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http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/06/04/why-reparations-for-slavery-could-help-boost-the-economy/

http://academic.udayton.edu/race/02rights/repara28.htm

Sam Natbony - Ilaw ACRam - AEC & AFCEmily - Deontology (#swag)

Eric - Deontology (#swag)

I'm looking for stuff about how a) theoretical knowledge constrains the ends wecan set--not the ends we think we can achieve, the ends we can in the first place set. b) how agents ought to decide which incompatible end to pursue and c)

So if our practical reason is influenced by our theoretical knowledge of the means at our disposal, is it possible that we can no longer intend to do somethingonce we know we aren't capable of bringing it about?

Then from that, is it a defensible position that the state willing compatible ends entails that it can't will multiple actions if doing so means it doesn't havethe ability to successfully carry them all out?

Reparations as an action rather than a generic aim of the will

Sebastian Rodl Kant Ought implies Can

Will an infinite array of actionsActions that you can't will unless you have the capacity to carry them out seemingly reparations has an inbuilt temporal limit. Rodl perspective has a finite end instead of an infinite end.

More strictly normative perspective and argue that the other ends are obligatoryends Duties of corrective justice shouldn't be carried out in the event of thembeing incompa

Different in the sense that it's not a biological being and it has fewer constitutive purposes. Other than that, no, because the Kantian arguments are so abstract they are meant to apply to any creature with a will.

If the claim is true about the nature of rpactical reason

The state does engage in practical thought because it takes

The argument I'm trying to make is the state has other obligations that arise from its duty to maintain the system of equal freedom--e.g. national defense or public health I think are two examples Ripstein makes--so it has to will other end

s that are compatible with those ends it already wills.

You don't need to worry about what the agent believes. There's no way to do it or it would conflict with other ends

Is there a difference between an end the agent is already willing and another end that would be incompatible with it?

Yeah you can change your mind

8/11/2019 Maiello Link

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It might be a sort of counteradvocacy against deontological affs--a PIC I guess?The problem would be determining how expensive is too expensive.

Tradeoff DA Reparations will be too expensiveA bunch of mix & match deont arguments and then the frontlines. You don't have aright to means that don't belong to you.

Must spec spendingCP - Do lessput the framework under the net benefit part of the CPaff case

On aff yeah you have to build up the framework. The part of the wayh you're building it up against the aff. Should be considerably shorter

Not reparations that you're advocating. Reparations requires actual reparationsof your harms but it's a bad argument

CP: If they have utilitarian arguments. Intention of corrective justice

Notice that your arguments involve ontology and epistemology as well

What exists are agents and e unfold the metaphysics of agency

Ontology first doesn't matter so long as you explain that your argmmetns are metaphysical and ontological

Our beliefs ahave nothing to do with believing things

The biggest hurdle typically is read a little bit of the stuff until you realizeit's bush league philosophy.

Corrective justice is heavily discussed in the private law ofWhether those go endlessly back into the past

I don't think there's a discussion in Ripstein. It might be worth looking