Husserl Neokantismo

7/30/2019 Husserl Neokantismo

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HUSSER L AND NEO-KAN TIANISMTimothy J. Stapleton

The suggest ion of thematic and meth odo logi cal aff inities bet wee n the phenome nology of Edmund Hus serl andthe phi los oph ies of Descarte s and Kant appea rs rep eat edly wit hin the expa nsiv e secondary litera ture on th eorigin's of tra nsc end ent al phe no men olo gy , as w e l l as inthe actua l publication s of Husserl him sel f. Husser l'sindebtedn ess to Cartesian thought reveals itsel f t hro ugh out these wri tin gs, attaining its most expli cit form ulation in a seri es of lectures given in 19 29 , pu bli she dund er the title of Cartesian Med itat ion s. Withi n thiswo rk , Hus ser l refers to his own phe nome nol ogy as a typeof neo-Cart esianis m, pointing to Des car tes' Medi tatio nesas the impet us generating the move ment from a deve lop ingphenome nology to a genuine trans cenden tal phi los oph y.Desc art es' conception of philosoph y and scie nce, as wellas his insis tenc e upon absolute certain ty wi th respe ctto fundamental princ iples , strongly parallels Husse rl*sown sense of the natur e and task of ph ilo sop hy . Butdespi te the importanc e of such sim ila rit ies , whi ch doindeed animate the subse quent lines of advance wi th intranscen dental phenome nology , the bond betwe en these twothinkers remains largely a spiritual on e. The Hu sserli andive rgan ce from the Cart esian enterpr ise occ urs ea rlyalong the path to phenomen ology; a transition ne ce ss it a t e d " . . . p r e c i s e l y b y ( p h en o m en o l og y ' s) r a d i c a l d e v e l o p m en t o f C a r t e s i a n m o t i f s t o r e j ec t n e a r l y a l l t h e w e l l -known doctrinal content of the Cartesian phil osop hy." 1S o w h i l e i t m i g h t be cl a im e d t h at C a r t e s i a n i s m w i t hits view of phi los oph y as an all-i nclu sive sc ie nc e, uponthe basi s of , and wit hin which , par tic ula r sci enc es canbe g ro u nd ed an d the attendant turn to subjecti vity assource of apodic tici ty, affords the poin t of de par tur e

for Husserl's ph enomenol ogy, an even stronger affinitysurfa ces bet wee n Kant and Husse rl wit hin the conc retedevelopment of the idea of transcend ental pheno menol ogyitself. Both Kant and Husserl characterize their phi losophical positi ons as "transcendental ideali sm." Thephen omen olog ical reduction or epoc he, which finds itsinit ial mean ing withi n the horizon of a Cartesi an met hod olo gic al dou bt, can be interpreted in light of the s ub sequ ent devel opm ent of phenom enolo gy as a kind of"crit ical" turn . With the introd uction of the epo che in


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1 9 0 7 , Huss erl was no longer immersed with in a na iv e, pre -cri tic al problem set oriented excl usiv ely in a pos iti vema nn er toward bei ng s, but saw the need for a r adica lcritique of cognition whic h wou ld un cove r the condi tionsfor the possi bility of obj ect ivi ty. In add iti on, thereare extensive terminolog ical parallels between Ka ntianism and transcendental pheno menolo gy. Noti ons suchas the tra nsce nden tal ego as active in wor ld co ns ti tu tion, synt hesi s as the ground of obj ecti vity , a de ve lo pment of formal and trans cenden tal logi cs, a doc tri ne ofcate gor ies , and a pre-emin ent co ncern with the a prior iare just a few of the mult ipl e po int s of app are nt co nversion between the critical and phen omen olog ical tran scendental philosophies.

How eve r, there are severe dan gers in attem pting toexpl icat e and gain access to an und ers tan din g of Husse rl' sthou ght by clin ging too closely to eit he r the Cart esia nor Kanti an po sit io ns . These dangers may be more a cutewith re spect to Kan t, for the simi lari ties in langu agemay prov e, upon closer inspect ion, to be no mor e thanlinguist ic forms of agreement. Such equ ivo cat ion s couldonly serve to distort the genuine pheno men olo gic al sens eof Husserl's t ranscendental philosophy, bar rin g accessto the enti re prob lema tic from the ou ts et. With this inmind, we shall attempt an expos ition of some of the ce ntr al concepts developed in the Cart esia n Me di ta ti on s, andthen attempt a study of the sense of tra nsc end ent alide ali sm as phenom enolog y in contras t to a crit ical tr an scendental idealsim.The movement of thought with in the Cartesian Me di ta tions reflects in a gene ral fashion the fun dam ent alstructures which dominate all of Husserl ian phen omen olog y.On the most uni vers al leve l, it mig ht be said that twoconce pts delin eate the ent ire field and forma t of s tu dy :viz., the transcendental reduction and the problem ofcons titu tion . The trans cende ntal reduc tion ser ves as theonly avenue of approach to the realm of tra nsc end ent alsubje ctivit y, within which the tran scendenta l ego is d i s closed in its constituting activities as foundation ofthe wo rld . Both of these dimens ions of pheno men ol ogymust contin ually be kept in view, fo r the me ani ng of t heepoc he and the meani ng of constitu tion are fund amen tall yinsep arab le. The concrete constitu tional analyses d i s close the richn ess of the ep oc he , firmly dis tin gui sh ingit from a reversion to psy chi cal imman ence or a su b-jecti vizing of the sense of the obje ctiv e wo rl d. Inso faras the Cartesia n Medit ati ons , like Ideas I, is in tende dto serve as an "introduction to phe nom eno log y," the r eflectio ns are orie nted along a dev elo pme nta l lin e, fromthe posing of the problem of philosophy as science, to

the reduct ion as. meth odol ogic al poi nt o f ent ry, to an


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83expository laying open of the field of tran scen dent alexperi ence, a laying open which elicits certain un ive rsal struc tures while prob ing to eve r deep enin g levels ofinvestigation.

In the opening paragraphs of Cartesian Meditations,Huss erl exp end s consider able labor in atte mpt ing to arriveat a guidi ng idea for phil osop hica l reflection.; one w hi chwill give det erm ina te direction to the some what amor phou ssense of phi los oph y as "rigorous sci ence ." Th is guidi ngIdea is unc ove red in the implicit telo s gover nin g all"de facto" sci enc es, as wel l as the ori gina l Car tes ianenterp rise its elf . What serves as this ideal is a hi er archy of cog nit ion s, of mediate and immediate judgm ents ,ultimately grounded in apodictic evi den ce, wit h a cor respondent ap odictici ty vis- arvis the primacy of thes eoriginal cog nit ion s. The possibility of realizin g sucha demand, howe ver , is held in abeyance, bes tow ing uponthe inves tigati ons a certain hypot hetic al tone analag ousto that characteriz ing the Kantian "Copern ican Rev olu tion." But thi s hypo the tica l spirit is not one whi chinfil trat es each level of inquiry consid ered in its el f,but envel ops the phenomen ological enterpr ise with respectto its final aim, the aim that animated Descartes' owninve stig atio ns: a reforming of philo sophy into a sciencegrounded upon an absolute founda tion, a sci ence which inturn grounds the multiplicity of positi ve s cie nce s,whether they be materia l or for mal, nat ura l or s oc ia l.

The distin ction is drawn betw een adequacy andapodicticity with respect to evi den ce. Adequac y implies a certain whol isti c orie ntat ion, an absolute fu lfilling of the unful filled , a harmo nious synthe sis whi chmay lie at inf ini ty, remin iscie nt of a Kan tia n Ide a.Apodict icity, ho wev er, must serve as a meas ure at eachstep. Apodi ctici ty is a further groundi ng of what isalready evid ent , by goi ng back and ground ing at a hi gh erlevel in pr in ci pl es . The issue is not one of graspi ngwith certai nty, no r even with full certainty which ac tua lly excludes doubt. On the contrary, apodictic eviden ce

. . . discl oses its elf to a crit ical reflec tionas hav ing the single peculi arity o f bei ng at thesam e time the absolute unim agi neab len ess of . . .non-being, and thus excluding in advance everydoubt as objectless , em pt y. 2It is this sense of apodicti city as crite rion of rigo rousphilo soph ical science that forms the spiri tual bond b etween Husserl and Descartes, and further, introduces theCartesian methodological doubt and the turn to the egocogi to as functi ona l wit hin the Husse rlian framewor k asw e l l . But Hus ser l*a c lai m is that hi s ow n tho ugh t is


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concret ely differentiated from the Cart esia n course inthat the latte r failed to under stand the true si gn if icance of the "I am," as a turn to tr ans cen den ta l su bjectivity.

The demand for apodicticity functions in a twofoldma nn er whi ch in turn gives the tran sce nde ntal epo che adual nature, and correlatively bifurcates the Husserliansense of the Absolute qua transcend ental subj ectiv ity.On the one hand, what are sought are evi den ces wh ich arein thems elve s apodi ctic. The criterio n of the absolu teinco ncei veab ilit y of the non-bei ng of the ob jec ts o fsuch exp eri enc e is satisfi ed only by the imma nent actsof consc iousn ess itself. This is not to sugg est th atthe being of the wor ld is dou bt ful , but only that it isnot apodic tic; i.e., it is, in prin cipl e, dubi tabl e.No t only do par tic ula r objects wi thi n the wor ld at timesshow themselves as ima ges , concretizin g the possi bilit yof non-b eing, but also entire expe rient ial frameworkssuffer the same devaluation, such as in dre am s. Th er efore, the entir e world, the one, obje cti ve, s pa ti o-temp oral fact worl d, wit hin whic h we dwe ll as me n,labors und er the shadow of the poss ibil ity of no n- bei ng .Not th at it is ratio nal to doubt the wo rl d, but tha t itis not fully rati onal to remain immersed wit hi n a naiv e,positi ve orie ntati on. But the ego cog ito , in the fu llsense of the multiplicity of possible acts of consciousn e s s , is indubitable on grounds of pri nci ple , is ap odi cti -cally evident.

Yet this constitutes only one of the dim ens ion s toapod ictic ity as it appears in the Cart esia n M ed it at io ns ,and consequently only one of the senses of the epoche"and of the Absolute being of transcendent al sub jec tiv ity .Apod ict ic insight must also be attaine d into the pri mac yof theBe original cognit ions. The initial p hil oso phic alformulation is,

I. . . the que sti on wh et he r it is po ss ib le for usto bri ng out eviden ces t hat, on the one ha nd ,carry with th e m a s we now must say apodict ically t h e insight that as first in th em se lv es 1 theyprece de all oth er imagin eable evi de nc es , and on theoth er han d, can be seen to be them selv es apo dict ic. 3The l atter demand is satisfied by the reco gni tion of theindubitab ility of the cogitationes, of the lived ex pe riences themselves, regardless of the objective status ofthe tran scen dent claims inherent in such pr oc es se s. Butthe former dime nsion of priority is grasped only with thereali zatio n that the entire sense of the be in g of theobj ect ive wor ld is derived exclus ively from such cons ciou slife . Here the move is from the epi ste mol ogi cal to theont olo gic al ins ofar as the mode of bei ng of the obj ect ive


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wor ld, its exi ste nti al statu s, is shown to be rela tiveand secon dary to the Absolute bei ng of tra ns cen de nta lsub jec tiv ity . It is from this aspect of apod icti city andof Abso lute be in g that the concrete const itut ive anal ysesof phenomeno logy blossom, for constitution, in ge nera l,refers to just such a relation bet wee n primary andsecon dary, absolu te and relative bein g.The pre ced ing brief treatment of the ba ckg ro und ofthe reduction wa s intended solely to trace the co rr el ation betwe en the method ologic al onset of phenom enolog yand the not ion s of phil osoph y, scien ce, and apo dict icit ywhich animate the who le course of the Cart esia n Me di ta tions . We can now attempt a prese ntati on of the ph en om -enol ogica l reduction itself. One way of illumi natingthe sign ific ance of the epoch e is by co ntra stin g it wi ththe Cart esia n turn to the cogit o. For Des ca rte s, oncethe apodict icity of the "I am" was enc oun ter ed, theproblem immediately bec ame that of reintrod ucing thetranscendent wor ld. The basi c episte mologi cal prob lemw a s , as it always has bee n, that of the relation bet wee nsubj ectiv ity and objectiv ity co nceived in terms of immanence and trans cende nce. "The problem of tradit ionalepis temol ogy is that of trans enden ce."4 How is it tha tthat whi ch is give n wit h apodic ticity , yet see ming lyhas only subjective significance, can relate to that whichis bey ond my "island of cons ciou sne ss?" How is the "foru s , " even whe n given with clarity and disti nctn ess, re lated to the "in it se lf ?" It wa s pre cis ely at thisjuncture that Descartes was forced to appeal to divineveracity as the episte mologi cal guarante e of the objec tivesig nifi can ce of purely immanent consci ous life.The phenom enolo gical response to this difficul ty isnot a pos itiv e attempt to solve the prob lem. The int ro duction of the metho dologi cal techniques chara cter isticof Huss erl' s thou ght is not oriente d toward a rad ica l reexam inat ion of the problem ; rathe r the epoc he dism isse sthis ent ire probl em for mulation as er ro ne ou s, as aCartes ian motif whi ch must be trans cende d in the spiri tof neo -Ca rte sia nis m. But this form of the pro ble m couldbe considere d as far more pervasive than mer ely a Carte siandilem ma, for it really serves as that framewo rk w it hinwhich the ba si c epistem ologica l questio n need nece ssaril ybe pose d, insof ar as it is asked by nat ura l me n. Th us ,Husserl claims,To the extent that I apprehend myself as a naturalhuman being, I presuppose having apprehend ed aspat ial reali ty; I have conceive d of mys elf asbei ng in sp ac e, in whic h I consequ ently ha ve anoutside of myself.5


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The probl em of transcen dence whic h is raised by tra dit ion al epis temo logy , Descar tes' formulation servi ng as aparad igmati c instance, arises with in a settin g whi chpres uppo ses as antecedant that whi ch shoul d be es ta bl is hed as a result of the critique of cognition.The phenomenolog ical epoche , howe ver, places theentire objective spatio-temporal worl d in br ac ke ts . The"spatiality" of space likewise is reduced, insofar as itserve s as the horizon withi n whi ch being s i a the wo rldshow thems elv es. It is just at this poi nt that natu ra lreflecti ve consciousness must be radically differe ntiated

from trans cenden tal reflective con sci ous nes s. The turnto the act of cog niti on, the cogito as that wh ic h is gi venabsolu tely, can be undertak en wit hin the con text of twohor izon s. From a world-immanent perspe cti ve, the objectof a reflec tive conscio usness appears wi th in the hori zonof consciousness and object such that the cogito makesup a part of the tota lity of the wo rl d. Rea lit y is theconj unct ion of mat ter and spir it, one ext ende d, the o the rnot exte nded . The probl em then is to dis cov er a lawfulrelations hip betwee n the two par ts. The brac ket ing ofthe worl d developed by the reduct ion, ho we ve r, develo psalong completely differe nt lines. The epo che reduc es notonly individual objects within the worl d to their app ear ing as such in consci ousn ess, but also the "world ly"chara cter of the wor ld, as univers al horizo n wit hinwhi ch such phe nom ena give the mse lve s. It is this movethat unco vers Absolute subjec tivity as the uni ver se ofpossi ble meanin gs, bearing within itself both the imman ence and the transce ndence of the na tu ral wo rl d view .Thus being-i n-itself and being-fo r-us are moments with inthe whole of transcendental subje ctiv ity. The reductionis not , and coul d not, be carried out by ru nni ng thr oug hthe multi plici ty of acts of cognition and re ducin g ea chin turn, but is realized by a sin gle st ro ke in wh ic h theenti re wor ld, incl udin g conscious activ ity and the hori zonwit hin which this activity gains determi nate sign ific ance ,comes to be seen as "universal acceptan ce ph en om en on ,"as the mea nt as suc h. Ins ofa r as to be hu ma n is to ex is t .withi n a constant belief-i n-the-wo rId, tran scen dent alpheno meno logy makes a demand upon the ph ilo sop her wh ichstands outsi de of his human pos sib ili tie s. Wit h this inmind , one can unders tand Ricoeur's desc rip tion of theepoch e as a spirit ual discipli ne rather than simply amethodological device.

The domain of phen omen ologi cal inqui ry ope ned bythe reduction is a realm of tra nsc end ent al ex pe ri en ce ,characterized by its epistemolog ical apodic ticity andonto logi cal priority. Husserl insists that the tra nsce nden tal is a realm of genuine bei ng, of ind ivi dua l b ei ng ,wit h a mode of existe nce prop er to it. Thi s mod e of being ,


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however, is a unique and singular one, as is the experience which lays hold of it, the transcendental experie nce. While it is characteristic of wor ldl y, tr an scendent objects to give themselves only persectively,in an ongoing process of synthesis which is essentiallyopen-ended, those object s of transcendenta l reflection(lived expe rien ces) do not present themselves per spe cti ve-ly. The eve r prese nt possib ility of non -be ing whi chbelon gs to worl dly objec ts is exclu ded essen tia lly fromlived experienc es taken eidetic ally. The disti nctio nbetween persp ectiv e variation, which is an exp eri enc e,and pers pect ed va ria ble , whic h is spat ial, is an abso luteo n e . Th us , Hu ss er l claims in Ideas I_ th at .

Betw een the mea nin gs of consc iousn ess and re alit yyawns a veritab le abyss. Here a Being which ma nifests itself perspe ctively , never giving itselfabsolutel y, merely contingent and relat ive; th erea necessa ry and absolute Being, fundamental ly in capa ble of be ing given through app eara nce andperspective patterns.6H e r e , therefore, is the inversion of the meaning of Beingat the core of Husserl*s transce ndental idea lism.

The scientificall y oriented necessity for apo dic ticity has led bac k to the ego cogito . The genuin e s enseof the ep oc he , as we ha ve see n, is not gra spe d so longas it is und ers too d in terms of psy cho log ica l imm anen ceand trans cende nce. But the radical phil osoph ical mea nin gof this pheno menol ogica l " discipline" can be understoo dconcret ely only to the exten t that the unique na tur e o ftransc enden tal bein g is uncovere d. The movem ent inMed ita tio ns II-I V is preci sely a laying open of the fieldof transcendental experience in its universal structures.Hen ce , it is not simply t he bar e ego cogito wh ic h is gi venwith apodic ticity . And correlatively, the phe nom eno log i-cal onset is not tha t of the relation bet we en the "Ithink" and transcendent objectivities; a problematicwhi ch led Desc arte s to the proofs of God' s exi ste nce andvera city , and ultim ately yielde d wha t Huss erl labels an"absurd trans cende ntal realism." Transc ende ntal ph eno men ology undertake s the task of the explora tion and syst emat icdescription of the realm of transce ndental subj ecti vity .And fu rth ermo re, inso far as this is to be a new sc ien ce,a study of the uni ver sal , the phe nom eno log ica l andeide tic reductions are both necessar y meth odol ogic almom ent s. Huss erl insists that,

The bar e identi ty of the 'I am' is not th e onlything given as indubitable in trans cende ntal se lf -ex pe ri en ce . Rath er there exten ds throu gh all the


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particular data of actual and possible self-e x p er i e nc e . . . a u n i v e r s a l , a p o d ic t i c a ll y e x -perienceable structure of the Ego.7Univ ersa l transcendental structures const itute the su bject matter for phenomenology as science, and with theelucid ation of these structures the sen se, ori gin , andme an in g of the transcen dent worl d are unc ove red . Onthis most g eneral of lev els , certai n par all els can beseen between the Kantian and Husse rlian pro ble mat ics .It is transcen dental ideality whic h furnish es the co nditions for the possibility of obj ecti vity . No longe rdoes philosop hy remain locked withi n a posi tive ori ent ation toward obje ctiv itie s in whi ch the se lf is "for gotten," but rather subjectivity itse lf is subm itte d tocrit ical refle ction in a search for a gro und of the wo rl d.Despite radical divergen ces between cr itic al and tr an scenden tal idealism, both recognize the neces sity forprobing the constitutive activity of consciousness inattempting to come to an understanding of the humanwor ld and its very possib ility .

********In the development of thought up to the fifth meditation, three eidetic structures of transcendental subjectivity emerge as central to all phenomenologicalcon sid era tio ns. The first is that of the eg o- co git o-cogitatum, which reflects the gener al form of int ent ion -all ty. Thi s singula rity is not exh aus ted wit h the wayin whi ch conscious acts give themse lves to ref lec tio n,but is furth er refracted in the, "ont ic" predi cat es whic h

are discove red as applicab le. Whe the r that act be pe rceiving, valuin g, willi ng, desirin g, imag inin g, remembering, or caring, it is an achieving act of an egotowards an objectivity in the broade st possi ble se ns e.Thus the structure ego-cognito-cogitatum is an orderingof all conscious life, discovered by eid eti c'i ntui tio ncarr ied out wit hin the limits of the ep oc he . One neednot run through all types of consci ous a cti vit ies inorder to recognize this structure as uni ver sal , butrather via imaginative variation one comes to intuit, tosee in an apod icti c fashion wh ic h exc lud es all p oss ibl edou bt in advance , that a consc ious act wi th ou t such astru ctur e wou ld not be a cons ciou s act .

It should be further noted that this int ent ion alstru ctur e is a relat ional st ruc tu re, but one of a uniquekin d. The rela tion al structu re cannot be captu red inspa tia l "me taph ors, " viewin g the term s to be rel ated inan onti c fashion as essen tiall y inde pen den t parts wh ichare capable of bei ng thought in relation to one a not her .The unity of the.ego-co gito-cogita tum is not an exte rn al -


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ly imposed on e, hold ing between fundamentally self -inclosed fac tor s. Inste ad, the unity of act , of cogi ta tio ,of think- ing, perceive-i ng, with ego and with cogitatum,(that it is I-am-perceiving-a-house-perception), is aninter nally articula ted unity of mom ent s whi ch stand inan ess ent ial struc tural inter-connectedness. As Husserlsays concer ning the obje ct oriented dim ensi on of the r elatio n, "Each cogi to, each conscious p roc es s, . . . mea nssome thin g o r ot he r, and bears in its elf , in this ma nn erpecul iar to the mea nt, its particular cogitatum."8 Whenthe pro blem of the relation betwe en the subje ct and theobject is taken up in this transcende ntal fashio n, andthe temptat ion to impose a world -imma nent con ce ptu alframework upon consciousn ess is resisted, atte ndi ngmerel y to wha t shows itself in itsel f wit hin the limi tsin wh ic h it sho ws its elf , then the groun d of the n at ur alattitude's subject-object dichotomy is discove red w ith ina pri mal unity of intentionali ty. Husserl's adame ntopposition to construct!vistic philosophy which emergesmost clearly he re , as the imposition of a concep tua lschem a whi ch take s the moments of the whole of con sci ous ness as part s of an all, is the pre jud ice which pr ecludes the possib ility of bridging such a di chot omy.Eide tic insigh t grasps the necessary struct ural int er-conn ected ness in its unive rsal form, and br ing s tointuitive giveness the essentially depende nt nature ofmomen ts wh ic h can be only abstractly c once ived as in d e p e n d e n t p a r t s .A second eidetic structure of transcendental subjectivity is temporality, or the continuous consciousn e s s , spec ific ally with reference to the 1905 lectur eseries,9 t hree levels of objec ts and temp oral ity mustbe dis tin gui she d. The first level is that of the thin gsof exp erie nce in obje ctiv e tim e. Thi s level is a pr e-

phen omen olog ical , pre-reduction time, correspo nding toour nai ve, natur alisti c conception of tim e. Just asupon the uni ver sal leve l of the be ing of the wo rl d, theepoche effect s an inversion of the mea ning of b ein gsuch that the sense of the worl d re-emer ges with in thephenome nologic al sphere as relative and co nstituted ,objective time can be traced to its genetic origins viap h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d s .The secon d level to be dist ingu ishe d is des cri bedas, "the const ituti ng appearance-manifolds of va rious

levels, the immanent units in pre-emp irical ti me." Atthis junct ure , we enco unter the immanent field of t ra nscend ental expe rien ce. The immanent-objective sense ofworld time is contained in this level of temporality.But Hus serl 's an alys is of time is not exh aus ted wit hthis dyadic schema, nor is the genuine sense of time inHusserl*'s phe nome nolo gy thereby unc ove red . Ins tead ,


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phen omeno logy p robes to a stil l de ep er lev el, to thatwhich in the Phenomenology of Internal Time -Cons cious nessis call ed, "the absolut e time cons tit uti ng strea m ofconsc iousne ss." While transcendent objects exist inobject ive time, and the immanent co mpone nts of t ra ns ce ndenta l consciousness have their being in immanent tem por ali ty, on the final leve l one dis cov ers the "ult imat eand absolu te," vi z. , the consciousness of interna l timeitse lf, as that which makes possible tr ansce ndent al ex peri enc e. It is in these prim al depths of tran sce nden talsubjectivit y that pheno menol ogica l reflect ion reaches itsvery core.

The differentiation drawn in the Phenomenology ofIntern al Time-Co nscious ness between the second and tnTr dl e v e l s , betwe en "the constituting appeara nce mani fold sin pre-e mpiri cal time" and "the absolu te, tim e-c ons tit uting stream of consciousness," is also mentioned in theCartesi an Med ita tion s. In this later wo rk , Husser lformulates the problem in the following terms:The distin ction between inte rnal time itself andthe consciousness of internal time can be expressed also as that betwee n the subj ecti ve pro cess inint ern al ti me, or the temporal f orm of this p r o c e s s , and the modes of its temporal appearance,as the corresponding multip liciti es.10

If we take as an example an inhere ntly t emp ora l o bj ect ,one that is wha t it is only insof ar as it is.t empo ral lyext ende d (e.g., a musi cal t o n e ) , perhaps these distinctions can be broug ht int o clearer reli ef. Onc e thetransi tion is made beyond the obje ctiv e, worl dly to ne ,wit h its spatial point of origi n and its occ urr enc ewith in objectiv e clock time, we discov er the lived ex per ien ce of the tone its elf . This lived exp er ien ce hasits own tempo ral form. Using the term inolo gy of IdeasI_, the genu ine ly imm anent com pon ent s q f the li ved e x peri ence , the noeses and the hyle tic data, posse ss atemp ora l form. The immanent obje ct as uni ty, the toneas lived expe rien ce captured in a ref lect ive gl an ce ,and philosophicall y significant as tran scen dent al e xperi ence , has a multiplicity of phase s against the ba ck groun d of a temporal contin uum. Env elo pin g the no w-phase are the just-elapsed phases and the coming phases.The phases belong to internal time as the form of immanento b j e c t s . And beyond this , we find the consc iou sne ss ofinte rnal time. With this dimen sion, Husserl' s inquirypro bes beyond the concern with inten tio nal !ty as a re lation between the transcendental and the transcendent,and bri ngs to light the possibility of tran scen denta lexper ience itself . The consciousness of immanent data ,the consciousness of internal time, itself possess a


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structure whic h grounds and makes possibl e tra nsc ende nta l,reflective experience, and thus in turn affords the condition for the possi bility of objective ex per ien ce.The immanent object, the phenomen ologica lly reducedlived exper ien ce, is found to be a cohesi on of a mul tiplic ity of tempo ral pro fil es, in contrast to a spa tia lconti nuum qu a series of per spe cti ves . To account forthis uni ty, an eve n mor e radical reflect ive tur n iseffected, toward the noetic dimension of noeses andhyletic data themselves, insofar as they are objects ofreflec tion. Here a phenomenology of phenom enolog y take spl ac e, as a kin d of quid juris in relat ion to the p o s sibility of the ent ire phen omen olog ical me th od . It isHusserl's position that, "The fundamental form of universal syn the sis , the form that makes all other synth esesof cons cious ness possib le, is the all-embracing con sci ous ness of inter nal ti me ." *! The primary level of consc iou sness is identified with temporality, and the structure ofthis level is that of retention-primal impression-pro-ten tion . The now mom ent is not simply an unex tend edpoin t, and int ern al time consc iousn ess is not mer ely amultipli city of such poi nts . Rather, the now momentemer ges as ext end ed, as a sort of speci es pres en t, wh ichcontains within itself in an originary way ret enti onaland prot enti onal modi fica tion s. Memory , as a re- pro duc tive cons ciou snes s, and expec tatio n, as an a ntici pativ econs ciou sness , are derivative modes in which the obje ctis not given as origi naril y pres ent, "in per son. " SoHusser l sta tes , in the Phenomenology o f Inte rnal T im e-Cons ciou snes s, with respect to retention,. . . if we ca ll perc ept ion the act in whi chall 'origination' li es, which constitute s o rig inar ily , then prima ry remembrance (retention) isper cep tio n. For only in primary remem brance d owe see what is passed; only in it is the pastconst itut ed, i.e., not in a re-p res enta tiv e wa ybu t i n a pr im it iv e way.^-2

The same hold s for protent ion, or primary expec tatio n,vis-a-vis the future.It can be said, ther efor e, that the second eid eti cstructure of transcend ental subjectivity is t emporalit y,

which possesses the form of retenti on-prim al impr essi on-pro ten tio n. These are the fundam ental "intentive componen ts of consci ous life," as act phases whi ch in themselves are not cons titu ted. The first eide tic str uctu rewas expressed in the universal and necessary proposition,"all consciousness is intentional, possessing the ego-cogito- cogitat um format." The second eideti c structurecan be exp res sed as , "All consc iousn ess is tem por al, of


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the form retention-primal impres sion-p otenti on." Justas transc endent objects are found to be co nst itut ed ina multip licit y of appe aran ces, immanent objec ts of tr an scen dent al experi ence are a syn the tic unity of a man ifo ldof temporal phases which themselves have th eir inten tive,noe tic components in the pa rti al inte ntio ns of re ten tio n-prima l impression-pr otention. Within a fully exten dedinten tiona l act, such as hea rin g a tone , each part ialintention is oriented toward the object, or rather towardone of its profiles; and simultaneously, the elapsed nowpoints are retained such that I am conscious of innerdur atio n. Here the critical dual relat ednes s of par tialintent ions is uncovere d, a related ness whi ch makes s el f-consc iousne ss possibl e as unme diat ed due to the uniquenatur e of inne r tem porality .

The final dimension of Huss erl' s concep t of trans cendent al subje ctivi ty that sha ll be deve lope d pri or toturning toward some genera l remarks on tr ans cen dent alphil osop hy in Kant and Hus ser l, is sy nt he si s. We havethus far uncovered two univ ersa l stru ctu res of tra nsc enden tal expe rien ce claimed to be given with apod icti city ,v i z . , intentional!ty and temporalit y. Husse rl alsoasserts, in the second Meditation, that,

. . . the who le of conscious l ife is unifi ed sy ntheti cally . Conscious life is ther efor e an al l-embracing cogito, synthetically comprising al lparticular conscious processes that ever becomeprominent , and having its all-embrac ing cogitatumfounded at different levels on the man ifo ld pa rticular cogitata,-"An und erst andi ng of Husse rl's conc epti on of synt hesi s isabsolu tely necessary for a posit ive a pprop riati on of theinne r dynamic of transcendental pheno menol ogy; for ins ofar as phenomenology is a phenome nology o f cons ciou snes s,viewe d as absolute subjec tivit y, 'and syn thes is is " thepr ima l form belon ging to consc iousne ss," th e mov eme nt ofconsc iousn ess at all levels is a syn the tic movem ent withrespect to the constitutio n of both imma nent and t ra nscend ent obje cts . Such an insi ght, ho we ve r, canno t beatt ain ed so long as one remain s wi th in an "on tic " fr am ewo rk . Hus ser l sees synthesis a s, ". . . a mod e of combina tion exclusively peculiar to consciou sness,"1 4 andhenc e analogical schemes functional for wor dly sciencesare entire ly inappropriate for the ph en ome no lo gi cal concept of syn the sis . The unique mode of be ing of consci ous nes s, attested to by the pos sib ili ty of the ep och e,and further concretized by the disc overy of in ten ti on -ality and.the being -in of tran scen denc ies whi ch give usthe "wo rld," is also det erm ina tive for the conce pt ofs y n t h e s i s .


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It is Husserl*s position that only in the elucidationof the "facts of synthetic structure" can the genuinesignifi cance of Brentano's concept of inten tiona litybe revealed. The activity of synt hesi s, how eve r, is amulti -leve led on e, bifurcat ed along the most gene rallines int o active and passi ve sy nth ese s. It can be sa id,on a very bro ad bas is , that for Huss erl sy nth esi s is notan externa lly directed activity whic h imposes deter minat eforms upon a pure man ifo ld, thereby gen era tin g a unitar yrela tedn ess. Instead, synthesis is an int erna l articu lation such that any moment within the synthetic wholebears within i tsel f, even if only in a pot ent ial , an ticipatory way , the syn thet ic who le of whi ch it is a mom en t.This can, per ha ps, be exhibited more concretel y if weturn to a pa rt icu la r form of pass ive synt hes is as foundin a deve lope d ego ; one in whic h an env iro nme nt of obje ctsis already given as mate rial for possible high er sy nthet ic act s. An intentional analysis of percep tion re veals a uni tary object being meant or in ten ded thro ugh amul tip lic ity o f acts , in which the object as mea nt, theobject of cons cious ness , shows itself in a variety ofpers pect ival sha din gs. In any one act as cog ita tio , onlyone featu re or aspect of the object as mea nt shows it se lf .Th e cha ir tha t I now look to , whi ch is giv en t o me as anobject for possib le judgm ents, which co uld be submi ttedto analysi s or put to some use via hi gh er le vel acti vesynt hese s, at any moment shows only one feature. Ano theract, at another point in time and from another positionin sp ace , shows an other featur e, but anot her f eature o fthe same iden tica l chai r. It is the syn the tic unity o fthese acts whi ch con stit utes the one ident ica l obj ec t asm e a n t .But to clai m that to each act there co rre spo nds apart icula r and distinct cogitatum, and to pose the prob lem

of the syn the sis of this disp arat e mul tip lici ty is torecognize only the dimension of actuality belonging toconsc ious lif e. It is to concei ve of con scio usne ss as abu ndl e of sens e data , and then to attempt to impo se aunit y on this mult ipli city ana logous to the cons truc tionof a comple x spat iall y extended entity from simp le pa rt s.The recog niti on that consciousne ss is not a res ext en siais of mi ni ma l pos iti ve value if one still dem and s thatspecif ically "ontic," world-im manent predi cates and conceptual frameworks be brought to bea r on it. A de scr iptive, tran scen dent al, eidetic science such as Huss erl' shas the positive value that it is guided by the phenomenathe ms elv es, and does not immediately reduce the mani fol dsenses of being to either the physical or psychicallevel. The unique mode of being belon ging to pure con sciousness is separated by an abyss from the being ofNature, and synthetic consciousness as intentional being


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is radically differ entiat ed from ont ic com bin atio n. Thepecu liari ty of inten tiona lity, the theme dev elo ped inSecti on 20 of Cartes ian Medit ati ons , oug ht to be take nas a concrete instanc e whi ch lends subs tant ive me an in gto the phen omen olog ical sloga n, "to the thi ngs them selve sSuch phrases remain empty and holl ow unle ss they arerendered det erm ina te through the wor kin g out of phe nom enological analyses in light of the demands of the epocheand eide tic stru ctures .

Thus, concerning intentional analysis, Husserlc l a im s t h a t , " . . . i t s p e c u l i a r a t t a in m e n t (as i n t e n tiona l) is an uncov ering of the pot ent ial iti es "impli cit"in actualities of conscious ness."^^ The distinct ion b e tween actuality and pote ntia lity is fun dame nta l in p h e nom eno log y, in that it suppli es the ba sis for the cen tralconcept of "horizo ns," and simultaneously affords accessto an und ers tan din g of synthesis as a mod e of comb inat ionpecu liar to consc iousne ss. Each cogi to is a mean ing o fsomethi ng meant, and something mo re. This "somethingm o r e " is contai ned in the cogito ins ofa r as the lat teris a constitutive moment of a synth etic wh ol e. In per ceiv ing the cha ir I have expli citly bef ore my gaze on lyone aspec t, yet I simult aneous ly mea n the chai r in itsful lnes s. The mult ipli city of other poss ible vie ws iscontained wi thi n the sin gula r act, and is co-i nten dedin the sense of the cogitatum. Inte ntio nal ana lys is u n covers and exp lic ate s this implicit dimens ion wh ichmak es up the horizon structure chara cteris tic of a llintenti onalit y. The relation is an interna l one betweenpos sibi lity and actuali ty. It is wi th this di sti nct iv efeature of the kind of being belongi ng to tran scen dent alsubjectiv ity in mind that we must underst and Husser l*snotion of the unity of synthesis as,. . . not merely a continuous con nect edn ess ofcoqi tati ones (as it we re , a be ing stuc k to oneanother e x t e r n a l l y ) , but a connected ness thatmak es the unity of one con scio usn ess, in whi chthe unity of an int ent iona l obj ect ivi ty, as'the sa me ' objec tivit y bel ongi ng to mult ipl emodes of appearance , become s constitut ed.16

********This completes ou r treatment of som e of the g ene ralstructures of Husserl's transcendental phen ome nol ogy .This interpr etat ion wa s intended to dev elo p c ertainthemes in such a way that the contras ts coul d su bs eq ue nt ly be drawn betw een the mean ing of phil osop hy as cr it ic altransc enden tal idealism versus a phen ome nolo gica l tra nscend enta l idealism. Our comparative reflections sh allbeg in wit h what I take to be a Huss erli an cr iti cis m of


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95the entire structure of the Kantian problem set. F r o m aKantian or neo-Kantian position, the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a lmethod, with its attendant conception of p h i l o s o p h i c a lk n o w i n g as intuition, might be termed dogmati c. Critic alreflection presents philosophical knowing as a c o n s t r u c tive arguing to the conditions for 'the possibility ofobjectivi ty. From such a p e r s p e c t i v e , H u s s e r l ' s p h e nomen ology might indeed seem both intuition istic andontologistic, insofar as (a) it fails to distinguishsensibility and understanding in an adequate fashion,and (b) reifies the a priori as object of intuitive reflection in opposition to a formal realm of m e a n i n g . Onthe oth er hand , fr om a p h e n o m e n o lo g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , itcan be said that the very sub-structure of K a n t i a n i s m ,the triadic s c h e m a of manifold-imaginative synthesiB-unity of apperception, is a naive, pre-philosophicalp r o b l e m set. Begi nning wit h this claim, we shall attemptto move systematically to a consideration of the m e a n i n gof "transcendental" for K a n t and H u s s e r l , to the resultantrejection of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f and the archetypusIntellectus, to a comparison of the ideas of s y n t h e s i s ,and finally to a look at the ground of unity in criticaland phenomenological thought, as transcendental unity ofapperception and temporality respectively.

From the very outset of the Critique of Pure Reason,in the opening pages of the "TranscendentaT~Aesthetic,"Kant presents the struc tural framework withi n which tr an scendental philosophy as crit ical idealis m shall u nfol d.There the stems of knowledge are delineated into se ns ibility and u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a distinction which in turn isgrounded upon the radical opposi tion betwe en receptivi tyand spon tane ity. Also introdu ced in this first sectionis a m a t t e r - f o r m d i c h o t o m y , in terms of the m a n i f o l dthat stands in n e e d of o r d e r i n g , and the ordering activityr e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 7 It is from wit hin this framewor k thatthose struct ures whi ch make possible exper ience emer gei n s o f a r as human cognition is finite: viz., (a) thepure manifold as given and which must be intuited undera certai n form, (b) the forms of unity in light of w h i c hthe transcendental power of imagination orders the m a n i fold, and (c) the unity of apperception, as the c o n d i tion for the possibility of b r i n g i n g the m a n i f o l d together in one c o n s c i o u s n e s s .For Hus serl , how eve r, this entire format re flectsthe inappropriate point of departure in Kantian thought.Transcendental philosophy is entirely subsequent to, anddependent upon, the phenomeno logical epoch e. That whichis known by critical trans cendental knowledge is the pureforms of intuition and understanding to w h i c h any o b j e c tmust conform if it is to be an object of possible exp e r i e n c e . The p r o c e s s of movement toward the realm of


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96the tran scend ental with in Kant iani sm is an abst ract iveproc ess. One argumentatively and constructively u npacksthe concrete unity of any experience.

In the transcend ental aesthetic we sha ll, there fore,first isolate sensibility, by taking away from iteveryt hing which the understand ing thinks throughits con cept s, so that noth ing may be left saveempirical intuition. Secondly, we sha ll alsosepar ate of f from it every thing whic h belong s tosens atio n, so that nothi ng may remain sav e pu reintui tion and the mer e form of appe ara nce s . . .In opposition to this, the phenomenological epoche is notan abstrac tion in any sen se, eith er criti cal or ps yc ho logi cal. Rat her , the Husserlian wo ul d claim tha t thismet hod is concretion insof ar as the lim ite dne ss of thesens e of the wor ld chara cteris tic of the na tu ra l attitudeis brok en through by the reduct ion.

To argue to a concept of pure man ifo ld and abso luteunity founded upon the disti nctio n bet wee n rece ptiv ityand spontaneit y is , for Hus ser l, to remain immersed wi th in a world -imma nent outl ook, and to have pre vio usl ycommitted one sel f to a view of the rel ati ons hip bet wee nconsciousness and objec t. Such noti ons are "con struc tio ns; " abstract ions derived from a sense of the w orl dwhi ch is wit hin the world , and nowhe re are they give nwith the kind of apodicti city requi site for phil oso phyto be sci enc e. Receptivity and spont aneity , despit ethei r apparent "obviousness," cannot serve as pre- givenpol es about whi ch one can develop a genui ne tr an sc en dental phi loso phy , for such concept s are mu nd an e. Th ered uct ion , in cont rast, allows one to pe ne tr at e to thetransce ndenta l origins of these concepts t hems elv es.The ego-cogit o-cogitatu m structure revealed within thedomain of absolute subjectivity is a tran scen dent al co ncept which can be seen to be a nece ssary stru ctur e b e longi ng to any conscious exp eri enc e. It is this con cep t,as intentio nality, which Husserl poses in oppos ition toa manifold -form-un ity schema.

In tur n, one can say that for Kant "tr ans cen den tal "is primarily an adjective, modify ing kno wle dge . "Theter m trans cenden tal,'" claims Kan t, ". . . sign ifie ssuch kno wled ge as concern s the a prior i possi bil ity ofkno wle dge , or its a priori employment. Tha t which isknown by this kind of kno wle dge , ho wev er, i s the a pri oriworld forms in thei r relation to the unit of a pp er ce ptio n. The figurat ive synthesis is a uni fyi ng activi tyin wh ic h the form of givenness of the mani fo ld is br ou gh tto the unity of one consciousness in a det erm ina tefashio n, i.e., according to the functions of jud gme nt.


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97This synthesis, as pure, is to be contrasted with thereproductive synthesis belonging to the domain of psychology. That whi ch is know n transc endent ally is for mal ,the mat ter being given as raw manifold capable of bei ngordere d by a prior i form s. The tran scen denta l for Hus ser l,in cont rast , desi gnate s a genuine realm of bei ng ac ce ssible to a singular kind of exper ience . The t ran sce ndental reduction is not an abstractive movement, but abrac keti ng of the wor ld through whi ch the wor ld re -emerges as intentional correlate of transcendental subjectivity. The phenomen ological transcen dental domainis non-worldly insofar as that is understood from anaive or nat ura l point of view . So whil e for Kan t,"tran scend ental " mig ht be said to point out a formal ap r i o r i , und erst ood as orde ring the ma tte r whi ch allowsof bein g ord ere d, the phen omen olog ical sense of "tra nsce nde nta l" is that of a subject ivity which const itute sthe me an in g and bei ng (Sinn und Sein ) of the wo rl d. Inphenomeno logy the opposition is between the tr ansce ndent alas non- worl dly and the transc endent as worl d-i mma nen t, incontra st to the Kanti an split betwee n the wor ld form s,which are a priori, and the world matter qua a posteriori.

We can se e, th er efo re , that accompanying the re je ction of the opp osi tio n betw een receptivity and s pont anei tyas foundational concepts, is the dismissal of the matter-form schema as it emerges in the Critique of Pure Reason.In turn the real differences between the senses of"tr ansc end enta l" in Kantian idealism and Hus ser lia nphenomenolog y appear. Another consequence of this ori gina l brea k is the den ial of the Kantian thi ng-i n-i tse lfand the archet ypus int ell ect us, even as limiti ng co ncepts wit hin tran scen dent al phil osoph y. Insof ar as thetheme of finitude is central to the Critique of PureReason, and finitude becomes manifest in terms of thereceptivi ty functi ons as a limiting con cept . Th e gapbetween phenomenon and noumenon on the side of the objectis reflected in the differentiation between the archetypusint ell ect us and the finite hum an intell ect on the side ofthe subj ect. For trans cende ntal phe nome nolo gy, on theot he r hand , such dist inct ions are simply seen as con sequences of the original receptivity-spontaneity pr ob le mati c. Transce ndental subjectivity, with its eg o-c og ito -cogitat um struct ure , is the wh ol e. The fact that tr an scendent, spatial objects are given to consciousnessonly perspect ively is not discl osive of an in suff icie ncyor defect in ou r mode of kno win g, but is repr esen tati veof that kin d of bei ng which belo ngs to the reg ion, N at ur e.The radical otherness of the Ding an sich which must bethought insofar as human knowledge -Ts sensible and finiteis grounded in the receptivity of the man ifo ld. Hus ser l'srej ect ion of the for mer follows from hi s rej ect ion ofthe lat ter , insof ar as receptivity and man ifo ld areconstructs rooted in pre-transcendental world v ie ws .


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98It should be noted that Husserl 1s intention is not

to dismis s the distinct ion betw een the in-i tse lf and thefor-us as an illu sory on e. Ins tead , hi s aim is to tra cethis distinction to its genetic origins in tra nsc end ent alsub jec tiv ity . In this respect , a certa in affini ty can beseen betw een Fichte and Hu sse rl . Ficht e pos its the ra di cal distinction between dogmatism and idealism, with theattendant claim that we are all b o m dogm atist s. Thatwe do, experient ially, think the thing -in-i tself isgive n; but the content of this concept diff ers acc ord ingto whe the r we think it transcendent ally or tran scen dent ly.The latte r posi tion is calle d.for in life . "To think ofsometh ing as a thing-in-itself, that is, as exi sti ng indepe nden tly of myse lf, the emp iri cal , I must th ink ofmys el f from the poi nt of view of life , wh er e I am me rel ythe em pi ri cal ." 2" Naively, we think a recep tivity , andconseq uentl y a thing-in -itself. But for nei the r Fich tenor Hu ss er l can this function as a ground co ncep t intrans cende ntal philosoph y. The nece ssity for thinkingthe Din g an sich must find its foun datio n in the int el lect ual intuition of the Absol ute I and the ac com pan yingposi ting of the I and no n- I. For Hus ser l, the diff ere nti ation betw een being -for- us and bei ng- in- its elf must alsofind its ground in tran scen dent al sub je cti vi ty. It ishere that the sense of the in-itself emerges as a kindof Kan tia n Idea . The be ing of Nat ure is such that itshows itself only through pers pect ives . It is throughthe pat ter ned synthe sis of a mult iplic ity of acts thatthe objec t as unity is con sti tut ed. This pr oce ss ofsyn the sis is an open end ed one , in that, ". . . a m a r gin of determineable indeterminacy always remains o v e r . " 2 !Thus the be in g of a "Thing" takes on a nat ure anal ogousto tha t of a Kant ian I dea in that the synt hes is canideal ly continu e ad infinit um.

Up to this poi nt, an attempt has be en ma de t o d i s tinguish critical transcendental idealism from ph en ome no logical transcendental idealism in light of Husserl'srejection of the initial proble m setting wi th in whi chKant ian thou ght dev elo ps. In this vein , there is anoth eraspect of Kantiani sm which should be clearly sepa rate dfrom the phenomenological movement, viz ., syn thes is. Ashas bee n said prev ious ly, both Kant and Hus ser l dev elopphilo sophi es of subjectivity with in which the object ofcon sci ous nes s is the result of the syn th eti c activit y ofthe sel f. It could be claimed tha t the int ent ion of bothof the se t hin kers is to give an accoun t of ob je ct iv it yvi a an anal ysis of the life of con sci ou sne ss, wi th thislife bei ng essentially a synthe tic life. Husse rl's con cepti on of synth esis has been discuss ed prev iou sly asone of the eidetic structures of transcendental subjecti vity. If, how eve r, we look to Kant 's not ion ofsy nth es is , attending primarily to the way in whi ch itis prese nted in the B deduction , it beco mes recog nizea ble


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that the critica l conception of synthesi s dif fers rad ica lly from the phen omen olog ical . Furth ermor e, this d i s tinc tion too can be trace d back to the sta rt ing poi ntsof their respective systems.

For Kant, synthesis is always exter nally impos ed.Tha t whi ch is to be comb ined is a man ifo ld giv en vi asensi bility . That manifo ld may be pure or emp iric al; ineith er case, the ordering activity is imposed from w it hout.. . . Al l com bi na ti on b e we conscious of it orno t, be it a combin ation of the ma nif old inintui tion, empiric al or non- empir ical , or ofv a r i o u s c o n c e p t s i s an a ct o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .To this act, the general title 'synthesis' maybe assigned.22

The previous account of Husserlia n synthesis was limitedto that of the pas siv e, pre-pre dicati ve vari ety, such asthat found in perce ption by a developed eg o. Corr espo ndingly, a treatm ent of the Kanti an account of sy nth esi sbet wee n concept s in judgment shall be omi tte d, focusin ginstead upon the synthes is of the manifo ld of intu iti on,and prima rily upon the pure m anifo ld.

All synt hes is, as combination, is acti vity . Thisplaces synt hesis on the side of the unde rsta ndin g asfaculty of spon tane ity. But syn the sis, as a det erm ina temode of combination, takes place in light of a directiveunity according to which that which l acks orde r acquiresit. Ins ofar as the ma nif ol d is to be given to us , itmust sub mit t o the forms of space and ti me . Ins ofa r asit is to be th oug ht, how ev er , it must be capabl e of be in gbroug ht to the unity of one cons ciou snes s. All possi bleprese ntati ons must be capable of bei ng mi ne . The dif fe rent deter min ate way s in whi ch the man ifo ld is to bebrought to this unity are found in the functions ofjudg ment. The appl icat ion of the pure not ion s to thepure form of ti me , whi ch contai ns any man ifo ld give n tofinite, hum an con scio usne ss, results in the categ oriesas ont olo gica l predic ates in the sense of a prio ri de te rminat ions of the objecti vity of obj ect s. The exten t towhi ch the mat ter- form schem a permea tes this account ofsynthe sis is evid ent. The matte r is the given ma nifo ldto be combined by an act of the und ers tan din g, t hat actbei ng the logical function of judgment. The ext ern ali tyof this idea of synthesis is due to the rigorous bifurcatio n of the ste ms of kn ow le dg e. Wit h respe ct to thecategor ies, Kant claim s,

. . . they are merel y rules for an und ers tan din gwho se who le power consists in thou ght, con sis ts,


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that is , in the act wher eby it br in gs th e sy nthesi s of a mani fold , given to it from els ew her ein intuition, to the unity of ap pe rc ep ti on afaculty, therefore, which by itself kno ws nothi ngwhat soev er, but merely combines and arranges thematerial of knowledge.23This kin d of synt heti c activity is antit het ica l tothat found in transcen dental phen omen olog y. In Kant 'simaginat ive sy nthe sis, the mat ter to be order ed iseit her a pure or empir ical mani fol d. From a phe nom eno logical viewp oint, such a manifold is an abstr actio n

rooted in a pre-ph iloso phical start ing poi nt. On theemp iric al level this woul d seemingly be a bu nd le , orrath er a chao s, of sense da ta . Des pit e the advanc emad e by the Kanti an onset ove r a Hum ean emp ir ica l co nception of consc iousn ess, strains of such atomis m s til lstructure the critical problema tic. Husserlian synthe sis,on the othe r han d, unfolds wit hin the frame work o f in ten tio nal ana lys is. The parts to be combine d are notatomic elemen ts, but moments of a who le which bea r wi th in themse lve s, in the unique sense of bein g-i n whi chintentionality has uncovered, possibilities into whichthey may flow in actuality to constitute the syntheticw h o l e . The Kantian emphasis upon the activity of consciousn ess in the best owa l of obje ctiv ity is surelycorrect from a Husserlian per spe cti ve, yet this co nception of activity is not a genuinely tra nsc end ent alone, for it eme rges in terms whi ch ar e appl ica ble tothe ont ic. Despite the radical diff eren ce wit hin cr it ical philoso phy between philo soph ical and nat ur al (orempirical) k nowi ng, the former stil l contains the seedsof the nat ura l attitude due to its enigm ati c star tingpoint.

If, finally, we look to the groun d of all syn th es is ,of all unity, in the phen omeno logic al and crit ica lphil oso phie s, the same type of oppos ition manif est s itsel f. For Kant, the transc endent al unity of ap perce ptionserves as epistemo logical gua rantee of the obj ect iveunity of the obje ct as we ll as of the ident ity of con sciou snes s throughout these pre sen tat ion s. Thi s high estprinc iple of unity is a pure form, a pure sel f-i den tic alact whi ch must necess arily be thoug ht, but is in prin ci pleouts ide the domain of expe rien ce. In ord er for this hi gh est principle to be trans cende ntal, an abstr actio n mustbe mad e from the ma tt er to the form , and in so fa r as itis to be on the side of the un der sta ndi ng, th e ab st ra ction is eff ect ed from the forms of givenness to f orm ofspontaneity as universal self-co nsciou sness. The par tic ula r synthet ic activities which const itute the life ofcon sci ousn ess are possi ble only to the ext ent that theelemen ts stand under the unity of one con sci ous nes s.


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101Hus ser l, on the other hand, cl aims , "The fund ament alform of univ ers al syn the sis , the form that makes all o ther

forms of synthe sis possi ble, is the all-e mbrac ing con scio usne ss of inter nal tim e. "24 ph e problem of thehig hes t pri nci ple o f unity, of the conditi on for thepossib ility of any experie nce what soe ver , is no t, forHus ser l, that of the unity of a mul tipl ici ty of ato micparts wh ic h admit of bei ng related to one anot herthroug hout the vehicle of the sponta neity of con sci ous n e s s . While transcende nt objects mani fest thems elvesthrough perspectival shadings oriented along the linesof spat ial ity, those immanent acts whic h const ituteobjectivity are themselves extended along a tempora lcont inuu m. And ins ofa r as immanen t acts are vie wedfrom wit hin the framework of the tran scen dent al red uction, all cons ciou snes s, as synth etic unity, is subjec tto inte rnal tempor ality . The absolute unity of consciousness, therefore, is grounded in the structure oftemporali ty itself. Each now mom ent , as a pri mit iveinten tion al act, bears withi n itself in an inter nallyart icu lat ed f ashio n, the past and the future in r et en tion and pre ten tion . Time is not simply a one d ime nsi onal flowin g of a mult ipli city of dispa rate no ws , but isa primor dially ove rlappin g contin uum who se elem ents aremoments of an all-enve loping wh ol e. Thu s, Husse rls t a t e s , " . . . a ny i m ag i ne a bl e p a r t ic u l a r s u b je c t iv eprocess is only a prominence within a total cons cious nessalways presu ppose d as unitary."25 This pres uppo siti onfinds its warr ante d validity in the ret enti on-p rima limpres sion-pr otenti on structur e of the consc iousn ess ofinternal time.

It i3 at this l evel that Hus ser l ho pes t o ha ve ov er come the enig mati c issue of the possibil ity o f tr an scen den tal know ledg e itsel f. Time is no lon ger a formof int uit ion whi ch serves as a med iat ing age nt, as". . . som e third thing wh ic h is ho mo ge ne ou s on the o nehan d wi th the cat egory , and on the ot he r ha nd wi th theappe aranc e, and which thus makes the applicat ion of theforme r to the latter possi ble." 26 For in this e mp lo yment it is also that which stands betw een cons ciou snes sand the in-its elf, barring knowledge of noumen al reali ty.Instead, in the lectures on internal time-consciousness,Husserl identifies the intent!ve components of a temporally exte nded conscious act with parti al int ent ion s, eachof these beari ng withi n itself a consci ousness of pastand future in an or ig in al fash ion. This ho ld in g of thejust-pas t founds the possi bili ty of an unm edi ate d re flecti ve gla nc e. "It is thanks to rete ntio n that con sciousness can be made an o bj ec t. " 2 7 And whe n this co nscious ness is absolute consci ousnes s, is trans cen den talcon sci ous nes s as effec ted by the ep oc he , then it is r etent ion as a mome nt in the struc ture of the co ns ci ou sness of int ern al time whi ch affords the poss ibi lity of


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transcendenta l experien ce. Thus transcendental ph eno men olo gy claim s to do justice to the unique mod e of be in gof consciousness/ strik ing out interp retiv e ho riz onswhi ch red uce the mani fold senses of be in g to tha t wh ic his phy sic al, psyc hica l, or a formal off shoo t of suchn o t i o n s . And simult aneous ly, by explo ring consc iousn essat the prim ary level of tempor ality i ts el f, it claims tooffer a kind of self- criti que, a phen omen olog y of ph eno menology, which deals directly with the problem of thepossibility of transcendental knowledge.Pen nsyl van ia State University


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MOTES

^Edmund Huss erl, Cartesian Medit ation s, tr ans.Dorion Cairns (The Hague ! Martinus Nijhoff , 1 9 7 0 ) , p. 43.2Ibid., p. 56.3Ibid.4Edmund Husserl, The Paris Lectures, tra ns. PeterKoestenbaura (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 30.5Ibid., p. 32.Edmund Husserl, Ideas 1 t r a n s . W. R. Doyce Gibson(New York: The Humanities Press, 1 9 6 7 ) , Sec. 49.7Huss erl, Cartesian Meditati ons, p. 67.

8Ibid., p. 71.gEdmund Huss erl , Phenomenolog y of I n t e r n a l T i m e -Consciousn ess tr ans . James Churchill 7Bioomington:Indiana university Press , 1 9 7 1 ) .

*Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 81.i ; LIbid.12 Husserl, Phenomenology of I n t e r n a l T i m e - C o n s c i o u s ness, S e c t . 17.13 Huss erl, Cartesian Meditat ions, p. 80.1 4Ibid., p. 77.1 5Ibid., p. 83.1 6Ibid., p. 80.17 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans.Norman K. Smith (New Y o r k : St. Martin's Press, 1 9 6 5 ) ,(A20,B34).1 8Ibid., (A22,B36).1 9Ibid., (A56,B81).


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1042 0 F i c h t e , Science of Knowledge tr an s. P. Heath andJ. Lachs (New Yor k: Appl eton -Cen tury -Cro fts, 1 9 7 0 ) ,(1,483).2 1 H u s s e r l , Id ea s I, p . 1 2 5 .2 2 K a n t , Critique of Pure Reason, B13 0.2 3 I b i d . , B1 45 .2 4 H u s s e r l , C a rt e si a n M e d i t a t i o n s , p . 8 1 .2 5 I b i d . , p . 8 0 .2 6 K a n t , C r i t i q u e o f P u r e R e a s o n , ( A 1 3 8 , B 1 7 7 ) .2 7Husser l, Phenomenology of Internal Ti me- Con sci ous ness , p . 1 6 2 .

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