I Gede Widhiana Suarda - QUT Gede Widhiana...AN EXAMINATION OF INDONESIAN PRISON OFFICERS’ EXPERIENCES ON DERADICALISATION: TOWARDS BETTER PRACTICE I Gede Widhiana Suarda Bachelor

AN EXAMINATION OF INDONESIAN

PRISON OFFICERS’ EXPERIENCES ON

DERADICALISATION: TOWARDS BETTER

PRACTICE

I Gede Widhiana Suarda

Bachelor of Law (Udayana University, Bali)

Master of Law (Diponegoro University, Central Java)

Principal Supervisor: Professor Reece Walters

Associate Supervisor: Associate Professor Mark Lauchs

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

School of Justice, Faculty of Law

Queensland University of Technology

2018

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice i

Keywords

Challenges, Collaboration, Counterterrorism, Corrections, Deradicalisation,

Disengagement, Experiences, Extremist, Directorate General of Corrections (DGC),

Implementer, Indonesian Prison Officers, Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation

Program, Jihadist, National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Partnership, Prison,

Prison-based Deradicalisation Program, Radicalisation, Reform, Rehabilitation, Role

of Indonesian Prison Officers on Terrorist Rehabilitation, Special Prison for

Convicted Terrorist, Strategy, Terrorism, Terrorist Convicts, Terrorist Inmates,

Terrorist Prisoners, Terrorist Rehabilitation.

ii An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice

Abstract

In dealing with convicted terrorists throughout prisons, prison-based deradicalisation

programs have been instituted by many states. Generally, the programs have two objectives:

preventing radicalisation in the prisons, and reducing violent behaviour of the convicted

terrorists. For the implementation of such programs, terrorist inmates are the participants,

while one arm of the implementers is the prison officers.

Following this issue, many studies around terrorist inmates and deradicalisation

programs have been conducted. In the Indonesian context, although an emerging body of

literature is available that focuses on terrorist inmates and deradicalisation programs, less

attention has been paid to the Indonesian prison officers who are implementing the program

at the coalface. This study addresses this research gap, and focuses on the experiences of

Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.

To achieve these goals, focus group discussions with Indonesian prison officers were

conducted in three Indonesian prisons, namely Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and

Surabaya Prisons. To analyse the data, a thematic qualitative analysis was employed. The

study also applied legal research to formulate strategies to improve the role of Indonesian

prison officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs.

The findings demonstrate five challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers

implementing such programs: terrorist inmates’ personalities, the readiness of Indonesian

prison officers, the sustainability of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program,

institutional infrastructure problems, and unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.

Further, the study specifically considered the establishment of a special prison for convicted

terrorists in Indonesia. Although various advantages, disadvantages, and policy

recommendations related to the establishment of this prison were identified, there was

absolute agreement among the prison officers for this initiative. An evaluation of the needs

of Indonesian prison officers in implementing terrorist rehabilitation programs found that

appropriate training and good partnerships are essential. Moreover, the thesis presents policy

recommendations and identifies regulation reform to improve Indonesian prison officers’

role in terrorist rehabilitation. These findings extend the body of knowledge on prison-based

deradicalisation programs from the perspective of prison officers.

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice iii

Table of Contents

Keywords .................................................................................................................................. i

Abstract .................................................................................................................................... ii

Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... iii

List of Figures ........................................................................................................................ vii

List of Tables ........................................................................................................................ viii

List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. ix

Statement of Original Authorship ........................................................................................... xi

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ xii

Introduction ...................................................................................... 1

1.1 Contextual Background ..................................................................................................3

1.2 Research Questions .........................................................................................................6

1.3 Objectives of the Research .............................................................................................7

1.4 Significance of the Research ..........................................................................................7

1.5 Conceptual Frameworks .................................................................................................8

1.6 Terrorist Prisoners: A Working Definition ...................................................................11

1.7 Publications ..................................................................................................................14

1.8 Thesis Structure and Chapter Outline ...........................................................................14

Literature Review ........................................................................... 17

2.1 Terrorism in Indonesia: Incidents, Networks, and Future Threats ...............................17

2.2 Terrorist Inmates in Indonesian Prisons: Facts and Figures .........................................21

2.3 The Nature of Indonesia’s De-radicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners .............25

2.4 Reported Outcomes of Indonesia’s Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Inmates ...30

2.5 Limitations in the Current Literature ............................................................................34

2.6 Summary and Implications ...........................................................................................43

Research Design .............................................................................. 45

3.1 Overview of the Research Design and Methodology ...................................................45

3.1.1 The Methodology and Research Questions ........................................................46

3.1.2 Qualitative Social Research Methodology: Empirical Legal Research ..............47

3.1.3 Legal Research: Policy and Law Reform Research ...........................................48

3.2 Research Site ................................................................................................................49

3.3 Participants and Their Recruitment ..............................................................................51

iv An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice

3.4 Data and Legal Materials ............................................................................................. 53

3.5 Data Collection Methods ............................................................................................. 55

3.5.1 Primary Data ...................................................................................................... 55

3.5.2 Secondary Data .................................................................................................. 58

3.6 Legal and Non-Legal Materials Collection Methods ................................................... 58

3.6.1 Primary Legal Materials .................................................................................... 59

3.6.2 Secondary Legal Materials ................................................................................ 59

3.6.3 Non-Legal Materials .......................................................................................... 60

3.7 Data Analysis ............................................................................................................... 60

3.7.1 Familiarisation with the Data ............................................................................. 61

3.7.2 Generating Initial Codes .................................................................................... 61

3.7.3 Searching for Themes ........................................................................................ 62

3.7.4 Reviewing Themes ............................................................................................ 62

3.7.5 Defining and Naming Themes ........................................................................... 63

3.7.6 Producing the Report ......................................................................................... 63

3.8 Ethical Considerations ................................................................................................. 64

3.9 Scope and Limitations .................................................................................................. 66

3.9.1 Scope .................................................................................................................. 66

3.9.2 Limitations ......................................................................................................... 66

Legal Frameworks .......................................................................... 69

4.1 Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law .................................................................................. 70

4.1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 70

4.1.2 The Substance of Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law ........................................... 72

4.1.3 The Crime of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Law.................................... 75

4.2 Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Financing Law ................................................................. 82

4.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 82

4.2.2 The Nature of the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law ............................................. 83

4.2.3 The Crime of Terrorism Financing under the Anti-Terrorism Financing

Law .................................................................................................................... 86

4.3 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................ 88

The Challenges of Terrorist Deradicalisation: Indonesian Prison

Officers’ Experiences ....................................................................... 93

5.1 Overview ...................................................................................................................... 94

5.2 Terrorist Inmates’ Personalities ................................................................................... 94

5.2.1 Terrorist Inmates’ Beliefs .................................................................................. 95

5.2.2 Terrorist Inmates’ Behaviour ........................................................................... 100

5.2.3 Non-Cooperative Terrorist Inmates: A Greater Challenge .............................. 104

5.3 The Readiness of Indonesian Prison Officers ............................................................ 109

5.3.1 Internal Factors (Individual Aspects)............................................................... 110

5.3.2 External Factors (Collegial Aspects) ............................................................... 113

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice v

5.4 Program Sustainability................................................................................................116

5.4.1 An Incidental Program .....................................................................................117

5.4.2 A Partial Program .............................................................................................122

5.5 Institutional Infrastructure Problems ..........................................................................126

5.5.1 Overcapacity .....................................................................................................127

5.5.2 Obscurity of Segregation Practices ..................................................................130

5.6 Unavailability of Collaborative Mechanisms .............................................................133

5.6.1 Lack of Cooperation and Coordination between the BNPT and the DGC .......134

5.6.2 Unorganised Partnerships .................................................................................137

5.7 Concluding Remarks ..................................................................................................140

The Perspective of Indonesian Prison Officers on the

Establishment of a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates in

Indonesia ......................................................................................... 143

6.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................144

6.2 The Establishment of a Special Prison for Terrorist Prisoners:

An Absolute Agreement .............................................................................................144

6.2.1 Terrorist Inmates: General Prison versus Special Prison .................................144

6.2.2 An Absolute Agreement ...................................................................................149

6.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates .................152

6.3.1 Advantages .......................................................................................................152

6.3.2 Disadvantages ...................................................................................................154

6.4 Policy Issues Related to a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates .................................157

6.4.1 Type of Inmate: Non-cooperative Terrorist Inmates ........................................159

6.4.2 Decision Maker for the Distribution .................................................................161

6.4.3 Timing of Distribution to the Special Prison ....................................................163

6.4.4 Strengthening Partnerships ...............................................................................165

6.4.5 Availability of Data on the Background of Convicted Terrorists.....................168


Improving the Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in Terrorist

Rehabilitation: A Strategy for the Future ................................... 173

7.1 Overview ....................................................................................................................174

7.2 The Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in terrorist Rehabilitation ............................175

7.3 The Needs of Indonesian Prison Officers on Terrorist Rehabilitation........................176

7.3.1 A Direct Need: Training ...................................................................................177

7.3.2 An Indirect Need: Good Partnerships ...............................................................182

7.4 A Correlation between the Findings on the Challenges and

the Findings on the Needs ...........................................................................................187

7.5 Strategies for the Future ..............................................................................................190

7.5.1 Strategy One: Policy Recommendations ..........................................................190

7.5.2 Strategy Two: Regulation Reform ....................................................................192


vi An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice

Conclusions and Recommendations............................................ 199

8.1 Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 200

8.1.1 The Challenges of Deradicalisation: Indonesian Prison Officers’

Experiences ...................................................................................................... 201

8.1.2 The Perspectives of Indonesian Prison Officers on the Establishment of a

Special Prison .................................................................................................. 205

8.1.3 Improving the Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in Deradicalisation ........... 206

8.2 Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 208

8.2.1 Practical Recommendations for the Government of Indonesia ....................... 209

8.2.2 Suggestions for Further Research .................................................................... 211

Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 213

Appendices .............................................................................................................. 235

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice vii

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 The Relationship between Rehabilitation, Deradicalisation, and

Disengagement in the Context of Terrorist Inmates .................................... 10

Figure 1.2 The Relationship of Counterterrorism and Counter-radicalisation

Initiatives with the Concepts of Disengagement, Deradicalisation, and

Rehabilitation ............................................................................................... 11

Figure 2.1 The Number of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesia (2011 - 2017) ............... 22

Figure 2.2 Overall Assessment of Prison-based Deradicalisation Program for

Terrorist Prisoners in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Yemen and Western

Europe .......................................................................................................... 33

Figure 2.3 Grouping of the Existing Research on Indonesia’s Prison-based

Deradicalisation Program............................................................................. 38

Figure 2.4 The Process of the Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners

in the Context of Indonesian Correctional Services .................................... 41

Figure 2.5 Including Prison Officers’ Perspectives in the Research Topic of

Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program ................................... 42

Figure 3.1 The Research Sites .................................................................................... 50

Figure 3.2 The Ten Indonesian Prisons with the Largest Number of Terrorist

Prisoners ....................................................................................................... 51

Figure 4.1 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism

Law (ATL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program ......... 91

Figure 4.2 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism

Financing Law (ATFL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation

Program ........................................................................................................ 92

Figure 5.1 Classification of Terrorist Inmates in Indonesia: Terminology

Comparison between the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan

Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]) and Prison Officers ..... 107

Figure 5.2 Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program: Prison Officers’

Perspectives................................................................................................ 121

Figure 6.1 Findings on the Future Policy Issues of a Special Prison for Terrorist

Inmates ....................................................................................................... 158

viii An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice

List of Tables

Table 2.1 The Distribution of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesian Prisons and

Detention Centres ......................................................................................... 23

Table 2.2 The Number of Prisoners Convicted under Special Criminal Acts by

August 2015 ................................................................................................. 25

Table 2.3 Presman and Flockton Review of the Differences between Violent

Extremists and Non-Ideologically Motivated Offenders ............................. 26

Table 2.4 List of Recidivist Terrorists ....................................................................... 31

Table 3.1 Research Questions and the Associated Methodologies ............................ 47

Table 3.2 The Correlation between Research Questions, Data, and Materials .......... 54

Table 3.3 Details of Focus Group Discussions .......................................................... 57

Table 6.1 Comparison of the Distribution of Terrorist Inmates (Adapted from

Newman’s Findings) .................................................................................. 148

Table 7.1 Correlation between the Challenges and the Need of Indonesian

Prison Officers Regarding Terrorist Rehabilitation ................................... 189

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice ix

List of Abbreviations

AMLL Anti-Money Laundering Law

ASG Abu Sayyaf Group

ATFL Anti-Terrorism Financing Law

ATL Anti-Terrorism Law

BNPT Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter

Terrorism Agency)

CIL Correctional Institution Law

CMT Conflict Management Training

Densus Detasemen Khusus (Special Detachment)

Ditjenpas Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan Republik Indonesia (Directorate

General of Corrections)

DGC Directorate General of Corrections

DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representative)

FATF Financial Action Task Force

FGD Focus Group Discussion

ICG International Crisis Group

INP Indonesian National Police

IPA Indonesian Prison Authority

IPAC Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict

JAT Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid

JI Jemaah Islamiyah

KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication

Commission)

KUHP Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Pidana (Indonesian Penal Code)

KUHAP Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (Indonesian Law of

Criminal Procedure)

LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Institute)

LST Life Skills Training

MMDJ Metro Manila District Jail

MoRA Ministry of Religious Affairs

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

x An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice

MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesia Ulema Council)

NBP New Bilibid Prison

NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations

NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia)

NSW New South Wales

OHCHR The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human

Rights

Perpu Peraturan Pemerintah Penganti Undang-undang (Government

Regulation in Lieu of Law)

PP Peraturan Pemerintah (Government Regulation)

PRAC Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare

R & N Risk and Need

RUTAN Rumah Tahanan (Detention Centre)

RQ Research Questions

SFCG Search for Common Ground

SOPs Standart Operating Procedures

SPS Singapore Prison Service

TPM Tim Pembela Muslim (Muslim Defender Team)

UK The United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

US The United States

VERA Violent Extremist Risk Assessment

YPP Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation)

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice xi

Statement of Original Authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet

requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the

best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously

published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

Signature : QUT Verified Signature

Date : 14 April 2018

xii An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice

Acknowledgements

First, I wish to express my gratitude to my principal supervisor Professor

Reece Walters, who encouraged, guided, and challenged me in conducting the

research and in the writing process. His companionship was very remarkable. He

made me feel that I could do what was required. I also wish to thank my previous

associate supervisor, Professor Geoff Dean, and my recent associate supervisor,

Associate Professor Mark Lauchs, who have both supported and encouraged me to

complete my research. They always gave me the moral support and confidence to

progress towards each milestone in my PhD journey.

My sincere thanks also go to the Ministry of Research and Higher Education of

the Republic of Indonesia, the sponsor of my PhD. I thank the Government of

Indonesia for entrusting me with the public money. Special thanks to the Faculty of

Law at the University of Jember, where I have worked for over twelve years, for

supporting me to undertake a PhD degree at QUT. I also would like to thank QUT

for awarding me financial assistance in the last semester of my PhD at QUT.

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to the Director General of Corrections

of the Republic of Indonesia, I Wayan K Dusak, for support and for giving formal

permission to conduct fieldwork in three Indonesian prisons. I also thank Mr Harun,

a senior official in the Directorate General of Corrections of the Republic of

Indonesia, for his encouragement in conducting research within the Indonesian

correctional institutions. In addition, I am very grateful for the help and cooperation

from the friendly prison officers when I was conducting my fieldwork. To all the

prison officers who participated in this study, I thank you for agreeing to be part of

the study.

To my wife, Ni Putu Widita Cahya Dewi Suarda, I appreciate all the love,

sacrifice, and companionship you gave me throughout my PhD studies. To my

sweeties, I Gede Sadhu Anant Suarda and Ni Kadek Divya Ozy Suarda, who gave

me unconditional love and adorable smiles, thank you for making me relax after hard

working days. To my parents and my parents-in-law, thank you for always praying

for me and for supporting me in the completion of my PhD. Unfortunately, my

father-in-law passed away in 2016 after a sudden illness. May you rest in peace. I

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice xiii

have also been lucky to have my younger brother and my brother-in-law, who always

supported my study.

I would like to thank Dr Leigh Findlay, an accredited editor with the Institute

of Professional Editors (IPEd), who provided editing and proofreading services in

accordance with the Australian Standards for Editing Practice and the university-

endorsed guidelines for editing research theses.

To my friends, Tien Hoang Le, Hope Johnson, Elizabeth Rowe, Huong Van

Nguyen, Evan Hamman, Surendran Subramaniam, Hamzah, Walakada Sumanadasa,

Alice Witt, Rosalie Gillett, Janani Ganapathi, Yafet, and my other PhD colleagues in

G-Block, I wish to thank you all for the friendship and all the fun we have had over

the past four years. You are awesome!

Finally, yet importantly, I must thank the Senior Research Services Officers in

the QUT Faculty of Law – Leana Sanders, Myra, and Catherine Mackenzie – who

gave me much information and advice on administrative matters during my PhD

studies.

An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice 1

Introduction

The concept of terrorist rehabilitation starts from the belief that one is not

born a terrorist. A person will go through a process of indoctrination before

he is ready to commit violence. During the indoctrination process, one is led

to be believe that violence and acts of aggression in the name of religion are

permissible. The ideology that is imbibed in his mind needs to be extricated

through a process known as rehabilitation. This is especially important when

extreme ideology is deeply rooted in the mind of the detainees [Introduction

in the book entitled Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-

terrorism]. (Gunaratna & Ali, 2015, p. xv)

Since the terrorist attacks on the United States World Trade Center and the

Pentagon on 11 September 2001, terrorism related activities have occurred in many

parts of the world, resulting in various national and transnational counterterrorism

initiatives (Ramraj, Hor, & Roach, 2005). The number of convicted terrorists is

reportedly increasing and is estimated to be around 100,000 worldwide. The Middle

East, Central Asia and South East Asia report the greatest numbers with large

increases in Western Europe (Eckard, 2014; Kruglanski, Gelfand, & Gunaratna,

2010). This research specifically focuses on counterterrorism policies in Indonesia.

Similar to global trends, the number of convicted terrorists in Indonesia is

significant. According to the Indonesian National Police (INP) discussion paper

entitled Law Enforcement in Indonesia there were 695 terrorist suspects arrested and

519 convicted and imprisoned between 2002 and 20111 (Mabes Polri, 2011). A

report published by Search for Common Ground (SFCG), a non-governmental

organization with a mission to transform the way the world deals with conflict,

identified that Indonesian prisons were holding more than 800 terrorist prisoners

between 2003 and 2013 under the management of Indonesia’s Directorate General of

Corrections (SFCG, 2013, p. 3).

1 This thesis will shed more recent light on the number of convicted and sentenced terrorist offenders

in Indonesia, and on their progress in the prison system.

2 An Examination of Indonesian Prison Officers’ Experiences on Deradicalisation: Towards Better Practice

Many states have instituted deradicalisation programs to deal with convicted

terrorists detained in prisons. The actions of states in response to terrorism involves

not only “hard-line” approaches such as military retaliation (Silke, 2003), but also

“soft” approaches. Implementing deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists is

an example of an adopted soft approach (Fink & El-Said, 2011; Schmid, 2013).

States have developed their own approaches to persuading terrorist inmates to stop

engaging in violent activities (QIASS, 2010; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013).

As the opening quotation attest, rehabilitation has been an approach adopted by

the Indonesian authorities. Generally, the programs have two objectives: preventing

radicalisation in the prison and reducing violent behaviour of the convicted terrorists

(Eckard, 2014, p. 1). As a consequence, prison-based deradicalisation is implemented

by prison officers; hence their experiences in implementing programs play a vital

role in achieving deradicalisation objectives. In addition to an understanding of the

characteristics of terrorist prisoners and the programs themselves, an understanding

of prison officers’ perspectives is needed.

In the Indonesian context, although a considerable amount of research, policy

and political debate have focused on terrorist prisoners (Hassan, 2007; Jones C. R.,

2014; Osman, 2014; Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono, 2013) and deradicalisation programs

(Bakti, 2014; Eckard, 2014; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Istiqomah, 2012;

Johnston, 2009), less attention has been paid to the Indonesian prison officers who

are implementing the program at the coalface. Therefore, the prison officers’

perspectives and the implementation contexts should be assessed in more detail. An

examination of this aspect of prison-based deradicalisation programs seeks to explore

uncharted terrain that may prove invaluable for future policy and practice.

The goal of this thesis is to examine Indonesian prison officers’ experiences in

implementing deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners. The challenges that

Indonesian prison officers face and their views on the establishment of a special

prison for convicted terrorists were investigated. To fully understand and appreciate

the difficulties and complexities confronting Indonesian prison officers, detailed

qualitative methodologies with focus group were deployed.

Focus group discussions (FGD) were conducted in three Indonesian prisons,

namely Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison, Cipinang Prison, and Surabaya Prison.

These prisons were selected because they hold a considerable number of convicted


terrorists. The participants were Indonesian prison officers who had been working for

a minimum of two years for the Indonesian prison service and had the task and

responsibility for rehabilitating and/or supervising terrorist prisoners.

This chapter outlines the contextual background of the research (Section 1.1),

the research questions (Section 1.2), the objectives (Section 1.3) and the significance

of the research (Section 1.4). Section 1.5 describes the conceptual frameworks for the

research and Section 1.6 provides a working definition for terminology surrounding

terrorist prisoners. Section 1.7 lists the articles from the work presented in this thesis.

Finally, Section 1.8 provides an outline of the remaining chapters of the thesis.

1.1 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Terrorist attacks are a significant threat to global security. Ongoing acts of

terrorism in Indonesia indicate that the country is vulnerable to this serious crime.

Incidents have occurred in Aceh, Bali, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Sumatra. The first Bali

bombing on 12 October 2002 marked a pivotal moment for the development of a

criminal justice initiative in Indonesia. The INP subsequently implemented a range

of measures to improve detection of, prevention, and enforcement against terrorism

(ICG, 2007; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Priatmodjo, 2010).

As a result of these proactive policing initiatives, the number of convicted

terrorists in Indonesian prisons has increased. Of considerable concern are the cases

of recidivism regarding terrorist acts. In a seminar entitled ‘From Radicalisation to

Terrorist’, Petrus Reinhard Golose argued that many of the convicted terrorists’

repeated acts of terrorism were involved in radicalising other inmates while

imprisoned (Berita Satu, 2012).

However, it remains unclear how and why this recidivism and radicalisation

happens in Indonesian prisons. For example, it is not known whether former

prisoners who commit terrorism acts after release were radicalised in prison or were

acting on established beliefs. Furthermore, it is unclear what supervisory prison

models are in place to prevent repeat offending. Such questions raise policy and

practical issues for the Indonesian authorities: the specific programs and personal

development models to implement in prisons; the ideology or theory that informs the

best practice of these models; and how the Indonesian Prison Authority (IPA)

evaluates or assesses the success of a model.


Although the Indonesian Government has launched a deradicalisation program,

questions and criticisms have been raised. For example, the International Crisis

Group (ICG) recommended that the Indonesian Government accelerate efforts to put

in place a system under the Corrections Directorate for identifying and monitoring

high-risk detainees, both while in detention and after their release (ICG, 2012, p. ii).

The ICG also recommended improving supervision through upgrading the analytical

capacity of correction staff (ICG, 2012, p. ii). These recommendations indicate that

both the current system and the capacity of officers who are in charge of

rehabilitating terrorist prisoners need improvement.

When convicted terrorists Taufik bin Abdul Halim (hereafter referred to as

Dani) and Edi Setiono (hereafter Abas) were sent to prison, their incarceration

marked the first time that an Indonesian prison attempted the rehabilitation of

terrorist prisoners. Dani and Abas had been found guilty by the Central Jakarta

District Court as the perpetrators of the Plaza Atrium bombing in August 2001. They

were jailed in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, and lived in the same cell and block with

other “ordinary” prisoners (Andrie, 2011).

Indonesia subsequently introduced the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2002, and many

criminals have since been convicted as terrorists. Consequently, the number of

terrorist inmates has increased sharply. Andrie (2011, p. 6) accurately argues that this

was a period when Indonesian prisons faced difficulties in dealing with terrorist

prisoners. Moreover, while behind bars, some became “passive” actors in subsequent

terror acts. For example, Imam Samudra, a terrorist convicted after the first Bali

bombing, was found to be a passive actor in the second Bali bombing.

Communication between Noordin M. Top – the intellectual leader behind the attacks

– and Imam Samudra occurred when Samudra was imprisoned in Kerobokan Prison.

These issues faced by Indonesian prisons require investigation.

Following the increasing number of convicted terrorists entering Indonesian

prisons, some prison directors began implementing specifically targeted

deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates. Although Indonesian authorities and

journalists have frequently reported the success of such programs, their effectiveness

has been questioned (Nurezki, 2013). The case of Abdullah Sonata is an example of

the failure of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program to deradicalise terrorist prisoners.

After his release in 2009, he was involved in a terror attack; one of the targets was


the former Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Istiqomah, 2012, p.

267). There are also other cases of convicted terrorists returning to their group after

release and being involved in further terror attacks. To cope with this problem, the

Indonesian Government has now established a special prison for terrorist prisoners in

Bogor, West Java.

To explore the effectiveness of deradicalisation programs for convicted

terrorists in the Indonesian context, this study advances the hypothesis that

deradicalisation programs will be effective if supported by well-trained prison

officers who implement the program. Moreover, this study argues that prison officers

play a vital role in rehabilitating terrorist prisoners. Nurezki (2013, p. 74) stated that

Indonesian prison officers are “the main implementers” of deradicalisation programs

behind bars, rather than other officers from other agencies. Therefore, understanding,

uncovering and evaluating prison officers’ experiences are essential because the

findings can be used to develop strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison

officers in supporting rehabilitation programs for convicted terrorists. Prison

officers’ challenges in implementing the program and their perspectives on the

establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners were examined.

Research focused on the topic of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation

program have been widely reported in the literature (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007;

Istiqomah, 2012; Johnston, 2009; Neumann, 2010; Nurezki, 2013). Empirical

qualitative studies that focus on convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons are also

available (Andrie, 2011; Osman, 2014; Sukabdi, 2015; Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono,

2013). However, empirical qualitative studies on Indonesian prison officers’

experiences and perspectives related to the implementation of the program and policy

are lacking. Also lacking are studies that examine the prison-based deradicalisation

program from prison officers’ point of view. Further, the challenges that the officers

face and their views on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorist

are often ignored.

Although several studies (ICG, 2007; Istiqomah, 2012; SFCG, 2013) report

interviews with Indonesian prison officers, the focus is not the prison officers’

experience of and perspectives about the deradicalisation program and policy. The

studies mainly concern how Indonesian prisons have managed terrorist prisoners and

the “external” factors affecting Indonesian prison officers in managing convicted


terrorists. To produce further insight into this phenomenon, the focus of this study

was how officers experience the challenges of implementing the program, and their

views on the establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners in Indonesia.

Hence, this study examined the “internal” factors relevant to the management of

convicted terrorists by Indonesian prison officers.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In order to address the above issues, this study was guided by three research

questions. First, what are the challenges for Indonesian prison officers in

implementing deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists? Indonesia has no

national policy specifically focused on prison-based deradicalisation programs.

Policies are designed locally by the prison directors based on their capability and

experience and are tailored to context-specific programs. Thus, uncovering the

challenges for the prison officers in implementing deradicalisation programs for

terrorist prisoners is worthwhile. The findings extend the body of literature on

prison-based deradicalisation programs to encompass prison officers’ points of view.

Second, what are Indonesian prison officers’ views on the establishment of a

special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia? There are no studies addressing

Indonesian prison officers’ perspectives in this context. Again, the findings extend

the body of literature on prison-based deradicalisation programs to encompass prison

officers’ points of view. Moreover, the Indonesian government has now established a

special prison for convicted terrorists in Sentul, Bogor, in West Java. As mentioned

in the previous section, an understanding of prison officers’ views is imperative for

formulating future policy regarding the existence of special prisons for terrorist

inmates in the Indonesian correctional system.

Third, what strategies can be used to improve the role of Indonesian prison

officers in implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs? Previous empirical

data, analyses and discussions were used simultaneously to examine this question. In

addition, data from primary and secondary legal materials and from non-legal

materials was also be used. These collected data were integrated and analysed to

identify the strategies that can be used to improve the role of Indonesian prison

officers in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs.


1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

This research examines the experiences and perspectives of Indonesian prison

officers regarding prison-based deradicalisation programs and policy concerning

such programs in the Indonesian context. In line with the research questions, the

objectives of this study were specifically:

1. To investigate Indonesian prison officers’ challenges in implementing

prison-based deradicalisation programs.

2. To analyse Indonesian prison officers’ views related to the establishment of

a special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia.

3. To examine and assess strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison

officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

This research makes a novel contribution to counterterrorism studies and to

criminal justice policy and practice by investigating and examining Indonesian

prison officers’ experiences of implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.

More specifically, the study extends the body of knowledge around prison-based

deradicalisation programs in the Indonesian context. Indonesian prison officers’

perspectives regarding deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates were

thoroughly investigated. From my review, the focus of the previous studies is the

program and the inmates. In contrast, there is a lack of qualitative studies that focus

on prison officers’ experiences in implementing programs. The programs were

assessed but the end-users of the program were not. Therefore, the results of this

study advance the discussion of prison-based deradicalisation program from the

viewpoint of Indonesian prison officers’ experiences and may contribute to future

policies and reforms.

Moreover, discourses surrounding the establishment of specialist prisons for

terrorist inmates arise among both academics and policy makers. The pros and cons

of this issue are commonly debated in Indonesia. However, the perspectives of prison

officers, as previously mentioned, are not available in the existing literature,

including whether they agree or disagree with this proposal. The findings on prison

officers’ perspectives on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists


will contribute to the fields of criminology, criminal justice studies, and correctional

science.

In addition, this study will contribute practically to the Indonesian authorities.

By revealing and exploring prison officers’ challenges in implementing

deradicalisation programs, implementation weaknesses and challenges can be

identified and reviewed. These findings are valuable resources in order to investigate

strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs, and to prevent of the spread of

radical beliefs from terrorist inmates to prison officers.

1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

Indonesian scholars, including government authorities, have stated that

rehabilitation is “one aspect of deradicalisation process” (Idris & Taufiqurrohman,

2015, p. 72). According to Bakti (2014, p. 189), prison-based deradicalisation

programs in Indonesia include several processes or stages: identification,

rehabilitation, re-education, resocialisation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Conceptually, this indicates that rehabilitation is viewed from a “micro”

perspective. Rehabilitation is used for a specific type of offender and is applied to a

specific program. It is seen as a treatment for special populations (Burkhead, 2007;

Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007). A practical example includes the

treatment programs for sex offenders (Mullins, 2010, p. 176). On the other hand, a

“macro” perspective of rehabilitation means that the concept of rehabilitation is not

just intended to refer to a specific type of offender. It implies a broader scope related

to the effort for the treatment of all types of offenders. Therefore, a macro

perspective of rehabilitation views rehabilitation as a “major goal of the correctional

system”, as concluded by Cullen and Gilbert (2013, p. 155). In studies by other

criminologists (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013; Cullen, Skovron, Scott, & Burton, 1990;

Cullen, Lutze, Link, & Wolfe, 1989; Gendreau, 1996), a macro perspective of

rehabilitation has also been adopted. Rehabilitation is viewed as a core of

correctional goal, regardless of the type of the crime that have been committed by the

offenders.

From this view point, a macro perspective of rehabilitation is deployed in this

research. Furthermore, by deploying this perspective, the linkage between the


terminology of rehabilitation and deradicalisation is determined. From a macro

perspective of rehabilitation, deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists in

Indonesia are viewed as part of rehabilitation program for all prison populations

currently administered by the Indonesian prison authorities. Therefore, rehabilitation

is broader than deradicalisation.

However, the terms “terrorist rehabilitation” and “terrorist deradicalisation” are

used interchangeably in this research because, as explained by Fink and El-Said

(2011, p. 3), “the programs aim for a combination of deradicalization and

rehabilitation, and their target objective is to reduce the risk of violent activity”. In

the existing studies, these terms are also often used interchangeably (QIASS, 2010;

Ranstorp, 2009; Schmid, 2013; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013).

In addition to rehabilitation and deradicalisation, “disengagement” is another

concept in the literature surrounding the management of convicted terrorists. Then

the question is how to situate the concept of disengagement in this framework. Some

scholars have argued that the processes of deradicalisation and disengagement from

terrorism should be distinguished (Horgan, 2008; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). The

main reason behind this analysis is ambiguity in the outcomes of deradicalisation

initiatives. For example, Horgan (2008, p. 8) concluded that “there is no evidence to

suggest that disengagement from terrorism may result in deradicalisation”. On the

other hand, a different perspective is proposed by Kruglanski et al. (2011, p. 136),

who argue that disengagement is “a crucial element of deradicalisation”. These

authors defined deradicalisation as “a change in people’s attitudes and beliefs

entailed in the terrorism-justifying ideology” (Kruglanski, Gelfand, & Gunaratna,

2011, p. 136). In this sense, the distinction between deradicalisation and

disengagement has not been rigidly applied and is open to fluid interpretation.

For the purpose of this research, I applied a conceptual framework in which

disengagement is a part of deradicalisation, as conceptualised by Kruglanski et al

(2011). Furthermore, both disengagement and deradicalisation are part of a

rehabilitation program for terrorist inmates, as illustrated in the Figure 1.1. In other

words, rehabilitation is broader than either deradicalisation or disengagement.


Figure 1.1 The Relationship between Rehabilitation, Deradicalisation, and Disengagement in the

Context of Terrorist Inmates

In addition to the concepts discussed above, it is essential to acknowledge that

there are further discourses related to the study of terrorism. The most relevant to this

study are the concepts of counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism. For the

purposes of this study, the differentiation between counter-radicalisation and

counterterrorism follows that of El-Said (2015), who concluded that the key point of

differentiation between these two approaches is based on the target. Counter-

radicalisation policies target wider communities, including youth and women, while

counterterrorism targets terrorists (El-Said, 2015, p. 10). From this perspective, the

concepts of disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation of terrorist inmates

are part of counterterrorism initiatives. According to Iqbal (2015), disengagement,

deradicalisation, and rehabilitation are important parts of counterterrorism narratives

and accompanying policies. Furthermore, regarding the relationships among

disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation in the context of terrorist inmates

as shown in Figure 1.1, counterterrorism could be presented by a “fourth” ring

outside rehabilitation. A fifth outer ring would represent counter-radicalisation

initiatives, because their focus is not exclusively terrorists but also communities, as

can be seen in Figure 1.2.

Disengagement

Deradicalisation

Rehabilitation


Figure 1.2 The Relationship of Counterterrorism and Counter-radicalisation Initiatives with the

Concepts of Disengagement, Deradicalisation, and Rehabilitation

1.6 TERRORIST PRISONERS: A WORKING DEFINITION

The terminology of “terrorist prisoners” should be clarified for the purpose of

this study. A clear working definition of terrorist prisoners is important in order to

differentiate this study from other studies within the research on terrorism. Who are

terrorist prisoners and why they are labelled as such should be identified. Moreover,

as the topic of this study is a part of the research on terrorism, the debate about how

to define terrorism should also be discussed.

A significant, widespread, and disparate effort to define or redefine terrorism

occurred in most countries after the “9/11” attack (Young, 2006, p. 70). Some

countries such as The Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) amended their

penal code or enacted special terrorism laws and formally defined terrorism in their

legal system. For example, in June 2004, through the Act of 24, the Dutch Criminal

Code and some other laws connected with terrorist crimes (e.g. Crimes of Terrorism

Act) were amended by the Dutch Government (UNODC, 2014), while the UK

Government enacted the Terrorism Act 2000 (The UK, 2000).

Other countries in Europe have also defined terrorism within their national

legislation, including the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland,

Disengagement

Deradicalisation

Rehabilitation

Counterterrorism

Counter-radicalisation


Portugal, Spain, and Sweden (European Commission Sixth Framework Programme

Project, 2008). The United States of America (USA), India, New Zealand, Australia

and Canada have also tried to define terrorism through their anti-terrorism laws

(Roach, 2007; Young, 2006). In Indonesia, terrorism has been stated and limited in

anti-terrorism law since 2002. In Australia, the first national anti-terrorism laws was

also enacted in 2002; a definition of terrorist act was inserted into the Criminal Code

Act 1995 (Lynch, McGarrity, & Williams, 2015, p. 15; Schloenhardt, 2011, p. 400).

The efforts of these countries to state a definition of terrorism in their legal

system is crucial because this definition is then applied in determining “whether a

violent incident is an act of terrorism” (Martin, 2014, p. 7). Regardless of the

definitional debate, it is important for countries to have a legal definition of terrorism

acts, because terrorist attacks occurred worldwide, including in Europe, Asia, and

Africa. In the case of bombing attacks, for example, anti-terrorism laws can be used

to prosecute and convict both those who conduct the attacks and those who work

“behind the scene”.

However, the ongoing debate about the definition of terrorism should be noted.

This issue has been recognised by many scholars in the field (Aly, 2011, p. 4; Lutz &

Lutz, 2011, pp. 1-2; Martin, 2014, p. 41; Richards, 2014), and Ganor (2002, p. 287)

stated that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. In his publication

in 2014, Gottlieb (2014, p. 1) asserted that agreement among experts will never be

reached on the definition of terrorism. Moreover, Mahan and Griset (2013, p. 3)

concluded that a personal perspective is included in establishing a precise definition

of terrorism, and thus a general agreement on the definition will not likely be

achieved. Thus, a universal definition of terrorism remains an ongoing debate.

Although Schmid also acknowledged a definitional problem for terrorism, he

argues that efforts should be made to achieve a “good enough” definition of terrorism

(Schmid, 2011, p. 4). In order to achieve a good enough definition of terrorism,

Easson and Schmid (2011) compiled more than 250 academic, governmental, and

intergovernmental definitions of terrorism. Based on this compilation, Schmid then

proposed a revised “academic consensus definition of terrorism” (ACDT) for his

work with Jongman in 1983 and 1988 (Schmid, 2011, pp. 86-87).

Equally perplexing as finding a common and global definition for terrorism is

the struggle to define a terrorist. These terms (terrorism and terrorist), can generally


be differentiated as an act and an actor: terrorism is the act and a terrorist is the actor.

As a result, those who commit terrorism acts could be defined as terrorists. But, as

has been established, the problem is the lack of a universal definition of terrorism.

Establishing a definition for terrorist prisoners seems more easily accepted by

the international community since there is no definitional debate about the term

“prisoners”, either in the academic arena or on a practical level. At the international

level, for example, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners is

widely accepted as universal guidance for the countries on the treatment of prisoners

and the management of institutions (Clifford, et al., 1972; Skoler, 1975; OHCHR).

The definition of prisoner can be found easily in general dictionaries such as the

Oxford Dictionary and the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. In the online Oxford

Dictionary, a “prisoner” is defined as a person legally committed to prison as

punishment for a crime or while awaiting trial. Similarly, in the online Merriam-

Webster Dictionary, a “prisoner” is described as a person who is kept in a prison or a

person who has been captured and is being kept somewhere.

For the purposes of this study, the definition of prisoner will follow the

definition in the Oxford Dictionary as a person legally committed to prison as

punishment for a crime. Although “conviction under terrorist legislation is not a

primary manner of identification” (Silke, 2011, p. 123), the term “terrorist prisoner”

in this study will be limited to a person legally committed to prison as punishment

for a terrorism crime under state anti-terrorism laws. In other words, a terrorist

prisoner refers to someone who is convicted by the Court for terrorism acts under a

country’s anti-terrorism laws, and consequently lives in prison or jail, whether for a

short or a long time, or even for life.

In this sense, the term “terrorist prisoners” does not include those who are

categorised as “suspected terrorists” or those who are being interrogated by police

departments, those who are awaiting trial or are in the trial sessions, or even those

with the status of fugitive because of acts of terrorism. Thus, this thesis focuses

solely on convicted terrorists. Until a guilty verdict is stated by the court and the

person is sentenced to imprisonment for terrorism acts, the person is not categorised

as a terrorist prisoner.

In addition, because the term prisoner is similar to others such as “convicted”,

“convict”, and “inmate”, these terms will be used interchangeably in this thesis. That


is, throughout this thesis the terms “terrorist inmate” and ‘terrorist convict’ are used

interchangeably with “terrorist prisoners”. The term “convicted terrorist” also has the

same meaning as is “terrorist prisoner”.

1.7 PUBLICATIONS

I have published and disseminated the following articles from the work

presented in this thesis:

1. Suarda, I Gede Widhiana (2016). A Literature Review on Indonesia’s

Deradicalization Program for Terrorist Prisoners. Jurnal Mimbar Hukum,

28(3), pp. 526-543 (Suarda, 2016).

2. Suarda, I Gede Widhiana (2015). Terrorism and Terrorist Prisoners in

Indonesia. Asian Criminological Society 7th Annual Conference on

Criminology and Criminal Justice in a Changing World: Contributions

from Asia (p. 86). Hong Kong: Asian Criminological Society (Suarda,

2015).

1.8 THESIS STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER OUTLINE

This thesis is comprised into eight chapters. Each chapter has a specific

purpose. However, they are related in terms of the objectives of the study, the

methodology, the findings and the discussion.

Chapter 1 provides an overall background for the study. It revolves around the

context of the research, the research questions, the objectives of the research, and the

significance of the research. Furthermore, the conceptual frameworks deployed in

this study, a working definition for the term “terrorist prisoner” and the list of my

publications are also briefly provided.

Chapter 2 reviews current literature on Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation programs. The literature surrounding the issue of Indonesia’s prison-

based deradicalisation programs is thoroughly investigated and research on this topic

is substantively evaluated. As a result, a research gap in the topic of Indonesia’s

prison-based deradicalisation program is identified.

Chapter 3 details the research methodology applied in this study. It discusses

the use of particular research methods for qualitative social research and legal

research. The methods are used because the set of research questions in this study


must be addressed by different methods. The chapter then also describes ethical

concerns for conducting fieldwork within the prison environment in Indonesia, as

well as the scope and limitations of this study.

Chapter 4 discusses fundamental matters relating to the two existing

Indonesian laws relevant to this study, Indonesia’s Anti-terrorism Laws and Anti-

terrorism Financing Law. Further, the relationship between these laws and the

prison-based deradicalisation programs being implemented by the Indonesian prison

authorities is presented.

Chapter 5 investigates how Indonesian prison officers experience the

rehabilitation of terrorists. Based on the officers’ first hand experiences in

implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs, I specifically discuss the

challenges facing Indonesian prison officers in their role in rehabilitating terrorist

inmates. The discussion includes an analysis of the reasons behind the beliefs about

such challenges experienced by the prison officers.

Chapter 6 moves further that analyses Indonesian prison officers’ views about

the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia. In this

chapter, I explore the perspectives, ideas, and opinions of the officers surrounding

the government initiative to establish a specialised terrorist prison in the Indonesian

correctional system.

Chapter 7 examines and assesses strategies to improve the role of Indonesian

prison officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs. The first half of

the chapter examines the practical need of Indonesian prison officers to rehabilitate

terrorist inmates. To validate the need, the previous findings and analysis about the

challenges faced by the Indonesian prison officers in the task of terrorist

rehabilitation are revisited. The second half of the chapter assesses strategies that

could be used to improve the officers’ role in deradicalisation. It recognises the

frameworks of policy and legal reform research that are applied on the study of law.

Chapter 8, the final chapter, comprises two sections. In the first section, I

summarise the research and the main findings of this study. The second section

offers recommendations: practical recommendations for the Government of

Indonesia and suggestions for future research.


Literature Review

While criminologists have talked about rehabilitation of criminals for

decades, the idea of specific rehabilitation programs designed for terrorists is

a new idea. What is even newer is the widespread understanding of their

importance. (Stone, 2015, p. 223)

The issue of terrorist prisoners has been studied worldwide within the rising

issue of radicalisation during incarceration (Useem & Clayton, 2009, p. 561). The

amount of cross-disciplinary academic writing on terrorist prisoners has increased

substantially in recent years (Jackson, Smyth, & and Gunning, 2009, p. 4). Therefore,

an understanding of previous research is important to justify that this study asks new

questions and provide innovative insights.

The literature surrounding the issue of Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation program is thoroughly investigated in this chapter. Terrorism,

terrorist prisoners, and prison-based deradicalisation programs in the Indonesian

context are explored. Previous research on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation

program is substantively evaluated. As a result, a research gap on the topic of

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program is identified. Finally, the

implications of this study for the existing field of science are also presented.

2.1 TERRORISM IN INDONESIA: INCIDENTS, NETWORKS, AND

FUTURE THREATS

Bomb attacks in Indonesia began in 2000 with the targeting of churches,

followed by several suicide bombings up to and including 2005. Based on the

number of victims and international impacts, the most notorious attacks were the first

Bali bombing in 2002, the first Marriot Hotel bombing in Jakarta in 2003, the

bombing of the Australian Embassy in 2004, and the second Bali bombing in 2005

(Sarwono, 2012, p. 75). Because of subsequent investigations, in November 2005 the

Indonesian National Police (INP) killed one of the most important masterminds

behind these bombing attacks, Dr Azahari Husin.


Between 2005 and 2009, bomb attacks were controlled successfully by the

INP, and Indonesia experienced no bombing incidents during this period (Sarwono,

2012, p. 76). The effectiveness of the INP in preventing attacks from 2005 to 2009

was the result of improved investigation, with a focus on prevention. Hence, the

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cells were dismantled, and some future attacks were

prevented. Interestingly, the investigation’s processes were also supported by Nasir

bin Abas, “the former head of JI’s Mantiqi III and head of military training in the

Southern Philippines who became disillusioned with the al-Qaeda campaign of terror

against soft Western targets” (Abuza, 2009, p. 198). His role remains vital because

he provides valuable information for police investigations of JI and its operations.

However, in 2009, bombs exploded at the J.W. Marriott Hotel and the Ritz

Carlton Hotel in Jakarta. The bombing at the J.W. Marriott Hotel was the second at

that location, following an earlier attack in 2004. Several perpetrators were

identified, including Indonesia’s most wanted Islamist militant, Noordin M. Top. The

authorities claimed that he was the mastermind behind the attack (BBC, 2009).

Noordin was a fugitive after several bombing attacks, until the INP killed him in a

shoot-out during a raid in Central Java in September 2009. However, although

Noordin and Dr Azahari Husin had been killed, Indonesia was not become secure

from the threat of terrorism. Sydney Jones stated that:

It’s a major success for the police but it doesn’t mean, unfortunately, that the

problem of terrorism is over. It’s still unclear how many people were in

Noordin’s group and there are a number of fugitives still at large who have

at least the potential to replace him as the leader of an al Qaeda-like

organization. (Reuters, 2009, paragraph 7)

Attacks have still occurred since 2009, but with a shift in both the methods and

the targets. The perpetrators have not only used bombs as a strategy to attack the

targets, but have also used firearms. Moreover, the attackers are not only focused on

Western targets, but also on local ones. Heiduk noted that “Indonesian officials and

government institutions have increasingly become targets” (Heiduk, 2012, p. 33). A

failed bomb plot to assassinate former President Yudhoyono in 2010 is an example

of this change in strategy. The plot was uncovered by police surveillance and two


bomb-makers were killed during the subsequent raid. As another example, Hamparan

Perak police station in Sumatera Utara province was attacked and destroyed by

several people with firearms in 2010, killing three police officers (BBC Indonesia,

2010). Since this incident, several other police stations have been attacked by

terrorists and more police officers shot and killed. In March, June, and August 2014,

for instance, former Indonesian Police Chief General Sutarman declared that three

police officers who died in Bima were shot by terrorists (Merdeka.com, 2014).

Rather than attacking Western targets, therefore, evidence suggests that one of

the main trends in terrorism in Indonesia since 2009 has been attacking the police

(either by shooting police officers or destroying police stations). Another important

trend to emerge during this period has been attacks on the public, regardless of

whether they are of Muslim or other faiths. In April 2011, for example, there was a

bomb attack on a mosque in the Cirebon police station complex, as well as a planned

attack on the Christ Cathedral Church that was prevented by police. Later, in August

2013, the Vihara Ekayana Buddhist Centre in Jakarta was also the target of bombing

attacks (Kompas.com, 2013a). To summarise, since 2009 the terrorists have changed

from attacking mostly Western targets to attacking specific targets such as police

stations, churches, viharas (Buddhist temples), and even mosques. The finding of a

list of viharas located in and around Jakarta that was printed by suspected terrorists

(who were arrested in Jakarta and East Java in January 2014) indicates that targets

are random.

The majority of people assume that JI is behind the bomb attacks in Indonesia,

particularly the incidents from 2000 to 2005. Sarwono states that during this period

the perpetrators were JI members. JI was established in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar

and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Sarwono, 2012, p. 78; Ramakrishna, 2015, p. 184). This

group has a relationship with al Qaeda, indicated by the programs of Abdullah

Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir sending the Bali bombers group to “pre-jihad

training” on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to jihad fronts in

Afghanistan, the Philippines, Ambon, and Poso (Sunarko, 2006, p. 127). JI also has

close links to other Islamist Militant groups throughout South East Asia, such as the

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines (Arianti, 2012, p. 9; Jones & Morales,

2012, p. 213). Importantly, the main goal of JI is to establish a pan-Islamic country in


South East Asia (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011, p. 161; Jones & Morales,

2012, p. 214; Pusponegoro, 2003, p. 103).

In relation to the types of terrorist target, it could be argued that terrorism in

Indonesia is religiously motivated because JI pursue the replacement of the

established government with an Islamic government. Furthermore, JI is striving for

the creation of a pan-Islamic government in Indonesia despite the opposition of the

majority of Indonesian Muslims to this idea.

Classification of terrorism varies across the emerging literature in the fields of

sociology, criminology, and peace studies. Martin (2010, p. 46), for instance, divides

terrorism into five categories: state terrorism, dissident terrorism, criminal terrorism,

international terrorism, and religious terrorism. State terrorism (terrorism “from

above”) is terrorism committed by established governments against their perceived

enemies, either internationally or nationally, while dissident terrorism (terrorism

“from below”) is terrorism committed by various non-governmental actors against

governments, specific groups, or other perceived enemies (Martin, 2010, p. 46).

Criminal terrorism is terrorism in which the goal is financial or political gain, or

both, whereas international terrorism is terrorism in which the goal is a global effect,

or the target is an international symbol (Martin, 2010, p. 46). Religious terrorism is

“terrorism motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned

– and commanded – the application of terrorist violence for the greater glory of

faith” (Martin, 2010, p. 46).

However, critical scholars of criminology state that categorising terrorism can

be more of an obstacle than an aid to rigorous research, although they also argue that

attempts to categorise terrorism can be beneficial in gaining understanding of this

phenomenon (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, & Smyth, 2011, p. 171). Therefore,

categorising the acts of terrorism in Indonesia into a specific typology may lead to a

better understanding of the problems. Based on both the current situation, and the

body of literature and empirical research, the acts of terrorism in Indonesia can be

categorised as religious terrorism according to the above definition. For instance,

Martin identified Laskar Jihad, an armed Islamic group in Indonesia, as a religious

terrorist group, along with Aum Shinrikyo, Lord’s Resistance Army, Palestine

Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Jammu-Kashmir groups, Sikh groups,

and Algerian/North African cells (Martin, 2014, p. 156).


According to Gregg (2014, p. 40), religious terrorism can be divided into three

subcategories based on their goals: “fomenting the apocalypse, creating a religious

government, and religiously cleansing a state”. Because the goal is to establish an

Islamic government in Indonesia, JI’s intention identifies them as an example of the

second subcategory.

On the other hand, Singh (2004, p. 65) has warned that blaming incidents only

on JI is not accurate because “there are many regionally-based terrorists groups that

have nothing to do with the JI”. Related to this statement, a report by Ansyaad Mbai,

the former Head of the Indonesian National Anti-terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional

Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]), offers support for Singh’s view.

Furthermore, Ansyaad Mbai stated that there are various concentrations of terrorist

groups in Indonesia, including Qoidah Aminah in North Sumatera and Aceh,

Mujahid Indonesia Barat in Lampung and Java, Islamic State for Indonesia (Negara

Islam Indonesia – [NII]) in South Kalimantan and Tasikmalaya, Mujahid Indonesia

Timur in Poso; Asmar in Sulawesi, Walid group in Ambon, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid

(JAT) in Bali, Bima networks in West Nusa Tenggara, and the Solo networking

group (Tempo.co, 2014). These groups demonstrate the widespread nature of new

terrorist cells and their networks in Indonesia, whether they have links to JI or not.

This situation indicates that Indonesia remains under threat of terrorism in the

future. Even though a study has concluded that “Indonesia is the least risky, least

volatile, and most resilient” (White, Porter, & Mazerolle, 2013, p. 315) when

compared with the Philippines and Thailand, many experts (ICG, 2012, p. 24;

Sarwono, 2012, p. 84; Ungerer, 2011, p. 17) predict that terrorist attacks will likely

occur in Indonesia in the future. It does mean that terrorist attacks may still occur in

Indonesia in the future, despite greater risk elsewhere in the region.

2.2 TERRORIST INMATES IN INDONESIAN PRISONS: FACTS AND

FIGURES

Data concerning the exact number of convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons

vary between reports and articles. Some reports (Abuza, 2009, p. 198; Horgan &

Braddock, 2010, p. 274) estimate that more than 300 individuals were sent to prison

by 2007, while Ungerer (2011, p. 11) suggests that around two-thirds of nearly 600

suspects were convicted between 2000 and 2010. Similarly, the IRIN reported that

600 of 830 individuals were sentenced for conducting acts of terrorism in the decade


2002 – 2012 (IRIN, 2012). Notwithstanding the different timeframes, the

inconsistent data reported in these sources is confusing.

More accurate data about the number of terrorist convicts can be seen on the

official website of the Directorate General of Corrections, Republic of Indonesia

(Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan Republik Indonesia – [Ditjenpas RI]). In this

official government database, the number of terrorist prisoners was first established

in 2011. The number of terrorist prisoners in the years 2011 – 2017 is given as 109

(Ditjenpas RI, 2011), 204 (Ditjenpas RI, 2012), 276 (Ditjenpas RI, 2013a), 277

(Ditjenpas RI, 2014a), 216 (Ditjenpas RI, 2015a), 205 (Ditjenpas RI, 2016a) and 224

(Ditjenpas RI, 2017), respectively. The data show that by August 2013 the number of

terrorist inmates had increased to nearly three times the number in August 2011.

Although the number of terrorist inmates remained steady in 2014, the number fell

sharply from 277 in 2014 to 216 in 2015, and then remained fairly steady in the

following two years. Overall, the number of terrorist prisoners in Indonesia has been

above 200 since 2012, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 below.

Figure 2.1 The Number of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesia (2011 - 2017)

These prisoners are not isolated in one or two special prisons, but are dispersed

among several prisons across the provinces. By August 2015, the data show that 216

convicted terrorists were dispersed among 33 prisons and detention centres

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017


throughout the islands, as presented in Table 2.1.2 Pasir Putih Nusakambangan

Prison holds the largest concentration of terrorist inmates (37), followed by Cipinang

Prison (23). The fewest inmates are held in Medan Prison, Palembang Prison, Banda

Aceh Prison, Magelang Prison, Kuningan Prison, Garut Prison, Ciamis Prison,

Cianjur Prison, Indramayu Prison, Wonosobo Detention Center, Sanggan Detention

Center and Tanggerang Women’s Prison, all of which hold only one terrorist

prisoner. Additionally, the data indicate that there is only one female terrorist held in

Indonesian jails.

Table 2.1 The Distribution of Terrorist Prisoners in Indonesian Prisons and Detention Centres

No. Prison/Detention Centre Province Terrorist

prisoners

1 Batu Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 19

2 Cipinang Prison Jakarta 23

3 Cirebon Prison West Java 11

4 Madiun Prison East Java 2

5 Medan Prison North Sumatera 1

6 Palembang Prison South Sumatera 1

7 Semarang Prison Central Java 18

8 Surabaya Prison East Java 12

9 Tangerang Prison Banten 13

10 Banda Aceh Prison Aceh 1

11 Besi Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 4

12 Cibinong Prison West Java 19

13 Karawang Prison West Java 4

14 Kediri Prison East Java 2

15 Kembang Kuning Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 10

16 Magelang Prison Central Java 1

17 Palu Prison Central Sulawesi 2

2 Since the fieldwork was conducted at the end of 2015, I used the data of terrorist inmates as reported

by August 2015 in considering the research sites for conducting the focus group discussions with

Indonesian prison officers. This consideration is further discussed in Chapter 3 (Research Design).


18 Pamekasan Prison East Java 7

19 Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 37

20 Permisan Nusakambangan Prison Central Java 10

21 Salemba Prison Jakarta 5

22 Kuningan Prison West Java 1

23 Subang Prison West Java 2

24 Garut Prison West Java 1

25 Ciamis Prison West Java 1

26 Cianjur Prison West Java 1

27 Indramayu Prison West Java 1

28 Lumajang Prison East Java 2

29 Cipinang Detention Centre Jakarta 2

30 Wonosobo Detention Centre Central Java 1

31 Jepara Detention Centre Central Java 9

32 Sanggan Detention Centre West Kalimantan 1

33 Tangerang Women’s Prison Banten 1

Total 216

Source: Ditjenpas (2015b)

Compared with the total number of convicted prisoners under the charge of

special criminal acts in Indonesian prisons, Table 2.1 indicates that the number of

terrorist prisoners is small. Specifically, of 74,449 prisoners convicted of special

criminal acts by August 2015, the number of terrorist prisoners was only 216

(Ditjenpas RI, 2015b). Therefore, the percentage of prisoners convicted of terrorist

offences is less than 1 percent of the total number of prisoners held under special

criminal acts. Table 2.2 shows the number of other types of prisoners convicted

under special criminal acts by August 2015 (Ditjenpas RI, 2015b).


Table 2.2 The Number of Prisoners Convicted under Special Criminal Acts by August 2015

Type of Crime The Number of Prisoner

Corruption 4,387

Drugs and Narcotics - Dealers 42,053

Drugs and Narcotics - Users 26,220

Illegal Logging 1,142

Human Trafficking 319

Money Laundering 110

Genocide 2

Source: Ditjenpas (2015b)

These facts and figures for convicted terrorists are similar to the trends in other

countries. For example, The Netherlands held only five terrorist prisoners in 2010

(Neumann, 2010, pp. 17-18), while Australia held 21 convicted terrorists in 2011

(Porter & Kebbel, 2011, p. 212), and Canada held 18 convicted terrorists in 2015

(Monaghan, 2015, p. 385). Despite these relatively small totals, Silke (2014, p. 3)

argues that “when such prisoners do start to appear in the prison system their impact

can be out of all proportion to their number”, a concern that raises the issue of

recruitment and radicalisation of “ordinary” prisoners. Similarly, with regard to

suspected terrorists, Walen (2011, p. 872) has argued that “they are predicted to pose

a threat larger than that of almost all other criminals”.

In addition, although Indonesian officials claim that many convicted terrorists

repeat acts of terrorism, as highlighted in the introduction, a firm official number of

recidivism cases for acts of terrorism has not been provided, including on the official

website of the DGC. This lack of clarity has been underlined by C. R. Jones (2014, p.

87) and Ungerer (2011, p. 17).

2.3 THE NATURE OF INDONESIA’S DE-RADICALISATION PROGRAM

FOR TERRORIST PRISONERS

Terrorist prisoners are not the same as other criminals (Goldman, 2014, p. 48).

Rather, they are special because this type of prisoner carries an ideology (Gunaratna,

2011, p. 67). A review conducted by Pressman and Flockton (2014, pp. 123-125)


confirmed that there are significant differences between terrorists, violent extremists,

and non-ideologically motivated violent offenders.

Pressman and Flockton (2014, p. 124) pointed out that although terrorists and

violent extremists both use violence to further political, religious, and ideological

aims, the acts of violent extremists commonly have no “intention to cause fear and

terror in civilian populations or decision makers”. The authors point to violent anti-

abortionists as an example. This group intends to cause enormous destructions to

public facilities such as property, buildings, vehicles, and hospitals, but “they have

not demonstrated an interest in indiscriminate civilian killing, or maximum diffuse

destruction” (Presman & Flockton, 2014, p. 124). In contrast, this psychological

intention is a common objective of terrorist attacks (Presman & Flockton, 2014, p.

124).

Furthermore, Pressman and Flockton (2014, pp. 124-125) identified a sharp

distinction between violent extremists and non-ideologically motivated violent

offenders based on a review of previous studies. Table 2.3 summarise the significant

differences between violent extremists and non-ideologically motivated offenders.

Table 2.3 Presman and Flockton Review of the Differences between Violent Extremists and Non-

Ideologically Motivated Offenders

Violent Extremists

Non-Ideologically Motivated Offenders

Motivated by ideologies, beliefs, and

social and religious political causes.

Known to engage in acts generally due to

motivations such as personal gain,

addictions, criminogenic needs, and impulse

control problems.

Advertise their attacks and they

communicate their goals.

Try to avoid detection and attention.

They are not mentally ill or

psychologically disordered.

Regularly exhibit personality disorders,

psychopathy, uncontrollable aggression,

behaviour problems, and/or other mental or

clinical disorders.

Source: Presman & Flockton (2014, pp. 124-125)


As a consequence of these differences between terrorists and other criminals,

terrorist prisoners should be rehabilitated under a specific program. Although Mullin

has observed that there are opportunities to adopt best practices from the

rehabilitative literature on ordinary prisoners, he also noted that “the content of

criminal and terrorist rehabilitation programs will always differ” (Mullins, 2010, p.

162).

A specific deradicalisation program for terrorist prisoners has been

implemented in several countries in order to achieve the goal of rehabilitation and to

stop the spread of radicalisation in prisons. Saudi Arabia, for example, has a strategy

called Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC). In general, the program is

recognised as a “soft” approach to terrorist prisoners within the concept of reform

and transformation (Porges, 2014, p. 169). In another example, the United Kingdom

has launched CONTEST (the government’s counterterrorism strategy) and the

revised PREVENT strategy (Pickering, 2014, p. 161).

Deradicalisation programs in several countries display similarities, or at least

have the same approach or pattern, for example France, The Netherlands, Spain, the

UK, and the USA (Neumann, 2010, p. 13). The programs in these countries focus on

security, with only a limited awareness of promoting reform (Neumann, 2010, p. 13).

On the other hand, the approaches also differ in some respects. For instance, of the

five countries named, only The Netherlands has implemented “concentration”

principles, whereby all terrorist prisoners are held in one place in the high security

prisons in Vaugh. The remaining four countries apply dispersal and partial

concentration policies (Neumann, 2010, p. 18). Although both policies “have

advantages and disadvantages” (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. xi),

Mulcahy, Merrington, and Bell (2013, p. 11) concluded that “overall, academics in

the field of terrorism agree that we may be facilitating radicalism by integrating

converted Islamic extremist with criminals”.

In the Philippines, a deradicalisation program exists, but the policy is designed

and implemented differently across the correctional system. For example, in the New

Bilibid Prison (NBP) convicted terrorists are integrated with ordinary inmates,

whereas in the Metro Manila District Jail (MMDJ) they are separated from the

general prison population (Jones & Morales, 2012, p. 219). To sum up, in terms of

deradicalisation programs worldwide, although every country has its own approach,


each country’s program has similarities, significant differences, or both to those of

other countries.

Through the prisons and detention centres, Indonesia also runs a

deradicalisation program for terrorist prisoners. However, Indonesia’s distinct

program for convicted terrorists does not just follow the global trend as implemented

in other countries. Arguably, the foundation of Indonesia’s program is underpinned

by two principal factors: (1) that Indonesia has terrorist prisoners; and (2) that there

is an indication of the spread of radicalisation in Indonesian prisons.3 Moreover, as

mentioned earlier, experts and studies conclude that Indonesia remains under the

threat of terrorism despite some of the most wanted terrorists being killed or

imprisoned. Therefore, the possibility of terrorist prisoners will remain.

Indonesia’s deradicalisation program for terrorist inmates has been

implemented by either prison services or other governmental agencies such as the

INP and the BNPT. Among these institutions, the program is coordinated by the

BNPT, which was established in 2010 based on the President’s Regulation Number

46. Ironically, although the program is coordinated by the BNPT, some studies

(Istiqomah, 2012, p. 268; Sarwono, 2012, p. 136) have stressed that the involvement

of many agencies in the implementation of the program has drawbacks in achieving

the goals of rehabilitation. Indeed, the program has been described as

“underfinanced, understaffed, and not terribly institutionalized” (Abuza, 2009, p.

198). To cope with these problems, Ungerer (2011, p. 19) recommended that the

coordination between the BNPT and prison services should be improved in their

efforts to rehabilitate convicted terrorists.

The literature shows that the rehabilitation initiatives for terrorist convicts can

involve disengagement, deradicalisation, or both (Hill, 2011, p. 32; Horgan &

3 A report prepared by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (2016, p.

271) noted the problems associated with the term “radicalisation as an expression of legitimate

political thought” and its relationship to radicalism. This is because radicalism “does not, in itself, lead

to violence” (European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 2016, p. 271). In this

context, S. Jones explained that the term radical “means so many different things” (Jones S. , 2006, p.

3). Further, and specifically in Indonesia, S. Jones identified that “five groups in particular need to be

distinguished” (Jones S. , 2006, p. 3). These five groups can be placed in three categories. The first

group rejects violence, such as Muslim political parties and Hizbut-Tahrir. The second groups are

willing to use violence, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Salafis. The third groups are willing to

use violence and engage in terror attacks, such as Jema’ah Islamiyah and its affiliates (Jones S. , 2006,

pp. 3-5).


Braddock, 2010, p. 280; Mullins, 2010, p. 163). Deradicalisation is related to

psychological change in terrorists’ ideology, while disengagement focuses on

behavioural change. Both of these programs can be implemented at either a group

(collective) level or an individual level (Neumann, 2010, p. 12).

After an examination of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program, some

researchers (Abuza, 2009; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Osman, 2014; Sarwono, 2012)

have argued that Indonesia’s practices in managing terrorist inmates reflect

disengagement rather than deradicalisation. However, Schmid (2013, p. 41) stated

that Indonesia’s program is a combination of individual and collective

deradicalisation. In a study on radicalisation and deradicalisation in 15 countries,

Neumann (2010, pp. 47-58) identified Indonesia as a country that deploys individual

deradicalisation and disengagement programs, along with Afghanistan, the

Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Yemen. Regardless of which programs are

best suited to Indonesia’s approach, all agree that the notable features of Indonesia’s

program are utilising a former terrorist, Nasir bin Abbas, to re-educate terrorist

prisoners; and providing monetary incentives or economic assistance to captured

terrorists, including their families.

Deradicalisation programs in Indonesian prisons are currently developed and

managed locally by prison directors and are consistent with a prison’s circumstances

and capability (Andrie, 2011, p. 10). Based on fieldwork conducted in some

Indonesian prisons and detention centres, Andrie concluded that most of these

prisons did not have a specific program for rehabilitating or deradicalising terrorist

prisoners (Andrie, 2011, pp. 10-14). Only two prisons were considered to have

adequate programs: Porong (Surabaya) Prison and Semarang Prison (Andrie, 2011,

p. 10; Maliki, 2013, p. 17).

How terrorist prisoners are housed depends on a prison’s capability. For

example, in Cirebon Prison, terrorist prisoners are prevented from interacting with

each other, whereas in Cibinong Prison they are given the freedom to communicate

with each other. Then, In Cipinang prison, terrorist inmates are placed in a special

block where they also have the opportunity to communicate (Ditjenpas RI, 2013b).

Theoretically, these methods could be classified as a mix of isolation and separation.

According to Neumann (2010, p. 17), there are three models of distribution for this

prisoner population: “namely whether they should all be held in one place


(concentration); whether they should be separated from the general prison population

(separation); and if they should be isolated from each other (isolation)”. Furthermore,

in terms of integration or segregation with general prisoners, C. R. Jones stated that,

although Indonesian prisons try to segregate terrorist inmates, interactions with

general prisoners remain a problem (Jones C. R., 2014). He argued that Indonesia has

no single strategy (Jones C. R., 2014).

2.4 REPORTED OUTCOMES OF INDONESIA’S DERADICALISATION

PROGRAM FOR TERRORIST INMATES

Discussion of the outcomes of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program reveals

disagreement about its efficacy. Although research has shown that Indonesian

prisons can be assessed positively for their deradicalisation initiatives (Ranstorp,

2009), a study conducted by Horgan and Braddock argues that such assessments of

initiatives that focus on monetary incentives are “inaccurate and certainly premature

to consider this true de-radicalisation” (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 267 and 269).

Moreover, Hasan and Yasin’s investigation concluded that weakness in the prison

system has allowed incarcerated terrorists to “continue their contribution to the

extremist’s long term strategy” (Hassan & Yasin, Indonesian Prisons: A Think Tank

for Terrorist, 2012, p. 12). Various articles and books on pro-violence ideology have

been published by incarcerated extremists. Despite their small number, Hasan and

Yasin reviewed that “the potential of such publications to radicalise the broader

community should not be underestimated” (Hassan & Yasin, Indonesian Prisons: A

Think Tank for Terrorist, 2012, p. 11).

Nurezki (2013, p. 90) stated that the effectiveness of the deradicalisation

program that is now being run by the Indonesian government is questionable due to

recidivism cases in terror activities. After an investigation based on various sources,

including fieldwork, he reported that 15 former terrorist prisoners had reoffended

(Table 2.4).


Table 2.4 List of Recidivist Terrorists

Name Previous offences Involvement in

Deradicalisation

Program

Post-release

activities

Current

status

1.

Abdullah

Sunata

Possession of firearms

and sheltering Noordin

Top. Orchestrated Bali

bombings.

In May 2006, District

Court in South Jakarta

sentenced Sunata to 7

years imprisonment.

Cooperated with

police while

undergoing

deradicalisation

program.

Accused of

masterminding a

terrorist training

camp in Aceh and

the plan to attack

the Presidential

Palace on 17

August 2010.

In 2010,

sentenced to

10 years

imprisonment.

2.

Abu Bakar

Ba’asyir

Amir of Jemaah

Islamiyah. Masterminded

several key bombings

such as Bali Bombing 1.

In 2003, sentenced to 4

years imprisonment.

Released in 2006 for

cooperating with police.

Rejected

deradicalisation

program

Financer and ran a

training camp in

Aceh.

In 2011,

sentenced to

15 years

imprisonment.

3.

Aman

Abdurrahman

Masterminded the

bombing of Cimanggis in

2004. Sentenced to 7

years imprisonment.

Released in 2008.

Rejected

deradicalisation

program. Launched

a counter-

deradicalisation

narrative while in

prison.

Provided financial

assistance to

Dulmatin at a

military training

camp in Aceh.

In 2010,

sentenced to 9

years

imprisonment.

4.

Agus

Kasdianto

alias Hasan

alias Musaf

bin Nasim

Involved in the bombing

of Senen Atrium 2001.

Also involved in

Cimanggis bombing.

Sentenced to 5 years

imprisonment.

Involved in a

rehabilitation

program in prison.

Participated in a

terrorist camp in

Aceh.

In 2011,

sentenced to 9

years

imprisonment.

5.

Air Setyawan Sheltered Urwah and

Noordin Top. Involved in

Australian Embassy

bombing. In 2004,


imprisonment.

Went through

rehabilitation

program in prison.

Delivered bomb

to bekasi.

Shot dead in

Bekasi,

August 2009.

6.

Bagus Budi

Pranoto alias

Urwah

Collaborated with

Noordin Top. Sentenced

in 2004 to 4 years

imprisonment. Released

in 2007 for good

behaviour.

Rejected the

program. Launched

a counter-

deradicalisation

narrative while in

prison. However,

later cooperated

with police.

Wanted by the

police in 2009 for

his connection

with the Ritz

Carlton and JW

Marriott

bombings.

Shot dead in

Solo,

September

2009.

7.

Enceng

Kurnia alias

Arham alias

Arnold

Sheltered Dulmatin and

Umar Patek. In 2006

sentenced to 6 years


in 2008.

Went through a

deradicalisation

program in

Cipinang prison.

Ran a terrorist

camp in Aceh

Shot dead in

Aceh, March

2009.

8.

Fadli Sadama Involved in a robbery at

Lippo Bank in Medan.

Imprisoned from 2004 to

2007.

Put through

deradicalisation

program. Released

for good behaviour.

Sheltered Urwah

and involved in a

robbery at Bank

Niaga in Medan.

In 2013,

Escaped from

Tanjung

Gusta Prison

in North

Sumatra.


9.

Luthfi

Haedaroh

alias Ubeid

Collaborated with


to 4 years imprisonment.

Released in 2007.

Put through

deradicalisation

program.

Trainer for a

military camp in

Aceh.

In 2010,

sentenced to

10 years

imprisonment.

10.

Heri Sigu

Samboja alias

Soghir

Assembled bomb that

exploded outside

Australian embassy in

Jakarta. Sentenced to 7

years imprisonment in

2005. Released 2008.

Put through

deradicalisation

program. Released

for good behaviour.

Masterminded

bombing of

Danish’s Embassy

in Jakarta.

In 2011,

sentenced to 8

years

imprisonment.

11.

Rahmat Puji

Prabowo alias

Bejo

Collaborated with


in 2004 for 7.5 years

imprisonment.

Did not participate

in deradicalisation

program. Mentored

drug addicts while

in prison.

Sheltered Urwah.

Transported

explosives.

In 2010,

sentenced to 3

years

imprisonment.

12.

Mustofa alias

Abu Tholut

Took part in the bombing

of the Atrium shopping

mall in Central Jakarta in

2001. Found guilty of

possessing illegal

ammunition and

explosives in 2003.


imprisonment in 2004 but

received a reduced

sentence in 2007.

Put through a

deradicalisation

programme in

Depok, West Java.

Alleged member

of the Tanzim Al

Qaedah group in

Aceh. Supplied

weapons.

In 2011,

sentenced to 8

years

imprisonment.

13. Suryadi

Masood alias

Umar

Bombed MacDonald’s

restaurant in Makassar,

October 2002. Sentenced

to 8 years imprisonment.

Followed through a

deradicalisation

program in

Cipinang prison.

Purchased

firearms for

training camp in

Aceh.

In 2010, faced

possible death

sentence.

14. Sri Puji

Mulyo

Siswanto

Withheld information

from police regarding the

group led by Subur

Sugianto. In 2006,

sentenced to 6 years

imprisonment.

Put through a post-

release

rehabilitation

program by Noor

Huda. Re-

radicalised due to

old networks.

Provided shelter

for Urwah.

In 2011,

sentenced to 8

years

imprisonment.

15. Thoriqudin

alias Abu

Rusydan

Sheltered Bali bombers

and Mukhlas. In 2003,

sentenced to 3.5 years


in 2005 for good

behaviour.

Showed good

behaviour in prison

and cooperated with

the police Refused

deradicalisation

programme.

Continued to

support Jemaah

Islamiyah

activities but

condemned

violence.

Active in

public forums

and the media.

In early 2013,

labeled the

Indonesian

government as

thogut.

Source: adapted from “A Hazy Redemption: Can Radicalisation Work in Indonesia?” by L.

P. Nurezki, 2013, Master Thesis, National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore, pp.

91-93.

In contrast, after analysing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program

in terms of the level of religious re-education and the level of institutionalisation,

Eckard (2014, p. 199) concluded that “Indonesia has a low to moderate level of


institutionalisation and a moderate level of religious re-education, which indicates an

overall moderate level of effectiveness”. In a comparative analysis of prison-based

deradicalisation programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Yemen, and Western Europe,

Eckard found that the prison-based deradicalisation program that is now being run by

Saudi Arabia was the most effective (Eckard, 2014, p. 199). Further, Eckard found

that the Indonesian deradicalisation programs was moderately effective, while that of

Yemen was lees effective. In comparison with programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,

and Yemen, prison-based deradicalisation programs in Western European countries

had a low level of effectiveness. Eckard (2014, p. 199) presented the overall

assessment of prison-based deradicalisation programs in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,

Yemen, and Western Europe in a quad chart, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 in the next

page.

Figure 2.2 Overall Assessment of Prison-based Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners in

Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Yemen and Western Europe

Level of

Religious Re-

education

Level of Institutionalization

High

High

Low

Saudi Arabia

Indonesia

Low

Yemen

Western Europe

Source: adapted from “Prison-based Deradicalization for Terrorist Detainees: An Analysis

of Programmatic Religious Re-education and Systematic Institutionalization and their

Impact on Achieving Deradicalization”, by T. N. Eckard, 2014, PhD Thesis, Northern

Illinois University (NIU), DeKalb, IL, p. 199.


According to Eckard’s findings, several aspects of Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation program need to be evaluated in order to make the program more

effective, especially at the level of institutionalisation (Eckard, 2014). In this regard,

the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in implementing the program, and their

views on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists, are useful to

examine.

However, the effectiveness of deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners

is not solely an Indonesian issue. As Eckard’s study revealed, prison-based

deradicalisation programs in Yemen and Western Europe countries are less effective

than Indoesia’s program. Many studies have demonstrated that the effectiveness of

deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists is debateable (Caitlin & Szmania,

2016; Ezzarqui, 2010; Ganor & Falk, 2013; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; IPI, 2010).

Related to this issue, El-Said (2012) concluded that “no single formula can deal with

all cases of violent extremism in a single region … and there is no single recipe for

success”. Therefore, any evaluation of the existing Indonesian program must be

conducted thoroughly and critically because Indonesia has a significant number of

terrorist prisoners and more such prisoners are likely in the future.

2.5 LIMITATIONS IN THE CURRENT LITERATURE

Since the 9/11 attacks, terrorism as a research area has become of greater

interest than previously (Silke, 2007, p. 90). This increased interest was predicted by

Walters, because many countries enacted or revised their own anti-terrorism laws

after this time (Walters, 2003, p. 125). Various studies have been conducted, with

journals specifically concerned with terrorism published since the attacks, such as

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism, and Political

Aggression and Critical Studies on Terrorism. It is apparent that terrorism has

become a fruitful research area throughout the world.

Indonesian terrorism research shows the same trend as seen internationally.

Terrorism is not observed exclusively by law and justice scholars; it is discussed by

scholars from various backgrounds. Compilation work by Nainggolan (2002)

provides an example of discussion on terrorism from political, economic, social,

military, security, and religious perspectives, as well as how terrorism affects

relationships between countries on regional and global levels. In Hendropriyono’s


(2009) doctoral thesis at Gadjah Mada University, terrorism is observed from a

philosophical point of view. Meanwhile, in Soeharto’s (2007) doctoral thesis at

Padjajaran University, the topic of terrorism is observed from law and justice

perspectives. He examined the protection of the rights of the suspected terrorist, the

defendant, and the victim. However, discussions on the protection of rights for

terrorist inmates were not included (Soeharto, 2007).

On the other hand, studies on terrorism face the challenge of the definition of

terrorism itself, as discussed in Chapter 1. There is no universal definition of exactly

what terrorism is. Martin (2010, p. 31) concluded that “there is some consensus – but

no unanimity – on what kind of violence constitutes an act of terrorism”. This

challenge does not affect the meaning of studies on terrorism. In fact, many relevant

research topics fall within the area of terrorism research. For example, terrorist

prisoners, radicalisation and de-radicalisation in prisons, counterterrorism, and the

causes of terrorism are specific research topics within the broader area of terrorism

studies.

Specifically, many experts and scholars throughout the world have addressed

research topics on terrorist prisoners and radicalisation in prisons. They examined the

terrorist’s life in prisons, and the spread of radicalisation among prisoners.

Nowadays, radicalisation in prisons is a trending topic among experts, as Useem and

Clayton (2009, p. 561) noted: “the radicalisation of prisoners is one of the most

discussed…”

Previous studies have concluded that radicalisation has already happened in

prisons and found that some radicalised persons were involved in terrorist attacks

after release from prison. Hamm (2009), for instance, demonstrated that some

previous studies revealed indoctrination of bombing actors while in prisons.

Indoctrination spread in prisons in various countries, namely in Morocco, Spain, a

British young offender institution, Jordan’s high-security Suwaqah prison, and

California’s New Folsom Prison. Another study focused on radicalisation in Spanish

prisons, finding that they were unsafe from radicalisation (Trujillo, Jordan, Gutierrez,

& Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2009). Trujillo et al. claimed that higher security has been

implemented for Muslim inmates, because they “demonstrate behavioral patterns in

terms of horizontal and vertical cohesion, endo-groupal identity, and the

legitimisation of terrorism which lead to and indicate a tendency towards radical


Islamism” (Trujillo, Jordan, Gutierrez, & Gonzalez-Cabrera, 2009, p. 578).

Moreover, the authors argued that control and prevention of radicalisation in Spanish

prisons is even more problematical (Trujillo, Jordan, Gutierrez, & Gonzalez-Cabrera,

2009, p. 578).

Similarly, some researchers have demonstrated that radicalisation has already

taken place in Indonesian prisons (Andrie, 2011; ICG, 2007; Septian, 2010).

Previous studies claimed that terrorist prisoners in Indonesia successfully influenced

other inmates to become jihadist. The spread of radical beliefs to prison officers

worsens the situation. In other words, terrorist inmates are not only successful in

radicalising other inmates but also some of the Indonesian prison officers. Some

cases have shown that prison officers were turned into radicals and jihadists (ICG,

2007). It is ironic because their duty is to rehabilitate both terrorist and ordinary

prisoners. The ICG (2007, p. 9) explained that Beni Irawan, a prison officer at

Kerobokan Prison, became “the most militant of their charges, with all the ardor of a

new convert”. He was accused in 2006 of smuggling a laptop computer into Iman

Samudra’s4 cell.

The spread of radicalisation in prisons has become a global issue, especially in

countries that hold terrorist inmates. To cope with this issue, a specific rehabilitation

program for terrorist prisoners has been developed, with the primary goal of the

program being de-radicalisation or disengagement. As a result, deradicalisation or

disengagement is discussed worldwide in academic scholarship. Experts are not only

discussing radicalisation but also deradicalisation or disengagement for convicted

terrorists. For example, Veldhuis (2012) examined an argument for a realist approach

to rehabilitation and reintegration programs for terrorist prisoners, while Schmid

(2013) presented a conceptual discussion and literature review on radicalisation,

deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation. In his review, he explored these terms

and the discourses surrounding them (Schmid, 2013).

According to Schmid (2013, p. 20), previous research over the past 10 years

has focused on Islamist radicalisation, and the deradicalisation of jihadist terrorists.

Schmid (2013, p. 20) demonstrated that existing literature on the topic informs a

4 Imam Samudra was one of the three main actors behind the Bali bombing in October 2002. The

other two were Amrozi and Ali Ghufron. These three perpetrators were sentenced to capital

punishment and executed in 2008.


number of conclusions, regardless of the fact that the findings about religious

radicals might not apply to other types of radical groups (e.g. left-wing militant

radicals). Based on an extensive literature review on the topic, he concluded

(Schmid, 2013, p. 20):

1. Most terrorists are clinically normal, although their acts are considered

widely as extra-normal in moral terms.

2. Backgrounds of terrorists are very diverse; there are many paths to terrorism

and there is no single profile of a terrorist.

3. Radicalisation is usually a gradual, phased process.

4. Individual poverty alone does not cause radicalisation towards terrorism, but

un(der)employment may play a role.

5. Grievances play a role, but often more as a mobilisation device than a

personal experience.

6. Social networks or environments are crucial in drawing vulnerable youths to

a terrorist movement.

7. Ideology often plays an important role in that it can provide the true believer

with a “license to kill”.

8. Disengagement from terrorism often occurs without deradicalisation.

These conclusions indicate that discussion focusing on radicalisation receives

more attention than does deradicalisation. Deradicalisation or disengagement is only

mentioned in Conclusion 8, while radicalisation and its aspects are the focus of

conclusions 1 to 7. More specifically, conclusions 3 to 7 show why someone

becomes a terrorist; and conclusions 1 and 2 show who becomes a terrorist. Schmid’s

review is valuable for synthesising “what we think we know about radicalisation”

(Schmid, 2013, p. iv) and for examining various deradicalisation and counter-

radicalisation programs. He has distilled the current literature on radicalisation,

deradicalisation, and counter-radicalisation globally.

As the scope of this study is Indonesia and its prison-based deradicalisation

program, the question is what aspects are researchers focusing on within this topic, or

how are studies analysing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs. This

literature review found that the various research projects on the Indonesian prison-

based deradicalisation program could be divided into two major groups: those about


the program itself and those about the terrorist prisoners, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.

This division is based on the “angle” from which the program is viewed in the study.

In the first group, aspects of the prison-based deradicalisation program itself are

examined, such as the implementation of the program or analysis of the program

components. In the second group, the prison-based deradicalisation program is

examined from the perspectives of terrorist prisoners, such as their responses to the

program or the extent of their involvement in the program.

Figure 2.3 Grouping of the Existing Research on Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program

Firstly, regarding the first group of studies, research on Indonesia’s prison-

based deradicalisation program that is focused on the program itself widely available

in the literature (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Istiqomah, 2012; Johnston, 2009;

Neumann, 2010; Nurezki, 2013; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010).

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program has been selected either for

comparative analysis or as a case study analysis. For example, Eckard (2014)

examined the prison-based deradicalisation programs in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia,

Yemen and Western Europe. The study provides a comparative analysis of programs

among countries. Then a case study analysis of these programs compares them to the

Research topic on Indonesian prison-based

deradicalisation program

The program The terrorist prisoners

Focus or 'angle' of Discussion


USA’s programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similar to Eckard, Neumann (2010),

Johnston (2009) and Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek (2010) selected

Indonesia’s prison-based de-radicalisation program for analysis alongside those of

other countries. However, these studies did not compare the programs; they applied a

single case study analysis to each national deradicalisation program, including

Indonesia’s program (Johnston, 2009; Neumann, 2010; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, &

Boucek, 2010).

In its report, the ICG (2007) explored some practical aspects of Indonesia’s

program, particularly how terrorist prisoners are housed and what strategies have

been used by the Indonesian authorities to deal with terrorist prisoners. Similarly,

both Nurezki (2013) and Istiqomah (2012) analysed Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation program and its implementation. However, Nurezki and Istiqomah

provide different recommendations for preventing recidivism concerning terrorism

acts. Nurezki (2013, pp. 137-138) argues that the best strategy for deradicalisation in

Indonesia is disengagement, while Istiqomah (2012, p. 273) argues that a reformation

of the correctional system is required.

Secondly, regarding the second group of studies, empirical qualitative studies

on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program viewed from the perspective of

convicted terrorists’ experiences are also available (Andrie, 2011; Osman, 2014;

Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono, 2012; Sukabdi, 2015). The focus of these existing studies is

diverse. Some researchers (Ungerer, 2011, p. 2; Sarwono, 2012, p. 45) examined the

motivations of terrorist prisoners and the factors that influenced them to become

involved in terrorist activities and violent actions. Why the prisoners chose to either

re-engage or disengage from violent acts after release from prisons was also

investigated. Other research analyses prisoner radicalisation and the authorities’

efforts to prevent the spread of radicalisation in Indonesian prisons (Osman, 2014).

Osman and Ungerer used different sources when investigating the

deradicalisation program. Osman (2014, pp. 222-226) evaluated deradicalisation

efforts implemented by the INP and by civil society, while Ungerer (2011, pp. 14-16)

elaborated on and discussed deradicalisation efforts run by the INP and the DGC.

Based on interviews with terrorist prisoners and former terrorist prisoners, these

studies found that most of the subjects claimed that they had not been involved in the

deradicalisation program (Ungerer, 2011, p. 16) and that economic assistance from


the police did not influence their changing views on terror activities (Osman, 2014,

p. 224). In their conclusions, both Ungerer (2011, p. 19) and Osman (2014, p. 226)

stress the importance of the role of Indonesian prisons in rehabilitating terrorist

prisoners; thus a prison-based deradicalisation program is critical for best practice.

In his report, entitled Kehidupan di Balik Jeruji: Terorisme dan Kehidupan

Penjara di Indonesia, Andrie (2011, pp. 17-18) discussed terrorist prisoners’

responses to the deradicalisation program, founding that most of the participants

refused to be involved in the program. His study not only examined terrorist

prisoners’ views but also the programs in the prisons. Based on observations,

literature review and fieldwork, he investigated prisons’ programs, whether prison

had a deradicalisation program for convicted terrorists (Andrie, 2011, pp. 11-14). In

this sense, his study could also be included in the group that observed the prison-

based deradicalisation program from the program perspective.

A recent study that selected terrorist prisoners and former terrorist prisoners as

the subjects of research was conducted by Sukabdi (2015). This study presents more

direct and specific discussions on the relationship between the program and terrorist

prisoners. Sukabdi (2015, p. 52) identifies five substantial findings: “terror activists’

behavior transformation process in Indonesia, critical areas of development needed in

changing terrorism perpetrators’ behaviors, key elements in rehabilitation, criterion

for successful rehabilitation, and parameters of effective deradicalisation”. This study

shows it is possible to transform behaviour from pro-violence to non-violence. To

rehabilitate Indonesian terrorist prisoners, six critical dimensions of development are

needed: social skills, personal skills, vocational skills, spiritual maturity, domestic

skills, and contextual insight (Sukabdi, 2015, p. 46). Furthermore, Sukabdi (2015, p.

49) argues that a successful rehabilitation program for convicted terrorists is

indicated by participants’ rejecting violence and adopting more positive behaviours.

In conclusion, from the two major groups of existing research on the topic of

the Indonesian prison-based deradicalisation programs, a research gap within this

topic can be identified, namely, a lack of studies focused on Indonesian prison

officers as the implementers of the deradicalisation program. Therefore, researching

these prison officers’ experiences and perspectives regarding the prison-based

deradicalisation program is worthwhile. The findings will extend the body of

literature on the topic of Indonesian prison-based deradicalisation programs.


The Designer of the Program

Besides extending the body of literature, researching this topic will help gain

an integrated understanding of the complexity of implementing the deradicalisation

program. Implementing this program is part of a broader process in which several

parties are involved: the program is designed by the authorities (the prison director),

implemented by the implementers (the prison officers), and applied to the

participants (the terrorist prisoners), as illustrated in Figure 2.4.

Furthermore, by extending the object or subject of research into the prison

officers’ experiences and perspectives, research on the Indonesian prison-based

deradicalisation program can then be divided into three major groups: the program

(the tool), the terrorist prisoners (the participants in the program), and the prison

officers (the implementers of the program). Figure 2.5 illustrates an updated division

of the research on Indonesian prison-based deradicalisation program after the subject

of research into the officers’ experiences and perspectives is included.

The Implementer of the Program Prison Officers

Terrorist Prisoners The Participants in the Program

The Prison Director

GOAL:

Rehabilitation/Deradicalisation

Figure 2.4 The Process of the Deradicalisation Program for Terrorist Prisoners in the Context of

Indonesian Correctional Services

The Designer of the Program


Figure 2.5 Including Prison Officers’ Perspectives in the Research Topic of Indonesia’s Prison-based

Deradicalisation Program

To sum up, this study focuses on the experiences and perspectives of

Indonesian prison officers charged with implementing the deradicalisation program.

The investigation was narrowed to the examination of prison officers’ challenges in

implementing the program, prison officers’ views on the establishment of a special

prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia, and strategies to improve future delivery

of the program by prison officers.

Investigating the challenges that Indonesian prison officers face in

implementing the program is critical. Specifically, this will extend the body of

knowledge on prison-based deradicalisation program in the Indonesian context.

Although some researchers (Istiqomah, 2012; Maliki, 2013) have conducted

interviews with Indonesian prison officers and a prison director, they did not

investigate the challenges of implementing the program. For example, although

Maliki’s study also examined the implementation of the rehabilitation and

reintegration program for terrorist prisoners, the prison officers’ challenges were

apparently not investigated; interview results and discussions with only Semarang’s

prison director were provided (Maliki, 2013, pp. 6-7). In Istiqomah’s study, although

she conducted and presented her results of interviews with the prison officers, a

Research topic on Indonesian prison-based

deradicalisation program

The program

(the tools)

The terrorist prisoners

(the participants of the program)

The prison officers

(the implementers of the program)

Focus or 'angle' of discussion


thorough examination of the prison officers’ challenges in implementing the program

is not available. Therefore, research on the challenges that Indonesian prison officers

face would extend the body of knowledge on prison-based deradicalisation programs,

particularly in the Indonesian context.

Moreover, Indonesian authorities have established a special prison for

convicted terrorists in Sentul, Bogor – West Java. There is still contention within the

utilities on whether it is useful in rehabilitating and reintegrating incarcerated

terrorists. However, in-depth studies or empirical research have not been conducted

by either the Indonesian Government or scholars to review the need for this prison.

To identify the strengths and weaknesses of this special prison, empirical research

focused on prison officers’ views of the facility is necessary, because their views

could play an important role in examining the continued existence of this contested

initiative. For these reasons, ascertaining Indonesian officers’ views is essential to

extend the body of current knowledge.

Equally important is to investigate practical recommendations in order to

strengthen the prison officers’ role in supporting the effectiveness of the prison-based

deradicalisation program. Although previous studies provide recommendations on

the implementation of deradicalisation programs in the Indonesian prison

environment, such recommendations remain theoretical and abstract; for example,

recommendations to deliver proper training for prison officers (Nurezki, 2013) and

for correctional institution reform (Istiqomah, 2012). Applicable strategies and

policies that focus on improving prison officers’ role in implementing the prison-

based deradicalisation program have not been provided. Therefore, researching and

assessing applicable strategies would be beneficial, particularly for the legal,

regulatory and policy reform agendas.

2.6 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

This research makes an original contribution to criminal justice policy and

practice in Indonesia. By investigating and examining Indonesian prison officers’

experiences, the study extends the body of knowledge around prison-based

deradicalisation programs, specifically in the Indonesian context. Indonesian prison

officers’ perspectives regarding deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates was

thoroughly investigated. My review of the literature determined that the primary


focus of previous studies is the program and the inmates. In contrast, there is a lack

of qualitative studies that focus on prison officers’ experiences in implementing the

programs. Although programs have been assessed, users of the programs were not

assessed. Therefore, the results of this study will advance the discussion of prison-

based deradicalisation programs from program oriented to prison-officer oriented.

Moreover, discourses surrounding the establishment of a special prison for

terrorist inmates arise among both academics and policy makers, with pros and cons

commonly advanced on this hotly debated issue in Indonesia. However, the

perspectives of prison officers on this issue are not available in the existing literature,

including whether they agree or disagree with the prison’s establishment, and what

their hopes for it might be. From this study, the findings on prison officers’

perspectives on this topic will contribute to the fields of criminal justice studies,

criminology, and correctional science.

Further, this study provides a uniquely practical contribution to the Indonesian

authorities. By uncovering prison officers’ challenges in implementing the

deradicalisation program, the weaknesses can be identified and then evaluated. These

findings are valuable resources for investigating strategies to strengthen the role of

Indonesian prison officers, especially regarding the implementation of Indonesia’s

prison-based deradicalisation program and preventing the spread of radical beliefs

from terrorist inmates to prison officers.

In conclusion, this study contributes to the discipline of terrorist rehabilitation

and prison-based deradicalisation programs. More broadly, the study contributes to

several fields such as corrections, penology, political violence, and criminal justice.


Research Design

A good research design ensures you will get the best evidence – the most

relevant, credible, valid, trustworthy, reliable and authentic possible – and

also that you haven’t overlooked possible sources of criticism or possible

counter-evidence. It matches up the sources available, and the questions

needing answers, with the kinds and amounts of evidence needed to develop

a case or demonstrate a situation. It allows time for reflection to creatively

develop plausible explanations; and it ensures the purposes of the research

are properly met. (Wadsworth, 1997, p. 27)

This chapter outlines the methodology employed in this study and provides an

account of ethical concerns for conducting fieldwork within the prison environment

in Indonesia. The chapter begins with a discussion on the research design and

methodology used in this study (Section 3.1) followed by discussion of the research

site and why it was selected for data collection purposes (Section 3.2). Next, this

chapter discusses participants and their recruitment (Section 3.3) and shows the data

and legal materials for answering the research questions (Section 3.4). The method

for data collection (Section 3.5), and collection methods for legal and non-legal

materials (Section 3.6) are presented, before discussing analysis of the data (Section

3.7). As this study needed human participation, ethical considerations are described

(Section 3.8). Finally, this chapter discusses the scope of the study and the

limitations of the research (Section 3.9).

3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

As discussed in Chapter 2, this study aimed to bridge the research gap on the

topic of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. The gap in existing

research on this topic is the lack of studies on terrorist rehabilitation viewed through

the lens of the implementers. Hence, Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation

programs were examined from the viewpoint of the implementers of the program,

that is, Indonesian prison officers. Specifically, the aims of this study were to

examine the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in rehabilitating terrorist

inmates and to investigate the strategies for improving the officers’ role in terrorist


rehabilitation. To achieve these aims, the set of research questions is discussed

comprehensively in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.

In line with the proposed research questions, this study had three objectives:

(1) to investigate Indonesian prison officers’ challenges in implementing terrorist

rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs; (2) to analyse Indonesian prison

officers’ views regarding the establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates in

Indonesia; and (3) to examine and assess strategies to improve the role of Indonesian

prison officers in the implementation of deradicalisation programs. These objectives

were investigated throughout the firsthand experiences of Indonesian prison officers

in dealing with terrorist inmates inside prisons.

In doing so, this study used qualitative social research and legal research

methodologies. These methodologies were used because the set of research questions

in this study had to be addressed by different methods, as asserted in the quotations

above (Baker, 1999, p. 9; Wadsworth, 1997, p. 27). Moreover, in applying

methodology for a specific research project, Crompton and Jones (1998, p. 72)

echoed that “different methods are appropriate for different problems”. In terms of

data collection, Burton (2013, p. 55) explained that research questions are inevitably

the starting point to determine whether they can be answered by collecting primary

data. The connection between the methodology and the research question is

discussed in the following subsection as well as in the discussion on the selected

methodological approach.

3.1.1 The Methodology and Research Questions

Qualitative social research methodology was used to investigate the challenges

faced by prison officers implementing the deradicalisation program (Research

Question 1), as well as to analyse their views on the establishment of a special prison

for convicted terrorists in Indonesia (Research Question 2). Primary and secondary

data were collected to address Research Questions 1 and 2.

Qualitative social research and legal research methodologies were combined to

identify strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison officers in

implementing the deradicalisation program (Research Question 3). Because the

context of the problem is about change (Hutchinson, 2010, p. 63), reform-oriented


research was applied. Therefore, this study combined these methodologies to

examine Research Question 3.

The research design is outlined in Table 3.1, which shows the connection

between the methodologies and the research questions. Use of qualitative social

research and legal research methodologies are discussed further in the following

subsection.

Table 3.1 Research Questions and the Associated Methodologies

Key Research Aims:

To examine the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-

based deradicalisation programs and to identify policy and law reform options related to the

improvement of Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist rehabilitation.

Research Question

Methodology

Qualitative Social

Research Legal Research

1 What are the challenges for Indonesian

prison officers implementing prison-

based deradicalisation programs for

convicted terrorists?

X

2 What are Indonesian prison officers’

views on the establishment of a special

prison for convicted terrorists in

Indonesia?

X

3 What strategies can be used to improve

the role of Indonesian prison officers

in implementing prison-based

deradicalisation programs?

X X

3.1.2 Qualitative Social Research Methodology: Empirical Legal Research

Qualitative and quantitative research methodologies play an important role and

have long histories in the development of the social sciences. Both methodological

approaches have been widely used in the development of many specific fields of

social science such as economics, politics, and psychology. Qualitative and


quantitative research methodologies have different approaches, which include but are

not limited to differences in philosophical and theoretical approaches, aims or

purposes, and techniques. Selecting which methodology, and the methods to use

(qualitative, quantitative, or mixed) depends on the issues, research problems, and,

most importantly, the proposed research questions.

Use of qualitative or quantitative social methodologies to study law is a

relatively new phenomenon, starting in the 19th century. These methods can be used

to seek a specific issue within a legal context, so both methodologies are widely

employed in many studies. This applies to both the public law and the private law

fields (Burton, 2013; Cownie & Bradney, 2013). In the Australian context, non-legal

methodology has been used by scholars such as White, Dean, and Mackenzie, who

used qualitative methodological approaches in their studies (Hutchinson, 2010, pp.

130-133).

Using methods from other disciplines for legal research is defined as

conducting empirical legal research (Burton, 2013, p. 55) or non-doctrinal legal

research (Hutchinson, 2010; Leeuw & Schmeet, 2016), or socio-legal studies

(Banakar & Travers, 2005; Cownie & Bradney, 2013). Drawing from the literature

on the use of qualitative social methodology in the legal context, this study is a work

of empirical legal research. Although this study could also be classified as socio-

legal research, empirical legal research is more appropriate because it employs focus

group methods for data collection, which are classed as empirical work. According to

Cownie and Bradney (2013, p. 45), conducting socio-legal research is not always

empirical. For this reason, this study is classified as empirical legal research.

An empirical legal researcher, according to Burton (2013, p. 58), can adopt

different research techniques and strategies that broadly fall into the qualitative and

quantitative definitions. Various methods such as in-depth interview, focus group,

questioners, and case study are available and can be used to answer the proposed

research questions. The critical point for an empirical legal researcher is deciding the

appropriate methodological approach for the research questions.

3.1.3 Legal Research: Policy and Law Reform Research

Besides using a qualitative social research methodology, legal research was

also used in this study, particularly to develop arguments for Research Question 3.


This methodological approach was required to examine a potential policy or legal

reform related to the role of Indonesian prison officers in implementing the prison-

based deradicalisation program. Hence, in examining Research Question 3, empirical

legal research and legal research were combined. Referring to the review of Hanley

et al. (2016), the results from empirical legal research are used to identify possible

legal or regulation reforms. In this regard, Hanley et al. concluded that empirical

research contributes to law reform by “identifying and evaluating reform options to

redress the problem” (Hanley, Fileborn, Larcombe, Henry, & Powell, 2016, p. 559).

To identify strategies to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in

implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs, this research applied the

frameworks of policy and law reform research. According to Hutchinson (2010),

policy research and law reform research are categorised as additional legal research

frameworks, along with theoretical research. By using the frameworks of policy and

law reform research, relevant laws and regulations were identified and then analysed

to decide whether the provisions require amendment, or whether new provisions are

needed to solve identified problems.

3.2 RESEARCH SITE

As mentioned in Chapter 2, a number of Indonesian prisons and detention

centres hold terrorist inmates. Three of these prisons were selected as the research

sites: Cipinang, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, and Surabaya prisons. These prisons

were selected because they hold significant numbers of terrorist prisoners compared

to the numbers held in the other prisons and detention centres. Figure 3.1 shows the

geographical positioning of the research sites in Indonesia.


Figure 3.1 The Research Sites

Source: adapted from http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cPZhivuKlmU/Tk-

i0t2qnDI/AAAAAAAAD-w/wW0vjRxCQsc/s1600/peta-indonesia.jpg

According to the online data of the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC)

to August 2015, the largest number of convicted terrorist inmates was in Pasir Putih

Nusakambangan Prison, which then held 37 individuals, followed by Cipinang

Prison with 23 individuals, and Surabaya Prison with 12 individuals. The 10 prisons

and detention centres that held the largest number of terrorist convicts in Indonesia at

this time were Pasir Putih Nusakambangan, Cipinang, Batu, Cibinong, Semarang,

Tanggerang, Surabaya, Kembang Kuning, and Permisan Prisons (Figure 3.2). There

is also one detention centre that holds a significant number of terrorist inmates:

Jepara Detention Centre.

At August 2015, the number of terrorist inmates in Surabaya prison was

lower than that in Batu Nusakambangan Prison, Cibinong Prison, Semarang Prison,

and Tangerang Prison. Both Batu Nusakambangan Prison and Cibinong Prison held

19 individuals, whereas Semarang and Tangerang prisons held 18 and 13 individuals,

respectively. Besides its significant number of terrorist inmates, Surabaya prison was

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cPZhivuKlmU/Tk-i0t2qnDI/AAAAAAAAD-w/wW0vjRxCQsc/s1600/peta-indonesia.jpg

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-cPZhivuKlmU/Tk-i0t2qnDI/AAAAAAAAD-w/wW0vjRxCQsc/s1600/peta-indonesia.jpg


selected because a previous study found that this prison is successfully managing

terrorist prisoners and achieving the goals of a prison-based deradicalisation program

(Andrie, 2011, p. 9). In evaluating the implementation of the prison-based

deradicalisation program in Surabaya prison, Andrie’s study concluded that terrorist

prisoners are likely becoming “softer” and more willing to cooperate in the prison

(Andrie, 2011, p. 10). Examining the experiences of Surabaya’s prison officers is

therefore valuable in order to gain insights into the implementation techniques used

in this prison.

Figure 3.2 The Ten Indonesian Prisons with the Largest Number of Terrorist Prisoners

Geographically, the three selected prisons are all located in the area of Java.

Pasir Putih Prison is one of the prisons on Nusakambangan Island, which is in

Central Java Province. Cipinang Prison is in the capital city of Jakarta, and Surabaya

prison is located in Surabaya in East Java Province.

3.3 PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR RECRUITMENT

Participants in this study were selected using a purposive sampling method.

This method is normally adopted for focus group research (Liamputtong, 2011, p.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40


50), and the investigated topic is shaped by a specific group of participants, in this

case, Indonesian prison officers. The participants provided firsthand information,

generating the desired data.

Besides working in the selected prisons, the participants had taken part in the

duties and responsibilities associated with rehabilitating terrorist inmates. In addition,

work experience was also considered as a selection criterion: participants had to have

a minimum of 2 years of relevant work experience.

Therefore, the criteria that the Indonesian prison officers had to meet for the

focus group were:

(1) To have duties and responsibilities associated with prisoners’

rehabilitation and/or deradicalisation, including terrorist inmates.

(2) To have a minimum work experiences of 2 years.

Other factors outside these criteria were not considered in the selection of

participants. For instance, age, religion, or gender were not taken into consideration

because they were considered not relevant to the subject of this study.

Once the sampling method was selected, the next step was to recruit qualifying

participants. This involved three stages: obtaining formal permission from the

authorities, discussing the research project with the prison directors, and then

recruiting the participants.

Obtaining formal permission from the authorities is critical because it can lend

credibility to the research (Minichiello, Aroni, & Hays, 2008, p. 171). A formal

request letter was sent to the Director General of Corrections of the Republic of

Indonesia (see Appendix B and Appendix C). The letter included a summary of the

research proposal, the Ethics Certificate from QUT, participant criteria, and a

consent form for the participants.

The letter was given to the Director General of Corrections, I Wayan K Dusak,

personally in his office in Jakarta. During the meeting, the research project was

discussed. The DGC of the Republic of Indonesia issued a formal permission letter,

Letter Number: 02 PAS.DL 01-542, September 23, 2015 (see Appendix D and

Appendix E). The letter was signed by Endang Sudirman, the Secretary of the DGC

of the Republic of Indonesia. In accordance with the request, the researcher was


granted formal permission to conduct fieldwork in three prisons: Pasir Putih

Nusakambangan Prison, Cipinang Prison, and Surabaya Prison.

To comply with the requirement stated in the formal permission letter, the next

step was to discuss the research project with the prison directors of the selected

prisons. A formal permission letter from the DGC of the Republic of Indonesia was

addressed to each prison director or to the prison authorities. The researcher

explained that the research project would conduct a focus group with the prison

officers who had had relevant responsibilities for at least 2 years. The prison

directors then passed this request to qualifying potential participants. As a result,

several eligible prospective participants were available in each selected prison.

Once prospective participants were determined, the next step was recruitment.

The candidates were asked individually about their willingness to participate in this

study, and particularly to engage in the focus group discussion. They were asked

directly in random order at the research site. Through this process, 13 prison officers

were selected to participate in the series of focus groups. I provided an Information

Sheet (see Appendix F) to the research participants. The sheet contained background

to the research, a summary of the research proposal, and necessary information about

the research. All participants signed the Consent Form (see Appendix G) that

informed them of their rights as research participants.

3.4 DATA AND LEGAL MATERIALS

This study used data and legal materials for answering research questions. As

the research questions in this study required different methodological approaches, the

connections among research questions, data and legal materials should be clarified.

As discussed previously, because qualitative social research methodology was

employed specifically for investigating and analysing both research questions 1 and

2, either primary or secondary data were used. Specifically, data from focus groups,

the research diary, and states documents were used. On the other hand, data and

materials for legal research were combined in examining Research Question 3.

Materials for legal research were also used because legal research was applied to

answer Research Question 3. The materials included primary legal materials,

secondary legal materials, and non-legal materials. Primary legal materials such as

Indonesian laws, regulations, and policies surrounding the issue of terrorist


rehabilitation were used as the first preference. Secondary legal materials such as

legal journals and textbooks were used. In addition, to enhance arguments and

recommendations, non-legal materials or non-legal literature were also used.

Table 3.2 summarises the correlation between the research questions, the data,

and the legal materials used in this study. Data collection methods are presented in

Section 3.5, and the collection methods for legal and non-legal materials are

presented in Section 3.6.

Table 3.2 The Correlation between Research Questions, Data, and Materials

Research

Question

(RQ)

Empirical Legal Research Legal Research

Primary Data Secondary Data

Primary

Legal

Materials

Secondary

Legal

Materials

Non-Legal

Materials

RQ1 Focus group,

complemented

by research

diary

Previous studies,

official reports,

and state

documents

RQ2 Focus group,

complemented

by research

diary

Previous studies,

official reports,

and state

documents

RQ3 Focus group,

complemented

by research

diary

Previous studies,

official reports,

and state

documents

The ATL,

the ATFL,

and other

relevant

laws and

regulations.

Legal

literature

(e.g. journal

articles,

textbooks,

proceedings,

websites,

encyclopaedi

as)

Non-legal

literature

Note: ATL = Anti-Terrorism Law; ATFL = Anti-Terrorism Financing Law


3.5 DATA COLLECTION METHODS

In line with the use of a social research methodology, this study used two main

types of data: primary and secondary. Primary data were collected through focus

group discussions. To increase the trustworthiness of the data collected, a research

diary was also used to record fieldwork activities and prominent insights related to

the topic of this study (Duong, 2010). Moreover, secondary data were collected

through literature searches.

3.5.1 Primary Data

Focus Groups

In relation to the selection of a data collection method in a study or a research

project, Silverman (2013, p. 6) demonstrated that choosing the method of data

collection is not about “right” or “wrong”. It is always about “more or less

appropriate” (Silverman, 2013, p. 6), and then it must be justified within the practical

and analytical issues (Silverman, 2013, p. 48). In this context, the focus group was

used as a primary data collection method for this study. Throughout the fieldwork

phase, three focus groups with Indonesian prison officers were conducted.

The focus group was selected as data collection method because this

methodology is an “ideal” approach for examining the stories, experiences, points of

view, beliefs, needs, and concerns of individuals (Kitzinger, 2005, p. 57). Moreover,

focus groups were appropriate for this study because they were useful for exploring

the gap between what Indonesian prison officers say and what they do regarding

terrorist rehabilitation or deradicalisation (Conradson, 2005, p. 131). Further, the

literature recognises conducting focus groups as more efficient than conducting

personal interviews, as concluded by Liamputong (2011, p. 7) and Morgan (1997, pp.

13-14). On the other words, one of the strengths of the focus group is its relative

efficiency.

However, using focus groups as a data collection method has its weaknesses.

Referring to the work of Sussman et al. (1991) on a program for adolescent tobacco

use cessation, Morgan (1997, p. 15) explained that “the concerns for focus groups

include both a tendency toward conformity, in which some participants withhold

things that they might say in private, and a tendency towards ‘polarisation,’ in which

some participants express more extreme views in a group than in private”. In dealing


with the issue of conformity, I tried to accommodate the wishes of participants and to

make them feel as comfortable as possible. For instance, I stated at the beginning of

the focus group that opinions among the participants might differ, but that this was

fine because each individual had different experiences. Furthermore, for the

convenience of participants, prior to conducting the focus group, I asked about the

venue and whether they preferred the discussions to be conducted within or outside

the prison, such as in a restaurant or a rented room. All participants agreed to and

were happy for the focus group to be conducted within the prison. Practically, this

was beneficial for me because it saved time on venue setup and because the

discussion could be scheduled when participants were not working. I also asked the

participants whether they were willing for the discussion to be recorded. The

participants expressed no objection to recording of the discussion.

In dealing with the issue of polarisation, as the moderator I tried to manage

discussions carefully and to stimulate the participants to engage actively in the

discussions. No single participant expressed any extreme views while discussing the

questions. Participants were not asked questions individually; rather, they were

encouraged to discuss the issues and to share their own ideas. As noted by Wilkinson

(2011, p. 169), “although focus groups are sometimes referred to as ‘group

interviews’, the moderator does not ask questions of each focus group participant in

turn but, rather, facilitates group discussion, actively encouraging group members to

interact with each other”. However, if a particular participant did not express an

opinion on a topic, they were then asked individually for a comment, even if it was

only a short comment, such as agreement, disagreement, objection, or satisfaction.

Focus group discussions were conducted to discuss three related issues:

1. Indonesian prison officers’ challenges while implementing deradicalisation.

2. Indonesian prison officers’ views on the establishment of a special prison

for terrorist prisoners.

3. The needs of Indonesian prison officers in implementing terrorist

rehabilitation programs.

To guide the discussion, a set of primary questions were prepared, since semi-

structured focus groups were chosen as the data collection tool (see Appendix A:

Question Guide for Focus Groups). These questions led to the several issues


surrounding the rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners. For instance, what are the

challenges for rehabilitating and supervising terrorist prisoners? Do you know about

the deradicalisation program? What do you think about the establishment of a special

prison for convicted terrorists? What should be considered by the government when

rehabilitating terrorist convicts inside the prisons? Note that the questions probed the

experiences and perspectives of prison officers while dealing with terrorist inmates in

the prison facilities.

A series of focus groups was carried out in November 2015 and June 2016. It

started in Cipinang Prison on 1 November 2015, then in Pasir Putih Nusakambangan

Prison on 2 November 2015. The last session was conducted in Surabaya Prison on

25 June 2016. The focus groups took about one hour each on average. After the focus

group was completed, all participants were given an incentive to compensate their

time and effort in taking part in the focus group. Participants received

IDR250,000.00 (equal to AUD25.00) to be used for a dinner in a local restaurant.

The details of these focus groups are presented in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Details of Focus Group Discussions

Prison Province/State Venue Duration Date/Month/Year

Cipinang Jakarta Inside the prison 1:17:14 01/10/2015

Pasir Putih Central Java Inside the prison 1:27:39 02/10/2015

Surabaya East Java Inside the prison 0:44:39 25/06/2016

To determine whether a follow-up session was needed, saturation theory was

applied (Liamputtong, 2009). After the third session of the focus group, it was

determined that a subsequent session was not needed because additional information

on the issue was no longer generating new understanding (Morgan, 1997). Reliable

answers to the research questions were gained from these three sessions of the focus

groups. Therefore, the research moved to next step, coding and analysing the data,

followed by writing up (Kitzinger, 2005).


Research Diary

A research diary was used to complement the focus group data. Gillham (2000)

argues that a research diary is a log book to record personal notes on observations,

questions, ideas, or insights. A research diary provided field notes “in action” at the

time of conducting fieldwork and also represented the progress of the research.

Moreover, the diary helped to increase the trustworthiness of the primary data. To

ensure the quality of the diary, observations were always noted directly after the

activities occurred (Duong, 2010).

During the focus groups, some important comments from the participants were

noted, and some expressions and body language that indicated correlations with their

ideas. Hence, the diary enhanced the data from the focus group. The research diary,

however, was not used as the main source of data for this study. It was

complementary to the data from focus group discussions.

3.5.2 Secondary Data

Secondary data was a valuable source of deep insights into the issue being

researched, providing different perspectives and ideas on the topic of Indonesia’s

prison-based deradicalisation program. If secondary data used in combination with

other data, it may bring important insights. In this case, secondary data enriches my

empirical evidence on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs.

Moreover, state documents and official reports “helped strengthen the credibility,

validity, and trustworthiness of the data collected from the field” (Duong, 2010, p.

100). Because the deradicalisation program is a national program to counter

terrorism in Indonesia, the discussion of the issue needs to be contextualised.

Therefore, the analysis cannot be based on primary data alone.

Secondary data used in this study comprised previous studies around the issue,

official reports, and state documents such as laws, regulations, and states policies.

These secondary data were mainly collected through literature methods and from the

internet. However, several laws and regulations that were not available in the library

were collected from state actors during fieldwork in Indonesia.

3.6 LEGAL AND NON-LEGAL MATERIALS COLLECTION METHODS

In terms of legal research, legal resources used in this study were primary and

secondary legal materials, and non-legal material. Primary legal materials, according


to Iosipescu and Whitehead (2004, p. 13), are “the records of rules laid down by

those bodies vested with the authority to declare the law”. Further, secondary legal

materials are “preliminary research tools that assist the student in finding, evaluating,

and understanding primary materials” (Iosipescu & Whitehead, 2004, p. 73). Similar

to Iosipescu and Whitehead, Watt and Johns (2009, p. 111) illustrate that the law

itself is the primary legal material, while discourse about the law is the secondary

legal material.

3.6.1 Primary Legal Materials

The meaning of primary legal materials is not synonymous with primary data.

Primary legal materials clearly denote laws issued by the states. On the other hand,

primary qualitative data includes data collected from the field by, for example,

conducting interviews, focus groups, or surveys. Legislation and case reports are the

most common sources of primary legal materials (Bott & Talbot-Stokes, 2010, p. 9).

Legislation includes not only statutes but also subordinate legislation that “is made

under powers conferred by a statute” (Iosipescu & Whitehead, 2004, p. 13), such as

regulations. Within the context of the Indonesian legal system, this includes

government regulations and presidential regulations (Marzuki, 2011).

In line with the topic of this study, the primary legal materials used in this

study were the Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL), the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law

ATFL, the Correctional Institution Law (CIL), and some relevant regulations.

Judicial decisions (cases) were not used in this study because they are less relevant to

the objectives of the study. Primary legal materials were collected through literature

and library methods. Searching on the internet was used because many laws and

regulations are also available online. Primary legal materials that were not available

in the library or via the internet were collected from state actors during fieldwork in

Indonesia.

3.6.2 Secondary Legal Materials

In this study, secondary legal materials and secondary data were the same in

the form – both were textual. However, they differed in content. As explained by

Iosipescu & Whitehead (2004, p. 73), secondary legal materials are materials

basically used for understanding primary legal materials. Secondary legal materials

were used in this study, as mentioned in the previous section. These materials


included articles from law journals, textbooks, conference papers or proceedings,

encyclopaedias, and websites. The information was basically legal in content. In

contrast, the secondary data was not only legal in its content but also included

broader information. In the context of the social research approach used, the

secondary data covered state documents, policies, previous studies, or any other

sources.

Secondary legal materials were first collected through the literature and library

method, and through the internet. Particular secondary legal materials were then

selected based on relevance to this study.

3.6.3 Non-Legal Materials

In addition, non-legal materials were also used to assess Research Question 3.

Non-legal materials on topics such as psychological, political, economic, social, and

criminal justice management issues were also used. These materials are used in order

“to give some guidance to the literature and information services of that particular

area” (Campbell, Poh-York, & Tooher, 1996, p. 422). According to Marzuki (2016,

pp. 204-206), non-legal materials are materials that are not related to the legal field;

however, findings from other disciplines are often used in the legal research context

to enrich and strengthen the analysis.

Similar to the collection of primary and secondary legal materials, non-legal

materials were also collected through literature and library methods, and from the

internet. Relevant non-legal materials were selected to provide evidence to support

the identified policy recommendations and legal reform approaches.

3.7 DATA ANALYSIS

The difficult part of the qualitative research process is data analysis (Boeije,

2010, p. 82). The analysis of qualitative data consists of two main activity streams:

unfolding and then structuring the data (Boeije, 2010, p. 77). Qualitative data is also

challenging because “the concepts that will come to play an actual role during the

analysis and in the final results are not known in advance” (Boeije, 2010, p. 83).

As stated in the section of data collection method above (Section 3.5), primary

data were generated from the focus groups with Indonesian prison officers. Prior to

data analysis, I acknowledged that there has been some debate on the application of


analyses designed for other qualitative methods (e.g. in-depth interviews or semi-

structured interviews) to analysis of focus group discussions. Some argue that it is

inappropriate to apply such analyses to focus groups (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 172).

However, others suggest that analyses designed for other qualitative methods can be

applied similarly to focus groups (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 172). In this study, the

second perspective was followed because my interest was the individual voices

rather than the dynamic aspect of interaction within the group.

There are various ways of analysing focus group data as noted by Wilkinson

(2011, p. 169): “content, thematic, ethnographic, phenomenological, narrative,

experiential, biographical, discourse, or conversation analysis”. For the purposes of

this study, thematic analysis was applied. According to Braun and Clarke (2006, p.

79), thematic analysis is “a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns

(themes) within the data”. In performing the thematic analysis, I undertook six

processes in line with the step-by-step guide of Braun and Clarke (2006, pp. 86-93).

3.7.1 Familiarisation with the Data

Firstly, focus group data was transcribed into written form. This phase is usual

for all qualitative studies in which data is generated through verbal communication

such as in-depth interviews. Drawing from the existing literature, Braun and Clarke

(2006, pp. 87-88) noted that this stage was “an interpretative act, where meanings are

created, rather than simply a mechanical act of putting spoken sounds on paper”.

This phase was challenging and time-consuming. However, after transcription

of the focus group proceedings, I had started to familiarise myself with the data.

Then I read and reread the data to familiarise myself with the content. By doing this,

I generated an initial list of ideas regarding the content of the data.

3.7.2 Generating Initial Codes

After data familiarisation, I started coding. Coding is necessary in thematic

analysis, and initial and axial coding are required to deconstruct data (Liamputtong,

2011, p. 173). Coding is a technique of assigning codes and sub-categories to written

codes or transcripts in order to aid meaningful data retrieval (Barbour, 2008). In the

early stages of coding, I started to index the information. Indexing acts “as [a]

signpost to interesting bits of data, rather than representing some final argument

about meaning” (Seale, 1999, p. 154).


In this research, two sets of characters were used to index the prisons: letters

and numbers. Cipinang Prison was indexed as FG1, Pasir Putih Nusakambangan

Prison was indexed as FG2, and Surabaya Prison was indexed as FG3. For the

confidentiality of the participants, only numbers were used. These provided specific

short names for the information of focus group participants. To designate the

research sites at which the focus groups were conducted, they were separated by a

colon. I marked them in numerical order. For example, FG1:2 denotes information

given by focus group participant number 2 in Cipinang Prison and FG3:4, denotes

information given by focus group participant number 4 in Surabaya Prison. Thus the

information was kept confidential but the indexing assisted in checking information

in the transcript.

After the indexing, a table was created. The left column indicated data extract

while the right column indicated the codes. By doing this, initial codes from the data

produced.

3.7.3 Searching for Themes

In this phase, broad themes were identified. I started to analyse my codes and

considered how different codes could combine to form a broader theme. I used a

visual method – a thematic map – to help sorting the codes into themes. At the end of

this activity, I had collected some candidate themes and subthemes.

Then I grouped these candidate themes and subthemes into three main issues

related to the research questions of the study:

1. The challenges to implementing the prison-based deradicalisation program.

2. The opinions regarding the establishment of a special prison for terrorist

inmates.

3. The officers’ needs in the task of rehabilitating terrorist inmates.

As a result, some candidate themes and sub themes were generated to the

proposed issues.

3.7.4 Reviewing Themes

The next stage was reviewing the themes. I found that some candidate themes

were not really themes because there was not enough data to support them, for

example, the candidate theme of “payment”. I also found that some themes collapsed


into each other; for example, the themes of “training on communication” and

“training on deradicalisation” could be combined into one theme, the “direct need” of

the participants. Similarly, the themes of “need other actors” and “a good

collaboration with BNPT” became the theme “indirect need”.

I checked my results against the data set as a whole to ensure that my thematic

map accurately reflected the meanings evident in the data set at this level (Braun &

Clarke, 2006, p. 91). At the end of this stage, I found that my thematic map worked,

and so progressed to the next phase of defining and naming the themes.

3.7.5 Defining and Naming Themes

At this point I defined and refined the themes that I presented for the analysis.

By defining and refining the themes, I identified, in the words of Braun and Clarke

(2006, p. 92), “the essence of what each theme is about (as well as themes overall),

and determined what aspect of the data each theme captures”. I found that most of

the identified themes contained subthemes. For example, the theme of “the readiness

of the prison officers” contained the subthemes of “internal factors” and “external

factors”. Only one theme, “an absolute agreement”, had no subthemes. This theme

related to the point of view of the focus group participants regarding the initiative of

the Government of Indonesia to establish a special prison for convicted terrorists.

3.7.6 Producing the Report

As the last phase of this analysis, I started to write the report for this thesis. The

complicated story of my focus group data was presented in detail, showing the

validity of my analysis. The three main issues were presented and supported by a set

of thoroughly formulated themes.

Firstly, the challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers when implementing

the prison-based deradicalisation program included the themes:

1. Terrorist prisoner personalities.

2. The readiness of Indonesian prison officers.

3. The sustainability of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.

4. Institutional infrastructure problems.

5. Unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.


Secondly, the establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners included

the themes:

1. An absolute agreement.

2. Advantages and disadvantages.

3. The policy issues.

Thirdly, the needs of Indonesian prison officers in supporting their task of

terrorist rehabilitation included the themes:

1. Direct need.

2. Indirect need.

3.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

As mentioned previously, participants in this research were Indonesian prison

officers who were tasked with rehabilitating terrorist prisoners. Willing participants

from this particular group were invited to join a focus group. This research was

designed to ensure no harm to any participants. Safety issues for this research were

important because conducting research in the prison environment can be dangerous

(Kraska & Neuman, 2012, pp. 82-83). Thus, ethical considerations were mandatory

in this research.

I submitted an ethics application to the university ethics committee prior to

conducting fieldwork. The application required a brief project summary, including

the research participants and their involvement, the research questions and aims,

potential risks and benefits, details of data collection (e.g. where and when the data

would be collected), and how the data would be stored and reported. The application

was approved by the university ethics committee with approval number 1500000642,

from 29 July 2015 to 29 July 2017.

This research was assessed as “low-risk” because participants in the focus

group discussions were limited to prison officers. Prisoners were not participants in

this research. Moreover, participants were interviewed about their tasks and

responsibilities in the normal course of their work: how they implement the

programs, the challenges they face, and their needs were the main topics of the focus

groups. The research did not ask about sensitive or personal topics, nor was it likely

to discover illegal activities, even inadvertently or unexpectedly.


Having correctional jobs delivering deradicalisation programs, participants

were familiar with speaking to share their experiences about the implementation of

the program. Participants were asked what official processes were in place to manage

terrorist prisoners. In addition, participants were aware of the nature of the research

before they agreed to participate; thus the level of risk was estimated as no more than

the inconvenience of participating in a focus group discussion. That is, the potential

risks for the proposed research was minimal but might include inconvenience. But, in

order to minimise the identified risks, this research project ensured that participants

were aware of the following:

1. The nature and objectives of the research.

2. Their participation in the research was voluntary.

3. They were not required to provide answers to all questions during the focus

group interview.

4. Their confidentiality would be preserved throughout the research via use of

codes rather than names.

5. Focus group interviews would be conducted at locations and times that were

most convenient to participants.

Furthermore, participating in this research should not be made uncomfortable

to them. Careful attention was paid to the questions asked of the participants. To

avoid negative emotions and to ensure they experienced no discomfort or became

stressed, prison officers were not asked sensitive questions. Sensitive questions such

as their beliefs and the value they placed on in their personal life were not asked.

The questions were designed only to gain understanding about their experiences in

implementing the deradicalisation program.

In addition to ethical concerns, I also had to obtain participant consent due to

the fact that this research was conducted with human subjects. Prior to the

discussions, I provided information (see Appendix F) and consent forms (see

Appendix G) to the participants to be signed. This is important to ensure they were

aware of their rights and responsibilities as participants in the research. This is also

important for the participants to gain an understanding of the purpose and usefulness

of the research, as well as the way that the data would be gathered and used. Through


this process, the participants were informed that they could withdraw from the

research project at any time until the final submission.

The informed consent form was translated into Bahasa Indonesia for the

participants who could not read or speak in English. Even though I explained the aim

of study and the conditions of consent in Bahasa Indonesia, the version in Bahasa

Indonesia had been made available for the participants. Finally, all participants had

signed Bahasa Indonesia versions of the consent form.

The last concern was related to the obligation to protect the confidentiality and

privacy of the participants (Hagan, 2012, p. 63). Throughout this research,

discussions were anonymised. All participant names and details, such as address and

date of birth, were not included in the transcripts. Identifying features were included

on the consent form but were not be attached to the transcripts. This data, the

recordings, and the transcripts were stored in a locked cabinet on campus. Data could

only be accessed by the researcher and the supervisors.

3.9 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

3.9.1 Scope

The scope of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program in this research was limited

to the in-prison program. Investigations and analysis of deradicalisation outside the

prison or after release were not included. Limiting the scope of this research was

motivated by parole considerations. As Abusa (2009, p. 200) notes: “Indonesia’s

justice system does not have a system of parole”. Discussions about a post-release

deradicalisation program are complementary.

Additionally, in terms of radicalisation, the scope of this research was limited

to Islamic radicalisation because this problem is the core of terrorism in Indonesia

(Sarwono, 2012, p. 75). Empirical research has demonstrated that a number of

former members of radical Islamic groups “have transformed into terrorists” (Hasani

& Naipospos, 2012, p. 170).

3.9.2 Limitations

This research has two limitations. The first is related to the data collection

method, particularly regarding the number of focus group participants. Conducting

focus groups with the prison officers in the three selected prisons was sufficient to


address the research questions. However, it would have been beneficial to select

three more prisons as research sites because of their holding significant numbers of

terrorist prisoners. These facilities are Batu Prison, Cibinong Prison, and Semarang

Prison (see Figure 3.1). Due to time constraints, budget and personnel, only three

prisons were selected. However, as this research employed qualitative methodology,

“the aim is not statistical representativeness, but instead the chance to look in detail

at how selected participants experience the world” (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 59).

The second limitation relates to the proposal to compare results with the

experiences of Singaporean prison officers with deradicalisation. I applied for formal

permission from the Singapore Prison Service (SPS) to conduct research but the

application was rejected. In this case, the second limitation was the unfortunate

outcome of the application to conduct fieldwork in the Changi Prison complex in

Singapore. Therefore, a comparison between Indonesian and Singaporean prison

officers’ experiences and perspectives of the implementation of deradicalisation

programs was not possible. Nevertheless, an opportunity for a rigorous further

research project remains. If intergovernmental cooperation and further funding can

be secured, a comparative study is likely to be conducted. This comparative study

could extend beyond Indonesia and Singapore to include other South East Asian

countries that have implemented prison-based deradicalisation programs, such as

Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.


Legal Frameworks

Barely a month after 9/11, the federal government introduced a massive anti-

terrorism bill that for the first time created and defined crimes of terrorism

under Canada’s Criminal Code. The bill’s definition of terrorism was clearly

inspired by the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000 in requiring proof of

religious, ideological, or political motive and the commission of a broad

range of harms that went well beyond violence against civilians. (Roach,

2005, p. 513)

As noted in the above quotation, the incident of 9/11 in the year of 2001 caused

the Canadian Government to define terrorism crimes under its Criminal Code.

Besides Canada, many countries have responded to the 9/11 attack with tough new

laws on counterterrorism. However, introducing new anti-terrorism laws in some

countries, including in Indonesia, provoked debates about the appropriate response to

the incident in the USA (Roach, 2011, pp. 2-3). Indonesia, according to Roach (2011,

p. 3), “refused to enact a draft law on anti-terrorism law that would have brought

back some repressive Soeharto-era practice”. However, the government then enacted

an anti-terrorism law immediately after the Bali bombings in October 2002.

This chapter describes Indonesian laws that have been promulgated specifically

to prevent and supress acts of terrorism and terrorism financing. The purpose of this

chapter is to provide an understanding of the Indonesian laws relevant to this study.

Two laws discussed in this chapter. They are Indonesian Law No. 15 of 2003 in

conjunction with Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the

Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism (the Anti-Terrorism Law – [ATL]) and Law

No. 9 of 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism

Financing (the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law – [ATFL]). There are many provisions

outlined in these laws; however, this chapter primarily investigates the provisions

that relate to the topic of this study.

The first section of this chapter (Section 4.1) discusses the ATL. It also

provides some of the interactions between the ATL and the ATFL. The ATFL is then


discussed (Section 4.2). Finally, the last section (Section 4.3) provides a summary of

the chapter.

4.1 INDONESIA’S ANTI-TERRORISM LAW

4.1.1 Introduction

A special law on terrorism was enacted by the Indonesian Government shortly

after the first Bali bombing on 12 October 2002. President Megawati Soekarnoputri

announced the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 on the

Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism (Perpu No. 1 tahun 2002 tentang

Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme) and the Government Regulation in Lieu

of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Application of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law

No. 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism for the Bombing Acts in

Bali on the 12th October 2002 (Perpu No. 2 tahun 2002 tentang Pemberlakuan

Perpu No. 1 tahun 2002 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme pada

Peristiwa Peledakan Bom di Bali pada Tanggal 12 Oktober 2002). These laws were

introduced and enacted on 18 October 2002. The reasons of the promulgation of

these emergency laws are (Juwana, 2006, pp. 295-296):

First, terrorism had “claimed human lives intolerably and raised widespread

fear among the community [and] caused loss of freedom and damage of

property”. Second, terrorism had maintained extensive networks, posing a

threat to national and international peace and security. Third, national

legislation was required to implement international conventions relating to

terrorism. Lastly, the Anti-Terrorism Law was a matter of urgency because

existing legislation in Indonesia was inadequate and failed to deal

comprehensively with combating criminal acts of terrorism.

These laws are “emergency” laws because they were issued by the president.

Ordinarily, laws can be issued only by the House of Representatives, with the

approval of the President. However, under emergency legislative powers, the

President can issue Government Regulations in Lieu of Law. According to Article 7

(1) Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Making of Laws and Regulations, Government

Regulations in Lieu of Law have authority equivalent to Law. Pursuant to Article 7

(1) of the law, the hierarchy of Indonesian law is:


a. The 1945 Constitution.

b. The People’s Consultative Assembly Decree.

c. Law/Government Regulation in Lieu of Law.

d. Government Regulation.

e. Presidential Regulation.

f. Provincial Regional Regulation.

g. Municipal or Regency Regulation.

Government Regulations in Lieu should be approved by the House of

Representatives in subsequent sessions. If a law is not approved, it shall be revoked

as prescribed in Article 22 of the 1945 Constitution (Marzuki, 2011).

Referring to Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Making of Laws and Regulations and

the 1945 Constitution, Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 and

Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2002 are two examples of the

implementation of emergency legislative power by the President. These emergency

laws were then adopted by the House of Representatives through Government

Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 as Law No. 15 of 2003 and Government

Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2002 as Law No. 16 of 2003 at its next session

on 4 April 2003.

Based on the theoretical framework of criminal law sources, terrorism is

categorised as a specific crime. In terms of specific crimes, it is accepted as general

knowledge in criminal law and criminal justice science that crimes are divided into

two types: general crimes and specific crimes (Arief, 1998; Hamzah, 1994;

Moeljatno, 1989; Soedarto, 1991). General crimes are criminal acts according to the

penal codes, whereas specific crimes are nominated criminal acts according to

specific acts or laws. As a consequence, terrorism is a specific crime because it is

based on Indonesian Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Eradication of the Crime of

Terrorism. Many crimes are classed as specific crimes in Indonesia. Corruption, for

instance, is a specific crime because it is based on Indonesian Law No. 31 of 1999

about the Eradication of Corruption, while crimes such as murder, theft, and robbery

are general crimes based on the Indonesian Penal Code.


4.1.2 The Substance of Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law

The Law No. 15 of 2003 in conjunction with Government Regulation in Lieu

of Law No. 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism, known as

Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL), consists of eight chapters and 47 articles.

The content covers acts of terrorism; other acts related to acts of terrorism;

investigation, prosecution, and the trial session; compensation, restitution, and

rehabilitation; and international cooperation. In the context of this research, the

investigation focuses on criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL. A detailed

discussion of criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL is presented in

Subsection 4.1.3.

Chapter I of the ATL is the general provision. This chapter defines specific

terms that are used in the ATL, such as the definition of the act of terrorism. Article 1

(1) states that: “The crime of terrorism is any act that fulfils the elements of a crime

under this Government Regulation in Lieu”. However, this is not a literal definition.

It defines the scope of acts of terrorism related to the provision in the law itself. The

criminal act of terrorism is formulated in Chapter III of the ATL.

Besides the criminal act of terrorism, the ATL also stipulates other criminal

acts related to the acts of terrorism (see Chapter IV). These acts are offences

particularly conducted while criminal justice processes are ongoing. For example,

intimidation of investigators, public prosecutors, lawyers, or judges who are

examining terrorism offences is an offence under Article 20 of the ATL that carries a

minimum sentence of 3 years and a maximum of 15 years. In other examples,

sentences of 3 years minimum and 15 years maximum apply for providing false

testimony in a trial of a criminal act of terrorism, for submitting false material

evidence, or for attacking a witness or the officials in a trial of a criminal act of

terrorism. In several special criminal acts, the formulation of the crime related to the

main offence is included. For instance, the Anti-Corruption Law (Law No. 31 of

1999)5 and the Anti-Money Laundering Law (Law No. 8 of 2010)6 have provisions

about other offences that relate to the main offences of the specific type of crime.

The offences are commonly related to criminal acts that are conducted while criminal

justice procedures are undertaken.

5 See Chapter 3 of the Law No. 31, 1999. 6 See Chapter 3 of the Law No. 8, 2010.


The provision on jurisdiction of the ATL is stipulated in Chapter II. The

applicability of the ATL is based on the territorial principle and the extra territorial

principle. The law, therefore, is not only applied to criminal acts of terrorism

conducted in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia7 (territorial principle) but also

to acts conducted in other countries (extraterritorial principle), provided the victims

are Indonesian citizens8; acts that are directed at Indonesian government facilities,

including premises of diplomatic or consular officials9; or acts conducted on board a

vessel under the flag of Indonesia or an aircraft that is registered under Indonesian

laws.10 Santoso (2013, p. 93) points out that “the law is expected to be able to

effectively reach the crimes of terrorism defined in its content, which are committed

beyond the territorial limits of the State of the Republic of Indonesia”. An important

aspect of the ATL is its scope. The law confirms that the ATL does not apply to

political criminal acts (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 10; Juwana, 2006, p. 297). This

exclusion of political crimes is also formulated in Chapter II of the ATL.11

Chapter V contains relevant criminal procedure law. Because terrorism is a

special crime, the ATL contains provisions for some exceptions to criminal

procedure law that are not available in the Penal Procedure Code (Law No. 8 of

1981). The exceptions apply to all stages of criminal procedure law: the

investigation, the prosecution, and within the trial session; hence, the ATL confers on

investigators, public prosecutors, and judges some extraordinary powers (Juwana,

2006, p. 398). Nevertheless, if not regulated specifically in the ATL, the criminal

procedure law for the crime of terrorism still refers to the Penal Procedure Code

(Law No. 8 of 1981).12 Among others, a provision that attracts concern from

academics is the use of any intelligence report as preliminary evidence

(Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 129; Butt, 2009, p. 15; Santoso, 2013, p. 99), which is

allowed by the ATL.13 However, determination of the adequacy of preliminary

7 See Article 3 (1), ATL. 8 See Article 4 (a), ATL. 9 See Article 4 (b), ATL. 10 See Article 4 (e), ATL. 11 See Article 5, ATL. 12 See Article 25 (1), ATL. 13 See Article 26 (1), ATL.


evidence is based on an inquiry process by the Head or Deputy Head of the District

Court, and is conducted in closed session.14

Chapter VI of the ATL contains provisions on compensation, restitution, and

rehabilitation. Rights for compensation and/or restitution are granted to victims15,

meanwhile rights for rehabilitation are granted to the accused if they are found not

guilty by the court.16 Chapter VII contains a provision on international cooperation.

Therefore, Chapter VII relates to Chapter II of the ATL on jurisdiction. As noted by

Santoso (2013, p. 93) and Juwana (2006, p. 398), the provision of international

cooperation in the ATL reinforces the law on acts of terrorism committed

extraterritorially.

Chapter VIII is the ATL’s final chapter. It contains the concluding provision.

In Article 47, it states that this law has binding power since the law was issued on 18

October 2002. In contrast, Article 46 states that the ATL may be applied

retroactively. This is a controversial provision because it contradicts the main

criminal law principle of non-retroactivity.

Based on the provision of Article 46, the ATL could be used to prosecute acts

of terrorism conducted before the promulgation of the law. The implementation is

based on the law or government regulation in lieu of law, such as the promulgation

of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Application of

Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the

Crime of Terrorism for the Bombing Acts in Bali on 12 October 2002. However, the

application of the retrospectivity principle to arrest and prosecute several terrorist

suspects in connection with the first Bali bombing has faced challenges. Masykur

Abdul Kadir, a defendant in the case of Bali Bombing 1, submitted a judicial review

on the Law No. 16 of 2003 on the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of

Law No. 2 of 2002 on the 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing as a Law. A ruling of the

Indonesian Constitutional Court stated that the Law No. 16 of 2003 was

unconstitutional because it contradicts the 1945 Constitution. As a consequence, this

law did not have any binding power (Santoso, 2013). Nevertheless, the issue of

applying a law retroactively is still debated (Santoso, 2013, p. 97).

14 See Article 26 (2) and (3), ATL. 15 See Article 36, ATL. 16 See Article 37, ATL.


4.1.3 The Crime of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Law

In line with the context of this research, investigation focuses on acts that

constitute terrorism under the ATL. Under the ATL, there are some acts categorised

as terrorism, but this law does not define what terrorism is. Yet, as stated previously,

Article 1 (1) states that: “The crime of terrorism is any act that fulfils the elements of

a crime under this Government Regulation in Lieu”. Although Chapter III of the

ATL on the “Criminal Act of Terrorism” covers articles 6 to 19, the acts of terrorism

are set out from Articles 6 to 16. In addition, Articles 17 and 18 cover the application

of the ATL to corporations, while Article 19 covers sentencing guidance for the

juvenile perpetrators.

As a consequence, if someone’s acts fulfil the elements of crime as formulated

in articles 6 to 16 of the ATL, they can be prosecuted as terrorists. The same holds

true for corporations and juveniles. If the acts of corporations or juveniles fulfil these

elements of crime as formulated in articles 6 to 16 of the ATL, they can be

prosecuted as terrorists. However, the application of the criminal responsibility and

criminal sanctions for a corporation suspect are based on Articles 17 and 18.

Meanwhile, the application of the criminal responsibility and criminal sanctions for a

juvenile suspect are based on Article 19, which stipulates that suspects of terrorism

acts who are under 18 years old cannot be subject to the death penalty, life

imprisonment, or the stipulated minimum imprisonment (see Figure 4.1).

Moreover, from the provisions of Articles 6 to 16, terrorism is defined

generally in Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 states that (Butt, 2009, pp. 2-3):

Any person who by intentionally using violence or threats of violence,

creates a widespread atmosphere of terror/fear or causes mass casualties, by

taking the liberty or lives and property of other people, or causing damage or

destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or

international facilities, faces the death penalty, or life imprisonment, or

between four and 20 years’ imprisonment.

Furthermore, Article 7 states that:


Any person who by intentionally using violence or threats of violence,

intends to create a widespread atmosphere of terror/fear or causes mass

casualties, by taking the liberty or lives and property of other people, or

causing damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment,

public facilities or international facilities, faces imprisonment for a

maximum of life imprisonment.

As a consequence, a perpetrator can be charged under Article 6 of the ATL if

the acts resulted in taking lives, or property, or causing damage or destruction

(Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 9). In contrast, these results are not needed if the perpetrator

is charged under Article 7 of the ATL. If someone intends to perform acts that use

violence where such actions may create an atmosphere of terror in the society, they

can be charged under Article 7 (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 11). Due to this

differentiation, Atmasasmita (2012, pp. 9-11) has noted that Article 6 and Article 7

have different qualifications. Article 6 is categorised as delik materiil while Article 7

is qualified as delik formiil. These qualifications (delik materiil or delik formiil) are

based on the focus of the provision on whether a result is stipulated as an element of

the crime or not. From criminal law theory, delik materiil means that the focus is on

the results of the prohibited acts; on the other hand, delik formiil means that the focus

is on the acts that are prohibited, regardless of their results (Hamzah, 1994;

Moeljatno, 1989).

Besides the qualification of the acts, the differences between Articles 6 and 7

are the maximum penalties. The maximum penalty in Article 6 is capital punishment,

while in Article 7 it is life imprisonment. Atmasasmita (2012, p. 11) argued that

formulation of life imprisonment as the maximum imprisonment in Article 7 is not

fair because the result of the acts has not been considered. This argument implies that

the formulation of criminal sanction in Article 7 needs further evaluation and

potentially amendment.

In addition to articles 6 and 7, a range of specific acts of terrorism is also

defined under the ATL. Article 8 covers “a range of offences relating to various

aspects of aviation security” (Juwana, 2006, p. 296) and provides “the same penalties

as Article 6 – that is, death, life imprisonment, or between four and 20 years’

imprisonment – to people who” (Butt, 2009, pp. 4-5):


a. destroy, make unusable or damage air traffic safety buildings or

thwart efforts to make those building secure;

b. cause destruction to, the non-usability of, or damage to air traffic

safety buildings, or thwart efforts to make those building secure;

c. intentionally and illegally destroy, take or move signs or equipment

for flight safety; make the signs or equipment fail to work; or install

the incorrect signs or equipment;

d. by omission, cause signs or equipment for flights safety to be

destroyed, damaged, taken or shifted, or to cause the installation of

the incorrect signs or equipment for flight safety;

e. intentionally and illegally destroy or render unusable an aircraft

owned entirely or in part by another person;

f. intentionally and illegally cause an aircraft to have an accident; or

destroy, make unusable or damage an aircraft;

g. by omission, cause an aircraft to have an accident; or destroy, make

unusable or damage an aircraft;

h. with intention enrich oneself or another illegally, obtain insurance

and cause the burning, explosion, destruction, damage or

inoperability of an aircraft insured against danger, [loss of] its cargo,

or [loss of] income from the receipt of its cargo;

i. in an aircraft by means of an illegal act, seize or take control the

aircraft in flight;

j. in an aircraft with violence, threats of violence, or threats of another

kind, seize or take control the aircraft in flight;

k. as a part of a conspiracy with another person, and with

premeditation, cause serious injury to a person or damage to an

aircraft thereby endangering the flight, with intent to steal the

independence of a person;

l. intentionally and illegally commit an act of violence against a person

on an aircraft during a flight, if that act could jeopardise the safety of

the aircraft;

m. intentionally and illegally damage an official aircraft or cause

damage to that aircraft so that it cannot fly or jeopardises the safety

of the flight;

n. intentionally and illegally put in place or causes to be put in place on

an official aircraft, using any means, equipment or materials which


could damage the aircraft, making it unable to fly or causing damage

to that aircraft which could jeopardise safety on the flight;

o. as a part of conspiracy with another person, with premeditation, and

causing serious injury to a person, perform the acts referred to in (l);

(m); and (n);

p. provide false information, knowing that the information is false,

which jeopardises the safety of an aircraft in flight;

q. in an aircraft, perform an act which could jeopardises the safety of

the aircraft in flight;

r. in an aircraft, perform an act which could disrupt the order and

procedures of the aircraft in flight.

Although elucidation of Article 8 mentions that Article 8 elaborates on the

provisions contained in Chapter XXIX A of Book II the Indonesian Penal Code

(Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana – [KUHP]), Article 8 is almost “a word-to-

word reproduction of the Articles 479 (a) to (r) of the KUHP” (Butt, 2009, p. 5).

Another specific terrorism-related offence is stated in Articles 9 and 10 of the ATL.

Article 9 covers explosives, firearms, and ammunition offences relating to

terrorism (Juwana, 2006, p. 296). Article 10 describes the use of chemical,

biological, and other weapons (Juwana, 2006, p. 296). Both articles do not focus on

the result of the acts, so could be categorised as delik formiil (Atmasasmita, 2012, p.

14 and 16). Article 9 states that (Butt, 2009, p. 5):

Any person who illegally brings into Indonesia, makes, accepts, attempts to

obtain, transfers or tries to transfer, controls, carries, has supply of,

possesses, stores, transports, hides, uses or takes to or from Indonesia: a

firearm, ammunition, explosives or other dangerous materials with intent to

perform an act of terrorism, faces the death penalty, life imprisonment, or

between 3 and 20 years’ imprisonment.

Article 10 states that (Butt, 2009, p. 6):

Any person who intentionally uses chemical weapons, biological weapons,

radiology, micro-organism, or radioactivity or its components, thereby


causing an atmosphere of terror or widespread fear, causing mass casualties,

endangering health, disrupting the life, security and rights of people, or

damaging strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or

international facilities, faces the same penalty as contained in Article 6.

Article 9 is adapted from Article 1 (1) of Indonesia’s Emergency Law No. 12

of 1951 on the Possession of Firearms and Explosives by adding the specific element

of an intent to perform an act of terrorism (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 14). On the other

hand, Article 10 is a new formulation scoping acts of terrorism in the Indonesian

legal regime, along with Articles 6, 7, 11, and 12 (Atmasasmita, 2012, pp. 16-17).

Offences for financing any criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL are

formulated in articles 11 and 13. However, Article 11 was repealed after the Law No.

9/2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Acts on Financing Terrorism

had been promulgated. Article 13 (1) has also been repealed. These repeals occurred

because the content of these articles is more relevant to the new law on terrorism

financing: Law No. 9 of 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Acts on

Financing Terrorism known as Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Financing Law (ATFL).

This law is discussed is more detail in Section 4.2.

Like Article 11, which has been revoked, Article 12 of the ATL prohibits

providing or collecting assets intentionally that could be used, partly or wholly, for

terrorism acts. However, this article has not been repealed after the promulgation of

the ATFL. In detail, Article 12 states that (Butt, 2009, pp. 6-7):

Any person who supplies or collects assets to be used, or which that person

should have known will be used, entirely or in part to perpetrate the

following, between three and 15 years’ imprisonment:

a. illegally accepting, possessing, using, transferring, altering, or

disposing of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological

weapons, radiology, microorganisms, or radioactivity and its

components that cause or could cause death or serious injury or

damage to property.

b. stealing or seizing nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological


components.


c. smuggling or obtaining illegally nuclear materials, chemical

weapons, biological weapons, radiology, micro-organisms, or

radioactivity and its components.

d. seeking through force, threat of force or any form of intimidation

nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological weapons, radiology,

microorganisms, or radioactivity and its components.

e. threatening to

1) use to nuclear materials, chemical weapons, biological


components to cause death, serious injury or property

destruction.

2) perpetrate the crime referred to in (b) in order to force another

person, international organization, or other state to do

something or refrain from doing something.

f. attempting to perpetrate the crimes referred to in (a), (b), or (c).

g. participating in the perpetration of the crimes referred to in (a) – (f).

Article 13 of the ATL stipulates acts facilitating or providing assistance

intentionally to terrorism perpetrators by (Butt, 2009, p. 7):

a. giving or lending money, property or other assets to the perpetrator of a

terrorism crime; or

b. hiding the perpetrator of terrorism crime; or

c. concealing information about a terrorism crime.

Anyone who is found guilty of conducting these acts is subject to

imprisonment for a minimum term of 3 years and a maximum term of 15 years. As

mentioned previously, Article 13 (a) above was repealed after the promulgation of

the ATFL because this provision more closely relates to the criminal acts of terrorism

financing.

Regardless of the repealing of Article 13 (a), the stipulated terrorism criminal

acts in Article 13 are inchoate offences that are accessories to the perpetrator of the

criminal acts of terrorism. Articles 14, 15, and 16 are also provisions on inchoate

offences. The inchoate offences are covered by the KUHP yet the ATL also enacted


specific provisions on inchoate offences as well as enacting various new terrorism

offences. As noted by Roach (2011, p. 150), inchoate offences under the ATL

include “intentional assistance, incitement, plotting or attempting to commit acts of

terrorism, and also facilitating an act of terrorism outside Indonesia”.

Article 14 of the ATL imposes the death penalty or life imprisonment on those

who plan and/or incite others to commit a crime of terrorism referred to in Article 6

to Article 12 of the ATL. Based on elucidation in Article 14, preparation conducted

either physically or financially, or of human resources is included as a plan in

committing terrorism crime. Inciting is defined as conducting incitement and

provocation, giving of gifts, money or promises. It is clear from this elucidation that

incitement is directed specifically to the intellectual actors of terrorism crime (Butt,

2009, p. 7). Therefore, an intellectual actor of terrorism crime is subjected to the

death penalty or life imprisonment (Atmasasmita, 2012, p. 24).

Article 15 of the ATL imposes the same penalty as that of a perpetrator to

those who conduct any plot, attempt, or assistance to commit any criminal act of

terrorism referred to in articles 6 to 12 of the ATL, because it is deemed assistance.

According to Atmasasmita (2012, pp. 23-24), an accessory in this article is defined

as providing assistance prior, at the same time, or after the criminal act was

conducted.

Similar to Article 13, Article 16 covers accessories to terrorism crime.

However, articles 16 and 13 have differences. “Accessory to terrorism” in Article 13

applies to perpetrators who live or stay in Indonesia, while Article 16 focuses on

perpetrators who live or stay outside the territory of Indonesia (Juwana, 2006, p.

298). According to Article 16 (Butt, 2009, p. 7):

Any person outside of the territory of Indonesia who provides assistance,

facilitation, the means or information for the commission of a terrorism

crime referred to in Article 6-12, faces the same penalty as for the

perpetrator.

The definition of “assistance” and “facilitation” refers to the elucidation of

Article 13, which defines these terms. Assistance is defined as an act of providing


assistance before or during the commission of the crime, whereas facilitation is

providing assistance after the committal of the crime.

Articles 17 and 18 of the ATL cover the application of the ATL to corporations

as the perpetrators of terrorism crimes. These articles contain provisions explaining

to what extent the individual acts within a corporation can be identified as terrorism

crime committed by the corporation. The main criminal sanction that can be imposed

on corporations under the ATL is a fine; the corporation can also be frozen, have its

license revoked, or be declared a forbidden corporation. At the time of writing, there

have been no corporations accused of criminal acts of terrorism under the ATL.

Finally, the ATL’s Article 19 is applied to juveniles who commit criminal acts

of terrorism under the ATL. Article 19 clarifies two points. The first is to what extent

a perpetrator of the crime of terrorism is categorised as a juvenile or minor.

According to Article 19, anyone who is aged under 18 years is subject to exclusion

from the application of criminal sanctions as formulated in the ATL. That is, all who

are aged under 18 years are categorised as juveniles or minors. The second point is

the criminal sanctions that are applied to juveniles and minors. Criminal sanctions

applied to juveniles and minors are lighter than those applied to adults. Article 19

stipulates that the period of minimum imprisonment, the death penalty, and life

imprisonment are not applied to juveniles or minors.

4.2 INDONESIA’S ANTI-TERRORISM FINANCING LAW

4.2.1 Introduction

The Indonesian Government ratified the International Convention for the

Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism by issuing Law No. 6 of 2006. Within this

ratification, the Indonesian Government is obliged to enact a special law on the

criminal act of terrorism financing. Following the ratification, the Government of

Indonesia then promulgated a special law that is Law No 9 of 2013 on the Prevention

and Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism Financing, known as the Anti-Terrorism

Financing Law (ATFL).

In fact, some of Indonesia’s special laws are available to be applied to

prosecuting criminal acts of terrorism financing, similarly to the ATL. Before the

promulgation of the ATFL, this type of criminal act would be charged under the ATL

since the ATL has provisions on terrorism financing as formulated in Articles 11 and


13 (a). Besides the ATL, another law that could be used to charge the accused of

terrorism financing crime is Law No. 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of

Money Laundering, known as the Anti-Money Laundering Law (AMLL).

However, Husein (2012, p. 79) identified that the existing laws had not

comprehensively provided prevention and eradication of terrorism financing. Husein

noted that the term “terrorism financing” had not been used explicitly and had not

been defined, even though the ATL has provisions on the crime of terrorism

financing (Husein, 2012, p. 48). Although the criminal act of terrorism is included as

one of the predicate crimes in the AMLL, the law could not be implemented

effectively to prevent and eradicate terrorism financing crime (Husein, 2012, p. 73).

Preventing terrorists and terrorist organisations from funding their activities is

an essential component of any successful counterterrorism strategy, and is a binding

requirement under several United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions.

Countries should enact laws that criminalise the financing of terrorism in accordance

with the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,

and are encouraged to implement the recommendations of the Financial Action Task

Force (FATF) on criminalising terrorist financing (Amrullah, 2017). Based on such

convention and the FATF recommendations, Amrullah (2017, p. 3) explains that the

Indonesian Government enacted a special law on terrorism financing – the ATFL –

in 2013. Procedures and proper mechanisms allowing for freezing, seizing, and

confiscation of terrorist assets and funds used or allocated for the purpose of terrorist

financing should also be enacted in accordance with the relevant UN Security

Council resolutions and subject to appropriate review.

4.2.2 The Nature of the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law

The ATFL consists of 11 chapters and 33 articles in total. The content covers

the scope of the law; acts of terrorism financing; other acts related to acts of

terrorism financing; prevention; blocking; lists of suspected terrorists and terrorist

organisations; investigation, prosecution, and examination in the court; cooperation

on prevention and eradication; and transitional provision. In this context of this

research, investigation focuses on the criminal acts of terrorism financing under the

ATFL, and is presented in detail in Subsection 4.2.3.


As with the ATL, Chapter I of the ATFL is the general provision. This chapter

defines specific terms that are used in the ATFL. Among others, the definition of

terrorism financing is stated in Article 1 (1): “Financing of terrorism is any act to

providing, collecting, giving, or lending funds, either it is committed directly or

indirectly, and it is used and/or will be used for committing terrorism activities,

terrorist organisations, or terrorists”. As a part of the general provision, this

definition is a general definition of terrorism financing under the ATFL, while

specific criminal acts of terrorism financing are formulated in Chapter III. Chapter I

is akin to a summary of the following articles, in which the elements of terrorism

financing crime are formulated.

Chapter II of the ATFL stipulates the jurisdiction of the law. Article 1 of the

ATFL reflects the territorial and extraterritorial principles. The law can be applied to

anyone who commits a terrorism financing crime in Indonesia or outside the territory

of Indonesia, or to a fund that relates to terrorism financing crime in Indonesia or

outside the territory of Indonesia. Article 2 (2) paragraph (a) of the ATFL contains a

“passive national principle” because Indonesian citizens are also subject to the ATFL

for those who commit terrorism financing crime internationally. Article 2 (2)

paragraphs (b) to (g) contain active national principles because the law can be

enforced on anyone committing terrorism financing crime in other countries.

Consequently, foreigners who commit terrorism financing crime under the ATFL are

subject to criminal sanction in cases that are connected to criminal acts of terrorism:

against Indonesian citizens17

against Indonesian Government facilities, including diplomatic or

consular officials’ premises18

that force the Indonesian Government to take or not take actions19

to an aircraft operated by the Indonesian Government20

17 See Article 2 (2) para b, ATFL 18 See Article 2 (2) para c, ATFL 19 See Article 2 (2) para d, ATFL 20 See Article 2 (2) para e, ATFL


committed on board a vessel under the flag of Indonesia or an aircraft

that is registered under Indonesian laws,21 or

the acts of financing terrorism committed by a stateless person who

resides in Indonesia.22

Therefore, instead of active and passive national principles, Article 2 of the

ATFL also reflects the extraterritorial principle because the law can reach anyone

who commits the crime outside the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, similar to

the ATL. This article also specifies the details of the application of the extraterritorial

principle.

In terms of exclusion of political crime, the ATFL has the same provision as

that of the ATL. The ATFL also confirms that political crime is excluded.23 Thus, the

spirit of these two special criminal laws is the same – that is, to draw a clear line

between terrorism and political crime, both to guarantee public rights and to prevent

arbitrary action by the ruling government.

Chapter III of the ATFL describes the elements of the criminal act of terrorism

financing. This criminal act is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.3 in this

chapter. Besides the criminal act of terrorism financing, the ATFL also stipulates

other criminal acts related to the acts of terrorism financing (see Chapter IV). These

offences pertain to administrative matters particularly, for instance, an obligation to

maintain confidentiality of documents related to suspicious financial transactions or

to the financing of terrorism.24

Chapter V contains a preventive measure, and then Chapter VI regulates how

to freeze funding that is used or might be used to commit terrorism crime in

Indonesia. Chapter VII focuses on the list of suspected terrorists and terrorist

organisations published by the government, and the procedure for publishing

personal identities and corporations on the list. Chapter VII also covers how to block

funding, as well as how to object to a listing. Thus the provisions of these three

chapters are related.

21 See Article 2 (2) para f, ATFL 22 See Article 2 (2) para g, ATFL 23 See Article 3, ATFL. 24 See Article 9, ATFL.


Furthermore, Chapter VIII has a provision on special criminal procedure law

implemented for the crime of terrorism financing. Because terrorism is a special

crime, the ATFL covers some exceptional provisions of criminal procedure law that

are not provided in the Penal Procedure Code (Law No. 8 of 1981). The exceptions

cover all stages of criminal procedure law: the investigation, prosecution, and the

trial session. Chapter IX covers cooperation on prevention and eradication of the

criminal act of terrorism financing. The focus is not only cooperation among related

agencies in Indonesia but also between the Government of Indonesia and that of

another country or jurisdiction.

Finally, Chapters X and XI relate to the existence of the ATL’s articles 11 and

13 (a). They clarify that articles 11 and 13 (a) of the ATL are repealed after the

ATFL is promulgated.25 The transitional provision, on the other hand, states that

offences that are being processed at the level of investigation, prosecution or

examination in the court are still charged under the ATL.26

4.2.3 The Crime of Terrorism Financing under the Anti-Terrorism Financing

Law

In line with the context of this research, this investigation focuses on acts that

constitute terrorism financing under the ATFL. Based on the provisions in Chapter

III, three Articles (articles 4, 5, and 6) contain the elements of criminal acts of

financing terrorism. In the provisions of these Articles, a criminal act of financing of

terrorism is stipulated only in Article 4, whereas Articles 5 and 6 are inchoate

offences.

Although articles 7 and 8 are also included in Chapter III, these provisions do

not specify the element of terrorism financing crime. They are guidelines in

conjunction with the criminal acts of terrorism financing. The provisions of Article 7

contain a guideline for cases in which a convicted party cannot not pay fines imposed

by the ruling. Similarly, Article 8 covers the application of the ATL to corporations

as the party accused of terrorism financing crime.

Article 4 of the ATFL states that any person can be charged for terrorism

financing if they are intentionally providing, collecting, giving, or lending funds,

25 See: Article 48, ATFL. 26 See: Article 47, ATFL


either directly or indirectly, with intent to be used in whole or in part for criminal

acts of terrorism, terrorist organisations or terrorists. Anyone who commits this

criminal act is subject to a maximum of 15 years imprisonment and a maximum fine

of up to IDR1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah), or around AUD1,000,000 (one

million Australian dollars). Based on the provisions of Article 4, there are two main

elements of the criminal act of terrorism financing: intentionally providing,

collecting, giving, or lending funds; and the intention that such funding be used in

conducting criminal acts of terrorism, or be provided to terrorist organisations or

terrorists. The general prosecutor must prove these elements in the trial session.

ATFL Article 5 is an inchoate offence that applies to accessories to the

perpetrator of the criminal acts of terrorism. The provisions of Article 5 stress that

anyone who conducts any plot, attempt, or assistance to commit any criminal act of

terrorism financing will be sentenced the same as the perpetrator of such an act of

terrorism financing. The provisions of Article 5 of are almost identical to those of

Article 15 of the ATL.

A new provision related to inchoate offences is also available in Article 6 of

the ATFL. It states that those who plan, organise, or incite another person to commit

any criminal act of terrorism financing as defined in Article 4 face life imprisonment

or a maximum of 20 years imprisonment. This provision is almost identical to that of

Article 14 the ATL, where the intellectual actor is subjected to heavier criminal

sanctions than those imposed on the actual actor.

Article 7 of the ATFL is a guideline for cases in which the convicted person

cannot pay the relevant fines, requiring that they are subjected to confinement for

1 year and 4 months. This is an exceptional provision to Book I of the KUHP.

According to the KUHP’s Article 30 (4), the confinement as the replacement for the

fine should be no longer than 8 months.

Like Article 7, Article 8 of the ATFL also contains guidelines in the event that

the perpetrator is a corporation. According to Article 8 (4), if found guilty of

committing terrorism financing, a corporation faces a maximum fine of

IDR100,000,000,000 (one hundred billion rupiah), or around AUD10,000,000.

Besides receiving the fine imposed by the court, a corporation is subjected to

additional sentences: freezing of the business of the corporation, in part or totally;

revoking its license and declaring it a forbidden corporation; liquidating the


corporation; expropriating the corporate assets; the state taking over the corporation;

and/or the announcement of the court decision. These sentences can be imposed on

either a corporation or a corporate controller, as stated in Article 8 (1) of the ATFL.

4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

In the context of Indonesia, criminal acts of terrorism and terrorism financing

are specific crimes because they are nominated criminal acts under special laws.

Terrorism is based on the ATL, while terrorism financing is based on the ATFL.

Consequently, a perpetrator of terrorism is prosecuted under the ATL, while a

perpetrator of terrorism financing is prosecuted under the ATFL. Nevertheless,

before the promulgation of the ATFL in 2013, perpetrators of terrorism financing

crime were charged under the ATL, the AMLL, or both.

Based on the review of the substance of the ATL and ATFL, there are

similarities and differences between these two laws. The similarities showed from

the provisions on jurisdiction and the scope of the laws. Both laws provide the extra-

territorial principle (Article 4 of the ATL and Article 2 paragraph 2 of the ATFL) and

the restriction from the laws being applied to political crimes, crimes relating to

political crimes, crimes with political motives, and crimes with political objectives

(Article 5 of the ATL and Article 3 of the ATFL). Furthermore, both laws provide a

chapter that contains provisions on other criminal acts related to the criminal acts of

terrorism and terrorism financing, in Chapter IV of both laws. On the other hand,

these laws also contain some differences. There is a specific chapter on prevention

under the ATFL, while prevention provisions are absent from the ATL. A chapter on

compensation, restitution and rehabilitation is formulated in the ATL, whereas in the

ATFL is not formulated.

Comparisons between the ATL and the ATFL in this summary specifically

concern the provisions on criminal acts. In Chapter III of both laws, there are

similarities and differences in the provisions on terrorism (under the ATL) and

terrorism financing (under the ATFL). There are some similarities in the formulation

of the criminal acts between the ATL and the ATFL.

Firstly, there are similarities in the provisions on sentencing of inchoate

offences. Those who commit inchoate offences are subjected to the same penalties as

the perpetrator. This is an exception to the general provision of Book I of the KUHP,


in which those who are attempting to commit, or are accessories to serious crime or

felony (kejahatan), face lighter sentences than the perpetrator’s sentence; the

sentence is reduced by one-third (Article 53 paragraph 2 KUHP and Article 57

paragraph 1). For example, if someone is found guilty of attempted murder under

Article 338 KUHP, the maximum penalty would be reduced by one-third. Therefore,

because Article 338 KUHP provides a maximum of 15 years imprisonment for the

perpetrator of murder, a person attempting to commit murder who is charged under

Article 338 KUHP would face a maximum of 10 years imprisonment (Suarda, 2011,

p. 188).

A second similarity is found in the provisions for corporations. Both the ATL

and the ATFL state that a corporation can also be charged as the perpetrator of a

crime. This is also an exceptional provision to the KUHP, which specifies only the

individual as the perpetrator. A third similarity concerns intellectual actors.

Provisions in Article 14 of the ATL and Article 6 of the ATFL are directed to

intellectual actors of the crimes. Both articles impose heavier penalties for the

intellectual actor than for the perpetrator.

On the other hand, there are two differences regarding the provisions on

criminal acts of terrorism and terrorism financing between the ATL and the ATFL.

The first is related to the formulation of the definition of the crime. In the ATL,

terrorism is not defined, although Article 1 (1) states that terrorism is any act that

fulfils the elements of a crime under the ATL, which is not actually a definition. This

statement serves to emphasise that there are several types of criminal acts of

terrorism as formulated in several articles in the law. This is typical of Indonesian

laws, in which the most important factor is the elements of the crime as formulated in

such articles. This is a characteristic of a civil law system, which was adopted by

Indonesia from the civil law system of The Netherlands. The ATFL, on the other

hand, tries to define the acts of terrorism financing more clearly rather than stating

that the crime of terrorism financing is a crime as formulated in a specific article.

The ATFL defines terrorism financing in Article 1 (1) and then stipulate in Article 4,

which includes criminal sanctions to a maximum of 15 years imprisonment and a

maximum fine of up to IDR1,000,000,000 (one billion rupiah).


The second difference relates to the specific crimes formulated under the ATL

and the ATFL. The ATL has six main typologies of criminal acts of terrorism,

namely:

1. Terror attack.

2. Intended to create terror attack.

3. A range of offences relating to various aspects of aviation security.

4. Explosives, firearms, and ammunition offences relating to terrorism.

5. The use of chemical, biological and other weapons.

6. Providing or collecting assets intentionally to be used, partly or wholly, for

terrorism acts and further offences relating to chemical and biological

weapons, including the provision of assistance or funds to obtain them.

In contrast, the ATFL has only one type of terrorism financing crime, that is

that is, “providing, collecting, giving, or lending funds, either directly or indirectly

with intent to be used in whole or in part, relating to terrorism, terrorist organization

or terrorist” as formulated in the Article 4 of the ATFL. In fact, this criminal act was

prosecuted under the ATL, the AMLL, or both, before the promulgation of the

ATFL. Since the issue of the ATFL, this act is charged under the ATFL.

To conclude this summary, it is important to highlight that someone conducting

the crimes of terrorism or terrorism financing within Indonesian jurisdiction will be

prosecuted as a terrorist. If they are found guilty and sentenced by the court, they

become a convicted terrorist. They are sent to prison and are then treated as a

terrorist inmate. Furthermore, they are likely to be required to participate in prison-

based deradicalisation programs, implemented in either a special prison for terrorists

or a general prison. This conclusion provides the connection between existing

Indonesian special laws on terrorism (the ATL and the ATFL) and prison-based

deradicalisation programs or rehabilitation programs for terrorist inmates. Figure 4.1

shows the connection of these programs with the ATL and Figure 4.2 shows the

connection with the ATFL.


Figure 4.1 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program

ATL

Allegations of

terrorism

Trial

Not Guilty

Guilty

Person

Corporation

Death (Exclude minors)

Life Imprisonment

(Excludes minors)

Imprisonment

Fine

Freezing or license is revoked

PRISONS

SOCIETY Release Release

Criminal acts

Prison-based

deradicalisation

program


Figure 4.2 Connection between Acts of Terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Financing Law (ATFL) and Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program

ATFL

Allegations of

terrorism

financing

Trial

Not Guilty

Guilty

Person

Corporation

Life Imprisonment

(Exclude minors)

Imprisonment

Fine

Additional sentences:

PRISONS

SOCIETY Release Release

Criminal acts

Prison-based

deradicalisation

program

freezing of the business of the corporation, in part or totally

revoking license and declaring it a forbidden corporation

liquidating the corporation

expropriating the corporate assets

taking over of the corporation by the state

announcement of the court decision


The Challenges of Terrorist

Deradicalisation: Indonesian

Prison Officers’ Experiences

In jurisdictions where violent extremist prisoners are held in separate

facilities, prison staff will find themselves only working with violent

extremists. In other countries where violent extremists are integrated into all

prisons, or dispersed among a few high-security prisons, prison staff may

work with violent extremists on a less frequent basis. In both scenarios, the

way in which prison officials deal with violent extremist prisoners (who

sometimes refuse to conform to legitimate expectations) can be one of the

greatest challenges to the professionalism of prison staff. (UNODC, 2016, p.

27)

To answer Research Question 1, as outlined in Chapter 1, this chapter

investigates Indonesian prison officers’ experiences with terrorist rehabilitation.

Specifically, this chapter presents the results and discussion on the challenges facing

Indonesian prison officers in their role in rehabilitating terrorist inmates. It draws on

both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected from a series of focus

groups conducted to identify challenges encountered in implementing the Indonesian

prison-based deradicalisation program. Secondary data were taken from existing

research, state documents, and agency reports. To analyse collected primary data, a

qualitative thematic analysis was used (see Chapter 3).

This chapter begins with an overview in Section 5.1, followed by results and

discussion on the personalities of terrorist inmates, the readiness of Indonesian prison

officers, the sustainability of programs, the prison environment, and the

unavailability of collaborative mechanisms, which are presented in sections 5.2, 5.3,

5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, respectively. A conclusion to the chapter follows in Section 5.7.


5.1 OVERVIEW

Chapter 2 argued that there is a gap in the literature concerning the

implementers’ lens on the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs

in the context of Indonesia. This thesis seeks to bridge this gap by examining

Indonesian prison officers’ experiences on deradicalisation through deploying

qualitative research and legal research methodologies as discussed in Chapter 3.

Further, the connection between the existing Indonesian laws on anti-terrorism and

prison-based deradicalisation programs was presented in Chapter 4. This chapter

reports on the investigation into Indonesian prison officers’ challenges in

implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. The chapter discusses five

challenges that this research found are faced by Indonesian prison officers

implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.

Firstly, it is argued that the personalities of the terrorist inmates is one of the

challenges. Terrorist inmates’ beliefs and behaviour are discussed; these beliefs and

behaviour promote difficulties in implementing prison-based deradicalisation

programs. Secondly, the readiness of the officers themselves is perceived as a barrier

to implementing the programs. In terms of the officers’ task to deliver

deradicalisation programs, both individual and collegial weaknesses were identified

as challenges for terrorist rehabilitation. Thirdly, the sustainability of the program is

apparently an obstacle. Incidentally and partiality of the implemented program were

perceived as shortcomings in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation

programs. Fourthly, institutional infrastructure problems contribute to the challenges

in the implementation of such programs. The issues of overcapacity and obscurity of

segregation practices in Indonesian prisons lead to difficulties in implementing the

programs. Fifthly, there is an issue of the unavailability of collaborative mechanisms

among the implementers of the program. Although many agencies are involved in the

program, it is argued that the collaboration remains unorganised.

5.2 TERRORIST INMATES’ PERSONALITIES

The focus group results revealed that one of the greatest perceived challenges

for Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs

is the beliefs and behaviour of convicted terrorists. This challenge was experienced

by focus group participants on a daily basis through contact with terrorist inmates, as


well as while implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. The focus group

results also revealed that the personalities of terrorist inmates are unique and differ

from the personalities of other types of inmates.

5.2.1 Terrorist Inmates’ Beliefs

In terms of the beliefs of terrorist inmates, there were several challenges faced

by Indonesian prison officers implementing Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation program. Challenges recognised by the focus group participants

were the beliefs of terrorists that:

1. They are not criminals.

2. They are heroes in a divine war.

3. They were the only most “right” individuals in interpreting Islamist

religious teachings.

Furthermore, these challenges were perceived as difficult issues to cope with

because these established beliefs were related to the hearts and minds of imprisoned

terrorists. One focus group participant emphasised this difficulty:

We could not deal with terrorist inmates’ beliefs because in the bottom of

their heart they said they were not wrong. It was about convicted terrorists’

hearts and minds and it was so difficult to be challenged. On the contrary,

interventions for non-terrorist convicts were much easier because in the

bottoms of their hearts they believed they were wrong. In this case we have a

huge chance to “touch” and then rehabilitate them. Yet, it was not so for

convicted terrorists. (FG2:4)

Firstly, imprisoned terrorists apparently have a strong belief that they are not

criminals. Based on the series of three focus groups (FG1, FG2, and FG3) with

Indonesian prison officers, all of the participants had experienced that most terrorist

prisoners hold strong beliefs that they are not criminals. No participant rejected this

assertion. Thus, the terrorists did not feel guilty, even if they had been found guilty

and sentenced by the courts. Subsequently, as one focus group participant said:


When they were sent to and live inside the prison, they still believe that they

were not criminals. (FG1:1)

Similarly, another focus group participant stated:

Although the acts of terrorist inmates took many lives, terrorist inmates feel

very confident that they did not commit any criminal acts, so they believe

that they were not prisoners. (FG2:4)

Indonesian prison officers believe that the “criminal” label is not accepted by

most terrorist inmates. Despite their criminal acts being recognised as crimes of

terrorism, this will never be accepted by most terrorist inmates. In other words,

terrorist inmates have strong self-justifications for perpetrating violence and bombing

attacks and do not see themselves as criminals.

A number of authors have reported analyses of comparisons between terrorists

and other types of criminals. These studies demonstrated terrorists differ from other

criminals (Ganor, 2002; Goldman, 2014; Gunaratna, 2011; Mahan & Griset, 2013;

Presman & Flockton, 2014; Silke, 2014; UNODC, 2016). Silke (2014, p. 4) has

examined that:

terrorist prisoners rarely describe themselves as “terrorists”. Instead they

portray themselves as soldiers, freedom fighters, volunteers, partisans, the

resistance; at least in their own minds if nowhere else. Normally they bitterly

contest any effort to describe them as criminals.

There are similarities between the beliefs of convicted terrorists as expressed

by the Indonesian prison officers in this study and those described by Bakti (2014)

and Goldman (2014). Bakti concluded that terrorist inmates are not mentally

disordered individuals, and neither are they psychopaths nor psychotics (Bakti, 2014,

p. 196). Goldman’s investigation outlined that “psychologists have confirmed those

terrorists are psychologically normal. Violent criminals, on the other hand, tend to

suffer from mental disorders and can be unstable” (Goldman, 2014, p. 48). In the


words of Yehoshua, “these prisoners entered prison with a sense of righteousness”

(Yehoshua, 2014, p. 146).

The previous discussion suggests that terrorism differs from other crimes. The

case of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, an ideologue terrorist inmate, is a useful example for

analysing the differences between terrorist and ordinary criminals. A report

published by Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) stated that Abu Bakar

Ba’asyir expressed no regret for the crime that he committed. Ba’asyir said that “I

have no regret for helping military training in Aceh because the aim of the training

was to strengthen the capacity to defend Islam from enemy attacks; such training is

not just permitted by Allah, it is required” (IPAC, 2013, p. 9). Ba’asyir vehemently

justified his acts through “striving to achieve a common good for their community”,

as explained by Gupta (2008, p. 32). Gupta clearly argues that “this ubiquitous

pursuit of altruistic goals separates a terrorist from a common criminal” (Gupta,

2008, p. 32).

Secondly, convicted terrorists portrayed themselves as “heroes”. In the

Indonesian context, convicted terrorists particularly imagined that they are heroes in

a divine war for Islam. Because the background of the terrorist inmates was jihadist,

they were all inspired by what others see as a misunderstanding of Islam teachings. A

focus group participant said:

Most of convicted terrorists claimed themselves as prisoners of war from the

battlefield of war between Islam and their enemies, including the established

Indonesian Government. (FG1:3)

Furthermore, another focus group participant shared his communication

experiences with a convicted terrorist:

He said, “I am not a detainee; I am not a prisoner; I am a prisoner of war”.

That’s what I experienced when I did my job; and to me it’s a bad

experience. (FG3:5)


Another focus group participant underlined the difficulty dealing with those

who are “hardliner” or “ideologue” convicted terrorists, who show a strong belief in

their ideology:

An ideologue of convicted terrorist needs a specific treatment. They cannot

receive us. Because the majority of them feel that they were right. They were

not breaking the law with a belief that “My law is Allah”. I am defending my

religion so they do not have a guilty feeling at all. It’s absolutely different

with other criminals. (FG2:4)

Due to this belief of the terrorists, focus group participants argued that they

experience difficulties implementing effective prison-based deradicalisation

programs. However, the focus group participants also believed that there are a

number of terrorist inmates who could be rehabilitated, particularly those who are

categorised as “medium- or low-risk terrorist inmates” (FG1:2 and FG2:4).

Furthermore, terrorists’ beliefs of themselves as heroes of a holy war seem to

be consistent with Hasan’s (2007) study on Imam Samudra’s justification for the Bali

Bombings. Imam Samudra was one of the masterminds of the Bali Bombings and

was sentenced to death. In his article, Hasan (2007) demonstrated that Samudra’s

idea of a perpetual war was the most critical aspect of his thinking. He assessed that

Imam Samudra (2007, p. 1043):

holds to the belief that non-Muslims will never allow Muslims to live in

peace and thus armed jihad is the only kind of relationship that could exist

between Muslims and the non-Muslims. Using the abrogation argument, he

holds that armed jihad is a standing obligation until the end of the world. It

has to be observed until all lands fall under the rule of Islam. The basis of the

relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, thus, is war, not peace.

Thirdly, participants reported a further belief held by convicted terrorists that

they were the “most right” individuals in interpreting Islamic teachings. One focus

group participant realised that “many of them have a high confidence in the religious

matters, particularly Islam and Islam teachings” (FG1:2). Furthermore, he stated that:


When we started conversations about Islam with the aim to challenge

convicted terrorists’ beliefs about jihad, they showed a strong argument by

referring to the Al-Quran. And, they always showed to us an advanced

interpretation. (FG1:2)

It would be difficult for us to implement deradicalisation programs,

particularly on facilitating a religious discussion, because they were totally

ready to challenge my interpretation about Islam. I do believe they will

refuse my interpretation, particularly on the interpretation of jihad. (FG3:5)

The quotes above demonstrate that these Indonesian prison officers experience

a challenge in facilitating discussions on Islamic teachings with terrorist inmates

when the inmates believe that they are the “most right” individuals in interpreting

Islamic teachings.

This issue requires better communication between Indonesian prison officers

and terrorist inmates. As a strategy to improve communication, one focus group

participant started conversations about non-religious topics, normally based on day-

to-day activities, for instance “soccer or life skills” (FG3:5).

Focus group participants also noted that convicted terrorists viewed their

incarceration as a time for reflection, or that they imagined prison as a place of

isolation. A convicted terrorist told a focus group participant that: “life in prison is a

time and place to re-organise the strategy for the struggle; it does not matter for me

to live in prison” (FG3:5). From this experience, the participant said that “whatever

interventions that will be introduced and applied for convicted terrorists, it will be

useless because this inmate is so strong in holding their beliefs” (FG1:5).

In addition to this, as an expression of frustration because of terrorist inmates’

beliefs, another focus group participant said that:

It was a wasting time and energy for us to deal with an inmate with beliefs

like this, so we need help in this matter. It is an ideology. (FG2:4)

This finding that terrorist inmates believe they are the “most right” individuals

in interpreting Islamic ideology agrees with the findings of the International Crisis


Group (ICG, 2007, p. 12) and Bakti (2014, p. 176), which showed a negative

response of terrorist inmates to a discussion about Islam delivered by an outsider of

their circle. Bakti (2014, p. 176) illustrated the impact of the initiative of the National

Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terosrisme –

[BNPT]) when Islamic scholars from Jordan (Ali Al-Halaby) and from Egypt

(Syaikh Najih Ibrahim) presented to terrorist inmates in the Nusakambangan prison

complex. The inmates totally disagreed with the interpretation of Islam delivered by

those scholars.

As pointed out by Gunaratna (2011, p. 67), ideological debate and religious

counselling sessions are vital components of the rehabilitation program for Islamist

terror detainees. Therefore, further research should be conducted to investigate the

extent to which the debate and discussion can positively contribute to the

deradicalisation of terrorist inmates.

5.2.2 Terrorist Inmates’ Behaviour

The behaviour of convicted terrorists was recognised as an obstacle by focus

group participants to the successful implementation of prison-based deradicalisation

programs. Focus group results revealed that there were two challenges concerning

the behaviour of terrorist inmates: reacting against the officers and refusing to

participate in any programs. These findings further support the issue of violence

against prison officers as a direct challenge to the prison authorities (McEvoy, 2001;

UNODC, 2016).

Reacting against the prison officers was often experienced by focus group

participants in day-to-day interactions with terrorist inmates. One indicator was an

unwillingness to greet prison officers. Many focus group participants had

experienced this unwillingness to reply to greetings offered by prison officers.

Several terrorist inmates showed negative attitudes to prison officers by rejecting any

greetings offered. To greet someone, an Indonesian Muslim normally says

“Assallamualikum” and the other will reply by saying “Waalaikumsalam”.

Indonesian prison officers who greeted terrorist inmates in this manner found that

terrorist inmates would not reply to the greeting; they ignored such greetings and

tended to behave in an introverted manner towards the officers:


Simply, some of them, if we meet they will not greet as. If we greet them,

they will not reply. (FG2:2)

Terrorist inmates tended to maintain the distance with us. They don’t want to

get “close” with us. From their body of language and expression we can see

that. They won’t say a greeting to us. They won’t shake hands with us.

(FG2:3)

The focus group participants considered this refusal a critical moment that

indicated the willingness of these individuals to participate in correctional programs,

including prison-based deradicalisation programs. Logically, if inmates do not want

to greet prison officers, they are unlikely to participate in prison-based

deradicalisation programs. A focus group participant realised this:

That’s it, sir. That’s a challenge for us. When I was moved here for a job

promotion, I found that all convicted terrorists won’t speak with me. Even

they look like they want to fight with me. That’s my first experience when I

moved to this prison. (FG2:4)

Indonesian prison officers faced difficulties due to resistance from terrorist

inmates. Interestingly, a focus group participant thought that terrorist inmates were

“brave individuals” (FG3:5) because they showed no fear of the consequences of

their behaviour, including for their lives. They were commonly ready to die for their

beliefs. One focus group participant expressed his experiences in managing terrorist

inmates:

When there was a conflict nearly happening between terrorist inmates and

other inmates, a terrorist inmate said “dead was fine”. If the conflict

occurred, the safety of the prison officers would be at risk. We were in

trouble as well. (FG3:3)

Although terrorist inmates sometimes appeared to be accepted by other

“ordinary” inmates in the prison (ICG, 2007), this was usually not the case. This

situation was a potential security threat and could lead to a conflict between terrorist


inmates and other inmates. In one prison where a focus group were conducted, such a

conflict had almost occurred. A focus group participant explained:

Yes, it nearly happened a clash between terrorist inmates and narcotics

inmates. At that time, there was a concert inside the prison. The problem

arose because the concert started while terrorist inmates had not finished

pray. It was nearly finished actually. A group of terrorist inmates complained

to the other group who were in the concert, and the situation got worse. They

shouted at each other, and then crowded. Terrorist inmates yelling “Allah

Akbar ... Allah Akbar … Allah Akbar”. Sometimes, a small thing in the

prison could end up as a big problem. (FG3:3)

The cumulative outcome of these beliefs and attitudes is the rejection by

terrorist inmates of participating in any kind of interventions and programs delivered

by prison officers and prison authorities. For instance, when terrorist inmates were

sick and needed medical treatment, “they do not want to go to the prison’s

polyclinic” (FG2:1). Moreover, the participant said:

If they are sick, they will not take the drugs offered by the prison’s

polyclinic. It was their presumption that the drugs provided by the

government were “haram”. It was like that. So there is a presumption that

what the country provides for them is “haram”. So they do not want to take

it. They usually try to use an alternative medicine brought from their friends

or family visiting them in the prison. (FG2:1)

Another participant talked about the activities at in-house mosques that:

Some terrorist inmates will refuse to attend prayer in the in-house mosque

together with other types of inmates. They will pray in their own block.

(FG3:5)

In terms of prisoner rights to receive conditional release and remission, terrorist

inmates showed unwillingness to accept these rights. Some convicted terrorists, as a

focus group participant emphasised, “rejected those benefits offered by the prison


authorities” (FG2:3). Terrorist inmates showed a strong preference to remain in the

prison rather than take early release; they refuse because the parole requirements

include signing a declaration contrary to their beliefs, such as to “obey the

Government of Indonesia and obedience to Pancasila” (FG2:3).

These findings are consistent with a previous study carried out by Hannah et al

(Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008). Hannah and colleagues (2008) classified the

spectrum of the potential activities undertaken by radicalised prisoners, particularly

using passive or non-violent resistance, and using active or violent resistance to

prison authorities. These two types of terrorist inmate behaviour have been

experienced by Indonesian prison officers.

Non-violent resistance is indicated by inmates ignoring greetings expressed by

prison officers. This passive action tends to block the opportunity to communicate

with prison officers. Refusing any treatment options such as seeing the in-house

doctor or receiving medications, and refusing prisoner rights such as parole or

conditional release, could also be identified as non-violent resistance against prison

authorities. However, during my fieldwork, no self-harm activities were reported,

such as hunger strikes at the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay as observed by

Hannah et al. (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. 43).

Further, using violence to resist prison authorities was indicated by the

potential harm faced by the focus group participants. The following quote by Hannah

et al. is based on the report of the UK Prison Officers Association as published in the

Observer in 2007, describes a major event in which a group of inmates launched

violence against prison officers (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. 44):

when an officer confronts a Muslim prisoner in Belmarsh, he or she often

finds themselves surrounded by five or six other Muslim inmates. They are

becoming a lot more defensive … Tariq al-Daour, jailed for establishing an

online jihad network, was caught making a website in his cell at Belmarsh

urging terror attacks. When al-Daour refused to hand over his laptop, a riot

ensued as prison officers clashed with a group of al-Qaeda sympathisers.

A participant in a focus group indicated that he had “almost suffered violence”

(FG3:4). It means that there is a great risk to Indonesian prison officers of violence


from terrorist inmates. Although the focus group participants did not mention

personal experiences of direct attacks by terrorist inmates, several prison riots in

Indonesian prisons have been documented as initiated by the terrorist inmates, for

instance, the riot in Tanjung Gusta Prison in 2013. Due this incident, some prisoners

escaped. The investigation of this prison riot concluded that the actor behind the riot

was a terrorist inmate, Fadli Sadama (Kompas.com, 2013b). In 2016, a prison officer

in Cirebon Prison was a victim of an attack committed by a terrorist inmate during an

incidental operation to investigate illegal items such as drugs and weapons. The

incident occurred when the officer tried to enter the block where terrorist inmates

were housed (Liputan6, 2016).

Besides their beliefs and behaviour, refusing involvement in prison-based

deradicalisation programs was reinforced by deradicalisation terminology.

Participants perceived that terrorist inmates are very sensitive to this terminology;

they do not want to be called radical because “they think what they had have been

conducting was right and there was nothing wrong with that, so that was not a radical

matter” (FG1:3). Regarding this issue, this focus group participant suggested “to

revaluate the terminology of deradicalisation with other terminology such as re-

education” (FG1:3).

5.2.3 Non-Cooperative Terrorist Inmates: A Greater Challenge

The focus group results showed that Indonesian prison officers have

established terminologies to classify terrorist inmates based on their risk. There were

three terms commonly used: “non-cooperative”, “cooperative”, and “grey” terrorist

inmates. According to the focus groups in Cipinang, Pasir Putih, and Surabaya

prisons, these terms are used and applied in the prison to categorise every terrorist

inmate (FG1; FG2; and FG3). This was a form of risk assessment, and focus group

participants relied on it to determine the extent to which terrorist inmates meet and

cooperate with prison officers and prison authorities.

Non-cooperative terrorist inmates are those who totally refuse to cooperate

with prison officers and prison authorities. They are those who “rejected any prison

programs, including deradicalisation programs which were developed by prison

officers or prison authorities” (FG1:1). Terms such as “ideologue”, “high-risk” and

“hardliner” are used interchangeably with non-cooperative terrorist prisoners.


Cooperative terrorist inmates are the opposite: “if they accepted to cooperate

with prison officers and prison authorities, they will be classified as this type of

terrorist inmates” (FG3:2). Convicted terrorists belonging to this group were also

“willing to be involved and be participated in activities run by the prison officers,

including in deradicalisation programs” (FG2:5). The terms that are also used for

these prisoners are “low-risk” and “follower”.

Between these categories, there is a group of individuals who can be classified

as a “grey” group. According to a focus group participant, this type of terrorist

inmate can be characterised thus:

They mainly accept government incentives like grants for establishing an in-

house farm, running a small business, receiving prisoners’ rights like

remission and conditional release granted by the prison authorities, but

refusing to participate in any religious programs. (FG2:5)

In this case, they also accepted correctional processes such as parole and

remission, which are rejected by non-cooperative terrorist inmates. This type of

convicted terrorist is also called “militant” or “medium-risk”.

In the existing literature, classification of terrorist inmates has been discussed

by Gunaratna (2011) in his article “Terrorist Rehabilitation: A Global Imperative”.

He categorised terrorist inmates as high, medium, or low risk. High-risk terrorists are

terrorist leaders in both operational and spiritual aspects. Despite undergoing many

programs, they strongly resist ideological change. Medium-risk terrorists are

members or operatives in terrorist organisations. They are commonly ready to

commit violence and experience hatred. Although few cases indicated whether there

was a genuine shift or a strategic calculation, Gunartna believes some in this group

can be rehabilitated. Low-risk terrorists are supporters and sympathisers. The

knowledge of these individuals of the ideology is weak and they generally take for

granted what they are told. They believe that what they are doing is justified by their

religion (Gunaratna, 2011, p. 78).

In the current study, Indonesian prison officers classified terrorist inmates into

three categories consistent with Gunaratna’s classifications: non-cooperative terrorist

inmates equate with high-risk terrorist inmates; grey inmates equate with medium-


risk inmates; and cooperative inmates equate with low-risk terrorist inmates.

Although the terms differ, the meaning of the terms and the treatment needed for

each inmate category are similar to the findings of this study. Furthermore,

Gunaratna (2011, p. 78) explained that terrorist classifications are essential,

particularly to identify suitable responses to inmates, such as the qualifications of the

Islamic scholars who deliver and lead discussions. Gunaratna (2011, p. 78) suggested

that practitioners should be able to differentiate between high-, medium-, and low-

risk terrorist inmates because they require different responses.

In connection with the BNPT’s role in the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs, the current study found that the prison officers and the

BNPT use different terminology to classify individual terrorist inmates. Although the

BNPT’s terminology is not regarded as official, the differences are interesting to

highlight. According to Suhardi Alius (Tempo.Co, 2016), the chief of the BNPT,

terrorist inmates can be divided into four levels, based on their participation in

prison-based deradicalisation programs:

1. Level 1: terrorist inmates who refuse to follow any prison-based

deradicalisation programs.

2. Level 2: convicted terrorists who meet with authorities but they refuse to

follow prison-based deradicalisation programs.

3. Level 3: convicted terrorists who cooperate with authorities but refrain from

inviting other terrorist inmates to join in prison-based deradicalisation

programs.

4. Level 4: terrorist inmates who have progressed in the deradicalisation

process and are also open to inviting others to participate in the programs.

Comparing classifications for terrorist inmates between Suhardi and focus

group results (i.e. effectively comparing the study results with the BNPT

classifications), it could be concluded that non-cooperative convicted terrorists

would fall into Level 1, while the grey convicted terrorists would fall into Level 2.

Cooperative terrorist inmates, however, might fall into Level 3 or Level 4, as

illustrated in Figure 5.1 in the next page.


Figure 5.1 Classification of Terrorist Inmates in Indonesia: Terminology Comparison between the

National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]) and

Prison Officers

Furthermore, in terms of the non-cooperative, cooperative, and grey groups of

inmates, all of the focus group participants agreed that the greatest challenges for the

implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs come from the non-

cooperative group. Participants argued that these inmates will absolutely reject or

refuse to participate in the programs and refuse to use prison facilities. As some

focus group participants explained:

Non-cooperative terrorist inmates will always refuse any government

interventions, treatments, benefits, etc. (FG3:5)

Discussing a treatment or intervention for non-cooperative terrorist inmates

and cooperative terrorist inmates, I do believe that we can do nothing with

Terrorist Inmates

Non Cooperative

Refuse to follow the program Level 1

Grey Meet with authorities, but refuse to engage in deradicalisation

Level 2

Cooperative Refrain to encouraging other terrorist inmates

Level 3

Willing to encourage other terrorist inmates

Level 4


non-cooperative terrorist inmates. When we were delivering the programs,

they will almost always refuse it. (FG2:1)

Those who are non-cooperative terrorist inmates will not go to the prison’s

mosque to pray together with other inmates. They rejected to use prison

facilities. (FG3:5)

Regarding the grey and cooperative groups of terrorist inmates, some focus

group participants commented:

So, we could deliver and apply rehabilitation programs for those who were

cooperative terrorist inmates, and might be the medium risk [grey group].

We could do it. (FG2:4)

For terrorist inmates who were on the grey group or militant or cooperative

terrorist inmates, I think we can set them again. We can rehabilitate both of

them. (FG1:2)

On the other hand, other focus group participants had different opinions about

grey and cooperative groups. They explained:

To me it’s a bit different. Terrorist inmates that were in the “grey” group just

take the benefits such as conditional release and remission, or even only to

receive incentives given by the prison authorities. But, after release they will

do the same offence; commit terror. (FG3:5)

I have a different opinion. Those [who] cooperate with us cannot be

automatically identified as a person who deradicalise[s] successfully. I have

a chat experience with a cooperative terrorist inmate that makes me wonder

about his engagement with his radical belief. For example, there was AA

Gym photo on the wall with the 3S slogan: “Senyum, Salam, Sapa” (Smile,

Regard, Greeting). However, the inmate said, “There was one S missed, sir:

Serang (Attack)”. Actually, this prisoner was cooperative with us. So we

cannot judge them just by the extent they were cooperative or non-

cooperative with us. We have to go through what they think. (FG1:3)


This was an interesting result. From the above quotes, it seems that participants

have one of two opinions regarding the grey and cooperative groups of terrorist

inmates. Some believe that grey and cooperative groups of inmates can be managed

easily. For some of the participants, the inmates in this group showed a willingness

to participate in the programs implemented by the officers.

On the other hand, some focus group participants believe otherwise. They

believe that the grey and cooperative groups of terrorist inmates should not be

assessed as easily managed. These inmates might be willing to participate in a

delivered program but this is not a guarantee that their radical beliefs will diminish.

Imprisoned terrorists who are classified in the grey and cooperative groups cannot be

assumed to have deradicalised or to have renounced the use of violence to achieve a

goal.

The result of the current study on the classification of terrorist inmates used by

Indonesian prison officers supports Ungerer’s (2011, pp. 16-17) study, which

categorised Indonesia’s terrorist inmates into three groups: white, grey, and black

groups. The white group equates with the non-cooperative terrorist inmates;

meanwhile the black group equates with the cooperative terrorist inmates. Regarding

the grey group, Ungerer (2011) stressed that the inmates in this group are willing to

receive benefits such as financial support but they still engage in terrorist activities.

5.3 THE READINESS OF INDONESIAN PRISON OFFICERS

By using qualitative thematic analysis, a broad theme on the readiness of

prison officers emerged. This theme arose, for example, in discussions of how

confident the officers were to implement prison-based deradicalisation programs, and

in discussions about the institutional problems experienced by the prison officers.

Thus, besides terrorist inmates’ personalities as a challenge in the implementation of

such programs, the readiness of Indonesian prison officers is also a great challenge

for the implementation of the program.

Before discussing this broad theme of the readiness of Indonesian prison

officers, two related subthemes that emerged from focus group data should be noted

as challenges for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs:

internal factors and external factors. Internal factors are factors that relate to “inside”

the Indonesian prison themselves, such as self-evaluation and prison officers’


personal aspects. External factors are those that relate to “outside” the Indonesian

prison themselves, such as group-evaluation and prison officers’ collegial aspects.

5.3.1 Internal Factors (Individual Aspects)

The study found two results that can be classified as internal factors of the

readiness of prison officers that become barriers to implementation:

1. Lack of skills and abilities in terrorist deradicalisation and rehabilitation.

2. Lack of knowledge of religious Islamic teachings.

First, while Indonesian prison officers may have substantial experience in

dealing with prisoners, they lacked specific abilities and skills for dealing with

terrorist inmates. The existing skills base is limited to dealing with general prisoners

such as burglars, robbers, and murderers. Through personal improvisation, officers

applied their existing skills when dealing with convicted terrorists. The following are

two quotes from focus group participants describing recognition of their lack of

applicable abilities and skills:

Frankly, prison officers have no specific training or knowledge in dealing

with terrorist inmates. It never happened before. So in any prisons if there is

a terrorist inmate, what are we going to do? Especially on deradicalisation

programs, or on how to deradicalise someone, currently we are not going so

far to this point. (FG3:5)

But, with a terrorist, a belief, this is different ... We can do nothing, we do

have a legal basis, the Correctional Institution Law [CIL], but the focus was

to general inmates. It is not about a specific type of inmates. That’s all we

have. (FG2:4)

The quotes above indicate that although Indonesian prison officers are

confident dealing with general prisoners, they feel that their existing abilities and

skills are inadequate for implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs.

Therefore, intervention and treatment applied to terrorist prisoners is similar to that

applied to general prisoners. A focus group participant stressed the reason for this:


It is because this prison holds all type of the prisoners; it does not

specifically address terrorist prisoners. (FG2:3)

Second, although all the focus group participants were Muslim, they felt

weaker or less informed than terrorist inmates about the Islamic teachings and the

ideology of Islam. As presented in Chapter 2, the type of terrorism in Indonesia is

religious terrorism, particularly concerning the misinterpretation of Islam and jihad.

In the name of jihad and Islam, convicted terrorists tend to use violence to achieve

their established goal. Based on the backgrounds of terrorist prisoners imprisoned in

the three Indonesian prison research sites, this is correct – they are all jihadist.

Indonesian prison officers believe that terrorist inmates have an advanced

understanding of Islamic teachings and ideology.

Convicted terrorists, according to focus group participants, are well-educated

individuals in the field of Islamic teachings. Hence, if a convicted terrorist provoked

a debate on Islamic teachings or the ideology of Islam, focus group participants were

unlikely to argue. Focus group participants believed they would lose a debate about

Islamic teachings because “we were not good enough in the ideology of Islam”

(FG2:2). Starting a debate on Islamic teachings with terrorist inmates was viewed as

useless and to be avoided. Focus group participants said:

Terrorist inmates received the same treatment and rehabilitation programs in

all prison in Indonesia. The problem is the programs have not reached their

ideology. What we can do was running a kelas pengajian (religious classes).

But, still we have limited abilities to run such programs. (FG2:3)

To start a religious chat with terrorist inmates is very difficult. If we say

something about religion especially Islam, they will say: “Your Islamic

knowledge is weak. I am the best in interpreting Islam ideology.” So it’s

useless to discuss about Islam with them. (FG3:5)

These results indicate that prison officers’ professionalism in rehabilitating

terrorist inmates is an issue of concern for the Indonesian correctional system.

However, it must be appreciated that the officers’ gave a self-evaluation and an

honest assessment. The more surprising result is the explanation by the prison


officers about their colleagues who work in prisons that do not have terrorist inmates.

They strongly believe that their colleagues would struggle with many issues if a

convicted terrorist were sent to those prisons. Focus group participants imagined:

I still have many issues that we cannot solve in dealing with terrorist inmates

even until now. I have around four years’ experiences on the ground but still

I am not sure whether I am right or wrong. I do believe my colleagues who

have no experience with terrorist inmates will be crazier than me if someday

they were given responsibility for rehabilitating terrorist. (FG1:3)

If my colleagues were given a specific task to rehabilitate a terrorist inmate

at the first time, they will get confused with what they have to do. What do I

have to do with this guy? What treatment do they need? And many more

questions. I can imagine that this will be experienced by my colleagues who

work in the prison with no terrorist inmates inside previously. (FG3:5)

In conclusion, the focus group results identified two issues as internal factors

related to the readiness of the Indonesian prison officers to implement prison-based

deradicalisation programs. The first is acknowledgement of the limitations of the

skills and abilities of the prison officers. The second is acknowledgement of their

limited capabilities in religious Islamic teachings and experiences. These findings of

the current study are consistent with those of Eckard (2014), who concluded the

typical problem of Indonesian prison officers with limited skills and abilities, and

those of Maliki (2013), who assessed that Indonesian prison officers’ religious

education and experiences were often lower than those of terrorist inmates.

Interestingly, Maliki further explained that this problem occurs not just because the

training is not available – it is related to the attitude of the prison officers themselves,

in that some do not care about terrorist rehabilitation (Maliki, 2013, p. 12).

These findings are also consistent with studies by C. R. Jones (2014, p. 88) and

Ungerer (2011, p. 12), who concluded that prison officers and prison populations

regard terrorist inmates highly because the inmates are devout religious men willing

to lay down their lives for Islam. These studies may explain the results of the current

study regarding why focus group participants thought that they lacked capabilities in

religious teachings and experiences, compared to those of terrorist inmates. Osman


(2014, p. 219) concluded that many prison officers avoid arguments with terrorist

inmates because they might be angered or cowed when their “Muslim-ness” is

questioned by terrorist inmates. In many cases, according to Osman (2014, p. 219),

terrorist inmates are left to themselves by prison officers, who do not wish to be

called thogut or syaitan (evil).

Regarding the importance of facilitators’ religious capabilities and the socio-

economic aspects to rehabilitating terrorist inmates, it is interesting to compare

studies by the ICG and Sukabdi. The ICG’s (2007, p. 13) report stated that socio-

economic issues are more important than religious teachings, while Sukabdi (2015,

p. 47) found that facilitator knowledge on religion is the most important part of

terrorist rehabilitation. Sukabdi’s study (Sukabdi, 2015, pp. 47-48) identified that,

from 21 key elements in terrorist rehabilitation, the most important is facilitators’

knowledge about religious teachings, followed by empowerment of convicted

terrorists, and humbleness of practitioners (95%, 93%, and 79%, respectively).

Both studies presented rigorous empirical evidence. However, they used

different sources of data to explore this issue. In the first study, the data were

collected from the implementers, who were senior police officers, by conducting

interviews. In the second study, the data came from participants who were terrorist

inmates and former terrorist inmates. Therefore, further research on the impact of the

religious knowledge of Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation is

strongly suggested.

5.3.2 External Factors (Collegial Aspects)

From the prison officers’ perspectives as the implementers of the program,

further challenges were identified, namely the limited number of prison officers, a

lack of professional support and training, and a lack of legal protection. These factors

can be classified as external factors affecting the readiness of Indonesian prison

officers for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs.

In this study, the limited number of prison officers affected the readiness of

Indonesian prison officers to implement the deradicalisation program. They faced

difficulties supervising prisoner movements and communication between terrorist

inmates and ordinary inmates. Some focus group participants (FG1, FG2, and FG3)

acknowledged that recruitment was evident in Indonesian prisons. They believe that


one of the root causes of this phenomenon is the inadequate number of prison

officers to supervise every terrorist inmate’s activities. As one focus groups

participant said that:

We were limited in number. You might say it’s a classic reason but that’s the

fact we encountered. Here in this prison we have 1700+ inmates but the

officers who supervise the inmates were only 12 officers. Can you imagine

that? Twelve officers should supervise the movement of 1700+ inmates.

Moreover there are terrorist inmates who interact with these 1700+ inmates.

How to overcome with this problem? (FG3:5)

This finding on the limited number of prison officers regarding the

implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program is consistent

with those of studies by Abuza (2009, p. 198) and Eckard (2014, p. 170), who

highlighted that understaffing is one of the key problems for Indonesia’s prison-

based deradicalisation.

Another issue is the absence of professional support and training for

Indonesian prison officers specifically on terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation

programs. Although the focus group participants showed a strong commitment to

rehabilitating terrorist prisoners, lack of professional support and training affects

Indonesian prison officers’ readiness to implement programs. In my fieldwork,

Indonesian prison officers confirmed that:

We are not receiving any specific training yet regarding the management and

rehabilitation model for terrorist inmates. (FG3:5)

The Directorate General of Corrections [DGC] itself has not yet provided

training on deradicalisation programs; so, what we are going to do with the

programs? Suddenly we were pushed to organise such program for terrorist

inmates. We do not know what we have to use. Finally, yes there was

nothing so special interventions for terrorist prisoners. (FG1:3)

The finding on the lack of professional support and training for Indonesian

prison officers on deradicalisation is consistent with many other studies (Eckard,


2014; ICG, 2007; Maliki, 2013; Osman, 2014; SFCG, 2013). To address this

weakness, studies have recommended that the Government of Indonesia “establish an

on-the-job training program for prison administrators designed to improve

management practices, supervision of wardens, and knowledge of problem inmates”

(ICG, 2007, p. ii).

Furthermore, turning now to legal protection for Indonesian prison officers

charged with terrorist rehabilitation, this was also found to be weak, or even

unavailable. Focus group participants want support through appropriate legal

protection in performing their job of rehabilitating terrorist prisoners. One participant

said that:

Convicted terrorists will be accompanied by the Muslim Defender Team

[Tim Pembela Muslim – TPM] if they have any legal problems during their

incarceration. In contrast, we do not have it at all. (FG2:3)

Similarly, another focus group participant said: “terrorist inmates get fully

support of legal advice from TPM; however, we did not get this privilege in

implementing deradicalisation programs” (FG2:1). Further, he said that:

The availability of legal protection will make Indonesian prison officers

become more confident implementing prison-based deradicalisation

programs and other interventions for terrorist inmates. If there is a clash

between prison officers and terrorist inmates, we would like to get

appropriate protection instead of to be blame and charged in conducting

offences breaking prisoners’ rights. (FG2:1)

Focus group participants highlighted the lack of legal protection related to

possible conflict between prison officers and terrorist inmates. If the conflict or clash

occurs during the incarceration of terrorist inmates, the officers should receive

appropriate legal advice and legal protection.

The lack of legal protection for Indonesian prison officers has not been

described in the previous studies. This finding does explain that the risk to

Indonesian prison officers implementing deradicalisation programs was overlooked


in the previous studies. These findings are rather disappointing because there have

been incidents in Indonesia where threats have been made to Indonesian prison

officers and their families, and a target killing has also occurred (Liputan6, 2016).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have reminded prison

administrations to “take appropriate steps to ensure the personal safety of staff

working in prisons holding violent extremist prisoners” (UNODC, 2016, p. 33).

Attacks from terrorist inmates on prison officers most likely happened, as

mentioned in the finding on terrorist inmates’ personalities. Therefore, a research is

recommended on the extent of the need for legal protection for Indonesian prison

officers who have the specific task of rehabilitating terrorist inmates.

5.4 PROGRAM SUSTAINABILITY

The Indonesian Government seems to realise that a hardline approach alone

will not solve the problem of terrorism. Capturing, prosecuting, punishing, or even

killing a terrorist cannot solve the problem. The Indonesian Government and most

countries throughout the world have realised that a soft approach is an important part

of solving and preventing terrorism, including rehabilitating terrorist inmates

(Gunaratna, 2011; Gunaratna & Ali, 2015; Neumann, 2010; Schmid, 2013).

Therefore, the Indonesian authorities have initiated deradicalisation programs either

outside or inside prisons (Bakti, 2014, pp. 173-174).

From my fieldwork in three Indonesian prisons, it demonstrated that Cipinang,

Pasir Putih, and Surabaya prisons have been running prison-based deradicalisation

programs. Existing studies (Andrie, 2011; ICG, 2007; Osman, 2014) also indicate

that these prisons have implemented deradicalisation programs for convicted

terrorists. However, based on the experiences of focus group participants charged

with implementing these programs with terrorist inmates, the current study identified

that the programs have incidental and partial weaknesses. These issues were grouped

under a broad theme of the sustainability of the programs. In the other words, the

analysis indicated that one of challenges for implementation of the programs is the

sustainability of the programs. This finding is consistent with the analysis of the

current literature, which indicated that the nature of the programs was recognised as

unsustainable (Bakti, 2014; Gunaratna, 2015; ICG, 2007). The focus group finding


that showed Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs are incidental and

partial is discussed in the following sub-sections.

5.4.1 An Incidental Program

Activities implemented for terrorist prisoners were mainly based on the

Correctional Institution Law (CIL) as the umbrella legislation of the Indonesian

correctional system. Focus group participants explained that “we mainly rely on the

CIL as the umbrella act for rehabilitation of prisoners” (FG2:4). The more applicable

legal material for the CIL is the Government Regulation Number 31 year 1999 on the

Guidance of Prisoners, which also applies for general prisoners, that is, for all types

of inmates. The existing Indonesian law and regulations on correctional services was

designed for general prisoners and was not intended to be applied to specific types of

prisoners, including terrorist inmates. Regardless, interventions for terrorist inmates

are basically based on the CIL.

The focus group results reinforced the view that the Indonesian prison-based

deradicalisation program is an incidental program. The program was designed as a

minor accompaniment to the established treatments and interventions for general

prisoners, a logical consequence from the absence of a specific national policy on a

prison-based deradicalisation program. As I highlighted in Chapter 2, although a

deradicalisation program has been implemented in Indonesian prisons, the

Government of Indonesia has no national policy on their use. As a result, in a prison

that holds convicted terrorists, the prison director has to develop their own relevant

policies and practices. In relation to this ad hoc policy, a focus group participant said

that:

Because prison officers do not have standard operating procedures [SOPs] to

be used in rehabilitating terrorist inmates, we end up relying solely on the

consideration of the prison director. So, it’s different ... The prison director

was pleased by the DGC to establish their own policy in managing and

rehabilitating terrorist inmates regarding local socio-cultural norms. (FG1:3)

As Indonesia has no national policy on prison-based deradicalisation programs,

the interventions and treatments applied for terrorist inmates are generally the same

as those applied for general prisoners, as regulated in the CIL and the Government


Regulation Number 31 year 1999 on the Guidance of Prisoners. Three focus group

participants from different prisons said of a comparison between the intervention

program for general prisoners and the deradicalisation program for terrorist

prisoners:

Interventions were the same. Frankly in this prison there is no specific

regulation related with the treatment or interventions for terrorist inmates, as

well as specific treatment for the corruptor. It’s because it’s a general prison

so we used general interventions and programs as provided in the CIL.

That’s what we did for general prisoners. So in dealing with terrorist

prisoners, we used our own experiences that we learned from dealing with

various types of inmates. (FG3:5)

To check whether the intervention for terrorist inmates has failed or

succeeded, we again used general guidance as outlined in Law 12/1995.

Because the prison is intended for all type of inmates; it was not for specific

inmates like terrorist inmates. (FG2:1)

I do believe we have to treat them differently. But, currently, in this prison

we rehabilitate them the same as other inmates. (FG1:1)

Furthermore, the incidental policies and practices for prison-based

deradicalisation programs were obvious because the assistance of several other

parties (state or non-state actors) in the design and implementation of terrorist

rehabilitation was only temporary. For instance, the Australian Government via the

New South Wales (NSW) Correctional Services, trained Indonesian prison officers

about Violent Extremists Risk Assessment (VERA) including officers from Cipinang

and Pasir Putih prisons. Focus group participants acknowledged that:

We have joint cooperation with NSW Correctional Services, and they urged

us to employ VERA for the assessment of terrorist inmates. I think DGC still

try to find the appropriate model to be used specifically for terrorist inmates.

(FG1:3)


Related to assessment for a convicted terrorist, yes, I got training about

VERA from NSW Correctional Services. (FG2:2)

The Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) assisted Indonesian prisons that

hold terrorist prisoners, especially by providing religious Islamic scholars to lead

discussions on Islamic teachings. This activity was also provided by the BNPT under

the BNPT’s deradicalisation program, and by non-state actors. Other than the MoRA

and the BNPT, “a corporate also provided the same assistance in presenting Islamic

scholars to deliver a speech and discussion on religious classes (kelas pengajian)”

(FG2:3). Besides providing Islamic scholars in the prison, non-state actors also get

involved actively to help Indonesian prisons to design and implement prison-based

deradicalisation programs. Some non-state actors, for example the Prasasti

Perdamaian Foundation (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian – [YPP]) and the Search for

Common Ground (SFCG), have provided assistance for the prison officers with the

prisoners’ rehabilitation program, including terrorist rehabilitation. These non-

government organisations (NGOs) helped the prison officers and prison authorities to

design, implement, and evaluate appropriate training for dealing with high-risk

prisoners. A focus group participant said:

Well after VERA, we also have joint cooperation with YPP. They provided

an instrument to cover the profile of a terrorist inmate. It was used to decide

the distribution of the inmate. It’s like a book record that includes terrorist

identity, background, the case and what factors are pushing them to commit

terror acts. To get this data, we were urged to use interview the individual

prisoners. (FG1:3)

Furthermore, he explained that:

There was also cooperation with SFCG. They also offered an assessment

instrument, they called profiling. It is actually similar to YPP’s. It may be

just the approach was different. YPP’s was more focused on the

psychological side of a convicted terrorist. They always remind us that

convicted terrorists always were a multi personal. So we have to be careful


that what they say is not necessarily the truth. On the other hand, profiling

more focus on the humanist aspects. (FG1:3)

These activities indicated the program was incidental, complementing

established rehabilitation programs applied to general inmates. As a result,

Indonesian prison officers believe that this is a challenge in rehabilitating terrorist

prisoners. They believe inviting Islamic scholars to lead religious discussions “has no

effect for the terrorist inmates because they were just coming once and there were no

further actions” (FG2:2). Although prison officers have improvised, focus group

participants viewed this as unsatisfactory (FG1; FG2; and FG3).

To sum up, incidental programs and practices on deradicalisation is one of the

challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers implementing deradicalisation

programs. Focus group data revealed that the Indonesian prison officers modified

established rehabilitation programs as they have been applied for general prisoners as

regulated in the CIL and Government Regulation Number 31 year 1999; they then

applied these programs to terrorist inmates within their own personal experiences of

working within the prisons. This finding concurs with those of Bakti (2014, p. 191)

and Istiqomah (2012, p. 269), who concluded that treatments and interventions

applied to terrorist inmates were the same as those regulated in the CIL.

Furthermore, an incidental program was indicated by the findings on the

assistance available for Indonesian prisons from other institutions, such as NSW

Correctional Services, the YPP, the SFCG, and the MoRA. These findings are

consistent with those of Eckard’s study, which showed that the Indonesian

deradicalisation program was an ad hoc and fragmented program (Eckard, 2014, pp.

165-166). In addition, unlike in Cipinang, Pasir Putih, and Surabaya prisons, prison-

based deradicalisation programs have not been developed and established in several

prisons even though these prisons also hold terrorist inmates. Example are Pakjo

Prison in South Sumatera and Gunungsari Prison in South Sulawesi (Andrie, 2011).

Overall, these findings support Eckard’s conclusion that Indonesia’s prison-

based deradicalisation program is a low to moderate institutionalised program

(Eckard, 2014, p. 164). Therefore, Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program

differs from those of other countries such as Singapore, Saudi Arabia, and Malaysia,

which have been “given credit for their achievements in the development of a


structure for counter-terrorism policies” (Gunaratna & Hassan, 2011, p. 55). From

the results and the existing literature on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation

program discussed above, the nature of the Indonesia’s program can be described as

an incidental program, as illustrated in the Figure 5.2 below.

Figure 5.2 Indonesia’s Prison-based Deradicalisation Program: Prison Officers’ Perspectives

Note:

BNPT = Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter Terrorism Agency);

CIL = Correctional Institution Law; DGC = Directorate General of Corrections; INP =

Indonesian National Police; MoRA = Ministry of Religious Affairs; MUI = Majelis Ulama

Indonesia (Indonesia Ulema Council); NGOs = Non-Governmental Organisations.

Implementer Deradicalisation Programs

DGC/Prison

Officers

BNPT

INP

MoRA

MUI

NGOs

Existing

rehabilitation

program for

ordinary prisoners

(under CIL)

Incidental

program for

terrorist

inmates

Ordinary

Inmate

Terrorist

Inmate Other

Actors

Rehabilitation


5.4.2 A Partial Program

Several interventions and activities fall under prison-based deradicalisation

programs in Indonesia. However, they have not all been applied to all terrorist

inmates – even among those in the same prison. This situation reinforces the partial

nature of the program, which is, in part, due to rejection of program involvement by

non-cooperative terrorist inmates, as explained by a focus group participant that:

Convicted terrorists, especially who were in the category of non-cooperative

terrorist inmates or the “ideologue” will reject any programs offered by the

prison officers. (FG2:2)

In terms of the number, focus group participants also stated that majority of

terrorist inmates rejected any kind of program interventions, including prison-based

deradicalisation activities:

We have asked terrorist inmates to participate in the training, and it has been

done in other prisons, such as Cibinong, Semarang, Porong, Poso, and so on.

The response of convicted terrorists to involvement in the programs was

actually antipathy. The majority of them were not interested in joining such

programs. They were so disrespectful of what we offered to them. So not all

convicted terrorists get involved in, even we push them harder. (FG1:3)

Terrorist prisoners, especially the non-cooperative, will reject any activities

or interventions that we have developed especially for terrorist inmates.

(FG2:1)

From the above quotes, it can be seen that the terrorist inmates showed a strong

determination to not engage in any activities initiated by the prison authorities. This

refusal is because the prison authorities and the prison officers were perceived by the

terrorist inmates as “the government’s tool” (FG2:5) inside the prison walls. As

mentioned in Chapter 2, the existing literature shows that the Indonesian

Government is perceived as an enemy (thogut) by terrorist inmates. Thus, the

Indonesian prison officers were also perceived as enemies. This perception is a huge

challenge for Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation


programs. In accordance with these findings, previous studies showed that, when the

terrorist inmates were asked about their participation or engagement in prison-based

deradicalisation programs, most of the interviewees said that “they hadn’t been part

of any deradicalisation programs while in prison” (Ungerer, 2011, p. 16).

Apart from the rejection of programs, a timeline for the interventions also has

prevented all of the terrorist inmates receiving prison-based deradicalisation

programs. In Cipinang prison, for example, initiatives of conflict management

training (CMT) and life skills training (LST) proposed by the SFCG have been

implemented; however, not all of the terrorist inmates have had the same opportunity

to participate because these initiatives were provided by NGOs and only offered for a

limited time. Therefore, terrorist inmates sent to the prison more recently did not

receive the same interventions. However, a focus group participant said that “CMT

and LST were appropriate interventions for terrorist inmates; and it showed a good

result for the rehabilitation of the participants” (FG1:3).

Although CMT and LST were judged appropriate activities by the Indonesian

prison officers, the sustainability of the program was not guaranteed because of

funding. A focus group participant explained that “because the programs were costly,

we do not know if DGC can provide suitable funding” (FG1:3). Therefore, the partial

nature of the program is associated with uncertain funding and timeline limitations.

Terrorist inmates’ refusal to participate in any prison programs has been

mentioned in the previous section. Regarding the timeline constraints for the

assistance provided by other agencies, this finding is consistent with the report

published by the SFCG, which assisted the DGC and prison officers to apply CMT

and LST to terrorist inmates. The report recognised that the program was only a one-

year project, from June to December 2013 (SFCG, 2013). In addition, the problems

of funding for the implementation of the prison-based deradicalisation program in

Indonesia match those observed in earlier studies, such as those by Abuza (2009) and

Eckard (2014).

Interestingly, VERA was recognised as a less relevant risk assessment

instrument in the context of socio-cultural Indonesia. One focus group participant

stated:


VERA was less relevant to be applied to terrorist inmates in Indonesia. If

VERA was used for terrorist prisoners’ risk assessment in the Indonesian

context, the result might be bias. All terrorist inmates in Indonesia will be

classified as radical and pro-violence individuals. In fact, some of them have

successfully left pro-violence acts. (FG1:3)

Furthermore, he explained that:

For example, if a respondent asked: would you like to mati syahid (to die in

the name of Islam)? I do believe if Indonesian, as a Muslim majority

country, were asked like that, they will be willing to do that. It’s because our

religious teaching is like that. We were afraid, if VERA will be used, it’s not

just terrorist inmates were radical, Islamic students in Islamic schools will be

also identified as radicals. (FG1:3)

Until recently, the finding that VERA is regarded less relevant to the socio-

cultural context of Indonesia was not discussed in the existing studies. Therefore, this

result needs further investigation, particularly from “the lens” of the program.

Next finding relates to family assistance in the Indonesia’s prison based-

deradicalisation program. Focus group participants believe that family involvement

in the program policy will foster the successful attainment of the goals of the terrorist

rehabilitation and integration programs. However, based on the experiences of focus

group participants, family assistance is not included in the existing programs – the

programs are not holistic within the family of terrorist inmates. For this reason,

besides partiality due to rejection, timeline limitations, and funding, Indonesia’s

prison-based deradicalisation program can be considered as a partial program due to

its scope not including terrorist inmates’ families. A focus group participant said that:

The family of terrorist inmates must be taken care of. It should be included

in the BNPT’s programs. School fees for their children or small capital for

his wife to run a small business must be assisted. (FG2:3)

Moreover, another participant said, “I believe that assistance or attention to the

terrorist inmates’ families would be useful in reducing their radical beliefs” (FG3:1).


Further, one participant noted the importance of the family rather than the prison

officers in reducing terrorists’ radical beliefs:

So, the most important thing was that the government approaches,

supervision and intervention must be holistic. That’s why for terrorist

deradicalisation was not just for the prisoner but also for their family. The

role of family was very important to prevent a terrorist inmate continuing

their wrongful acts in the future. We, prison officers, are nothing compared

to terrorist inmates’ family on deradicalisation. (FG3:5)

Based on observation during the focus groups, there was a strong belief among

focus group participants about the need for family assistance to be incorporated into

the program. A possible explanation is that full care of the families of terrorist

inmates will lead to easier communication with the terrorist inmates, resulting in

more effective rehabilitation or deradicalisation.

Regarding the finding that families were not included in the programs,

although it differs from that of a study by Kruglanski, Gelfand, and Gunaratna

(2011), it is partially consistent with the ICG’s (2007) report. In this report, the ICG

highlighted that there was an incentive provided by the Indonesian National Police

(INP) for the families of some terrorist inmates but not for others. For example, the

families of jihadi detainees from Ambon did not receive any incentive from the

authorities.

Moreover, this result suggested that if the family assistance was included, it

would help the task of prison officers in achieving the goals of terrorist rehabilitation

and deradicalisation programs. This result agrees with the findings of other studies

(ICG, 2007; Pendleton, 2008; Ranstorp, 2009), which concluded that family

assistance is an important part in terrorist deradicalisation in the Indonesian context.

In addition to this, it is interesting to compare the result of the current study

with those of Sukabdi’s (2015) study, particularly on the behavior transformation

process of convicted terrorists in the Indonesian context. Sukabdi’s study showed

that the most important points for the behavior-transformation process from pro-

violence to non-violence were the understanding of the contexts of daar al harb

(state of war) and daar as salam (state of peace), as admitted by 98% of the study


participants (Sukabdi, 2015, p. 44). According to Sukabdi (2015, p. 44), other factors

were finding their kin, such as their family, friends, significant others being hunted

and arrested by law enforcement (91%), being arrested (67%), meeting bombing

victims (23%), interacting with law enforcement people with good attitudes (19%),

and disappointment toward leaders (16%). Meanwhile, there was a small number of

reading inspiring Islamic books by reputable charismatic ima’am (clerics) about

jihad, using the soft method (2%).

Therefore, the focus group participants’ belief in the current study, that the

absence of family assistance was an issue in the implementation of programs for

terrorist inmates, differs from Sukabdi’s results. Although family is also one factor in

supporting behaviour transformation of terrorist inmates, in Sukabdi’s study, the

findings indicated that socio-economic assistance is not the issue. The issue is when

a convicted terrorist realises their family is also being hunted and arrested.

In this matter, a further study on the extent of family assistance can improve

terrorist rehabilitation is suggested. Moreover, as mentioned previously, other studies

(ICG, 2007; Pendleton, 2008; Ranstorp, 2009) have demonstrated that family

assistance is a vital part of terrorist rehabilitation in Indonesia. In addition, related to

the prisoner re-entry process, Naser and La Vigne have reviewed studies on families

and criminal behaviour, and concluded that “prisoners with greater contact with

family have more positive post-release outcomes” (Naser & La Vigne, 2006, p. 94).

5.5 INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROBLEMS

In terms of institutional infrastructure problems, participants realised implicitly

that rehabilitating terrorist inmates requires a supported and well-funded prison

environment. If the prison environment is not conducive, such as being overcrowded,

it will hinder the efforts to rehabilitate convicted terrorists, or act as a trigger factor

for the spread of radicalisation inside the prison.

From the results of the focus group series, two infrastructure issues were

identified as barriers to achieving the objectives of the prison-based deradicalisation

program. They are the overcapacity issue and the practices for housing terrorist

convicts. These issues were evident, for example, in discussions of the large number

of inmates in the prisons and whether there should be segregation or integration of

terrorist inmates and ordinary inmates. From these two issues, a broad theme of


institutional infrastructure problem emerged. Thus, I concluded that institutional

infrastructure problems are challenges faced by Indonesian prison officers


5.5.1 Overcapacity

The Indonesian prison system continues to face the problem of overcapacity.

This problem has been always evident throughout most Indonesian prisons,

especially prisons located in the big cities (General Elucidation of The Decree of the

Minister of Law and Human Rights Number M.HH-07.OT.01.03, year 2011).

Based on the findings from the focus groups in the three Indonesian prisons

studied, this common problem affects the tasks and responsibilities of prison officers

during implementation of the deradicalisation program in these prisons. Participants

from all the focus groups were mainly concerned that overcapacity helped the spread

of radical beliefs in the prisons (FG1; FG2; and FG3). A participant explained the

negative impact of overcapacity on the deradicalisation program:

Because one prison officer has to look after and supervise so many inmates,

which is why in the prison sometimes we failed to prevent the spread of

radical beliefs. It was much easier to supervise if they were placed on the

field together and we supervise from the top. We could. But now, in one

block there were five wings where each wing has 12 rooms, so there were 60

rooms in one block. How do we supervise effectively? In this case, we might

fail to prevent the spread of radical beliefs. (FG3:3)

A focus group participant in another prison also acknowledged that

overcapacity was a barrier in preventing the spread of radical beliefs. As they

admitted, in the prison site there had been a case in which some ordinary prisoners

was suspected of recruitment by a terrorist inmate, “Abu Husna” (FG2:2). Another

focus group participant stated that a narcotics prisoner was successfully recruited in

the prison. This required transferring the offender to another prison, “preventing

further communication between terrorist inmates or the recruiter and the narcotics

offender” (FG3:1).

On the other hand, a big prison and a large population of inmates were an

advantage for convicted terrorists who were running small businesses inside the


prison. Large numbers of prisoners meant large numbers of prospective consumers.

A large prison population certainly provides benefits for the businesses inmates set

up in the prisons. This is particularly evident in Surabaya Prison, where convicted

terrorists were given considerable freedom to establish and run businesses inside the

prison. Hence, overcapacity in the prison aids undesirable activities by terrorist

inmates.

These data showed that the correlation between a large number of inmates in a

prison and the presence of terrorist inmates is interesting because terrorist inmates

might benefit from the large number of inmates. At least two benefits were

identified:

1) Inmates have a great opportunity to recruit followers or sympathisers from

other type of inmates

2) Inmates have a huge market through which to develop their businesses

inside the prison.

Furthermore, how prison officers evaluated the situation is an interesting

question to be explored. In answering a follow-up question during the focus group,

“is close interaction between terrorist inmates and other types of inmates good or bad

for prison officers?” the responses were diverse; some liked it while others did not,

as can be seen in the following quotes:

To me it was good. When they have mingled with each other, then there was

comfort. We could definitely guarantee the security. (FG3:1)

I was worried. We do not know exactly what they did. So we are afraid there

was a recruitment process. (FG1:3)

Nevertheless, if terrorist inmates have plentiful opportunities to interact with

other types of inmates due to overcapacity, the probability that their established

radical beliefs will spread is higher, as expressed by a focus group participant:

Because terrorist inmates can freely interact with many inmates in the

prison, terrorist inmates have a huge chance to transfer their radical beliefs to

other inmates. They also can go to the other blocks. Moreover, if there was


overcapacity and lack number of officer issues, like here in this prison,

recruitment will easily occur. We had difficulty supervising all of their

activities. (FG3:5)

Overall, the data from the focus groups demonstrated that officers believe

overcapacity is a good environment for terrorist inmates, but is bad for the prison

officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. As the above quote

notes, it is difficult to supervise many inmates with minimal officers, heightening the

risk of radicalisation within the prison. To deal with this problem, currently

Indonesian prisons that hold terrorist inmates have to develop their own policies and

practices on housing terrorist inmates.

These findings match those observed in Gunaratna’s (2011, p. 65) study that

identified a correlation between the prison environment and the spread of radical

beliefs in the prison. The findings are also consistent with those of a number of other

previous studies (Eckard, 2014, p. 170; Istiqomah, 2012, p. 31; Jones C. R., 2014, p.

87; Osman, 2014, p. 222), which outlined overcrowded prisons and the problems in

practices for housing management of terrorist inmates, whether segregated from or

integrated with other inmates. Interestingly, these four studies also mentioned prison

corruption, which did not arise in focus group discussions in the current study.

Regarding prison overcrowding, UNODC (2016, p. 11) realised that

overcrowding often occurs in low-resource countries and post-conflict environments,

where meeting basic requirements may pose significant challenges. UNODC (2016,

p. 12) suggested that “tackling poor conditions in prisons should therefore be

considered as an integral part of the effort to counter violent extremism in prisons”,

such as in Somalia. This country successfully tackled overcrowding, providing

running water, beds and televisions for the prisoners, which led to reduced prison

violence, and enabled prison officers to deliver disengagement activity effectively.

As presented in Chapter 2, the DGC has no national policy on how terrorist

inmates should be housed in Indonesian prisons. Therefore, terrorist inmate housing

depends on the policy of individual prison directors, policy as to whether they will be

segregated from or integrated with other inmates, or perhaps isolated. In the three

prisons studied, I found that in Cipinang and Surabaya prisons terrorist inmates were

placed in a special block separated from the other types of inmates. In Pasir Putih


Nusakambangan Prison they were housed in the same block with ordinary prisoners;

however, previously they were placed in a special block. At the time of writing, Pasir

Putih Nusakambangan Prison no longer has a special block for terrorist inmates.

These practices, according to focus group participants, become a challenge for

implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. The problem of housing is

discussed in the following section.

5.5.2 Obscurity of Segregation Practices

The practices for housing terrorist inmates in Indonesian prisons present a

challenge for Indonesian prison officers. As mentioned earlier, terrorist inmates’

housing depends on the policy of the prison directors regarding segregation from or

integration with other inmates. The practices, however, remain unclear, even when a

segregation policy has been chosen. As a result, communications among terrorist

inmates occurs, as well as close contact between terrorist inmates and other ordinary

inmates. Two focus group participants emphasised that:

For example, even here in this prison where terrorist inmates were housed in

a special block, communication between terrorist inmates and other type of

inmates remain happens. It is because on a specific time they must do the

same activities such as doing prayers together in the mosque or doing sports.

(FG1:1)

The DGC has not ruled on the housing policy and practice for terrorist

inmates. So it depends on the prison director. Because their vision and

mission were varied, the policy adopted in each prison that holds terrorist

inmates were also varied. Each prison director has their own consideration in

this matter. (FG1:3)

Moreover, focus group results indicated that there is a similar concern about

the need to segregate non-cooperative terrorist inmates who are ideologues or

hardliners from the rest of terrorist inmates, and within prison population. A focus

group participant noted that “segregation policy must also be made for terrorist

inmates” (FG3:5). A focus group participant strongly argued that imprisoned

terrorists who are categorised as non-cooperative should be segregated from those

who are categorised as cooperative. It is because:


The practices to mix non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates will

affect the implemented programs received by cooperative terrorist inmates.

(FG2:4)

Thus, participants believe that unclear housing practices on segregating non-

cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates will affect the outcome of the program

received by the cooperative terrorist inmates. The following two quotes show the

effect of unclear housing practices for terrorists on the deradicalisation program.

Unclear policy and practices in segregating non-cooperative and cooperative

terrorist inmates might affect our effort negatively in implementing

deradicalisation programs. (FG2:4)

It was a challenge for us if the housing practices for terrorist inmates were

unclear, particularly in limiting contact between non-cooperative convicted

terrorists or “radical inmates” or “the ideologist”. If non-cooperative and

cooperative convicted terrorists can make close contact, positive results in

rehabilitating cooperative convicted terrorists will vanish. (FG3:2)

In this situation, Indonesian prison officers’ efforts to rehabilitate terrorist

inmates will be affected. Focus group participants worried that, although

deradicalisation programs have been implemented for terrorist convicts, and

especially for cooperative terrorist inmates who are willing to engage in a program,

“the effect of the implemented program will be diminished if they have a chance to

get in touch and gain communication with non-cooperative terrorist inmates”

(FG3:1). Through opportunities to communicate, non-cooperative convicted

terrorists will always try to convince cooperative convicted terrorists to keep their

established radical beliefs and view the imprisonment as a time for isolation. As one

focus group participant said:

If non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates were housed in one

block, they will absolutely gain better communication with each other. In

this occasion, I believe they have a leader (Amir) who is an “ideologist” or a

non-cooperative terrorist convict. If this was happens, we can do nothing


with the rest of the group especially to those who are cooperative with us. I

do strongly believe that all terrorist inmates regardless their radical level will

follow what the Amir (the leader) said. The program that we implemented

will be useless indeed. (FG1:3)

Regarding policies on housing for incarcerated terrorists, the three Indonesian

prison research sites deployed different policies. Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison

had an integration policy, while Cipinang and Surabaya prisons had a segregation

policy. Based on the fieldwork for this study, focus group participants believe the

policy adopted has a specific causal link to outcomes.

The focus group result in Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prison indicated that

integration was better than segregation. This was because prison officers had

experienced a negative impact from segregation. When terrorist inmates were housed

in the same block, they became a strong group. Therefore, the prison integrated

terrorist inmates with the ordinary inmates. As such, a terrorist inmate may be

housed in the same cell with non-terrorist inmates.

In Cipinang Prison, however, focus group data indicated that terrorist inmates

must be segregated. Prison officers in Cipinang supported the policy of segregation.

This policy was adopted due to Cipinang Prison experiencing a riot situation where

fighting between terrorist inmates and other ordinary inmates occurred. Since that

time, terrorist inmates have been housed in a special block separated from other

ordinary inmates.

The policy and practices in Surabaya Prison are interesting. Although a

segregation policy has been adopted, in some cases the practices in Surabaya Prison

indicate integration. Because of the overcapacity issue, with no room available in

other blocks, other types of inmates are sometimes housed in the special block where

terrorist inmates are housed. Furthermore, Surabaya’s prison officers apparently

support integration policy. To some extent, they believe that integration is better for

terrorist deradicalisation, even though it was not clear how they judged whether a

terrorist was deradicalised or not. Hence, although segregation policy was adopted,

the practices showed considerable integration. In other words, Surabaya Prison

employed a “middle road” or “mixed” policy of segregation and integration.


Differences in policy and practices on the housing of terrorist inmates among

prisons in Indonesia have been found in other studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007;

Osman, 2014; Ungerer, 2011). According to Eckard (2014, p. 168), this issue was

triggered by the absence of a formalised deradicalisation policy. In addition, the

current finding of the need to segregate non-cooperative terrorist inmates who are

ideologues or hard-liners from the rest of the prison population supports those of

previous studies (ICG, 2007, pp. 8-9), which found that some non-terrorists were

successfully radicalised by Imam Samudra in Kerobokan Prison; and even a prison

officer, Beni Irawan, was also radicalised.

Although in some cases radicalisation has occurred in Indonesian prisons due

to an integration policy, some focus group participants noted that it was effective for

terrorist rehabilitation. Therefore, investigating the effectiveness of integration policy

for terrorist deradicalisation is an interesting topic for future research.

In addition, the availability of a special block for terrorist inmates can cause an

imbalance in the distribution of room for other ordinary inmates. The number of

terrorist inmates is not high; if they are housed in a separate block, each terrorist

inmate probably has their own room. This environment can be the opposite of that

for non-terrorist inmates. According to a focus group participant, “it occurred in

other blocks where the number of non-terrorist inmates was so high then they should

be placed together in one room” (FG3:5). Housing management for all inmates in the

prison, however, faces various and significant challenges.

5.6 UNAVAILABILITY OF COLLABORATIVE MECHANISMS

Focus group data revealed two prominent insights related to collaborative

mechanisms as challenges in the implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation programs. The first was the lack of cooperation and coordination

between the BNPT and the DGC, and the second was unorganised partnerships.

From these challenges, it appears partnerships have not been well-managed among

the key actors in terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs. Furthermore,

a broad theme of unavailability of collaborative mechanisms emerged by analysing

these challenges.

In considering the terminologies of “collaboration” and “partnership”, these

terms are used interchangeably in this thesis because it was difficult to distinguish


the two terms in the field (Duong, 2010, p. 169). Collaboration and partnership both

involve a common environment, networking, shared goals, and shared commitments

(Carnwell & Carson, 2009). However, strictly speaking, partnerships go beyond

merely working together; they represent the higher end of the linkage continuum of

involvement, collaboration, participation, and partnership (Carnwell & Carson,

2009).

According to Kaats and Opheij (2014), coordination mechanisms and

cooperation are essential parts of effective collaboration between organisations that

automatically entail cooperation between people in the organisations. The existing

literature on collaboration and partnership shows that there are some indicators that

can be used to evaluate whether collaboration is good or bad. However, the available

evaluation criteria were not used to evaluate the coordination and cooperation

between the BNPT and the DGC on prison-based deradicalisation programs because

this research had a different focus: to examine Indonesian prison officers as the

implementers of terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs.

5.6.1 Lack of Cooperation and Coordination between the BNPT and the DGC

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs have been run by three

major state agencies: the INP, the BNPT and the DGC (Bakti, 2014). Although these

state actors treat convicted terrorists and claim that they are working for terrorist

deradicalisation and rehabilitation, their main objectives are different (ICG, 2007;

Osman, 2014). Hence, Eckard (2014, p. 169) concluded that the objectives of

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program are difficult to determine.

The INP’s deradicalisation program, for example, is directed to further

investigation or intelligence-gathering from arrested terrorists. The use of the

accused terrorists for the purpose of intelligence-gathering showed positive results

where several terrorist plots were dismantled (ICG, 2007). The BNPT, according to

several studies, is more focused on terrorist disengagement than on deradicalisation

(Eckard, 2014; IRIN, 2012). This is understandable because the scope of the BNPT’s

program on deradicalisation is broader, covering inside and outside prison facilities

(Bakti, 2014). The focus of the DGC is the closest to terrorist rehabilitation, although

it does not address terrorist deradicalisation (Istiqomah, 2012).


Other institutions are also involved in the prison-based deradicalisation

programs, both state and non-state actors. State institutions involved in prison-based

deradicalisation programs include the MoRA. Meanwhile NGOs that are helping

Indonesian prisons to develop programs and evaluate terrorist rehabilitation include

the YPP and the SFCG, as identified earlier.

Of the many agencies that are involved in prison-based deradicalisation

programs, the focus group results revealed that the lack of cooperation and

coordination between the BNPT and the DGC was a significant problem. Although

the BNPT coordinates the national deradicalisation program,27 the majority of focus

group participants were disappointed with the BNPT’s performance in this area.

Focus group participants explained:

Identifying problems with the deradicalisation program for terrorist inmates,

BNPT was too far from us. BNPT should be directly involved in the

interventions, whatever the programs or activities; and then, together with us

implementing it in the prison. So far it was not like that. We, prison officers,

were likely to be working alone on terrorist rehabilitation. (FG2:4)

When BNPT came to the prison, they asked to meet with terrorist inmates.

They sent a letter and provided the catering. We facilitated the room in the

prison. They met with the inmates, provide a gift, took photos, and gone.

Terrorist inmates went back to their cells. That’s it. We need more than that.

Moreover, BNPT was a specific state body on counter terrorism so they

should be able to do more. (FG1:3)

However, one focus group participant mentioned that, since 2014, the

involvement of the BNPT in the implementation of deradicalisation programs inside

the prison had been better than previously. He was quite optimistic about the

involvement of the BNPT since then:

27 Based on Article 3 (d) Presidential Decree Number 46 year 2010 on National Counter Terrorism

Agency.


I am going to mention BNPT’s programs both in the past and the present.

Since its establishment in 2010 until 2014, BNPT’s programs on prison-

based deradicalisation were not clear. They came to prison without a clear

focus. They just had a chat, took photos, finished, that’s all. They only did

this in every site visit to prison. And they asked the same things of terrorist

inmates, for example why you were here, what’s wrong, whoever was

coming. Terrorist inmates don’t like it. After 2014 and 2015, it was better.

The questions and activities given to terrorist inmates were various, such as

asking terrorist inmates their opinions about jihad, then they borrowed a

book. In the next visit, they had a discussion regarding the book. I, as a

prison officer, like these activities where it seems to be structured and

measurable. (FG3:5)

Although one focus group participant mentioned that there was an

improvement in terms of performance of the BNPT in coordinating the program, all

agreed that there were many shortcomings that must be solved regarding program

coordination and cooperation between the BNPT and the DCG. Therefore, the

unclear nature of the BNPT’s contribution to the program was believed by the focus

group participants as one of the challenges for deradicalisation programs. Indonesian

prison officers hope that collaborative mechanisms between the BNPT and the DGC

can be evaluated so that the BNPT’s staff and prison officers can work together to

better implement the programs. As a focus group participant noted:

Cooperation and coordination between BNPT and DGC need an evaluation

and the findings should improve implementation of the prison-based

deradicalisation program. (FG1:1)

Focus group data indicated that lack of coordination and cooperation between the

BNPT and the DGC was one of the challenges in the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs. These issues are evident in practice, where prison officers

had experienced lack of support from the BNPT’s staff in working together to

achieve terrorist rehabilitation or deradicalisation. This result is consistent with those

of other studies (IRIN, 2012; Istiqomah, 2012; Sarwono, 2012). “To design a global


strategy to counter jihadi ideology inside the prison”, Istiqomah (2012, p. 268)

suggested that the correctional system and its administration require reform.

Furthermore, the lack of coordination and cooperation between the BNPT and

the DGC resulted in a “passive” attitude among some Indonesian prison officers

towards prison-based deradicalisation programs. Indonesian prison officers believe

that the BNPT, within its establishment objectives, has the main task of

deradicalisation of imprisoned terrorists, particularly the “hard-liner convicted

terrorist” (FG3:4). Another participant also agreed, saying that:

Without intention to pass the job [rehabilitating convicted terrorists], the

responsibility for deradicalising convicted terrorists must be at the BNPT’s

hand. (FG3:5)

A strong commitment to building an effective partnership between the DGC

and the BNPT is evidenced by a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the

agencies, signed by the former Minister of Law and Human Rights, Amir

Syamsudin, and the former head of the BNPT, Ansyaad Mbai, on 23 July 2014

(Ditjenpas RI, 2014b). Recently, the Director General of Correction, I Wayan K

Dusak, and the Deputy of the BNPT, Abdul Rahman Kadir, also signed a MoU on

the management of a deradicalisation centre in the special prison for terrorist inmates

(Ditjenpas RI, 2016b). However, as found in the current study, realisation of this

commitment can be questioned, especially at the lower level of actors or in the real

implementation of the collaboration.

Further research from different perspectives is recommended to assess whether

the same problem is encountered by the BNPT’s staff. In addition, future studies

need to evaluate collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT, especially because it

is apparent that achieving good collaboration has been difficult. In this regard, all the

evaluation criteria in the existing literature on partnerships and collaboration could

be used.

5.6.2 Unorganised Partnerships

The key state agencies for prison-based deradicalisation programs are the

DGC, the BNPT and the INP, with support by others such as the MoRA. Besides


state agencies, non-governmental bodies involved in prison-based deradicalisation

activities include the SFCG, the Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (Yayasan Prasasti

Perdamaian – [YPPP]) and the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum –

[LBH]). The involvement of many agencies in the effort to rehabilitate terrorist

inmates, on one hand, is beneficial because “it will help prison officers in

rehabilitating terrorist inmates” (FG2:5). This suggests that prison officers need

collaboration with other people or agencies in order to rehabilitate or deradicalise

terrorist inmates. As a focus group participant realised that:

If rehabilitation or deradicalisation of terrorist inmates was only the

correctional responsibility, we work alone on it, it will be so difficult.

(FG3:3)

However, focus group participants also recognised that collaboration between

agencies has not been managed well. Consequently, programs implemented as a

result of collaborative work have not been particularly successful in terrorist

deradicalisation. For instance, focus group participants believe that Islamic scholars

provided by the MoRA and several private companies to lead religious classes (kelas

pengajian) do not meet the needs of terrorist inmates:

What we have done is regular religious classes [kelas pengajian] to all the

prison population including terrorist inmates. It was held in the prison’s

mosque. However, related to terrorism and terrorist prisoners, we need an

active role from the MoRA, for example, in providing a leading cleric or

Islamic scholar who can challenge terrorist beliefs. (FG2:3)

We do have religious classes [kelas pengajian] that were supported by the

MoRA, Indonesia Ulema Council [Majelis Ulama Indonesia], and private

companies. However, the content of these classes were mostly general issues

on Islam that encourage people to be a good person as a Muslim. This was

not relevant for terrorist inmates since they have their own interpretation

about Islam. (FG2:2)


The quotes above demonstrate that the classes were not focused on the issue of

terrorism and the needs of terrorist inmates. The content of such religious classes

(kelas pengajian) that have been delivered to the prison population (including

terrorist prisoners) is the same as that for community groups. According to a focus

group participant, “the content of the speech and discussion must be directed to and

should challenge the beliefs of incarcerated terrorists” (FG2:2).

The participation of non-state actors in Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation programs, on the other hand, was highly appreciated by the focus

group participants. For example, the CMT and LST programs were facilitated and

organised by the SFCG in cooperation with the DGC, the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute

(LBH) and the Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (YPP). These interventions were

valued as “the most appropriate activities to be used and integrated in prison-based

deradicalisation programs” (FG1:3). Moreover, the activities were not only

recognised as successful by the implementers, but were also recognised by

participants. For example, a convicted terrorist, Abdul Rouf, who was sentenced to

16 years in prison for his involvement in the first Bali Bombing attack, recognised

the program was good:

This is the third day of a five-day training course I am following here. The

result is very good. I can understand more about other inmates, the

differences among us here. (SFCGI & DITJEN PAS, 2010, p. 5)

Although focus group participants were satisfied with the programs delivered

by these NGOs, the sustainability of activities initiated by the NGOs remains a

problem of critical concern. As NGOs conduct activities and evaluate project

outcomes within a strict timeline, the survival of interventions greatly depends on the

input of the DGC and or the BNPT. A focus group participant commented that:

We do not know whether the program will continue or not, depending on

funding and our boss. We are just executors. (FG1:3)

Overall, the involvement of many agencies, either state or non-state actors, is

problematic. Indeed, many agencies are involved in prison-based deradicalisation


programs, as the focus group participants have experienced, but partnerships and

collaboration remain unorganised. This finding is consistent with those of a number

of studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; IPI, 2010; IRIN, 2012; Ungerer, 2011). These

previous studies explain that, although there are many actors working on terrorist

deradicalisation, the efforts have not been fully integrated.

The principal findings of this investigation suggest that, although partnerships

have been emphasised as playing an important part in achieving the goals of the

deradicalisation program, evaluation of the implementation is required. Furthermore,

various capacity constraints on partnerships must also be considered, such as

managing barriers to working together, budgeting issues, resource sharing, and other

possible difficulties in working collaboratively. Therefore, further research on

developing effective partnerships and collaboration among institutions, either state or

non-state actors, is worthwhile.

Together, these results provide important insights into the existence of

unorganised partnerships in delivering prison-based deradicalisation programs in the

Indonesian context. In addition, if a partnership is going well, the programs should

continue for the terrorist inmates. Therefore, the future of collaboration with NGOs

on prison-based deradicalisation programs should be maintained; otherwise, the

programs will remain incomplete program, as will the effect on terrorist inmates.

5.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has investigated the challenges that Indonesian prison officers

face when implementing Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. To

investigate such challenges, thematic qualitative analysis was employed. Analysis of

the focus group data revealed five broad themes as challenges faced by Indonesian

prison officers:

1. Terrorist prisoners’ personalities.


3. The sustainability of the program.




Furthermore, the discussion of the findings in this chapter indicates that,

although the Indonesian Government has paid considerable attention to

deradicalisation initiatives and has undertaken a wide range of activities to

rehabilitate terrorist inmates, programs have been scattered and without focus. Thus,

these efforts have not helped significantly in reducing recidivism related to terror

acts. It is evident that a number of terror acts in Indonesia have been committed by

former terrorist inmates. The spread of radical beliefs in Indonesian prisons is also

evident (Andrie, 2011; ICG, 2007; Ungerer, 2011).

To sum up, the analysis of Indonesian prison officers’ experiences reported in

this chapter provides insights useful for the evaluation of existing policies and

practices for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. The

analysis suggests that the experiences and perspectives of prison officers as the main

implementers of prison-based deradicalisation programs must be considered. In

addition, the analysis sets the scene for the next chapter, which focuses on

Indonesian prison officers’ perspectives on the establishment of a special prison for

terrorists. The opinions and ideas of Indonesian prison officers regarding this

initiative were investigated.


The Perspective of Indonesian

Prison Officers on the

Establishment of a Special

Prison for Terrorist Inmates in

Indonesia

Another aspect of this is the conscious choice on whether to segregate the

violent extremist offenders or integrate them in the larger prison population.

There are advantages and disadvantages to both alternatives. On the one

hand, separating this group from the general population makes them easier to

manage and reduces the risk of malign influencing. Moreover, necessary

resources including extra security measures and training for instructors and

specialist personnel are only needed in a limited number of locations. On the

other hand, integrating extremist offenders among other categories of

inmates prevents the formation of tight groups, and confronts extremists with

alternative perspectives and ideas that might contribute to their

deradicalisation. (Stone, 2015, p. 227)

This chapter presents the results and discussion pertaining to Research

Question 2, that is, the perspectives of Indonesian prison officers on the

establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners. To gain insights into this

issue, the study employed a thematic qualitative analysis similar to that used in the

investigation of Research Question 1. Primary data was collected through a series of

focus group discussions with Indonesian prison officers, while secondary data was

gathered from existing research and relevant state documents.

The chapter begins with an overview in Section 6.1. Further, sections 6.2, 6.3,

and 6.4 present a detailed discussion of the results: an absolute agreement on the

establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists (6.2); advantages and

disadvantages of a special prison for terrorist inmates (6.3) and related policy issues

(6.4). The last, Section 6.5 presents concluding remarks of the chapter.


6.1 OVERVIEW

The previous chapter explored the challenges faced by the Indonesian prison

officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs. Five challenges were

identified on the implementation of such programs, namely terrorist inmates’

personalities, the readiness of the officers, the sustainability of the program,

institutional infrastructure problems, and unavailability of a collaborative

mechanism. In dealing with the issue of radicalisation in prisons, the Indonesian

Government instituted several initiatives, such as the establishment of the National

Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]).

Recently, a special prison for terrorist prisoners was established in Sentul,

Bogor, West Java, under the management of the Directorate General of Corrections

(DGC). This chapter provides an analysis of the perspectives of Indonesian prison

officers on the establishment of this special prison. The chapter shows that there was

an absolute agreement among the focus group participants on the establishment of a

specialist prison for terrorists in Indonesia, despite their acknowledgement that such

prison have both advantages and disadvantages. Policy recommendations related to

the initiative are also proposed.

6.2 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SPECIAL PRISON FOR TERRORIST

PRISONERS: AN ABSOLUTE AGREEMENT

Before presenting the results of the investigation into the perspectives of

Indonesian prison officers on establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists,

the terms “special prison” and “general prison” need to be clarified in the Indonesian

context. The two types of prisons have both similarities and differences.

6.2.1 Terrorist Inmates: General Prison versus Special Prison

The institutionalisation and management of both prison types is similar. Both

special and general prisons are operated and controlled by a Branch Office of the

Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kantor Wilayah Kementerian Hukum dan

HAM) in the local government, and the DGC in the central government, which has

responsibility for the Minister of Law and Human Rights. Currently, the

administrative structure of Indonesian corrections consists of four levels of

institutions, from central to local:

1. The Ministry of Law and Human Rights.


2. The DGC.

3. The Branch Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights.

4. Prisons (special or general).

Prisons are established and built in each district level. Apart from prisons, the

Government of Indonesia also has a detention centre (Rutan or Rumah Tahanan) in

each district level, the main function of which is to detain those who are on remand

for criminal acts but are not yet convicted.

The differences between special and general prisons are related to their

purposes. Special prisons are for specific offenders; hence, the inmates have

committed the same type of crime. For example, when someone is accused of a

drugs-related crime and is sentenced to imprisonment, they will be sent to a special

prison for drugs and related offences, called a narcotics prison. Thus all the inmates

in narcotics prisons are drugs offenders, and no prisoners convicted of drugs-related

offences are held with regular prisoners in general prisons. Therefore, in the context

of this thesis, the scope of special prisons differs from that of general prisons, based

on crime types; special prisons may use treatments for inmates that differ from those

in general prisons. The management of prisons in the Indonesian context dictates that

special prisons be built separately from general prisons.

Besides special prisons established and built based on specific crimes, there

are also special prisons based on the gender and age of the offenders, such as those

for women and juveniles. For example, Indonesia has established the Kupang

Women’s Prison and the Mataram Juvenile Prison, based on the Decree of the

Minister of Law and Human Rights Number: M.HH-10.OT.01.01 year 2011. In

terms of narcotics prisons, more narcotics prisons have been established in 2012 in

Langsa, Langkat, Muara Subak, Pangkal Pinang, and Kasongan, based on the Decree

of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Number: M.HH-04.OT.01.01 year 2012.

Also based on this decree, juvenile prisons were established in Bandar Lampung and

Bandung.

The discourse on establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists in

Indonesia was initiated by the former Minister of Law and Human Rights 2009–

2011, Patrialis Akbar. This initiative was developed as an addition to the established

prison classifications of juvenile prisons, youth prisons, women’s prisons, men’s


prisons, general prisons, narcotics prisons, and open prisons; it was also proposed to

transform Sukamiskin Prison from a general prison into a special prison for convicts

convicted of corruption. When this initiative was introduced, the Ministry of

Religious Affairs (MoRA) and the House of Representative (Dewan Perwakilan

Rakyat – [DPR]) agreed with its intent (Bakti, 2014, p. 289).

However, many scholars and practitioners disagreed with this initiative.

According to Bakti (2014, pp. 195-196), they believed this initiative could not be

realised at that time. This was due to a common belief that, if terrorist convicts are

held in one place, they will become stronger as a terrorist group and therefore have

increased opportunities to incite violence against prison authorities. Because of the

strong debate about the pros and cons of this special prison, the Government of

Indonesia decided that, rather than being a special prison for terrorist inmates, the

new facility would be a deradicalisation centre. The BNPT then built this centre in

Sentul, Bogor, West Java, as a basecamp to deradicalise terrorist inmates (Bakti,

2014, p. 197).

Responding to this initiative, Handoyo Sudrajat, the former Director General of

Corrections, informed the public that the individuals sent to the centre would be

selected based on a risk assessment, and then only those classified as “high risk”,

hard core, or militant would be sent. A senior DGC official, Nugroho, confirmed that

one of the prisoners who was at the top of the list was Abu Bakar Ba’syir, because he

was categorised as an ideologist terrorist inmate (Koran Tempo, 2014). However,

prior to this initiative being abandoned, no convicted terrorists were sent to the

centre.

More recently, interest in establishing a special prison for terrorist convicts re-

emerged after apparent recruitment and the spread of radical beliefs in Surabaya

Prison. After the incident was investigated, an official report by the Indonesian

Government confirmed the problem. The government decided to proceed with the

original plan to establish a special prison for terrorist inmates. A legal basis for the

special prison was created through the Decision of the Ministry of Law and Human

Rights on the Establishment of Sentul Special Prison in Bogor, West Java (Ditjenpas

RI, 2016b). This prison was called Sentul Special Prison because it was located in

Sentul District, in the same area as the BNPT complex.


Therefore, the current policy of the Government of Indonesia is to have a

special prison for convicted terrorists – not only a deradicalisation centre – with all

required facilities and resources. When fieldwork for this study was completed in

July 2016, the prison development was ongoing, with operations commencing in

January 2017 (Ditjenpas RI, 2016b).

This research was originally based on the concept that the need for a special

prison for terrorist inmates was still the subject of debate, and that there was still a

possibility the government would adopt an alternative solution. This scenario

remained until after completion of the first and second focus groups. The new prison

was established before I conducted the third focus group. In July 2016, during my

field trip, I inspected the special prison from the outside, at which time the physical

construction of the prison building was almost completed. A prison director and staff

for this prison had then been appointed by the government.

Although the policy of the Government of Indonesia had changed from only

having a discourse about and a plan for the prison to actually establishing the prison,

the focus of this study was not affected. The focus of this part of the study was solely

to provide insights into the perspectives of Indonesian prison officers on the

establishment of the prison, regardless of whether it was built or not.

As mentioned in the literature review, the distribution of terrorist inmates in

Indonesia can be classified as a mix of isolation and separation, and follows a general

pattern of distributing terrorist inmates through correctional facilities, as described by

Neumann (2010). Neumann’s pattern has three options: isolation, separation, and

concentration. Isolation means that terrorist inmates are isolated from each other;

separation means that terrorist inmates are separated from the general prison

population; and concentration means that terrorist inmates are held in one place

(Neumann, 2010, p. 17).

Terrorist inmates were previously only dispersed throughout Indonesian

prisons because Indonesia had no single strategy on how convicted terrorists should

be housed (Jones C. R., 2014). The practices in each prison that holds terrorist

inmates differ. For example, in two of the research sites (Cipinang and Surabaya

prisons), terrorist inmates are segregated from other inmates, while in

Nusakambangan Prison they are integrated. However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, in


Cibinong Prison, an isolation policy has been implemented. For this reason, the

Indonesian practices are a mix of isolation and separation models.

However, with the initiative of the Government of Indonesia to establish a

special prison for convicted terrorists, the existing Indonesian model on the

distribution of terrorist inmates has become a mix of the isolation, separation, and

concentration models. The establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates

reflects a concentration principle. If not all terrorist inmates are housed in this special

prison as per the official policy (Ditjenpas RI, 2016b), then the practice could be

described as a partial concentration policy. Newman’s (2010) analysis that compared

the practices of five countries indicates that only Indonesia has opted for a mix of the

three models, as can be seen in the table 6.1 bellow.

Table 6.1 Comparison of the Distribution of Terrorist Inmates (Adapted from Newman’s Findings)

Country Model

Netherlands Fully concentration policy

United States of America A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy

France A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy

United Kingdom A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy

Spain A mix of dispersal and (partial) concentration policy

Indonesia A mix of dispersal and isolation, separation, and (partial)

concentration policy

In the context of the implementation of a deradicalisation program in a

particular prison, the International Crisis Group (ICG) demonstrated that decisions

about segregating terrorist inmates from, or integrating them with, other types of

inmates are important (ICG, 2007). However, there is a dilemma in selecting a

method because both segregation and integration have negative impacts. For

example, in one case integration resulted in the recruitment of non-terrorist prisoners,

while in another case segregation resulted in the terrorist inmates gaining solidarity

(ICG, 2007, p. 7). Interaction between terrorist inmates and other types of inmates


remains a problem, even though a segregation policy has been applied in some

Indonesian prisons (Jones C. R., 2014).

Evaluating Indonesia’s model of distribution for terrorist inmates after the

establishment of the special prison for convicted terrorist needs further empirical

research. More specifically, finding which model is appropriate for each type of

terrorist inmate in Indonesia is essential.

6.2.2 An Absolute Agreement

In discussing the need for a special prison for convicted terrorists, focus group

results indicated that there was an absolute agreement on this initiative. Despite

expectations of a debate on the pros and cons of the initiative, all the participants in

the focus groups agreed with and fully supported the initiative.

One participant expressed a strong belief that “if you ask whether it was

needed or not, yes absolutely it’s necessary” (FG1:2). A participant in a different

focus group also said that “yes, a special prison for terrorist prisoners must be

established” (FG2:1). Although other participants were less emphatic – “I think

that’s fine if the terrorists prison will be established” (FG2:3) – they still indicated

agreement.

The following responses from the Indonesian prison officers show agreement

on the need for a special prison for convicted terrorists:

Yes, I agree. That’s why in every briefing or meeting with the authorities, I

always said we have to have a special prison for terrorist prisoners. Through

this prison we might develop special treatments and interventions intended

to solve terrorist prisoners’ issues and also the terrorism problem. (FG3:5)

I believe that a special prison is urgent. This is because we applied a general

method in rehabilitating inmates in this prison. A special method then can be

developed in a special prison. It should be different, how narcotics’

offenders were treated in narcotics prisons. (FG1:2)

The focus groups results, as presented above, revealed that attitudes towards a

special prison for terrorist prisoners were very positive. The data showed that there

was agreement among Indonesian prison officers on the initiative in the three


research sites (FG1, FG2, and FG3); no participant showed any signs or made any

comments indicating disagreement.

Therefore, the first finding on this issue was that the Indonesian prison officers

absolutely agreed with and supported the establishment of a special prison for

terrorist inmates in the Indonesian correctional system. In common with the

established management of correctional services, this new prison is under the

management of the DGC.

This agreement by Indonesian prison officers supports existing research. The

need to pursue policies of isolation for religious extremist inmates in the context of

US prisons was examined by Merola and Vovak (2012). Based on a survey of the

wardens of all state-level prisons in the US, the study indicated that the most

effective approach for dealing with religious extremists was an isolation policy

(Merola & Vovak, 2012, p. 735 and 753). Furthermore, the current finding is also

consistent with the recommendation proposed by Hassan and Yasin (2012).

Referring to the Saudi and Singapore prison models, they recommended the

Government of Indonesia establish a special prison facility for convicted terrorists

(Hassan & Yasin, 2012, p. 13).

However, the value of establishing a special prison for a specific crime is still

debatable. This issue not only concerns special prisons for terrorist inmates but also

those for all specific types of crime. In terms of corruption inmates, for example,

Mochtar said that “corruptors should get the same treatment as the other criminals”

(JakartaGlobe, 2010) such as rapists, because he considered these offenders are the

same as the other criminals.

Although one may argue that a special prison for a specific offence is not

necessary, such prisons have been supported by some experts. In specific

circumstances, establishing special prisons is highly recommended. In terms of crime

types and prison management, some have argued that the need for special prisons lies

in issues around offenders’ rehabilitation and supervision.

Firstly, regarding rehabilitation goals, different programs for specific offences

are required. When the inmates live in special prisons, they can receive treatments

and programs different from those for ordinary prisoners, and even specific therapies.

The different treatment is required because of the specific type of crime (Burkhead,


2007; Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007), for example, drugs and narcotics

offences. With these offences, the inmates are often also users who need special

rehabilitation programs to improve their health or prevent their death. In this regard,

many see drug users as victims; in criminology such offences are called “victimless

crimes”, that is, “crime where there is no apparent victim and no apparent pain or

injury” (Lehman & Phelps, 2008). As such, these offenders do not need punishment

but rather specific medical treatments and therapies in order to help them stop using

drugs and narcotics. As a result, rehabilitation programs are possible for these

inmates.

Secondly, the issue of supervision particularly arose in Indonesia after several

cases in which corruptors were living in the prisons. Hence, many people suggested

that it was necessary to hold corruptors in a special prison to ensure proper

supervision. In the Indonesian context, Haryono, a former deputy of the Corruption

Eradication Commission of the Republic of Indonesia (Komisi Pemberantasan

Korupsi – [KPK]), noted it would be easier for the KPK to supervise these prisoners

if they were housed in a special prison (Tempo.Co, 2008). Diansyah believed that, if

they were jailed separately, these prisoners would tend to receive different treatment

and facilities because they have more money to pay the prison officers than ordinary

prisoners do (Tempo.Co, 2008). Thus, corruptor inmates would be more comfortable

during their incarceration because they would have extra facilities or luxurious rooms

with sophisticated appliances, which are not allowed for ordinary inmates. This

situation is likely to make supervision easier. Further, it might be easier for the

prison officers and authorities to supervise and apply specific treatments for

corruptors.

To what extent is a special prison for terrorist inmates needed, specifically in

the Indonesian context? As mentioned earlier, the current study found that

Indonesian prison officers agreed with this initiative. However, the focus group

results also highlighted several impacts from the establishment of a special prison for

terrorist inmates. The results indicated that this initiative might have both advantages

and disadvantages. These findings are discussed in the following section.


6.3 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A SPECIAL PRISON

FOR TERRORIST INMATES

In addition to agreement on the establishment of a special prison for convicted

terrorists, a broad theme on the advantages and disadvantages of the special prison

emerged. Focus group participants noted several factors that must be considered

during the establishment of this prison, both positive and negative.

In answering questions about their views on the establishment of a special

prison for terrorist prisoners, overall agreement was followed by explanations of

advantages and disadvantages. Specifically, one focus group participant said:

To my understanding, Indonesia has approximately 270 or 280 terrorist

prisoners. If they were held in one special prison, it will have positive and

negative impacts. (FG1:3)

Similarly:

If terrorist prisoners were housed in a special detention centre, separated

from other prison populations, this policy will produce good and bad sides

indeed. (FG3:1)

From the series of focus groups, three issues under the advantages theme of a

terrorist prison were identified: improving security and supervision, preventing the

spread of radicalisation in prisons, and increasing the likelihood of terrorist

deradicalisation. On the other hand, two issues under the disadvantages theme were

identified: increased solidarity among terrorist convicts, and hindering the collection

of intelligence data. Analysis of these insights is discussed in the following sub-

sections.

6.3.1 Advantages

Participants thought a special prison for terrorist inmates would probably lead

to improved security and supervision. Some participants argued that “security might

be easier to be maintained” (FG1:3) and that “it could improve supervision for

terrorist prisoners” (FG3:1). By segregating terrorist inmates, there is no opportunity

for conflict between them and other types of inmates. In contrast, if they are held in a


general prison, the chances of conflict are high because of the various types of

prisoners held in these prisons. For example, in a case in Cipinang Prison, solidarity

among terrorist inmates grew in opposition to criminal gangs (ICG, 2007, p. 7).

A special prison for terrorist inmates was viewed by focus group participants as

likely to prevent the spread of radicalisation in prisons. As one focus group

participant put it:

Concerns about recruitment of other targeted prison population were nil. It

was because they were only one group, terrorist inmates. (FG1:3)

Furthermore, another focus group participant said that:

The advantages? Surely they cannot establish a new group with ordinary

inmates as new members. There was no way to communicate with other

types of inmates. (FG3:1)

Lastly, participants thought a specialised prison would increase the

opportunities to achieve deradicalisation. A special prison for terrorist inmates would

be supported by both professional officers and specific programs for terrorist

inmates. For example, a focus group participant said:

I do believe that the establishment of special prison for terrorist prisoners

will be followed by the availability of specific programs to be applied for

terrorist inmates. So the goal of terrorist rehabilitation can be achieved. We

don’t have this resource in general prisons. (FG2:2)

On the availability of professional officers for terrorist rehabilitation, a

participant noted:

If this prison is established, I do believe that it will be equipped with

professional officers who get specific training in dealing with the issue of

terrorism, including terrorist prisoners. (FG3:5)


Because focus group participants believed that a special prison for terrorist

inmates would be equipped with professional officers and specific programs, they

also believed that the possibility of rehabilitating terrorist inmates would be

increased. These findings agree with the findings of other studies conducted by

Cropsey et al, in which conclude that “the smaller size of the prison, coupled with

more specialized staff, provide the formula for advancing the use of better practices”

(Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007, p. 80). On the other hand, they also

argue that “each special population is unique, and it is not adequate to provide

services or programs that are responsive to the needs of some offenders while

ignoring the needs of others” (Cropsey, Wexler, Taxman, & Young, 2007, p. 80).

This statement indicates that a specialised prison for specific offenders may face

challenges, regardless its benefit (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008, p. 51;

Mulcahy, Merrington, & Bell, 2013, p. 11). Related to this issue, the following

subsection discusses the findings about the disadvantages of the establishment of a

special prison for terrorist inmates in Indonesia.

6.3.2 Disadvantages

Participants were concerned about increased solidarity among terrorist

prisoners, who they thought could become a strong terrorist group due to regular

interaction among these prisoners. The following quotes illustrate the participants’

perception that terrorist inmates would gain solidarity inside a special prison facility:

Due to daily interaction and chance to interact each other, they will become

a strong terrorist group. I do believe they will have an intense discussion

regarding their beliefs inside this special prison. (FG3:5)

If they were held in the special prison together, I think they will have a

leader which is an ideologue or non-cooperative terrorist inmate. This leader

will be respected and followed by all terrorist inmates. It was the reality that

I experienced in dealing with terrorist inmates. (FG1:3)

Moreover, a cooperative terrorist inmate could become more radical and then

become a non-cooperative terrorist (i.e. high risk, hard core, or an ideologue). This

transformation could occur because other ideologue or non-cooperative terrorist


inmates would have ample opportunity to spread their radical beliefs to cooperative

convicted terrorists (i.e. supporters). A focus group participant said that:

In this special prison, if they were mixed between non-cooperative and

cooperative terrorist inmates, I believe that they who are cooperative terrorist

inmates or low risk terrorist inmates will be affected by those who are non-

cooperative. Non-cooperative terrorist inmates will transfer their radical

beliefs so those who are cooperative terrorist inmates might be become more

radicals. (FG2:1)

Given the identified possible disadvantages, there is a potential further

investigation warranted on the drawbacks of the establishment of a special prison for

terrorist inmates. Moreover, a previous study (El-Said, 2012) has indicated a concern

with the initiative to establish isolation policies for terrorist inmates after examining

the approaches of Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi

Arabia and Yemen. He pointed out that isolating violent extremists from each other

and from other ordinary inmates, “without a professional, comprehensive and

financially sustainable de-radicalisation programme, supported by consciously

designed prison policy”, it could be resulting in hardening violent extremists’ views

(El-Said, 2012). Further, other less violent terrorist inmates could be persuaded by

violent extremists to adopt violent practices, as has happened in Jordan in the past

(El-Said, 2012, p. 46).

Neumann (2010, p. 21) also demonstrated that holding all convicted terrorists

in a separate prison facility or concentration was beneficial in that these inmates

would no longer adhere to their former leader or may have already turned against

their former leader. However, if they still engaged with their group and their leader, a

new structure might be created. Hence, the nature of the terrorist group should be

examined before a particular policy is selected.

Turning now to the focus group findings on hindering collection of intelligence

data, concern was expressed about reduced opportunities to gather intelligence data

on terrorist inmates’ activities inside the prison. Because the prison would only hold

terrorist inmates, opportunities to use non-terrorist inmates as informants to gather

intelligent data would be lost. Some information might still be forthcoming, but the


validity of the information would be unknowns. As a focus group participant said

that:

If in this special prison only occupied by terrorist prisoners, for example 10

terrorist inmates. Like or dislike, I would gain information from only those

10 people. But, are they willing to say the truth? I don’t think so. It was

different with the situation where they were housed in the general prison

with other types of inmates. Here for example, there are 1700-plus prisoners

while terrorist inmates were below than 20. For gathering intelligent data, I

can ask the rest of population. Might be information from around 50

prisoners was enough. (FG3:1)

This quote illustrates that, if terrorist prisoners are held in general prisons and

are integrated with other types of inmates, intelligence data can be collected via other

types of prisoners who cooperate with officers. This cooperation is important to

prison officers for security and supervision reasons. Such opportunities seem

unlikely if all the inmates in the prison are terrorists.

However, one participant said that “even though they were housed in the

special prison, I think we still can gather data from those who are classified as

medium-risk or low-risk terrorist inmates” (FG2:5). But he also stressed that “the

chance was limited and not as many as if they were housed in a general prison

together with ordinary inmates” (FG2:5). Thus, although gathering information

within a special prison for terrorists is possible, it would not be easy. From the focus

group results, it can be concluded that difficulties in gathering intelligence data are a

key disadvantage of establishing a special prison for terrorist inmates.

The initiative of establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists in the

Indonesian context needs further evaluation in order to determine if it leads to or

correlates with better deradicalisation or rehabilitation of terrorist convicts. Research

could investigate to what extent establishing a special prison supports the

achievement of rehabilitation and supervision objectives. The current results on the

perceived advantages and disadvantages of the initiative imply that further research

is needed. A question might be: To what extent do the advantages of establishing a

special prison for terrorist prisoners outweigh the disadvantages in the Indonesian


context? In addition, a cost–benefit analysis could be done, because the limited

funding in developing countries such as Indonesia is always a big issue.

6.4 POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO A SPECIAL PRISON FOR

TERRORIST INMATES

In the previous sections two broad themes were discussed regarding

establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates: agreement on the need for

such a special prison, and the advantages and disadvantages of such a prison.

Another broad theme emerged around policy issues for the future management of

this special prison. Five issues were identified as of concern for the management of

this special prison:

1. The distribution criterion for the categories of terrorist inmates that should

be sent to a terrorist prison.

2. The decision maker for the distribution.

3. Distribution timing.

4. Strengthening partnerships.

5. Data availability on terrorist prisoners’ backgrounds.

Focus group participants argued that these issues must be considered if a

specialised prison for terrorists is to be established in Indonesia. Policies regarding

these issues could be grouped into three broad themes: the type of inmates,

distribution, and partnership. Policy 1 on the distribution criterion for the categories

of terrorist inmates that should be sent to a terrorist prison falls under the theme of

the type of inmates. Policies 2 and 3 on the decision maker for the distribution and

the distribution timing fall under the theme of distribution. Policies 4 and 5 on

strengthening partnerships and data availability on terrorist prisoners’ backgrounds

fall under the theme of partnership.

Figure 6.1 (in the next page) is a visual summary of the findings on the future

policy issues regarding the establishment of the special prison. The findings are

interrelated, with the main issue being the future management of the prison.


Figure 6.1 Findings on the Future Policy Issues of a Special Prison for Terrorist Inmates

Merola and Vovak (2012, p. 754) concluded that policies on the incarceration

of religious extremists and individuals with terrorist ties are essential. They also

explained that it is useful to conduct research by asking the greatest experts in the

corrections field. Their study employed a survey of wardens at maximum security

state prisons in the US, including questions on policy, training, and other issues

related to the incarceration of extremist individuals (Merola & Vovak, 2012, p. 737).

In addition, their findings on several issues regarding the management of a special

prison for terrorist inmates are significant. The study provides empirical evidence for

the future on identifying strategic policies and formulating procedures in the context

establishing a special prison for terrorist inmates in Indonesia. Moreover, these issues

were identified from the implementers’ experiences, so the findings contain valuable

and practical recommendations. These findings are particularly relevant for the DGC,

the institution responsible for the management of such a prison, as well as for the

BNPT, the coordinator of the national deradicalisation program, which is responsible

for providing a national action plan for deradicalisation.

Types of Inmates

• Who should be sent? Non-cooperative inmates

Distri-bution

• Distribution timing

• Decision maker for distribution

Partner-ships

• Should be strengthened

• Sharing data on terrorist background

Policy Issues


6.4.1 Type of Inmate: Non-cooperative Terrorist Inmates

The most notable policy issue was about the placement criterion for terrorist

inmates. Which terrorist inmates would be housed in this special prison? Should it be

all terrorist prisoners or a selection only? A common view among focus group

participants was that non-cooperative terrorist inmates (high risk, hard core, or the

ideologue) must be housed in this special prison. One focus group participant said

that:

If the Government does establish this special prison, the population should

be non-cooperative terrorist inmates. It should be selected then who are non-

cooperative terrorist inmates. For those who are cooperative terrorist inmates

can be still held here in this general prison. So terrorist inmates with strong

ideology or hard liners must be housed in the special prison. (FG3:3)

Another focus group participant agreed, saying that:

So this special prison, as expressed by [Mr FG3:3] must be a prison for

terrorist inmates who are classified as non-cooperative terrorist inmates.

They are radicals. As long as they are willing to cooperate with the officers,

I think they do not need to be housed in the special prison. (FG3:1).

As discussed above, focus group participants suggested that non-cooperative

and cooperative terrorist inmates must be placed separately. These results are

consistent with those of another study (Bakti, 2014) that urge that terrorist inmates

must be identified and then classified into the leaders and the followers. Within these

classifications, Bakti (2014, pp. 199-200) suggested that those who are terrorist

leaders must be housed separately from other terrorist inmates, including militants

and supporters.

The following comments explain why the Indonesian prison officers suggested

housing non-cooperative terrorist inmates (high risk or hard core or the ideologue) in

the special prison:


I believe such special prison will be equipped with suitable resources to

handle non-cooperative terrorist prisoners, or ideologue, or high risk terrorist

prisoners. This was not evident in general prisons, so if the non-cooperative

terrorist inmates were housed here, we will find difficulties to rehabilitate

this type of terrorist inmates. (FG3:2)

Non-cooperative terrorist inmates must be placed in the special prison. It is

because they are so strong to hold their ideology, and we can do nothing

with that. But for medium or cooperative terrorist inmates they can be

rehabilitated here in general prison. (FG2:1)

Focus group participants believed that whatever the program implemented for

non-cooperative terrorist inmates, it would not be effective in general prisons. On the

other hand, prison officers were willing to rehabilitate terrorist inmates, particularly

those who are medium risk (grey group) and cooperative terrorist inmates. Although

they agree with the establishment of a special prison for terrorist inmates, they are

still willing to deal with some terrorist inmates in the general prisons in which they

work. They believe that low-risk and medium-risk terrorists can be handled and can

be deradicalised, and they are willing to implement a prison-based deradicalisation

program for these inmates.

In conclusion, regarding which group of terrorist inmates should be housed in a

special prison, the results indicated that non-cooperative terrorist inmates, the

ideologues, the hardliners, and the high-risk terrorist inmates should be housed there.

However, this finding differs from the intended policy proposed by the DGC and the

BNPT. Although the Director General of Corrections, I Wayan K Dusak, stated that

the DGC planned to build a high-security prison for non-cooperative terrorist inmates

in Nusakambangan, an official launch indicated that the special prison for terrorist

inmates located in Sentul, Bogor, East Java, was for cooperative terrorist inmates

(Ditjenpas RI, 2016b).

Thus the intended policy contradicts the realised policy, which could lead to

problems in practice. This finding agrees with that of Veldhuis et al. that “the

discrepancies between the intended and realised policy reveal that the dilemmas that

could have been foreseen in advance indeed led to difficulties in practice” (Veldhuis,

Gordijn, Lindenberg, & Veenstra, 2010). Therefore, this issue needs further research,


to answer this question: Is it more appropriate to place non-cooperative terrorist

inmates or cooperative terrorist inmates in the special prison for terrorists?

The results also showed the majority of focus group participants confirmed that

they could implement deradicalisation or rehabilitation programs for terrorist inmates

who were classified as cooperative terrorist inmates; that is, the supporters, and

medium-risk or low-risk terrorist inmates. This finding implies that not all terrorist

inmates should be held in the special prison. Participants agreed that cooperative

terrorist inmates can be housed and placed in general prisons, where they can interact

with ordinary inmates. This result highlights that the Indonesian prison officers

strongly believed in separating non-cooperative and cooperative terrorist inmates.

The finding supports previous research carried out by Dugas and Kruglanski (2014)

in the context of the Sri Lankan deradicalisation program. Their study found that

segregation of the more and the less seriously committed offenders reduced inmates’

rejection of deradicalisation (Dugas & Kruglanski, 2014).

6.4.2 Decision Maker for the Distribution

A key policy issue was who will decide the placement of convicted terrorists?

Should it be decided by prison officers? A focus group participant argued that it must

be decided by the Indonesian National Police (INP), specifically by the Special

Detachment (Detasemen Khusus – [Densus]) 88:

The decision maker must be the INP, in this regard was Detachment 88. I

believe that they are the first officers who really engage in the identifying

characteristics or personalities of a single terrorist inmate. They understand it

because they’ve got lots of data on a single suspected terrorist. So in

deciding the distribution of a convicted terrorist, it should be decided by the

INP, especially by Detachment 88. (FG3:1)

Similarly, another participant implied that the decision maker for the placement

of convicted terrorists to the special prison should be the INP since “they have all

data from the investigation processes” (FG1:3). However, a focus group participant

at a different site commented that it must be decided by the BNPT:


For the assessment of a convicted terrorist in the special prison, it should be

BPNT’s task. They then should select it, which one for the inmates who

were non-cooperative and cooperative. (FG2:4)

In conclusion, the focus group participants did not regard themselves as

decision makers for the placement of terrorist prisoners in the special prison. This

suggests that the risk assessment processes for terrorist inmates should not be

responsibility of prison officers, but should be conducted by other authorities.

Further, the question is what individual professional should decide the distribution of

convicted terrorists? The results show that it should be decided by either the INP,

specifically by the Detachment 88, or the BNPT.

This result explicitly informs who the key actors for risk and needs assessment

of terrorist inmates should be. The actor identifies an individual convicted terrorist,

and classifies them as a non-cooperative, a cooperative, or a “grey” terrorist inmate

(in between non-cooperative and cooperative). According to the above results and

discussion, those who are classified as non-cooperative terrorist inmates should then

be housed in the special prison, with the others dispersed in general prisons.

There are two possible explanations why Indonesian prison officers do not

want to handle this responsibility. The first is a lack of training related to the

readiness of Indonesian prison officers to deal with terrorist inmates, as discussed in

Chapter 5. The second is unclear job descriptions among agencies that are involved

in prison-based deradicalisation programs, which result from a lack of coordination

and cooperation among state agencies, as also discussed in Chapter 5. There are three

state agencies that are at the forefront of this issue: the DGC, the BNPT, and the INP.

However, they had offered no risk and needs assessments at the time of writing.

Nevertheless, the results above should be interpreted with caution, and

possibility investigated further. It is to ensure that the Indonesian prison officers are

not avoiding responsibility for the task of risk assessments for terrorist inmates for

the wrong reasons.

Regarding this issue, a regulation has been introduced by the Ministry of Law

and Human Rights: the Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights Number

12 year 2013 on the Risk and Need Assessment for Prisoner and Probationer

(Assessment Risiko dan Assessment Kebutuhan bagi Narapidana dan Klien


Pemasyarakatan). Although the assessor and the supervisor responsible for

conducting risk and needs assessments for prison inmates are not stipulated

explicitly, this regulation implicitly places the responsibility on the prison officers.

Article 1 paragraph 3, in Chapter I on General Provisions stipulates that the meaning

of “officer” in this regulation is a prison officer.

Subsequently, the title of Chapter III of this regulation nominates the officer

(i.e. the prison officer) as the implementer of risk and need assessments for prisoners.

In other words, based on the interpretation of the Regulation of Ministry of Law and

Human Rights Number 12 year 2013, prison officers are the official officers for the

purposes of assessing the risk and needs of an individual prisoner, including a

terrorist inmate. However, as the results of the current study show that prison officers

face difficulties in handling this task, further research is recommended on who

should be responsible for the risk and needs assessments of terrorist inmates.

6.4.3 Timing of Distribution to the Special Prison

Focus group participants believed that all convicted terrorists should be sent

directly to the special prison, not to a general prison, after they are sentenced by the

courts, even those classified as cooperative convicted terrorists and without any

preliminary risk assessment. After some time, specifically when they show good

behaviour and a decreased inclination to support terror acts or violence, they might

be sent to a general prison.

The following quotes emphasise the participants’ belief that a convicted

terrorist must be sent directly to the special prison, and that decisions to hold a

convicted terrorist in the special prison or to move them to a general prison should be

based on the result of a risk assessment. Focus group participants said that:

Soon after the conviction, they must be housed in the special prison. After

they receive specific treatments and activities and they have been assessed as

cooperative terrorist inmates or low risk, then they could be housed in

general prisons, such as in Cipinang, Palembang, Jember, etc. But, for those

who still identified as ‘ideologue’ or non-cooperative terrorist inmates, they

must be still there in the special prison. (FG1:3)


Yes, they must be held in the special prison for terrorist prisoners since the

court sentenced the prisoner to jail. Then, they should participate in the

prison-based deradicalisation program organised by the special prison

authorities. Based on the risk assessment, non-cooperative terrorist inmates

must be still there in the special prison; meanwhile the cooperative or low

risk then could be dispersed to general prisons. (FG3:5)

These results show that Indonesian prison officers disagree with the existing

practice of sending convicted terrorists to general prison after they are sentenced. As

noted in Chapter 2, terrorist inmates are placed in several Indonesian prisons and

detention centres after they are convicted. A focus group participant strongly

disagreed with this existing practice:

I strongly disagree if convicted terrorists were sent to the special prison in

three months before they were released. To me, it will not be a real

deradicalisation for just three months before they were released. Convicted

terrorists must be distributed to this special prison directly after they are

convicted by the court. (FG2:2)

Overall, these results indicate that the Indonesian prison officers think that a

convicted terrorist should be placed into special prison directly after the court

verdict, and that a prison-based deradicalisation program should be implemented in

this special prison. After a risk assessment is completed by the authority in the

special prison, a terrorist inmate who is classified as cooperative can then be sent to a

general prison to receive further intervention from the correctional services.

Combining this finding with the previous finding on the willingness of the

Indonesian prison officers to rehabilitate cooperative terrorist inmates, the officers

consider that a general prison can be used to hold terrorist inmates, but only after

they are deradicalised in the special prison.

According to the Indonesian law of criminal procedures, the distribution of a

convicted offender should accord with the court jurisdiction in which they were

convicted. For example, for a criminal act committed in Denpasar, a suspect will be

both accused and convicted in Denpasar District Court, and then sent to a prison that

covers the Denpasar region. In this case, the convicted offender will be sent to


Kerobokan Prison. The case of Schapelle Corby, an Australian woman who was

charged with drugs offences, is an example of the distribution of a convicted

offender. She was found guilty in 2005 by Denpasar District Court and sentenced to

20 years in prison. She was then sent to Kerobokan Prison.

However, transferring an inmate to another prison outside the jurisdiction

where the criminal acts were committed is acceptable. The legal basis for transferring

prisoners to other prisons is Government Regulation No. 31 year 1999 on Guidance

of Prisoners, specifically stated in articles 46 to 54. This analysis is consistent with

the report of the ICG (2007, p. 7), which acknowledged that:

In Indonesia, there is not a single strategy, although there is a general policy

that prisoners who are threats to internal prison security should be

segregated; this includes narcotics offenders and those accused of terrorism.

If a national action plan stipulates that a convicted terrorist must be housed in

the special prison for terrorist inmates, regardless of their risk and needs, the opinion

of Indonesian prison officers could be realised easily. This process is likely to be

adopted by the Indonesian criminal justice agencies, and particularly the court.

However, until Indonesia completes a national action plan on prison-based

deradicalisation program, court decisions on distribution of terrorist inmates will

remain unclear. In the meantime, the current practice applied in the Indonesian

criminal justice system, where the prisoner is housed within the court jurisdiction in

which the trial was conducted, will continue.

6.4.4 Strengthening Partnerships

Strengthening partnerships also emerged as a policy issue for the management

of special prisons for terrorist inmates. This issue relates to the state agencies that

will be involved in the management of the special prison. Focus group participants

believed that, in order to deradicalise or rehabilitate terrorist inmates in a special

prison, some key state agencies should be involved: the INP, the BNPT, the DGC,

and the MoRA (FG1; FG2; and FG3). Among these key state agencies, effective

coordination and distribution of responsibilities should be developed; otherwise,

deradicalisation objectives and rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners will never be

achieved. Focus group data emphasised these views:


Related to the management of the special prison for terrorist inmates, some

state agencies must be involved in it and then specific responsibility must be

identified. For example, the INP or Detachment 88 was responsible for the

security. For correctional services, that’s the prison officers’ responsibility.

However, for religious matters it should be under the MoRA. BNPT can

provide the real programs for terrorist deradicalisation. Something like that.

(FG2:3)

And, for this special prison, I do agree with [Mr FG2:3]. Dealing with

terrorist inmates is not just the prison officers’ task. Corrections, the police,

MoRA, BNPT must be working collaboratively. (FG2:4)

I also agree with [Mr FG2:3’s] opinions. So those institutions must be

responsible for the management of the special prison for terrorist inmates:

the police, BNPT, and corrections. (FG2:5)

Of these state agencies that should be involved in the prison-based

deradicalisation program in the special prison for terrorist prisoners, focus group

participants said the BNPT should be the coordinator. For example, one participant

said that:

I hope that BNPT will be the coordinator for the prison-based

deradicalisation program in Indonesia and of course for this special prison.

BNPT has the power to invite other state agencies to be involved in the

prison-based deradicalisation program since BNTP was a state agency

directly under the President. We can support them. (FG1:3)

Other focus group participants said:

BNPT should be the main agency on prison-based deradicalisation

programs. (FG3:5)

BNPT must be the first institution on terrorist’s rehabilitation. It was because

our organisation’s [DGC’s] vision and mission is not specifically directed to


terrorist inmates, while BNPT has it. From the beginning until the

interventions for terrorist inmates, it should be under BNPT. (FG2:3)

Furthermore, an interesting finding was the officers’ view on the level of

coordination between the DGC and the BNPT on the prison-based deradicalisation

program at the coalface. Even though participants emphasised that the BNPT must be

the coordinator, they expressed the view that the BNPT must work actively with the

DGC to implement the program. Focus group participants said that:

BNPT’s staff and prison officers must be working together. We have to be

like that on deradicalisation. Don’t put us at the front and BNPT’s staff at the

back. Again, we must be working together. That’s what we want. (FG2:4)

If this prison is established, BNPT must work directly in the field with the

prison officers. We must be working together to implement prison-based

deradicalisation programs. (FG1:3)

Apparently, Indonesian prison officers explicitly hope that effective

coordination between the BNPT and the DGC occurs to implement the prison-based

deradicalisation program. The officers felt that the DGC should not act alone and that

the BNPT should also become actively involved. Furthermore, Indonesian prison

officers and BNPT staff should work together to implement the deradicalisation

program in the special prison for terrorist inmates.

To sum up, the result of this study indicated that partnerships must be

strengthened for management of the special prison for terrorist inmates. There are

four state institutions that were recommended to be actively involved in the

management of the prison, namely DGC, INP, BNPT, and MoRA. Due to the

involvement of many agencies, a specific task must be given to each agency. As

described on the previous section, the findings indicated that DGC is responsible for

day-to-day management and INP for the security. BNPT on the other hand was

responsible for designing the programs, while MoRA in supporting high profile

clerics or Islamic scholars.


In terms of strengthening partnerships as a policy issue in the management of

the special prison for terrorist inmates, no studies have explored this. However, good

collaboration among institutions on the management of terrorist inmates in prisons

has been recommended in several studies, such as Vogt’s article in the context of US

corrections. He argued that “active cooperation between local, state, and federal

corrections and law enforcement organisations involved in anti-terrorism efforts is

essential” (Vogt, p. 6). Specifically related to the Indonesian context, Ungerer (2011,

p. 19) recommended that the coordination among the BNPT, the INP and prison

services should be improved in the efforts to rehabilitate convicted terrorists. Further

research on the topic of collaborative mechanisms for the management of the

Indonesian special prison for terrorist prisoners is recommended.

6.4.5 Availability of Data on the Background of Convicted Terrorists

In addition to strengthening partnerships, the results also indicated that to

support the rehabilitation effort in the special prison for terrorist inmates, data on

prisoners’ backgrounds should be passed to prison officers, including the officers

who will be in charge. This implies the need for management reform of the existing

criminal justice processes for handing terrorism cases. Focus group participants said

that:

We are part of the criminal justice system right? It consists of the

investigator, prosecutor, and the judge until the prison officers. They all have

data on terrorist inmates’ backgrounds except the prison officers. It must be

synchronised from the beginning until the end. So that’s why the data on a

convicted terrorist should also be passed to prison officers as the

implementers of the criminal justice system. (FG1:3)

There should be a completed document covered the terrorists inmate’s

background since the investigation processes by the police officers. From

this document, we will have preliminary data about the convicted terrorist.

We can learn about the motivation of the offender from this document. More

importantly, from this document we can classify the convicted terrorist

whether they are an ideologue, a medium risk, or low risk or just a supporter.

So this data is important to be passed to prison officers who work at this

special prison. (FG2:3)


As evident from the statements above, currently Indonesian prison officers do

not have enough information or data regarding the background and characteristics of

convicted terrorists. After an accused terrorist has been convicted and sent to prison,

they do not transfer with complete data on their background. This data is actually

available as a consequence of the investigation, prosecution, and trial stages; but

when the accused is convicted, the information is not passed to correction staff.

Prison directors receive only a short summary of the court verdict (petikan putusan),

which mainly contains brief information on identity of the convict, the criminal acts

for which they were committed, and the punishment.

As presented above, available data on convicted terrorists’ backgrounds is

critical for Indonesian prison officers. Participants were not satisfied with the current

practice. Based on their experiences, they consider a full copy of the court verdict,

rather than the current extract. A full copy of the court verdict is vital in order to

investigate a terrorist inmate’s background.

Based on the Article 226 (1) Indonesian Law Number 8, year 1981 on the Law

of Criminal Procedure (Kitab Undang Undang Hukum Acara Pidana – [KUHAP]),

the extract of the court verdict is passed to the convicted or his lawyers. On the other

hand, a full copy of the court verdict is passed to the prosecutor and the investigator

based on Article 226 (2) KUHAP. In relation to the provision of Article 270

KUHAP, a full copy of the court verdict is passed by the clerks to the prosecutor as

the executor of the court verdict. Although it is not stated explicitly in the KUHAP

that a full copy of the court verdict should be passed to the prison officers, these

provisions mean that a full copy of the court verdict should be received by the prison

officers through the prosecutor. In this case, the prosecutor has to pass a full copy of

the court verdict to the prison officers.

A full copy of the court verdict is a valuable document for the Indonesian

prison officers in order to provide preliminary data for the risk assessment of

individual terrorist inmates. However, no studies are available on this issue.

Although the ICG (2007, p. ii) recommended the Indonesian Government provide

assistance for the criminal justice system agencies in terms of sharing background

information on terrorist inmates, this recommendation has not been investigated

thoroughly. Future studies on the topic of Indonesian criminal justice procedures,


particularly on the management of legal data on terrorist convicts, are therefore

recommended.


This chapter has presented findings on the perspectives of Indonesian prison

officers on the establishment of a special prison for terrorist prisoners. To gain

insights into this issue, the study employed a thematic qualitative analysis. Primary

data was collected through a series of focus group discussions with Indonesian prison

officers, while secondary data was gathered from existing research and relevant state

documents.

Throughout this chapter it was revealed that there was an absolute agreement

among the participants in the focus groups regarding the establishment of a special

prison for terrorist inmates in Indonesia. This policy was wanted by the prison

officers, regardless of its impact on counterterrorism. Furthermore, this chapter has

presented officers’ opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of a special prison;

hence, officers realised the potential drawbacks of this initiative. A number of policy

issues regarding the future management of this special prison are also presented in

this chapter.

The first is the distribution criterion to determine which categories of terrorist

inmates should be sent to a terrorist prison. Most focus group participants believed

that non-cooperative terrorist inmates must be sent to a special prison for terrorists.

The second issue is the decision maker for the distribution; participants

considered this should be the officers of the BNPT’s staff or Detachement (Densus)

88’s officers. The reason for this is that the officers feel that they do not have enough

knowledge and information to make such decisions.

The third issue is the timing of distribution. The officers recommended that,

after the court verdict, all convicted terrorists should be sent to and housed in the

special prison for terrorists. After evaluation by the authorities in this prison, terrorist

prisoners who are identified as cooperative or “grey” individuals can be sent to

general prisons to undertake further rehabilitation programs.

The fourth issue is strengthening partnerships. Because many institutions are

involved in the program for terrorist inmates, this chapter highlights that partnerships


are highly important in the implementation of the prison-based deradicalisation

program.

Lastly, the fifth issue is availability of data on terrorist prisoners’ backgrounds.

This policy issue is related to the partnerships issue because the focus group

participants stated they need data on terrorists’ background from other officers

involved in terrorism cases, such as the police or the prosecutor who investigated the

case.

The next chapter discusses strategies that can be used to improve the role of

Indonesian prison officers in the task of terrorist rehabilitation. The focus is the need

of the officers and how these needs can be met, and providing policy

recommendations and legal reforms for improving Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation program.


Improving the Role of

Indonesian Prison Officers in

Terrorist Rehabilitation: A

Strategy for the Future

Prison and other officials who are professionally involved with violent

extremist offenders could be appropriately trained and educated to

understand and deal with the complexities of reintegration and rehabilitation

efforts. Prison staff and professionals involved in rehabilitation programs

could be trained to distinguish signs of radicalisation, communicate in a way

that is constructive and avoids conflict, and respond appropriately to a

potential extremist threat. (Good Practice Number 5 of the Rome

Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of

Violent Extremist Offenders)

This chapter presents the findings and discussion pertaining to Research

Question 3, that is, an examination and assessment of strategies to improve the role

of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation

programs. The first section (Section 7.1) of this chapter provides an overview,

followed by a discussion on the role of Indonesian prison officers in the

rehabilitation of terrorist convicts (Section 7.2). Section 7.3 presents the findings and

discussion on the needs of Indonesian prison officers regarding terrorist

rehabilitation. A correspondence between the findings on the challenges and the

needs of Indonesian prison officers regarding terrorist rehabilitation is discussed in

the Section 7.4. Section 7.5 discusses strategies for improving the role of Indonesian

prison officers in deradicalisation. Section 7.6 concludes the chapter.

By offering strategies for improvement, this chapter is a significant

contribution by the researcher to knowledge about prison-based deradicalisation

programs in the Indonesian context. Besides extending the body of knowledge, this

chapter also provides a significant practical contribution to the Government of

Indonesia, especially for the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) of the


Republic of Indonesia in order to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in

terrorist deradicalisation.

7.1 OVERVIEW

The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine and provide strategies for

Indonesia, or other countries that hold terrorist inmates, on ways to improve the role

of prison officers in rehabilitating convicted terrorists within prison-based

deradicalisation programs. As discussed in Chapter 5, the role of Indonesian prison

officers in terrorist rehabilitation has been constrained by many challenges in

implementing prison-based programs. In this chapter, the needs of Indonesian prison

officers as the implementers of the program are investigated. A link between the

findings on the needs of the officers and the findings on their challenges in

implementing the program was developed; the needs and the challenges are

correlated.

Following this, policy recommendations for improving the role of Indonesian

prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation are then considered. Policy

recommendations specifically for the DGC of the Republic of Indonesia have been

identified: capacity building for prison officers who are in charge of terrorist

rehabilitation; developing collaborative mechanisms with other actors; and

developing a good partnership with the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan

Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – [BNPT]). Furthermore, these policy

recommendations must be implemented by removing the ambiguity that exists in the

current regulation related to the appointed implementer of the program in Indonesia.

The ambiguity lies in the provision in Article 34A (1) paragraph c, Government

Regulation Number 99, the year 2012 on the Second Amendment to Government

Regulation Number 32 the year 1999 on Conditions and Implementing Procedures

Related to Prisoner Rights. This provision, which nominates two institutions as the

implementers of the program, must be amended. This requirement produces an

ambiguity for both institutions in the implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based



7.2 THE ROLE OF INDONESIAN PRISON OFFICERS IN TERRORIST

REHABILITATION

Currently, three state institutions are involved in Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation programs: the Indonesian National Police (INP), the BNPT and the

DGC. Based on this situation, the implementing actors at the coalface are generally

police officers, BNPT’s staff, and prison officers. Although the roles of both

Indonesian prison officers and BNPT’s staff are significant, the prison officers’ role

in terrorist rehabilitation is crucially important. Therefore, this role should be

examined; the prison lies near the end of the processes of the criminal justice system.

As noted by Osman (2014), most convicted terrorists will be housed in prisons.

Under the existing laws, the role of Indonesian prison officers as the

implementers of prison-based deradicalisation programs is not explicitly stipulated.

However, rehabilitating terrorist inmates and delivering prison-based deradicalisation

programs is an unavoidable task for prison officers for two reasons.

Firstly, under the general corrections system stipulated in Article 2 of the

Correctional Institution Law (CIL), the aim of the corrections system is to improve

and develop prisoners so that they do not violate the laws, and simultaneously to

encourage prisoners to fully reinvigorate and become active, productive, and useful

members of society. This law is an umbrella act for correctional services and must

therefore be applied for all prison inmates, including terrorist inmates.

Secondly, according to Article 2 (1) paragraph c of the Government Regulation

Number 99 year 2012 on the Second Amendment to Government Regulation

Number 32 year 1999 on Conditions and Implementing Procedures Related to

Prisoner Rights, a terrorist inmate should complete a deradicalisation program run by

the prison authorities and/or the BNPT, in order to be granted a remission. Although

this government regulation does not explicitly state that prison officers are the

implementers of the program, the above stipulation implies that they are the

implementers, whether or not the BNPT’s staff are involved.

Thus, it is inevitable that prison officers are the implementers of Indonesia’s

prison-based deradicalisation programs. They can work independently or collectively

with prison officers from other institutions. They also can work collaboratively with

other officers such as law enforcement officers and officials from the BNPT, the

Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA), and non-government organisations (NGOs).


Because Indonesian prison officers are the implementers of prison-based

deradicalisation programs, developing and improving their role is important in order

to increase their effectiveness in this task (Nurezki, 2013). Moreover, within the

special prison now established for terrorist inmates in Sentul Bogor, the role of

prison officers who work in this prison is of concern. These officers are the actors in

most frequent contact with terrorist inmates as an unavoidable outcome of this

initiative.

Hence, the findings presented in this chapter are valuable for the Government

of Indonesia in designing policies that aim to improve Indonesian prison officers’

role in terrorist rehabilitation, in both the special prison for terrorist inmates and

general prisons. The officers should be equipped with suitable resources to support

their role in terrorist rehabilitation.

For this reason, the actual needs of Indonesian prison officers in this regard

should be identified. The following section discusses the findings on the needs of

Indonesian prison officers in their task of rehabilitating terrorist inmates. For this

purpose, data were collected through focus group discussions and analysed by

applying qualitative thematic analysis.

7.3 THE NEEDS OF INDONESIAN PRISON OFFICERS ON TERRORIST

REHABILITATION

From the focus group data, two broad themes emerged about the needs of

Indonesian prison officers: direct needs and indirect needs. For the purpose of this

thesis, “direct needs” are defined as needs viewed through the lens of prison officers.

These needs are directly related to their role as implementers of terrorist

rehabilitation programs. During the focus groups, many participants expressed a

requirement for training and unambiguous knowledge about implementing prison-

based deradicalisation programs. “Indirect needs” are needs that are external to

prison officers that help Indonesian prison officers to carry out terrorist rehabilitation

inside the prison. This theme arose from discussions about, for example, the term of

deradicalisation that is used for terrorist rehabilitation program. How prison officers

and other officials should work collaboratively in the implementation of Indonesia’s

prison-based deradicalisation program is another example of an indirect need of

prison officers for terrorist rehabilitation.


7.3.1 A Direct Need: Training

From the focus group data, two subthemes related to the direct need of training

for Indonesian prison officers in deradicalisation were evident: the need for training

on deradicalisation programs and the need for training on communication. The first

can be classified as training in “hard skills”, while the latter is training in “soft

skills”. The most surprising finding was that the officers did not nominate relevant

training to develop their religious knowledge. Although lack of knowledge on and

experience with religious Islamic teachings was acknowledged as a challenge in the

implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, training in this area was

not expressed as a need by the focus group participants.

The present findings are consistent with those of other research that concluded

that both training for prison officers and partnerships for terrorist rehabilitation are

important (Andrie, 2011; Gunaratna, 2011; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015;

Neumann, 2010). These two factors are required for effective terrorist rehabilitation,

along with visionary leadership (Gunaratna, 2011, p. 67).

The Need for Training on Deradicalisation

The need for training on deradicalisation arose in all three focus groups. This

finding indicates that the issue of training is one of the greatest concerns among

Indonesian prison officers. Focus group participants acknowledged that they have not

received training specifically about the prison-based deradicalisation program, either

from the DGC or from other state and non-state actors. Focus group participants said

that:

To be honest, we as a prison officer have not received any specific course or

training on the management of terrorist inmates. More specifically on

deradicalisation; how to change a radical person to be a good gentleman?

(FG1:5)

DGC has never provided training on deradicalisation program, how to carry

out the program. Suddenly, the regulation stipulated to be used for terrorist

inmates. We do not know what we have to do. Yes, there is nothing special

with the interventions or treatments for terrorist prisoners. So we just applied

the existing interventions and treatments as we have for any ordinary


inmates. That is a general rule for the treatment of prisoners as regulated in

the Law Number 12, 1995. (FG1:3)

Due to the lack of training on terrorist rehabilitation, focus group participants

explained that they rely on personal experiences in managing general prisoners,

which is mainly based on the CIL. Although they could transfer their experience in

rehabilitating ordinary inmates, the need for specific training on prison-based

deradicalisation programs was still a concern for the focus group participants. As

they noted that:

We need a specific training on deradicalisation as we don’t have any

knowledge about deradicalisation. How are we going to change their mind if

we were regarded as a foolish person? For example, how can a math teacher

teach mathematics effectively if his students have labelled him as a person

who do not understand math? (FG3:5)

My skills as a prison officer are directed only in the context of general

inmates. If the government would like to add deradicalisation program for

terrorist inmates, we need a specific training on terrorist deradicalisation.

(FG2:2)

Furthermore, when discussing their skills in terrorist rehabilitation, a focus

group participant said:

We, prison officers, do not have sufficient experiences in dealing with

terrorist inmates. Our knowledge is limited to the rehabilitation of general

prisoners. (FG3:5)

The main reason given for the need for specific training on deradicalisation

programs was lack of knowledge about and experience in deradicalisation. The

officers are grappling with a specific activity that must be applied for terrorist

inmates. Their actions under the deradicalisation program in the prison were based

on the CIL and its relevant regulations.


In comparing the results of this study with those of previous studies, the need

for training for Indonesian prison officers to support their task of terrorist

rehabilitation is consistent with the findings of other studies (Gunaratna, 2011; ICG,

2007; Neumann, 2010) that have encouraged the authorities to provide a specific

training for officers working on detention centre for extremist offenders. Gunaratna

(2011, pp. 73-75) identified that a number of essential aspects should be considered

as a working model for terrorist rehabilitation. He identified 12 essential aspects

(Gunaratna, 2011, pp. 73-75), including the significance of ongoing training and

education (Gunaratna, 2011, p. 75).

At the international level, the need for well-trained prison officers working in

prisons with violent extremists has been recognised by the United Nations Office on

Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which noted that:

Staffs are the most important element of any prison system. Prison

administrations should recognize this and devote ample amount of time and

resources in the recruitment, selection and training of people who work in

prison. Ensuring that prisons holding violent extremist prisoners has

sufficient number of well-trained staffs. (UNODC, 2016, p. 27)

In the Indonesian context, Andrie (2011, p. 3) suggested that training for prison

officers is established in order to develop their knowledge and skills in managing

terrorist inmates. Further, Nurezki (2013, p. 136) recommended that prison officials

who are in charge of deradicalisation programs should be trained properly to better

understand terrorists’ behaviour.

The finding of a lack of sufficient training organised by the state agencies, such

as the BNPT and the DGC, was disappointing. In fact, several NGOs have organised

training for Indonesian prison officers in the rehabilitation of prisoners. The NGOs’

training programs are appreciated by the prison officers, as mentioned in Chapter 5,

but the programs have lapsed due to limitations in both funding and time. In its

report, the Search for Common Ground (SFCG) recommended the DGC to take over

the program and run it on an ongoing basis for the prison officers (SFCG, 2013).

Moreover, the finding on the need for training for the Indonesian prison

officers will now be examined in light of the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices


for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (hereafter

referred to as the Rome Memorandum). The Rome Memorandum is an international

initiative on the rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist offenders and is

related to the issue of radicalisation in prisons. It provides best practices to guide the

development of rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs (Stone, 2015, p. 221).

The memorandum contains 25 good practices for consideration by countries for

their deradicalisation programs. The importance of training for officials working in

prisons with terrorists and extremists is described in Good Practice numbers 5 and 9

of the Rome Memorandum. Good Practice Number 5 states “ensure, as appropriate,

that all relevant staff are professionally trained and educated to deal with the

complexities of reintegration or rehabilitation efforts” (Stone, 2015, p. 238). Further,

Good Practice Number 9 states “as the personnel in most frequent contact with the

inmates, it is important that prison officers understand and are carefully attuned to

the rehabilitation process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery”

(Stone, 2015, pp. 239-240).

Based on the current findings and these two good practices in the Rome

Memorandum, I argue and strongly recommend that the Government of Indonesia

provides appropriate training on deradicalisation and rehabilitation for terrorist

inmates to equip prison officers and other prison officials to deliver prison-based

deradicalisation programs. Nonetheless, further investigation is required to establish

aspects of an effective training program, such as the curriculum and the educators.

This is an important area for future research.

The Need for Training in Communication

Reflecting on personal experiences in maintaining relationships with prison

inmates, focus group participants noted that a persuasive approach was a useful

strategy for establishing a good relationship with terrorist inmates. As a participant

mentioned: “I keep trying to talk with them even though they do not wish to talk.

That’s the lesson from my own experiences working in the prison” (FG2:2).

Furthermore, other focus group participants said that:

To gain a better communication, I do a persuasive way with terrorist inmates

in this prison. I know, initially, terrorist inmates will be angry but at the end,


they will accept us. So the important thing is communication, it should be

interactive and persuasive. (FG2:4)

In line with [Mr FG2:4], what we can do was credible. We cannot be

repressive. (FG2:2)

This is an excellent attitude of the officers who have been dealing with terrorist

inmates. A constructive way to communicate and avoid conflict has been recognised

by the UNODC (2016, p. 101) in its handbook about the management of violent

extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalisation in prisons. Communication

skills are complementary to the hard skills of prison officers who are tasked with

terrorist rehabilitation. However, the findings show there is still a need for soft skills

training in communication. Focus group participants argued:

So the point is actually the officers should have excellent communication

skills. How can the officers get in touch with terrorist inmates if they cannot

express their idea clearly? (FG3:5)

We used the communicative way with all the inmates. In accordance with

the Law Number 12 the year 1995, we must be persuasive. We cannot be

repressive. Here we need a skill on communication. (FG2:4)

Moreover, in the context of collecting data about terrorist inmates for profiling

or identification, a focus group participant said that they “conducted an interview

with terrorist inmates” (FG2:3). As mentioned previously in Chapter 5, Indonesian

prison officers in charge of the management of terrorist inmates have the special task

of gathering data on the terrorist inmates’ background, officially called profiling or

identification. To collect the data, they use both quantitative and qualitative methods.

In doing so, soft skills training in communication is important. The comments of

focus group participants illustrate the need for such communication training:

We conducted interviews and observations for data collection for profiling.

We observe the dynamics of terrorist prisoners in the prison. For this task,


we do need skills for gaining better communication during collecting the

data. (FG1:3)

We need to be trained on communication. Since the inmate is different with

other, we do also need a specific approach to get in touch with them. Even

though we can develop communication skills with ordinary inmates easily, it

will not automatically work with terrorist inmates. (FG2:2)

The need for training in communication skills is supported by previous studies

(Al-Hitar, 2011; Braddock, 2014), which indicated communicative activities form

part of a deradicalisation program (e.g. psychological counselling, dialogue, and

religious debate). Although unintended effects may occur, persuasive communication

is considered an integral aspect of deradicalisation programs (Braddock, 2014).

Therefore, training in communication is imperative, and should form part of the

capacity building for Indonesian prison officers who are tasked with implementing

prison-based deradicalisation programs.

In addition, although the finding that officers’ lack of knowledge about

religious Islamic teachings is a challenge in the implementation of deradicalisation

programs (see Chapter 5), focus group participants did not raise training on this

matter as a concern. A study by Merola and Vovak (2012) describes the involvement

of service providers on religious matters in the context of incarceration of religious

extremists. In this regard, Indonesian prison officers might think that religious

activities are the responsibility of other professionals, particularly clerics and Islamic

scholars.

7.3.2 An Indirect Need: Good Partnerships

The theme of indirect needs emerged from the analysis. This theme arose in

discussions on the best way to deliver the deradicalisation program and on

cooperation with the BNPT in the implementation of the program. Two factors

pertaining to this theme were acknowledged by the focus group participants as

supporting their task of implementing the prison-based deradicalisation program. The

first is related to the requirement stipulated in legislation for other actors in the

implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs. The second is


related to the issue of collaboration with the BNPT within the implementation of

deradicalisation programs in the prison.

In addition, these two aspects were recognised as principal challenges in the

implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, as discussed in chapters 5

and 6. In this chapter, however, the analysis focuses on the needs of the Indonesian

prison officers for support in their task as the implementers of the program.

The Need for Other Actors

As mentioned in chapters 5 and 6, many actors involved in Indonesia’s prison-

based deradicalisation program. In discussing their needs in performing the task of

terrorist rehabilitation, focus group participants were concerned about the need for

assistance from other actors. Focus group participants noted:

On the responsibility of terrorist rehabilitation, it must not be only the task of

prison officers indeed. It must be a task of all institutions. (FG1:3)

If it just a responsibility of prison officers, it will be so difficult for us.

(FG2:4)

Further, the cooperation of others agencies and people in the task of terrorist

rehabilitation was regarded as important. This cooperation is needed because many

issues are involved in dealing with this type of inmate. For instance, in terms of

religious teachings, a focus group participant acknowledged that “a role of clerics or

Imaam in a religious debate with a terrorist inmate cannot be ruled out” (FG2:1).

This field is definitely not an area of professional expertise of prison officers. The

following quotes also express the need for other actors in terrorist rehabilitation:

We need other actors such as; leading clerics, the police officers, BNPT,

MUI, and so on, for the implementation of deradicalisation programs for

terrorist inmates. (FG3:1)

For me, the collaboration with NGOs on delivering specific training for

terrorist inmates was perfect. Even though there are many weaknesses in the


implementation, but it helped us a lot to develop the understanding on

deradicalisation. (FG1:3)

In implementing deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates, we need

support from relevant institutions indeed, for example the Ministry of

Religious Affair. (FG2:3)

The comments above indicate that the implementation of deradicalisation

programs in prisons needs collaborative work with many actors and individuals.

Further, the model of an effective partnership for a deradicalisation program should

include the institutional level. In other words, an effective program involves not only

actors at the implementer level, but also at the institutional level.

The finding of the need for other actors to support prison officers in

implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs is consistent with the finding

of a previous study, which suggested that clergy and psychologists should assist

prison officers in rehabilitating terrorist inmates (Maliki, 2013, p. 18). In the

implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program, other actors

and professionals have been involved, including Islamic scholars, psychologists,

university scholars, and NGOs (Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Sarwono, 2012;

SFCG, 2013; SFCGI & DITJEN PAS, 2010).

Prison-based deradicalisation programs developed in other countries also

indicate that many actors are involved. For example, five religious scholars are

employed in the Yemeni deradicalisation program. These scholars are part of

Yemeni’s Religious Dialogue Committee. Then, Saudi’s program is supported by the

Advisory Committee Counselling Program, which is composed of many actors such

as religious clerics, religious experts, university scholars, psychologists, and

psychiatrists (Braddock, 2014).

Using the Rome Memorandum as a working model for the rehabilitation of

violent extremist offenders, the roles of different actors in prisons is acknowledged.

Good Practice Number 7 states that “rehabilitation programs could incorporate a

broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with close coordination among the relevant

departments and personnel involved” (Stone, 2015, p. 239). Good Practice Number 7


suggests actors such as psychologists, social workers, religious scholars, aftercare

experts, and even family members can be involved (Stone, 2015, p. 239).

The involvement of many actors in prison-based deradicalisation programs is

inevitable. Accordingly, the Indonesian Government, particularly the DGC and the

BNPT should identify potential actors who may assist the services in prison-based

deradicalisation programs. Although some actors are already involved in Indonesia’s

program, other potential actors should be identified. Current actors should be

evaluated as well. For example, due to many critiques about the capability of the

Islamic scholars who lead religious debates and discussions with terrorist inmates,

the selection criteria for the scholars must be carefully considered. In addition, the

establishment of specific bodies to represent Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation programs should also be considered, for example, a body similar to

the Saudi Advisory Committee Counselling Program (Braddock, 2014).

The Need for Good Collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT

Turning to the issue of collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT, the

focus group data indicated that a good collaboration should be initiated. Although

many actors are involved in the programs, one focus group participant recognised

“BNPT and DGC as the two main actors for the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs” (FG2:3). However, as presented in Chapter 5, issues

about the coordination and cooperation between the DGC and the BNPT emerged.

The findings in Chapter 5 indicate that there is a deficiency in this regard. A focus

group participant emphasised that there should be good collaboration between the

DGC and the BNPT, and that such collaboration was mandatory in order to

implement effective prison-based deradicalisation programs:

BNPT should work collaboratively with us. At the moment, I think we were

working alone without appropriate support from BNPT. For the

effectiveness of deradicalisation program in the prison, BNPT and prison

officers should work together to implement the program. Yes, I realized

BNPT did some activities in the prison in the name of deradicalisation

program, but I think it has not been effective. (FG2:3)


When explaining the problem of lack of collaboration with the BNPT, a focus

group participant stated that:

So, the point was BNPT was too far from us. They must also involve in the

field directly with us. If they have a program, then they can apply in the

prison. (FG2:4)

In addition, another participant mentioned about the BNPT’s role in the

aftercare program. This participant considered that the task of the BNPT should be

expanded to terrorist inmates who have been released:

The task of BNPT is also related to aftercare program. After a terrorist

inmate is released they must be supervised by BNPT. This issue has never

been discussed. We do not know about what is happening out there after

terrorist inmates are released from the prison. I do believe many of them

may get back to his terrorist fellow for some reasons, mainly economic

issue. To me, this must be BNPT’s responsibility to look after the former

terrorist activities. (FG1:3)

Overall, these results indicate that, while it was difficult for Indonesian prison

officers to implement a deradicalisation program in the prison, it was even more

challenging to develop a good partnership with the BNPT. Since the deradicalisation

program was introduced in 2012 and terrorist inmates were required to participate,

prison officers experienced ineffective coordination between the BNPT and the

DGC. Unsurprisingly, focus group participants believed that a good collaboration

between the DGC and the BNPT is the first step towards supporting their task of


Regarding this finding, some studies have suggested that coordination and

cooperation between the BNPT and the DGC must be improved in the

counterterrorism effort in Indonesia. The existing studies conclude that there is a lack

of coordination and integration among the BNPT and other agencies on the

management of terrorist inmates (Eckard, 2014; IRIN, 2012; Istiqomah, 2012;

Sarwono, 2012; Ungerer, 2011). In 2011, Ungerer (2011, p. 19) found that


“operational coordination for BNPT remains largely with the INP”; he also

concluded that “this has been the weakest leg of the Indonesian counter-terrorism

system” (Ungerer, 2011, p. 19). Considering the similar finding in the current study,

this issue remains unsolved by the Indonesian authorities.

As discussed in Chapter 5, although a focus group participant recognised that

there was an improvement after 2014–2015 in the involvement of the BNPT in

terrorist rehabilitation, most participants were not satisfied with the BNPT’s

performance in Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. Based on the

findings of this study, a good partnership between the BNPT and the DGC is highly

recommended in order to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in

deradicalisation. Moreover, since the roles of the DGC and the BNPT have been

stipulated in the Government Regulation Number 99 in the year 2012 on the Second

Amendment to Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on Conditions

and Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights, coordination and

cooperation between the DGC and the BNPT are critical for the effectiveness of

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.

Kaats and Opheij (2014, p. 1) posited that nowadays no organisation can solve

a problem on its own. Collaboration is important regardless of the sphere of action

(Bratton & Tumin, 2012). For this reason, I argue that collaboration or partnership

between the DGC and the BNPT is critical in achieving the goal of terrorist inmates’

rehabilitation. However, the issue of partnership or collaboration between the DGC

and the BNPT regarding Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program has been

overlooked. In the existing studies, although discussions that focus on the role of the

BNPT (Bakti, 2014; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015) and the role of the DGC (ICG,

2007; Istiqomah, 2012) are available, a thorough discussion on partnership between

the DGC and the BNPT is lacking. Therefore, future studies on effective partnerships

for Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program are highly recommended.

7.4 A CORRELATION BETWEEN THE FINDINGS ON THE

CHALLENGES AND THE FINDINGS ON THE NEEDS

The empirical results surrounding the needs of Indonesian prison officers in the

implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs highlighted three issues:

(1) the need for capacity building, (2) the need for support from other agencies, and

(3) the need for good collaboration between the BNPT and the DGC. In order to


assess these needs, we need to recall the findings and analysis presented in Chapter 5

on the challenges faced by the Indonesian prison officers in the task of terrorist

rehabilitation. Chapter 5 of the thesis discussed five broad themes prisoner officers

face as challenges in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs:

1. Terrorist inmates’ personalities.




5. The unavailability of collaborative mechanisms.

Furthermore, the correlation between the challenges and the needs of

Indonesian prison officers on terrorist rehabilitation is examined. It shows that an

obvious correlation exists between the challenges and the needs of Indonesian prison

officers in terrorist rehabilitation. Table 7.1 illustrates the correlation between these

two things.

First, the need of Indonesian prison officers for training in both deradicalisation

and communication is related to the readiness of the prison officers for the

implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, particularly the internal

aspects of readiness. That is, recognition of the lack of personal abilities and skills

leads to the identified need for training. In addition, the need for training also relates

to the personalities of terrorist inmates. Providing training on deradicalisation and

communication for Indonesian prison officers will equip them with basic knowledge

and skills required for dealing with terrorist inmate personalities. Thus the

overarching issue is capacity building for Indonesian prison officers.

Second, the need of Indonesian prison officers for support from other agencies

and for good collaboration with the BNPT is related to the challenge of the

unavailability of collaborative mechanisms, the sustainability of the program, and the

institutional infrastructure problems. In order to overcome the challenge of the

unavailability of collaborative mechanisms, support from other actors and good

collaboration with the BNPT are two avenues through which to develop collaborative

mechanisms for the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs. In

terms of program sustainability, the DGC should continue with life skill training


(LST) and conflict management training (CMT) for terrorist inmates by developing

collaboration with NGOs that have assisted prison officers in implementing LST and

CMT in several Indonesian prisons. Further, in order to overcome the challenge of

institutional infrastructure problems, establishing a specialised prison for terrorists is

the first step in the effort to rehabilitate terrorist inmates. Good collaboration

between the DGC and the BNPT is required to establish and manage such a prison.

Overall, recognition of these challenges translates into the need for support from

other actors and good collaboration with the BNPT.

Table 7.1 Correlation between the Challenges and the Need of Indonesian Prison Officers Regarding

Terrorist Rehabilitation

Challenges

Needs

Direct Indirect

TD TC SA GC

Personalities of Terrorist Inmates X X

Readiness of Indonesian Prison Officers X X

Sustainability of the Program X

Institutional Infrastructure Problems X

Unavailability of Collaborative

Mechanisms

X X

Note:

TD = Training on Deradicalisation;

TC = Training on Communication;

SA = Support from other Actors;

GC = Good Collaboration with the BNPT.


These findings are important for identifying strategies that can be used to

improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs. I argue that a reform option is one of the strategies to be

applied to rectify the problem, particularly concerning the issue of collaboration

between the BNPT and the DGC.

7.5 STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE

To find strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison officers in the

implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, this study applied the

frameworks of policy and legal reform research. Policy and legal reform research is

part of additional legal research frameworks that have been recognised and applied in

the study of law (Hutchinson, 2010). Applying these frameworks, the study

identified two strategies for improving Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist

rehabilitation: policy recommendations and regulation reform.

7.5.1 Strategy One: Policy Recommendations

The existing literature on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs

explains that Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation programs have been a “trial

and error” program (ICG, 2007; IPI, 2010), or an ad hoc program (Eckard, 2014;

Gunaratna, 2011; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015). Problems and issues have been

examined and identified. Consequently, previous studies have made many

recommendations: basing inmates’ rehabilitation on their individual motivations;

expanding financial assistance programs; improving coordination between

counterterrorism agencies (Ungerer, 2011); correctional institution reform

(Istiqomah, 2012); sharing data on terrorists’ background among parts of the criminal

justice system (ICG, 2007); and improving post-release monitoring (IPAC, 2013).

This study, however, provides different approach to investigating policy

recommendations by conducting a thorough empirical qualitative study through the

lens of the end users of the program, specifically, Indonesian prison officers. Focus

groups were conducted with this specific group of officers who are tasked with

rehabilitating terrorist inmates. From their firsthand experiences in implementing the

rehabilitation program, policy recommendations were generated, specifically for

improving their role in this process.


Drawing on Majchrzak’s (1984, p. 12) idea of “conducting research on a

fundamental social problem in order to provide policy makers with pragmatic,

actioned-oriented recommendation for alleviating the problem”, this study aimed to

provide policy recommendations for the Government of Indonesia. Furthermore, by

conducting empirical research on Indonesian prison officers’ experiences and needs

regarding the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, I argue that

the Government of Indonesia specifically the DGC of the Republic of Indonesia must

consider three policy recommendations:

1. Build the capacity of prison officers who are in charge of terrorist

rehabilitation.

2. Develop collaborative mechanisms with other actors.

3. Develop a good partnership with the BNPT.

To implement the first recommendation, the DGC should design, implement,

and evaluate capacity-building activities for Indonesian prison officers who are in

charge of delivering terrorist rehabilitation programs in prisons. The findings from

the focus groups conducted in this study indicate that officers need training in

communication and deradicalisation. Therefore, these two activities should be

included in the capacity-building activities set out for implementers. Because

capacity building can be very expensive, a socio-economic approach approach can be

employed to investigate efficient initiatives.

Regarding the second recommendation, the DGC should develop good

partnerships with other actors for the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs. The Rome Memorandum suggests that the

implementation of deradicalisation programs requires a variety of actors in prisons,

including psychologists, social workers, religious scholars, aftercare experts, and

even family members (Stone, 2015). Because of the typology of these inmates,

prison officers cannot deliver the programs by themselves. Thus, good partnerships

with other actors and professionals are mandatory. Further research should evaluate

collaborative mechanisms among agencies supporting the implementation of prison-

based deradicalisation program and recommend improvements.

Concerning the third recommendation, because the BNPT is the coordinator of

Indonesia’s deradicalisation program, the DGC must develop a good partnership with


the BNPT. This policy recommendation is vital for realising collaborative work

between the DGC and the BNPT on prison-based deradicalisation programs. The

lack of collaboration was identified in 2011 (Ungerer, 2011), but in 2017, at the time

of writing, the problem still existed. Since its establishment in 2010, assigning the

BNPT as the coordinator of Indonesia’s deradicalisation program has not solved the

problem. According to Istiqomah, the BNPT and other agencies are struggling to

integrate under “the umbrellas of counterterrorism program” (Istiqomah, 2012, p.

273). Therefore, I recommend further research on the topic of partnerships and

collaborations regarding Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. Finding

the underlying reasons for this problem with collaboration would be beneficial.

Moreover, investigation of how collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT can

be improved is also recommended.

7.5.2 Strategy Two: Regulation Reform

As well as proposing policy recommendations, this study also proposes a legal

reform agenda. To examine which regulations should be reformed to improve the

role of Indonesian prison officers in deradicalisation, several relevant regulations

(primary legal materials) were collected:

1. Government Regulation Number 31 in the year 1999 on the Guidance of

Prisoners.

2. Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on Conditions and

Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights.

3. Government Regulation Number 28 in the year 2006 on the Amendments to

Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on Conditions and

Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights.

4. Government Regulation Number 99 in the year 2012 on the Second

Amendments to Government Regulation Number 32 in the year 1999 on

Conditions and Implementing Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights.

5. Presidential Regulation Number 46 in the year 2010 on National Counter

Terrorism Agency.


6. Presidential Regulation Number 12 in the year 2010 on the Amendments to

Presidential Regulation Number 46 in the year 2010 on National Counter

Terrorism Agency.

After investigating and evaluating these laws, I found a problem with the

provision of Article 34A (1) paragraph c in regulation number 4 listed above (the

Government Regulation Number 99, the year 2012 on the Second Amendments to

Government Regulation Number 32 the year 1999 on Conditions and Implementing

Procedures Related to Prisoner Rights). This article stipulates that a remission will be

granted to a terrorist inmate if they have followed a deradicalisation program (with

certain conditions) held by Corrections and/or the BNPT. This provision causes an

ambiguity about the responsibility for implementing the program.

To begin with, the question is: Should the program be delivered by the BNPT,

Corrections, or both? Currently, both the BNPT and Corrections run deradicalisation

programs for terrorist prisoners, with a lack of coordination and cooperation between

the two institutions. To complicate the matter further, the INP also claims to

implement deradicalisation programs for terrorist inmates (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007;

Osman, 2014). Hence the ambiguity about which program(s) is an official program

in terms of the requirement for remission. Moreover, Idris and Taufiqurrohman

(2015) demonstrated several issues with the BNPT’s program related to its

implementation. Idris and Taufiqurrohman (2015, p. 85) argued that:

There is confusion whether it will be applied on the basis of voluntary

participation or forced participation. There is also a need to overcome the

lack of inter-agency cooperation and qualified human resources to run the

programme. In addition, it is not clear yet whether the terrorist prisoners who

have served their sentences but have not passed the programme evaluation

will be released from prisons or kept in the prisons until they pass the

programme.

The above statement and questions, including the recognition of the lack of

inter-agency cooperation, emerged because the main implementer is not stated

clearly in the Article 34A (1) paragraph c of the Government Regulation Number 99,

year 2012. Two institutions are responsible for the implementation of the program:


correctional institutions and the BNPT. However, collaborative mechanisms between

the DGC and the BNPT on prison-based deradicalisation programs is non-existent.

To sum up, Idris and Taufiqurrohman’s (2015) conclusion is related to the provision

of Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government Regulation Number 99, year 2012,

which stipulates two institutions (correctional institutions and the BNPT) for the

same task, namely, prison-based deradicalisation programs. However, further

provisions or policies on collaboration is not provided. Without a clear partnership

mechanism, correctional institutions and the BNPT will keep implementing the

program from their own perspectives and experiences. Therefore, the main

implementer must be clearly stated, as well as the collaborative mechanisms to be

applied. As explained by Kaats & Opheij (2014), collaboration is an important issue

nowadays, particularly when the participating parties face ambiguities.

Previous studies (Eckard, 2014; IRIN, 2012; Istiqomah, 2012; Sarwono, 2012;

Ungerer, 2011) also identified the problem of collaboration between the BNPT and

correctional institutions; however, investigation of the cause of the problem has been

overlooked. Through the lens of legal substance, the findings of this study suggest

that the problem of collaboration between the BNPT and correctional institutions is

caused by ambiguity in the legal provision for the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs. On the level of policy and practice, although the BNPT

runs deradicalisation programs in prisons, the findings of this study show that prison

directors assume the management of terrorist inmates. As presented in chapters 2 and

5, a prison director has discretionary power in housing policy and practice for

terrorist inmates in terms of whether they will be segregated from or integrated with

other inmates.

In conclusion, the vague statement about the main implementer of the prison-

based deradicalisation program in Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government

Regulation Number 99, in the year 2012 leads to ambiguity about the implementation

of the program at the coalface. Therefore, the provision in this article should be

amended. The main implementer of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation

program must be a single institution; otherwise, the program will remain ad hoc, or

consist of “trial and error” activities. Although other actors are mandatory in the

implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program, two or more

institutions should not be nominated as the main implementers. There should be a


single institution as the primary implementer. Other actors, on the other hand, can be

nominated as the complimentary implementers.

I argue that the provision of Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government

Regulation Number 99, the year 2012 is one of the root causes of the challenges

faced by the Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs. Appointing two institutions for the same task without

clear responsibilities for each institution leads to the issue of accountability. The

reason behind this provision may be to establish a “parallel” relationship (Scholten,

Maggetti, & Versluis, 2017, p. 358) in which Corrections and the BNPT share the

responsibility for implementing the prison-based deradicalisation program. However,

in the field, Corrections is the main implementer of the program (i.e. prison officers,

as discussed in chapters 5 and 6). Hence the participants in this study questioned the

accountability of the BNPT in the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation

programs. As presented previously, a participant stated that the “BNPT was too far

from us. They must also involve in the field directly with us. If they have a program,

then they can apply in the prison” (FG2:4). Thus a parallel relationship for program

implementation clearly does not currently exist. The relationship is “supporting” in

nature (Scholten, Maggetti, & Versluis, 2017, p. 359). The prison officers hold the

core of responsibilities while other actors, including the BNPT’s staff, play a

supporting role in various activities.

Moreover, I argue that correctional institutions, under the management of the

DGC, should be appointed as the main implementer. The prison authorities should

primarily organise and run the program, which is subsequently implemented by the

prison officers. Correctional institutions, rather than the BNPT and other actors, are

more appropriate for this task for two reasons.

First, correctional institutions are responsible for rehabilitating inmates,

including terrorist inmates. This specific role is stipulated in Article 2 of the CIL, as

presented in Section 7.2. To reiterate, the article states that the aim of the corrections

system is to improve and develop prisoners so that they do not violate the laws, and

simultaneously to encourage prisoners to fully reinvigorate and become active,

productive, and useful members of society. The BNPT and other actors do not have

such a specific role, although they are also involved in the prison-based



Second, in contrast to the BNPT and other actors, correctional institutions have

ample opportunities to interact with terrorist inmates through the arm of the prison

officers. Convicted terrorists are sent to and live in prisons for a specific period based

on their sentences, where prison officers meet and interact with them on a daily

basis. Therefore, appointing prison officers as the main implementers of prison-based

deradicalisation programs is more likely to support terrorist rehabilitation.

However, I must highlight here that appointing correctional institutions as the

main implementers of such programs does not mean that other actors are not needed,

including BNPT staff. If the BNPT appoints officers who are specifically responsible

for prison-based deradicalisation programs, these officers should work

collaboratively with the prison officers to implement the program. The “supporting

type of relationship” (Scholten, Maggetti, & Versluis, 2017, p. 359) should be

adopted. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, other actors such as clerics, psychologists,

and BNPT staff are definitely needed to work collaboratively with and to support the

correctional institutions in implementing deradicalisation programs. In other words,

other professionals must work collaboratively with the prison officers who are given

the specific responsibility for terrorist rehabilitation. For example, the prison

authority can invite other professionals to run specific activities such as religious

discussions or psychological counselling.

In conclusion, I recommend that a new regulation is enacted in order to realise

supporting relationships between the primary and complementary implementers of

prison-based deradicalisation programs. The responsibilities of the DGC, the BNPT,

and other actors in the implementation of these programs must be identified and

stipulated clearly in this new regulation. This legal foundation is vital for improving

collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT in the implementation of prison-based



This chapter has answered the research question on strategies that can be used

to improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of prison-

based deradicalisation programs. Before formulating the strategies, the needs of

Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation were identified. Through a

thematic qualitative analysis of these needs, two broad themes emerged, “direct


needs” and “indirect needs”. Direct needs are needs viewed through the lens of the

prison officers and directly relate to their role as the implementers of the programs.

Indirect needs are needs external to the prison officers that help the officers to carry

out terrorist deradicalisation programs inside the prison.

The findings discussed in this chapter can be adopted by the Government of

Indonesia in designing policies to improve Indonesian prison officers’ role in

terrorist rehabilitation. These policies are important not only for Indonesian prison

officers who are appointed to work in the special prison for terrorist inmates, but also

for those responsible for terrorist rehabilitation in general prisons. The officers

should be equipped with suitable resources to support their role in terrorist

rehabilitation.

Furthermore, two strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison

officers in terrorist deradicalisation were identified in this chapter. The first is

strategic policy recommendations, which include capacity building for prison

officers in charge of terrorist rehabilitation, developing collaborative mechanisms

with other actors, and developing a good partnership with the BNPT.

The second strategy is to reform a provision about the implementer of

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program as stipulated in Article 34A (1)

paragraph c Government Regulation Number 99 year 2012. The provision implies

that both the DGC and the BNPT can be implementers of the program. However,

currently collaboration mechanisms among the implementers of the program are

lacking. This provision causes ambiguity at the implementation level, as discussed in

Chapter 5. Although prison officers believe that the BNPT is the main implementer

of prison-based deradicalisation programs, in reality, terrorist rehabilitation programs

are primarily implemented by prison officers.

To solve this problem, I argue that Article 34A (1) paragraph c Government

Regulation Number 99 year 2012 must be amended by stipulating only one

institution as the main implementer, that is, the correctional institutions. However,

appointing correctional institutions as the main implementer of such program does

not mean that other actors are not needed. Other actors should be nominated as the

complimentary implementers. In rehabilitating terrorist inmates, correctional

institutions should be supported by other institutions such as the BNPT and the

MoRA.



Conclusions and

Recommendations

Rehabilitation is to help someone return to normal life by providing

education, training and therapy... Whether they are operational terrorists or

extremist supporters, they believe that violence and other extreme measures

are acceptable means to bring about political change. Terrorists and their

supporters are not mainstream but extreme. To facilitate their return to the

mainstream from the extreme, they must be rehabilitated. Rehabilitiation

may not be a perfect solution that transforms every single terrorist but it is

the best available solution. (Gunaratna, 2015, p. 5)

This chapter summarises the findings related to the research questions

presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis. It discusses how Indonesian prison officers

experience the implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, and

presents strategies to potentially improve Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist

rehabilitation. The findings presented in this thesis are important because, despite its

limitations, rehabilitation is “the best available solution” for deradicalising convicted

terrorists, as stated by Gunaratna (2015, p. 5) in the quotation above.

Due the fact that Indonesia has a significant number of terrorist inmates, the

authorities have established a prison-based deradicalisation program for this type of

inmate. The program is implemented either by prison officers or by other actors such

as the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan

Terorisme – [BNPT]), the Indonesian National Police (INP), and Non-Governemnatl

Organisations (NGOs). Because prison officers are the main people who interact

with the prisoners on daily basis, researching their experiences is worthwhile. My

literature review indicated a research gap on the topic of Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation programs viewed from the lens of the implementer. Moreover,

investigating and assessing the voices of prison officers is important as one of the

sources for future policy.

The remainder of the chapter is divided into two sections. Section 8.1

summarises the conclusions of my research and reiterates the main findings. Section


8.2 discusses the practical recommendations for the Government of Indonesia in

order to improve the role of prison officers in the deradicalisation program for

terrorist convicts. This is followed by a brief set of recommendations for future

research on Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program.

8.1 CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has examined the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in

implementing deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners. In the Indonesian

context, although a considerable amount of research, policy, and political debate has

focused on terrorist prisoners (Hassan, 2007; Jones C. R., 2014; Osman, 2014;

Ungerer, 2011; Sarwono, 2013) and prison-based deradicalisation programs (Bakti,

2014; Eckard, 2014; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Istiqomah, 2012; Johnston,

2009), less attention has been paid to the Indonesian prison officers who are

implementing the program at the coalface. Therefore, this thesis aims to bridge this

research gap by examining the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in the

implementation of prison-based deradicalisation programs, and by identifying policy

recommendations and law reform options related to the improvement of Indonesian

prison officers’ role in terrorist rehabilitation. To achieve these aims, these research

questions were proposed:

1. What are the challenges for Indonesian prison officers in implementing

prison-based deradicalisation programs for convicted terrorists?

2. What are Indonesian prison officers’ views on the establishment of a

special prison for convicted terrorists in Indonesia?

3. What strategies can be used to improve the role of Indonesian prison

officers in implementing prison-based deradicalisation programs?

In answering these research questions, this study used qualitative social

research and legal research methodologies. These methodologies were used because

the research questions had to be addressed by different methods. The methodology of

qualitative social research was used to investigate the challenges faced by prison

officers implementing the deradicalisation program (Research Question 1), and to

analyse their views on the establishment of a special prison for convicted terrorists in

Indonesia (Research Question 2). Primary and secondary data were collected to

address these questions. Qualitative social research and legal research methodologies


were combined to identify strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison

officers in implementing the deradicalisation program (Research Question 3).

As prescribed in social research methodology, this study collected two main

types of data: primary and secondary. Primary data were collected through focus

group discussions. A series of three focus groups was carried out in November 2015

and June 2016. I conducted the first focus group in Cipinang Prison on 1 November

2015 with three prison officers, and the second focus group in Pasir Putih

Nusakambangan Prison on 2 November 2015 with five prison officers. The third

focus group was conducted in Surabaya Prison on 25 June 2016 with five prison

officers. On average, the focus groups took about an hour. Thematic analysis was

applied for data analysis. Furthermore, to increase the trustworthiness of the data

collected, a research diary was also used to record fieldwork activities and prominent

insights related to the topic of the study. Secondary data were collected through

literature searches.

In terms of legal research, legal resources that were used in this study are

primary and secondary legal materials, and non-legal material. The primary legal

materials comprised the Anti-Terrorism Law (ATL), the Anti-Terrorism Financing

Law ATFL, the Correctional Institution Law (CIL), and some relevant regulations.

These materials were collected through literature searches and library methods. The

secondary legal materials included articles in law journals, textbooks, conference

papers and proceedings, encyclopaedias, and websites. They were collected through

literature searches and library methods, and through the internet. The non-legal

materials were findings from other disciplines; materials that are not related to the

legal field are often used in legal research to enrich and strengthen the analysis.

The main findings of the research are presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7, to

answer research questions 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The following subsections

summarise the main findings of the research.

8.1.1 The Challenges of Deradicalisation: Indonesian Prison Officers’

Experiences

The challenges for Indonesian prison officers in implementing prison-based

deradicalisation programs are discussed in Chapter 5. This thesis presents five

challenges that were identified from the experiences of Indonesian prison officers in

implementing the programs:


1. Terrorist inmates’ personalities.





Regarding the personalities of terrorist inmates, Indonesian prison officers

faced several challenges related to the beliefs and behaviour of these inmates. The

beliefs of terrorists that were recognised as challenges by the focus group

participants were beliefs that they (the terrorists) were not criminals, that they were

heroes in a divine war, and that they were the only “right” individuals in interpreting

Islamic religious teachings. In this context, many studies have demonstrated that

terrorists do differ from other criminals (Ganor, 2002; Goldman, 2014; Gunaratna,

2011; Mahan & Griset, 2013; Presman & Flockton, 2014; Silke, 2014; UNODC,

2016). Further, terrorists’ beliefs that they are heroes of a holy war are consistent

with Hasan’s (2007) study on Imam Samudra’s justification for the Bali Bombings.

Hasan demonstrated that Samudra’s idea of a perpetual war was the most critical

aspect of his thinking. The finding that terrorist inmates believed they are the “most

right” individuals in interpreting Islamic ideology agrees with the findings of the

International Crisis Group (ICG, 2007, p. 12) and Bakti (2014, p. 176), who showed

that terrorist inmates responded negatively to a discussion about Islam delivered by

someone outside their circle.

Besides the terrorist’s beliefs, participants recognised two challenges regarding

the behaviour of terrorist inmates: reacting against the officers, and refusing to

participate in any programs. These findings are consistent with those of a previous

study by Hannah et al. (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008). These authors

classified the spectrum of potential activities undertaken by radicalised prisoners,

particularly regarding the use of passive or non-violent resistance and active or

violent resistance to prison authorities. In terms of the current study, the participants’

challenge of prisoners reacting against the officers is a form of violent resistance,

while refusing to participate in any programs is a form of non-violent resistance.

In relation to the readiness of prison officers, the challenges fell under two

broad subthemes: internal factors and external factors. Internal factors are factors that


relate to “inside” Indonesian prison officers’ themselves, for example, self-evaluation

and prison officers’ personal characteristics. External factors are those that relate to

“outside” the officers, for example, group evaluation and prison officers’ collegiality.

Two internal factors were identified: limited skills and abilities of officers in

terrorist deradicalisation and rehabilitation, and limited knowledge of Islamic

religious teachings. The first acknowledges the limited skills and abilities of the

prison officers, while the second acknowledges their limited capabilities in religious

Islamic teachings and experiences. These findings are consistent with those of

Eckard (2014), who concluded limited skills and abilities is a common problem in

Indonesian prison officers, and those of Maliki (2013), who found that Indonesian

prison officers’ religious education and experiences were often less than those of

terrorist inmates. Further, studies conducted by C. R. Jones (2014), Ungerer (2011),

and Osman (2014) may help explain why the focus group participants thought that

they lacked capabilities in religious teachings and experiences. These studies

concluded that prison officers and prison populations regard terrorist inmates highly

because the inmates are devout religious men willing to lay down their lives for

Islam.

Three external factors were identified: the limited number of prison officers, a

lack of professional support and training, and a lack of legal protection. The limited

number of prison officers available to implement Indonesia’s prison-based

deradicalisation program suggests that understaffing is one of the key problems for

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program (Abuza, 2009; Eckard, 2014). The

finding of the lack of professional support and training on deradicalisation for

Indonesian prison officers is consistent with the findings of many other studies

(Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Maliki, 2013; Osman, 2014; SFCG, 2013). Previous

studies, however, have not uncovered a lack of legal protection.

When considering the sustainability of the programs, the results showed that

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program is incidental and partial. This

finding is consistent with the analysis of the current literature, which indicated that

the nature of the programs is recognised as unsustainable (Bakti, 2014; Gunaratna,

2015; ICG, 2007). The program was identified as incidental for two reasons: the

program was designed as a minor accompaniment to established treatments and

interventions for general prisoners; and the assistance offered by several other parties


(state or non-state actors) in the design and implementation of terrorist rehabilitation

was only temporary. The program was identified as partial because it is not applied

to all terrorist inmates, even among those in the same prison. Three further reasons

identify the program as partial: the rejection of program involvement by non-

cooperative terrorist inmates; a timeline for the interventions that prevents all of the

terrorist inmates from participating in the program; and non-inclusion of family

assistance in the existing programs.

Two institutional infrastructure problems were identified as barriers to

achieving the objectives of the prison-based deradicalisation program: the

overcapacity issue and the practices for housing terrorist convicts. Overcapacity was

a problem in most Indonesian prisons (General Elucidation of The Decree of the

Minister of Law and Human Rights Number M.HH-07.OT.01.03, year 2011). The

Indonesian prison officers believe that overcapacity affects their tasks and

responsibilities during implementation of the deradicalisation program. These

findings match those of Gunaratna (2011, p. 65), who identified a correlation

between the prison environment and the spread of radical beliefs in the prison. The

findings are also consistent with those of a number of previous studies (Eckard,

2014, p. 170; Istiqomah, 2012, p. 31; Jones C. R., 2014, p. 87; Osman, 2014, p. 222)

that describe overcrowded prisons and the problems associated with practices for

housing management of terrorist inmates, whether segregated from or integrated with

other inmates.

The practices for housing terrorist inmates in Indonesian prisons are also a

challenge for Indonesian prison officers in the implementation of the program.

Housing management for terrorist inmates depends on the policy of the prison

director on the segregation or integration of terrorist inmates. The practical

implementation of the chosen housing policy, however, is variable. For example,

even when a segregation policy is chosen, communication among terrorist inmates

may occur, as well as close contact between terrorist inmates and ordinary inmates.

Previous studies have noted differences in the policies and practices on the housing

of terrorist inmates among prisons in Indonesia (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; Osman,

2014; Ungerer, 2011). In addition, the current finding of the need to segregate non-

cooperative ideologue or hard-liner terrorist inmates from the rest of the prison

population supports findings from previous studies (ICG, 2007), which found that


some non-terrorists were successfully radicalised by Imam Samudra in Kerobokan

Prison; a prison officer, Beni Irawan, was also radicalised.

Regarding the unavailability of collaborative mechanisms as a challenge faced

by the Indonesian prison officers implementing prison-based deradicalisation

programs, there were two prominent findings. The first was the lack of cooperation

and coordination between the BNPT and the Directorate General of Corrections

(DGC). These issues are evident in practice. Prison officers have experienced lack of

support from the BNPT’s staff in working together to achieve terrorist rehabilitation

or deradicalisation, as discussed by Istiqomah (2012) and Sarwono (2012). The

second was unorganised partnerships. Of the many agencies that are involved in

prison-based deradicalisation programs, the focus group results revealed that the lack

of cooperation and coordination between the BNPT and the DGC was a significant

problem. Although the BNPT is the coordinator for the national deradicalisation

program, the majority of focus group participants were disappointed with the

BNPT’s performance in this regard. Moreover, collaboration between agencies has

not been managed well; hence, programs implemented as a result of collaborative

work have not been adequately focused on terrorist deradicalisation. This finding is

consistent with those of a number of studies (Eckard, 2014; ICG, 2007; IPI, 2010;

IRIN, 2012; Ungerer, 2011), which explain that, although there are many actors

working on terrorist deradicalisation, the efforts have not been fully integrated.

8.1.2 The Perspectives of Indonesian Prison Officers on the Establishment of a

Special Prison

The perspectives of Indonesian prison officers on the establishment of a special

prison is discussed in Chapter 6. From the analysis of focus group data, this research

identified three themes: an absolute agreement on the establishment of a special

prison for convicted terrorists; the advantages and disadvantages of a special prison

for terrorists; and the policy issues related to a special prison for terrorist inmates.

The finding of an absolute agreement on the establishment of a special prison

for terrorist inmates was an interesting result. I expected a debate on the pros and

cons of this initiative. However, all the participants in the focus groups agreed with

and fully supported the initiative. This finding is consistent with the recommendation

of Hassan and Yasin (2012) that the Government of Indonesia establish a special

prison facility for convicted terrorists (Hassan & Yasin, 2012, p. 13).


In practice, the Indonesian model of distributing terrorist inmates through

correctional facilities, as described by Neumann (2010), has become a mix of the

isolation, separation, and concentration models. Before a specialised prison for

convicted terrorists was established, practices in several Indonesian prisons adopted

isolation and separation models, rather than the concentration model reflected in a

special prison. If not all terrorist inmates are housed in this special prison as per the

official policy (Ditjenpas RI, 2016b), then the practice could be described as a partial

concentration policy.

Further, from focus group data three advantages of a terrorist prison were

identified: improved security and supervision; prevention of the spread of prison

radicalisation; and increased likelihood of achieving terrorist deradicalisation goals.

In addition, two disadvantages were identified: increased solidarity among terrorist

convicts; and hindering the collection of intelligence data. These findings support

those of previous studies (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008; Mulcahy,

Merrington, & Bell, 2013), which noted that a specialised prison for specific

offenders may face challenges despite the benefits. Because focus group participants

identified some disadvantages of a special prison for terrorist inmates, this indicates

they do have concerns about this initiative, despite their overall support for it. In this

regard, participants identified a number of policy issues about the management of a

special prison for terrorist inmates, includes:

1. The distribution criterion for of terrorist inmates sent to the special prison

for terrorists.

2. The decision maker for the distribution.

3. The timing of the distribution to the special prison.

4. Strengthening partnerships.

5. Availability of data on the background of convicted terrorists.

8.1.3 Improving the Role of Indonesian Prison Officers in Deradicalisation

In Chapter 7, empirical research findings and legal research findings were

combined in order to identify strategies for improving the role of Indonesian prison

officers in terrorist rehabilitation. Before identifying the strategies, the needs of

Indonesian prison officers regarding terrorist rehabilitation were investigated using


social qualitative approach. A legal research approach was also used, specifically, the

framework of policy and legal reform research.

Through thematic qualitative analysis, two broad themes emerged on the needs

of Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation: direct needs and indirect

needs. Direct needs are needs viewed through the lens of prison officers and are

directly related to their role as implementers of the terrorist rehabilitation program.

Indirect needs are needs that are external to the prison officers but that help

Indonesian prison officers to carry out terrorist rehabilitation inside the prison. Two

subthemes related to the direct need for training of Indonesian prison officers in

deradicalisation: the need for training on deradicalisation programs and the need for

training on communication. The first can be classified as training in “hard skills”,

while the latter is training in “soft skills”. Further, two subthemes related to the

indirect need for good partnerships: the need for others actors and the need for good

collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT. Overall, the present findings are

consistent with those of other research that concluded that both training for prison

officers and partnerships for terrorist rehabilitation are important (Andrie, 2011;

Gunaratna, 2011; Idris & Taufiqurrohman, 2015; Neumann, 2010). These two factors

are required for effective terrorist rehabilitation, along with visionary leadership

(Gunaratna, 2011, p. 67).

In examining the correlation between the challenges and the needs of

Indonesian prison officers in terrorist rehabilitation, my research revealed that there

is a link between the challenges and the needs of Indonesian prison officers in

terrorist rehabilitation. First, the need of Indonesian prison officers for training in

both deradicalisation and communication is related to two challenges found in this

study: the readiness of the prison officers and the personalities of terrorist inmates.

Recognition of the lack of personal abilities and skills leads to the identified need for

training. Thus providing training on deradicalisation and communication for

Indonesian prison officers will equip them with the basic knowledge and skills

required for dealing with terrorist inmate personalities.

Second, the need of Indonesian prison officers for support from other agencies

and for good collaboration with the BNPT is related to three challenges found in this

study: program sustainability, institutional infrastructure problems, and unavailability

of collaborative mechanisms. In terms of program sustainability, the DGC should


develop collaboration with NGOs that have assisted prison officers in implementing

life skill training and conflict management training in several Indonesian prisons, in

order to continue such training for terrorist inmates. Moreover, establishing and

managing a specialised prison for terrorists is the first step in the effort to rehabilitate

terrorist inmates, in order to overcome the challenge of institutional infrastructure

problems. Good collaboration between the DGC and the BNPT is required to

establish and manage such a prison. Finally, regarding unavailability of collaborative

mechanisms, support from other actors and good collaboration with the BNPT are

clearly needed.

Furthermore, through the policy and legal reform framework, two strategies

that could improve the role of Indonesian prison officers in terrorist deradicalisation

were developed and are presented in Chapter 7. Strategy One is a policy

recommendation that includes capacity building for prison officers who are in charge

of terrorist rehabilitation; developing collaborative mechanisms with other actors;

and developing a good partnership with the BNPT. Strategy Two is the

recommendation to reform the vague statement regarding the main implementer of

the prison-based deradicalisation program, as stated in Article 34A (1) paragraph c

Government Regulation Number 99 year 2012. The primary and subsidiary

implementers of the program must be clearly identified, as well as the mechanisms

for collaboration with other actors. This recommendation for policy reform is

important for the Government of Indonesia in planning and designing policies for

improving Indonesian prison officers’ role in terrorist rehabilitation. In addition, the

reform is valuable for Indonesian prison officers who are appointed to work in the

special prison for terrorist inmates, and for those responsible for terrorist

rehabilitation in general prisons.

8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Many recommendations are available in the existing literature regarding

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program. This study, however, provides

recommendations specifically based on the findings of research into Indonesian

prison officers’ perceptions and experiences of implementing such programs.

Therefore, the recommendations of this study are rooted in empirical evidence from

focus groups comprised of Indonesian prison officers.


The recommendations of this study fall into two sets: (a) practical

recommendations for the Indonesian Government in order to foster effective terrorist

rehabilitation through its prison-based deradicalisation program; and (b) suggestions

for future research. The first set is revisited in Subsection 8.2.1 and the second in

Subsection 8.2.2.

8.2.1 Practical Recommendations for the Government of Indonesia

First, the primary implementer of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation

program must be one state institution. The government should not appoint two or

more institutions, which results in ambiguity around the legitimacy of, and

responsibility for, implementing the programs. Currently, based on the Government

Regulation Number 99 year 2012, two state institutions are “implicitly” appointed

responsibility for the program in the prisons: the prisons under the management of

the (DGC), and the BNPT. Further, this study recommends that Indonesian prisons,

under the management of the DGC, should be appointed as the main implementer of

the program, because the DGC has resources that are likely to support terrorist

rehabilitation. Nevertheless, appointing the DGC as the primary implementer does

not mean other actors are not needed in the implementation of such programs. This

research found that other actors are definitely needed by the Indonesian prison

officers in rehabilitating terrorist inmates. Other actors such as psychologists, Islamic

scholars, and educators are subsidiary implementers who support the primary

implementers in running specific activities for terrorist inmates.

Second, regarding the involvement of many agencies in Indonesia’s prison-

based deradicalisation program, I recommend that the BNPT must be the

coordinator. The BNPT has the power to invite other actors involved in the program

to assist the prison officers responsible for implementation in the prisons because the

BNPT has been appointed as the coordinator of the national deradicalisation program

based on Presidential Decree No 46 year 2010. By accommodating Indonesian prison

officers’ advice as the main implementer of the program in the field, the BNPT can

invite other actors (individuals or institutions) that are needed by the prison officers

to rehabilitate terrorists. Again, I stress that the coordinator and the implementer of

Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program must be different actors. I

consider that the coordinator of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program

should be the BNPT while the primary implementer should be the DGC, through the


arm of Indonesian prison officers. Therefore, to coordinate subsidiary implementers

– other actors – in Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program should be the

responsibility of the BNPT.

Third, partnerships between the DGC and the BNPT must be improved. There

is no doubt that a good collaboration between these two institutions on the

implementation of Indonesia’s prison-based deradicalisation program will foster

terrorist rehabilitation. The existing research identifies this partnership issue (Eckard,

2014; ICG, 2007; Istiqomah, 2012; Ungerer, 2011), which was also found in this

study. Based on these findings, this study suggests that improved partnership

between the DGC and the BNPT should clarify responsibility among prison officers

and the BNPT’s officials regarding the implementation of the program. To realise

this goal, however, the Government of Indonesia must introduce an “umbrella”

regulation that explains how these two state institutions should collaborate in

fostering terrorist rehabilitation.

Fourth, Indonesian prison officers who are responsible for implementing the

deradicalisation program for terrorist inmates must be equipped with both basic and

advanced training on deradicalisation. As found in this study, their lack of

understanding about deradicalisation, including prison-based deradicalisation

programs, affects their role in implementing the program. An analogy might be “they

are given a sophisticated appliance but are not given training to operate it”.

Furthermore, training on communication should be provided. Officers in the study

had experienced that good communication improves the trustworthiness of

participants (i.e. terrorist inmates) in programs. The officers strongly believe that this

environment fosters rehabilitation for terrorists.

Fifth, the Government of Indonesia must establish a “National Action Plan on

the Prison-based Deradicalisation Program”. The Rome Memorandum can be used as

a working model because it contains successful practices from many countries and

experts on counterterrorism (Stone, 2015). Although no “one size fits all” when

dealing with the issue of deradicalisation, lessons learned from other countries that

are recognised as successful and effective in the implementation of prison-based

deradicalisation programs can be adapted for the Indonesian context (Gunaratna,

2015; Gunaratna & Ali, 2015).


Sixth, the Indonesian prison authority should include family assistance in

designing the prison-based deradicalisation program. As discussed in Section 5.4,

participants of this research believe that family involvement in the program policy

could foster the successful attainment of the goals of the terrorist rehabilitation and

integration programs. Further, the initiatives of conflict management training and life

skills training should be developed by the DGC and the BNPT. Participants in this

research believed that both these types of training are appropriate interventions for

terrorist inmates in the Indonesian context.

8.2.2 Suggestions for Further Research

A finding in this thesis indicated that prison officers considered that both

incentives and religious counselling can be effective in terrorist rehabilitation.

However, the existing literature concludes that incentives are more effective than

religious counselling. Therefore, investigating the extent to which religious

counselling can positively influence the deradicalisation of terrorist inmates is an

interesting topic for further research.

Moreover, this thesis has discussed the issue of radicalisation occurring in

Indonesian prisons due to a policy of integration. However, some focus group

participants noted that integration can be effective for terrorist rehabilitation. Hence,

the effectiveness of integration policies for terrorist deradicalisation requires

investigation.

As noted in Chapter 2, this research focused on the lens of the prison officers

who implement deradicalisation programs. In practice, the BNPT is also involved in

the implementation of programs. Therefore, further research from different

perspectives is recommended to assess whether BNPT staff face the same challenges

as those of prison officers.

Further, research is needed to evaluate collaboration between the DGC and the

BNPT. A thorough examination is suggested to determine the nature and

effectiveness of the collaboration. Previously, achieving good collaboration has

proved difficult. Criteria based on the considerable body of existing literature on

partnerships and collaboration could be used for evaluation. Regarding other actors,

further research is recommended on developing effective collaboration among


institutions, both state and non-state actors that are involved with the prison-based


In addition, two practical matters could also be investigated: the need for

training in religious teachings, and the implementation methods for deradicalisation

programs. Although the need for training in religious teachings did not emerge from

the analysis in this study, investigation of this issue is important. Exploratory

research, for example, could examine the perspectives of prison officers about the

extent to which such training could support their task of rehabilitating terrorist

inmates. Further, authorities could benefit from investigation of appropriate methods

to implement programs.

Finally, this thesis concludes that ongoing research is required about the policy

of establishing a special prison for convicted terrorists in the context of Indonesia.

The research might investigate whether, and to what extent, the advantages of such a

prison for terrorist inmates outweigh the disadvantages in the Indonesian context. In

addition, a cost–benefit analysis should be undertaken because limited funding is

always a major issue in developing countries, including Indonesia.


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Appendices

Appendix A

Question Guide for Focus Groups

Question guide for addressing Research Question 1:

What do you know about the deradicalisation program? How do you

implement the program in the prison?

What activities have you undertaken to rehabilitate terrorist inmates? Do you

treat terrorist prisoners the same as other ordinary inmates?

What are the challenges when you undertake your activities, and how do you

face these challenges?

Are there any officials from other agencies who play a role in rehabilitating

terrorist prisoners? If yes, what activities have they conducted in the prison?

Do you think the activities support terrorist rehabilitation?

How do you assess whether deradicalisation programs for terrorist prisoners

are successful or not?


What you know about the plan of the government to establish a special prison

for convicted terrorists?

How do you perceive the establishment of a special prison for convicted

terrorists?

What should the government consider if a specialised prison for terrorists is

established?

Do you agree with this initiative? If yes (or no), what are the reasons?

Is close interaction among terrorist inmates in a specialised prison good or

bad for rehabilitating terrorists?



How do you perceive your role in rehabilitating terrorist prisoners?

What do you think about the role of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency

(Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – BNPT) or other agencies in

rehabilitating terrorist inmates?

What are the challenges that the Directorate General of Corrections (DGC)

has faces in playing its role?

What kind of support do you think you need in order to improve your role in

rehabilitating terrorist inmates?

What policies has your institution established concerning your role in

rehabilitating terrorist prisoners?

How does your organisation respond to the needs of prison officers?


Appendix B

Formal Request Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons

(English Version)

Subject : Fieldwork Permit Application

Annex : 1 exemplar

To: The Director General of Corrections

The Ministry of Law and Human Rights of Republic of Indonesia

Dear Sirs,

I, the undersigned,

Name : I Gede Widhiana Suarda

Place, Date of Birth : Denpasar, 10 February 1978

Address : PerumGraha Citra Mas Blok Z No. 6 Kaliwates, Jember.

Occupation : Lecturer of Law Faculty of the University of Jember

would like to apply for a fieldwork permit within the Directorate General of Corrections,

specifically at Cipinang and Pasir Putih Nusakambangan Prisons. This research is part of my

PhD thesis to be presented at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Australia. I

hereby attach:

1. TOR and Proposal of Research;

2. Summary of Research Activity Plan;

3. Ethics Approval Certificate from QUT; and

4. Participant Willingness to Participate Form (Prison Officer).

I really appreciate your kind attention and cooperation.

Jakarta, 8 September 2015.

Faithfully,



Appendix C

Formal Request Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons

(Bahasa Indonesia Version)

Hal : Permohonan ijin penelitian lapang (fieldwork)

Lamp : 1 exp.

Kepada Yth: Direktur Jenderal Pemasyarakatan

Kementerian Hukum dan HAM Republik Indonesia

Dengan hormat,

Saya yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini:

Nama : I Gede Widhiana Suarda

Tempat/Tgl Lahir : Denpasar / 10 Februari 1978

Alamat : Perum Graha Citra Mas Blok Z No. 6 Kaliwates, Jember

Pekerjaan : Dosen FH Universitas Jember

mengajukan permohonan ijin kegiatan penelitian di lingkungan Direktorat Jenderal

Pemasyarakatan, khususnya di Lapas Cipinang dan Lapas Pasir Putih Nusakambangan.

Penelitian ini dilaksanakan sebagai bagian dari penulisan disertasi yang kini tengah saya

tempuh di Queensland University of Technology (QUT) Australia. Bersama ini saya

lampirkan:

1. TOR Proposal Penelitian;

2. Resume Rencana Kegiatan Penelitian;

3. Ethics Approval Certificate dari QUT; dan

4. Form Lembar kesediaaan bagi partisipan (Petugas Pemasyarakatan).

Atas perhatian dan kerjasamanya saya sampaikan terima kasih.

Jakarta, 8 September 2015

Hormat saya,



Appendix D

Formal Permission Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons

(English Version from Certified Translator)


Appendix E

Formal Permission Letter for Conducting Fieldwork in Indonesian Prisons

(Original – Bahasa Indonesia)


Appendix F

Participant Information Sheet

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT

RESEARCH PROJECT

– Focus group –

Title of the Study

QUT Ethics Approval Number 1500000642

RESEARCH TEAM

Principal Researcher: I Gede Widhiana Suarda PhD student

Associate Researchers: Professor Reece Walters Principal Supervisor

Associate Professor Mark Lauch Associate Supervisor

School of Justice, Faculty of Law,

Queensland University of

Technology (QUT), Australia

DESCRIPTION

This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD for I Gede Widhiana Suarda at QUT.

The purpose of this project is to examine terrorist prisoner supervision models in Indonesia.

In order to propose an alternative model to Indonesia, a comparison with Singapore’s models

will be conducted.

You are invited to participate in this project because you are a prison staff/guard/warden and

are currently supervising terrorist prisoners.

PARTICIPATION

Your participation will involve an audio recorded focus group at the prison office or another

agreed location. The focus group will take approximately one hour of your time. Questions

will include: what programs do you use to supervise terrorist inmates in prison, why do you

use these supervision programs, and how do you evaluate the programs.

A focus group is interviewing participants in a group to collect data. You will not be

interviewed individually. In this research we will have 5 guards/wardens to take part a part in

the focus group. I will be the moderator that focuses the group discussion on specific themes

of interest and I will include a number of different perspectives on the given themes.

Please note that if you arrive late it may not be possible for you to participate.

Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate you can

withdraw from the project without comment or penalty.

http://www.qut.edu.au/


EXPECTED BENEFITS

This research will not benefit you directly. However, the research project will provide the

opportunity to discuss various issues and experiences related to de-radicalisation and

rehabilitation programs for terrorist prisoners.

The main benefit of the research is that it will significantly contribute to existing academic

literature on de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programs for terrorist prisoners. The

research findings will be an invaluable piece of research that could potentially influence

future policy and law reform regarding terrorist prisoner supervision.

To recognise your contribution should you choose to participate, the research team is

offering you a gift voucher of $25 AUD (equal to Rp. 250,000) for dinner at a local

restaurant.

RISKS

The potential risks for the proposed research are minimal but might include inconvenience

because of the time and place of the focus group. You might also experience anxiety or

nervousness during the focus group discussion.

For your convenience on the discussion, you are not required to provide answers to all

questions. You will be asked what official processes and programs are in place to manage

terrorist prisoners. If you explain to me that harming the prisoners is the best way to control

them, then I will stop the interview immediately and explain that this research is not related

to day-to-day management techniques.

Moreover, as the research project has the approval of prison management, the focus group

interview will take place during work hours and/or after hours. The focus group can take

place at prison premises and/or at place convenient for you and the other participants.

PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY

All comments and responses will be treated confidentially unless required by law.

Through this research all interviews will be anonymized. Your name will not be included in

the transcripts even though it will be included in the consent form. The data, recordings and

transcripts will be kept securely. They will be stored in a locked cabinet on campus at QUT.

Data will only be accessed by the researcher and the supervisors. Audio recording will be

destroyed at the end of the research project.

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE

We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your

agreement to participate.

QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT

If have any questions or require further information please contact one of the researchers

listed below.


I Gede Widhiana Suarda [email protected] +61 7 3138 4653

Professor Reece Walters [email protected] +61 7 3138 2708

Associate Professor Mark Lauch [email protected] +61 7 3138 7114

CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT

QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.

However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project

you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email

[email protected]. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the research

project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner.

Thank you for helping with this research project.

Please keep this sheet for your information.

mailto:[email protected]





Appendix G

Consent Form for Participants

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT

RESEARCH PROJECT

– Focus group –

Title of the Study

QUT Ethics Approval Number 1500000642

RESEARCH TEAM CONTACTS

I Gede Widhiana Suarda [email protected] +61 7 3138 4653

Professor Reece Walters [email protected] +61 7 3138 2708

Associate Professor Mark

Lauch [email protected] +61 7 3138 7114

STATEMENT OF CONSENT

By signing below, you are indicating that you:

Have read and understood the information document regarding this project.

Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction.

Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research

team.

Understand that you are free to withdraw at any time without comment or penalty.

Understand that you can contact the Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or

email [email protected] if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the

project.

Understand that the project will include an audio recording.

Agree to participate in the project.

Name

Signature

Date

Please return this sheet to the investigator.





http://www.qut.edu.au/