Garff. Johannes de Silentio. Rethorician of Silence

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Johannes

de

silentio: Rhetorician

of

Silence

By JOAKIM

GARFF

Translated

by

R U C E

H .

K I R M M S E

»If there were no

eternal

consciousness in a person; if the basis for everything were

only a wild fermenting power, which struggles with its own obscure passions to pro-

duce everything great and small; if, hidden beneath everything, there is a bottomless

and

inexhaustible emptiness - then what would

life

be but despair? [... I]f the human

race passes through the world like a ship through the sea, like the wind across the de-

sert, an unthinking and fruitless business; if an eternally insatiable oblivion waits for

its

prey,

and

there were

no

power strong enough

to

wrest

it

free

- how

empty

and de-

void of consolation life would be But precisely for that reason it is not like this, and

just as God created man and woman, he also created the hero and the poet

f.. .] .«

1

The

name

of the

poet

is

Johannes

de

silentio.

T he

name

of the

hero

is

Abraham. And the words cited above are the former's panegyric over

the

latter.

But the

panegyric

is not

only

a

panegyric. There

is

also

a

logical implication,

or at

least something that resembles

a

logical

im -

plication, namely that after the »if there were not«, which introduces

the phrases, there is the prospect of a »then«. This logical conse-

quence is omitted, however. A nd for this very reason, the

final

»therefore«

has even more

force,

and it is worth noting that this

»therefore«

is not

directly connected with

the

»eternal consciousness«

with

which the implication began, b ut rather with the hero and the

poet.

The

meaning-vacuum

which

characterizes these obscure pas-

sions

is

apparently

filled by

these

tw o figures, or

rather

by

what they

have in common with Adam and Eve, by the epic, the story.

Fear

a nd

Trembling

is a

story

of

this sort,

a

story about

the

story

in

Genesis 22, which tells of the Abraham who travelled to Mount

1

S0ren Kierkegaard

Samlede

vcerker [The Collected Works

of

S0ren Kierkegaard],

A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg,

and

H.O. Lange eds.,

3d ed.

P.P. Rohde ed.,

20

vols.,

Copenhagen 1962-1964

[1901-1906],

vol. 5, p. 17 (hereafter in the format

»SV3

5,

17«).

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Authenticated

Download Date | 12 10 14 6:23 PM



Johannes de silentio: Rhetorician of Silence 187

Moriah to sacrifice his son Isaac. But at the same time, the story

forms the basis for a series of philosophical reflections, inasmuch as

Johannes

de

silentio proclaims that

he will

employ

the »form of

problemata

to

demonstrate

the

dialectic

in the

story

in

order

to

[show] what

an

enormous paradox faith

is [,..].«

2

Something similar will happen in what follows, only in reverse or-

der. It seems to me that the elements which Johannes de silentio ex-

tracts from

the

Abraham story

are

less pregnant with paradox than

the

story

he

tells about that story.

In other

words,

it is in the

area

of

narrative and rhetoric, rather than epistemology, that the problems

truly present themselves

in

earnest.

The

Individual th e Universal and the Paradox of Faith

Johannes

de silentio examines his problemata in three sections, all of

which can be read more or less explicitly as replies that are destruc-

tive

of the

position adopted

by

Judge William. This destruction

is not

aimed at the individual components of the judge's conciliating at-

tempt to establish equilibrium between the aesthetic and the ethical,

but

rather

at the

very desire

for

conciliation. Johannes

de

silentio

is

pretty close to being the very quintessence of irreconcilability. He in-

sists upon the distance between a human value orientation and the

divine revaluation of all values. Therefore he consistently denounces

the

human, all-too-human will toward

the

center,

and

both

the

con-

ciliatory William and the mediating Hegel come to

feel

his lash.

They would certainly

be

able

to

approve

of his

introductory

re-

marks, however. Johannes

de

silentio defines

the

relation between

the

universal and the individual as a relation in which the individual is

subordinated to the

universal, which

is the

historically specific

and

factual form in which the fundamental opposition between »good and

evil« makes

its

appearance. Johannes

de

silentio explains that »the

universal reposes immanently

in

itself,

has

nothing outside itself that

is

its own telos and is itself the telos for

everything outside itself

[,..].«

3

Therefore,

in relation to

this universal

it is the

individual's

»ethical task continually

to

express himself

in

[this universal],

to an-

nul his individuality in order to become the universal.«

4

On this point

2

SV3

5,50.

3

SV35.51.

4

Ibid.

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188 Joakim G arff

William, Hegel, and Johannes de silentio are in more or less complete

agreement.

But

that

is as far as their agreement extends, however, because

from

his

premises Johannes

de

silentio concludes that

if the

individ-

ual

is

subordinated

to the

universal, then

the

universal becomes

in

principle

identical with

the

final goal, which means that

the

universal

is

of »the same nature as a

person's

eternal salvation.«

5

A nd con-

versely,

this also means that if a person is to relate himself to eternal

salvation

this must take place

by

virtue

of faith as the

»paradox that

the individual is higher than th e universal [... and thus] stands in an

absolute relation

to the

Absolute.«

6

Beyond

good

and

evil,

faith

makes possible

a

suspension

of the

ethical

because

faith

receives

its

motive force

from

something other

than the

historical

period in which it exists. And, addressing himself

more or less directly to William and Hegel, Johannes de silentio

writes: »I t is therefore correct to say that every duty is at root a duty

to

God. Duty becomes duty

by

being referred

to

God,

but in the

duty

itself

I do not

enter into relation

to God

[...].

If in

this connection

I

then

say

that

it is my

duty

to

love God,

I am

really uttering only

a

tautology, inasmuch as >God< is here used in the completely abstract

sense as the divine, i.e., as the universal, i.e., as duty.«

7

Here

Johannes

de silentio does to William what Marx

will

later do

to Hegel - he turns him on his head. The duty which the judge had

defined in terms of the universal (because the universal was by

defi-

nition the ethical) is now shown to be a derived form of duty and as

such relative. God has become something different. He is no longer

the

ultimate guarantor

of the

validity

of

cultural arrangements

but is

almost

the opposite, nothing less than the radical reconfiguration of

the

principles constituting

the

human sphere. This becomes apparent

when

one

observes

the

paradox which springs

from faith and

con-

cerns the realm of communication. While,

from

the point of view of

ethics, everyone

is

obligated

»to

divest himself

of the

categories

of in-

wardness and express himself in the

external«,

8

Johannes de

silentio

maintains that

the

paradox

of faith is

that there exists

an

»inwardness

which

is incommensurable with the external [,..]«.

9

5

Ibid.

6

SV3 5,52.

7

SV3 5,63.

8

SV3 5,64.

9

Ibid.


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A nd because, from the point of view of ethics, inwardness is obli-

gated to suspend its own incongruity with the universal and submit to

the latter's demand to reveal oneself, this revelation has an eminently

verbal character. Thus,

from the

point

of

view

of

ethics, Abraham

is

obligated

to

tell Sarah, Eliezer,

and

Isaac about what

he is

contem-

plating

doing. But Abraham remains silent, and »he

cannot

speak -

therein lies the distress and the anxiety. For indeed, if I cannot make

myself understood when I speak, then I am not speaking

[...].«

10

Thus

because

of his absolute relation to the Absolute, Abraham is driven

away

from

the

realm

of the

universal

and of

communication,

a

realm

in

which

the

paradoxical duty could

be

formulated

but -

according

to

Johannes de silentio - in which it would be meaningless.

If this silence is paradoxically motivated by something beyond the

realm of communication, then it remains a paradox - or at least a

problem - for every text that wishes to reproduce it: How can one

speak about the silence without breaking it? That is, how can one de-

scribe Abraham without re-inscribing him in the very realm of com-

munication from which he has been ideologically suspended?

The

book's problemata pose these sorts

of

questions

but do not an-

swer them. Let us therefore make a mental

note

of this and pay care-

ful attention to the text.

Johannes

de

silentio:

Rhetorician

of silence

In his preface, Johannes de silentio introduces himself and his book

with

the

pathos

of

distance: »The present author

is by no

means

a

philosopher. H e is, to put it poetically and elegantly, a supplemental

clerk who neither writes the system nor makes

promises

about the

system,

who

neither pledges anything

about the

system

nor

binds

himself to the

system.«

11

If this »supplemental clerk« writes, it is be-

cause for him it is a pure and simple »luxury, which becomes more

pleasing and obvious as

fewer

buy and read what he

writes.«

12

Thus

he is also well aware of the fact that the work he is sending forth into

the

world

will

scarcely attract

any

attention

in an age

when »people

have crossed out passion in order to serve scholarly knowledge.«

13

10

SV 3 5,102; cf. 56.

11

SV3

5,11.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid.


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190 Joakim Garff

This, however, is not the reason - or at least it is not the only reason

- that he has inscribed silence into his name. Johannes de silentio

owes his name fully as much to the fact that in many respects the

book

has

chosen

as its

theme silence -

the

negative presence

of

lan-

guage

in

silence.

He

writes

not

only

from

silence,

but

also about

si-

lence.

Or

rather, this

is

what

he

wants

to do, but is

unable:

the

silence,

of

course, does not expand along with the text; on the contrary, the

more

the

text expands,

the

less silence there is. Thus

in

order

to

main-

tain

Abraham as the representative of the paradox, whose silence

may

not be

abolished

in the

communicative realm

of the

text, Johan-

nes de

silentio must establish

a

distance between

his own

thought

and the unthinkability of the paradox. A nd he does so with thorough-

ness: »I can make the great trampoline leap whereby I go over into

infinity.

M y back is like a tightrope dancer's, twisted in my childhood

- therefore it is easy for

me.«

14

When, »on the other hand, [I] have to

contemplate Abraham, then it is as if I were destroyed [...]. I strain

every

muscle

in

order

to get a

look,

and at

that very instant

I am

paralyzed.«

15

Despite

the

silence

he has

inscribed

in his

name, Johannes

de

silen-

tio is a

particularly talkative fellow, which itself

of

course reveals

how

inadequately he relates himself to Abraham's silence. If he points out

the distance as much as he does,

16

it is not so much in order to point

out his personal limitations as out of consideration for the task the

book sets out to accomplish and which near the outset is formulated

in terms which almost seem to be an imperative. What the book sets

out to bring about is not »the artistic weaving of fantasy, but the

shiver and shudder of thought.«

17

With this imperative the work proclaims its connection with the

idealist tradition's concept of the sublime as that which intrudes upon

the self-understanding of enlightened humanism and also goes be-

yond

th e merely aesthetic by confronting a person

with

impressions

that break

in

upon

contemplation's

peaceful relation

to

beauty.

The

alien character

of the

sublime

- or the

almost violent

effect

it has

upon the power of imagination -

fills

the subject with fear. And trem-

bling.

14

SV35.35.

15

SV3 5,32.

16

SV3 5,36.45.47 et passim.

17

SV3 5,13.


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Johannes

de silentio: Rhetorician of Silence 191

And yet, as Kant so famously asserted, the danger is not really a

serious one. The sublime eludes every sort of representation, but at

the same time it awakens the notion of a world beyond what man

can

conceive.

In

other words,

fear

of

what

is

alien

is

accompanied

by

an awe of

reason's conciliating capacity

of

distancing itself

from the

chaos that

the

sensible world

can

display quite unexpectedly.

When Johannes de silentio demands »the shiver and shudder of

thought«, he is thinking of the sublime, which has evaded the concili-

ation of reason and which remains something alien and terrifying, a

calamity which resists both

the

social

and

philosophical center,

be-

cause - as we are ceaselessly warned - »Abraham cannot be medi-

ated.«

18

»One cannot weep over Abraham. One approaches him with

a horror

religiosus

as Israel approached Mount Sinai.«

19

This

is

precisely what

we

will

not do,

however, because everyone

knows the outcome of the story and thus also knows that the danger

was

not

really serious:

»We all

know that

it was

only

a

trial.«

20

It is

thus with this reconciling knowledge

and not

with religious terror

that

we

approach Abraham,

and

precisely

in

doing

so we

come

to

for-

get the

fear

and trembling with which Abraham once approached the

mountain. This sort of knowledge is repeatedly

criticized.

21

A nd this

criticism is all the more understandable because, through its own in-

ner logic, this knowledge makes the drama undramatic by permitting

one to

stand

at a due

historical distance

from

which

» to

suck worldly

wisdom out of the paradox.«

22

Although the imperative of the work is anti-aesthetic, inasmuch as

the

shudder

of

thought

is

opposed

to

every form

of

clear representa-

tion, nonetheless the imperative can only be obeyed by means of an

aesthetic praxis which re-establishes the medium of clear representa-

tion. And

thus Johannes

de

silentio also dramatizes

the

journey.

He

stretches

out the

time that

it

took, describing

the

necessary equip-

ment for butchery, so that Abraham on his way to Mount Moriah is

accompanied by writing which invests its energy in producing the

presence or the personal knowledge, the autopsy which forms the ba-

sis for the shudder, the shudder of thought. Every means is used in

order to catch the reader's eye and maintain the terror. This is made

18

SV 3 5,56.

19

SV35.57.

20

SV3

5,23.

21

Cf.

SV35.28.49.59.60.61.

22

SV3 5,36.


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192 Joakim Garff

clear as early as the section entitled »Mood«, which comes immedi-

ately after the

preface

and

which presents

four

variations

on the

story

that both separately

and

together have

the

purpose

of

bringing about

the

terror's

shuddering

return.

23

Thus

it is

scarcely

an

overstatement

to

claim that

the

teleological suspension

of the

ethical corresponds

to

the

aesthetic suspension

of

time.

The

autopsy

is

indeed

the

point,

and

time

is the

threat which

the

text

is to

ward

off - and

which

it at-

tempts to abjure aesthetically, »as if a few millennia were an enor-

mous distance.«

24

Thus

the

text

is

composed

of an

artistic

web of

fantasy, whose tex-

ture is the precondition of the shudder. And yet Johannes de silentio

is

painfully

aware that Abraham evades representation, because

in

the case of Abraham, he confesses, »I cannot think myself into [him];

when

I

have reached

the

high point,

I

fall

down,

fo r

what

is

offered

me is the

paradox.«

25

Therefore, just as one ought to approach Abra-

ham

with religious terror,

so

must

the

text which grasps

after

that

which cannot be grasped be a text that continually betrays its knowl-

edge of the fact that it does not admit of being written, because then

it

wants to be a text about something which itself was not a text but a

paradoxical action.

For

this same reason

the

text

can

only

say

what

it

wants to do, but cannot do it. Johannes de silentio explains: »If I were

to

speak

of

[Abraham], then

I

would

first

sketch

the

pain

of

trial.

To

that end, like

a

leech

I

would suck

all the

anxiety

and

distress

and

torment out of a

father's

suffering, so that I could describe what

Abraham

suffered

throughout it all, yet he believed. I would point

out

that

the

journey lasted three days

and a

good

bit of the

fourth;

yes, these three and a half days would become infinitely longer than

the

couple

of

thousand years that separate

me from Abraham.«

26

A text which wants to retell a story about a journey that took

three days, but which arranges the time of the retelling in reverse

proportion to the time of the story, is not a text but is a demonstra-

tion

of the

misrelation between

the

text itself

and its

object,

so

that

strictly

speaking Johannes

de

silentio ought

to fall

silent

in

impotent

gestures. But he doesn't. He chooses instead to have a series of tex-

tual characters mime

the

story

of

Abraham,

and he

thereby causes

the

event, which

he

himself does

not

understand,

to

fasten

its

shud-

23

Cf. SV3 5,13ff.

24

SV35,33;cf.61.50.

25

SV3 5,32.

26

SV35 5Q.


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dering grip on

others

- others, be it noted, who do not let the matter

stop

with shuddering but who repeat the story of Abraham in their

own stories.

As a

sort

of

synchronization,

on the one

hand,

of the vi-

sion which the text has produced aesthetically and rhetorically, and

on the other hand, of the demand which its author requires honored

existentially, Johannes

de

silentio

can

write that

at

»the moment

I re-

flect upon it, I call out to

myself:

ja m tua re s agitur [now the matter is

about you].«

27

In

brief,

the

tale

of

Abraham demands repetition,

re-

duplication.

A nd that is what happens in what

follows.

Three

Knights of the Order of Faith

The story of Abraham is not the only one in the book, but is one

among several fantastic stories. And of these there are more than

seven

-

nearer seven times seven,

of

which

the

majority

go

beyond

the fantastic and become terrifying. Thus there is quite an extensive

gallery

of

characters: knights

of

various orders

and

ranks; heroes like

Agamemnon, Jephtha, and Brutus, inspired with greater or lesser de-

grees

of

heroic courage; several Copenhagen citizens

of the

more

anonymous sort; and a series of couples, such as Agnes and the Mer-

man, Tobias and Sara, and Faust and Margaret, who, as is well known,

only

form couples because they never became such. Characteristic

of

all

these

characters

is

that they

are

placed

in

small narrative niches

in

the larger room in which the story of Abraham takes place. In accor-

dance with their placement, they come forth with commentaries rang-

ing from a dispirited monologue of encapsulation, to the Aristotelian

definition

of

drama,

and to

something

so

quiet that

for a

moment

it

could resemble silence.

These commentaries could be read as the subtext to the text which

Johannes

de

silentio

is

writing about Abraham,

and

they

function

like

prisms

through which the various theological, philosophical, or psy-

chological problems

in the

basic story

are

refracted

and

personally

appropriated.

In

this way,

the

textual characters make explicit

the

epistemological implications

of the

text

-

they live

the

lives

of the

thoughts, so to speak. And it is a rather burdensome existence, one

must say, because Johannes de silentio has appointed himself »tortor

27

SV3 5,32.


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194 Joakim

Garff

heroum

[tormentor of heroes]«,

28

a post he looks

after

with meticu-

lous care. Thus just as the hero seems to espy a way out, Johannes de

silentio makes »a little change«

29

which makes the

hero's

situation, if

possible, even more unfortunate.

In

what follows below, however,

the

three

figures are

treated more

gently by

their

poet - indeed, the last of them actually becomes

happy despite an otherwise uncertain

fate.

All of them are knights of

the

noble order

of faith. The first is

someone

as

insignificant

as a

»tax

collector«, while the two others have neither names nor civic titles,

and for the

sake

of

convenience

I

have therefore dubbed them »that

man«

and »the insomniac«.

First

the

»tax collector«,

who is

close

to the

ideal version

of a

»knight

of faith« as he might appear in Biedermeier Copenhagen. In

reading

the

description

of his

appearance

one

must continually bear

in mind that, like Abraham, he has made the double movement of

faith.

That is, he has definitively surrendered everything (as Abraham

surrendered Isaac) - and simultaneously, by virtue of faith as the fi-

nal,

absurd possibility, he has received everything again (as Abraham

in

the obedience of his

faith

receives Isaac again). Enormous though

the socio-cultural distance between Abraham and the »tax collector«

is, they are very closely connected in their existential mode: »Here he

is.

The acquaintance is made, I am introduced to him. At the instant I

first see

him,

I

thrust

him from me,

even jump

a bit away,

clap

my

hands, and say

half

audibly, > Good Lord Is this the man? Is it really

he? He looks just like a tax

collector <

But it

is

he, however. I move a

b it closer to him, keeping an eye peeled for the least signal from in -

finity,

a

glance,

an

expression,

a

gesture,

a

sadness,

a

smile

to

betray

the

infinite

in its

heterogeneity with

the

finite.

No I

scrutinize

his

fig-

ure from top to toe to see if there is a little tear through which the

infinite

peeked out. No He is solid all the way

through.«

30

And

Johannes

de

silentio pursues

his

»tax collector«

up one

street

and down

the

next, page

after

page

- with the

same zeal that Johan-

nes the Seducer had earlier pursued Cordelia - seeking that little

»tear«,

but in vain. To his pronounced amazement he can only ascer-

tain that the »tax collector« goes to church and takes walks in the

woods with equal ease and that he is able to assume whatever role a

situation requires with no apparent difficulty. Quite ironically, pur-

28

SV3

5,99.

29

SV3 5,98.

30

SV3 5,37.


Authenticated




Johannes de


of

Silence

195

sued by his spy day in and day out, the »tax collector« resembles

what he is not: a »bourgeois«, a »clerk«, a »money-making business-

man«,

a

»poet«,

a

»postman«,

a

»restauranteur«,

a

»capitalist«, indeed,

even a »sixteen-year-old girl«, as well as a »genius«, a »pork butcher«,

and

finally a

»do-nothing«.

31

And - as if a

parody

of

Abraham's sacri-

fice

- a lamb, the very saving moment of the peripeteia: toward eve-

ning he gets the idea

that

his »wife will surely have prepared a spe-

cial hot meal for him when he returns home, fo r example, a roast

head of lamb with vegetables.«

32

Quite

understandably

it

occasions certain difficulties

for

Johannes

de silentio when he has to reconcile himself to the

fact

that the »tax

collector«

is a

»knight

of faith« and not

just

the

smooth bourgeois

fellow that his spiritless behavior would seem to indicate. Naturally

this ambiguity is the whole point, because the function of the »tax

collector« is of course to demonstrate that there is »an inwardness

which is incommensurable with the external [,..].«

33

Thus the »tax

collector« is a knight of

faith

not so much in spite of his external ap-

pearance as by

virtue

of it.

Johannes

de

silentio illuminates

the

dia-

lectic:

»He

continually makes

the

movement

of

infinity,

but he

does

it

so correctly and with such certainty that he continually gets finitude

out of it, and not even for a second

does

anyone suspect anything

else.«

34

Thus no one ever suspects or has the least clue about the exis-

tential basis underlying the »tax collector«, because that basis is com-

posed

either

of the

wondrous experience

of

faith

or of

simple, every-

day

conformism. Johannes de silentio maintains that in the present

case

we are confronted with the former, inasmuch as »to be able to

fall

down

in

such

a

manner that

it

simultaneously looks

as if one

stood up and walked, to transform the leap of life into a walk, abso-

lutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian - only that knight can

do this, and this is the only miracle.«

35

To express the sublime in the pedestrian, the exalted in the ordi-

nary

-

this

is the

formula

for the

inwardness which

is

incommensura-

b le

with

the

world

b ut

which

at the

same time

is the

prerequisite

fo r

remaining in that world. The formula itself borders upon paradox, for

the sublime is of course at the farthest imaginable remove

from

the

31

SV3 5,38.

32

SV35,38.

33

SV3

5,64.

34

SV35 39.

35

Ibid.


Authenticated







made clear

is

that »that man« simply collapses from fatigue every

time he has undertaken a journey to Mount Moriah. It is this autopsy

that the story has reproduced, which is why Johannes de

silentio's

rhetorical question makes good sense: »What

is the

value

of

taking

the trouble to remember that past which cannot become something

present.«

39

And with this sort of presence we have reached the third knight,

who was seized so completely by the vision of Abraham's sacrifice

that he could not close his eyes and thus became »the insomniac.« It

began rather quietly, though. One Sunday in church he had heard

about

the

sacrifice

and

then went home

and

»wanted

to do

just

as

Abraham

had done«,

40

that

is, he

wanted

to

repeat

or

reduplicate

the

story.

But no

sooner

had he

made

his

decision than

he met the

pastor,

who cannot exactly

be

said

to

have given

the

plan

his

blessing:

»Abominable man, scum of society What devil has possessed you to

make you want to murder your son.«

41

To this »the insomniac« re-

plied merely, »after all, it's what

you

yourself preached about

on

Sun-

day.«

42

The story does not really continue much further, and Johannes

de

silentio therefore comments upon

the

little scene: »The comic

and

the tragic here contact one another in absolute infinitude. By itself,

the pastor's sermon was perhaps ridiculous enough, but it became in-

finitely ridiculous through

its effect - and yet

this

was

quite natu-

ral.«

43

O f particular interest is Johannes de silentio's concluding assertion,

in which he makes it clear that despite its ridiculousness the effect

was quite natural.

And of

course, when »the insomniac« wants

to re-

peat the story of Abraham he is not possessed by a devil, as the pas-

tor assumes. He is possessed by the story, which therefore quite natu-

rally insists upon being repeated

- but of

course,

it

insists upon being

repeated

in the »external« and not merely in the »internal«, as was

the case with the two previous knights. But Johannes de silentio must

therefore ask how it can be explained that the one repetition is legiti-

mate while

the

other

is

not: »How does

one

explain such

a

contradic-

tion [...]?

Is it

because Abraham

has the

time-honored reputation

of

being a great man, so that what he does is great, and when another

39

SV3

5,30.

40

5V35,28.

41

Ibid.

42

SV35.29.

43

Ibid.


Authenticated




198

Joakim Garff

does

the

same thing

it is a

sin,

a sin

which cries

out to

heaven? [...]

If

faith cannot make

the

willingness

to

murder

one's son

into

a holy

act,

then let the same judgment be passed upon Abraham as upon every-

one

else.«

44

With his straightforward will to action, »the insomniac« is the first

of the characters in Kierkegaard's works to dispute the thesis that in-

wardness

is

incommensurable

- and the first to

transform inwardness

into action. And this action is so fascinating that Johannes de silentio

cannot resist

the

desire

to

write

a

short postscript

to the

story about

the insomniac knight:

»[He]

was probably then executed or sent to

the madhouse. In brief, he became unhappy in relation to so-called

reality.

In

another sense,

I

truly think that Abraham made

him

happy

] ««

This »so-called reality« is the

socio-cultural

system in which Judge

William and the bourgeois philistine, despite all their differences, are

situated. The former has consciously identified himself with his social

role, while the latter has unconsciously assimilated himself to that

role.

The

insomniac knight,

on the

other hand,

is

situated outside

of

this

mediating system

and

ends

in

delinquency

or delerium. And yet

Abraham makes

him

happy. Why? Because

the

story supplied

him

with

the

epic material

in

which

he found his

narrative identity.

The

story proved

to be

about him.

As the knight of reduplication, »the insomniac« bears repetition

upon his coat of arms, so it would not be out of order for him to re-

peat the idea - and he does so. Not even ten pages after Johannes de

silentio has announced a possible

future

for »the insomniac«, the lat-

ter is resurrected in a new

form.

The situation is the same, however. A

pastor has told the story of Abraham and has done so in such a bor-

ing fashion that the

entire

congregation has fallen asleep, except for

that individual »who suffered from insomnia.«

46

When the pastor fi-

nally finishes

his uninspired sermon, »the insomniac« returns home to

meditate upon the matter, but as soon as his ideas begin to develop,

the

pastor again shows

up and

exclaims: »Wretch That

you let

your

soul

sink

into such madness No miracle takes place [...]«, to which

»the insomniac« then replies, yet again, »after all, that was what you

preached about

last

Sunday.«

47

And in

keeping with this simple, sub-

44

I b i d

45

I b i d

46

SV3 5,49.

47

Ibid.


Authenticated




Johannes de


of Silence 199

tie logic, Johannnes de silentio must conclude: »If Abraham is not a

nullity,

a phantom, a bit of decoration used as a diversion, then the

sinner can never err in wanting to do the same

[,..].«

48

It is no coincidence that Johannes de silentio mounts a defense of

this sort. The insomniac knight,

after

all, is not a chance character. He

is

the

straightforward representative

of

autopsy,

the

character whose

eye cannot free itself from the images in the story, »because the per-

son who has

seen these images

can

never

get rid of

them again.«

In-

somnia is not merely the appropriate reaction to the religious terror

of the story; it also makes clear that it is to the e ye that the story di-

rects its appeal. Insomnia is a metaphor for the moment the twin-

kling of an eye - of

religious terror,

the

wide-open

eye

transfixed

in a

continual stare, the eye whose pains are not soothed by the relief of

sleep. In brief, to be sleepless is to be exposed to genuine fear and

trembling: »There were countless generations who knew the story of

Abraham by heart, word for word, but how many did it make sleep-

less?«

49

Yet

as the

character

of the

seeing eye,

of the

moment

- the

twin-

kling

of an eye -

»the insomniac«

is

also

the

very character

of

visibil-

ity,

of making manifest. A nd this is not the least important of the re-

spects in which the insomniac differs from his two fellow knights, for

in

their cases

»it is

only

by

faith

and not by

murder that

one

attains

likeness with Abraham.«

50

Things

are

different

fo r

»the insomniac.«

H e realizes his inwardness in the external and defies the realm of

communication,

which

the

busy pastor only just barely manages

to

maintain intact. Had he not arrived in time, the catastrophe would

have taken place

and the son

would have been slaughtered.

To put it

mildly, the

text does

not

place

the

pastor

in a

favorable light,

but

brands him a hypocrite who condemns that for which he himself has

served

as the

occasion. Thus

the

pastoral parody also serves

to em-

phasize the distance between, on the one hand, the mediating ten-

dency

of institutions and, on the other hand, a will which is opposed

to

every sort

of

middle way, opposed

to the socio-cultural

system

-

opposed,

in short, to »the established order.«

48

Ibid

49

51/35,28.

50

SV3

5,30.


Authenticated




200 Joakim

Garff

»The

Category of the

Turning

Point«

»In general, if poetry took notice of the religious and of the inward-

ness

of the

individual,

it

would take

on

fa r

more significant tasks than

those with which

it is

presently

occupied.«

51

This remark

is

allowed

to

fall in a

note

a bit

less than

20

pages

from the end of the

book,

but it

could well have been placed

a

good deal earlier,

in the

main text,

be-

cause Fear

a nd

Trembling

is

very attentive

to the

religious

and the in-

wardness

of the

individual,

and

thus even formulates

one of the

prob-

lems

with which, according

to

Johannes

de

silentio, poetry ought

to

occupy itself.

The

degree

to

which

the

book

has

dealt successfully with this prob-

lem

is

less certain, especially because Johannes

de

silentio

has

placed

himself in a

dilemma with

his

theory

of the

incommensurability

of in-

wardness. Thus, although poetry is required for the depiction of in-

wardness,

still, precisely because it is the medium of exposition and

externalization, it is also profoundly opposed to every form of in-

wardness.

Nonetheless Johannes

de

silentio presents

and

surveys

his

various characters

as if

they were stage actors whose

different

pos-

tures, scenes, and leaps indicated degrees on a scale of inwardness

which he could read from where he sits somewhere in his private

löge. From this

location

he follows faith's »double movement«,

52

and

evaluates it as pure, objectified inwardness: »Fortunate is he who can

make these movements. He does the marvelous, and I will never be-

come

tired

of

admiring him. Whether

it be

Abraham

or the

slave

in

Abraham's house, a professor of philosophy or a poor servant girl, is

a

matter

of

complete indifference

to me; I

look only

at the

move-

ments. But I do look at them, and I do not permit myself to be

fooled, either by myself or by anyone else.«

53

If

Johannes de silentio does not permit himself to be fooled now

and

then, either

by

himself

or by

others,

but

always judges correctly

about what

he

sees, then inwardness must

be

accompanied with

a

clearly readable correlate,

and

thus

it

must

be

anything

but

incom-

mensurable. If this is so, the »tax collector« is lost. He, of course, won

inwardly

and invisibly what he lost externally and visibly, so in his

case,

if one

paid attention only

to

»the movements«

one

would only

see a chance figure wandering aimlessly about Copenhagen. And it is

51

SV3 5,83n.

52

SV3

5,34.

53

SV3 5,36.


Authenticated





pretty clear that something similar is the case for »that man.« And

yet so doggedly

does

Johannes de silentio emphasize the movements

and their importance that

his

condescending remark about

the

»bal-

let

master,

with

whom

the

poet

so

often

confuses himself these

days«

54

seems more than a little out of

place.

He explains

that

»knights of infinite

resignation«,

for

example,

can be

known

by

their

walk,

which

is »light and

daring«,

55

and this also is true to some ex -

tent for the »knights of

infinity«,

for they possess »elevation.«

56

Though they excel in their leap, they

nonetheless

do not manage to

assume the correct position when they return to earth; they vacillate

for an instant and thereby reveal themselves: »One need not see

them in the air; one need only see them at the instant they touch and

make contact with the earth, and one recognizes

them.«

57

On the

other hand,

the

ability

to

leap

in a

given position

so

that

in

»the leap

itself

[one] takes

the position«,

58

is

within

the

capacity

of the

knight

of faith and him alone, whose inwardness can be clearly read »when

one looks at the scale.«

59

As

tortor heroum Johannes

de

silentio takes

zestful

pleasure

in

calling

forth

»poetic individualities«

and

uses »the power

of

dialectic

to hold [them ...] at the point of

extremity.«

60

To do this he employs

the whip of despair so that victims »can discover one thing or an-

other

in

[their]

anxiety.«

61

Behind

his

brutal practice Johannes

de si-

lentio has a theory about man as a being who first becomes aware of

his

true essence when he is subjected to a dramatic re-versal. It is not

surprising that in this connection he thanks Lessing for the idea of »a

Christian drama«,

62

just

as it

makes good sense when

he

refers

to the

two concepts

in

Aristotle's poetics

which

are

connected

to

drama,

namely

peripeteia and anagnorisis: reversal and recognition.

In connection with these concepts, »the insomniac« again returns to

view. If he wishes to repeat the story of Abraham concretely and ex-

istentially,

it is

because

he

recognizes himself

in the

story

and

imme-

diately understands that

the

story

is

about himself.

The

distance

be-

54

SV3 5 8 5 .

55

SV3 5 3 6 .

56

SV3 5 3 9 .

57

Ibid

58

Ibid

59

SV3 5 4 5 .

6

SV3

5 80 .

61

Ibid

62

SV3

5 8 1n .


Authenticated








204 Joakim

Garff

perspective which fo r want of a

better

name could be called bio-

graphical.

As is well-known, Kierkegaard's critique of the identity of the in-

ternal and the external is directed against Hegel, whose exchange be-

tween »Innere«

and

»Äussere« Kierkegaard

first

viewed

as an

exis-

tential

matter and then transformed it into a conflict between a

religiously-grounded inwardness and an external world, the universal.

Frater Taciturnus highlights this conflict: » It follows [...] of

itself

that,

in relation

to the

religious, such categories

of

actuality, such

as

that

the external is the internal and the internal is the external are in-

vented

by

Miinchhausens

who have absolutely no understanding of

the religious [...]. In matters such as this they [these Miinchhausens]

do about

as

much good

- to

cite

an old

proverb

- as

sticking

one's

tongue out the window and getting a smack because of

it.«

70

Kierkegaard

is no Baron von M unchhausen, naturally, but I am

certainly inclined to believe that his casting of suspicion upon the

connection between »internal«

and

»external«

has

cost

him no few

smacks because of his tongue - and indeed, what is worse, he ends by

contradicting

himself

and

putting

his

foot

in his

mouth. From being

the implacable defender of inwardness - for example, with the ty-

pological character »the tax collector« - over time Kierkegaard de-

velops into

a no less

implacable opponent

of

inwardness,

and

this

is

why

his writings can b e read retrospectively as an elaborate history of

the undoing of inwardness.

Nominally, this reversal

from

inner

to

outer

in

Kierkegaard's writ-

ings

is

situated

in the

reversal from Climacus

to

Anti-Climacus.

This

is

reflected

in the

settings announced

by

each

of

these

tw o

pseudonyms.

Whereas

the

first work asserts that »the setting

is

inwardness«,

71

the

second insists that »the setting is in Christendom.«

72

Although Anti-

Climacus, on the title page of his work Practice in Christianity issues

an

invitation

to

»Awakening

and

Inward Appropriation«, this invita-

tion is partially retracted by the book itself because Pract ice is, if any-

thing,

a

criticism

of the

religious sort

of

inward appropriation typical

of

the

times: »Here

we

have

the

concept

of

established Christendom.

In established Christendom we are all true Christians, but in hidden

inwardness. The external world has absolutely nothing to do with the

fact

that I am a Christian; therefore, my being as a Christian cannot

70

SK?8,225.

71

SV3

10,58.

72

SV 3 16,215.


Authenticated





be measured [...]. And why this hiddenness, then [...]? Oh, naturally,

because I fear that if someone

were

to discover the degree to which I

am a true Christian, I would be rewarded with extraordinary honor

and

esteem.

And

furthermore,

I am too

much

of a

true

Christian to

want to be honored and esteemed because I am a

true

Christian. So

you see, that is why I keep it concealed in hidden inwardness; [...]

Everyone is a true Christian, but in hidden inwardness.«

73

Not only is this undoing of the concept of inwardness fraught with

a

series

of

theological

and

social psychological

implications, it

also

in-

vites

a

biographical reading. That

is, by

describing

a

movement from

the »internal« to the »external«, Kierkegaard's canon gradually, work

by

work, implicates

and

renders visible

the man

behind

it, the

actual

author, Kierkegaard.

In

other words, Kierkegaard

is not

only

a

subject

who

attempts

to

present an authentic self, he himself is also implicated in this process,

which

is why

every reading

of

Kierkegaard

has a

biographical ten-

dency from

the

outset. Thus, Kierkegaard criticizes Hans Christian

Andersen

for

writing novels

in

which there

is »a

residue,

as it

were,

of

the author's

finite

character, which often

chatters

at inappropriate

moments, like some impertinent third party or an ill brought-up

child.«

74

Impertinently and displaying my own lack of proper up-

bringing, I will turn this comment back upon Kierkegaard himself.

The life and the writings not only influence

[indvirker]

one another,

they also produce [udvirker]

one

another: reality

is

made into writing,

and writing is made into reality. Thus I will assert with respect to

Kierkegaard what he asserted with respect to Fichte in his doctoral

dissertation, namely that »the producing I is the same as the pro-

duced

I.«

75

Thus,

in a

journal entry

from

1837 Kierkegaard

can

imag-

ine the

following

»situation«, which verges

on

being

a

self-prophecy:

»Someone wishes

to

write

a

novel

in

which

one of the

characters

goes mad; as he writes the novel he himself slowly goes mad and

ends

in the

first person.«

76

»What

I

wrote,

I

wrote«

is

here transformed into »What

I

wrote,

I

became.« That is, the second »I« which becomes visible is the »I«

which the written work puts forth in writing, and of course it does so,

somewhat ambivalently, by writing off an empirical »I.« Conse-

73

SV 3 16,202-203.

74

5V3

1,39-40.

75

SV3 1,285.

76

Pap.

II A

634.


Authenticated




206 Joakim

Garff

quently, the written canon can be read as a process in which the writ-

ing

subject traverses back

and forth

between

his own

construction

and destruction, and is thus deconstructed. This is why

as Kierke-

gaard himself eventually recognized

- he

could

not say »I« in a

solid

and autonomous

sense.

77

This sort of writing is biographical in the

specific sense that it

sees

both connection and separation between

life and writings, and I have chosen to highlight this in the following

by

placing a hyphen in bio-graphy.

It

goes without saying that

a

bio-graphical reading

is not

oblivious

to the notoriously autobiographical materials which appear in the

written

canon,

but it

justifies

itself

by

referring

to the way in

which

Kierkegaard describes his written corpus in

The

Point

o f

View

for My

Activity

a s a n

Author where indeed he states quite baldly that it was

»[divine]

Governance which

has

brought

me up, and

this upbringing

is reflected in the process of productivity.«

78

Although at first blush

this might be taken to be rampant megalomania, properly viewed, it

is Kierkegaard's confession of the fact that his autonomy has been

limited: it is not Kierkegaard who has guided the writings, but rather

the

reverse,

the

writings which have guided their writer. Kierkegaard

interprets this guidance religiously

as

»the role

of

[divine] Gover-

nance.« Kierkegaard's written works constitute a sort of

Bildungsro-

man

- or a novel depicting the process of his own undoing - in which

th e writing

in a

general

and

grammatological sense, stands

in a

maieutic relationship

to its

writer.

Viewed in this perspective, the attack on the church is not merely a

corrective

to

»the established order«,

it is

also

a

corrective

to the

pseudonymous

ventriloquism

of the

works, which

now

definitively

go

over to the personal out-spokenness of action. The turbulence of in-

wardness - which has become more and more dramatic since Judge

William

first

introduced the term »inner history« - must now mani-

fest itself with »the suddenness of the enigmatic« (as Vigilius Hauf-

niensis wrote in connection with the inexplicable precondition of

sin)

79

and

thereby become imperatively visible. Because,

as can be

read in the final issue of The

Moment

in which what is »decisive« is

said, »when the castle door of inwardness has long been shut and is

finally opened, it does not move soundlessly like an interior door

77

Pap.

X 2 A 89.

78

SV 3

18,125.

79

SV3

6,126.


Authenticated




Johannes

de silentio:

Rhetorician

of

Silence

207

with spring hinges.«

80

The day on which this door opens is Wednes-

day, M ay 16, 1855, when Kierkegaard explains in Fcedrelandet that if

he were now to issue a new printing of Practice the book would not

»be by a

pseudonym,

but by

myself,

and the

thrice-repeated

preface

would be removed [...].

Earlier,

my idea was that if the established

order could be defended this was the only way, by poetically (thus

pseudonymously) passing judgment upon

it [...].

Now,

on the

other

hand, I have come to a quite definite conclusion concerning two mat-

ters, both that from a Christian point of view the established order is

quite untenable

and

that, Christianly understood, every

day it

contin-

ues to exist is a crime; and that it is impermissible to draw upon grace

in this fashion. Therefore take the pseudonymity

away.«

81

Practice

with its intensified demands which could only be met by a

pseudonym,

had

»contained

a

judgment concerning [Kierkegaard's]

own

existence.«

82

And now

Kierkegaard passes judgment

on his

times

by taking back [a t tage igen] that pseudonymity, that is, by repeating

[a t gentage] in his own name the demands of the pseudonymous

author. If one here adopts a narratological point of view, however, it

is

remarkable that by repeating these demands in his own name,

Kierkegaard is assuming the role of his textual character. Indeed, we

recall that »the

insomniac's«

story began when

he

heard

the

pastor's

sermon in church one Sunday, and then wanted to repeat it existen-

tially, to reduplicate it. With this, »the insomniac« not only became

the

first

character in Kierkegaard's writings to defend the notion of

the

incommensurability

of

inwardness,

but he

also became

the

first

of

the autopsy characters. And in this double

role

as the representative

of

autopsy

and of the

incommensurability

of

inwardness

he

also

be-

came

the

character

of

visibility,

of

making manifest, because with

his

paradoxical action he instituted a frightful disparity within the social

order. Kierkegaard does something similar

on

December

30,

1854,

when,

using

the definitive title »There the Matter Rests «, he says the

following:

» I have not passed judgment on Bishop Mynster. No, but

in the hand of [divine] Governance I was the occasion fo r Bishop

M ynster to pass judgment on himself. O n Mondays, he either did not

recognize

or

dared

not or

would

not

acknowledge

his

Sunday ser-

mons. Because, quite ironically and naively, I was his own sermon on

M ondays. And if Bishop Mynster himself had not, with worldly

80

SV3 19,93.

81

SV3

19,72-73.

82

Pap. X5

B

62, p. 274.


Authenticated




208 Joakim

Garff

shrewdness, avoided shouldering the consequences of his Sunday ser-

mons on Mondays; if he had risked an existence and actions which

were

the equal of his Sunday rhetoric instead of employing worldly

shrewdness in

order

to gain advantage for himself in a variety of

ways - then his life would have taken on quite another appear-

ance.«

83

As »the insomniac« repeated the

pastor's

sermon on Monday, »S.

Kierkegaard«,

as the article is

signed,

now repeats

Mynster's sermon

on

Monday - the »Monday« constituted by Kierkegaard's actions of

1855. And the following journal entry makes it clear that Kierkegaard

thought his reduplication came under the same catastrophic category

as the one

used

in

connection with

the two

textual characters

who

are

members

of the

same knightly

order

which includes himself:

»How anxious people would

be for me if

they knew about

it, how

alien

it

would

be to

them:

for it is

certainly

the

case that

in

recent

times

I

have occupied myself quite exclusively with

the

question

of

whether

it was not

God's

will

that

I

should

do

this, that

I

should

risk

everything in

order

to

bring about

a

catastrophe,

to get

arrested,

judg ed, if

possible,

executed.«

84

The passionless times did not let themselves get lured into granting

Kierkegaard

the

per ea t

[»Let him die «]

which would have been

the

most

fitting

applaus [sign of approval], and this mismatch can serve

as the occasion either for lament or for ridicule, according to one's

point

of

view.

But the

mismatch

is not the

point. Rather,

the

point

is

that Kierkegaard's written canon

has

shown itself

to be

like

the

»novel«,

which Kierkegaard imagined in 1837, in which the author,

chapter by chapter, became inscribed in his story and

finally

ap-

peared

in the first

person singular,

in the

present tense, indicative

mood, active voice.

85

And

just

as

»the insomniac« wanted

to

repeat

the story of Abraham in a teleological suspension of the ethical

which was at odds with the social order, Kierkegaard repeats »the in-

somniac's« intention of unconditional

obedience

in defiance of the

world

and its

unchristian disorder. »The insomniac« became »un-

happy in relation to so-called reality« because he had been remuner-

ated with execution

or with

being sent

to the

madhouse,

but was

nonetheless

»in

another sense

happy.«

86

For his

part, Kierkegaard

be-

83

SV3

19,18-19.

84

Pap. X I

2 A 265, p.

267.

85

Pap. II A 634,

86

SV35.29.


Authenticated




Johannes

de silentio: Rhetorician of Silence 209

came

unhappy in relation to so-called reality, which ignored his will-

ingness

to sacrifice, but he nonetheless became happy in the sense

that

his

will

was

ready.

So let the

world remain what

it has in

fact

al-

ways

been,

scanty

drafts

of

thin

beer.

In a passage from »This Must Be Said, So Let It Be Said, Then«

(which nonetheless seems to have said more than ought to have been

said,

and

which

was

therefore omitted

from the

published version),

Kierkegaard proclaims the clearly personal, indeed, almost private

motivation

behind

his

action: »Therfore, even

if

things worked

out

such that this attack ended as unfortunately as possible for me, so

that

I

accomplished nothing

at all and

only became

a

pointless victim

[...]. I say [...] that even if there were not a single person who bene-

fitted

from

my being sacrificed, it would not therefore be pointless,

not at all. It is of infinite value for myself, [...] and [divine] Gover-

nance is not a childish person who judges according to the

result.«

87

Should

we

childish people

- we who

know »the result«

and

know

how the martyrdom dropped out of the story, rather unfortunately

from a

narrative point

of view -

should

we

therefore conclude that

Kierkegaard's story became

a

fiasco

and

that

its

concluding chapter

was his desperate attempt to write himself free of the necessity of

history, whereby he became one of the ironic victims »demanded by

the development of the world.«

88

Or, conversely, should we renounce

the

narrative requirement

and

instead

focus our

gaze

on

Kierke-

gaard's paradoxical will to powerlessness? Should we let this be the

true point

at

which

he

deviates from

the

story,

and

therefore agree

in

this

respect with Climacus, who explains that what makes »the deed

the

individual's

own is the

intention,

but

this

is

precisely what does

not get

included

in the

world-historical«

89

- and

thus does

not get in-

cluded

in the

story about this history?

In my view, we should embrace

both

of the alternatives outlined

above. The silent little hyphen between

bios

and

grafce

in bio-graphy

must be maintained exactly as that which both separates and unites.

Because the fact that Kierkegaard's

bios

was transfigured in the writ-

ings does not mean that this grafce was completely congruent with

the life it

transfigured.

On the

street,

in

reality,

and in the

larger story

of

the world, Kierkegaard was a victim of a logic which was incom-

patible with

the

logic

in the

story into which

he

himself

had

been

in-

87

Pap. XI 3 B 62, p.

112.

88

SV3

1,276.

89

SV3 9,129.


Authenticated




210

Joakim

Garff

scribed. On the other hand, on paper, in writing, and in the story the

canon tells about its author, the »producing I [becomes] the same as

the produced I«

90

, and Kierkegaard thus becomes »the insomniac«,

and specifically the knight of reduplication. For the same reason it is

fitting

that when Kierkegaard has to conclude his own story he does

so with a movement back and forth along the hyphen by

which bios

and

grafa

are

both united

and

separated: »Without falsifying

or

cheapening

the

concept,

I may say

that

my

life

is a sort of

martyr-

dom, but in a new pattern

[...].

Just come, History, and do your audit.

Everything is in its proper place; furthermore, I have run the risk vol

untarily

it was not something that happened to

me.«

91

A nd with this »historical audit« of Kierkegaard's story my own

audit of the story is concluded for the present.

90

SV3 1,285.

91

Pap.

XI1 A

484,

pp.

375-376.

Documents

Garff. Johannes de Silentio. Rethorician of Silence