Интеллектуальная собственность и развитие общества: время прагматики 2013 Светлана Авдашева Рошель Дрейфусс Игорь Дроздов Алексей Иванов Полина Крючкова Янис Лианос Сергей Плаксин Андрей Шаститко Авторы исследовАния «Глобализация – это один из важнейших вопросов сегодняшнего дня, и интеллектуальная собственность – один из важнейших вопросов глобализации, особенно учитывая, что мир движется в направлении экономики знания. То, как мы регулируем и управляем процессами создания и доступа к знаниям, имеет центральное значение для успешного функционирования новой экономики, экономики знания, и распределения выгод от ее работы. На кону – вопросы распределения благ и эффективности». Джозеф Стиглиц Лауреат Нобелевской премии по экономике
6. 5Intellectual Property and Development: Time for Pragmatism
| 2013I. ..........................9 1.
.......................................................................................................10
1.1.
.....................................................................................................11
1.2.
..................................................................................................................17
1.3. :
...................................................................................................19
1.4. ; ,
............................................................................................................................22
1.5.,
.......................................................................24
1.6. ........................26 2.
................................................................ 30
2.1. :
..........................................................................................32
2.2. ? ................................ 34 2.3.
.....................................................................................................36
2.4.
......................................................................37
2.5. ...............40 2.6. .............41
.......................................................................................................................................
43II. :
.........................................................................................................51
1.
....................................................................................................................53
2.-
................................................................58
3. (
)..........................................................................................................................................
64
........................................................................................................................................76III.
: ..............................................................79:
: ....................................................81New
challenges in the intersection of intellectual property rightswith
competition law a view from Europe and the United States ( )
........................ 88I. Introduction
...............................................................................................................................................................................
90II. The interaction between horizontal IP rules and sector
specific IP
regimes......................................................... 96
A. Validity
................................................................................................................................................................................98
1. Patentable subject
matter......................................................................................................................................................98
2. Novelty
..............................................................................................................................................................................100
3. Nonobviousness (inventive step)
........................................................................................................................................100
4. Utility (industrial application)
...............................................................................................................................................101
7. 6 : | 2013 5. Disclosure (specification) and
claiming...............................................................................................................................101
B.
Infringement..............................................................................................................................................................................102
1. Claim
interpretation..............................................................................................................................................................102
a. Literal
Infringement..........................................................................................................................................................103
b. Infringement under the Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE)
................................................................................................103
c. The Reverse Doctrine of
Equivalents.............................................................................................................................104
2. Parties to
Infringement.........................................................................................................................................................104
C. Defenses to
Infringement........................................................................................................................................................105
1. Socially significant
uses.......................................................................................................................................................105
a.
Research..........................................................................................................................................................................105
b.
Diagnostics......................................................................................................................................................................106
c. Supplying the
market......................................................................................................................................................106
d.
Working............................................................................................................................................................................106
2. Government
use...................................................................................................................................................................106
3. Prior
users.............................................................................................................................................................................106
4. Bad acts
..............................................................................................................................................................................107
D. Remedies
..............................................................................................................................................................................107
1. Injunctive
Relief.....................................................................................................................................................................107
2. Monetary
damages..............................................................................................................................................................107
3. Border
actions......................................................................................................................................................................108
E. Government funded
inventions...............................................................................................................................................108
III. Competition
law.................................................................................................................................................................110
A. Legal framework and goals of competition
law.....................................................................................................................112
B. The intersection between competition law and intellectual
property:
principles................................................................115
1. The thesis of a unified field and the persistence of
conflicts..........................................................................................115
a. Competition law, IP rights and the common objective of economic
welfare..............................................................115
b. Intellectual property, competition and cumulative
innovation......................................................................................116
c. Exclusionary theories of anticompetitive effects and
intellectual property
rights......................................................117 (i)
The leverage
theory....................................................................................................................................................117
(ii) The essential facilities
doctrine.................................................................................................................................117
(iii) Raising rivals
costs..................................................................................................................................................118
(iv) Maintenance to
monopoly.......................................................................................................................................118
2. The focus on static allocative efficiency analysis in
competition
law...............................................................................119
a. IP rights are not
monopolies...........................................................................................................................................119
b. The property rights character of IP rights should nevertheless
not provide competition law immunity..................120 3.
Standards for the interaction between competition law and IP
rights.............................................................................121
a. Formalistic standards for the IP/Competition Law
interface........................................................................................122
(i) Standards focusing on the scope or value of the IP
right.......................................................................................122
(ii) Standards focusing on the intent of the IP
holder...................................................................................................125
b. Economic balancing
tests..............................................................................................................................................125
c. Competition law and the turn to dynamic
analysis.......................................................................................................129
(i) Dynamic competition as a criterion of competition law
analysis.........................................................................129
(ii) Technology and innovation markets in US and EU competition
law.....................................................................131
(iii) Dynamic analysis in the context of competition law assessment
in merger control and antitrust.....................132 d. The need
to apply an overall decision theory
framework.........................................................................................134
C. Illustrations of the interaction between competition law and IP
rights: a comparative EU/US perspective.....................136 1.
The Patenting Process and Unreasonable Patent
Exclusions..........................................................................................136
a. Refusal to
license............................................................................................................................................................136
b. Anticompetitive abuses of the IP
system.......................................................................................................................139
2. The Innovation
Commons.................................................................................................................................................141
a. Patent pools and cross
licensing...................................................................................................................................142
b. Standard setting and other forms of technology
sharing.............................................................................................144
8. 7Intellectual Property and Development: Time for Pragmatism
| 2013 c. (F)RAND licensing
obligations........................................................................................................................................146
d. Price fixing and horizontal market
restraints.................................................................................................................147
e. Joint
ventures...................................................................................................................................................................148
3. Tying and
Interoperability.....................................................................................................................................................148
a. Patent
ties........................................................................................................................................................................148
b. Technological
tying.........................................................................................................................................................150
c. Package
licensing............................................................................................................................................................150
4. Pricing IP rights and competition
law..................................................................................................................................151
a. Royalty stacking, excessive royalties and price
discrimination...................................................................................151
b. Post-sale restraints on IP
distribution............................................................................................................................155
(i) Resale price maintenance of IP protected
goods....................................................................................................155
(ii) Vertical territorial
limitations......................................................................................................................................155
(iii) Vertical customer restrictions and field of use
restrictions....................................................................................155
5. IP settlements and competition
law....................................................................................................................................156
IV. Exhaustion (first
sale).......................................................................................................................................................160
V. Governance
issues............................................................................................................................................................166
A. Improving the Governance of the Intellectual Property
System...........................................................................................168
1. The role of the
USPTO.........................................................................................................................................................168
2. The Role of the
Courts.........................................................................................................................................................169
B. Improving the interaction between competition law and IP
law...........................................................................................170
VI.
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................................................................174
Table of legislation &
bibliography...............................................................................................................................................180
9. 9Intellectual Property and Development: Time for Pragmatism
| 2013
27. 27Intellectual Property and Development: Time for
Pragmatism | 2013 1 : - - (, -); - - ex ante , - - - ; - - - ex
ante,,, - - - , - - - exante - ex ante -,,- -() - ex post , - ex
ante ; - - - - ; - ex ante - - ,, - ex ante,- ; - - - () ex post -
-- - - - - ex ante; ex post - ()- - -ex ante; .: [WIPO 2011,
p.85]
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53. 55Intellectual Property and Development: Time for
Pragmatism | 2013 1. , , , . ( ) , , , 1902 .: - , - , , - , ,, ()
2. , , , , , , () . , 1902 . - . , . 1272 - , , - , - - . , , - , .
, - , - , . , , -1 .: Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton
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Duotal. . : Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports andInternational
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theInternational Association for the Advancement of Teaching and
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Geneva (July 7 to 9,1999). URL:
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, , - , - .- - : ( ), ( - ) . - - - , - - 3. - . - , . - - . , - ,
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54. 56 : | 2013 , - 1. , , , - . - , , , - - . , - , , - , 2. ,
- - -, . , - - XVII . , , - , , - , -, - 3. 1 The Constitution
describes the nature of American copyright law byproviding Congress
with the power to secur[e] to [a]uthors for limited [t]imes the
exclusive [r]ight to their [w]ritings. Art. I, 8, cl. 8. The
Founders,too, discussed the need to grant an author a limited right
to excludecompetition. But the Constitutions language nowhere
suggeststhat its limited exclusive right should include a right to
divide markets ora concomitant right to charge different purchasers
different prices for thesame book, say to increase or to maximize
gain. Neither, to our knowledge,did any Founder make any such
suggestion. We have found no precedentsuggesting a legal preference
for interpretations of copyright statutes thatwould provide for
market divisions. To the contrary, Congress enacteda copyright law
that (through the first sale doctrine) limits copyrightholders
ability to divide domestic markets. And that limitation is
consistentwith antitrust laws that ordinarily forbid market
divisions. Ibid, P. 3132.2 , : The common-law firstsale doctrine,
which has an impeccable historic pedigree, makes nogeographical
distinctions. Ibid, Syllabus, P. 3.3 In the early 17th century Lord
Coke explained the common laws refusal topermit restraints on the
alienation of chattels. Lord Coke wrote: [If] aman be possessed of
a horse, or of any other chattel and give or sell hiswhole interest
therein upon condition that the Donee or Vendee shall notalien[ate]
the same, the [condition] is voi[d], because his whole interest
isout of him, so as he hath no possibilit[y] of a Reverter, and it
is against Tradeand Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting
betwee[n] man and man: and itis within the reason of our Author
that it should ouster him of all power givento him. Ibid, P.17. , ,
- - , , 4. , - - , . - - - , - . , , - , , - 5. , , - . , , - , -
6. , - , - - , 7. , , .4 A law that permits a copyright holder to
control the resale or otherdisposition of a chattel once sold is
similarly against Trade and Traffi[c],and bargaining and
contracting. Ibid, P.175 I would resist a holding out of accord
with the firm position the UnitedStates has taken on exhaustion in
international negotiations. Ibid,Dissenting Opinion, P. 226 Because
economic conditions and demand for particular goods varyacross the
globe, copyright owners have a financial incentive to
chargedifferent prices for copies of their works in different
geographic regions.Their ability to engage in such price
discrimination, however, is under-mined if arbitrageurs are
permitted to import copies from low-price regionsand sell them in
high-price regions. Ibid, Dissenting Opinion, P.2.7 Weighing the
competing policy concerns, our Government reached theconclusion
that widespread adoption of the international-exhaustionframework
would be inconsistent with the long-term economic interests ofthe
United States. Ibid, Dissenting Opinion, P.20
55. 57Intellectual Property and Development: Time for
Pragmatism | 2013 . , . , - , : - - , , - , 1. , , , . - - - , - .
- - ,.. -.1 While the Government has urged our trading partners to
refrain fromadopting international-exhaustion regimes that could
benefit consumerswithin their borders but would impact adversely on
intellectual-propertyproducers in the United States, the Court
embraces an international-exhaustion rule that could benefit U.S.
consumers but would likelydisadvantage foreign holders of U.S.
copyrights. Ibid, Dissenting Opinion,P.20
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The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for
theControl of Restrictive Business Practices (first adopted by the
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