Finding our way backFinding our way back

The initial result of Descartes’ use of The initial result of Descartes’ use of hyperbolic doubt is the recognition that at hyperbolic doubt is the recognition that at least one thing cannot be doubted, at least least one thing cannot be doubted, at least one thing is certain: that he existsone thing is certain: that he exists

As was discussed, this does not seem like As was discussed, this does not seem like much; but Descartes does believe it is much; but Descartes does believe it is sufficient, as a starting point.sufficient, as a starting point.

The next logical question is: but what am The next logical question is: but what am I?I?

Meditation 2Meditation 2

Descartes’ claim is that I, the “I” that is the Descartes’ claim is that I, the “I” that is the subject of the “I think” or “I exist”, am a subject of the “I think” or “I exist”, am a thinking thing (and thinking thing (and onlyonly a thinking thing.) a thinking thing.) How does he arrive at this conclusion?How does he arrive at this conclusion?

A: by eliminating from contention all those A: by eliminating from contention all those possible features of myself (of the “I”) possible features of myself (of the “I”) which imply the existence of something of which imply the existence of something of which, which, at this pointat this point , I cannot be sure. , I cannot be sure.

Med. 2 (cont’d.)Med. 2 (cont’d.)

Descartes wants us to conclude that the mind Descartes wants us to conclude that the mind (as an essentially thinking thing) is more easily, (as an essentially thinking thing) is more easily, more intimately known than any physical thing more intimately known than any physical thing whatsoever (including one’s own body); and this whatsoever (including one’s own body); and this seems very counterintuitive. After all, I can’t see seems very counterintuitive. After all, I can’t see my mind, I can’t sense it or touch it, it’s not (& by my mind, I can’t sense it or touch it, it’s not (& by definition not) something physical.definition not) something physical.

Aren’t I more intimately acquainted w/ physical Aren’t I more intimately acquainted w/ physical things (bodies)? A: no!things (bodies)? A: no!

Med. 2 (cont’d.)Med. 2 (cont’d.)

Descartes asks us to consider a case Descartes asks us to consider a case where we would be inclined to say that we where we would be inclined to say that we have indisputable knowledge of something have indisputable knowledge of something physical, of some physical object (not that physical, of some physical object (not that it exists, say, but that it has this or that it exists, say, but that it has this or that property or set of properties), and a case property or set of properties), and a case where we would not be bothered by some where we would not be bothered by some of the initial puzzles he presented, i.e. of the initial puzzles he presented, i.e. under optimal conditionsunder optimal conditions

Med. 2 (cont’d.)Med. 2 (cont’d.)

The case Descartes presents has been called The case Descartes presents has been called ‘the wax example’, though any other physical ‘the wax example’, though any other physical object could have served as well.object could have served as well.

We are supposed to imagine taking in our hands We are supposed to imagine taking in our hands a piece of wax, and examining it under two a piece of wax, and examining it under two different circumstances, one as, say, in a different circumstances, one as, say, in a classroom at normal room temperature, and classroom at normal room temperature, and another which results when we bring the wax another which results when we bring the wax close to a flame; the situation can be close to a flame; the situation can be summarized as follows:summarized as follows:

The wax exampleThe wax example

Wax at room temp.Wax at room temp.

Smells of flowersSmells of flowers

Tastes sweetTastes sweet

Feels roughFeels rough

Makes a ‘plunk’ soundMakes a ‘plunk’ sound

Greenish colourGreenish colour

1 litre in volume1 litre in volume

Wax near the fireWax near the fire

Diminished or no smellDiminished or no smell

No tasteNo taste

Smooth textureSmooth texture

‘‘splash’ soundsplash’ sound

TranslucentTranslucent

> 1 litre in volume> 1 litre in volume

The wax example (cont’d.)The wax example (cont’d.)

AllAll of the properties of the piece of wax have of the properties of the piece of wax have changed (or, at least, all of the properties which I changed (or, at least, all of the properties which I can sense), and yet we are still inclined to say can sense), and yet we are still inclined to say that the same piece of wax remains. Why?that the same piece of wax remains. Why?

Well…one thing hasn’t changed - that it takes up Well…one thing hasn’t changed - that it takes up space (has ‘extension’), and while this may not space (has ‘extension’), and while this may not be enough to identify it as wax, it is enough to be enough to identify it as wax, it is enough to identify it as a physical objectidentify it as a physical object

The wax example (cont’d.)The wax example (cont’d.)

The conclusion we are supposed to draw is that, The conclusion we are supposed to draw is that, while we thought we were intimately acquainted while we thought we were intimately acquainted with things like pieces of wax, upon examination with things like pieces of wax, upon examination we find that (on the basis of sensory information) we find that (on the basis of sensory information) we don’t perceive physical objects very well at we don’t perceive physical objects very well at all -- that, even if we were wrong to say “I see a all -- that, even if we were wrong to say “I see a piece of wax”, we wouldn’t be wrong to say “I piece of wax”, we wouldn’t be wrong to say “I think I see a piece of wax”, and therefore think I see a piece of wax”, and therefore everything we say about physical objects is, in everything we say about physical objects is, in fact, better evidence for the existence of mind.fact, better evidence for the existence of mind.

Med. 2 (cont’d.)Med. 2 (cont’d.)

How does the previous follow from what How does the previous follow from what Descartes has said?Descartes has said?

A: what doesn’t change about the wax is its A: what doesn’t change about the wax is its ‘extension’, that it is a ‘spatial’ thing. But this is ‘extension’, that it is a ‘spatial’ thing. But this is something, supposedly, which we cannot something, supposedly, which we cannot adequately imagine (make a picture of to adequately imagine (make a picture of to ourselves) but only conceive. What I think clearly ourselves) but only conceive. What I think clearly about the wax, therefore, is not something about the wax, therefore, is not something physical but merely something abstract or physical but merely something abstract or mental.mental.

What does that all mean?What does that all mean?

1. We are aware of two, distinct kinds of 1. We are aware of two, distinct kinds of thing: a) minds, and b) bodies or physical thing: a) minds, and b) bodies or physical or material things;or material things;

2. These two, distinct kinds have distinct 2. These two, distinct kinds have distinct essential attributes: minds are thinking essential attributes: minds are thinking things, and bodies are extended (spatial) things, and bodies are extended (spatial) things’things’

3. These distinct kinds are distinct 3. These distinct kinds are distinct substances (Q: what is a substance?)substances (Q: what is a substance?)

More on the meaning of all More on the meaning of all thisthis

Substance =df. ‘that of which things can be Substance =df. ‘that of which things can be attributed, but which itself can never be attributed, but which itself can never be attributed to anything else’ (e.g. “Socrates is a attributed to anything else’ (e.g. “Socrates is a man”; things can be attributed to Socrates, that man”; things can be attributed to Socrates, that he is a man, for instance, but ‘Socrates’ can he is a man, for instance, but ‘Socrates’ can never be attributed to anything else -- we can never be attributed to anything else -- we can never say, for instance, that something is a never say, for instance, that something is a Socrates; therefore, ‘Socrates’ is a substance) Socrates; therefore, ‘Socrates’ is a substance) Q: what about “The teacher of Plato is Q: what about “The teacher of Plato is Socrates”?Socrates”?

Still moreStill more

The mind is one substance, the body another substance; The mind is one substance, the body another substance; therefore, human beings are composites made up of two therefore, human beings are composites made up of two kinds; one part (the body) is divisible and ‘perishable’, kinds; one part (the body) is divisible and ‘perishable’, the other part is indivisible, immaterial, and therefore the other part is indivisible, immaterial, and therefore ‘imperishable’; the “I” is identical with the mind (and ‘imperishable’; the “I” is identical with the mind (and personal identity over time = same immaterial mental personal identity over time = same immaterial mental substance)substance)

N.B.: the mind is a substance, therefore it is not N.B.: the mind is a substance, therefore it is not attributable to something else; the body is a distinct attributable to something else; the body is a distinct substance, no ‘mental’ attribute belongs to it (therefore, substance, no ‘mental’ attribute belongs to it (therefore, for instance, the brain doesn’t think)for instance, the brain doesn’t think)

CompareCompare

Descartes: I am a thinking, immaterial Descartes: I am a thinking, immaterial substancesubstance

Locke: I am my present consciousness Locke: I am my present consciousness plus my memoriesplus my memories

Hume: I am nothing at allHume: I am nothing at all Q: any positions not covered here?Q: any positions not covered here?