kosovo po pravilu aktivni u inicijativama u kojima učestvuju. Srbija ima solidne institucionalne kapacitete i može da podeli neka dobra iskustva i ekspertizu sa mnogim učesnicima iz regiona, dok Kosovo želi da se potvrdi kao ravno-pravni učesnik u regionalnim forumima. Mora se uzeti u obzir činjenica da je Kosovo manje razvijeno od ostalih učesnika, ali pokazuje veliku želju da preuzme odgovor-nost za unapređenje i promene u oblasti konkretnih politika. To je posebno vidljivo u oblastima koje se odnose na implementaciju Strategije JIE 2020. Pri tome, proces učenja i razmene dobre prakse se uvek odvija u oba pravca bez obzira na nivo razvi-jenosti različitih aktera. Tako, na primer, u slučaju asocijacija gradova i opština, mada spada u najslabiju asocijaciju mreža gradova i opština, Kosovo ima šta da ponudi (npr. uspešno programsko budžetiranje na Kosovu)34. Pokazalo se da povratni uticaj, uzaja-mno izveštavanje i dr. utiču na unapređivanje rada svih asocijacija lokalnih vlasti.

Multilateralni razvojni projekti približavaju učesnike i navode ih na međusobnu komu-nikaciju i saradnju, pa se najčešće ocenjuje da su one na uzlaznoj putanji. Ipak, sarad-nja dve strane uglavnom je inicirana proaktivnošću regionalnih inicijativa i njihovih radnih tela koja predlažu i podstiču aktivnosti u kojima obe strane učestvuju i kojima doprinose. Takođe, u organizacijama se vodilo računa da se učesnici ne dovedu u situ-acije koje nose politički rizik (izbegavalo se održavanje događaja u Srbiji ili na Kosovu, pažljivo se odvijao rad PR službe i pripremanje komunikacija, saopštenja, štampanih materijala, vizuelnih prezentacija i mapa, smanjivao se intenzitet ili učešće neke od strana na pojedinim konferencijama kada bi se javili politički pritisci, i sl.). Drugim

34 Odgovori na pitanja iz intervjua iz Mreže asocijacija lokalnih uprava u Jugoistočnoj Evropi, NALAS.

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rečima, pronađena je prihvatljiva formula za sve vidove saradnje koji se odnose na operativni i tehnički nivo. Tamo gde postoji zajednički interes, a to je razvoj pojedinih sektora, politika, standarda i sl. u regionu, dve strane su dobro sarađivale. Indikativno je da nema bilateralnih razilaženja u odnosima sa donatorima ovih inicijativa, čak i u tako važnim oblastima kao što su trgovina, transport, istraživanja i razvoj, i dr.


Uloga regionalnih inicijativa u rešavanju bilateralnih pitanja Srbija–Kosovo, ili pitanja od njihovog zajedničkog interesa35

Dva najupečatljivija primera pozitivnog delovanja sektorskih regionalnih inicijativa na bilateralnu saradnju Kosova i Srbije su u oblasti energetike i saobraćaja.

Uz posredovanje Sekretarijata Energetske zajednice (ECS) i EU, u februaru 2014. godine, generalni direktori kompanija potpisali su Ugovor između dva operatera prenosnog sistema (Elektromreže Srbije i Operatera prenosnog sistema Kosova)36. Misija Energetske zajednice u unapređivanju saradnje i rešavanju sporova potpi-snica ECT je tako na ovom konkretnom slučaju ostvarena. Ovaj pravno obavezujući ugovor predviđa dalje dogovore dva operatera o kompenzacionom mehanizmu u okviru evropske mreže operatera prenosnog sistema i obezbeđuje efektivnije ko-rišćenje kapaciteta prenosnika sa susednim zemljama koje su potpisnice ECT. Ovaj ugovor predstavlja prekretnicu u odnosima Srbije i Kosova u domenu energetike, ali ima i širi regionalni značaj. Direktor ECS Janez Kopač je nakon njegovog potpisivanja izjavio: „Ovaj ugovor nema samo bilateralni značaj. On će otkloniti mnoge ozbiljne prepreke koje su do sada sprečavale regionalnu integraciju tržišta električne energije u Jugoistočnoj Evropi.”37

Drugi primer je prećutno usaglašeno sukcesivno prijavljivanje Srbije i Kosova za fi-nansiranje izrade studija izvodljivosti za dve deonice jedinstvenog putnog pravca, koji povezuje Niš i Prištinu, sa liste prioritetnih projekata koja se svake godine aktu-elizuje u okviru SEETO. Tako je, nakon Dogovora o regionalnom predstavljanju, Srbi-ja konkurisala za sredstva Investicionog okvira za Zapadni Balkan (WBIF), u desetoj

35 Npr. uvođenje evropskih standarda, harmonizacija politika, uvođenje sektorskih planova za kandidate i po-tencijalne kandidate, adresiranje nekih širih regionalnih problema i strategija, i dr.

36 “Srbija, Kosovo electricity TSOs ink framework pact - Energy Community“, SEE News, February 21, 2014, , http://powermarket.seenews.com/news/Srbija-kosovo-electricity-tsos-ink-framework-pact-energy-com-munity-406113

37 Isto.

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rundi odobravanja projekata, sa putem Niš–Merdare38, a Kosovo u jedanaestoj rundi sa nastavkom puta od Merdara do Prištine (Niš–Priština predstavlja Rutu 7 u putnoj mreži od regionalnog značaja i vezuje Koridor X sa Jadranskim morem i lukom Drač)39.

Proces evropskih integracija ipak ima najveću moć u manifestovanju principa „la-kmus treće strane”. Okvir koji EU daje politikama u određenim domenima je najbit-nija komponenta saradnje i daje pravac i smisao delovanju na regionalnom nivou. Na neformalnom nivou, Srbija i Kosovo sve češće sarađuju, pa čak i razmenjuju relevan-tne dokumente vezane za proces pristupanja EU. Budući da se i u regionalnim inicija-tivama koristi princip „otvorenog metoda koordinacije” (open metod of coordinati-on – OMC40), kao dobro iskustvo EU, rezultati se ocenjuju kao pozitivni. Tako se okvir politika EU, proces pridruživanja i pristupanja i EU upravljačke metode pokazuju kao najjače strane eksternog uticaja koje se manifestuju i u regionalnim inicijativama, negde eksplicitno i programski41, a negde iskustveno i implicitno.

Opšti je zaključak da na regionalnom, multilateralnom nivou, predstavnici Srbije i Kosova uglavnom rade zajedno, često na vrlo inovativan način, jer u izveštajima o napretku u procesu približavanja članstvu EU ocenjuju se i stepen angažovanja u re-gionalnoj saradnji i napredovanje u nekom sektoru koje se odvija i preko regionalnih programa i projekata. Što se struke i kompetencija tiče, u svim sektorima, podsek-torima i politikama ima punog međusobnog razumevanja. Ali, ima mišljenja da u pogledu međusobnih odnosa u regionalnim inicijativama predstavnici Srbije često prihvataju kolege sa Kosova kao neku nužnu realnost, da su oni prisutni zato što tako

38 Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF),2013 Annual Report, str. 30, http://www.wbif.eu/up-loads/lib_document/attachment/373/WBIF_Annual_Report_2013_-_17_March_2014.pdf

39 Ovaj projekt se pominjao i tokom pregovora o normalizaciji odnosa Srbije i Kosova tadašnjeg premijera Dačića i premijera Tačija.

40 Otvoreni metod koordinacije (OMC) je relativno novo sredstvo međuvladinog karaktera u upravljanju Ev-ropskom unijom, koje se zasniva na dobrovoljnoj saradnji njenih država članica. Otvoreni metod počiva na mehanizmima mekih zakona kao što su smernice i indikatori, merenje performansi i razmena dobre prakse. To znači da nema zvaničnih sankcija za one koji kasne. Delotvornost metoda počiva na međusobnom pritisku u grupi, isticanju dobrih i ukazivanju na loše, jer nijedna zemlja članica ne želi da bude viđena kao najgora u nekoj oblasti EU politika. Videti:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Method_of_Coordination

41 Na osnovu odgovora na intervju koje je poslao Centar za preduzetničku obuku u Jugoistočnoj Evropi (SEE-CEL).


treba da bude, ali nisu spremni da prevaziđu razlike i da iskreno sarađuju. Sa druge strane, zvanični predstavnici Kosova, i nakon regulisanja pitanja njihovog regional-nog predstavljanja, a pogotovo u periodu dok se to pokretalo i pregovaralo, koristili su regionalne sastanke često kao političke forume i onda kada su oni bili posvećeni tehničkim i usko sektorskim pitanjima.

U celini uzev, može se zaključiti da zajedničko učešće u regionalnim programima na osnovu pojedinačnog interesa članica jača njihovu komunikaciju i saradnju, čime se indirektno podstiču inicijative za jačanje bilateralnih odnosa. Regionalne inicijative su multilateralne platforme (tehničke ili političke), gde se Srbija i Kosovo na institu-cionalnom nivou sastaju, razgovaraju i razmenjuju svoje pozicije. Svako približavanje pozicija ili postignuta saglasnost oko pojedinih pitanja doprinosi izgradnji poverenja između samih ljudi, pa i između institucija. To indirektno, a često i direktno, doprinosi stvaranju klime koja omogućava da se normalno razgovara o problemima u bilate-ralnim odnosima.

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Ka zajedničkoj evropskoj perspektivi

Paradigmatično bavljenje Evropske unije Kosovom i Srbijom je nedvosmisleno u sa-glasnosti sa njihovim dovođenjem u evropsku porodicu. Kako joj se Zapadni Balkan nalazi na samom pragu, EU ima obavezu da u regionu sprovodi svoju strukturnu agendu. Budući da Srbija i Kosovo stavljaju na probu evropsku bezbednosno-od-brambenu politiku, a naročito na polju promena posle Lisabonskog sporazuma, ove dve zemlje produbljuju praksu „konkretnijeg“ učešća EU. Povrh toga, u instrumen-talnoj ulozi EU u normalizaciji odnosa između Kosova i Srbije odražava se i uloga koju EU smatra svojim temeljom. Međutim, na političkom i tehničkom putu ka evropskoj kući nije sve ružičasto kako se možda čini. Debata o „proširivanju i produbljivanju“ Evropske unije iz sredine prve decenije ovog veka, koja je usledila nakon prijema Rumunije i Bugarske u njeno članstvo, nedavno je ponovo oživela kroz krizu evra, a i dalje traje, budući da se čini kako EU nalazi izlaz iz nje. Osim toga, javna podrška daljim talasima u proširivanju u Zapadnoj Evropi (naročito u Beneluksu, Nemačkoj i Austriji) veoma je slaba.

Što se tiče Kosova, EU će morati da donosi nova i kreativna rešenja (npr. rešenje sa fusnotom po pitanju imena, politički dogovori zasnovani na principima/konceptima koji su lišeni karakteristika suvereniteta, itd.) kako bi se pozabavila unutrašnjim razli-kama i nemogućnošću da iznađu rešenja za status Kosova i buduće ugovorne odnose sa EU. Na osnovu aktuelnog pravnog okvira EU, čak i ukoliko bi Kosovo potpisalo Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju, taj sporazum bi bio drugačiji od onog koji su potpisale ostale balkanske zemlje. On se ne može porediti sa sporazumima koja je EU potpisala sa „entitetima“ koji nisu države, ali se ne nalaze u Evropi i kao takvi ne teže integraciji u EU. S druge strane, Kosovo mora da ispuni svoje obaveze, koje se u prvom redu odnose na vladavinu prava, organizovani kriminal i visok nivo korupcije. Rešavanje socijalnih problema kao što su nezaposlenost mladih i reforma obrazova-nja od ključne su važnosti za promenu viznog režima.

EU je do sada pokazala kako ulaže sve sopstvene kapacitete, resurse i energiju da bi održala neutralan stav tokom dijaloga i njegove potencijalne implikacije na evropsku budućnost Srbije i Kosova. S jedne strane, ovo je opravdano dotaklo unutrašnje pode-le EU po pitanju Kosova, koja je jedina evropska zemlja u kojoj je EU na polju zakona


vršila eksperimente na tome kako se odnositi prema jednoj državi, a da se ona ne tretira kao nezavisna i suverena. S druge strane, neutralnost je u više navrata otvorila prostor za dvosmisleno čitanje i tumačenje od strane političara Kosova i Srbije, koji svojim biračima nude blago izmenjena i šira objašnjenja o implikacijama dijaloga i od-nosima sa EU. U narednim fazama pregovora o pristupanju, EU će biti pod pritiskom da bude konkretnija, direktnija i jednoznačnija kada postavlja uslove za dobrosused-ske odnose i o tome kako će se dalje odnositi prema članstvu Srbije i Kosova u EU.

Kada govorimo o sporazumima koji proizilaze iz dijaloga sa posredovanjem EU, naj-veći izazov na putu evropskih integracija jeste u tome da efekat dijaloga bude prisu-tan kod oba naroda tako da ceo ovaj napor ne ostane samo pravljenje pakta među elitom, već da stvori tlo za pomirenje obeju zajednica i na Kosovu i u Srbiji. Treba imati u vidu da je dijalog proces učenja i da je kao takav veoma važan. Za uspešnu primenu Briselskog sporazuma ključno je razrešavanje problema severnog Kosova. Kosovski Srbi još uvek nisu deo dijaloga Beograda i Prištine i mora se pronaći način da se oni zainteresuju i uključe. Glavni problem danas predstavlja plitak konsenzus oko primene Briselskog sporazuma i realni napredak na terenu je spor, te da zbog daljeg mira treba težiti intenzivnijoj saradnji. Briselski sporazum daje mogućnost da se intenziviraju odnosi između različitih aktera na lokalnom nivou, međutim, veliki problem predstavlja odsustvo otvorene javne debate o pitanjima iz Briselskog spora-zuma i decentralizacija donošenja odluka o tome.

Komunikacija je ključna za uspostavljanje i normalizaciju odnosa. Posebno je važna saradnja gradova i lokalnih zajednica koji pripadaju istim ekonomskim i geografskim prostorima. Međutim, ne postoji dovoljno političke volje ni spremnosti za uspostav-ljanje saradnje. Imajući u vidu njihovu ulogu, Asocijacije gradova i opština Srbije i Kosova treba da rade na unapređenju odnosa.

Imajući u vidu dosadašnja iskustva, očigledno je da su eksterni efekti ti koji katalizuju saradnju Srbije i Kosova. Regionalne inicijative predstavljaju efikasan mehanizam za rešavanje unutrašnjih odnosa u regionu Zapadnog Balkana i one podstiču ljude da zajedno rešavaju probleme na terenu, kao i da grade međusobno poverenje i razu-mevanje. Veliki podstrek za učvršćivanje regionalnih inicijativa je i činjenica da se IPA fondovi namenjeni regionalnoj saradnji dupliraju i da će time podrška regionalnoj saradnji biti jača.

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Iako su u različitim fazama procesa integracije u EU, Kosovo i Srbija imaju i nekoliko dodirnih tačaka, te je stoga preporučljivo da sarađuju na više polja. Pre svega, neop-hodno je da se sporazumi zaključeni kroz dijalog uz posredstvo EU poštuju u potpu-nosti. Priznavanje bilateralne dokumentacije (npr. univerzitetskih diploma) trebalo bi pospešiti kako bi se unapredila saradnja na institucionalno-obrazovnom nivou kroz predavanja, seminare i slične oblike univerzitetske razmene. Povrh toga, neophodna je saradnja Srbije ne bi li se paralelne strukture na severnom Kosovu potpuno raz-gradile. Treće, Kosovo bi moglo da iskoristi iskustva Srbije u vezi sa viznom liberali-zacijom i procesom privatizacije. Kosovu su postavljeni stroži zahtevi za ispunjavanje manjinskih prava. Srbija bi ovo iskustvo mogla podeliti na putu do ostvarivanja veće inkluzije manjina.

Povrh toga, trebalo bi poboljšati saradnju na nivou lokalnih vlasti Srbije i Kosova. U procesu decentralizacije bi od naročite koristi bili iskustvo Srbije sa fiskalnom de-centralizacijom, kao i iskustvo Kosova sa jezičkim i kulturnim pravima. Konačno, in-sistiranje EU na kratkoročnim političkim prioritetima, kao što su dijalog sa Srbijom i politička stabilnost obe zemlje, neće zaseniti niti kompromitovati ostale fundamen-talne prioritete evropskih integracija, u koje spadaju slobodni izbori i borba protiv korupcije. EU bi trebalo da zadrži čvrst stav po pitanjima vladavine prava i ljudskih prava, kao i da istovremeno postavi realne ciljeve i očekivanja.


Zaključci i preporuke

Na nivou odnosa Srbije i Kosova

·· Evropska perspektiva zemalja regiona je uveliko uslovljena regionalnom po-litikom EU prema njima i normalizacijom odnosa između pojedinih članica regionalnih inicijativa, u ovom slučaju Srbije i Kosova. Zato, preostale bila-teralne probleme treba i dalje rešavati dijalogom, uz podršku EU i drugih međunarodnih i posebno regionalnih aktera, jer se ta formula pokazala kao uspešna.

·· Svaka zemlja regiona treba da preuzme aktivnu ulogu u predvođenju neke ili više regionalnih inicijativa, jer se prelomna tačka događa u trenutku kada se od primaoca postaje aktivni učesnik u razmeni sa svim pravima i obavezama. To se ne odnosi samo na Srbiju i Kosovo, već i na sve zemlje regiona.

·· Jačanje diplomatije gradova može olakšati pomirenje i izgradnju mira izme-đu Kosova i Srbije. Lokalne vlasti imaju legitimitet i deluju znatno brže, po-sebno u ekonomskim poslovima.

·· Asocijacije gradova i opština Srbije i Kosova treba da intenziviraju svoje od-nose i da zajednički rade na unapređenju odnosa lokalnih zajednica Srbije i Kosova.

·· Otvoriti javnu debatu o svim pitanjima iz Briselskog sporazuma i uključiti Srbe iz severnog Kosova u dijalog između Beograda i Prištine kako bi primena Briselskog sporazuma bila uspešna.

·· Intenzivirati umrežavanje organizacija civilnog društva Srbije i Kosova i na taj način unaprediti komunikaciju lokalnih zajednica.

·· Iskoristiti potencijal učešća u programima EU Erasmus Plus i Erasmus 2020 u vidu razmene iskustava i upoznavanja prvenstveno mladih, koji mogu biti najbolji motor ponovne izgradnje poverenja između Srbije i Kosova.

·· Regulisanje pitanja putnih dokumenata je dovelo do povećanja saobraćaja između Srbije i Kosova, što povećava opravdanost ulaganja u putnu i žele-zničku mrežu. Zajednički nastup dve strane bi olakšao rekonstrukciju žele-zničke infrastrukture i uspostavljanje saobraćaja od Kraljeva do Prištine po istom principu po kome se priprema rekonstrukcija dela putne mreže tako

80 |

Zaključci i preporuke

što je svaka strana aplicirala kod WBIF za izradu studije izvodljivosti za svoj deo puta do Merdara.

Regionalni nivo

·· Prvi imperativ je održavanje političke volje za podršku regionalnim inicijativa-ma. Sve ostalo, uključujući bilateralna razilaženja, pitanja su za koja postoje pragmatična rešenja u regionalnim okvirima. Uz taj preduslov se može po-moći i u rešavanju odnosa Srbija–Kosovo u različitim domenima.

·· Bitno je osigurati bolji protok informacija, kako među nacionalnim akterima, tako i među regionalnim inicijativama. To bi, uz harmonizaciju podataka i po-litika, nesumnjivo uticalo, na duži rok, na bolje razumevanje i bolju saradnju Srbije i Kosova.

·· Jačanje regionalnih programa generalno, a naročito podsticanje aktivnosti od posebnog interesa za manji broj učesnika (2-3)42 u okviru tih programa, doprinelo bi prevazilaženju prepreka i nesuglasica među članicama.

Bolje zajedničko predstavljanje regiona, pre svega u evropskim institucijama stvara povoljnu klimu i osnažuje zajedničko lobiranje Srbije i Kosova za rešenja od zajednič-kog interesa (iskustva RCC-a, NALAS-a, SEETO i dr.).

42 Dobar primer subregionalne saradnje je Igmanska inicijativa, koju su pokrenule nevladine organizacije. Ona je doprinela pomirenju, unapređivanju političkih i ekonomskih odnosa, kao i odnosa gradova iz Srbi-je, Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine i Crne Gore. Ili, Civilni dijalog između Srbije i Kosova, koji već više godina razmatra osetljiva pitanja međusobnih odnosa na nivou civilnog društva, koja su tek 2011. postala predmet dijaloga među zvaničnim predstavnicima dve strane. Kao primer veoma uspešne međudržavne subregionalne saradnje treba pomenuti Međunarodnu komisiju za basen reke Save, koja okuplja Srbiju, Bosnu i Hercegov-inu, Hrvatsku i Sloveniju. Može se očekivati da će ovakvi subregionalni aranžmani biti sve češći u budućnosti, naročito vezano za bolje upravljanje zajedničkim prirodnim resursima.

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17

SERBIA AND KOSOVO:

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES AND

PRACTICALITIES

Beograd, 2014.

SERBIA AND KOSOVO: EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICALITIES | 93

Foreword

The publication before you is the result of the work on preparation of the two round tables organized in the framework of the Project Serbia and Kosovo*: European Per-spectives and Practicalities. The Project was implemented during the second half of 2013 and first half of 2014 by the European Movement in Serbia, in cooperation with the Institute for Development Policy INDEP from Pristina, with the support of the Danish Embassy in Belgrade. It sought to contribute to the process of improving overall relations between Serbia and Kosovo through the initiation of civil dialogue on the two major themes: mutual economic relations and prospects in the process of European integration.

The Brussels Agreements of April and May 2013, and the ongoing dialogue process under the auspices of the European Union which should lead to “a visible and sus-tained normalization of relations,” have been deeply motivated by the European perspective of both Serbia and Kosovo, resulting in the opening of accession talks between Serbia and the EU and the opening of negotiations of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between Kosovo and the EU. With this regard, the European Movement in Serbia has launched a series of activities in order to expand the circle of interlocutors on these issues and facilitate the exchange of experiences and opin-ions among experts, the business sector, civil society organizations and citizens of local communities.

The first round table entitled “Economic Relations of Serbia and Kosovo* - Impact on Local Economies and Communities” was held in Leskovac, December 17th 2013, and aimed to identify the main problems and obstacles in trade and economic relations between the local communities from both Serbia and Kosovo, and suggest measures for improvement of cooperation and networking of stakeholders. As a basis for dis-cussion, a document on economic aspects of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo

94 |

Foreword

and trade relations and business cooperation of local communities with a case study of the city of Leskovac, has been prepared. The authors, Radmila Milivojević, Genc Krasniqi, Bisera Šećeragić and prof. Predrag Bjelić analyzed the situation from the perspective of both sides and presented the key recommendations for overcoming problems.

The second roundtable was organized in Belgrade, on April 29th 2014, on the topic of potential cooperation and key challenges of common European perspective of both Serbia and Kosovo. The document for this occasion presented an analysis of Euro-pean integration of Serbia and Kosovo, with special emphasis on the opportunities opened by the Brussels Agreements, as well as a number of initiatives of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. The authors of the document, Dr. Filip Ejdus, Jelica Minić, and Vjosa Musliu, discussed the necessary legislation and reform steps that should contribute to the overall modernization and democratic and economic development of the region and provided key recommendations.

Both documents have been amended with most important conclusions from the events and transformed into a concise but telling publication before you. Survey data presented in tables and appendices give it a special quality.

We would like to express our gratitude to our partners in Pristina, the Institute for Development Policy, which coordinated the activities in Kosovo and made the publi-cation available in Albanian language; the authors on their commitment to research and effort in the preparation of publications; participants in the round tables on the active contribution and substantial recommendations; as well as the Embassy of Denmark in Serbia for recognizing the need for transferring the discussion of these issues from the highest state level to the local level and opening it for the citizens directly affected by the sought solutions.

Ivan Knežević In Belgrade, September 2014


Economic aspects of the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo1 – trade relations and business cooperation of local communities

An Outline of Economic Relations Between Serbia and Kosovo in the Period 1999-2012

In 1999, when the European Commission planted the seed of the Stabilization and Association Process as a long-term strategic and political approach to the countries of the Western Balkans – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo (in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1244/99.), the process of political and economic consolidation of the Western Balkans countries began after a period of bitter political conflicts and extremely low levels of their economic growth and development. The ultimate goal of the process was EU integration of the Western Balkans countries in accordance with the EU enlargement criteria (the Treaty on European Union (1992/1993), the Copenhagen (1993) and Madrid criteria (1995). It was concluded in the meeting of the European Council in 2000 that all countries included in the stabilization and accession process are potential candidates for EU membership and that EU’s goal is best possible integration of the Western Balkans into European political and economic structures. While, at the Zagreb Summit in 2000 it was confirmed that the Stabilization and Association Process was the path which will take the Western Balkans countries to EU membership. At the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 it was once more confirmed

1 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.

96 |

Economic aspects of the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo – trade relations and business cooperation of local communities

that the Stabilization and Accession countries can hope for EU membership, and the proces was ‘enriched’ with elements of pre-accession strategy, i.e. elements that had been available solely to candidate members.

Key elements of the stabilization and association process are the following:·· contractual relations – Stabilization and Association Agreement, being a

new type of contractual relations (third generation association agreement);·· developing trade relations – asymmetric liberalization of trade through au-

tonomous trade measures (ATM);·· financial assistance – EU funds and programs

EU has so far signed Stabilization and Association agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Kosovo has been part of the Stabilization and Association Process of the whole region from the very beginning. Owing to this and to progress in dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, in 2013 the European Commission drafted a Feasibility Study which confirmed that Kosovo is ready to open negotiations to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement, that takes into account the positions of certain EU countries on the status of Kosovo (which in practice means that the aim of these negotiations will be to sign the Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters, i.e. a free trade agreement between Kosovo and the EU). One of the key statements of the European Commission’s Recommendation2 for the opening of negotiations is that it is essential for Kosovo to continue to implement in good faith all agreements reached between Belgrade and Priština. Finally, EU Council of Ministers’ Decision of April this year formally launched the negotiation process aimed at Stabilization and Association Agreement between Kosovo and the EU, and the negotiations were formally closed in May 2014. The Stabilization and Association Agreement was initialed in Brussels on 25 July 2014. The next step will be the adoption of the SAA by the Council of the European Union and the signing of the agreement, which is expected to take place next spring.

2 Recommendation for a Council Decision authorizing the opening of negotiations on Stabilization and As-sociation Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo*, Brussels, 22.4.2013, COM(2013)200 final


On the other hand SAA Agrement between Serbia and EU has entered into force on September 1 2013. Moreover Serbia started accession negotiations with the EU in January 2014. Both decisions of the EU to start aforementioned negotiations were depended on progress of the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The dialogue began way back in 2011 by negotiations on technical matters such as movement of goods between customs territories of Kosovo3 and the rest of Serbia. The major problem was recognition of Kosovo’s customs seal and other documentation after Pristina declared independence.4 Serbia agreed to recognize the seal marked “Kosovo Customs” but without “the Republic of Kosovo” on customs declarations. This was confirmed by reaching an agreement which was later put down on paper but was not officially signed or ratified by both Serbian and Kosovo institutions.

A huge problem in commodity trading not only between Serbia and Kosovo, but in the Western Balkans region after Pristina declared independence in 2008 was the implementation of the CEFTA 2006 agreement because Kosovo refused to let UNMIK act on its behalf at regional meetings. Considering that Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina did not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, unlike other countries of the Western Balkans, it became an impediment to the functioning of CEFTA 2006 bodies.

Serbia recognized Kosovo as a separate customs territory by signing the Central European Free Trade Agreement in 2006 in which UNMIK was one of the parties, and it acted on behalf of Kosovo customs territory and in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1244. Problem with the implementation of CEFTA 2006 became quite obvious in 2011 when Kosovo became the Chair in Office of CEFTA 2006, which necessitated an agreement to allow Kosovo to take part in regional meetings and in the activities of regional organizations and bodies, while Serbia refused to take part in them unless Kosovo was represented by UNMIK.5

3 In 2006 by signing the CEFTA 2006 Agreement Central European Free Trade Agreement, Serbia effectively recognized the customs territory of Kosovo* as a separate customs territory because UNMIK is a signatory party acting on behalf of this territory in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1244/1999.

4 A compromise solution for Kosovo’s customs seal and other documentation was reached in October 2011

5 Center for Regionalism, Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods, Novi Sad, 2013

98 |


A compromise was reached through Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation which were harmonized in 2011.6

However, the most important agreement reached within the technical dialogue between Belgrade and Priština, under the auspices of the EU, and which paved the way for moderate normalization of economic cooperation and of movement of people and goods between Serbia and Kosovo was the Integrated Border Management agreement, which involves joint customs and immigration control on the administrative line dividing two customs territories.

After this agreement was harmonized, it was not implemented immediately, even though Serbian Government officially ratified it on December 6th 2012. The implementation of the agreement faced greatest obstacles in Northern Kosovo, because local Serbs opposed it. They expressed concerns that they might be cut off from Serbia due to complicated procedures and that they would not be able to import goods from central Serbia. There was also the question of collecting duty and taxes on these administrative crossings by Kosovo Customs. In order to solve these issues between Serbia and the authorities in Priština, it was verbally agreed that goods for inhabitants of Northern Kosovo would not be subject to duty if they are shipped by trucks that that can carry up to 3.5 t and six types of excise goods would be freely imported, while the goods would only be registered by the customs at these crossings. Serbia cancelled transit convoys for Kosovo trucks transiting Serbia, which used to be scheduled between 8 AM and 3 PM each day. Customs surveillance for goods from Kosovo transiting Serbia will be performed in Vranje and for certain types of goods in Niš.7

The customs agreement is still not fully implemented. One of the issues is vehicle insurance, because it affects transport vehicles carrying goods between the two

6 The agreement on main principles of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina envisages representation of Kosovo* at the regional meetings on its own behalf and for their own interests under the title “Kosovo*”. Asterisk following the name Kosovo* indicates a footnote reading: “This designation is with-out prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declara-tion of Independence”. European Union shall take charge in the process of implementation of this agreement.7 Center for Regionalism, Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods, Novi Sad, 2013


customs territories, as well as vehicles for transit of goods through these customs territories. At this moment the insurance regime that requires payment of the so called border insurance is being enforced, because Kosovo cannot become a member of the green card insurance club. In addition, monetary transactions represent another problem for Serbia and Kosovo. Serbia allowed payment of charges for goods from Kosovo in foreign currency, but foreign currency must be sold to the National bank of Serbia and to obtain the amount in Serbian dinars. However, present conditions are not adequate for cashless payment operations, in spite of the fact that there are banks in Kosovo which hold the capital from Serbia, such as Komercijalna banka with office in Pristina and Dunav banka a.d. Zvečan8

8 Center for Regionalism, Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods, Novi Sad, 2013

100 |


Normalization of Relations Between Serbia and Kosovo – the Economic Dimension

Trade regimes between Serbia and Kosovo have been changed since 2000, and there have been several stages. The first stage was between 2000 and 2004, and during that stage Serbia still endeavored to treat trade with Kosovo as internal trade, although Kosovo was defined as an independent customs territory in the Security Council resolution 1244, with the provision that UNMIK shall be in charge of creating and implementing Kosovo’s foreign trade policy. The second stage, (2004 – 2008) is distinguished by higher exchange between the two customs territories. Signing the CEFTA 2006 agreement was of special importance; however, there was a new crisis in relations in 2008, when Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence. The third stage of trade relations began in 2008 and is characterized by technical problems in trade and negotiations on technical issues which are supposed to facilitate trade between these two customs territories. Although the declaration of independence significantly complicated trade between Serbia and Kosovo, certain goods from Kosovo were re-exported to Serbia via Montenegro and Macedonia and contained their customs stamps, although Kosovo was marked as the country of origin. Due to the fact that the majority of population of Northern Kosovo is Serbs and the inability of Kosovo Customs to open its offices in Jarinje and Brnjak, Northern Kosovo became a de facto duty-free zone until mid-December 2013, when collection of duty at these two customs points began.

The extent of trade in goods between the customs territories of Kosovo and Serbia9 was very small during the first years following the conflicts in Northern Kosovo, while a significant rise started in 2004, according to data from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia and a comprehensive analysis recently published in the document entitled Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods, Center for Regionalism, Novi Sad 210310.

9 Ibid.

10 Note: Serbian tax authorities classify these data as internal trade, while grey economy is not included.


Table 1: ovement of goods between Serbia and Kosovo*, 2001-2012, mill. EUR

350

mil.

EUR

300

250

200

150

100

50

02001 2002 2003

Import from Kosova Export from Kosovo

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Source: Center for Regionalism, Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods, Novi Sad, 2013

Exports from Serbia to Kosovo rose in 2007 as a result of liberalization of regional trade through CEFTA 2006. Furthermore, this trend remained the same even during tensions in the aftermath of Kosovo’s unilaterally proclaimed independence, or after the world financial crisis broke out. In 2012 exports from Serbia to Kosovo reached the level of about 300 million EUR, which proves that this market is of primary importance for Serbia and significant for Serbian economic positioning in this market in the future. On the other hand, exports from Kosovo to Serbia were much smaller, although there had been some dynamics of growth until the economic crisis broke out. According to the Serbian Chamber of Commerce, export from Kosovo to Serbia reached the level of around 10 million EUR.

Mainly due to political issues, albeit many specific economic factors count, Serbia has exported to Kosovo significantly more than Kosovo has been able to export to Serbia.

102 |


In the External Trade Statistics Report of the Kosovo Agency of Statistics11, there is a mixed trend of Kosovo exports to Serbia. While an increasing trend prevailed until 2007, when total exports to Serbia were 19,280,000 EUR, this trend has been decreasing since Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Although in 2011 the exports picked up to 7,198,000 EUR compared to the 3,941,000 EUR exports the previous year, the exports compared to imports from Serbia are largely insignificant. The same report shows a constant increasing trend of Serbian goods exported to Kosovo. This contributed largely to Kosovo’s trade deficit through the years. The trade balance of Kosovo with Serbia remains an issue of high concern to Kosovo authorities. Serbian exports to Kosovo have marked an increasing trend until 2007, while there was a small decrease from 222,534,000 EUR in 2007 to 208,951,000 EUR in 2008. In 2010 especially there was a large increase to 260,471,000 EUR, which only decreased negligibly to 254,971,000 EUR in 2011. Serbia’s substantial trade surplus or Kosovo’s substantial trade deficit (whichever perspective we choose to look at the trade from) shows a large trade imbalance between the two economies, which does not necessarily reflect the economic status of these countries but rather the political economy relations between the two.

If we look into the structure of goods exported from Serbian customs territory to Kosovo in 2012, we can observe that most important export products were foodstuffs, with around 30% share, followed by industrial products classified by material, and whose share was 21.3%, chemical products with 13.9% share, mineral fuels and lubricants with 11.34%. Having assessed trends between 2008 and 2012, we can observe that food products became increasingly important, while the importance of machinery, transport equipment, mineral fuels and lubricants significantly dropped.

11 Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Series3: External Trade Statistics 2011, https://ask.rks-gov.net/ENG/publiki-met/doc_download/1040-external-trade-statistics-2011


Table 2: Export from the rest of Serbia to Kosovo according to SITC rev. 3, 2008-2012

SITC Product Group 2008 2010 2012

No. name 000 € % 000 € % 000 € %

Prim

ary

prod

ucts

Crud

e m

ater

ials

0 Food and live animals 61.464 26,28 76.120 25,68 95.926 32,47

1 Tobacco and beverages 10.560 4,51 9.475 3,20 12.783 4,33

2 Crude materials and materials

3.794 1,62 4.161 1,40 4.296 1,45

3 Mineral fuels and lubricants

26.030 11,13 55.394 18,68 33.483 11,34

4 Animal and vegetable oils

2.709 1,16 2.984 1,01 5.452 1,85

Indu

stria

l pro

duct

s

5 Chemical products 29.970 12,81 31.520 10,63 41.068 13,90

6 Manufactured goods chiefly classified by materials

57.843 24,73 60.526 20,42 62.912 21,30

7 Machinery and transport equipment

29.963 12,81 40.328 13,60 23.491 7,95

8 Miscelaneous manufactured articles

11.560 4,94 15.959 5,38 15.970 5,41

9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC

- - - - - -

TOTAL 233.898 100,00 296.471 100,00 295.385 100,00

Source: Center for Regionalism, Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods, Novi Sad 2013, data obtained from Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

104 |


Table 3: Main individual export products from Serbia to Kosovo in 2012

Rang HS code Name Value(EUR)

Share in total export

(%)

1. 1001.19 Wheat and meslin, other 16. 403.403 5,55

2. 2709.00 Crude oil, other 12.407.378 4,20

3. 1101.00 Flour 10.129.674 3,45

4. 6905.10 Ceramic roof tiles 8.784.774 2,97

5. 2106.90 Food products 7.785.683 2,64

6. 2716.00 Electric energy 7.493.761 2,54

7. 3003.20 Medicaments containig other antibiotics 7.222.675 2,45

8. 3105.90 Fertilizers 7.072.913 2,39

9. 2202.90 Non-alcoholic beverages 5.753.177 1,95

10. 2103.90 Mixed spices 5.406.449 1,83

All the above 88.459.887 29,97

TOTAL 295.358.692 100,00

Source: Center for Regionalism, Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Concluded between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods, Novi Sad 2013, data obtained from Serbian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Main products in demand in Kosovo are wheat, flour and construction materials, most of all roofing tile. Apart from wheat and wheat products, export of other kinds of food, like processed food, soft drinks and mixed spices, is also significant. Significant chemical products are medicines and fertilizers, and electricity export is most important in the field of energy.

On the other hand Kosovo is still an import based economy. Due to its geographical proximity, the main importing countries in Kosovo are CEFTA-members followed by the EU-countries. The EU and CEFTA member countries are the main partners of


Kosovo in the overall foreign trade. Over ¾ of imports and exports were realized with these groups of countries during the period 2003 – 2008 (similar situation is also prior to 2003). As regards the trade with CEFTA countries, the relations with the former Yugoslav Republics remain rather tight. Macedonia and Serbia were the main regional partners covering around ⅓ of exports and imports of Kosovo, respectively (see Table 1 and 2 in the Annex).

The local production on Kosovo has been growing exponentially in recent years. Even though local production is increasing steadily, Kosovo is still forced to import goods and raw materials that are not offered by the local market. Not only is the local demand continuously relying on the local production but furthermore Kosovo is increasingly exporting to its main trade partners, EU-countries and CEFTA-members.

Negative trade balance is only one of the economic problems Kosovo is facing. The Kosovo institutions are aware that the change of this reality requires comprehensive economic and political approaches and reforms in order to change the operational environment in Kosovo, for the purpose of improving the competitive position of Kosovo in the world market. As a result, they aspire to change and supplement the existing economic policies and improve the institutional functionality. This would, to a great extent, advance the operational environment in Kosovo. Such a commitment has been clearly stated in the all relevant government documents.

Apart from the improvements, the current level of economic relations, or to be more precise, of trade between Serbia and Kosovo is still burdened with problems and difficulties concerning customs procedure, payment operations and transit procedures.

Main impediments in the trade between Serbia and Kosovo are the following:·· The price of the services of the customs terminal in North Mitrovica is one

of the highest in Europe (EUR 41); higher tariff levels for tax computation and taxes for certain products exporeted from Serbia to Kosovo;

·· Time and amount of costs in international trade to and from the southern part of Kosovo, while goods cannot be transported in transit through Serbia;

·· Vehicle insurance – cheaper insurance policies, instructions on the use of insurance policies to be written in both languages, to prevent fraud and col-

106 |


lection of unfounded claims, guarantees that damages will be paid. Kosovo is not part of the green card system and has its own insurance, which is not recognized by Serbia, and goods sold in Kosovo market are thus even more expensive;

·· Payment operations are expensive and are not regulated. Costs of payment operations with the southern part of Kosovo are very high (These opera-tions with the southern part of Kosovo must be done via intermediary firms, whose commissions are 1-8%);

·· No bank guarantees or liabilities towards buyers in the southern part of Kosovo;

·· List of 141 types of products by foreign manufacturers that cannot be im-ported to Kosovo from Serbia; these manufactureres have representatives or licences for distribution and trade in the territory of Kosovo;

·· Problem with foreign citizens who cannot enter Serbia from Kosovo if re-turning to Serbia unless they have an entrance stamp in their passport, which proves that they previously entered Serbia. Requiring temporary documents from those who enter Serbia from Kosovo creates problems and obstacles to free movement of people;

·· Businesses in Kosovo complain of the long waiting-hours (up to 12 hours) for Kosovo exporters at the Serbian border. On the other side there have not been delays reported on the Kosovo side;

·· Serbia continues to request collection of Value Added Tax (VAT) on exports from Kosovo. This requires Kosovo exporters to register with offices of the Republic of Serbia illegally operating within the territory of Kosovo;

·· Serbia prohibits entering of goods with certificates issued by the Kosovo Food and Veterinary Agency even for transit through territory of Serbia to third countries and EU destinations and vice versa;

·· Serbian and Kosovo customs do not accept veterinary certificates for inter-nal trade of animal products or phytosanitary certificates issued by autho-rized laboratories;

·· Non-functioning rail transport and postal services between Serbia and Kosovo;

·· Most of the trade is still in the grey zone.


Stabilization and Association Process – EU’s Long-Term Strategic and Political Approach to the Western Balkans Countries – A Framework For Normalization of Relations Between Serbia and Kosovo

In the light of incoming negotiations between EU and Kosovo about SAA, which is in fact a trade liberalization agreement involving the respective obligations concerning trade policy measures, it can be expected that regulating the Kosovo market will be an important factor in generating foreign investors’ interest and rise in imports from the EU. Since trade relations between Serbia and Kosovo are regulated by the CEFTA 2006 provisions and concerning the fact that according to available data, trade is rising, it is time to launch practical initiatives and projects aimed at strengthening economic cooperation between the two customs territories.

A framework which is important for boosting the present trade was set in the Memorandum of Understanding signed between economic chambers of Serbia and Kosovo under the auspices of the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambers) on July 24th 2013. This Memorandum laid foundations for establishing special task forces in charge of customs/duty issues, supporting documentation, value added tax and other taxes, promotion of trade and all other technical questions which pose obstacles to free movement of goods. At the same time, this Memorandum is a framework for defining common projects aimed at creating stronger networks of businessmen from Kosovo and Serbia and of other projects of mutual interest and that can be classified as important, and huge investment projects, for example in road infrastructures (motorway between Belgrade and Pristina), reintroduction of railway services, projects in areas of energy or environmental rehabilitation, which are essentially “cross-border” projects, and are quite significant for the development and improvement of many branches of economy (e.g. agriculture or tourism). Each of these projects which attracts big foreign investors is also a chance to use local companies as contractors, which has a multiplicative effect on economic recovery of local communities. Recovery of infrastructure can attract new investments in local communities in the south of Serbia (opening new plants for manufacturing goods with high demand in Kosovo market by domestic or foreign investors alike) and in Kosovo, bearing in mind that

108 |


legal framework for business is expected to improve due to Kosovo-EU accession talks. We should not ignore the fact that higher demand in Kosovo is expected due to improvements in operational environment by way of dialogue with the EU (inflow from European funds, institutional and private funds).

On April 2013 as a result of a series of European Union (EU) facilitated talks, Serbia and Kosovo reached an encouraging “First Agreement on the Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations”. This agreement marks the most significant step forward and is expected to enhance their European integration prospects and contribute to peace and stability in the region. The April agreement builds on previous deals of a more technical nature. Namely, as of March 2011 until February 2012, a series of meetings were held by officials of both governments. In total seven conclusions were reached: (1) customs stamps, (2) civil registry, (3) university diplomas, (4) freedom of movement, (5) regional representation of Kosovo, (6) cadastre books and (7) IBM conclusions. While from October 2012 to January 2013 another series of meetings between the two prime ministers took place in Brussels, whereby it was agreed to: 1) implement the IBM; 2) create a multi-ethnic component of the Kosovo police to protect Serb Orthodox Churches and monasteries in Kosovo; 3) exchange their respective Liaison Officers; and 4) create the development fund for four Kosovo Serb majority municipalities of northern Kosovo.

Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina aimed at visible and sustainable improvement in mutual relations is one of the key requisites for Serbia and Kosovo to move further in EU integration, which is in case of Serbia confirmed by the fact that this issue will be considered as part of a special chapter of Serbia-EU negotiations, i.e. Chapter 35.

The essence of this chapter is Serbia’s duty to implement all agreements reached in negotiations with Kosovo in good faith and to fully respect the principles of comprehensive regional cooperation, which is one of the key elements of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU. This means that the agreements about technical issues should be implemented in an operative and sustainable way and the obligation to efficiently cooperate with EULEX. These obligations will most probably be laid down in the Stabilization and Association Agreement which Kosovo is to sign with the EU. Kosovo needs to continue to work on the eight other priority areas identified in the feasibility study so that it will be able implement the SAA and


meet the obligations this will entail. The Commission has also identified a number of specific deliverables that would be required of Kosovo in order to meet its obligations in each priority area under an SAA.

Generally speaking, we should bear in mind that the question of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo will constantly affect the development of future negotiations between Serbia and the EU and Kosovo-EU relations, which points to the necessity to make a strategic analysis of this matter even now and to identify economic issues and normalization of relations as top priorities.

110 |


City of Leskovac – Case Study

The city of Leskovac has an exceptional geographic position. It is located between three countries, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia and borders the administrative line with Kosovo along the transcontinental route E-75 which links – in the Morava-Vardar direction, Central Europe with Greece and the Middle East. Additionally, Leskovac is a transportation hub because the international trains from Europe to Skopje, Thessaloniki and Athens stop there. Regional roads from Leskovac lead to Pristina, Pirot and Bosilegrad.

The road between Leskovac and Pristina, via Medveđa, is extremely important for revitalization of economic relations of this part of Serbia and Kosovo but its construction is shadowed by long unsolved issues between Belgrade and Priština. The lack of customs checkpoint at the border crossing of Mutivode near Medveđa, not only significantly reduces trade between local neighboring markets, but is a factor that limits development of business initiatives of the entire Jablanica District, the city of Leskovac included.

According to the 2011 census the population of the Jablanica District was 216,304, which is 3.0% of the overall population of the Republic of Serbia compared to 3.2% at the census of 2002. 92.4% of overall population declared themselves as Serbs, followed by 5.3% of Roma, 0.2% Albanians, 0.1% Montenegrins, 0.1% Macedonian and the remaining 1.9% were members of other ethnic groups (Bulgarians, Croats, Yugoslavs, Russians, Romanians, Muslims, Gorani etc.). Leskovac is the city with largest population and according to the 2011 census, 66.7% of overall population of the Jablanica District lives there.

Since the beginning of 2000 until today, the employment level has oscillated a great deal in Leskovac. The structure of employees, with high oscillations, is dominated by participation of public sector employees (83.5% in 2001, 74.4% in 2005, 70.1% in 2011), but the number of private sector employees is also on the rise (from 25.6% in 2005 to 29.9% in 2011). Generally, it can be concluded that an increased participation rate of private sector employees results primarily from private entrepreneurial ideas


but also from the struggle of the local population to survive in the hard times of transition.

As an economic and cultural center of the Jablanica District, Leskovac consists of five municipalities (Bojnik, Medveđa, Lebane, Vlasotince and Crna Trava), which were classified as the least developed municipalities until 2005, pursuant to the Law on Underdeveloped Areas in the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, № 53/95), while Leskovac was in the category of remaining municipalities. The 2009 Law on Regional Development categorized Leskovac into the 3rd group with the development level ranging between 60% and 80% of national average, while other municipalities of the Jablanica District were classified in group 4, with the development level of below 60% of national average.

Since 2005 even the economy of Leskovac has been stumbling and has had features of other municipalities of the Jablanica District, which was proved by the indicator of number of employed people per 1000 population by municipalities, in comparison to national and district indices. This indicator for the city of Leskovac, at the end of 2011 amounted to slightly more than 2/3 of the average level of the Republic of Serbia.12

Private sector was not strong enough to absorb the overall manpower surplus from the entire sector, who partially go to labor market and cause an increase in the number of unemployed population, year in, year out. According to the official data of the National Employment Service (NSZ), the overall number of unemployed persons for the city of Leskovac amounts to 22,138 (position as of October 31, 2013), or around 60% of the overall number of unemployed in the Jablanica District. Male population is constantly leading and it makes 52.3% of the overall number of unemployed population in the city of Leskovac. Worryingly, even the educational structure of the unemployed in Leskovac is unfavorable, from the point of view of dominant participation of the unemployed with I, II and III degree of professional qualification amounting to 59.2% (13,107), or the population that does not possess any adequate specialized knowledge. Additionally, low participation of the unemployed with university degrees (5.3%) is discouraging and consequently

12 Source: National Employment Service, NSZ, Serbian Municipalities 2012.

112 |


such educational structure of unemployed persons puts Leskovac and the Jablanica District into the unenviable position of having to face numerous challenges.

Table 4: Unemployed population per sex and qualification, the city of Leskovac, 31 October 2013

Professional qualification degree

City of Leskovac, position as of 31 Dec 2009

City of Leskovac, position as of 31 Nov 2013

Overall % female participation

% overall participation

Overall % female participation

% overall participation

Index20132009

I degree 5.143 49,0 24,6 5.197 46,7 23,5 101,1

II degree 389 52,9 1,9 369 50,9 1,7 94,8

III degree 7.295 42,1 34,8 7.541 36,4 34,1 103,4

IV degree 6.272 58,7 30,0 6.606 53,5 29,8 105,3

V degree 135 21,5 0,6 161 32,2 0,7 119,2

VI-1 degree 919 54,7 4,4 807 54,7 3,6 87,8

VI-2 degree 32 68,7 0,1 281 64,0 1,3 878,2

VII-1 degree 729 54,0 3,5 1.164 55,3 5,3 159,7

VII-2 degree 8 37,5 0,04 12 41,6 0,1 150,0

Overall 20.922 49,8 100,0 22.138 46,2 100,0 105,6

Source: National Employment Service, NSZ, Serbian Municipalities 2012.

Unfavorable educational structure of the unemployed population is directly related to unfavorable structural economics of both the city of Leskovac and the district. Due to inherited decades-long circumstances till 2000 and disregard of “specificities of this border region“ by the designers of more balanced regional development, structure of the local economy, looking from the present perspective, did not manage to respond to new challenges regarding the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, notwithstanding the potentials that it possesses (natural resources, geostrategic position, traditional business coordination with the neighboring Kosovo market, enormous manpower potentials whose education is disproportionate to current requirements of the operational environment).


Results of such employment movements in the city of Leskovac and the entire Jablanica District are not related only to delayed and inefficient transition but could also be attributed to breaking of the economic bonds of this area with its natural and adjacent market partners i.e. entrepreneurs from Kosovo.

The official unemployment rate, as of October 2013,13 in all Jablanica District municipalities, excluding Crna Trava (17.53%), was above the national unemployment rate (28.64%), while the unemployment rate in Leskovac is 1.5 times higher compared with the national average.

It is obvious that the economy in Leskovac remained “non-reformed and trapped” compared to the situation in the 1990s. This is corroborated by the data about the variation of the share of Leskovac income in Serbian GDP:

participation amounted to 1,51%




in 1989 in 2000 in 2005 in 2012

*i.e. the participation of the Leskovac income share in the Serbian GNP almost halved in 2012 compared to the 1990s.

Source: National Employment Service, “Unemployment Rate per Municipalities and Districts”, in Sta-tistical Bulletin Monthly: Unemployment and Employment in Republic of Serbia, No. 134, Belgrade, October 2013.

The income per employee provides a full insight into the economic situation and adequately differentiate each of the municipalities in the Jablanica District. In late 2005 personal income per employee was lower compared to the average national

13 National Employment Service, “Unemployment Rate per Municipalities and Districts”, in Statistical Bulletin Monthly: Unemployment and Employment in Republic of Serbia, No. 134, Belgrade, October 2013.

114 |


level of the Republic of Serbia by 42.3%. The tendency of income per employee to fall on regional level compared to the Republic average, has continued to this day and in October 2013, it was lower compared to the national average by 24.2%, i.e. nominally less by RSD 10,454. At the level of Leskovac, at the end of October 2013 the income per employee was by 29.6% lower compared to the national average i.e. nominally by RSD 12,774. The average income per employee in Leskovac has constantly been falling compared to the national average by about 30%.

Table 4: Average income per employee, taxes and contributions excluded, in RSD

Municipalities 2005. 14 % Participation 2011.15 % - IX 2013.16 %

Bojnik 7.244 41,5 28.535 75,1 34.153 79,0

Lebane 5.524 31,7 26.988 71,1 30.419 70,4

Leskovac 11.265 64,6 29.022 76,4 30.457 70,4

Medveđa 8.419 48,3 34440 90,6 38.492 89,0

Crna Trava 14.675 84,1 23.457 61,7 30.799 71,2

Jablanica District 10.065 57,7 28.314 74,5 32.777 75,8

REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 7443 100,0 37976 100,0 43231 100,0

Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, SORS, Announcement no. 317, Employment and income statistics, year LXIII, 25 November 2013.

14 15 16

14 Source: Municipalities in Serbia 2006. Income average for 2005, taxes and contributions excluded.

15 Source: Municipalities and regions in the Republic of Serbia 2012. Income average for 2011, taxes and contributions excluded.

16 Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, SORS, Announcement no. 317, year LXIII, 25 November 2013. Employment and income statistics.


Export per activity sectors and groups of products in Jablanica District and Leskovac

According to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia data17, exportation from this southern part of the Republic of Serbia18 to the customs territory of Kosovo significantly rose in 2006 and 2007, which can be explained by enforcement of the CEFTA 2006 agreement, which liberalized regional trade as it was signed also by both Serbia and UNMIK/Kosovo. The overall export of the presented municipalities to Kosovo was doubled in 2008 (Index 230.7) compared to 2007, regardless of the fact that Kosovo proclaimed independence. A more significant drop occurred in late 2009 when the overall municipality export dropped compared to 2008 by 15.2% (Index 84.8) i.e. the export drop is evident based on the data presented for Leskovac, because in that year export to Kosovo was lower compared to 2008 by 15.8% points, which can be explained by a drop in general economic activity displayed by a rapid decrease in the overall number of employees in the city in that period.

It can be concluded that there was a growing export tendency in the municipalities of this part of the Republic of Serbia to the customs territory of Kosovo in the period from 2010-2012, only to amount to USD 28.3 million by the end of 2012, with participation of about 6.86% of the total Serbian export to Kosovo (in 2012 Serbian export to Kosovo reached the level of about EUR 300 million)19, consequently ranking it as the top-priority export market. The overall export per municipalities for the period from 2005 to 2012 is enclosed in the Annex (Table 3).

17 Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia, Belgrade, 6 December 2013.

18 Customs law of the Republic of Serbia (Official gazette of the Republic of Serbia 18/2010) defines Serbian customs territory as territory identical to the territory of the Republic of Serbia, which also implies Kosovo (Customs Law of the RS, Article 3). This Law is applicable to all form of flow of goods between the customs territories of Serbia and all other customs territories, and thus regulates Serbian foreign trade with the rest of the world (Customs Law of the RS, Article 1). However, Article 309 of the Customs law provides the application of its provisions even to „flow of goods with the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija during the validity of the Resolution 1244“. This Law predict the obligation to establish checkpoints at the administrative line of division with Kosovo, where customs surveillance and customs procedures should be applied. These details are to be regulated by adoption of by-laws.

19 Source: “Monitoring of Implementation of the Agreement Between Kosovo and Serbia in the Field of Free Movement of People and Goods“, Expert Report, Center for regionalism, Novi Sad, September 2013.

116 |


The overall Leskovac export to the customs territories of Kosovo amounted to USD 7.7 million in 2012, which is by 4.4% points lower than in 2011 (Index 98.1). The export structure20 is dominated by the following sectors: construction material industry (19.5%), metalworking (15.3%) and pharmaceutical industry (11.6%), while chemical and food processing industry participate in the overall city export with 6.2% and 5.2% respectively:

Table 5. Main export per sectors, Leskovac, 2012

No. S e c t o r 2012.(USD in 000)

% Participation 2012.

1. Construction material industry 1.506 19,5

2. Metalworking industry 1.183 15,3

3. Pharmaceutical industry 896 11,6

4. Chemical industry 478 6,2

5. Food processing industry 402 5,2

Overall for the City of Leskovac 7.715 100,0

Source: Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia: Structure of goods exported from Leskovac region to Kosovo developed based on the available tables: the first 20 types of products, of the total of 316, Belgrade, 6 December 2013.

According to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia21, the most important goods exported from Leskovac region to Kosovo in 2012 were the following: liquefied butane (13.8%), heating appliances (12.2%), non-alcoholic beverages (8.3%) with almost doubled rise of export compared to 2011 (index 275.6), followed

20 Export structure, per sectors, at the level of Leskovac developed based on the available data of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia: Table of the top 20 businesses of this southern part of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 6 December 2013.

21 Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia: Structure of goods exported from Leskovac region to Koso-vo developed based on the available tables: the first 20 types of products, of the total of 316, Belgrade, 6 December 2013.


by: upholstered furniture (5.6%), ceramic roof tiles (5.2%), polyethylene bags and bands (4.6%), sheet metal, iron and steel panels (4.1%), liquefied propane (4.0%), and different cellular structures (3.9).

The flow of goods in trading with Kosovo is dominated by heating appliances (12.2%) and liquefied butane (13.8%), but it is also indicative that these goods have seen a drop in export by 32.2% compared to 2011. The biggest drop in export of the listed goods compared to 2011 has been noted for pharmaceuticals by over 80% (index 17.4) and liquefied butane by over 30% (index 67.8), while the highest rise of export of the listed goods is recorded for different cellular structures by over 170% (index 277.,7), non-alcoholic beverages by over 150% (index 275.9), ceramic roof tiles by 68.1% (index 168.1), mineral water (index 159.3) etc. Export per groups of products for the Jablanica region for 2012 is displayed in the Annex (Table 4). At the end of 2012 the overall export to Kosovo from the Leskovac region22 amounted to USD 28.3 million which, compared to 2011 is higher by 14.3%.

22 Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia, Belgrade, 6 December 2013.

118 |


Import from Kosovo to Leskovac per sectors of activities and groups of products

Export form Kosovo to the Jablanica region is much lower, but it also has its own dynamics and we can conclude that it marked more significant rise in 2006 only to drop in 2007. In late 2012, Kosovo export into this region amounted only to USD 155,000. Although this is a negligible amount, it should be noted that Kosovo as underdeveloped economy has generally low levels of export. The overall import per municipalities for the period from 2005 to 2012 is displayed in the Annex (Table 5).

The overall import of the city of Leskovac from Kosovo amounted in 2012 to USD 100,000, and it increased four times compared to 2011, with participation of 64.4% in the overall import from Kosovo. Thus, in 2012, Leskovac, compared to all other municipalities in the region, was the greatest importer of goods from Kosovo. The importer is PEŠIĆ-VINET d.o.o. (ltd.) from Veliko Trnjaje, Leskovac, and the goods imported are agricultural products (sweet pepper, fresh or frozen).

Findings of this research indicate that it is necessary to change the approach to solving essential development issues of both the city of Leskovac and other Jablanica District municipalities, that there is no a general approach, but it has to be adapted to real needs of local communities and their population by using all available resources. All the necessary reforms must start form precise and accurate data, because it is only based on such data that is possible to design development plans that will have real results and long-lasting effects in practice.

Regional differences observed in the previous, decades-long period, deeply affected economic and developmental perspectives of this part of southern Serbia, and even of Leskovac as an economic and cultural center of the Jablanica District. Unfavorable educational structure of the unemployed and insufficiently developed road infrastructure are directly related to unfavorable structural economy of Leskovac. Accompanied with disregard of “specificities of this border region”, by the designers of more balanced regional development, structure of the local economy, from this perspective, did not manage to tackle new challenges regarding the relations


between Serbia and Kosovo, notwithstanding the potentials that it possesses (natural resources, geostrategic position, traditional business coordination with the neighboring Kosovo market, enormous manpower potentials). The economy in Leskovac remained “non-reformed and trapped” compared to the situation in the 1990s. This is corroborated by the data about the variation of the share of the Leskovac income in Serbian GNP, which was almost halved by the end of 2012 if compared to the one from the 1990s. However, export from the municipalities of this southern part of the Republic of Serbia to the customs territory of Kosovo had a rising tendency in the period 2010-2012 and culminated at the end of 2012 with USD 28.3 million and participation of about 6.86% of overall Serbian export to the territory of Kosovo. As a reminder, Serbian export to Kosovo in 2012 reached the level of about EUR 300 million and thus ranks this territory as a top-priority export market. The city of Leskovac is about 100 kilometers far from Kosovo market and this proximity is an exceptional competitive advantage of this region.

Development policy makers on local and national level are recommended to find the solution for more secure existence and economic development of the Jablanica District population in competitive advantages of this south part of Serbia situated at medium altitude with continental climate, which provides favorable life conditions and is good for all economic activities.

120 |


Recommendations for Promotion of Trade Relations and Business Cooperation of Local Communities

The most important political breakthrough in the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština was the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations between Belgrade and Priština, which was a precondition for initiation of negotiations of Kosovo with the EU in order to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement. On the other hand for Belgrade it was the proof of fulfillment of the necessary political criteria from the Stabilization and Association Agreement and precondition for the EU to make a decision on the date for the beginning of the EU accession negotiations.

Current developments in the communication and dialogue system between Serbia and Kosovo and in the process of stabilization and accession of both sides, also formed a framework for one of the essential stabilization preconditions of a politically sensitive situation in south Serbia. Most importantly, from the point of view of political sustainability of the achieved and future solutions, these development are expected to contribute towards strengthening economic exchange and other forms of economic cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo.

Current circumstances of the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo and the existing potentials related to economic exchange are also basis for common action towards Brussels in order to advocate additional funding for projects relevant for economic renewal and development of both Serbian and Kosovo communities as incentives and support to economic dialogue and joint economic projects of Serbia and Kosovo.

This is particularly important, having in mind latest developments in the implementation of the so-called Brussels agreement i.e. the expected constitution of the Community of Serbian Municipalities and a relatively recent European Commission Decision of 31 October 2013 to approve initial funds of EUR 15 million of aid to municipalities with Serbian majority for the renewal and development of municipal infrastructure, public administration, rural and regional development, employment and environmental protection. It should be timely recognized that part of these funds is indirectly intended for economic rehabilitation and development of


the Serbian community in Kosovo (infrastructure, rural and regional development, employment, environmental protection and public administration reform as an important determinant of facilitated operational environment for businesses), which indicates the necessity to timely prepare adequate projects.

It is important to underline that there is an evident shift in solving of the problems that burden trade exchange between Serbia and Kosovo. However, there are still open issues to be resolved through dialogue.

The key obstacles identified in the trade exchange between Serbia and Kosovo to be eliminated in order to promote trade exchange in the coming period are the following:

·· In the field of transportation and customs services it is necessary to cut the costs of the customs terminal in North Mitrovica which is among the most expensive ones in Europe (EUR 41), and implementation of adequate cus-toms tariffs for calculation of customs duties and taxes for certain products shipped from Serbia to Kosovo. It is also necessary to do everything possible to stop the practice of VAT collection for the goods exported from Kosovo. In order to reduce transportation time in the international trade of goods to and from the south part of Kosovo, it is necessary to find, through dialogue, adequate ways to transport transit goods from Kosovo via Serbia. Addition-ally, through dialogue, a solution should be found for problems related to unimpeded transport of goods including reduction of time spent at the ad-ministrative line as well as prompt establishment of functional railway traf-fic and postal service between Serbia and Kosovo.

·· In the area of vehicle insurance it is necessary to provide more affordable prices of insurance policies, text of the policy usage instructions written in both languages, prevention of misuse and collection of unjustified liabili-ties, guarantees that the damage incurred will be collected.

·· On the other hand, in the area of payment operations and banking ser-vices it is necessary to arrange payment operations between Serbia and Kosovo and thus lower very high costs because the operations are carried out through intermediaries, with a 1-8% commission. It is also necessary to establish an adequate system of banking guarantees or collaterals for the buyers in the southern part of Kosovo.

122 |


·· Additionally, in the area of free movement of people, there is a problem of foreign citizens who cannot enter Serbia from Kosovo in return unless they have a Serbian entrance stamp in their passports when entering Serbia, which should be solved. The practice of issuance of temporary documents for those who enter Serbia from Kosovo, should also be discussed because it creates additional problems and obstacles in free movement of people.

·· As far as the trade certificates are concerned, it is necessary to solve the problem of veterinary certificates for inner trade by both Serbian and Koso-vo customs authorities related to the trade of animal products and to phy-tosanitary certificates issued by the accredited laboratories.

Ultimately, it is necessary for both sides to take all available measures in order to dramatically reduce trade in the gray zone.

Solving of the open problems stated in this paper requires determination and effort.

The process of European integration is essential for successful establishment and promotion of economic relations between Serbia and Kosovo. However, it is necessary to intensify cooperation between municipalities, between the Chambers of Commerce, among youth and between civil society organizations from Serbia and Kosovo in order to use potentials for cooperation offered by the process of European integration in this context. For accelerated solving of the identified problems it is necessary for local authorities to put some pressure, which requires raising the level of trust between local communities from Kosovo and Serbia so as to allow respective municipalities to start cooperating directly in real projects.

Due to the identified barriers to economic cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo everybody is at a loss but most of all citizens from south Serbia. Economic interdependence of Serbian south and Kosovo has been built for centuries and the same problems, but chances as well, constitute an objective, interest-related, long-term base for undertaking many diverse mutual cooperation activities, primarily among the local stakeholders. It is in common interest of everyone living in the area to create conditions convenient for free movement of labor force. A good example would be Serbia using the area of Sandžak for further promotion of goods exchange with Kosovo, while similar solutions could very well be found in Kosovo.


Annex 1

Table A1. Kosovo trade exchange flow with the rest of the world 2012-2013

Country Exports Imports

2012 2013 2012 2013

October October

Value % Value % Value % Value %

Total 25.584 100.0 26.198 100.0 222.478 100.0 218.821 100.0

27 EU countries 8.113 31.7 9.805 37.4 85.155 38.3 87.457 40.0

Austria 218 0.9 410 1.6 3.204 1.4 3.718 1.7

Belgium 27 0.1 55 0.2 617 0.3 739 0.3

Great Britain 149 0.6 187 0.7 1.545 0.7 1.346 0.6

Denmark : : : : 347 0.2 116 0.1

France 119 0.5 127 0.5 1.547 0.7 2.229 1.0

Germany 1.077 4.2 450 1.7 25.711 11.6 21.403 9.8

Greece 34 0.1 80 0.3 9.849 4.4 12.606 5.8

Netherland 128 0.5 241 0.9 2.059 0.9 3.356 1.5

Hungary 13 0.1 54 0.2 2.121 1.0 2.871 1.3

Ireland : : 0.0 0.0 269 0.1 365 0.2

Italy 5.876 23.0 6.193 23.6 19.086 8.6 18.738 8.6

Luxemburg : : : : 4 0.0 29 0.0

Poland 15 0.1 73 0.3 2.322 1.0 3.976 1.8

Czech Republic 177 0.7 0 0.0 1.554 0.7 1.624 0.7

Slovakia 181 0.7 0 0.0 735 0.3 762 0.3

Slovenia 6 0.0 277 1.1 6.704 3.0 5.264 2.4

124 |



2012 2013 2012 2013

October October


Spain : : 36 0.1 1.055 0.5 1.903 0.9

Sweden 58 0.2 83 0.3 1.061 0.5 304 0.1

Romania 1 0.0 14 0.1 1.860 0.8 2.597 1.2

Bulgaria : : 69 0.3 2.959 1.3 3.148 1.4

Other countries of EU

34 0.1 1.454 5.6 546 0.2 363 0.2

CEFTA 11.260 44.0 9.794 37.4 77.680 34.9 67.321 30.8

Albania 3.404 13.3 3.769 14.4 13.082 5.9 9.161 4.2

Macedonia 2.830 11.1 2.377 9.1 22.347 10.0 16.557 7.6

Montenegro 2.509 9.8 1.345 5.1 1.167 0.5 1.503 0.7

SERBIA 2.145 8.4 1.931 7.4 23.229 10.4 28.137 12.9

Bosnia and Herzegovina

143 0.6 137 0.5 9.520 4.3 7.242 3.3

Moldavia : : 0.5 0.0 33 0.0 8 0.0

Croatia 228 0.9 234 0.9 8.302 3.7 4.714 2.2

EFTA 471 1.8 387 1.5 2.853 1.3 2.074 0.9

Switzerland 471 1.8 387 1.5 2.364 1.1 1.962 0.9

Iceland : : 0.0 : : : 1 0.0

Norway : : 0.0 : 471 0.2 111 0.1

Liechtenstein : : 0.0 : 17 0.0 : :

Other countries – Europa

953 3.7 584 2.2 20.529 9.2 16.831 7.7

Turkey 953 3.7 569 2.2 19.863 8.9 15.814 7.2

Ukraine : : 15 0.1 666 0.3 1.017 0.5



2012 2013 2012 2013

October October


Other countries – non european

10 0.0 7 0.0 10.552 4.7 11.586 5.3

USA 10 0.0 7 0.0 6.036 2.7 7.550 3.5

Canada : : : : 71 0.0 70 0.0

Brazil : : : : 4.243 1.9 3.843 1.8

Mexico : : : : 203 0.1 103 0.0

Other countries – Asia

2.744 10.7 3.060 11.7 15.800 7.1 19.255 8.8

Japan : : 0.0 : 984 0.4 788 0.4

China 39 0.2 169 0.6 14.014 6.3 16.594 7.6

India 2.705 10.6 2.891 11.0 802 0.4 1.873 0.9

Other 2.034 7.9 2.561 9.8 9.909 4.5 14.317 6.5

126 |


Table A2. Kosovo export by countries (2005-2011)

Country Export

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Austria 1,017 1,211 2,005 2,072 1,978 5,670 5,711

Belgium 19 17 5,587 28,113 5,176 11,455 5,085

Great Britain 72 62 154 173 249 681 1,343

Denmark 142 44 94 53 75 44 52

France 515 232 145 247 639 1,084 1,305

Germany 5,965 3,952 16,190 7,205 7,563 15,587 24,144

Greece 5,522 3,914 8,400 10,851 240 222 194

Netherlands 124 1,128 2,413 1,888 1,506 1,018 2,923

Hungary 92 18 112 105 396 29 89

Ireland 3 20 48 10 3 6 7

Italy 5,668 12,654 9,672 25,485 46,218 80,193 83,924

Luxembourg : : : : : : 8

Poland 102 281 121 102 53 150 650

Czech Republic 1 356 159 1,127 463 297 168

Slovakia 34 37 395 241 391 920 2,405

Slovenia 1,231 4,515 4,290 6,304 2,882 6,203 6,001

Spain : 49 114 196 51 49 57

Sweden 18 43 8,155 4,390 322 1,116 365

Romania : : 1,142 43 232 272 987

Bulgaria 970 13,506 10,005 2,632 2,709 6,765 936

Other of EU 126 69 169 2737 129 50 294

27 EU countries 21,621 42,108 69,370 93,974 71,275 131,811 136,648

Albania 5,784 12,645 20,799 21,113 26,182 30,841 34,566

Macedonia 10,828 9,734 17,384 20,046 17,355 26,308 30,949


Country Export

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Montenegro 743 2,207 2,913 3,770 3,084 3,920 6,988

SERBIA 8,158 20,910 19,280 9,893 3,504 3,941 7,198

Turkey 1,041 1,668 2,660 3,044 6,512 9,357 7,831

Switzerland 681 7,047 12,937 7,380 10,510 17,786 17,611

Bosnia and Herzegovina

3,411 5,126 5,287 5,919 1,206 1,847 612

Croatia 928 1,123 1,837 793 2,151 2,744 2,794

Ukraine 4 : 50 : : : :

USA 182 3 17 286 290 116 182

Brazil 45 : : : : : 43

Japan : : : : 3 12 5

China 10 5 18 31 1,596 14,779 28,268

Other 2,847 8,198 12,560 32,214 21,660 52,495 45,470

TOTAL* 56,283 110,774 165,112 198,463 165,328 295,957 319,165

Anne

x 1

128

Tabl

e A3

. Ove

rall

expo

rt p

er m

unici

paliti

es fo

r the

per

iod

2005

-201

2, in

000

USD

, % p

artic

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on p

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unici

paliti

es, S

ourc

e: C

ham

ber o

f Com

mer

ce a

nd

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of S

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a

Year

M u

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a l

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Lesk

ovac

Vran

jeBu

jano

vac

Preš

evo

Surd

ulic

aLe

bane

Bosi

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na T

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Vlas

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all

mun

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%

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cipa

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%

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cipa

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%

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cipa

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%

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%

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cipa

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%

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cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

2005

.1.

118

422

237

147

268

55

21.

970

56,8

21,5

12,0

7,5

1,3

0,4

0,2

0,2

-10

0,0

2006

.1.

332

373

5123

55

43

11.

796

74,2

20,8

2,8

1,3

0,3

0,3

0,2

0,1

-10

0,0

2007

.4.

516

714

270

4310

56

291

380

6.06

4

74,5

11,8

4,4

0,7

1,7

0,1

0,5

-6,

310

0,0

2008

.7.

845

3.77

91.

053

241

182

210

71

784

13.9

94

56,1

27,0

7,5

1,7

1,3

-0,

7-

5,7

100,

0

2009

.4.

784

4.29

81.

912

454

-27

-2

400

11.8

77

40,3

36,2

16,1

3,8

-0,

2-

-3,

410

0,0

SE

RB

IA A

ND

KO

SO

VO

: EU

RO

PE

AN

PE

RS

PE

CT

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S A

ND

PR

AC

TIC

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S | 1

29

Year

M u

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Lesk

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Vran

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%

Parti

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%

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%

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cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

2010

.4.

680

4.72

63.

999

238

953

90-

581

14.3

76

32,5

32,8

27,8

1,6

-0,

40,

6-

4,0

100,

0

2011

.7.

867

5.89

08.

318

1.29

348

4312

5-

1.31

724

.901

31,6

23,6

33,4

5,2

0,2

0,2

0,5

-5,

310

0,0

2012

.7.

715

7.29

17.

307

3.94

878

3813

1-

1.81

228

.320

27,2

25,7

25,8

13,9

0,3

0,1

0,5

-6,

510

0,0

130 |


Table A4. Export per groups of goods for the Jablanica region in 2012.

LESKOVAC (03) USD in

1.000Share Index USD in

1.000Share

No Cartar Goods 2012 2012 2012/2011 2011 2011

1) 2711.13 97 00 Bhutan, liquid, other 3.968 13,8 67,8 5.852 23,2

2) 7321.89 00 00 Non-electric appliances for heating, other, including appliances on solid fuel

3.498 12,2 120,7 2.899 11,5

3) 2202.90 10 00 Drinks non-alcoholic, non-dairy and dairy products

2.385 8,3 275,9 864 3,4

4) 9401.61 00 00 Seats, wooden, upholstered, other

1.600 5,6 115,4 1.387 5,5

5) 6905.10 00 00 Tiles (roof) of the ceramics 1.493 5,2 168,1 888 3,5

6) 6305.32 11 00 Bags of polyethylene tape, knitted, for bulk materials

1.314 4,6 127,1 1.034 4,1

7) 7308.90 51 00 Panels of two profiled steel, iron and steel

1.179 4,1 113,6 1.039 4,1

8) 2711.12 97 00 Propane, liquid, other 1.162 4,0 155,5 747 3,0

9) 3921.13 10 00 Forms, polyurethane, flexible, cellular

1.115 3,9 277,7 402 1,6

10) 6904.10 00 00 Brick masonry, ceramic 774 2,7 212,4 364 1,4

11) 421.39 20 90 Device for filtering or purifying air, other

756 2,6 - - -

12) 3004.90 00 99 Other medicines, other 511 1,8 - - -

13) 3920.10 40 00 Forms of polymers of ethylene, d <= 0, 125mm, Others

509 1,8 120,9 421 1,7

14) 2201.10 19 00 Water, mineral, natural, with added CO2, no sugar

461 1,6 259,3 178 0,7

15) 3208.90 91 00 Paints and coatings, synthetic polymers, non-aqueous, other

451 1,6 90,0 501 2,0

16) 5607.41 00 00 Ropes of polyethylene, etc. 448 1,6 141,1 317 1,3

17) 2202.10 00 00 Water, incl. mineral and aerated, with sugar, other

431 1,5 ***,* 24 0,1


LESKOVAC (03) USD in 1.000

Share Index USD in 1.000

Share

No Cartar Goods 2012 2012 2012/2011 2011 2011

18) 4819.40 00 00 Sacks and bags, others, including cones

406 1,4 165, 246 1,0

19) 3004.90 00 91 Other drugs, for retail sale, other

385 1,3 17,4 2.209 8,8

20) 2103.90 90 90 Mixed Spices - mixed seasonings, other sauces

347 1,2 249,6 139 0,6

20 Sub Total: 23.192 80,6 118,9 19.509 77,5

316 Total Goods: 28.320 100,0 114,3 25.169 100,0

Note: ***,* - index is over 1000

Source: Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Serbia

Anne

x 1

132

Tabl

e A5

Ove

rall

expo

rt p

er m

unic

ipal

ities

in th

e pe

riod

2005

-201

2, in

000

USD

, % p

artic

ipati

on p

er m

unic

ipal

ities

Year

M u

n i

c i p

a l

i t i

e s

Lesk

ovac

Vran

jeBu

jano

vac

Preš

evo

Surd

ulic

aLe

bane

Bosi

legr

adCr

na T

rava

Vlas

otinc

eTo

tal-

All

mun

icip

aliti

es

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

100,

0

2005

923

-4

--

--

-36

25,0

63,9

-11

,1-

--

--

100,

0

2006

5.11

1-

--

--

--

-5.

111

100,

0-

--

--

--

-10

0,0

2007

575

--

--

28-

--

603

95,3

--

--

4,7

--

--

2008

37-

54

-26

--

375

49,3

-6,

75,

3-

34,7

--

4,0

100,

0

2009

12-

2617

7-

--

--

215

5,6

-12

,182

,3-

--

--

100,

0

2010

--

--

--

--

--

SE

RB

IA A

ND

KO

SO

VO

: EU

RO

PE

AN

PE

RS

PE

CT

IVE

S A

ND

PR

AC

TIC

ALI

TIE

S | 1

33

Year

M u

n i

c i p

a l

i t i

e s

Lesk

ovac

Vran

jeBu

jano

vac

Preš

evo

Surd

ulic

aLe

bane

Bosi

legr

adCr

na T

rava

Vlas

otinc

eTo

tal-

All

mun

icip

aliti

es

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

%

Parti

cipa

tion

100,

0

2011

20-

-23

--

--

-43

53,5

--

46,5

--

--

100,

0

2012

100

-3

--

33-

-17

155

64,4

-1,

9-

-21

,3-

-11

,010

0,0

134 |


A6: The list of major exporters from the group of “top 20“ out of 162 companies of the region and the city of Leskovac

1. NIS-SVETLOST, d.o.o-Bujanovac (17.8%, metalworking industry),2. ALFA-PLAM a.d-Vranje (12.4%, metalworking industry), 3. FLUIDI d.o.o- Preševo (8.8%, food processing industry),4. Simpo a.d.-Vranje (5.5%, timber industry).

The major exporters for Kosovo from the city of Leskovac, in 2012. were the following companies:

1. IGM MLADOST d.d.o.-Leskovac (5.2%, construction material industry),2. INTERLEMIND a,d,- Leskovac (4.1%, metalworking industry), 3. ZDRAVLJE a.d. – Leskovac (3.1%, pharmaceutical industry),4. NEVENA COLOR d.o.o.-Leskovac (1.7%, Chemical industry )5. MESOKOMBINAT-PROMET d.o.o.-Leskovac (1.2%, food processing industry).

The greatest drop in export of the companies from the list of the “top 20“, compared to 2011, was noticed in

1. ZDAVLJE a.d. – Leskovac by about 60% (index 40.6), 2. NIS-SVETLOST d.o.o. – Bujanovac by about 27% (index 73.1)3. SIMPO a.d. – Vranje za 13,5% (index 73.1).

while the highest rise in export were noticed with the following companies from the list:

1. FLUIDI d.o.o. – Preševo by 170% (index 270.2), 2. IGM MLADOST d.o.o. – Leskovac,3. SIMPEN d.o.o. – Bujanovac by 160% ( common index 260.5), 4. HEBA a.d. – Bujanovac by about 160% (index 257.5), 5. NUTRIKO d.o.o. – Vranje by about 80% (index 179.4), 6. MESOKOMBINAT-PROMET d.o.o. – Leskovac by about 50% (index 147.7).


Serbia – Kosovo*23: Potential for Cooperation and Key Challenges Of a Common European Perspective

The European path of Serbia and Kosovo

The European Union policy towards the Western Balkan region is based on the Stabilization and Association Process launched in 1999. The purpose of the Stabilization and Association Process is to provide peace, stability, and economic development in the region, and to open the perspective of integration into the European Union. Since the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, all Western Balkan countries have been confirmed as “potential candidates” for European Union membership.

In Thessaloniki, European political actors sent a clear message to countries aspiring for membership, stressing that the EU is decisive in further investment in long-term peace, regional security, stability, democracy, and economic development in the Western Balkans. New instruments like the European Partnership, additional support for democratic institution-building, the promotion of economic development, the inauguration of Community programs and agencies have been initiated in this direction. Though the Summit made no specific mention of Kosovo, it is ostensibly

23 This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence

136 |

Serbia – Kosovo*: Potential for Cooperation and Key Challenges Of a Common European Perspective

seen as the starting point of a European future for Kosovo, mainly because it was the first large scale EU event at which Kosovo’s political leaders were present.

The EU integration agenda of Serbia and Kosovo is underpinned by the technical dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, and the fulfillment of obligations deriving from the SAA agreement and the Copenhagen Criteria for enlargement. While the SAA between Serbia and the EU came into force in September 2013, when speaking about Kosovo’s European integration process, little progress has been made in the SAA agreement and the general obligations of the Copenhagen criteria. Currently, the debate and efforts of actors from both the EU and Kosovo have been focused on EU-mediated technical dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Albeit labeled ‘technical’ in the EU’s verbal and written discourse, the issues discussed, such as cross-border mobility, acknowledgment of documentation etc. and their implications are inherently political.

Relations among the EU, Kosovo and Serbia are interlinked. First and foremost, for the EU, the joint European path of Kosovo and Serbia is defined by the EU’s broader reconciliation agenda on the Western Balkans. Currently, this takes the form of EU-mediated technical dialogue in Brussels. This provides that the EU path of either country is quintessentially linked with the successful and sustainable normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The second issue is the enlargement agenda – which would culminate with the EU membership of both Serbia and Kosovo, upon the fulfillment of the required criteria. While for Kosovo and Serbia this would mark a threshold in their histories and political developments, on the EU level, it is seen as an indicator of a unified EU action for foreign policy, and on a larger scale, as a success story of the EU’s structural foreign policy.

What follows below is an overview of the EU’s enlargement agenda and its relations with Serbia and Kosovo. In analyzing the European integration path of both Kosovo and Serbia, attention is given to the EU’s topical engagement in the technical dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and to the issue of the visa regime still in place for Kosovo. In addition, two regional aspects of the dialogue24 and the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo will be considered. The first

24 The process of “Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina” mediated by the European Union on th basis of the Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly A/RES/64/298 of September 9, 2010.


is Serbia and Kosovo’s participation in regional initiatives and structures, together with the dynamics of their relationship within a regional framework. The second is how these initiatives and structures contribute, in turn, to the normalization of the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo, and how their role in this regard has been manifested so far. The paper concludes first by evaluating the negotiations on the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo from a regional perspective, and puts forward recommendations on how the regional framework could be better used in the future. Finally, the prospects of a joint European path for Kosovo and Serbia and the EU’s role in that process are examined.

138 |


Overview of the EU’s relations with Kosovo

When it comes to EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, it is imperative to point out that for the first time in its history, the EU is involved in preparing future member states by engaging in state building programs, reconciliation and conflict resolution platforms and structural changes in democracy and the rule of law. In the case of Kosovo, this role appears even stronger considering its case is sui generis: its (initial) undecided political status and later, the position taken by the EU towards Kosovo. On the one hand, Kosovo is not recognized by the EU en bloc: five member states (Greece, Cyprus, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) do not recognize its status. Following Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence in 2008, the European Council, while highlighting the EU’s conviction that Kosovo independence constituted a unique case, stated that it is up to the EU Member States to decide on their relations with the Republic of Kosovo, in accordance with their own local practice and international law. The EU maintains this neutral status towards Kosovo and refers to it as Kosovo* (This designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence).

After the Declaration of Independence in 2008 the Government of the Republic of Kosovo adopted its Plan for European Integration 2008 – 2010, a reform package designed to further institutional development within the European Integration framework, with a view on keeping up with increased commitments ensuing from the SAP. Following this, in 2008 the Government established new inter-institutional structures for European Integration. The European agenda has been enshrined in all local institutions, structures, planning and policy choices.

On 28 February 2012, the Foreign and European Affairs Ministers of the EU Member States, convened in the General Affairs and External Relations Council, endorsed the intention of the European Commission to launch a feasibility study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo. The Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy established that Kosovo had met the benchmarks; nevertheless, major challenges remained, in areas such as the rule of law (the fight against organized


crime and corruption in particular), public administration reform, migration, freedom of expression, the protection and promotion of minority rights, with a view to their integration into society (Serbs in particular), as well as enhancing dialogue and reconciliation between all communities. Finally, a constructive approach from all Kosovo’s neighbors was underlined as a necessary component in enabling Kosovo’s full inclusion and participation in all regional cooperation initiatives, particularly when it comes to trade, policy harmonization and cross-border issues.

On the other hand, from 1999 onwards the EU has had a significant presence in Kosovo and has become its primary donor per capita. Since then, the EU has injected €2 billion into Kosovo on development programs ranging from the promotion of the rule of law and democracy promotion, jazz concerts. In 2008, the European Commission hosted a Donor Conference for Kosovo in Brussels, in which the EU and its Member States pledged a combined €508 million (out of a total of €1.2 billion pledged), to be disbursed over the following three years. Physically, the European Union Office in Kosovo is among the three largest EU offices around the world (the others are in Belgrade and Moscow). In foreign policy, the sheer size of ‘embassies’ and structures deployed abroad are indicators of commitment and the importance attached to particular countries. Nonetheless, inability to enter into contractual relations with Kosovo, as with other aspiring states, has not prevented the Council from establishing and deploying the EULEX Rule of Law Mission and the EU Special Representative (EUSR), operating under the same umbrella as the International Civilian Office (ICO), responsible for overseeing the transition of key state institutions towards full functionalization. With around 2000 judges, prosecutors and policemen, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo is concentrated in mentoring, monitoring and advising local authorities. This is the EU’s largest ESDP mission to date, and Brussels sees it as a litmus test of joint EU action, the EU’s ability to speak with one voice, and more broadly as a test of the EU’s common foreign policy.

In October 2012, the European Commission found that there were no legal obstacles to Kosovo signing Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, provided further progress was made in the areas of rule of law, public administration, protection of minorities and trade. SAA negotiations were launched in autumn 2013.

The SAA represents the first comprehensive contractual relationship between Kosovo and the EU and, like other states in the Western Balkans, it will serve

140 |


Kosovo as a roadmap to ensure a closer relationship with the EU. Aside from the priorities of the SAA in areas such as rule of law, public administration, protection of minorities and trade, the SAA sets down an additional condition for the countries in the Western Balkans: ‘Regional Cooperation’, considered a cornerstone of the EU’s policy framework, within the context of the Western Balkans it is seen as a necessary ingredient for stability, reconciliation, good neighborliness and good political relations.

Despite the EU’s major expenditure in Kosovo and an unprecedented structural presence preoccupied with the rule of law and organized crime, it is precisely in these two domains that Kosovo’s performance receives criticism, from international organizations and also through domestic public opinion. The report of the European Court of Auditors has also addressed these issues underlining the EU’s inability to meet its own mission objectives. This has widened the gap in Kosovo’s EU integration when compared to the other countries in the region.

While the issue of the five EU Member States that do not recognize Kosovo is seen as a macro-political problem that would have consequences in the later stages of Kosovo’s EU integration, the issue of visa free travel is the most pressing day-to-day matter. Kosovo is the only potential candidate for EU membership in the Western Balkans that does not enjoy visa liberalization with the EU. The EU and Kosovo opened dialogue on visa liberalization in January 2012, later that year Kosovo received a roadmap detailing the necessary reforms. A progress report on Kosovo’s implementation of the plan, presented in 2013, indicated that Kosovo’s capacity to fight organized crime and corruption remained limited and this could potentially have a stark impact on the EU’s internal security. The EU maintained its position that prior to opening visa dialogue with Kosovo further progress was needed in the fields of readmission and reintegration. In July 2013, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a package of eight laws – as required by the EU within the framework of the Roadmap for Visa Liberalization. Unlike the European Commission and the Council, the European Parliament has continuously highlighted the risk of not opening visa liberalization to Kosovo and the boomerang effect that might ensue for the EU in the future. Civil society within Kosovo has voiced its concern that the set of laws were passed in a rather haphazard fashion without following the democratic principles of public consultation.


Countries within the EU have expressed clear reservations on a visa liberalization policy with Kosovo, fearing a large flow of immigrants to the EU with resulting security and political implications. The experience of increased immigration from Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the aftermath of visa liberalization has substantiated these fears, particularly given that around 70% of the population of Kosovo is under the age of 35, while unemployment is estimated to be between 30% and 40% (though the data are contested). The embassies of EU Member States in Pristina have tightened and further bureaucratized their visa application procedures and a slightly increased rejection rate of visa applications has been observed. In terms of the requirements for visa liberalization and their fulfillment, it appears that Kosovo’s Roadmap for Visa Liberalization differs methodologically from that of other potential candidates. Though the conditions required may look similar in principle, items such as border security measures, document security, the fight against corruption and organized crime etc., Kosovo is subjected to more benchmarks, reinforced monitoring mechanisms, a stricter and more phased evaluation process and a more complex decision-making procedure.

The visa regime is, first and foremost, a serious obstacle to the freedom of movement of the people making them the most isolated group in Europe. It also hinders Kosovo’s prospects of economic development. Finally, being the only potential candidate left out of the visa free policy, the EU sends a negative signal to Kosovo and the population’s EU aspirations. At the Balkan Summit in December 2013, the EU parliamentarian, Doris Pack argued that the EU may lose its momentum in Kosovo and in the Western Balkans if it continues to send messages of isolation.

142 |


Overview of the EU’s relations with Serbia

When the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown in October 2000, Serbia began a process of democratization and Europeanization. This dual process has meant not only institutional reform but also a transformation of identity. Through progressive transition, due to a more and more complex interaction with European society, the country has gradually and simultaneously assumed a European and democratic identity. These two identities have strongly influenced how Serbia defines its national interests. Following the regime change, Serbia (and FRY) has not given up its demands regarding Kosovo, although it has started to look for a solution “together with international factors, not in conflict with them”.25

EU Membership is a strategic goal based on economic and political reasons and a sense of value. The EU is Serbia’s most important trading partner (accounting for 60% of overall trade) and its biggest investment partner (60% of all investments since 2001). Following democratic changes Serbia became part of the Stabilization and Association Process in 2000. Serbia, as one of the two federal units of the FR Yugoslavia, started its institutional preparation for EU accession in January 2002. At that time, the Serbian Government established a Unit for European Integration under the Ministry of International Economic Relations. The current Serbian EU Integration Office (SEIO) was established in 2004, clearly demonstrating the Serbian Government’s determination to speed up preparations for EU integration. In adopting the National Strategy for EU Accession in 2005, the government defined accession to the European Union as a top-priority and a long-term strategic goal; the short-term goal was to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement as soon as possible; the medium-term goal, (end of 2008 or beginning of 2009) was to obtain candidate status.

In October 2005, the European Union and the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro opened negotiations on concluding the Stabilization and Association Agreement,

25 Speech of the Foreign Minister, Goran Svilanovic, in front of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia, October 24th 2001. Available in: Dragojlovic Natasa et al, Serbia’s Foreign Policy Strategies and Documents, Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia, 2010, p. 295.


the first step towards EU integration. Due to insufficient cooperation with the ICTY negotiations were called off between May 2006 and June 2007. During this period of suspension however, the EU made efforts to ensure Serbia’s European integration process did not lag. Continued dialogue with Serbia, both in the form of technical talks and through meetings with the EU Troika, showed the EU’s firm orientation towards keeping Serbia on its European path. Political Dialogue continued with Serbia, as a successor state of the State Union, after the Union was dissolved when Montenegro declared independence as the result of a referendum in May 2006.

Negotiations on concluding the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) were re-launched in June 2007 and it was finally signed in April 2008 and entered into force in September 2013. According to EU Progress Reports, Serbia has built a solid track record in the implementation of the SAA, however this will be monitored further during the accession process.

Negotiations with Serbia on the Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements were opened by the European Commission in 2006, following a mandate from the EU Council. The draft agreements were signed in September 2007. The Visa Facilitation agreement lowered visa handling fees for Serbian citizens with total exemption from visa fees for certain categories of applicant. Moreover, the supporting documents for a visa application were simplified and the issue of multiple entry visas became possible for certain categories of frequent traveler. The Readmission Agreement set out clear obligations and procedures for the authorities, both in Serbia and in EU Member States, as to when and how to readmit the people who are illegally residing on EU territory.

The European Commission opened dialogue on visa liberalization with Serbia and other Western Balkan countries in early 2008. Centerpieces of the dialogue were the European Commission’s roadmaps, setting out the conditions each country had to meet. In July 2009, the European Commission proposed lifting visa obligations for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro and the European Parliament expressed a positive opinion in November 2009. In December 2009 the visa-free regime with the EU came into force. Citizens of the Republic of Serbia no longer require a visa to travel to 25 EU member states, as well as three countries that are not EU members but part of the Schengen area.

144 |


Serbia applied for EU membership in 2009, in March 2012 official EU candidate status was granted by the European Council, the date of the intergovernmental conference was confirmed by the European Council in December 2013 and scheduled by the Greek Presidency for January 21, 2014 – thus reaching the stage of accession negotiations with the EU. In theory and practice, these are talks about the dynamics and means whereby the EU acquis are adopted and implemented, there is little or no possibility to derogate from them; the process is punctuated by the opening, interim and closing benchmarks. Furthermore, the negotiations start with the most ‘difficult’ chapters – namely 23 and 24, on the judiciary and fundamental rights as well as on justice, freedom and security. In Serbia’s case, the issues of Kosovo and Belgrade-Pristina dialogue have a strong influence on the dynamics of the accession process and will be particularly monitored in chapter 35 – “Other issues”. The body of European acquis, the ‘subject’ of the negotiations, needs to be transposed, implemented, and enforced in the Serbian legal system. Thus, negotiations are likely to last for a number of years and to gradually have reasonable and positive social and economic effects even prior to membership.

Since 2000, as a potential candidate country for EU membership, Serbia has been able to use EU financial pre-accession instruments for implementing political, economic, social and institutional reforms within the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process. In recent years a lot of effort has gone into the creation of a national institutional structure capable of efficiently co-ordinating reforms supported through EU-funded projects.

The EU gave substantial support to the Republic of Serbia via the CARDS program between 2000 and 2006. During this period EU assistance to the Western Balkans amounted to €4.2 billion, €1390.6 million of which was allocated to the Republic of Serbia.

In 2007 the EU introduced a new financial instrument for the pre-accession process for the period 2007-2013. During this budgetary period pre-accession funding is channeled through a single, unified instrument, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), designed to deliver focused support to both candidate and potential candidate countries. As a potential candidate country, the Republic of Serbia was able to use IPA components I and II. Between 2007 and 2013 the average annual allocation to Serbia was €200 million while the total allocation for this period was approximately €1.4 billion.


EU mediated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade

Since Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the leadership in Belgrade has been holding on to the idea that continuing their struggle for Kosovo and furthering their aims to join the EU were two independent objectives that could be pursued in parallel. However, over the past two years, it has become clear that these two aims are far less inter-related than Belgrade portrays them to be.

In a single, unified voice the EU has asked Serbia and Kosovo to ‘normalize their relations’ as a prerequisite for opening accession talks. Even though meeting that benchmark was a necessary condition for opening the SAA negotiations with Kosovo and accession negotiations with Serbia, it was necessary for the EU to attain some sort of stabilization and/or normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia. Without necessarily defining what ‘normalization of relations’ would entail, it pointed to solving the problems regarding the disputed territory in the north of Kosovo. The dialogue which began on March 8, 2011 has so far been focused on three main issues 1) regional cooperation; 2) freedom of movement; and 3) rule of law. Conclusions have been reached in regarding customs stamps, civil registry, university diplomas, freedom of movement, the regional representation of Kosovo, cadaster books, Integrated Border Management, the creation of a multi-ethnic component in the Kosovo police force to protect Serbian Orthodox Churches and monasteries in Kosovo, the exchange of respective Liaison Officers and a development fund for the four Kosovo Serb majority municipalities in northern Kosovo. Yet, internal divisions within the EU have come to the surface again with regard to how much this dialogue can be incorporated and utilized as a conditionality by the EU. While Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK want to press Serbia to formally recognize Kosovo, the five non-recognizing EU Member States along with the Czech Republic and Italy appear to be taking a softer line in pressuring Serbia.

146 |


The Brussels Agreement

Of particular importance was the agreement reached on April 19, 2013 between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia arranging a power-sharing mechanism in the north of Kosovo that would be acceptable to both the Pristina and Belgrade authorities and providing inter alia that both states will not block or encourage others to block the other side’s progress in their respective EU paths. The agreement was hailed as a major step forward towards normalizing relations, though it does not translate into Belgrade recognizing Kosovo’s independence, for the EU Chief of Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton the agreement represented “a step away from the past, and for both of them, a step closer to Europe”. Several days after the agreement, the European Commission gave the green light to launching negotiations on a SAA between the EU and Kosovo, as well as starting EU membership negotiations with Serbia. In this respect, the dialogue has played a role in smoothing the way towards a SAA for Kosovo and accession negotiations for Serbia on the one hand and progress in the normalization of relations on the other.

The Brussels agreement has only 15 items. The first six are dedicated to the Association of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo. Items seven, eight and nine are related to the integration of Serbian security structures into Kosovo’s unified system. Item ten regulates the integration of the judicial institutions in Kosovo. Article eleven refers to the organization of local elections. Item twelve announces the adoption of an Implementation Plan, while the thirteenth deals with negotiations on telecommunications and electricity. Item fourteen is particularly important for this paper, it commits both sides “not to block or encourage others to block the other side’s progress in their respective EU paths.” Finally, section fifteen provides for the establishment of an Implementation Committee, with the assistance of the EU.

The brevity of the agreement undoubtedly facilitates is implementation. Were the parties mired in arranging details, achieving agreement would probably be much harder. Nonetheless, the brevity of the text has also given rise to many doubts which now plague its implementation. All the deadlines set in the agreement have expired. With considerable delay, and with great difficulties and repetitions, local


elections were held in Kosovo. For the first time, in four northern municipalities elections took place in accordance with the laws of Kosovo, for time being this is the greatest achievement under the Brussels Agreement. However, the Association of Serbian municipalities has not yet been established. Belgrade and Pristina are unable to agree even on how it should be called (Community or Association), let alone on detailed responsibilities and methods of funding. A Kosovo Serb has been appointed regional police commander for the North of Kosovo, but he has come up against many obstacles. All the offices of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior in northern Kosovo have been closed, but very few Serbian policemen have been integrated into the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The civil security structures in the north of Kosovo remain completely untouched and represent a potential security challenge. Though the courts of the Republic of Serbia have stopped receiving new cases, an agreement on the establishment and composition of a District Court in Kosovska Mitrovica has not yet been reached. The integration of Serbian judges into Kosovo’s juridical institutions has not yet commenced. Agreements on energy and telecommunications have been achieved but implementation is slow and difficult (particularly in telecommunications).

Reaching the Brussels Agreement unblocked Serbia’s European integration process. During the June summit, the European Council endorsed the opening of membership negotiations with Serbia and the first intergovernmental conference was held on January 21, 2014. The EU adopted a negotiating framework in which Chapter 35 plays a very important role. In general Chapter 35 is reserved for “Other Issues”, in the case of Serbia this will be mainly devoted to the normalization of relations with Kosovo. This chapter, together with chapters 23 and 24 concerning justice and security, will be opened first and closed last. Furthermore, the implementation of obligations arising from Chapter 35 will be led by the European Foreign Service, and not the European Commission. It is certain that in the accession process the Commission will share its role with several capitals, including a prominent role played by Berlin. On the one hand, this can be very positive for dialogue with Pristina, but it may have negative effects on the process of legal harmonization and internal reforms within Serbia. More specifically, there is justified fear that democratization and Europeanization will be pushed aside, and that Serbia will join the EU for “strategic” purposes. Although the negotiation framework does not define specific conditions related to the normalization of relations with Pristina, it is assumed that

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this will include respect of agreements reached, regional cooperation which includes Kosovo, cooperation with the EULEX mission and the continuation of negotiations in good faith in order to complete the normalization process with legal and binding conclusions. For time being high officials have not requested that Belgrade recognize Kosovo’s independence, but it is not excluded in the future.

Regarding Kosovo, the conclusion of the Brussels Agreement has also led to progress in its European integration, but less so than in the case of Serbia. Just a few days after reaching the “historic agreement”, the European Commission proposed opening negotiations on the conclusion of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Kosovo; the European Council confirmed this at their June meeting. Negotiations began in October, and the conclusion of the agreement is expected by summer 2014. Unlike previous SAAs, which had to be ratified by all EU Member States, under the new rules that came into force with the Lisbon Treaty, this will no longer be the case. Since the EU has acquired the status of a legal person, signatures on agreements of this type no longer have to pass the ratification of the Member States. Kosovo’s accession process should therefore be far smoother, given that five Member States have not recognized Kosovo and that during a ratification process in these countries it would most likely have been blocked. Nevertheless, the actual agreement on membership, if and when it occurs, will still have to obtain ratification in all Member States.

Regarding relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and indeed the process of European integration in this part of the Western Balkans, 2013 in many ways has been a historical year. The EU’s foreign-policy record, normally a list of unspectacular achievements, scored one remarkable, almost dazzling success. Notwithstanding, it would be unrealistic to expect major progress in the normalization of relations or, even, in European integrations to follow in 2014. Elections were held first in Serbia (in March), followed by the EU (in May), and finally in Kosovo (in June). During this period at least one of the three parties was unable to make decisions in its full capacity, therefore, the focus of the parties was deteriorated and hence we can hardly expect any great step forward. Dialogue on normalization in autumn 2014 is most likely to be led by completely new players, and some time will be need for this team to begin to feel the reins. Moreover, unlike Serbia and Kosovo, whose decision-makers do not rush into necessary compromises which are always unpopular at


home, the EU will be preoccupied with their own elections, and the Ukrainian crisis abroad. Unless the situation becomes significantly worse on the field, during 2014 the Western Balkans is most likely to be put on autopilot until the conditions are met to move on to the next step.

Thus, by the end of 2014, at best we can expect a certain fomentation and implementation of the agreements already reached, though experience has shown that in the Western Balkans, the best scenario hardly ever occurs in practice. Since the respective negotiations for both countries will develop to a large extent in line with the dialogue on normalization, even on this front it is not realistic to expect any major steps forward, except for those that have already been announced.

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Regional implications of negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo and the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations”26

Besides the Brussels agreement signed in 2013, a so-called “footnote agreement” on Kosovo’s participation in Balkan regional forums was reached in March 2011. Previously, Kosovo had been represented at regional meetings by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established after the war in 1999 under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. While this had become unacceptable to the government in Pristina after the declaration of independence in 2008, Belgrade continued to insist on UNMIK’s presence, thus blocking Kosovo’s participation in regional structures. The agreement has considerable practical and economic value and in the political domain in Kosovo, it was perceived as a further step towards a fully-fledged sovereign identity. For Serbia, the agreement stood as proof to its public opinion that the dialogue still respected Serbia’s line on Kosovo’s status. Finally, in the EU, the footnote agreement was hailed as a success in overtaking an “obstruction” mentality in the Western Balkans.

The themes of negotiations between the two parties have been related primarily to the name, presentation, and signature of Kosovo in regional organizations and initiatives where Kosovo already participates. Although the first provision of the Agreement reached on regional representation and cooperation states that “both sides reaffirm their commitment to effective, inclusive and representative regional cooperation”27, the Serbian party has not yet committed itself to supporting Kosovo’s presence in regional initiatives in which it has yet to participate, nor does it refrain

26 The following analysis is based primarily on available official documents on the negotiations between Ser-bia and Kosovo, agreements concluded and commitments made. Other sources of information are regional initiatives, data on membership and activities available to the public on their Internet sites, as well as inter-views with representatives of the initiatives involving both Serbia and Kosovo.

27 Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation was reached on February 24th 2012, in Brussels, in the ninth round of negotiations between representatives of Serbia and Kosovo, with the EU’s mediation. http://www.balkanopen.com/article.php?id=559


from distracting such efforts. Nevertheless, Article 1028 of the agreement does open some possibilities in the future for Kosovo’s membership in these other regional initiatives, though this has not been easy to attain.

On the other hand, Kosovo’s negotiators have tried to solve this issue after the agreement had been concluded. During the fourth meeting of the Implementation Group, November 29-30, 2012, while negotiating on how to implement certain provisions of the Agreed Conclusions on IBM (integrated control of administrative border crossings) they proposed to agree to procedures of information exchange within the Technical Protocol on condition they be admitted to regional organizations dealing with IBM (MARRI and SELEC)29, this was rejected by the Serbian party. Again, on April 17, 2013, Serbia accepted all 15 provisions of the First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations30, except those linking the issue of police in northern Kosovo with Kosovo’s membership of international organizations.

Immediately after the agreement on regional representation had been concluded, the interpretation of the agreement arose as a new challenge: the text of the agreement did not specify whether the name of Kosovo could appear without a footnote on placards identifying representatives participating in meetings. Consequently, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia left a meeting of the Regional Cooperation Council Board held in Sarajevo on March 16, 2012, as there were no footnotes on the said placards; on the same day, representatives of institutions and NGOs from Kosovo left a meeting of NGOs in Belgrade, organized by the Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN) and the European Commission Civil Society Program (Technical Assistance to the Civil Society Organizations – TACSO), because the footnote appeared on their placards.

28 Article 10: “The regional organizations referred to in these conclusions are existing and future intergovern-mental organizations or arrangements whose aim is to promote cooperation or integration in the Balkan re-gion. ’Regional meetings’ includes meetings of these organizations and also ad-hoc or informal meetings with similar aims. It also includes meetings with EU institutions in the context of the European agenda“. Ibidem

29 See more: Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation, in the overview of regional initiatives dealing with justice and home affairs given in the Annex 1, p. 4.

30 First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations, signed on April 19th 2013 in Brus-sels, without the disputed point.

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After that, the Government of Serbia issued instructions that its representatives should not participate in meetings in which Kosovo participants are represented by placards or working materials not containing the aforementioned footnote.31

The conduct of representatives of the state bodies of the Republic of Serbia in accordance with these instructions was deemed to inflict damage on Serbia’s foreign relations and the process of European integration. Therefore, it has been accepted that the word Kosovo* with an asterisk but without the accompanying text should appear on the placards identifying representatives of Kosovo institutions. Thus, during session held on September 2, 2012 the Government of Serbia adopted new “Instructions for Conduct of State Representatives of the Republic of Serbia in Meetings Dedicated to Specific Regional Cooperation Attended by Representatives of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) in Pristina”.32 The adoption of new guidelines has eliminated different interpretations on the implementation of the agreement, and enabled due respect of the Brussels Agreement in accordance with the interpretation of the European Union.

However, the Serbian side has not changed its positions at all on the asymmetric representation of Kosovo with a clear reference to Resolution 1244, and the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. The Serbian side considers that the disempowerment of UNMIK would lead to the extinction of Resolution 1244; this arrangement allowed the possibility of UNMIK to continue to participate in meetings of regional organizations and initiatives, together with representatives of Kosovo institutions in the future.33

31 On 20 and 29 March 2012 the Government adopted the Decision on “Instructions for Conduct of State Representatives of the Republic of Serbia in Meetings Dedicated to Specific Regional Cooperation Attended by Representatives of the PISG in Pristina”, followed by the new List of Organizations and Initiatives dedi-cated to Regional Cooperation in Southeast Europe. As quoted in: The Report on Current Process of Political and Technical Dialogue, pp. 18-19. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/archive/files/cir/pdf/akta_proce-dura/2013/1666-13.pdf

32 Ibidem.

33 Article 6 of the Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation states: “As concerns modifications to existing agreements signed by UNMIK, nothing in these conclusions will be interpreted as prejudicial to UNMIK’s legal rights. A representative of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will be invited to meetings organized within the framework of arrangements for which it is a signatory. It is for UNMIK to decide whether to attend any particular meeting“. op.cit.


It also insists that the agreement reached provides that hosts of meetings are encouraged to avoid displaying national symbols and display only symbols of the EU.

Considering Serbia’s attitude, as well the Kosovo authorities’ refusal to be represented in any way by UNMIK, or participate in meeting in their presence, Article 6 of the agreement could complicate the activities of regional organizations should UNMIK be a signatory of an interstate agreement. This is already a problem in signing the additional protocol on further trade liberalization with CEFTA, as the signatory is UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo. Serbia does not accept the transfer of UNMIK representation to Kosovo in previously concluded international treaties, while Kosovo does not accept to be represented by UNMIK when taking further commitments in international treaties.

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Participation in Regional Initiatives and Mutual Cooperation between Serbian and Kosovo Institutions and/or Civil Society Organizations, Local Self-Governments, etc.

An analysis of data on the memberships of both Serbia and Kosovo in regional initiatives, task forces or networks on a representative sample of 46 regional organizations (detailed overview provided in Appendix 1 of this paper34), shows Serbia’s participation as average for the Western Balkans: full membership in 44 and observer status in one. Kosovo participates as a full member in 20, and is an observer in one regional initiative. Since Kosovo possesses no regular army or a Ministry of Defense, it is not represented in the six initiatives involving military and security structures. In nine initiatives involving representatives from Ministries of the Interior and Justice, Kosovo only participates in one. Kosovo’s representation in regional initiatives therefore, is significantly smaller than Serbia’s or that of other Western Balkan countries. However, in the area of social and economic development, infrastructure and energy, building human capital (education, research and development, and culture), parliamentary cooperation, enhancing governance, and cooperation under two regional umbrella organizations (the South East European Cooperation Process, playing a major role in political cooperation, and the Regional Cooperation Council, playing a key coordinating role), Kosovo participates in two-thirds of these initiatives, and is an active participant in the process of networking and cooperation in the region. Given the size and economic strength of the participants in this process, together with their administrative capacity and the financial obligations imposed by cooperation, first and foremost the political will to cooperate, it is natural that Serbia and Croatia (even after joining the EU), are the backbone of this complex structure which continues to function and develop.

34 Annex 1: Taskforces and Initiatives in SEE in 2014, based on the RCC mapping of regional initiatives and task forces in 2010 and described “Overview of Regional Initiatives and Task Forces in South East Europe”, Annex III of the RCC Strategy and Work Programme 2014-2016, as well as news on the www.rcc.int and on the web sites of other regional initiatives. This is a tabular overview of the relevant regional initiatives active in 2014, with details about their membership and residence. The presentation of the initiatives follows the areas as grouped (with minor changes) in the umbrella intergovernmental regional organization, the Regional Cooperation Council, founded in 2008, in Sarajevo, as a successor of the Stability Pact for South East Europe.


According to a survey conducted on a representative sample of 12 regional initiatives the general findings on the involvement of participants in these processes – in particular on mutual cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia, issues that arise, and successful formula to transcend them – are based on interviews with a sample of twelve representatives on regional initiatives.

Within a broad spectrum of 20 regional initiatives (international agreements, intergovernmental organizations, a network of governmental institutions, civil society organizations, local governments, etc.) Serbia and Kosovo are equally represented and generally cooperate well. In some of them, not dominated by official institutions, cooperation has been effective from the very beginning, for example in the cases of the Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South East Europe (NALAS) or the Balkan Civil Society Development Network. Only when these regional forums have been used for the politicization of generally technical questions, have occasional incidents occurred. In the former, the cases of politicization involved decentralization, urban planning, fiscal decentralization, energy efficiency, waste and waste water treatment, sustainable tourism, etc., while in the latter, incidents occurred regarding the development of civil society, sustainability, transparency, funding resources, regional networking, relations with the authorities at a national level, cooperation at a European level and providing support to European institutions. These two initiatives began their work at the beginning of the last decade, with the full support of both Serbia and Kosovo showing joint involvement in decision-making structure joint lobbying for the interests of their target groups and representing the organizations externally.

This model can be seen in other initiatives that have had major problems due to the participation of official institutions of Serbia and Kosovo. As long as the activities of regional structures were exclusively devoted to sectoral, technical, and functional aspects of cooperation, there have been no major issues. Cooperation proceeded with occasional absences of either of the two sides at times of worsening political relations, while conference hosts’ approaches differed depending on whether their countries recognized the independence and statehood of Kosovo. Though good personal communication between officials of both sides has been established for the most part, there has been some reticence in setting up institutional cooperation; until the Brussels agreement, the official guidelines did not encourage this kind of

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direct connection, including mutual visits, reciprocal support in specific activities, exchange of experience, etc. Basically, with rare exceptions, those regional initiatives involving memberships of both Serbia and Kosovo, avoided holding important meetings at a political level either in Serbia or Kosovo. Thus, all annual ministerial conferences in different areas have been held, even those organized by regional initiatives founded through interstate or contractual relationships such as the Central Europe Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA, 2006), the South East Europe Energy Community Treaty (ECT) – in which both parties participate – the South East Europe Transport Observatory (SEETO), and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC). Kosovo’s representatives were absent only in 2012, shortly after the adoption of the Arrangements Regarding Regional Representation and Cooperation, at a ministerial meeting held in Belgrade, when the precise inscriptions that was to appear on the Kosovo representatives placards had not yet been finally agreed upon.

Kosovo’s membership of international organizations may indeed prove crucial for obtaining admittance to some regional initiatives that take place under their auspices. One example is Kosovo’s absence from the South East Europe Health Network (SEEHN), the network itself has not taken the initiative to invite Kosovo to join, nor has Kosovo applied. A partial explanation could lie in the fact that Kosovo is not a member of the World Health Organization (WHO), the main sponsor of this network.

Another similar example is the way in which agreement has not yet been reached on transforming the South East Europe Transport Observatory constituted in 2004 under the auspices of the Stability Pact for South East Europe and the EU, on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding, signed by all countries of the Western Balkans and UNMIK on behalf of Kosovo) into the SEE Transport Community Treaty (TCT), based on an interstate contract. Serbia does not accept that this international agreement be signed by Kosovo* as a party; the Transport Community would become the first case of contractual relations between Kosovo and the EU. Furthermore, two EU members have certain reservations concerning technical issues (which are not so insurmountable), and some countries that have not recognized Kosovo also do not accept signing contracts with Kosovo. It is expected that the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo, which would introduce mutual contractual relations, could facilitate this issue, and the end of the current year has been mentioned as a possible deadline.


The pragmatic approach – not to jeopardize what already works well – sometimes wins over. Despite the fact that Kosovo in 2013 changed its participation in the Regional Cooperation Council from a representation through UNMIK into a representation as Kosovo* (with the corresponding footnote), in the Investment Committee for South East Europe (as the RCC’s integral body) Kosovo has remained in observer status, participating equally and in full measure in its work with representatives of Serbia and other countries in the region. Consequently, Kosovo has been one of the actors formulating and adopting the South East Europe 2020 Strategy, assuming all the obligations resulting from this document. In some regional initiatives Kosovo continues to be represented under the auspices of UNMIK and in some it is an observer. In others, Kosovo institutions, organizations or local government bodies since their foundation continue to appear as in the beginning without any change; while in most of them their status has been renamed in accordance with the agreement reached. Although UNMIK still formally figures in some initiatives, following the relevant provisions of the Agreement, it does not participate in meetings but sends a letter of appreciations.

The general impression is that Serbia and Kosovo are, as a rule, active in initiatives where they take part. Serbia has a solid institutional capacity and may share good experiences and expertise with many participants from the region, while Kosovo strives to be confirmed as an equal player in regional forums. Although Kosovo is less developed than most of other participants, it does show a great desire to take responsibilities for improvements and changes in specific policy areas. This is particularly evident regarding the implementation of the SEE 2020 Strategy. Thus, the process of learning and exchanging good practice is always carried out in both directions regardless of the various actors’ level of development. An example is the association of cities and municipalities, despite having the weakest association, Kosovo has much to offer (e.g. successful program budgeting in local communities)35. It is evident that this reciprocal influence, mutual reporting etc, improves the function of associations of local authorities in the region.

35 Based upon answers in interviews submitted by the Network of Associations of Local Authorities of South East Europe (NALAS).

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Multilateral development projects bring participants together and lead them to communicate and cooperate with each other; consequently, the general assessment is that these interactions are on the rise. However, cooperation between the two sides is mainly initiated by the proactivity of regional initiatives and their working bodies proposing and encouraging activities in which both parties participate. Moreover, regional organizations protect participants from situations of political risks (events not held in Serbia or Kosovo, carefully prepared communications, announcements, printed materials, visual presentations and folders, less or no participation of some of parties at some conferences when political pressures is high etc.) In other words, acceptable formulae have been found for all kinds of cooperation on an operational and technical levels. Where there is a common interest in the region, namely the development of certain sectors, policies, standards, etc., the two sides have cooperated well. It is significant that there are no differences between Serbia and Kosovo when approaching donors of regional initiatives, even in such important areas as trade, transport, research and development, etc.


The role of regional initiatives in solving bilateral issues between Serbia and Kosovo, or issues of common interest36

The two most striking examples of regional initiatives having a positive impact on the bilateral cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia occurred in the domains of energy and transport.

Under the mediation of the Energy Community Secretariat (ECS) and the EU, in February 2014 the CEOs of two transmission system operators (Energy Network of Serbia and Transmission System Operator of Kosovo) signed an agreement.37 This particular case marks a significant achievement for the Mission of the Energy Community in advancing cooperation and resolving disputes. This legally binding agreement opened the way to further agreements between the two operators on compensation mechanisms within the framework of the European power grid operators, providing a more efficient use of transmitter capacity also with neighboring countries that are signatories of the ECT. The agreement represents a milestone in relations between Serbia and Kosovo in the field of energy and has a wider regional significance. After signing, Janez Kopac, Director of ECS commented: “Not only is this agreement important from a bilateral point of view, it overcomes many serious obstacles which have hitherto prevented regional integration of the electricity markets in South East Europe”.38

Another example is the tacit harmonization that occurred in successive applications on behalf of Serbia and Kosovo to finance feasibility studies for two sections of a single road route connecting Niš and Pristina, from priority projects renewed each

36 For example: the introduction of European standards, the harmonization of policies, the introduction of sectoral planning for candidates and potential candidates, addressing of some broader regional problems and strategies, etc.

37 Serbia, Kosovo electricity TSOs ink framework pact - Energy Community, February 21, 2014, SEE News, http://powermarket.seenews.com/news/serbia-kosovo-electricity-tsos-ink-framework-pact-energy-com-munity-406113

38 Ibidem.

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year within SEETO. Following the Agreement on regional representation, at the tenth round of project approvals Serbia applied for funds from the West Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) for the road Niš – Merdare,39 and at the eleventh round Kosovo applied for the extension Merdare – Pristina (Niš – Pristina is route 7 of the regional road network connecting Corridor 10 to the port of Durres and the Adriatic Sea).40

The strongest leverage applied by European integration in the region is evident through what might be termed the “third party litmus” principle. The framework provided by EU policies in certain areas is the most significant component of cooperation and provides direction and meaning to activities on the regional level. At an informal level, Serbia and Kosovo are working together more and more, even exchanging relevant documents related to the EU accession process. Since the regional initiatives use the principle of the “open method of coordination – OMC41, as good EU practice, the results are assessed as positive. Accordingly, the EU policy framework, the process of association and accession, and EU governance methods have been shown to be the strongest aspects of external influence on regional initiatives, at times explicit and programmatic42, and at others empirical and implicit.

The general conclusion is that at the regional, multilateral level, representatives of Serbia and Kosovo work together, practically and often in a very innovative way. This is reflected in the EC progress reports on the advancement of the European integration process, where the degree of involvement in regional cooperation and

39 Westren Balkans Investigative Framework, WBIF 2013 Annual Report, p. 30 http://www.wbif.eu/uploads/lib_document/attachment/373/WBIF_Annual_Report_2013_-_17_March_2014.pdf

40 This project was mentioned during negotiations between former Prime Minister Dačić and Prime Minister Tachi on the normalization of Serbia -Kosovo relations.

41 The open method of coordination (OMC) is a relatively new and intergovernmental means of governance in the European Union, based on the voluntary cooperation of its member states. The open method rests on soft law mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking and sharing of best practice. This means that there are no official sanctions for laggards. Rather, the method’s effectiveness relies on a form of peer pressure and naming and shaming, as no member state wants to be seen as the worst in a given policy area. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Method_of_Coordination

42 Based upon answers in interviews submitted by the South East European Centre for Entrepreneurial Learn-ing (SEECEL).


progress in certain sectors carried out through regional programs and projects is also evaluated. Concerning professionalism and competences in all sectors, sub-sectors and policies, there is full mutual understanding. Nevertheless, the impression persists in certain quarters that in regional initiatives Serbian representatives often accept colleagues from Kosovo as a necessary reality, but are not ready to overcome differences and to cooperate sincerely. On the other hand, Kosovo officials, just after their regional representation was regulated and during negotiations, frequently used regional meetings as political forums, even when these were devoted to technical and very specific issues.

Generally speaking, we can conclude that joint participation in regional programs, based on the individual interest of its members, strengthens communication and cooperation and indirectly encourages initiatives to forge bilateral relations. Regional initiatives are multilateral platforms (whether technical or political) where Serbia and Kosovo meet, discuss and exchange their positions at an institutional level. Each position discussed or agreement reached on certain issues, contributes to building trust between people, as well as between institutions. It indirectly and often directly contributes to creating a climate that favors normal discussion on issues in bilateral relations.

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Towards a Joint European Perspective

The structural involvement of the EU with Kosovo and Serbia is unequivocally in line with the objective of bringing them into the European family. Having the Western Balkans at its doorstep, the EU is committed to enforcing its structural agenda in the region. In particular in light of post-Lisbon changes, Serbia and Kosovo stand as an example of a more ‘hands-on’ involvement, a test of the EU’s ESDP. In addition, the EU’s instrumental role in normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia also reflects the principles the EU perceives itself to be founded on. However, the political and technical path towards a European home is not as rosy as it may seem. The debate on ‘widening and deepening’ the European Union in the first decade of the millennium, following the entry of Romania and Bulgaria, was recently revived during the euro-crisis and continues though the EU seems to be finding its way out. Furthermore, public support for further enlargement in Western Europe is lukewarm, particularly in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria.

With regard to Kosovo, the EU will be faced with further solutions and creative arrangements (e.g. the footnote solution to the name, political arrangements built on defoliated principles/concepts of sovereignty etc.) to address its own internal differences, its inability to find solutions to Kosovo’s status and Kosovo’s future contractual relations with the EU. Based on the existing EU legal framework, even if Kosovo were to sign a SAA, it would have to be different than the SAA signed by other Balkan countries. It cannot be compared to agreements the EU has with ‘entities’ that are not states, but happen not to be located in Europe and as such do not aim to integrate in the EU. Kosovo on the other hand needs to deliver on its obligations focusing primarily on rule of law, organized crime and high-level corruption. Addressing societal challenges such as youth unemployment and education reform remain critical to changing the course on the visa regime.

Throughout the dialogue and regarding the potential implications of an EU future both for Serbia and Kosovo, the EU has been seen to invest all its capacities, resources and energies in maintaining a neutral stance. On the one hand, this has rightfully addressed the EU’s internal divisions on the issue; Kosovo is the only


European country where the EU has experimented legally on how to relate to a state without treating it as independent and sovereign. On the other hand, this neutrality has time and again left room for politicians in Kosovo and Serbia to give ambiguous readings and interpretations and somewhat altered explanations to their national constituents on the implications of the dialogue and relations with the EU in general. During the next stages of accession negotiations, the EU will be under pressure to be more specific, direct and unambiguous in the conditions that define good neighborly relations and how EU membership should proceed in both Kosovo and Serbia.

Regarding agreements resulting from EU-mediated dialogue, the real challenge in EU integration would be to achieve an effective grassroots impact in the two populations, so that the entire effort goes beyond mere elite pact-making and lays the foundations for reconciliation within both communities. Dialogue is a learning process, and as such it is very important. To successfully implement the Brussels agreement it is crucial to settle the issue of northern Kosovo – Kosovo Serbs remain excluded from the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, a way must be found to make them interested and involved. The main issue today is superficial consensus on the implementation of the Brussels Agreement, real progress on the ground has been slow, to achieve a more lasting peace more effective cooperation needs to be sought. Though the Brussels Agreement provides a framework for closer relations between different actors at a local level, the lack of open public debate on the issues of the Agreement is a major problem as is the decentralization of the decision-making process.

The key to establishing and normalizing relations is communication. Cooperation between cities and communities belonging to the same economic and geographic area is particularly important. What is lacking, however, is sufficient political will to establish cooperation. The Association of Towns and Municipalities of Serbia and Kosovo needs to work on improving relations among local communities from Kosovo and Serbia.

Bearing previous experiences in mind, it is obvious that these external effects have catalyzed cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo. Regional initiatives are an effective mechanism that can resolve internal relations in the Western Balkans as they encourage people to solve problems in the field together and build mutual

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trust and understanding. A great impetus for strengthening regional initiatives is the fact that IPA funds for regional cooperation have been doubled, this will further strengthen regional cooperation.

Though they are at different stages in their respective EU integration processes, Kosovo and Serbia do have a number of points in common, therefore cooperation in a number of different areas is advisable. First and foremost, it is imperative that agreements reached through EU-mediated dialogue are properly respected. The acknowledgement of bilateral documentation (e.g. university diplomas) should be brought further, enhancing cooperation at an academic level through lectures, seminars and similar inter-university exchanges. Moreover, Serbia’s cooperation in fully dismantling the parallel structures in northern Kosovo is essential. Kosovo could benefit from Serbia’s experience with visa liberalization and privatization. As Kosovo has been given stricter requirements in fulfilling minority rights, this experience could be shared with Serbia on its road to a more inclusive settlement of minorities.

Furthermore, cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo should be enhanced at the local government level. Serbia’s experience in fiscal decentralization and likewise Kosovo’s experience of language and cultural rights within the decentralization process would be particularly beneficial. Finally, the EU’s insistence on short-term political priorities, such as the dialogue with Serbia and political stability in both countries, should not overshadow or compromise other fundamental priorities of EU integration including free elections and the fight against corruption. The EU should remain firm on issues pertaining to the rule of law and human rights, and at the same time, set realistic goals and expectations.


Conclusions and Recommendations

Serbia Kosovo relations

·· On the whole, the region’s European perspective is largely conditioned by the approach adopted in EU regional policy and by the normalization of relations between individual states in regional initiatives, as in the case of Serbia and Kosovo. Therefore, the remaining bilateral issues ought to be pursued throu-gh dialogue, with the support of the EU, other international entities and regi-onal players in particular, as this formula has already proved its effectiveness.

·· Each country in the region should play an active role in leading one or more regional initiatives, it has been seen that a turning point is reached when re-cipients become active participants assuming all rights and obligations. This applies not only to Serbia and Kosovo but to all the countries of the region.

·· Strengthening municipal diplomacy can facilitate reconciliation and peace building between Kosovo and Serbia. Local authorities have legitimacy and act much faster, especially in economic affairs.

·· The Associations of towns and municipalities of Serbia and Kosovo should intensify their relations and work together to improve cooperation at a local community level.

·· To implement the Brussels Agreement successfully, all related issues need to be discussed in a public debate, with Serbs from North Kosovo included in the Belgrade – Pristina dialogue.

·· Intensify networking among civil society organizations in Serbia and Kosovo, thus improving communication among local communities.

·· Exploit the potential of the EU programs Erasmus Plus and Erasmus 2020. An exchange of experience and learning, primarily among young people, may be the best engine for rebuilding trust between Serbia and Kosovo.

·· The regulation of travel documents has led to increased traffic between Ser-bia and Kosovo, which increases the justification for investing in the road and rail networks. The presence of both sides would facilitate the reconstructi-on of the railway infrastructure between Kraljevo and Pristina, likewise for works on the road network. Both sides have applied for a feasibility study to WBIF for their section of the road towards Merdare.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

The Regional level

·· The first imperative is to maintain the political will to support regional initiati-ves. All the rest, including bilateral disagreements are issues for which there are pragmatic solutions within the regional framework. The establishment of this prerequisite can help in solving issues in Serbia-Kosovo relations in a number of domains.

·· Ensuring a better flow of information is essential, among both national ac-tors and regional initiatives. This together with data and policy harmoni-zation, would undoubtedly lead to better understanding and cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo in the long-term.

·· Strengthening regional programs in general and in particular encouraging activities of special interest to a small number of participants (2-3)43 in the framework of these programs, would contribute to overcoming obstacles and disagreements among members.

·· Improved joint representation of the region, in European institutions in par-ticular, would create a more favorable climate and strengthen joint lobbying by Serbia and Kosovo for solutions of common interest (the good experience of RCC, NALAS, SEETO, etc.).

43 A good example of sub-regional cooperation is the Igman Initiative founded by nongovernmental organi-zations in the region. It contributed to reconciliation, the advancement of political and economic relations, as well as relations between cities from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro. Another is Civil Dialog between Serbia and Kosovo, dealing with sensitive issues of mutual relationships at the civil society level for several years now, before those issues became the focus of negotiations between officials from both sides in 2011. A very successful example of intergovernmental sub-regional cooperation is the International Sava River Basin Commission that brings together Serbia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. It can be expected that sub-regional arrangements such as these will be more present in the future, especially those focusing on better management of shared natural resources.

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176 |

Impresum

IZDAVAČ/ PUBLISHEREvropski pokret u Srbiji/ European Movement in Serbia, Kralja Milana 31, Beograd/Belgradewww.emins.org

ZA IZDAVAČA/ FOR PUBLISHERMaja Bobić

AUTORI/ AUTHORSRadmila MilivojevićBisera Šećeragićprof. dr Predrag BjelićGenc Krasniqidr Filip Ejdusdr Jelica MinićVjosa Musliu

KOORDINATOR PROJEKTA/ PROJECT COORDINATORIvan Knežević

PARTNERI NA PROJEKTU/ PROJECT PARTNERInstitut za razvojnu politiku INDEP, Priština/ Institute for Development Policy INDEP, Pristina

KOREKTURA I LEKTURA/ COPY EDITINGVesna PravdićLazar Nikolić Liam Mac Gabhann

PREVOD/ TRANSLATIONMarina PetkovićNenad Tomović

DIZAJN I PRIPREMA ZA ŠTAMPU/ DESIGN AND LAYOUTISSstudioDesign, Beograd, [email protected]

ŠTAMPA/ PRINTED BYKuća štampe Grafolik/ Printing House Grafolik

TIRAŽ/ PRINT RUN300

ISBN: 978-86-80046-00-6

Septembar 2014. / September 2014

Mišljenja i stavovi izraženi u ovoj publikaciji ne odražavaju neophodno i stavove zvanične stavove Ambasade Danske u Beogradu i Evropskog pokreta u Srbiji, ukoliko nije drugačije naglašeno. /

The opinions and positions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Embassy of Denmark and the European Movement in Serbia unless stated otherwise.

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацијиНародна библиотека Србије, Београд

341.217:330(4-672EU:497.11)341.217:330(4-672EU:497.115)327.7/.8(4-672EU:497.11)

SRBIJA i Kosovo: evropske perspektive i praksa = Serbia and Kosovo: European Perspectives and Prac-ticalities / [autori, authors Radmila Milivojević ... et al.]. - Beograd : Evropski pokret u Srbiji = Belgrade: European Movement in Serbia, 2014 (Beograd: Kuća štampe Grafolik). - 176 str. : tabele ; 24 cm

Uporedo srp. tekst i engl. prevod. - Podaci o autori-ma preuzeti iz kolofona. - Tiraž 300. - Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst.

ISBN 978-86-80046-00-61. Миливојевић, Радмила, 1953- [аутор] 2.Краснићи, Генц [аутор]a) Европске интеграције - Економски аспект- Србија b) Европске интеграције -Економски аспект - Косово и МетохијаCOBISS.SR-ID 209753612

Srbija i Kosovo: Evropske perspektive i praksa / Serbia and Kosovo: European Perspectives and Practicalities