INDUSTRIA CONSTRUCTOARE DE

MAŞINI ÎN SUA

GEOGRAFIE ECONOMICĂ

Studentă : Huţanu Mădălina – Elena

Specializarea: Geografia turismului, Anul I

Grupa 1214 A

INDUSTRIA CONSTRUCTOARE DE MAŞINI ÎN SUA

-Sinteză –

Industria constructoare de maşini reprezintă dezvoltarea, producerea, comercializarea şi vinderea automobilelor, fiind una dintre cele mai importante sectoare economice de venituri din lume. În 2010,producţia mondială a atins un vârf de 73,3 milioane de euro. În 2011, producţia a scăzut cu 13,5 la sută la 61 milioane de euro.

Vânzările în S.U.A au scăzut de la 21,2 la sută la 10,4 milioane de unităţi. China a devenit cea mai mare piaţă din lumea Autovehiculelor, atât în vânzări cât şi de producţie, crescând în 2011 cu 45 % la 13,6 mil. unităţi.

Productivitatea medie per angajat în industrie ajunge la aproximativ 26,670 de euro, în condiţiile în care numărul salariaţilor este de aproximativ 270.000. Aprecierea cifrei de afaceri a avut ca sector principal finalizarea investiriilor străine de peste 1,6 miliarde de euro şi punerea în funcţiune a capacităţilor de producţie, destinate în principal exporturilor.

Un rol special în economia americană îl joacă companiile transnaționale: Microsoft, Ford, IBM, General Electric, Intel, Exxon, Wal-Mart, Mc Donald’s, reprezintă imaginea SUA în întreaga lume. În topul primelor zece corporații transnaționale din lume, primele cinci sunt din SUA. Activitatea lor se concentrează asupra ramurilor cu reale perspective de dezvoltare și de obținere a profitului. De altfel, companiile transnaționale sunt vârful de lance al ofensivei americane în contextul globalizării economice.

În anul 2010, vânzările de autovehicule au crescut cu 11% față de 2009, la 11,6 milioane de unități. Cele mai mari vânzări le-au avut Ford cu 1.935.000 de autovehicule, Toyota cu 1.760.000 și Chrysler cu 1.085.000 de unități.

Vânzările de autovehicule din SUA au crescut cu 11% în 2010 la 11,6 milioane de unităţi, acestea revenindu-şi după un an, 2009, foarte dificil pentru constructorii auto locali, în care General Motors (GM) şi Chrysler au intrat în faliment. Vânzările auto s-au situat la 1,14 milioane de maşini, cu 11% peste nivelul din 2009, potrivit datelor companiei de analiză a pieţei auto Autodata.

Anul 2010 a fost marcat de relansarea celor mai mari trei constructori auto americani, GM, Chrysler şi Ford. Dintre aceştia, Ford este singurul care nu a fost nevoit să ceară protecţie în faţa creditorilor sub legea falimentului. GM, principalul producător auto din SUA, piaţa pe care are o cotă de 19,1%, a reuşit şi o revenire spectaculoasă pe bursă, în luna noiembrie. Vânzările grupului au urcat cu 6,3% anul trecut, la 2,215 milioane de maşini.

Pentru anul 2010, constructorii auto anticipează continuarea procesului de revenire a sectorului, chiar dacă nivelul vânzărilor nu se va ridica la cel anterior crizei. GM mizează pe vânzările de 13-13,5 milioane de autovehicule în acest an, 2011, în SUA, în timp ce Ford estimează că va comercializa 12,5-13,5 milioane de unităţi. Aşadar, luna iulie a anului 2011 reprezintă un come back sesizabil al constructorilor de automobile americani şi o cădere gravă a celor japonezi.

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Acest lucru înseamnă că americanii doresc să cumpere din ce în ce mai mult modele 100% americane sau cel puţin maşini realizate în Europa.

Cea mai mare scădere în SUA a fost înregistrată de Honda Motors USA (-28.40%) şi Toyota Mo Co care are o scădere de 22.70%. Aceste cifre pot parea mici însa daca ne uităm la faptul că Toyota a vândut cu până la 40.000 de maşini mai puţin sau Honda cu mai putin de 30.000 de unităţi faţă de anul 2010, cifrele au o nouă însemnătate.

Construcţia de maşini este printre cea mai importantă industrie din lume. Companiile sunt multinaţionale, adică sunt preluate de companii din străinătate. Aceste companii fac sau importă maşinile făcute de companii din alte ţări. Industria de automobile americană consistă din trei companii mari americane şi alte nouă companii ori germane sau japoneze, care produc vehicule uşoare, plus alte 100 de companii care produc maşini comerciale (cum ar fi autobuze sau camioane mari). Industria a produs 12.1 milioane de autovehicule în 1997. Sunt trei mari companii care produc maşini în America: General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Company (sunt denumite în vorbirea de zi cu zi cele „ Trei Mari” ) care asigură trei pătrimi din angajările directe din America de Nord.

Industria automobilelor influenţează direct economia Statelor Unite ale Americii şi a lumii întregi. Într-un an normal industria de automobile generează aproape 17% din livrările de bunuri durabile (proiectate să ţină cel puţin 3 ani). Producţia de automobile consumă cantităţi mari de fier, oţel, aluminiu şi cauciuc natural. Industria mai consumă: cupru, zinc, geam, piele, plastic, plumb şi platină consumând astfel mai mult decât orice altă industrie din America. În 1997, vânzătorii de automobile au realizat un venit de peste 284 de milioane de dolari, cam 3.5 din PIB (produsul intern brut).

Producătorii de componente sunt o altă mare secţiune în America, alcătuit din aproape 5000 de firme, incluzând firme din companii japoneze europene şi canadiene. Aceste firme asigură piaţa de echipamente şi pentru piese de schimb. Numeroase alte industrii susţin industria automobilelor. Acestea includ asigurări, protecţie, produse petroliere, proiectări de autostrăzi şi străzi şi industria de construcţii.

Importurile excesive de automobile străine în 1980-1990 au ameninţat puterea constructorilor domestici, dar după 1990 vânzările au explodat. Importurile au scăzut de la 31% în 1987 la 16% în 1997. Cu vânzările de automobile străine împuţinându-se producătorii de automobile americani au avut numai de caştigat. În 1996 industria automobilelor avea o cotă de 9% de americani care lucrau activ producând bunuri de lung consum, cea mai mare valoare de la 1979 încoace.

Vânzările de automobile americane nu se vor mări substanţial în viitor poate cu vreo 1 sau 2 % pe an, în timp ce alte ţări vor avea un coeficient de export mai mare poate cu 2, 3, 5, sau chiar 10 ori mai mare decât acum. Deoarece exportul de automobile va fi un mod de dezvoltare a industriei, America a încheiat tratate cum ar fi: Memorandumul de înţelegere cu Korea (1993), Pactul de liber schimb Nord American (NAFTA, 1994), şi pactul cu Japonia în 1995. Aceste pacturi şi altele au mărit exportul în alte ţări cum ar fi Japonia, Mexic, Koreea de multe ori.

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INDUSTRIA CONSTRUCTOARE DE MAŞINI ÎN SUA

Istoria automobilului începe în 1769, o dată cu crearea automobilului cu motorului cu abur și care putea transporta persoane la bord. În 1806, apar vehiculele dotate cu motoare cu ardere internă care funcționau cu combustibil lichid. În jurul anului 1900, apar și vehiculele cu motor electric.

The Automobile Industry finally came of age with Henry Ford in 1914 for the bulk production of cars. This lead to the development of the industry and it first begun in the assembly lines of his car factory. The several methods adopted by Ford, made the new invention (that is, the car) popular amongst the rich as well as the masses.

According the History of Automobile Industry US, dominated the automobile markets around the globe with no notable competitors. However, after the end of the Second World War in 1945, the Automobile Industry of other technologically advanced nations such as Japan and certain European nations gained momentum and within a very short period, beginning in the early 1980s, the U.S Automobile Industry was flooded with foreign automobile companies, especially those of Japan and Germany.

The current trends of the Global Automobile Industry reveal that in the developed countries the Automobile Industries are stagnating as a result of the drooping car markets, whereas the Automobile Industry in the developing nations, such as, India and Brazil, have been consistently registering higher growth rates every passing year for their flourishing domestic automobile markets.

Ce companii auto produc maşini în SUA:

1. Toyota. În America, Toyota produce peste 1,6 milioane de maşini/anual, iar în UE, aproape 400.000. Cele mai importante ţări producătoare de vehicule Toyota au fost Japonia (4 milioane), SUA (945.000), China (772.000).

Toyota Motor Corporation (sau TMC) este o companie multinaţională care produce automobile, camioane, autobuze şi roboţi,cu sediul principal în oraşul Toyota, Japonia. Toyota este cel mai mare producător de autovehicule din Asia şi al doilea producător mondial.

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Toyota este unul din cei trei mari producători asiatici de autovehicule care concurează cu producătorii americani pe piaţa mondială, ceilalţi doi fiind Nissan Motors şi Honda Motor. Compania oferă de asemenea servicii financiare prin filiala sa Toyota Financial Services, şi activează şi în alte domenii de activitate. Autovehiculele produse sunt vândute sub denumirile de Toyota, Scion şi Lexus. Toyota deţine majoritatea acţiunilor în cadrul companiilor Daihatsu şi Hino, şi 8,7% din Fuji Heavy Industries, producătorul automobilelor Subaru.

În anul 2005, Toyota împreună cu Daihatsu Motor Company a produs 8,54 milioane de vehicule, cu aproape 500.000 mai putin decât General Motors în acel an. În luna iulie 2006 Toyota depăşise Ford în vânzările de automobile, însă producătorul american şi-a recâştigat poziţia o luna mai târziu. Toyota deţine o importantă cotă de piaţă în Statele Unite, Europa şi Africa şi este liderul de piaţă în Australia.

Toyota Motor Corporation a aparut în luna septembrie a anului 1933, atunci când compania Toyoda Automatic Loom a creat o noua divizie dedicată producerii de automobile sub conducerea fiului fondatorului, Kiichiro Toyoda. La puţin timp după aceea, divizia producea deja primul motor (Type A Engine), în 1934, care a fost folosit la propulsarea primului autovehicul (Model A1) în luna mai 1935 şi a camionului G1 în august 1935. Producţia autovehiculelor Model AA a inceput în 1936.

Deşi grupul Toyota este cunoscut azi îndeosebi pentru autovehiculele produse, are o prezenţă activă în industria textilă, producând războaie de ţesut automate (acum complet computerizate), şi maşini de cusut electrice, disponibile în toată lumea.

Toyota Motor Corporation s-a despărţit de compania mamă, devenind o entitate independentă în 1937. Deşi numele de familie al fondatorilor este Toyoda, numele companiei a fost modificat pentru a marca separarea muncii fondatorilor de viaţă casnică, pentru simplificarea pronunţiei şi pentru a fi de bun augur noii firme. Toyota este considerat un nume mai norocos decât Toyoda în Japonia, unde cifra opt este considerată una norocoasă, opt fiind numărul de linii necesare pentru a scrie Toyota cu caracterele katakana.

În timpul războiului din Pacific compania a produs camioane destinate armatei imperiale. Din cauza penuriei de materii prime din Japonia, camioanele militare fuseseră simplificate la maximum - de exemplu, aveau un singur far amplasat în centrul capotei. Fabricile Toyota din Aichi au scapat bombardamentelor deoarece războiul s-a încheiat cu doar puţin timp înaintea unui raid programat al forţelor aliate.

Producţia de autovehicule de pasageri a fost reluată în 1947 cu modelul SA. în 1950 a fost înfiinţată o companie separată specializată în vânzări, Toyota Motor Sales Company, care a funcţionat până în anul 1982. În aprilie 1956 a fost creat lanţul de reprezentante de vânzări Toyopet.

Toyota deţine fabrici în toată lumea, unde se produc şi asamblează autovehicule pentru pieţele locale. Compania deţine fabrici de producţie sau asamblare în Japonia, Statele Unite, Australia, Canada, Indonezia, Polonia, Africa de Sud, Turcia, Marea Britanie, Franţa, Brazilia, cele mai recente fiind cele din Pakistan, India, Argentina, Republica Cehă, Mexic, Malaezia, Tailanda, China şi Venezuela.

Primul vehicul Toyota construit în afara Japoniei a fost un Land Cruiser FJ-251 construit în São Paulo, Brazilia, în luna mai a anului 1959.

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Toyota Model AA

Lexus

Lexus este marca sub care Toyota produce automobile de lux. În Statele Unite, Lexus deţine topul vânzărilor la maşini de lux. De la introducerea mărcii în 1989, Lexus şi-a dobândit reputaţia de a vinde produse fiabile şi a oferi servicii de calitate către client. În anul 2006, firma de evaluare a produselor J. D. Power a declarat Lexus ca fiind cel mai fiabil brand din Statele Unite pe baza unui sondaj în care a intervievat peste 47.000 de posesori de autovehicule referitor la problemele pe care le-au avut în primii trei ani de la cumpărarea autovehiculului.

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În decembrie 2011 Toyota a înregistrat urmatoarele vânzări :

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2. General Motors. În America s-au realizat peste 3,6 milioane automobile, iar în Asia 3,3 milioane. În ţările UE s-au produs peste 1,2 milioane maşini (majoritatea covârşitoare fiind Opel). China a fost cea mai importantă ţară de producţie (2,26 milioane autoturisme), urmată de SUA cu 1,7 milioane vehicule dintre care 1,1 milioane au fost popularele camionete.

În anul 1901, Max Grabowski a fondat o companie numită "Rapid Motor Vehicle Company", care dezvolta unele dintre cele mai timpurii camioane construite vreodată. Camioanele erau echipate cu motoare cu un cilindru.

În anul 1909, compania a fost cumparată de către General Motors pentru a forma bazele lui General Motors Truck Company, din care a derivat GM Trucks. Un alt producator independent cumpărat în acelaşi an de către GN a fost Reliance Motor Car Company. 

Rapid&Reliance a fuzionat în 1911, iar în 1912 marca GMC Truck a fost prezentată pentru prima dată la Salonul Auto International de la New York. În jur de 22.000 de camioane au fost produse în acel an. În 1916, un camion GMC a traversat ţara din Seattle până la New York în trei zile, iar în 1926, un camion cu capacitatea de două tone a fost condus din New York până în San Francisco în cinci zile şi 30 de minute. 

În timpul celui de-al Doilea Razboi Mondial, GMC Truck a produs 600.000 de camioane pentru Armata S.U.A.

În 1925 GM a cumpărat o parte din acţiunile unei firme producătoare de autobuze din Chicago, Illinois, care era fondată de John D. Hertz. După ce a cumpărat şi restul de acţiuni în 1943, GM a redenumit-o GM Truck and Coach Division, şi au produs autobuze în Canada şi Statele Unite până în anii 1980. GM s-a confruntat cu o concurenţă crescută la sfârşitul anilor 70, iar în 1980 au încetat producerea de autobuze. În 1987, GMC a vândut modelele de autobuze către Transportation Manufacturing Corporation. 

În 2002, GMC a tipărit o carte numită GMC: Primii 100 de ani, în care se explica întreaga istorie a companiei. În zilele noastre GMC produce SUV-uri, camionete pick-up, van-uri, camioane uşoare şi camioane de capacitate medie. În trecut GMC a mai produs autospeciale de pompieri, ambulanţe, camioane grele, vehicule militare, rulote motorizate şi autobuze de tranzit.

În 2007 GMC a introdus Acadia, un SUV crossover, fiind primul automobil unibody al companiei. În 2009, GMC a scos pe piaţă noile all-terrain, un SUV crossover mediu, pe paltforma Theta.

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General Motors, modelul Sierra

3. Ford. Ford a produs 4,98 milioane de vehicule anul trecut, dar uzina de la Craiova a contribuit cu doar 10.000 de utilitare Transit Connect. Cifrele de vânzări au fost puternic ridicate de segmentul camionetelor şi al vehiculelor comerciale uşoare, foarte populare în SUA unde producţia totală a fost de 2,8 milioane vehicule. Ford a produs maşini în 19 ţări, dintre care 1,3 milioane în ţările UE şi 2,8 milioane în cele două Americi. Ford a produs în Germania peste 740.000 de maşini, în China peste 400.000 de vehicule, iar în Mexic peste 390.000.

Ford Motor Company este o corporaţie multinaţională americană situată pe locul trei în lume la producţia de automobile. În 2006, s-a clasat pe locul doi în SUA la producţia de automobile cu o cota de 17.5% în spatele firmei General Motors, care a avut 24.6% cotă dar înaintea companiei Toyota 15.4% şi a companiei DaimlerChrysler14.4%. Ford s-a clasat de asemenea pe locul şapte în topul celor mai mari companii din SUA cu venituri de aproximativ US$ 160.1 miliarde. În 2006, Ford a produs aproximativ 6.6 milioane de automobile şi a avut 280.000 de angajaţi în aproximativ 100 de fabrici şi alte facilităţi din întreaga lume. Având sediul în Deaborn, Michigan, o suburbie a oraşului Detroit, producătorul de automobile a fost

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fondat de către Henry Ford în anul 1903. De-a lungul timpului Ford a înglobat multe alte firme cum ar fi Lincoln şi Mercury în SUA,  Jaguar şi Land Rover în Marea Britanie sau Volvo în Suedia. Ford deţine de asemenea şi 30% din Mazda.

Ford a fost tot timpul în top zece cele mai mari companii din lume în funcţie de venituri iar în anul 1999 a fost printre cele mai profitabile companii din lume, şi al doilea cel mai mare producător de automobile din lume. Ford a introdus diferite metode de producere în masă a automobilelor şi managementul în masă a unei forţe de munca industriale, în special producţia pe banda rulantă a automobilelor. Combinaţia lui Henry Ford de fabrici eficiente, muncitori bine plătiţi şi preţuri mici a revoluţionat lumea automobilelor iar acest proces a fost cunoscut sub numele de "Fordism". Ford s-a lansat într-o fabrică modificată în 1903 cu 28.000 de dolari de la doisprezece investitori, în special de la John Francis Dodge şi Horace Elgin Dodge, care mai târziu au fondat "Compania de automobile a fraţilor Dodge". În timpul anilor de pionierat, compania a produs numai câteva bucaţi de Ford T Model pe zi într-o fabrică pe Bulevardul Mack din Detroit, Michigan. Grupuri de câte doi-trei oameni munceau la fiecare automobil, de la componente până la comenzile de la alte companii. Henry Ford a avut 40 de ani când a infiinţat compania Ford, care va avea să devină una dintre cele mai mari şi mai profitabile companii din lume, de asemenea fiind şi printre putinele companii care au supravietuit Marii Depresiuni. Ford este cea mai mare companie din lume aparţinând unei singure familii, fiind în managementul familiei Ford de mai bine de 100 de ani. 

Ford – model clasic

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Ford quote: ,,As we climb out of the recession, I am optimistic about the possibilities that lie ahead. I believe this is one of the most exciting times in our industry since the automobile began being mass produced more than 100 years ago. Today automobiles are once again on the leading edge of technology, which is enabling us to make greener, safer, smarter cars without tradeoffs in function or performance. In the near term, we expect overall industry sales volumes to continue to grow worldwide in 2011. We plan to continue introducing best-in-class new products at a rapid pace. Increased sales volume, combined with our ongoing efforts to improve productivity, should enable us to continue to improve our year-over-year performance.

We expect continued improvement in 2011, driven primarily by our growing product strength, a gradually strengthening global economy and an unrelenting focus on improving the competitiveness of the Company. Asthe U.S economy continues to recover, we anticipate U.S. industry sales volumes will increase from 11.8 million units in 2010 to somewhere in the range of 13 million to 13.5 million units this year. We also expect to see strong growth in emerging markets such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey, which will offer us significant sales volume opportunities.”

4. Honda. Marca Honda a menţinut un nivel ridicat al producţiei şi este pe locul şapte în clasmentul grupurilor auto, cu 3,6 milioane de maşini realizate anul trecut, din care două milioane în Asia şi 1,42 milioane în cele douî Americi. În Europa există uzine în Marea Britanie şi Turcia. Partea interesantă este că nu Japonia este ţara cu cea mai importantă producţie, ci SUA (954.000 faţă de 941.000). China încheie podiumul, cu peste 650.000 unităţi. Marca Nipona face maşini în 16 ţări, printre care Pakistan şi Filipine.

Honda este o companie unică printre producătorii de autoturisme japonezi. În 1946, octombrie, Soichiro Honda înfiinţează societatea care va purta numele Honda Motor Co. În 1959 este înfiinţată filiala American Honda Motor Co.

În 1973 Honda semnează contract cu Ford, pentru a livra companiei Ford motoare cu tehnologie CVCC şi mai semnează contract cu Chrysler, pentru a furniza companiei Chrysler motoare cu tehnologie CVCC. Producţia totală de motociclete atinge cifra de 20 de milioane unităţi; Începe construcţia fabricii de autoturisme din Ohio SUA, iar în 1974 se lansează modelul de motocicleta Gold Wing 1000, pe piaţa din SUA fiind cea mai mare motocicleta de croazieră care a fost construită. Honda Civic stabileşte un nou record de consum de benzina în SUA 3,3l/100 km.

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Honda Accord

Honda R&D Americas, Inc. (HRA) is responsible for creating advanced products and technologies that provide new value to Honda and Acura customers. Established in Southern California in 1975 as Honda Research California to conduct local market research and design, HRA today has the capability of "complete product creation" – developing all-new vehicles starting from market and technology research and design-styling through engineering design, prototype fabrication and testing, local parts procurement, and support for mass production preparation. With major facilities in California, Ohio, North Carolina and Florida, HRA is engaged in the development and testing of Honda and Acura automobiles, and Honda power sports and power equipment products, and is also taking a leading role in the advancement of leading-edge safety and environmental technologies.

Honda Research Institute was founded in 2003, to focus on longer term research and discovery in order to innovate Honda's current and future products. Honda Research Institute maintains three U.S. offices dedicated to the fields of material science (focused on novel functional nano-materials), computer science research (focused on human-level intelligence) and strategic venturing (investing in early-to-mid stage technology venture companies which would create strategic synergy with Honda).

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5. Fiat. Grupul italian a produs anul trecut 2,41 milioane de unităţi, dintre care circa 1,2 milioane în UE şi peste 850.000 în America de Sud. Ponderea producţiei va fi cu totul alta anul acesta când Fiat este acţionar majoritar la Chrysler, însa anul trecut cea mai mare producţie Fiat nu a fost în Italia, ci în Brazilia (765.000). În Italia s-au realizat 740.000 maşini ale grupului, iar în Polonia, 440.000. Producţia Alfa Romeo a fost anul trecut de circa 120.000 unităţi, cea a Lancia de circa 98.000, Ferrari a depăşit 6.600, iar Maserati, 5.800. Chrysler a produs anul trecut 1,57 milioane vehicule, dintre care mai mult de jumătate au fost construite în SUA şi 475.000 în Canada. Şi Mexic a avut o producţie importantă de 250.000 unitati.

FIAT, care este un acronim de patru litere pentru Fabbrica Italiana di Automobili Torino, este cel mai important grup financiar şi industrial al Italiei. Sediul central al grupului se află în Torino, regiunea Piemont, în nord-vestul Italiei.

Încă de la înfiinţare, FIAT a dovedit a avea un simţ special pentru detectarea celor mai promiţătoare pieţe, în 1908 înfiinţându-se FIAT Automobile Co. în Statele Unite. Producţia a crescut şi a fost extinsă pentru a nu include numai automobile, ci şi vehicule comerciale uşoare, motoare navale, camioane şi tramvaie. Au fost lansate multe modele, inclusiv prima maşină cu patru locuri, FIAT 509. Compania a decis începerea producţiei industriale de masă, considerată ca singura modalitate de a reduce costurile prohibitive ale autovehiculelor.

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Veniturile au reînceput să crească, la fel ca şi numărul angajaţilor. Angajamentul FIAT în cercetare şi inovare a fost confirmat de lansarea a două noi modele, FIAT 500 şi FIAT 1400.Pentru prima dată echipamentul standard includea un sistem de încălzire şi ventilare. Cercetarea a continuat şi în sectoarele naval şi aeronautic, prima aeronavă italiană fiind G80. Modelul FIAT 1400, lansat în 1953, a fost prima maşină FIAT oferită şi în varianta diesel. Anul 1958 a marcat începutul unei ascensiuni fără precedent în producţia de autovehicule dar şi de echipamente agricole.

În 1983 vor fi achiziţionate şi Alfa Romeo şi Maserati, prestigioase mărci de maşini sport.

Activităţile multilaterale ale FIAT au fost incorporate în companii independente, născându-se astfel FIAT Ferroviaria, FIAT Avio, FIAT Trattori, FIAT Engineering, Comau, Teksid şi Magneti Marelli alături de FIAT Auto.

1980 a fost anul noului autoturism FIAT, numit Panda, desenat de Giugiaro şi urmat doi ani mai târziu de maşina care va marca reînnoirea FIAT Auto: FIAT Uno, o maşină ce a venit cu inovaţii importante la partea electronică, în alegerea materialelor şi în adoptarea unui motor curat: 1000 Fire.

În 1989, şi-a făcut apariţia altă maşină de mare succes: Fiat Tipo, aleasa maşina anului pentru soluţiile tehnice de avangardă pe care le asigura.

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Fiat Topolino

2011 U.S. YTD Performance: 500 monthly demand peaked at 40,000 shoppers in August (see chart below). The growth coincided with a blitzkrieg of advertisements (including those that leveraged Jennifer Lopez). Even with declines in September and October, 500 averaged 28,301 shoppers to date. 500’s 28,301 average shoppers trailed Mini Coopers (36,000), but bettered Scion tC (15,000), though those are not launching models.

500 conversion (sales/shoppers) has also trailed those same rivals. Its conversion has averaged 6.6% in the period, vs. 14.8% for Mini Cooper’s and 13.9% for Scion tC’s. However, as a launching model we’d expect 500 conversion to be low, as it often takes a few months for supply, mix, and distribution to be optimized. Furthermore, Fiat has resisted the temptation to boost conversion with incentives. Since August, 500’s average unit incentive was $467, roughly half of Mini’s $986.

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Fiat 500 USA

6. Dodge este un brand de automobile uşoare şi camioane grele, puse în piaţă de către Corporaţia Chrysler din 1928 pînă în prezent.

Înainte de 1928, compania a fost numită Dodge Brothers Motor Vehicle Company. Dodge, ca şi alte subramuri, face acum parte din baza germană DaimlerChrysler AG după ce Daimler –Benz a fost cumparat de Chrysler în 1998. În 1901 John Francis Dodge şi Horace Elgin Dodge au mutat uzina lor Dodge Brothers Bicycle & Machine Factory în Detroit, Michigan. În 1914 Dodge Brothers au pornit compania lor proprie auto, pe care au numit-o Dodge Brothers Motor Vehicle Company. Modelele anterioare aveau ceva asemănări cu modelul Ford T, dar cu aşa rafinamente ca

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manivela electrică au devenit mai populare în clasa mijlocie. Noile maşini Dodge au avut un succes comercial. În 1925 Dodge Brothers Company a fost cumparat de Dillo, Read and Company cu 146 milioane dolari, se zice că aceasta ar fi cea mai mare tranzacţie cash din istorie de până azi. Dillon Read la rîndul său a vândut Dodge Corporaţiei Chrysler pe 31 iulie, 1928. Ca urmare a cumpărării British Rootes şi Simca din Franta de către Chrysler, şi ca rezultat a stabilirii Chrysler Europa la sfârşitul anilor 1960, brand-ul Dodge era folosit ca vehicule comerciale uşoare, anterior marcate ca Commer şi pick-up-uri şi modele wan a companiei Simca 1100.

Dodge Firearrow

Cel mai comun dintre acestea era modelul Dodge 50, pe larg folosit în folosul companiei şi militărie, dar mai rar văzute în afara Marii Britanii. Urmând falimentul Companiei Chrysler în Europa în 1977, uzina Dodge şi câteva drepturi de a folosi numele Dodge în Europa a fost cumpărat de Renault, care treptat a re-utilat rangurile de wan-uri şi camioane între anii 1980, eventual lăsând să cadă numele şi să producă în uzină motoare. Dodge este acum parte a companiei Daimler Chrysler. Din 2005, brand-ul Dodge a devenit cunoscut pentru camioanele sale, care acopereau 78% din diviziunea de vânzări. Dodge încearcă să schimbe aceasta cu introducerea noului Dodge Charger. Marca Dodge va fi de asemenea promovată în Europa. În prezent Viper este unicul brand vehicol în aceste vânzări, dar DaimlerChrysler va începe să concureze din greu cu brand-ul Caliber şi modelul Nitro printr-o imagine mai masculină.

Dezvoltarea economiei bazată pe

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industria constructoare de maşini în SUA

Un rol special în economia americană îl joacă companiile transnaționale. Coca Cola, Colgate, Microsoft, Ford, IBM, General Electric, Intel, Exxon, Wal-Mart, Mc Donald’s, reprezintă imaginea SUA în întreaga lume. În topul primelor zece corporații transnaționale din lume, primele cinci sunt din SUA. Activitatea lor se concentrează asupra ramurilor cu reale perspective de dezvoltare și de obținere a profitului. De altfel, companiile transnaționale sunt vârful de lance al ofensivei americane în contextul globalizării economice.

În anii 80, societățile transnaționale dețineau o treime din producția industrială, peste jumătate din comerțul exterior. Valoarea mărfurilor și a serviciilor asigurate de transnaționalele de proveniență americană se ridica în această perioadă la 350 miliarde dolari. Exprimat în procente, firmele americane reprezentau în 1999, 71,8% din valoarea primelor 50 de societăți transnaționale din lume . Prin investițiile directe în străinătate, marile companii americane obțin profituri uriașe dar mai ales capătă posibilitatea de a controla sursele de materii prime.

Companiile americane sunt prezente pe piețele de înalt nivel în ceea ce privește consumul dar în regiunile producătoare de materii prime. Totodată companiile americane transferă în exterior modelul american de planificare și de management a activității economice, și în egală măsură și noile tehnologii de mare randament și productivitate . Globalizarea economiei duce la dezvoltarea companiilor transnaționale.americane. Ele sunt astăzi o puternică forță în economia mondială și un adevărat liant al economiei americane care se regăsește și dincolo de frontierele naționale.

Secretul succesului american este legat de sumele uriașe investite în cercetare și dezvoltare, atât de către companiile private dar și de către autoritățile federale. Un alt factor al succesului îl reprezintă gradul de pregătire și numărul personalului de cercetare. Revoluția tehnico-științifică a pornit din Statele Unite. Cei mai mulți deținători ai premiului Nobel în știință sunt americani. Nivelul înalt al tehnologiei utilizate în industria americană determină repartizarea forței de muncă în domeniul serviciilor într-un procent uriaș (73,2% ) prin comparație cu 24,1% în industrie și 2,7%în agricultură.

În anul 2010, vânzările de autovehicule au crescut cu 11% față de 2009, la 11,6 milioane de unități. Cele mai mari vânzări le-au avut Ford cu 1.935.000 de autovehicule, Toyota cu 1.760.000 și Chrysler cu 1.085.000 de unități.

Vânzările de autovehicule din SUA au crescut cu 11% în 2010 la 11,6 milioane de unităţi, acestea revenindu-şi după un an, 2009, foarte dificil pentru constructorii auto locali, în care General Motors (GM) şi Chrysler au intrat în faliment. Vânzările auto s-au situat la 1,14 milioane de maşini, cu 11% peste nivelul din 2009, potrivit datelor companiei de analiză a pieţei auto Autodata.

Anul 2010 a fost marcat de relansarea celor mai mari trei constructori auto americani, GM, Chrysler şi Ford. Dintre aceştia, Ford este singurul care nu a fost nevoit să ceară protecţie în faţa creditorilor sub legea falimentului. GM, principalul producător auto din SUA, piaţa pe care

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are o cotă de 19,1%, a reuşit şi o revenire spectaculoasă pe bursă, în luna noiembrie. Vânzările grupului au urcat cu 6,3% anul trecut, la 2,215 milioane de maşini.

Pentru Ford, vânzările au crescut cu 19%, la 1,935 milioane de autovehicule. Cota de piaţă a avansat pentru al doilea an consecutiv, la 16,7%. Chrysler a reuşit să comercializeze 1,085 milioane de maşini anul trecut, cu 17% mai multe decat în 2009. Cota de piaţă a constructorului auto a fost de 9,4%.

În schimb, vânzările celui mai mare producător auto mondial, Toyota, au scăzut cu 0,3%, la 1,76 milioane de unităţi.

Conform sursei wall-street.ro, Don Esmond, responsabilul Toyota pentru SUA, a declarat că: "Ieşim din cea mai dificilă perioadă din istoria noastră de 53 de ani". El a atribuit performanţele slabe de anul trecut suspendării vânzării şi producţiei principalelor modele Toyota în ianuarie, în America de Nord, în urma unor acţiuni masive de rechemare pentru reparaţii.

Toyota, care avea în 2010 o cotă de piaţă de 15,2% în SUA, a rechemat peste zece milioane de maşini în întreaga lume începând cu toamna lui 2009. Problemele tehnice ale autovehiculelor au afectat imaginea grupului de campion al calităţii. În plus, concurenţii americani devin tot mai competitivi la capitolul maşini ecologice şi de dimensiuni reduse.

Pentru anul 2010, constructorii auto anticipează continuarea procesului de revenire a sectorului, chiar dacă nivelul vânzărilor nu se va ridica la cel anterior crizei. GM mizează pe vânzările de 13-13,5 milioane de autovehicule în acest an, 2011, în SUA, în timp ce Ford estimează că va comercializa 12,5-13,5 milioane de unităţi.

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Aşadar, luna iulie a anului 2011 reprezintă un come back sesizabil al constructorilor de automobile americani şi o cădere gravă a celor japonezi.

Cele mai bune exemple sunt date de mărcile Jeep care au avut o creştere cu 46% faţă de aceeaşi perioadă a anului trecut. Acum marca italo-americană, Jeep, a vândut în luna iulie 38.691 de unităţi faţă de cele 26.466 unităţi realizate în 2010.

Pe aceelaşi trend se află şi mărcile KIA, Volvo, GMC, Lincoln, Volkswagen sau Chevrolet care anunţă creşteri sesizabile. Marii perdanţi pe cea mai mare piaţă din America sunt următorii: smart (-41%), Jaguar (-35%), Cadillac (-25%), Toyota (-22.81%) şi Subaru -9.39%).

Acest lucru înseamnă că americanii doresc să cumpere din ce în ce mai mult modele 100% americane sau cel puţin maşini realizate în Europa.

Cea mai mare scădere în SUA a fost înregistrată de Honda Motors USA (-28.40%) şi Toyota Mo Co care are o scădere de 22.70%. Aceste cifre pot parea mici însa daca ne uităm la faptul că Toyota a vândut cu până la 40.000 de maşini mai puţin sau Honda cu mai putin de 30.000 de unităţi faţă de anul 2010, cifrele au o nouă însemnătate.

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Industria are urmatorul rol in economia Statelor Unite:

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Over the past decade imports have become an increasingly important source of supply for both U.S consumers and producers, partly due to changes in the relative prices of imported and domestic goods. From 1997 to 2007, imports as a share of all goods and services consumed in the United States increased from 18 percent to 23 percent. This aspect of globalization has affected the size and structure of the U.S. economy, especially the manufacturing sector, but it has also complicated the task of measuring economic growth and industry performance. Policymakers and researchers are concerned that increased outsourcing to lower-cost offshore suppliers has affected key economic measures such as output, value added, and labor input. Difficulties in measuring price change for imported goods can affect measured growth in real gross domestic product (GDP). Similarly, problems identifying outsourcing-related activities could affect measures of industry contributions to economic growth and productivity in manufacturing and other sectors.

For several decades, imports have been the major source of U.S. supply for final consumer goods such as apparel, toys, shoes, motor vehicles, and consumer electronics, and for certain kinds of business investment goods. More recently, the import share has increased for final goods such as furniture and other household products, with important implications for the

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measurement of domestic consumption prices. Another recent trend has been strong growth in the use of imported intermediate materials by U.S. manufacturing industries, partly at the expense of domestic goods. A significant portion of this trade occurs among affiliated parties within U.S. multinational companies. This form of offshore outsourcing—substitution of imported for domestic materials—has raised questions about the measurement of real value added by industry and its impact on real GDP growth.

Limitations in the measurement of imports have somewhat different implications for the various approaches typically used by statistical agencies to measure GDP.175 Only the final expenditures approach and the production approach provide measures of both nominal and real GDP. Because imports are subtracted using either approach, import growth has important measurement implications. In the final expenditures approach, which is featured in the United States, real GDP is an aggregate of personal consumption expenditures, private equipment and structures, government consumption and investment, and exports less all imports, both final and intermediate. In the production approach, which is the featured approach in many other countries, real GDP is an aggregate of the real value added originating in all industries, including government. Value added equals gross output less intermediate inputs, which include imported inputs. As a result, under the production approach, only the imports consumed in intermediate uses are subtracted. In recent years, intermediate goods and services have accounted for slightly more than 50 percent of all imports.

Data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) annual industry accounts can be used to identify not only the uses of imported goods (intermediate vs. final) but also the overall importance of imported products by measuring their value relative to the value of comparable domestically produced goods. For this paper, we use data from the BEA’s annual industry accounts and from the BEA’s surveys of multinational companies (MNCs) to determine how growth in imported intermediate inputs has affected growth in real value added by industry (real GDP growth), and to assess the impact of alternative assumptions about the use of imports and the behavior of import prices. In this paper, we calculate real value added by industry and real value added for all industries (real GDP) using alternative assumptions about industry use of imports and the behavior of imported input prices. In the current (baseline) methodology, the allocation of imports to industries is based on an “import comparability” assumption. This assumes that the portion of intermediate inputs attributable to imports is calculated as a percentage of the total purchase value, using the economy-wide ratio of commodity imports to the total domestic supply of the commodity. Alternative assumptions about the use of imports by selected industries are based on the BEA’s data on imports by the U.S. parents of foreign affiliates and unaffiliated parties. For the deflation of imported intermediate inputs, the current methodology relies primarily on import-price indexes compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Alternative assumptions about import-price change are made to determine a threshold required for import price biases to impact real GDP, the manufacturing sector, and selected manufacturing industries.

The remainder of this paper is presented in four sections. The next section provides background on how the industry accounts can be used to measure outsourcing and the role of imported inputs at the industry level, how the BEA’s import-use tables are compiled, and how imported inputs are used in constructing real value added by industry. After that we briefly describe the BEA’s International Economic Accounts, including the MNC data, and explain how

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the MNC-based import-use tables are compiled. The following section presents empirical results that compare the current (baseline) estimates from the annual industry accounts with results from the MNCbased import-use tables. This section also describes results based on different assumptions about the behavior of import prices. We conclude with a brief summary and recommendations for improving data on imported inputs by industry and import-price indexes.

The annual industry accounts are estimated within the framework of balanced make and use tables, which allows for integrated analysis of industry output, inputs, employment, final demand, and imports. The annual input-output (I-O) accounts provide a time series of detailed, consistent information on the flows of goods and services that both comprise industry production processes and that are included in final expenditures. Estimates of the supply of commodities are prepared at nearly the same level of detail as in the benchmark I-O accounts and are then aggregated to the higher publication level used for the annual industry accounts. The GDP by industry accounts feature estimates of nominal and real value added by industry. Value added is defined as an industry’s gross output (sales or receipts and other operating income) minus its intermediate inputs (energy, materials, and purchased services). Intermediate inputs are acquired from either domestic or foreign sources (imports). Price and quantity indexes of gross output, intermediate inputs, and value added are published for industries, industry groups, and broad sectors in the GDP by industry accounts.

For this paper, alternative import-use tables were constructed using data from the BEA’s surveys of MNCs. Companies in these surveys are classified according to the International Survey Industry (ISI) classification system, a system developed by the BEA that is based on the NAICS. The MNC surveys provide information on total imports by U.S. parent firms (from both affiliated and unaffiliated parties) classified by the U.S. parents industry, and imports by U.S. parent firms from foreign affiliates classified by the foreign affiliate’s industry. For the “benchmark” survey years, additional product information on imports is provided. These broad product categories are listed below:

• Food, live animals, beverages, and tobacco

• Crude materials, inedible, except fuels

• Mineral fuels, lubricants, and related materials

• Chemicals and related products

• Industrial machinery and equipment

• Office machines and automatic data processing machines

• Telecommunications, sound equipment, and other electrical machinery and parts

• Road vehicles and parts

• Other transportation equipment

• Other products

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Linking the foreign affiliate to its U.S. parent provides the basis for a commodity and industry classification for the import-use framework. Industry classification is based on the ISI industry of the U.S. parent and commodity classification is based on the ISI industry of the foreign affiliate. To develop this mapping, imported products from the foreign affiliate were compared to the ISI industry of the foreign affiliate. In most cases, the ISI industry of the foreign affiliate aligns well with the product imported. For example, a foreign affiliate classified in pharmaceuticals and medicines manufacturing (ISI 3254) ships products categorized in chemicals and related products (NAICS 325). Because industry classifications are not available for unaffiliated parties, imports from unaffiliated firms are assumed to resemble those of affiliated firms. The import-use tables based on ISI industry categories were converted to the 1997 NAICS-based structure used for the Annual Industry Accounts. Import shares for commodities purchased by each industry were calculated as the ratio of the commodity import value for that industry and the total import value for that industry. In total, the MNC-based imports accounted for about 60–65 percent of all imported intermediate inputs presented in the annual industry accounts.

Average Annual Growth Rate for Real Value Added by Industry with Price Adjustments,

1999 - 2006

(Comparison of International Accounts and Annual Industry Accounts Import-Use Tables)

In the annual industry accounts, imports of intermediate inputs are constructed using the import comparability assumption for purposes of separately deflating domestic and imported intermediate inputs in the calculation of real value added. An analysis of import shares for the annual industry accounts compared to import shares constructed using actual source data from the International Accounts shows that the import comparability assumption provides a good approximation of imported intermediate use. Differences at detailed levels, however, may be the result of using MNC company data rather than establishment-based data. In addition, while

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MNC imports account for about 60–65 percent of total imported intermediate inputs in the annual industry accounts, it is possible that import usage differs among the smaller firms that account for the remaining 35–40 percent. The possible impact of this coverage difference may be worth examining more closely.

Most notably, data from the international accounts suggest that growth in real imported materials inputs is likely understated in the annual industry accounts. However, this understatement does not currently lead to large differences in real value added growth for all industries (real GDP) or for manufacturing because of the limited availability of import-price data used to deflate the import-content of intermediate inputs. A simulation of a range of bias adjustments for import prices used in deflation suggests that better import-price measurement will improve the accuracy of real value added by industry; however, the overall magnitude of the bias adjustments would need to be about 6.5 percent to affect real GDP growth by at least one-half of a percentage point, irrespective of whether import shares are from the annual industry accounts or based on data from the international accounts.

Further study is required to develop a better understanding of how imported inputs affect industry output, employment, real value added, and contributions to GDP. More research is also needed to determine the sensitivity of these results to the assumptions used by the BEA for the annual industry accounts with respect to the classification of imported goods and services, the distribution of goods and services by using industry, and the behavior of import prices. The BEA will continue to review these assumptions and will further investigate company-based data from the international accounts that could help evaluate the assumptions underlying the industry distributions. The BEA is also interested in working with the BLS International Price Program to try to develop improved price indexes for the deflation of imported intermediate inputs in both the NIPAs and annual industry accounts. The BEA is also interested in the idea of input-price indexes that are proposed by the BLS. These input-price indexes could be used to deflate total intermediate inputs without concern for the sourcing mix. Input-price indexes, in conjunction with domestic price indexes, could be used to calculate import price indexes, allowing for the continued study of imported intermediate inputs.

The BEA plans to investigate these differences in more detail with the goal of obtaining improved industry distributions of imported intermediate inputs in the annual industry accounts. Better grounding of these assumptions is important not only for understanding the role of imported inputs in the U.S. economy, but also for developing more reliable quantity and price indexes for intermediate inputs and value added by industry.

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Gradul de dezvoltare a industriei de maşini caracterizează puterea industrială şi implicit economică a unei ţări, întrucât în statele dezvoltate (SUA, Japonia, China, Germania, Marea Britanie) aceasta reprezintă 30-40 % din valoarea totală a producţiei industriale.

Amplasarea centrelor industriei construcţiilor de maşini este determinată de :

- Proximitatea marilor centre metalurgice pentru subramurile sau consumatoare de metale ( Volga-Ural, Manchester- Liverpool, Marile Lacuri, etc.)

- Existenţa forţei de muncă calificată şi înalt calificată prin subramuri de mare precizie şi a unor institute de cercetare ştiinţifică şi de învăţământ superior

- Marile oraşe ale lumii ce reprezintă mari centre consumatoare

- Proximitatea căilor de comunicaţie, în principal maritime şi fluviale ce asigură transportul materiilor prime şi al produselor finite ( de ex. Marile porturi ale lumii : Los Angeles, New York, Singapore, Londra, etc. )

Industria constructoare de masini reprezinta dezvoltarea,producerea, comercializarea si vinderea automobilelor, fiind una dintre cele mai importante sectoare economice de venituri din lume. In 2007,productia mondiala a atins un varf de 73,3 milioane de euro. In 2009, productia a scazut cu 13,5 la suta la 61 milioane de euro.

Vânzările în S.U.A au scăzut de la 21,2 la sută la 10,4 milioane de unităţi. China a devenit cea mai mare piaţă din lumea Autovehiculelor, atât în vânzări cât şi de producţie, crescând în 2009 cu 45 % la 13,6 mil. unităţi.

Productivitatea medie per angajat în industrie ajunge la aproximativ 26,670 de euro, în condiţiile în care numărul salariaţilor este de aproximativ 270.000. Aprecierea cifrei de afaceri a avut ca sector principal finalizarea investiriilor străine de peste 1,6 miliarde de euro şi punerea în funcţiune a capacităţilor de producţie, destinate în principal exporturilor.

Producătorii de componente sunt o altă mare secţiune în America, alcătuit din aproape 5000 de firme, incluzând firme din companii japoneze europene şi canadiene. Aceste firme asigură piaţa de echipamente şi pentru piese de schimb. Numeroase alte industrii susţin industria automobilelor. Acestea includ asigurări, protecţie, produse petroliere, proiectări de autostrăzi şi străzi şi industria de construcţii. Şi alte industrii precum motelurile, cinematografele şi fast foodurile, îşi datorează existenţa mobilităţii asigurate de automobil.

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Producţia Globală de Automobile:

Industria de utilaj, echipament tehnic şi industrial. Această ramură produce utilaje şi echipament tehnic şi industrial, utilaj minier şi petrolier, utilaj metalurgic, maşini-unelte, utilaje şi echipamente industriale, de prelucrare a lemnului, a materialelor de construcţii, industriei textile şi alimentare. În ultimele decenii s-a trecut la fabricarea roboţiilor industriali, maşinilor-unelte cu comandă electronică şi computerizată, fapt ce a mărit considerabil productivitatea muncii şi produsele, mai ales în Japonia, dar şi în C.S.I , S.U.A, Germania, Italia şi Franţa.

Pentru statele mai mici se remarcă o specializare în diverse produse: utilaj minier şi sidelurgie în Cehia şi Slovacia, utilaj petrolier în România, rulmenţi în Suedia, utilaje de textile în Polonia, maşinile-unelte în Elveţia. S.U.A produce utilaje şi echipamente industriale în regiuni industriale de tip megalopolis şi conurbaţie : BosWAsh, Baltimore,New York.

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Topul Producătorilor de Automobile:

1. Toyota Motor Corporation ( Japonia ) : Daihatsu ; Hino ; Lexus ; Scion ; Toyota

2. General Motors Company ( U.S.A ) : Buick; Cadillac; Chevrolet; Daewoo; Gmc; Holden; Opel; Vauxhall.

3. Volkswagen Group Ag ( Germania ) : Audi; Bentley; Bugatti; Lamborghini; Scania; Seat; Skoda; Volkswagen; Volkswagen Commercial Vehicles

4. Ford Motor Company ( U.S.A ) : Ford; Lincoln; Mercury; Troller

5. Hyundai Motor Company ( U.S.A ) : Hyundai ; Kia

6. PSA Peugeot Citroen S.A. ( Franta ) : Citroen; Peugeot;

7. Honda Motor Company ( Japonia ) : Acura; Honda

8. Nissan Motor Company ( Japonia) : Infiniti ; Nissan

9. Fiat S.p.A ( Italia ) : Abarth; Alfa Romeo; Ferrari; Fiat; Fiat Professional; Irisbus; Iveco; Lancia; Maserati

10. Suzuki Motor Corporation ( Japonia ) : Marturi Suzuki; Pak Suzuki Motors; Suzuki

11. Renault S.A ( Franta ) : Dacia; Renault; Renault Samsung

12. Daimler AG ( Germany ) : Freightliner ; Master; Maybach; Mercedes- Benz;

Mitsubishi Fuso; Orion; Setra; Smart; Thimas Built; Western Star;

13 Chana Automobile Company, Ltd ( Republica China ) : Chana; Hafei

14. BMW AG ( Germania ) : Bmw; Mini ; Rolls- Royce

15. Mazda Motor Corporation ( Japonia ) : Mazda

16. Chrysler Group, LLC ( U.S.A ) : Chrysler; Dodge; GEM; Jeep; Ram

17. Mitsubishi Motors Corporation ( Japonia ) : Mitsubishi

18. Beijing Automotive Industry Holding Corporation. LTd ( Republica China ) : Baw; Foton.

19. Tata Motors, Ltd ( India ) : Hispano; Jaguar; Land Rover; Tata; Tata Daewoo

20. Dongfeng Motor Corporation (Republica China) : Dongfeng

21. First Automotive Group Corporation ( Republica China ) : Besturn; Freewind; Haima; Hongqi; Jiaxing; Vita; Xiali

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22. Chery Automobile Company Ltd ( Republica China) : Chery ; Riich ; Rely

23. Fuji Heavy Industries, LTd ( Japonia ) : Subaru

24. BYA Auto ( Republica China ) : BYD

25. Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation ( Republica China ) : MG; SsangYong; Roewe; Soyat ; Yuejin ;

26. Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Company,LTd ( Republica China) : JAC

27. Geely Automobile ( Republica China) : Geely; Maple; Volvo

28. Isuzu Motors,Ltd ( Japan ) : Isuzu

29. Brilliance China Automotive Holding.LTf ( Republica China ) : Brilliance; Jinbei;

30. OAO AvtoVAZ (Rusia) : Lada; VAZ

Industria automobilelor, industria care produce automobile şi alte vehicule care folosesc benzină pentru a merge, cum are fi autobuze, camioane şi motociclete. Industria automobilelor este una din cele mai importante industrii din lume care afectează nu numai economia dar şi cultura lumii. Asigură slujbe pentru milioane de oameni, generează milioane de dolari în profituri globale. Automobilele au revoluţionat transportul în secolul 20, schimbând pentru totdeauna modul în care oameni trăiesc, călătoresc şi muncesc.

Construcţia de maşini este printre cea mai importantă industrie din lume. Companiile sunt multinaţionale, adică sunt preluate de companii din străinătate. Aceste companii fac sau importă maşinile făcute de companii din alte ţări. Industria de automobile americană consistă din trei companii mari americane şi alte nouă companii ori germane sau japoneze, care produc vehicule uşoare, plus alte 100 de companii care produc maşini comerciale (cum ar fi autobuze sau camioane mari). Industria a produs 12.1 milioane de autovehicule în 1997. Sunt trei mari companii care produc maşini în America: General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler Company (sunt denumite în vorbirea de zi cu zi cele „ Trei Mari” ) care asigură trei pătrimi din angajările directe din America de Nord.

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Primele concepte

Industria automobilelor influenţează direct economia Statelor Unite ale Americii şi a lumii întregi. Într-un an normal industria de automobile generează aproape 17% din livrările de bunuri durabile (proiectate să ţină cel puţin 3 ani). Producţia de automobile consumă cantităţi mari de fier, oţel, aluminiu şi cauciuc natural. Industria mai consumă: cupru, zinc, geam, piele, plastic, plumb şi platină consumând astfel mai mult decât orice altă industrie din America. În 1997, vânzătorii de automobile au realizat un venit de peste 284 de milioane de dolari, cam 3.5 din PIB (produsul intern brut).

Importurile excesive de automobile străine în 1980-1990 au ameninţat puterea constructorilor domestici, dar după 1990 vânzările au explodat. Importurile au scăzut de la 31% în 1987 la 16% în 1997. Cu vânzările de automobile străine împuţinându-se producătorii de automobile americani au avut numai de caştigat. În 1996 industria automobilelor avea o cotă de 9% de americani care lucrau activ producând bunuri de lung consum, cea mai mare valoare de la 1979 încoace. Angajaţii în fabricile de automobile au avut un salariu cumulat de aproape 13.4 miliarde de dolari - o creştere cu 50% faţă de 1990 - şi totalizează 14% din totalul de bani plătiţi de producătorii de bunuri durabile.

Import / export de automobile

Vânzările de automobile americane nu se vor mări substanţial în viitor poate cu vreo 1 sau 2 % pe an, în timp ce alte ţări vor avea un coeficient de export mai mare poate cu 2, 3, 5, sau chiar 10 ori mai mare decât acum. Deoarece exportul de automobile va fi un mod de dezvoltare a industriei, America a încheiat tratate cum ar fi: Memorandumul de înţelegere cu Korea (1993), Pactul de liber schimb Nord American (NAFTA, 1994), şi pactul cu Japonia în 1995. Aceste pacturi şi altele au mărit exportul în alte ţări cum ar fi Japonia, Mexic, Koreea de multe ori.

Construcţia de maşini include unele decizii majore despre designul maşinii, cum va fi construită şi cum va fi vândută. Managerii de fabrici trebuie să coordoneze producţia fabricii, să

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cumpere materia primă şi să antreneze muncitorii - şi totul dintr-un buget. "Echipele" de marketing trebuie să vândă maşina şi să dea banii "înapoi" investitorilor. Noi modele sunt introduse anual, dar designul unei singure maşini poate dura ani de la planşă de desen şi până la prezentarea în show-romuri. O companie tipică are mai multe modele de maşini la diferite stadii de dezvoltare oricând. Un grup în interioriorul companiei ia principalele decizii asupra unei maşini şi includ deseori un preşedinte al adunării, membrii adunării, preşedintele fabricii, directorii de marketing, directorul de vânzări, directorul financiar şi conducătorul proiectului. Aceşti conducători trebuie să stabilească bugetul, să angajeze oameni şi să stabilească termenul de livrare. Decât să trimită idei pas cu pas, când s-a ajuns la acel pas, conducătorii colaborează de la început cu designeri şi inginerii într-un proces numit inginerie simultană pentru a mări viteza şi eficienţa producerii unei maşini.

Înainte de a fi construită maşina trebuie să fie cercetată, desenată, şi dezvoltată într-un proiect pe care se poate lucra. Cercetătorii caută ce merge şi ce nu merge într-o maşină bazându-se pe sondaje de opinie şi analizează ce se cumpară, iar apoi sugerează ce fel de maşină să construiască. Designererii muncesc pentru a da o formă acestor idei realizând părţi tangibile sau produse. Inginerii adoptă piesele de schimb existente şi desenează planurile pentru un prototip. Producătorii încep să construiască mai multe prototipuri înainte de a trimite prototipul la vreo fabrică. Planificatorii de produs monitorizează procesul şi au grijă ca maşina nouă aprobată să fie terminată la timp şi în cadrul bugetului. Cum avansează tehnologia, noile maşini includ noi sisteme şi inovaţii. Schimbarea şi inovaţiile, în industria automobilelor au nevoie de timp pentru a fi implementate şi trebuie să treacă de nişte teste realizate de guvern şi alte companii de specialitate. Sistemele noi sunt introduse de obicei una cate una. O componentă nouă (cum ar fi sistemul de frânare ) într-o variantă finală poate dura chiar 4 ani până va fi implementată într-un model nou. O parte din acest timp este folosit pentru designul, construcţia şi instalarea produsului. Testarea noului sistem pe o copie în mărime naturală (de clei, de ceară sau de lemn) şi prepararea vehiculelor pentru a vedea performanţa per total i-a şi el timp. Între timp, membrii staffului ai departamentului de marketing şi al celui de vânzări selectează un nou nume pentru produs, şi conduc sondaje pentru a vedea cât de vândută va fi maşina şi pentru a rezolva problemele anticipate care ar putea apare pe parcurs. Ţintele produsului iniţial sunt stabilite în concordanţă cu cercetările de piaţă făcute.

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Proiecţie de automobil

Odată ce conducerea aprobă noul nume şi modelul final, încep să apară primele prototipuri din fabrici (ateliere). Comitetul încearcă prototipul, iar apoi experţii trec la testarea excesivă a produsului, incluzând testul din "tunelul vântului", "tunelul prafului", teste pe pista de încercare a fabricii, testul de călduri tropicale sau de "friguri" din Antarctica, şi în final testul de duritate. Înainte ca un nou model să fie construit, fabrica trebuie mai întâi să fie reutilată. Reutilarea fabricilor implică şi schimbarea maşinăriilor pentru a suporta construcţia unui nou tip de maşină. Producătorii de unelte, saboţi, şi de vopsele se uită la specificaţiile noii maşini examinând noile piese şi colaborând cu oficiul de design al noilor unelte pentru a realiza unelte sau a modifica maşinile.

După ce materialele prime au fost primite şi inspectate în fabrică, sunt îndoite, turnate, "ştampilate", sau modelate în diferite forme. Muncitorii preselor operează maşini care ştampilează (le taie în forme) fier in bucato folosite pentru caroserie. Formării de fibră de sticlă şi tăietorii acesteia formează bucaţi mari de plastic şi taie marginile aspre. Vopsitorii şi operatorii de puşti cu vopsea fac ultimele modificări ale plasticului şi al caroseriei. Deoarece aceste munci de modelare şi vopsire au fost automatizate, este nevoie de analişti de computer, programatori şi tehnicieni. Aceste poziţi cu orientări informatice de obicei cer Bac-ul sau o şcoală post gimnazială.

Fabrică de automobile

În anul 1929 s-a produs o criza la bursa din New York şi de aceea unele companii chiar au disparut datorită nevânzării modelelor lor. În America au supravieţuit abia cei Trei Mari cu multe pierderi din punct de vedere financiar. Ford a supravieţuit după ce a cumpărat o fabrică de procesat soia, GM a supravieţuit folosind conceptul volumului standard. S-a creat un sindicat al lucrătorilor în 1936 şi au hotărât oprirea lucrului la GM. Acea greva de 6 săptămâni a fost dusă de 2000 de oameni însă a afectat 150.000 de oameni din diferite ramuri economice.

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În timpul celui de-al doilea război mondial companiile nu au avut de suferit după ce America a intrat în război, deşi maşinile nu se vindeau, dar nici nu se mai produceau. Fiecare fabrică s-a "restructurat" făcând diferite chestii: Ford: bombardiere, Chrysler: tancuri, GM: bombe şi muniţie precum şi puşti de orice fel, iar alte companii au produs camioane pentru militari. După 1946 maşinile au fost din nou vândute în cantităţi record 4.8 milioane de unităţi bătând vechiul record stabilit în 1929 de 1 milion. Acest număr va fi împins la 7.2 milioane în 1955.

După Primul Război Mondial

În anul 1973 a fost o criză a petrolului care a crescut preţul benzinei peste noapte cu 100%. Atunci guvernul a intervenit, a dat standarde de economie a benzinei. Criza a fost declanşată de comitetul ţărilor care exportau petrol care a tăiat furnizarea către America. Atunci au profitat maşinile japoneze care aveau un consum mic: Nissan, Toyota, şi nou venitul Honda Motor Co. Ltd. Companiile au descoperit noi metode de a salva benzina şi de a nu mai polua aerul (datorită Actului de aer curat din 1970). Motoarele diesel, convertorii catalitici, injecţia, caroserii aerodinamice, maşini cu tracţiune pe faţă, şi alte tehnologii au fost introduse pentru a micşora costul autovehiculului şi pentru a micşora nivelul de benzină folosit.

Profitul făcut de fabricile de automobile a scăzut drastic la începutul lui 1980 atunci când ei se reprofilau pe maşini mici, compania Chrysler era aproape de pragul de faliment. Executivul lui Ford Lee Iacocca s-a mutat la Chrysler şi i-a ajutat să obţină un împrumut de la guvern în 1980 şi a salvat compania de la moarte. Au apărut maşinile de lux în Japonia şi Europa: Toyota a început să producă linia Lexus, iar germanii BMW şi Mercedes-Benz s-au reprofilat pe maşini de lux, la fel şi în Anglia Rolls-Royce.

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Industrial Relations in the U.S. Automobile Industry: An Illustration of Increased Decentralization and Diversity

This paper traces the evolution of employment relations in the u.s. auto industry over the post World War II period with particular emphasis on recent developments. There is a strong movement toward growing variation in employment relations within both the assembly and parts sectors of the auto industry. Variation appears both through the spread of more contingent compensation and team systems of work organization. There is also wide variety across plants and industry segments in basic employment systems including low wage, human resource, Japanese-oriented, andjoint team-based approaches. Declining unionization is a particularly strong influence in the parts sector although nonunion operations have now spread to the assembly sector. While these trends are well illustrated by developments in the auto industry, they are trends common to other parts of the U.S. economy.

From 1946until 1979,the auto industry in the U.S. was on a prosperous growth path, even in the face of the industry's periodic sharp cyclical swings. Over these years domestic production of cars and trucks increased from 5 to 13million vehicles. From 1946 to 1979 the number of production workers grew 20% and periodically fluctuated substantially along with vehicle production. The combination of large vehicle output growth and modest employment growth was due to the significant productivity gains accomplishedby the industry.This productivityand

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output growthhelped produce strong profit figures for the industry and provided support for substantial growth in auto workers' real earnings.

From the end of World War II until the late 1970s, the economic environment of the auto industry was conducive to steady improvements and general stability in labor relations. Three environmental factors were critical - growth in domestic auto sales, a low level of imported vehicle sales, and a high degree of unionization. Yet, in the early 1980s, a labor and management that had grown accustomed to long run growth in total vehicle sales and profits were confrontedby a numberof fundamentalchanges in the auto market.

One important aspect of the change was an increase in international competition in the form of increased vehicle imports. While the level of imports increased steadily during the 1960s and 1970s from a post-war low of 5% in 1955, it surged during the 1980s. The total import share of American new car sales rose from 21.9% in 1979 to 30.7% in 1987, before falling back to 26.4% in 1990.

In the early 1980s American auto makers also confronted sizeable declines in sales induced by a sluggish American economy. From 1979 to 1982 employment in the auto industry (SIC 371) declined by 29.4% (from 990,400 to 699,300). Ford and Chrysler were hardest hit during this downturn. Then in mid 1983, auto sales began to rebound strongly and employment in the industry and the financial status of the auto assemblers markedly improved. By 1985 employment had recovered to 883,500; these numbers reflect not only the recovery of the Big Three but also the strong growth in transplant employment during the early 1980s. Profits also rebounded; in 1983 and 1984, the combined profits of the Big Three (GM, Ford and Chrysler) were, respectively, $6.3 billion and $9.8 billion, and the Big Three continued to be profitable on through the 1990s.

Despite the return to profitability in the mid-1980s, the Big Three faced increasing competition not only from imports but also from the sizeable growth in Japanese transplant auto production. Japanese transplant car sales grew from zero in 1982 to 14.4% of the U.S. market in 1990, with transplant sales projected to rise to a 20% share of the American market by the turn of the century.

When a sluggish economy returned in the early 1990s, it had dramatic effects on both employment and profits among the Big Three. By 1991, auto industry employment was down to 789,000; most ofthis drop reflected job losses for the Big Three, since the transplants continued to bring new capacity on-line during this period. In 1991 financial losses in the core automotive businesses at GM, Ford and Chrysler, respectively were, $5.2 billion, $1.9 billion, and $0.8 billion. GM's losses led to the company's decision to close 22 plants by 1995 and cut white and blue collar employment by 80,000.

Then in 1993 profits rebounded strongly at the Big Three with Chrysler performing particularly favorably. Along with this sales and profit rebound, employment also rebounded, although not as strongly as the auto companies made extensive use of overtime (particularly at Ford and Chrysler) and benefited from productivity improvements. Some good news for American companies came in the early 1990s with a small but significant increase in Big Three market share, to 64.4% in 1992, brought on by sluggish sales of vehicles imported from Japan,

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partly due to an unfavorable exchange rate, and the Big Three's successful unveiling of some popular new products and willingness to show price restraint to gain sales.

Even in the face of periodic profit rebounds, the increase in international and domestic competition led to sizeable declines in employment at the Big Three and VA W membership. From 1978 to 1990, the number of hourly jobs at the Big Three declined by 39% (from 740,000 to 455,000). Meanwhile, UAW membership declined 37% from 1979 to 1990 (from 1,510,000 to 950,000).

In addition to intensified competitive pressures, the economic environment of the U.S. auto assemblers was altered from the 1980s on through the Big Three's decision to forge coproduction agreements with their Japanese counterparts, as noted above. The primary motivation for the U.S. companies was to fill gaps in their product lines, particularly for small cars. Yet, the Big Three have also been influenced, to varying degrees, by the desire to use these co-owned but Japanese-managed plants to experiment with new production systems and to develop demonstration models for their whollyowned plants. The importance of the transplants for industrial relations arises from the fact that they utilize innovative practices in both work organization, employee involvement, and manufacturing practice (discussed below) and that the plants solely built by the Japanese are unorganized.

Also significant for collective bargaining has been the formation of more extensive linkages between the assembler companies and their parts suppliers. Most assemblers dramatically reduced the number of their parts suppliers and initiated longer term contracts with the select group of suppliers that remained. At the same time, they increased the percentage of the parts purchased from non-captive suppliers through increased outsourcing from their wholly-owned 'inside' suppliers. The immediate effect of this trend was to increase the pressure for cost reduction on the parts plants owned by the assemblers, and to reduce union density in the auto parts sector, since the vertically-integrated suppliers are 100% unionized, while the U.S.-owned independent sector is about 50% unionized and the Japanese supplier transplants are nearly 100% non-union. The formation of stronger links across the assembly companies and between assemblers and parts suppliers eventually also may produce complicated problems regarding bargaining structure and union jurisdiction.

As the level of inventory held by the Big Three dropped during the 1980s, the interdependence of assembler and supplier plants increased dramatically, affecting labor"relations in unpredictable ways. For instance, while the lean buffers of Just-In-Time (TIT) provide an incentive for suppliers to avoid labor conflict that might interrupt parts deliveries (and for assemblers to do business with suppliers who can manage labor relations effectively), the greater interdependence between assembly and parts plants also gives a new potential source of strike leverage.

Analysis of the changing nature of employment relations in the U.S. auto industry requires separate consideration of the assembly and independent parts sector as the timing and extent of non-un ion growth differs in the two sectors, although there are commonalities in the pattern of developments across the auto industry. The independent parts sector excludes the assembly and parts operations within the Big Three automobile companies and the auto parts

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production carried out within other companies that include assembly operations (the Japanese and German 'transplant' firms). The Japanese and German transplants have made a significant contribution to the growing variation in employment relations in the U.S. auto industry because the transplants operate on a non-union basis. Furthermore, as described in more detail later, the work practices in the Japanese transplants plants follow a 'Japanese-oriented pattern' and have served as a model for firms in many other industries. The programmatic details of work practice implementation and operation differ significantly across the transplants, contributing another important element to the growing variation in employment relations in the U.S. auto industry.

In the assembly and independent parts sectors, respectively, the diversity in employment relations brought about through the growth of non-union operations is examined first. Then the analysis focuses on the variation that is appearing within the union and non-union sectors.The analysis of with in sector variation (union and non-union) distinguishes between the variation appearing in worker earnings and the variation surfacing in work practices.

One of the key sources of growth in variation in the employment relations in auto assembly plants in the United States has been the growth of non-union auto assembly plants. Until the start-up of Japanese owned transplants, the auto assembly sector had remained one of the key completely unionized sectors in the United States. The assembly plants of the Big Three auto companies had been organized in the late 1930s and 1940s by the VA W. Collective bargaining in the Big Three companies then led to substantial growth in the wages and fringe benefits received by auto workers and established the VA Was one of the most pivotal unions in the country.

The union status of the assembly plants in the Big Three was challenged in the 1970s through GM's southern strategy which entailed the opening of non-union plants in the South. However, by the early 1980s the non-union GM assembly plants in the South were organized, in large part through the automatic ('accretion') procedures the VA Wwon from GM after the union threatened to withdraw from the joint programs that were simultaneously spreading in GM's unionized plants and threatened job actions at GM's other plants if the issue of union recognition was not settled. (Katz, 1985:90).

Wage levels at the transplants vary between 80 to 90% of those at American- owned auto plants. For example, in January 1994 the hourly wage rate for assemblers at the Nissan and Honda transplants were, respectively, $15.08 and $15.65 (while they were $18.03 at General Motors). In March 1996, the hourly wage rate for assemblers at the BMW auto assembly plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina was $17.00 (while it was $18.74 at General 4 Motors ).

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Fabrica de automobile

The small difference in the hourly wage rate at the Nissan and Honda transplants cited above is representative of the fact that wage rates have not varied significantly across the transplants. In the transplants a variety of performance-based pay supplement worker hourly earnings. These supplements generally range on the order of 5 to 20% oftotal worker pay although the form of the performance pay varies across the plants. Toyota's Georgetown

assembly plant, for example, has two bonus systems that supplement hourly earnings. One bonus has been tied to plant performance and has produced flat rate bonus payments that varied between 8 to 12% of workers total hour( e-mings between 1987 and 1994. (Adler 1995: 27; Mishina 1995: 16) Since 1990 at the Georgetown plant there has also been a 'discretionary bonus' paid annually at the discretion ofthe president of the company ranging from $600 per worker in 1991 to $1400 in 1993. At Honda's transplant operations, meanwhile, workers receive semi-annual bonuses that are based in part on the degree to which quality goals for the model year are being achieved. (MacDuffie, forthcoming: 28).

With regard to fringe benefits there are more substantial differences between the compensation package provided to hourly workers in the Big Three plants and the benefits provided in the transplants. The transplants, for example, tend to provide significantly more modest medical insurance and pension plans where the latter often include an individual retirement account or defined contribution plan rather than the more elaborate defined benefit programs found in the Big Three. Howes (1993: 46-50) and Ghilarducci (1991: Table 3, p.l0) find, for example, that pension costs per worker-hour in 1987 were $2.63 and $.95, respectively, at Ford and GM and $.50 and $.43, respectively, at the Honda and Toyota transplants.

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The non-union Japanese transplants lack the formal grievance procedures used in the unionized American-owned auto plants to settle worker complaints and worker-supervisor disputes. In the transplants, supervisors are more active in settling disputes, often through informal channels. (Graham 1995: 108) At some of the Japanese transplants more formal procedures have been established to address worker complaints concerning discharges. At Honda, for example, ajoint (worker and management) peer committee reviews disciplinary discharges and has reversed a high percentage of these discharges (Katz and MacDuffie 1994: 214).

The extent of variation in wages and work practices is even larger in the unionized auto assembly plants. Understanding how variation in earnings and work practices has grown in the unionized Big Three auto assembly plants requires an awareness of the bargaining structure that has guided collective bargaining at the Big Three. In the traditional bargaining structure that prevailed at the Big Three auto companies compensation is set by national company-specific, and multi-year (since 1955they have been three year) agreements. Some work rules such as overtime administration, employee transfer rights, and seniority guidelines are also set in the national contracts. Local unions, in turn, negotiate plant level agreements that supplement the national agreements. These local agreements define work rules such as the form ofthe seniority ladder,job characteristics, job bidding and transfer rights, health and safety standards, production standards, and an array of other rules that guide shop floor production. The local agreements do not regulate either wages or fringe benefits which are set in the national contracts. Some indirect influences on wage determination do occur at the plant level in the definition and modification of

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job classifications provided through the local agreements. Local bargaining over work rules allows for the expression of local preferences and in the face of the extreme economic pressures that confronted many plants from the 1980s on, local bargaining became increasingly important and volatile.

Even greater variation now appears in the work practices used in unionized auto assembly plants. Sizeable variation in employment relations in assem bly plants has occurred as a result of the fact that work rules and work organization have been modified in different ways and at a varied pace across auto assembly plants. The threat of increased employment loss due to either increased foreign sourcing of vehicles, plant closings due to excess capacity, or the out sourcing of certain operations all created pressures to lower costs and improve product quality. Ultimately, the pressure for increased inter-plant work rule divergence came from the same source as the pressure for inter-company pay variation, the fear that even greater losses in employment would result if previous policies were maintained. Companies often used investment decisions as explicit leverage for these changes, in a strategy unions saw as 'whipsawing', i.e. forcing plants to compete against each other through concessions.

Some of these work rule changes involved increases in the 'effort bargain' through a tightening of production standards. Other work rule changes include efforts to lower production costs by increasing the flexibility with which labor is deployed. Common examples of the latter include classification consolidation; limits imposed on job bidding rights; the use of work teams to promote multiskilling through job rotation; and a pushing down of certain responsibilities, such as quality inspection, to production workers on the shop floor.

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At plants that were threatened with imminent closing the work rules were typically changed in a disorganized and ad hoc manner. The presence of excess capacity allowed management to directly pit assembly plants against one another in work rule concession bargaining. This happened frequently from the late 1980sto the early 1990s inGM (and commonly in parts plants across the Big Three as described later). Although the particular work rule changes made in any assembly plant at any particular moment varied widely, the trend across the Big Three companies over the last fifteen years has been to gradually shift from a traditional system of work organization to ajoint team-based approach.

The pace at which this joint team-based approach is spreading in the Big Three varies across the Big Three. General Motors has experimented most extensively with this approach by using initially non-union' Southern strategy' plants as a testing ground for the concept. In the early 1980s General Motors started spreading the team approach in its northern assembly plants, first in new facilities such as the Lake Orion and Hamtramack plants and then in the late 1980s GM management often made the use of a team approach a necessary precondition for the survival of what were then often redundant facilities. Ford and Chrysler were even more gradual in their implementation in the joint team-based approach in part because neither was building new assembly plants in the 1980s and 1990s and thus did not have the opportunity to experiment in greenfield sites, and in part because the GM experience of introducing teams in existing ('brownfield') plants did not always work out so well.

Yet, by the early 1990s even at Ford and Chrysler's assembly plants a joint team-based approach was spreading. Both Ford and Chrysler management began pushing what they referred to as 'modern operating a~reements' (MOA's) which included teams and weakened seniority rights.

At the same time, not all Big Three assembly plants adopted team systems. For example, at GM the Linden, Doraville, and Wilmington assembly plants do not use teams as of early 1997. In a 1994 survey of a number of U.S. auto assembly plants, MacDuffie and Pi! (1995: 10 ) find that one-third of the Big Three assembly plants in their sample use a team system.

Substantial variation also' appears in the programmatic details of how teams and other features of this approach are actually being implemented. In team plants, for example, there is wide variety in the procedures used to select team leaders and the role that hourly team members exert in that selection process. Some team plants use strict seniority rights to determine who serves as the hourly team coordinator while some other teams allow team members to directly elect their team coordinator. While in some other assembly plants there is ajoint labor-management selection committee that screens and interviews candidates for the team coordinator position in a jointly-designed assessment procedure. Meanwhile, other plants (such as GM's Shreveport truck assembly plant) allow the teams to chose the team leader selection procedure and as a result the selection procedure varies by work group across the plant. The procedures used to select team leaders is no incidental matter. This is revealed by the fact that this selection procedure has been a key issue in disputes (some of which have entailed work stoppages) at the Ford-Dearborn and other Big Three assembly plants.

There is also wide variety across plants in the specific duties performed by team members and leaders. In some plants team members have the authority to directly contact and visit parts vendors to resolve production problems. A number of plants have put hourly workers on scrap

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and quality control tasks forces and freed workers from assembly line responsibilities to give them the time to carry out new duties.16Pay-for-knowledge has been adopted along with teams insome plants to encourage workers to learn more jobs in their work area and in the process become more capable of understanding the linkages between jobs in and across work teams. The presence and form of pay-for-knowledge varies across plants which as noted earlier, provides a source of earnings variation across plants in contrast to the traditional work system that served to dampen such variation. Thus assembly plants of the Big Three differ in terms of whether they use the traditional or ajoint team-based work system and there is much variation across team plants in terms of the specific way that teams are being introduced.

Team systems have led to increased variation in work organization and work practices across auto plants through their operation as well as a result of the varying structure of team administration. The purpose of team meetings is to have workers directly address production problems as they arise and in the process have workers provide input into plant operations in order to settle problems or avoid them in the first place. This process produces variety in plant operations as workers in one team adopt work modes that either suit their preferences or respond to a particular problem in a manner that differs from the way that workers inother teams (or workers who reside in a plant that does not use teams) carry out their work.

Along with the variation produced by team systems there is wide variation appearing across assembly plants in the role that workers play in business decisions. The existence of teams work organization is part of a deepening of worker involvement in business decisions. Yet, in many other ways not directly linked to teams per se, there is wide variety appearing in the role that workers and union officials are playing in plant operations. In broad terms there is a blurring occurring in the roles that workers and managers exercise in the plants. This blurring occurs, for example, when workers serve on a task force to solve a specific production problem and it also occurs when workers become part of in-sourcing, quality, scrap and the many other sorts of joint committees that are now typically a key part of each plant's administrative structure. In a number of Big Three assembly plants union officers now meet regularly with plant managers as business issues or crises arise, in some cases this participation extends to involvement in the preparation of a plant's long term business plans.

The broader involvement of workers and union officers in plant affairs has been spurred by a decentralization occurring within the ranks of management. As the negotiation of work practice change has intensified at the plant level and in the face of wide plant-level (and within-plant) variations that have appeared as a consequence of these negotiations, in unionized settings the influence of plant level industrial relations or employee relations managers has increased relative to their corporate counterparts. In addition, the involvement of operating managers (such as production managers or production superintendents) in employee relations matters has increased in part through the reduced role that the formal grievance procedure is playing in conflict resolution and the increasing role of informal discussions held between operating managers and workers (and union officers). Some of these discussions arise out of the natural operation of teams, while others occur as result of the broader roles workers are playing in problem solving forums or through the activities of the various joint committees operating on the shop floor.

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In some plants a formal 'area' management structure is spurring the decentralization of industrial relations down to the shop floor. In these plants typically three or four key operational areas are designated and reporting lines are adjusted to fit these areas rather than the traditional plant hierarchy. In the traditional management structure labor relations staff report upward to the plant industrial relations (or personnel) director and not to an operating manager. In an area management structure, in contrast, the employee relations support staff report directly to an area operating manager and report in a matrix manner to an employee relations (or industrial relations) director. Area management represents a business-unit style of operation at the plant level and is intended to bring an awareness and responsiveness to cost and profit pressures down to the work area. This concept, used in plants such as Chrysler's Jefferson Avenue assembly plant, is leading to a reorganization of the employee relations function within management as well as a broader involvement of workers and union officers in plant operations.

The purpose of area management is to have the operations leaders of the work area take on more direct responsibility for employee relations issues and also have the employee relations staff learn about and respond more directly to business needs. In the process the staff function of industrial relations is being shifted downward inside the plant and also being diffused to operating managers who traditionally did not get directly involved in employee relations matters.

With this shift to area management and other more informal changes, management faces a number of human resource issues such as how to reshape reporting and training lines accordingly. For instance, the career development of industrial relations staff (and that of operating managers) has to be reshaped to accommodate the fact that industrial relations staff now are required to interact more extensively with operating managers and less often with higher level staff within their own functional area.

The most extensive decentralization of employment relations in a Big Three assembly plant (and perhaps the most extensive anywhere) occurs at the Saturn Corporation. Notably, this decentralization has led to extensive involvement by workers and union representatives in business issues at Saturn. The organizational structure of Saturn includes a number of committees, each of which includes worker or union representation. (Rubenstein, Bennett, and Kochan, 1992) At the shop floor level there are work units made up of 6 to 15 workers and a single production worker classification. Work units participate as a problem solving group and make decisions concerning job assignments, job rotation, overtime, and recruitment. Workers perform a variety of job tasks in their work area and also perform some of the planning and control tasks traditionally carried out by supervisors. At the top level of Saturn is a 'strategic advisory committee that engages in long run business planning and includes the president of the VA W local union.

One ofthe most novel aspects of shop floor industrial relations at Saturn derives from the fact that the VA Wcontract governing the Saturn complex has no local seniority agreement. Thus, there is no formal role for seniority in matters such as job assignments, job bidding, overtime, and shift assignments. Most ofthese decisions are made informally by the work units (i.e., by workers themselves). Perhaps most revolutionary is the presence of union and management 'partners' who co-manage decisions within the Saturn complex. Although the union does not have a formal place on the GM Board of Directors which makes the ultimate decisions concerning Saturn's investments, products, and pricing, the strong role played by union partners

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at Saturn gives the union a level of involvement in decision making that is unparalleled in contemporary American industrial relations.

In a number of ways Saturn provides an extreme example of the work practices found in thejoint team-based approach. Compared to Saturn, most auto plants (and plants in other industries as well) have less dramatically meshed worker and manager roles. At the same time the existence of Saturn, and the fact that other plants have in their own ways restructured work and labor and management roles, adds to the rich nature of the variety found across joint team-based plants.

Technology, managers' efforts to preserve their own role and control, and other factors still constrain the options available to workers and unions. Nevertheless, the spread of teams and other forms of participatory work reorganization are producing a significant increase in variation in work practices particularly where teams and the like are being linked to a decentralization within management structures.

Variation in employment relations has increased in the auto parts sector in general terms in a manner similar to developments in the assembly sector. At the same time, a number offactors differ in these two sectors, in part due to differences in the timing and intensity of non-union employment growth. The 'internal' parts operations of GM, Ford, and Chrysler are the largest producers in the auto parts industry accounting for approximately 60% of the shipments in the motor vehicle parts and accessories industry. The internal parts plants follow the same bargaining structure as the assembly plants and nearly all are covered by the master company agreements negotiated between the Big Three companies and the VA W.18Since they are covered by company-wide collective bargaining agreements, wage rates and fringe benefits at the internal parts plants are identical to those at the Big Three assembly plants.

In recent years Big Three company negotiators have frequently complained about the competitive pressures confronting the internal parts plants and have expressed the desire to create separate lower tier pay rates for the internal parts operations. The VA W has successfully resisted these demands, but the union has been less successful in constraining the outsourcing of parts production and the negotiation of work rule concessions. In line with the Big Three-VAWbargaining structure, there are separate local (often plant) agreements at the internal parts operations and from the early I980s on there were major concessions negotiated in the work practices at the internal parts plants.

Since the growth of non-union competition has become such a significant factor in the auto parts industry, it is worth examining how non-union growth has occurred. The' independent' parts companies, companies that produce auto parts but do not assemble those parts into final vehicles, were heavily, although never completely, organized with a lag behind the unionization of the Big Three.19 The percentage of the supplier plants with a majority of their workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement rose from 50-55% in 1940 to 95% in 1957 and unionization then produced a substantial rise in the earnings of organized workers. Mean earnings in the supplier firms relative to earnings in assembly firms rose from 87.5% to 95.3% from 1940 to 1957. (Katz 1987).

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Union coverage in the independent parts plants fell substantially from the mid 1970s on as illustrated by the figures in Table 3. The fall in unionization was a major cause of the decline in the earnings of workers in the independent parts firms relative to the earnings of workers in auto assembly plants. And have beenmuch larger in small firms. These earnings declines are probably linked to the fact that unionization declines were particularly large in small auto supplier firms. Many of the small parts finns pursued an employment relations strategy which entailed either low wage or bureaucratic non-union employment practices.

The push for concessions at the independent parts firms from the early 1980s on was exacerbated by the fact that independent parts firms faced all the pressures that were impinging on the auto assemblers, lacked the financial resources of the assemblers, and faced more substantial growth in low wage domestic non-union competitors. Even in the face of a set of common pressures, substantial diversity emerged in the employment relations strategies pursued by independent parts firms, diversity influenced by business and union strategies and the degree to which new investments, or the lack thereof, gave management an interest in work reorganization and/orbargaining leverage.

The local branches of the UAW have ended up with a lot of discretion regarding workplace issues. This is spurring experimentation and variety in local work rule changes. Yet, the absence of forceful national coordination of work rule bargaining also opens the door to managerial-led whipsawing in which plants are played off against one another in survival contests when the presence of excess capacity and production cutbacks shifts bargaining power to management.

Management typically initiates the workplace changes discussed in this chapter in an effort to improve costs, quality, and production flexibility in their plants. Data from assembly plants suggests that on average Japaneseoriented work practices have led to improvements in production costs and product quality. (MacDuffie 1995)Yet, there are a number of U.S. assembly plants that have attained relatively favorable production costs without resorting to such methods. (Babson 1995) These plants have retained many traditional work and industrial relations practices, but have modified those practices incrementally by gradually increasing, through informal channels, the amount of worker (and union) involvement in plant operations. In some cases increased worker input has come in these plants through the heightened use of existing suggestion programs. In these' incrementalist' plants job classifications have often been simplified and reduced although not through the introduction of team methods. Cost improvements also have come in the incrementalist plants (as in the Japanese-oriented plants) through changes in management methods that reduce the number of parts and simplify the assembly process as well as through improvements in technology (the same is true for plants that radically restructured work organization).

The successes achieved in plants that adopted at incremental approach to work restructuring have created doubts within the ranks of both managers and union officers as to whether more extreme work practices changes are necessary in order to maintain profitability and employment. (Lee 1996) These doubts have been enhanced by the fact that more radical work practice reform efforts did not always work out well in the auto assembly sector. Research suggests, for example, that the introduction offormal team systems in GM assembly plants in the early and mid 1980s led to deteriorations, and not the expected improvements, in productivity on

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average even though there were a few assembly plants in GM where team systems did lead to substantial performance improvements. (Katz, Kochan, and Keefe 1987) The inability of teams to always improve productivity may have been associated with the fact that team plants did not in all cases lead to substantive increases in worker involvement in decision making and workers and unions in many of the plants resented that they had agreed to introduce teams only as a result of managements' threats to otherwise close the plant. Incrementalism in changing employment relations also was promoted by the fact that the financial success of Ford in the late 1980s and Chrysler in the early 1990s seems to have rest primarily on successful product design and not as a result of particularly successful work practice initiatives.

Thus, managers and unionists were not convinced by the mid 1990s that work practice initiatives were essential for financial success and they were confused as to whether and how changes in work practices would affect economic performance. The presence of this confusion helps explain why there has been (and continues to be) so much variation in the workplace initiatives being pushed by management. Given that corporate (and central union) officials are uncertain of the advantages of a particular work practice, the initiative for change is typically left up to plant-level actors. This shifts the locus for change to the plant level.

Overall, management benefited greatly from the shift toward locallydriven workplace initiatives as these initiatives have led to lower costs and improved product quality, even in the face of the parties' confusion regarding the sources of improvements. Yet, when demand for Big Three products improved and capacity constraints tightened in the early 1990s, at some plants management lost its bargaining leverage and localized bargaining turned back into a process of union-led whipsawing. This was well illustrated by events in the early and mid 1990s at GM when the VA W conducted a series of strikes at parts plants. A strike at the Dayton brake plant of GM in the spring of 1996 was the most well publicized ofthese strikes as it led to the closure of nearly all ofGM's assembly plants. The specific issue that precipitated each of these strikes varied, but the common thrust of these strikes was efforts by the UAW to acquire more extensive employment security guarantees at the plant level.

Variation in employment relations is growing in the United States as a product of the growth in non-union employment and the existence of a variety of union and non-union employment patterns. Similar trends are apparent in other parts of the U.S. economy (and in other industrialized economies). (Darbishire and Katz, 1997) The auto industry is distinguished by their high levels of union representation (which as elsewhere are declining) but not by the processes through which variation in employment relations is appearing. The breakdown of pattern bargaining across firms and industries in the union sector, and the spread of contingent forms of pay and associated greater reliance on individualized rewards are all contributing to increased variation in pay. These changes in pay practices have contributed to the unusually large increases in income inequality in the United States. (see Oarbishire and Katz, 1997).

While team systems have spread and operate as a critical part of the sophisticated HRM and joint team-based patterns, more traditional forms of work organization continue in firms following the low wage, bureaucratic, and New Deal employment patterns. Meanwhile, work practices variation is being spurred by a decentralization in managerial and corporate structures. Management is eager to pursue this decentralization and link it to more direct involvement ofthe workforce in business decisions and new communication strategies. However, in union settings

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when bargaining power has shifted back towards labor's advantage, decentralization has not so clearly worked to management's advantage. Furthermore, the labor movement has occasionally been able to use decentralized bargaining to whipsaw management, more often than not, union weakness has been both a precondition and consequence of collective bargaining decentralization. Decentralization, more direct management-employee communication, and increased employee (and union) involvement in business decisions thus all have contributed to the wide variation appearing in work practices.

No one employment pattern is dominating in the United States, in part because management is unsure of the performance advantages of the various employment patterns. Management's indecisiveness has been fueled by the mixed objective evidence regarding performance effects and the fact that the effects of employment practices seem to be linked so closely to business (and labor) strategies. What is most striking about U.S. developments is the wide variation appearing within and across employment patterns and the auto industry provides a clear illustration of this growing variation.

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